is
is,
APPENDIX
525
senate, b no doubt evident from the treaty with the community of Astypalaea ( Corp.
is,
APPENDIX
525
senate, b no doubt evident from the treaty with the community of Astypalaea ( Corp.
The history of Rome; tr. with the sanction of the ... v.2. Mommsen, Theodor, 1817-1903
The royal domains and
chaf. x THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR
509
royalties were not granted to the confederacies, and these
were specially prohibited from working the gold and silver mines, a chief source of the national wealth ; but in 596 158. they were again permitted to work at least the silver- mines. 1 The import of salt, and the export of timber
for shipbuilding, were prohibited. The land-tax hitherto
paid to the king ceased, and the confederacies and com munities were left to tax themselves ; but these had to pay
to Rome half of the former land-tax, according to a rate fixed once for all, amounting in all to 100 talents annually
The whole land was for ever disarmed, and the fortress of Demetrias was razed ; on the northern frontier alone a chain of posts was to be retained to guard
against the incursions of the barbarians. Of the arms given up, the copper shields were sent to Rome, and the rest were burnt
The Romans gained their object The Macedonian land still on two occasions took up arms at the call of princes of the old reigning house ; but otherwise from that time to the present day it has remained without a history.
(^24,000). *
Illyria was treated in a similar way. The kingdom of
Genthius was split up into three small free states. There broken UP» too the freeholders paid the half of the former land-tax to
1 The statement of Cassiodorus, that the Macedonian mines were
reopened in 596, receives its more exact interpretation by means of the 158. coins. No gold coins of the four Macedonias are extant ; either there
fore the gold - mines remained closed, or the gold extracted was converted
into bars. On the other hand there certainly exist silver coins of Ma
cedonia prima (Amphipolis) in which district the silver- mines were
situated. For the brief period, during which they must have been struck (596-608), the number of them is remarkably great, and proves either 158-148. that the mines were very energetically worked, or that the old royal money
was recoined in large quantity.
1 The statement that the Macedonian commonwealth was " relieved of seignorial imposts and taxes" by the Romans (Polyb. xxxvii. 4) does not necessarily require us to assume a subsequent remission of these taxes : it is sufficient, for the explanation of Polybius' words, to assume that the hitherto seignorial tax now became a public one. The continuance of the constitution granted to the province of Macedonia by Paullus down to at least the Augustan age (Liv. xlv. 32 ; Justin, xxxiii. a), would, it is true, be compatible also with the remission of the taxes.
iiiyria
Coqn.
Humilia
their new masters, with the exception of the towns, which had adhered to Rome and in return obtained exemption from land-tax—an exception, which there was no oppor tunity to make in the case of Macedonia. The Illyrian piratic fleet was confiscated, and presented to the more reputable Greek communities along that coast. The constant annoyances, which the Illyrians inflicted on the neighbours by their corsairs, were in this way put an end to, at least for a lengthened period.
Cotys in Thrace, who was difficult to be reached and might conveniently be used against Eumenes, obtained pardon and received back his captive son.
Thus the affairs of the north were settled, and Macedonia also was at last released from the yoke of monarchy —in fact Greece was more free than ever; a king no longer existed anywhere.
But the Romans did not confine themselves to cutting
5io
THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR
tion of the the nerves and sinews of Macedonia. The senate resolved Greeks in
general
Course pursued with Pergamus.
at once to render all the Hellenic states, friend and foe, for ever incapable of harm, and to reduce all of them alike to the same humble clientship. The course pursued may itself admit of justification ; but the mode in which it was carried out in the case of the more powerful of the Greek client-states was unworthy of a great power, and showed that the epoch of the Fabii and the Scipios was at an end.
The state most affected by this change in the position of parties was the kingdom of the Attalids, which had been created and fostered by Rome to keep Macedonia in check, and which now, after the destruction of Macedonia, was forsooth no longer needed. It was not easy to find a tolerable pretext for depriving the prudent and considerate Eumenes of his privileged position, and allowing him to fall into disfavour. All at once, about the time when the Romans were encamped at Heracleum, strange reports were circulated regarding him — that he was in secret intercourse
clAP. x VliE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR
511
with Perstuj; that his fleet had been suddenly, as it were, wafted away ; that 500 talents had been offered for his non- participation in the campaign and 1500 for his mediation
to procure peace, and that the agreement had only broken down through the avarice of Perseus. As to the Pergamene fleet, the king, after having paid his respects to the consul,
went home with it at the same time that the Roman fleet went into winter quarters. The story about corruption was
as certainly a fable as any newspaper canard of the present
day ; for that the rich, cunning, and consistent Attalid, who
had primarily occasioned the breach between Rome and Macedonia by his journey in 582 and had been on that XIX
account wellnigh assassinated by the banditti of Perseus, should —at the moment when the real difficulties of a war, of whose final issue, moreover, he could never have had any serious doubt, were overcome — have sold to the instigator of the murder his share in the spoil for a few talents, and should have perilled the work of long years for so pitiful a consideration, may be set down not merely as a fabrication, but as a very silly one. That no proof was found either in the papers of Perseus or elsewhere, is sufficiently certain ; for even the Romans did not venture to express those suspicions aloud. But they gained their object Their wishes appeared in the behaviour of the Roman grandees towards Attalus, the brother of Eumenes, who had commanded the Pergamene auxiliary troops in Greece.
Their brave and faithful comrade was received in Rome with open arms and invited to ask not for his brother, but for himself — the senate would be glad to give him a kingdom of his own. Attalus asked nothing but Aenus and Maronea. The senate thought that this was only a preliminary request, and granted it with great politeness. But when he took his departure without having made any further demands, and the senate came to perceive that the reigning family in Pergamus did not live on such terms with each other as
Sia
THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR book iii
were customary in princely houses, Aenus and Maronea were declared free cities. The Pergamenes obtained not a foot's breadth of territory out of the spoil of Macedonia ; if after the victory over Antiochus the Romans had still saved forms as respected Philip, they were now disposed to hurt and to humiliate. About this time the senate appears to have declared Pamphylia, for the possession of which Eumenes and Antiochus had hitherto contended, inde pendent What was of more importance, the Galatians — who had been substantially in the power of Eumenes, ever since he had expelled the king of Pontus by force of arms from Galatia and had on making peace extorted from him the promise that he would maintain no further communi cation with the Galatian princes — now, reckoning beyond doubt on the variance that had taken place between Eumenes and the Romans, if not directly instigated by the latter, rose against Eumenes, overran his kingdom, and brought him into great danger. Eumenes besought the mediation of the Romans ; the Roman envoy declared his readiness to mediate, but thought it better that Attalus, who commanded the Pergamene army, should not accompany him lest the barbarians might be put into ill humour. Singularly enough, he accomplished nothing ; in fact, he told on his return that his mediation had only
exasperated the barbarians. No long time elapsed before the independence of the Galatians was expressly recognized and guaranteed by the senate. Eumenes determined to proceed to Rome in person, and to plead his cause in the senate. But the latter, as if troubled by an evil conscience, suddenly decreed that in future kings should not be allowed to come to Rome ; and despatched a quaestor to meet him at Brundisium, to lay before him this decree of the senate, to ask him what he wanted, and to hint to him that they
would be glad to see his speedy departure. The king was long silent ; at length he said that he desired nothing
chap, x THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR
513
farther, and re-embarked. He saw how matters stood : the epoch of half-powerful and half-free alliance was at an end ; that of impotent subjection began.
Similar treatment befell the Rhodians. They had a HumiU»- singularly privileged position : their relation to Rome Rhodes assumed the form not of symmachy properly so called, but
of friendly equality ; it did not prevent them from enter
ing into alliances of any kind, and did not compel them to supply the Romans with a contingent on demand. This
very circumstance was presumably the real reason why their good understanding with Rome had already for some time been impaired. The first dissensions with Rome had arisen in consequence of the rising of the Lycians, who
were handed over to Rhodes after the defeat of Antiochus, against their oppressors who had (576) cruelly reduced 178. them to slavery as revolted subjects ; the Lycians, however, asserted that they were not subjects but allies of the Rhodians, and prevailed with this plea in the Roman senate, which was invited to settle the doubtful meaning of
the instrument of peace. But in this result a justifiable sympathy with the victims of grievous oppression had perhaps the chief share ; at least nothing further was done on the part of the Romans, who left this as well as other Hellenic quarrels to take their course. When the war with Perseus broke out, the Rhodians, like all other sensible Greeks, viewed it with regret, and blamed Eumenes in par ticular as the instigator of so that his festal embassy was not even permitted to be present at the festival of Helios in Rhodes. But this did not prevent them from adhering to Rome and keeping the Macedonian party, which existed
Rhodes as well as everywhere else, aloof from the helm
of affairs. The permission given to them in 585 to export 169. grain from Sicily shows the continuance of the good under standing with Rome. All of sudden, shortly before the battle of Pydna, Rhodian envoys appeared at the Roman
VOL. II
65
a
in
it,
5M
THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR book lit
headquarters and in the Roman senate, announcing that the Rhodians would no longer tolerate this war which was injurious to their Macedonian traffic and their revenue from port-dues, that they were disposed themselves to declare war against the party which should refuse to make peace, and that with this view they had already concluded an alliance with Crete and with the Asiatic cities. Many caprices are possible in a republic governed by primary
assemblies; but this insane intervention of a commercial
city — which can only have
of the pass of Tempe was known at Rhodes — requires special explanation. The key to it is furnished by the well-attested account that the consul Quintus Marcius, that master of the " new-fashioned diplomacy," had in the camp at Heracleum (and therefore after the occupation of the pass of Tempe) loaded the Rhodian envoy Agepolis with civilities and made an underhand request to him to mediate a peace. Republican wrongheadedness and vanity did the rest ; the Rhodians fancied that the Romans had given themselves up as lost ; they were eager to play the part of mediator among four great powers at once ; com munications were entered into with Perseus; Rhodian envoys with Macedonian sympathies said more than they should have said ; and they were caught The senate, which doubtless was itself for the most part unaware of those intrigues, heard the strange announcement, as may be conceived, with indignation, and was glad of the favour able opportunity to humble the haughty mercantile city. A warlike praetor went even so far as to propose to the people a declaration of war against Rhodes. In vain the
Rhodian ambassadors repeatedly on their knees adjured the senate to think of the friendship of a hundred and forty years rather than of the one offence; in vain they sent the heads of the Macedonian party to the scaffold or to Rome ; in vain they sent a massive wreath of gold in token
been resolved on after the fall
chap, x
THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR
515
of their gratitude for the non-declaration of war. The up right Cato indeed showed that strictly the Rhodians had committed no offence and asked whether the Romans were desirous to undertake the punishment of wishes and thoughts, and whether they could blame the nations for being appre hensive that Rome might allow herself all license if she had no longer any one to fear? His words and warnings were in vain. The senate deprived the Rhodians of their possessions on the mainland, which yielded a yearly produce of 120 talents (,£29,000). Still heavier were the blows aimed at the Rhodian commerce. The very prohibition of the import of salt to, and of the export of shipbuilding timber from, Macedonia appears to have been directed against Rhodes.
Rhodian commerce was still more directly affected by the erection of the free port at Delos ; the Rhodian customs- dues, which hitherto had produced 1,000,000 drachmae (£41,000) annually, sank in a very brief period to 150,000 drachmae (£6180). Generally, the Rhodians were para lyzed in their freedom of action and in their liberal and bold commercial policy, and the state began to languish.
Even the alliance asked for was at first refused, and was
only renewed in 590 after urgent entreaties. The equally 164. guilty but powerless Cretans escaped with a sharp rebuke.
With Syria and Egypt the Romans could go to work Interren- more summarily. War had broken out between them ; 5^! ° and Coelesyria and Palaestina formed once more the Egyptian subject of dispute. According to the assertion of the war* Egyptians, those provinces had been ceded to Egypt on
the marriage of the Syrian Cleopatra : this however the court of Babylon, which was in actual possession, disputed. Apparently the charging of her dowry on the taxes of the Coelesyrian cities gave occasion to the quarrel, and the Syrian side was in the right ; the breaking out of the war
was occasioned by the death of Cleopatra in 581, with 178. which at latest the payments of revenue terminated. The
516
THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR book III
war appears to have been begun by Egypt; but king Antiochus Epiphanes gladly embraced the opportunity of once more—and for the last time—endeavouring to achieve the traditional aim of the policy of the Seleucidae, the acquisition of Egypt, while the Romans were employed in Macedonia. Fortune seemed favourable to him. The king of Egypt at that time, Ptolemy VI. Philometor, the son of Cleopatra, had hardly passed the age of boyhood and had bad advisers ; after a great victory on the Syro- Egyptian frontier Antiochus was able to advance into the territories of his nephew in the same year in which the
171. legions landed in Greece (583), and soon had the person of the king in his power. Matters began to look as if Antiochus wished to possess himself of all Egypt in Philometor's name ; Alexandria accordingly closed its gates against him, deposed Philometor, and nominated as king in his stead his younger brother, named Euergetes II. , or the Fat Disturbances in his own kingdom recalled the Syrian king from Egypt ; when he returned, he found that the brothers had come to an understanding during his absence; and he then continued the war against both. Just as he lay before Alexandria, not long after the battle
168. of Pydna (586), the Roman envoy Gaius Popillius, a harsh rude man, arrived, and intimated to him the command of the senate that he should restore all that he had conquered and should evacuate Egypt within a set term. Antiochus asked time for consideration ; but the consular drew with his staff a circle round the king, and bade him declare his intentions before he stepped beyond the circle. Antiochus replied that he would comply; and marched off to his capital that he might there, in his character of " the god, the brilliant bringer of victory," celebrate in Roman fashion his conquest of Egypt and parody the triumph of Paullus.
Egypt voluntarily submitted to the Roman protectorate; and thereupon the kings of Babylon also desisted from the
chap, x THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR
517
last attempt to maintain their independence against Rome. As with Macedonia in the war waged by Perseus, the Seleucidae in the war regarding Coelesyria made a similar and similarly final effort to recover their former power; but it is a significant indication of the difference between the two kingdoms, that in the former case the legions, in the latter the abrupt language of a diplomatist, decided the controversy.
In Greece itself, as the two Boeotian cities had already paid more than a sufficient penalty, the Molottians alone remained to be punished as allies of Perseus. Acting on secret orders from the senate, Paullus in one day gave up seventy townships in Epirus to plunder, and sold the inhabitants, 150,000 in number, into slavery. The Aetolians lost Amphipolis, and the Acarnanians Leucas, on account of their equivocal behaviour; whereas the Athenians, who continued to play the part of the begging poet in their own Aristophanes, not only obtained a gift of Delos and Lemnos, but were not ashamed even to petition for the deserted site of Haliartus, which was assigned to them accordingly. Thus something was done for the Muses ; but more had to be done for justice. There was a Macedonian party in every city, and therefore trials for high treason began in all parts of Greece. Whoever had served in the army of Perseus was immediately executed , whoever was compromised by the papers of the king or the statements of political opponents who flocked to lodge informations, was despatched to Rome; the Achaean Callicrates and the Aetolian Lyciscus distinguished them selves in the trade of informers. In this way the more conspicuous patriots among the Thessalians, Aetolians,
Acarnanians, Lesbians and so forth, were removed from their native land ; and, in particular, more than a thousand Achaeans were thus disposed of—a step taken with the view not so much of prosecuting those who were carried off, as of silencing the childish opposition of the Hellenes.
Measures °n ^J£?
Rome and denda! 01"
To the Achaeans, who, as usual, were not content till they got the answer which they anticipated, the senate, wearied by constant requests for the commencement of the investi gation, at length roundly declared that till further orders the persons concerned were to remain in Italy. There they were placed in country towns in the interior, and tolerably well treated ; but attempts to escape were punished with death. The position of the former officials removed from Macedonia was, in all probability, similar. This expedient, violent as it was, was still, as things stood, the most lenient, and the enraged Greeks of the Roman party were far from content with the paucity of the execu tions. Lyciscus had accordingly deemed it proper, by way
of preliminary, to have 500 of the leading men of the Aetolian patriotic party slain at the meeting of the diet ; the Roman commission, which needed the man, suffered the deed to pass unpunished, and merely censured the employ ment of Roman soldiers in the execution of this Hellenic usage. We may presume, however, that the Romans instituted the system of deportation to Italy partly in order to prevent such horrors. As in Greece proper no power existed even of such importance as Rhodes or Pergamus, there was no need in its case for any further humiliation ; the steps taken were taken only in the exercise of justice— in the Roman sense, no doubt, of that term — and for the prevention of the most scandalous and palpable outbreaks of party discord.
All the Hellenistic states had thus been completely subjected to the protectorate of Rome, and the whole empire of Alexander the Great had fallen to the Roman commonwealth just as if the city had inherited it from his heirs. From all sides kings and ambassadors flocked to Rome to congratulate her ; and they showed that fawning is never more abject than when kings are in the ante chamber. King Massinissa, who only desisted from
Si8
THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR BOOK m
chap, x THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR
519
presenting himself in person on being expressly prohibited from doing so, ordered his son to declare that he regarded himself as merely the beneficiary, and the Romans as the true proprietors, of his kingdom, and that he would always be content with what they were willing to leave to him. There was at least truth in this. But Prusias king of Bithynia, who had to atone for his neutrality, bore off the palm in this contest of flattery ; he fell on his face when he was conducted into the senate, and did homage to "the delivering gods. " As he was so thoroughly con temptible, Polybius tells us, they gave him a polite reply, and presented him with the fleet of Perseus.
The moment was at least well chosen for such acts of homage. Polybius dates from the battle of Pydna the full establishment of the universal empire of Rome. It was in fact the last battle in which a civilized state confronted Rome in the field on a footing of equality with her as a great power; all subsequent struggles were rebellions or wars with peoples beyond the pale of the Romano-Greek civilization —with barbarians, as they were called. The whole civilized world thenceforth recognized in the Roman senate the supreme tribunal, whose commissions decided in the last resort between kings and nations ; and to acquire its language and manners foreign princes and youths of quality resided in Rome. A clear and earnest attempt to get rid of this dominion was in reality made only once— by the great Mithradates of Pontus. The battle of Pydna, moreover, marks the last occasion on which the senate still adhered to the state- maxim that they should, if possible, hold no possessions and maintain no garrisons beyond the Italian seas, but should keep the numerous states dependent on them in order by a mere political supremacy. The aim of their policy was that these states should neither decline into utter weakness and anarchy, as had nevertheless
happened
in Greece nor emerge out of their half- free
5*0
THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR book hi
into complete independence, as Macedonia had attempted to do not without success. No state was to be allowed utterly to perish, but no one was to be permitted to stand on its own resources. Accordingly the vanquished foe held at least an equal, often a better, position with the Roman diplomatists than the faithful ally; and, while a defeated opponent was reinstated, those who attempted to reinstate themselves were abased — as the Aetolians, Macedonia after the Asiatic war, Rhodes, and Pergamus learned by experience. But not only did this part of protector soon prove as irksome to the masters as to the servants; the Roman protectorate, with its ungrateful Sisyphian toil that continually needed to be begun afresh, showed itself to be intrinsically untenable. Indications of
a change of system, and of an increasing disinclination on the part of Rome to tolerate by its side intermediate states even in such independence as was possible for them, were very clearly given in the destruction of the Macedonian monarchy after the battle of Pydna. The more and more frequent and more and more unavoidable intervention in the internal affairs of the petty Greek states through their misgovernment and their political and social anarchy ; the disarming of Macedonia, where the northern frontier at any rate urgently required a defence different from that of mere posts ; and, lastly, the introduction of the payment of land-tax to Rome from Macedonia and Illyria, were so many symptoms of the approaching conversion of the client states into subjects of Rome.
in conclusion, we glance back at the career of Rome ^rom the umon 0I" I**ly t0 the dismemberment of Mace- donia, the universal empire of Rome, far from appearing as
gigantic plan contrived and carried out by an insatiable thirst for territorial aggrandizement, appears to have been
result which forced itself on the Roman government without, and even in opposition to, its wish. true that
position
The *"
extra" Itaitan
Rome. 0
It is
aa
If,
chap, x THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR
521
the former view naturally suggests itself — Sallust is right when he makes Mithradates say that the wars of Rome with tribes, cities, and kings originated in one and the same prime cause, the insatiable longing after dominion and riches ; but it is an error to give forth this judgment — influenced by passion and the event — as a historical fact It is evident to every one whose observation is not superficial, that the Roman government during this whole period wished and desired nothing but the sovereignty of Italy; that they were simply desirous not to have too powerful neighbours alongside of them; and that — not out of humanity towards the vanquished, but from the very sound view that they ought not to suffer the kernel of their empire to be stifled by the shell — they earnestly opposed the introduction first of Africa, then of Greece, and lastly of Asia into the sphere of the Roman protector ate, till circumstances in each case compelled, or at least
with irresistible force, the extension of that The Romans always asserted that they did not pursue a policy of conquest, and that they were always the
party assailed ; and this was something more, at any rate, than a mere phrase. They were in fact driven to all their great wars with the exception of that concerning Sicily— to those with Hannibal and Antiochus, no less than to those with Philip and Perseus —either by a direct aggres sion or by an unparalleled disturbance of the existing political relations; and hence they were ordinarily taken by surprise on their outbreak. That they did not after victory exhibit the moderation which they ought to have done in the interest more especially of Italy itself; that the retention of Spain, for instance, the undertaking of the guardianship of Africa, and above all the half- fanciful scheme of bringing liberty everywhere to the Greeks, were in the light of Italian policy grave errors, is sufficiently clear. But the causes of these errors were, on the one
suggested sphere.
522
THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR book in
hand a blind dread of Carthage, on the other a still blinder enthusiasm for Hellenic liberty; so little did the Romans exhibit during this period the lust of conquest, that they, on the contrary, displayed a very judicious dread of it The policy of Rome throughout was not projected by a single mighty intellect and bequeathed traditionally from generation to generation ; it was the policy of a very able but somewhat narrow-minded deliberative assembly, which had far too little power of grand combination, and far too much of a right instinct for the preservation of its own commonwealth, to devise projects in the spirit of a Caesar or a Napoleon. The universal empire of Rome had its ultimate ground in the political development of antiquity in general. The ancient world knew nothing of a balance of power among nations ; and therefore every nation which had attained internal unity strove either directly to subdue its neighbours, as did the Hellenic states, or at any rate to render them innocuous, as Rome did, —an effort, it is true, which also issued ultimately in subjugation. Egypt was perhaps the only great power in antiquity which seriously pursued a system of equilibrium : on the opposite system Seleucus and Antigonus, Hannibal and Scipio, came into collision. And, if it seems to us sad that all the other richly -endowed and highly -developed nations of antiquity had to perish in order to enrich a single one out of the whole, and that all in the long run appear to have only arisen to contribute to the greatness of Italy and to the decay involved in that greatness, yet historical justice must acknowledge that this result was not produced by the military superiority of the legion over the phalanx, but was the necessary development of the international relations of antiquity generally —so that the issue was not decided by provoking chance, but was the fulfilment of an unchangeable, and therefore endurable, destiny.
APPENDIX
THE TREATIES BETWEEN ROME AND CARTHAGE
[Extracted from Dr. Mommsen's work on Roman Chronology (p. 273 ff. ) — a book which, in addition to its intrinsic merits, derives a peculiar interest from the fact that it is written in friendly controversy
with the author's own brother. ]
THE earliest treaty between Rome and Carthage, given by Polybius, is stated by him to have been concluded xari. Ktixum 'Iotfrtoi' Bpo&ror KttX liipKor '(lpdruw. 1 I have formerly endeavoured to defend this date as documentary,1 but I have now to confess myself mistaken. Painful as it is to witness the disappearance of the last star which seemed to light the anxious pilot in navigating the dark seas of early history, an unprejudiced consideration shows that the Polybian date is not documentary, and is probably erroneous.
Cum Carihaginiensibus eodem anno foedus tertio renovatum Ugatisque arum, qui ad id ventrant, comiter munera
missa. — —
475 U. C. Livy:8 Cum Carthaginiensibus quarto foedus reno
vatum est. This treaty is indisputably the third of Polybius.
The inconsistency between Polybius on the one hand and Fabius on the other is manifest. The former too says expressly that even in his time the oldest men, and those most cognisant of public matters in
Rome and in Carthage, were unacquainted with these documents,7 and, as on that account he excuses Philinus for having remained ignorant of them, he must have held a similar view regarding the
448 u. c. Livy :
1 Polyb. Bin. * In earlier editions of the History. • xvi. 60.
* viL 37 ; and thence Orosius, iii. 7 : primum illud ictum cum Carthaginitnsi-
busfoedus. ^ ■ be. 4*^ • Ep. 13.
' iii. 26, a twvto — naff qsw irt uu 'Vtt/iaxvr koI Kapxifioviw el wp9rfivra. nn ml
ftiAiOTe SMCOvmt »«p* T* mowA vnvSafttv vyyeovr.
(to Page 41)
Respecting the treaties between Rome and Carthage, we have, in addition to the evidence of Polybius, the following statements.
406 v. C — Diodorus,3 undoubtedly on the authority of Fabius : 'Erl Si ratnvjp (under the consuls of this year) 'Pw/udoit fib rpbt KapxijSertovt -rpwror awSijuai tytnrro. Livy : * — Cum Carthaginien- sibus Itgatis foedus ictum, cum amicitiam ac societatem petentes venissenU — * —
524
APPENDIX
expression of Fabius, that the treaty of 406 was the first treaty between Rome and Carthage. On the other hand Polybius by no means says —what he has often been made to say—that he had himself discovered the documents, and that no one had made use of them before him. On the contrary, it is probable that they came to light on occasion of the endless diplomatic negotiations which preceded the third Punic war, and that it then became apparent that they were unknown to the leading statesmen in the Roman and Carthaginian senates. Perhaps they were brought to light by Cato, who had sufficient inducement to search for them in the Roman archives, and who, when he charged the Carthaginians with having six times before 536 broken their compacts with Rome,1 must have taken some trouble to ascertain the contents of the earlier treaties. Polybius either gained his knowledge of them from the oral communications of Cato or of some third person, or—as there is nothing to prevent us from assuming —derived them from Cato's historical work. Livy follows, as he so often does, different authorities —as to 406 Fabius, as to 448 and 475 an authority agreeing with Polybius. *
The traditional testimony therefore stands thus : the one party reckons the treaties of 5i4$, 4487 47ij, as first, third, and fourth; the other reckons that 0P466 as the first, and therefore, beyond doubt, those of 448 and 475 as the second and third. In the first place, the latter view is supported by the fact that it has the older authorities in its favour. In the second place, it is evident that there were in the Roman archives in Cato's time only two treaties with Carthage, which preceded that of 475 ; which would suit very well, if that were the third, but not if it were the fourth, treaty, especially as the missing treaty must have been not the first, but either the second or the third, of the four. In the third place, it would be very delightful to meet with a document dating from the legendary period ; but on that very account such an occurrence is far from probable.
While all these considerations tell in favour of the earlier and evidently more unbiassed tradition, in reality neither on internal nor external grounds can the Polybian date be vindicated. The document does not bear internal traces of so great an antiquity ; if it lay before us without date, we should simply infer from it that it must be earlier than 416. That in the seventh century treaties of alliance had the date officially attached to them, at least if they were concluded by the
1 Cato, Orig. L iv. afi. Nonium, v. dwdmcesimo, p. loo M. : Dsinds duodrvi- cesimo (rather duostvicssimo) anno post dintiitum folium, quod quattuor it rriginti artnos fuit, Carthaginisnsis ssxtunt de footers decenure (rather decssstrdy The fifth breach of the peace was probably constituted in his view by the occurrences which led to the cession of Sardinia in 517, the fourth by the declaration of war in
400, the third by the attempt on Tarentum in 48a. The first two I know no means of determining. In reference to the number and order of the treaties— to throw light on which the passage has often been employed — nothing is deducible from it.
* The proposal to harmonize the statements of Livy by counting the diplomatic congratulations of the Carthaginians in 411 (Liv. vii. 43) as a second treaty, simply substitutes one piece of negligence for another, because Livy ought to have said this, had he meant it- It moreover, unwarranted, when an inconsistency between Fabius and Polybius established, to explain away the traces of the same incon sistency in Livy.
is
is,
APPENDIX
525
senate, b no doubt evident from the treaty with the community of Astypalaea ( Corp. Inscr. Grace. 2485), and that relating to Asclepiades the Clazomenian and others (C. I. Gr. 5879) ; but the age of this custom is not incontestably established, and the only inference which it warrants is, that the first treaty with Carthage might, not that it must, have been dated. Polybius himself by no means refers his statement of the year to this source which would dispel all doubt, and
moreover he specifies the time of the second and third treaties in so general and reserved a manner, that in these cases at least he cannot possibly have found a specification of the year. The circumstance (to which I was formerly disposed to attach some weight) that the second treaty of Polybius seemed not to suit the year 448 well, because Tyre after the time of Alexander the Great can hardly have had the independent right of stipulating with a foreign power, was of some importance, so long as the choice between 406 and 448 seemed open : but the constitutional relations subsisting between the Greek and Phoenician mercantile cities and the crown of Asia, as well as those between Tyre and Carthage, are far from being ascertained to such an extent that on that ground we should refuse to believe other important testimonies. The only grounds that remain are, the impossibility of discovering the source of the mistake, and the weight of the authority of Polybius. But, desirable as it is, with a view to complete con viction, to point out not only the error, but also the truth from which every error proceeds, we cannot possibly be required, in the case of such a specification of time presenting itself wholly apart from its original connection, to hold it as true until we have shown in what way the author came by the erroneous number. Lastly, the authority of Polybius is undoubtedly, in his own field of investigation, one of the
highest furnished to us by antiquity ; but in this case his account refers to an epoch which he did not seek independently to investigate, and as to which he took his facts in good faith from some Roman work. He specifies the year of the foundation of the city, and the duration of the reigns of the kings ; but fable does not become converted into history because he has placed it on record. Histori cal criticism must therefore place the first treaty between Rome and Carthage in 406, and the two following, accordingly, in 448 and
It follows that no proof can be drawn from the statement of Polybius in favour of the historical character of the pair of consuls marking the year at the head of our list ; while conversely, after their unhistorical character has been otherwise demonstrated, the Polybian date necessarily falls with them.
END OF VOL. II
475.
chaf. x THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR
509
royalties were not granted to the confederacies, and these
were specially prohibited from working the gold and silver mines, a chief source of the national wealth ; but in 596 158. they were again permitted to work at least the silver- mines. 1 The import of salt, and the export of timber
for shipbuilding, were prohibited. The land-tax hitherto
paid to the king ceased, and the confederacies and com munities were left to tax themselves ; but these had to pay
to Rome half of the former land-tax, according to a rate fixed once for all, amounting in all to 100 talents annually
The whole land was for ever disarmed, and the fortress of Demetrias was razed ; on the northern frontier alone a chain of posts was to be retained to guard
against the incursions of the barbarians. Of the arms given up, the copper shields were sent to Rome, and the rest were burnt
The Romans gained their object The Macedonian land still on two occasions took up arms at the call of princes of the old reigning house ; but otherwise from that time to the present day it has remained without a history.
(^24,000). *
Illyria was treated in a similar way. The kingdom of
Genthius was split up into three small free states. There broken UP» too the freeholders paid the half of the former land-tax to
1 The statement of Cassiodorus, that the Macedonian mines were
reopened in 596, receives its more exact interpretation by means of the 158. coins. No gold coins of the four Macedonias are extant ; either there
fore the gold - mines remained closed, or the gold extracted was converted
into bars. On the other hand there certainly exist silver coins of Ma
cedonia prima (Amphipolis) in which district the silver- mines were
situated. For the brief period, during which they must have been struck (596-608), the number of them is remarkably great, and proves either 158-148. that the mines were very energetically worked, or that the old royal money
was recoined in large quantity.
1 The statement that the Macedonian commonwealth was " relieved of seignorial imposts and taxes" by the Romans (Polyb. xxxvii. 4) does not necessarily require us to assume a subsequent remission of these taxes : it is sufficient, for the explanation of Polybius' words, to assume that the hitherto seignorial tax now became a public one. The continuance of the constitution granted to the province of Macedonia by Paullus down to at least the Augustan age (Liv. xlv. 32 ; Justin, xxxiii. a), would, it is true, be compatible also with the remission of the taxes.
iiiyria
Coqn.
Humilia
their new masters, with the exception of the towns, which had adhered to Rome and in return obtained exemption from land-tax—an exception, which there was no oppor tunity to make in the case of Macedonia. The Illyrian piratic fleet was confiscated, and presented to the more reputable Greek communities along that coast. The constant annoyances, which the Illyrians inflicted on the neighbours by their corsairs, were in this way put an end to, at least for a lengthened period.
Cotys in Thrace, who was difficult to be reached and might conveniently be used against Eumenes, obtained pardon and received back his captive son.
Thus the affairs of the north were settled, and Macedonia also was at last released from the yoke of monarchy —in fact Greece was more free than ever; a king no longer existed anywhere.
But the Romans did not confine themselves to cutting
5io
THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR
tion of the the nerves and sinews of Macedonia. The senate resolved Greeks in
general
Course pursued with Pergamus.
at once to render all the Hellenic states, friend and foe, for ever incapable of harm, and to reduce all of them alike to the same humble clientship. The course pursued may itself admit of justification ; but the mode in which it was carried out in the case of the more powerful of the Greek client-states was unworthy of a great power, and showed that the epoch of the Fabii and the Scipios was at an end.
The state most affected by this change in the position of parties was the kingdom of the Attalids, which had been created and fostered by Rome to keep Macedonia in check, and which now, after the destruction of Macedonia, was forsooth no longer needed. It was not easy to find a tolerable pretext for depriving the prudent and considerate Eumenes of his privileged position, and allowing him to fall into disfavour. All at once, about the time when the Romans were encamped at Heracleum, strange reports were circulated regarding him — that he was in secret intercourse
clAP. x VliE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR
511
with Perstuj; that his fleet had been suddenly, as it were, wafted away ; that 500 talents had been offered for his non- participation in the campaign and 1500 for his mediation
to procure peace, and that the agreement had only broken down through the avarice of Perseus. As to the Pergamene fleet, the king, after having paid his respects to the consul,
went home with it at the same time that the Roman fleet went into winter quarters. The story about corruption was
as certainly a fable as any newspaper canard of the present
day ; for that the rich, cunning, and consistent Attalid, who
had primarily occasioned the breach between Rome and Macedonia by his journey in 582 and had been on that XIX
account wellnigh assassinated by the banditti of Perseus, should —at the moment when the real difficulties of a war, of whose final issue, moreover, he could never have had any serious doubt, were overcome — have sold to the instigator of the murder his share in the spoil for a few talents, and should have perilled the work of long years for so pitiful a consideration, may be set down not merely as a fabrication, but as a very silly one. That no proof was found either in the papers of Perseus or elsewhere, is sufficiently certain ; for even the Romans did not venture to express those suspicions aloud. But they gained their object Their wishes appeared in the behaviour of the Roman grandees towards Attalus, the brother of Eumenes, who had commanded the Pergamene auxiliary troops in Greece.
Their brave and faithful comrade was received in Rome with open arms and invited to ask not for his brother, but for himself — the senate would be glad to give him a kingdom of his own. Attalus asked nothing but Aenus and Maronea. The senate thought that this was only a preliminary request, and granted it with great politeness. But when he took his departure without having made any further demands, and the senate came to perceive that the reigning family in Pergamus did not live on such terms with each other as
Sia
THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR book iii
were customary in princely houses, Aenus and Maronea were declared free cities. The Pergamenes obtained not a foot's breadth of territory out of the spoil of Macedonia ; if after the victory over Antiochus the Romans had still saved forms as respected Philip, they were now disposed to hurt and to humiliate. About this time the senate appears to have declared Pamphylia, for the possession of which Eumenes and Antiochus had hitherto contended, inde pendent What was of more importance, the Galatians — who had been substantially in the power of Eumenes, ever since he had expelled the king of Pontus by force of arms from Galatia and had on making peace extorted from him the promise that he would maintain no further communi cation with the Galatian princes — now, reckoning beyond doubt on the variance that had taken place between Eumenes and the Romans, if not directly instigated by the latter, rose against Eumenes, overran his kingdom, and brought him into great danger. Eumenes besought the mediation of the Romans ; the Roman envoy declared his readiness to mediate, but thought it better that Attalus, who commanded the Pergamene army, should not accompany him lest the barbarians might be put into ill humour. Singularly enough, he accomplished nothing ; in fact, he told on his return that his mediation had only
exasperated the barbarians. No long time elapsed before the independence of the Galatians was expressly recognized and guaranteed by the senate. Eumenes determined to proceed to Rome in person, and to plead his cause in the senate. But the latter, as if troubled by an evil conscience, suddenly decreed that in future kings should not be allowed to come to Rome ; and despatched a quaestor to meet him at Brundisium, to lay before him this decree of the senate, to ask him what he wanted, and to hint to him that they
would be glad to see his speedy departure. The king was long silent ; at length he said that he desired nothing
chap, x THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR
513
farther, and re-embarked. He saw how matters stood : the epoch of half-powerful and half-free alliance was at an end ; that of impotent subjection began.
Similar treatment befell the Rhodians. They had a HumiU»- singularly privileged position : their relation to Rome Rhodes assumed the form not of symmachy properly so called, but
of friendly equality ; it did not prevent them from enter
ing into alliances of any kind, and did not compel them to supply the Romans with a contingent on demand. This
very circumstance was presumably the real reason why their good understanding with Rome had already for some time been impaired. The first dissensions with Rome had arisen in consequence of the rising of the Lycians, who
were handed over to Rhodes after the defeat of Antiochus, against their oppressors who had (576) cruelly reduced 178. them to slavery as revolted subjects ; the Lycians, however, asserted that they were not subjects but allies of the Rhodians, and prevailed with this plea in the Roman senate, which was invited to settle the doubtful meaning of
the instrument of peace. But in this result a justifiable sympathy with the victims of grievous oppression had perhaps the chief share ; at least nothing further was done on the part of the Romans, who left this as well as other Hellenic quarrels to take their course. When the war with Perseus broke out, the Rhodians, like all other sensible Greeks, viewed it with regret, and blamed Eumenes in par ticular as the instigator of so that his festal embassy was not even permitted to be present at the festival of Helios in Rhodes. But this did not prevent them from adhering to Rome and keeping the Macedonian party, which existed
Rhodes as well as everywhere else, aloof from the helm
of affairs. The permission given to them in 585 to export 169. grain from Sicily shows the continuance of the good under standing with Rome. All of sudden, shortly before the battle of Pydna, Rhodian envoys appeared at the Roman
VOL. II
65
a
in
it,
5M
THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR book lit
headquarters and in the Roman senate, announcing that the Rhodians would no longer tolerate this war which was injurious to their Macedonian traffic and their revenue from port-dues, that they were disposed themselves to declare war against the party which should refuse to make peace, and that with this view they had already concluded an alliance with Crete and with the Asiatic cities. Many caprices are possible in a republic governed by primary
assemblies; but this insane intervention of a commercial
city — which can only have
of the pass of Tempe was known at Rhodes — requires special explanation. The key to it is furnished by the well-attested account that the consul Quintus Marcius, that master of the " new-fashioned diplomacy," had in the camp at Heracleum (and therefore after the occupation of the pass of Tempe) loaded the Rhodian envoy Agepolis with civilities and made an underhand request to him to mediate a peace. Republican wrongheadedness and vanity did the rest ; the Rhodians fancied that the Romans had given themselves up as lost ; they were eager to play the part of mediator among four great powers at once ; com munications were entered into with Perseus; Rhodian envoys with Macedonian sympathies said more than they should have said ; and they were caught The senate, which doubtless was itself for the most part unaware of those intrigues, heard the strange announcement, as may be conceived, with indignation, and was glad of the favour able opportunity to humble the haughty mercantile city. A warlike praetor went even so far as to propose to the people a declaration of war against Rhodes. In vain the
Rhodian ambassadors repeatedly on their knees adjured the senate to think of the friendship of a hundred and forty years rather than of the one offence; in vain they sent the heads of the Macedonian party to the scaffold or to Rome ; in vain they sent a massive wreath of gold in token
been resolved on after the fall
chap, x
THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR
515
of their gratitude for the non-declaration of war. The up right Cato indeed showed that strictly the Rhodians had committed no offence and asked whether the Romans were desirous to undertake the punishment of wishes and thoughts, and whether they could blame the nations for being appre hensive that Rome might allow herself all license if she had no longer any one to fear? His words and warnings were in vain. The senate deprived the Rhodians of their possessions on the mainland, which yielded a yearly produce of 120 talents (,£29,000). Still heavier were the blows aimed at the Rhodian commerce. The very prohibition of the import of salt to, and of the export of shipbuilding timber from, Macedonia appears to have been directed against Rhodes.
Rhodian commerce was still more directly affected by the erection of the free port at Delos ; the Rhodian customs- dues, which hitherto had produced 1,000,000 drachmae (£41,000) annually, sank in a very brief period to 150,000 drachmae (£6180). Generally, the Rhodians were para lyzed in their freedom of action and in their liberal and bold commercial policy, and the state began to languish.
Even the alliance asked for was at first refused, and was
only renewed in 590 after urgent entreaties. The equally 164. guilty but powerless Cretans escaped with a sharp rebuke.
With Syria and Egypt the Romans could go to work Interren- more summarily. War had broken out between them ; 5^! ° and Coelesyria and Palaestina formed once more the Egyptian subject of dispute. According to the assertion of the war* Egyptians, those provinces had been ceded to Egypt on
the marriage of the Syrian Cleopatra : this however the court of Babylon, which was in actual possession, disputed. Apparently the charging of her dowry on the taxes of the Coelesyrian cities gave occasion to the quarrel, and the Syrian side was in the right ; the breaking out of the war
was occasioned by the death of Cleopatra in 581, with 178. which at latest the payments of revenue terminated. The
516
THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR book III
war appears to have been begun by Egypt; but king Antiochus Epiphanes gladly embraced the opportunity of once more—and for the last time—endeavouring to achieve the traditional aim of the policy of the Seleucidae, the acquisition of Egypt, while the Romans were employed in Macedonia. Fortune seemed favourable to him. The king of Egypt at that time, Ptolemy VI. Philometor, the son of Cleopatra, had hardly passed the age of boyhood and had bad advisers ; after a great victory on the Syro- Egyptian frontier Antiochus was able to advance into the territories of his nephew in the same year in which the
171. legions landed in Greece (583), and soon had the person of the king in his power. Matters began to look as if Antiochus wished to possess himself of all Egypt in Philometor's name ; Alexandria accordingly closed its gates against him, deposed Philometor, and nominated as king in his stead his younger brother, named Euergetes II. , or the Fat Disturbances in his own kingdom recalled the Syrian king from Egypt ; when he returned, he found that the brothers had come to an understanding during his absence; and he then continued the war against both. Just as he lay before Alexandria, not long after the battle
168. of Pydna (586), the Roman envoy Gaius Popillius, a harsh rude man, arrived, and intimated to him the command of the senate that he should restore all that he had conquered and should evacuate Egypt within a set term. Antiochus asked time for consideration ; but the consular drew with his staff a circle round the king, and bade him declare his intentions before he stepped beyond the circle. Antiochus replied that he would comply; and marched off to his capital that he might there, in his character of " the god, the brilliant bringer of victory," celebrate in Roman fashion his conquest of Egypt and parody the triumph of Paullus.
Egypt voluntarily submitted to the Roman protectorate; and thereupon the kings of Babylon also desisted from the
chap, x THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR
517
last attempt to maintain their independence against Rome. As with Macedonia in the war waged by Perseus, the Seleucidae in the war regarding Coelesyria made a similar and similarly final effort to recover their former power; but it is a significant indication of the difference between the two kingdoms, that in the former case the legions, in the latter the abrupt language of a diplomatist, decided the controversy.
In Greece itself, as the two Boeotian cities had already paid more than a sufficient penalty, the Molottians alone remained to be punished as allies of Perseus. Acting on secret orders from the senate, Paullus in one day gave up seventy townships in Epirus to plunder, and sold the inhabitants, 150,000 in number, into slavery. The Aetolians lost Amphipolis, and the Acarnanians Leucas, on account of their equivocal behaviour; whereas the Athenians, who continued to play the part of the begging poet in their own Aristophanes, not only obtained a gift of Delos and Lemnos, but were not ashamed even to petition for the deserted site of Haliartus, which was assigned to them accordingly. Thus something was done for the Muses ; but more had to be done for justice. There was a Macedonian party in every city, and therefore trials for high treason began in all parts of Greece. Whoever had served in the army of Perseus was immediately executed , whoever was compromised by the papers of the king or the statements of political opponents who flocked to lodge informations, was despatched to Rome; the Achaean Callicrates and the Aetolian Lyciscus distinguished them selves in the trade of informers. In this way the more conspicuous patriots among the Thessalians, Aetolians,
Acarnanians, Lesbians and so forth, were removed from their native land ; and, in particular, more than a thousand Achaeans were thus disposed of—a step taken with the view not so much of prosecuting those who were carried off, as of silencing the childish opposition of the Hellenes.
Measures °n ^J£?
Rome and denda! 01"
To the Achaeans, who, as usual, were not content till they got the answer which they anticipated, the senate, wearied by constant requests for the commencement of the investi gation, at length roundly declared that till further orders the persons concerned were to remain in Italy. There they were placed in country towns in the interior, and tolerably well treated ; but attempts to escape were punished with death. The position of the former officials removed from Macedonia was, in all probability, similar. This expedient, violent as it was, was still, as things stood, the most lenient, and the enraged Greeks of the Roman party were far from content with the paucity of the execu tions. Lyciscus had accordingly deemed it proper, by way
of preliminary, to have 500 of the leading men of the Aetolian patriotic party slain at the meeting of the diet ; the Roman commission, which needed the man, suffered the deed to pass unpunished, and merely censured the employ ment of Roman soldiers in the execution of this Hellenic usage. We may presume, however, that the Romans instituted the system of deportation to Italy partly in order to prevent such horrors. As in Greece proper no power existed even of such importance as Rhodes or Pergamus, there was no need in its case for any further humiliation ; the steps taken were taken only in the exercise of justice— in the Roman sense, no doubt, of that term — and for the prevention of the most scandalous and palpable outbreaks of party discord.
All the Hellenistic states had thus been completely subjected to the protectorate of Rome, and the whole empire of Alexander the Great had fallen to the Roman commonwealth just as if the city had inherited it from his heirs. From all sides kings and ambassadors flocked to Rome to congratulate her ; and they showed that fawning is never more abject than when kings are in the ante chamber. King Massinissa, who only desisted from
Si8
THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR BOOK m
chap, x THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR
519
presenting himself in person on being expressly prohibited from doing so, ordered his son to declare that he regarded himself as merely the beneficiary, and the Romans as the true proprietors, of his kingdom, and that he would always be content with what they were willing to leave to him. There was at least truth in this. But Prusias king of Bithynia, who had to atone for his neutrality, bore off the palm in this contest of flattery ; he fell on his face when he was conducted into the senate, and did homage to "the delivering gods. " As he was so thoroughly con temptible, Polybius tells us, they gave him a polite reply, and presented him with the fleet of Perseus.
The moment was at least well chosen for such acts of homage. Polybius dates from the battle of Pydna the full establishment of the universal empire of Rome. It was in fact the last battle in which a civilized state confronted Rome in the field on a footing of equality with her as a great power; all subsequent struggles were rebellions or wars with peoples beyond the pale of the Romano-Greek civilization —with barbarians, as they were called. The whole civilized world thenceforth recognized in the Roman senate the supreme tribunal, whose commissions decided in the last resort between kings and nations ; and to acquire its language and manners foreign princes and youths of quality resided in Rome. A clear and earnest attempt to get rid of this dominion was in reality made only once— by the great Mithradates of Pontus. The battle of Pydna, moreover, marks the last occasion on which the senate still adhered to the state- maxim that they should, if possible, hold no possessions and maintain no garrisons beyond the Italian seas, but should keep the numerous states dependent on them in order by a mere political supremacy. The aim of their policy was that these states should neither decline into utter weakness and anarchy, as had nevertheless
happened
in Greece nor emerge out of their half- free
5*0
THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR book hi
into complete independence, as Macedonia had attempted to do not without success. No state was to be allowed utterly to perish, but no one was to be permitted to stand on its own resources. Accordingly the vanquished foe held at least an equal, often a better, position with the Roman diplomatists than the faithful ally; and, while a defeated opponent was reinstated, those who attempted to reinstate themselves were abased — as the Aetolians, Macedonia after the Asiatic war, Rhodes, and Pergamus learned by experience. But not only did this part of protector soon prove as irksome to the masters as to the servants; the Roman protectorate, with its ungrateful Sisyphian toil that continually needed to be begun afresh, showed itself to be intrinsically untenable. Indications of
a change of system, and of an increasing disinclination on the part of Rome to tolerate by its side intermediate states even in such independence as was possible for them, were very clearly given in the destruction of the Macedonian monarchy after the battle of Pydna. The more and more frequent and more and more unavoidable intervention in the internal affairs of the petty Greek states through their misgovernment and their political and social anarchy ; the disarming of Macedonia, where the northern frontier at any rate urgently required a defence different from that of mere posts ; and, lastly, the introduction of the payment of land-tax to Rome from Macedonia and Illyria, were so many symptoms of the approaching conversion of the client states into subjects of Rome.
in conclusion, we glance back at the career of Rome ^rom the umon 0I" I**ly t0 the dismemberment of Mace- donia, the universal empire of Rome, far from appearing as
gigantic plan contrived and carried out by an insatiable thirst for territorial aggrandizement, appears to have been
result which forced itself on the Roman government without, and even in opposition to, its wish. true that
position
The *"
extra" Itaitan
Rome. 0
It is
aa
If,
chap, x THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR
521
the former view naturally suggests itself — Sallust is right when he makes Mithradates say that the wars of Rome with tribes, cities, and kings originated in one and the same prime cause, the insatiable longing after dominion and riches ; but it is an error to give forth this judgment — influenced by passion and the event — as a historical fact It is evident to every one whose observation is not superficial, that the Roman government during this whole period wished and desired nothing but the sovereignty of Italy; that they were simply desirous not to have too powerful neighbours alongside of them; and that — not out of humanity towards the vanquished, but from the very sound view that they ought not to suffer the kernel of their empire to be stifled by the shell — they earnestly opposed the introduction first of Africa, then of Greece, and lastly of Asia into the sphere of the Roman protector ate, till circumstances in each case compelled, or at least
with irresistible force, the extension of that The Romans always asserted that they did not pursue a policy of conquest, and that they were always the
party assailed ; and this was something more, at any rate, than a mere phrase. They were in fact driven to all their great wars with the exception of that concerning Sicily— to those with Hannibal and Antiochus, no less than to those with Philip and Perseus —either by a direct aggres sion or by an unparalleled disturbance of the existing political relations; and hence they were ordinarily taken by surprise on their outbreak. That they did not after victory exhibit the moderation which they ought to have done in the interest more especially of Italy itself; that the retention of Spain, for instance, the undertaking of the guardianship of Africa, and above all the half- fanciful scheme of bringing liberty everywhere to the Greeks, were in the light of Italian policy grave errors, is sufficiently clear. But the causes of these errors were, on the one
suggested sphere.
522
THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR book in
hand a blind dread of Carthage, on the other a still blinder enthusiasm for Hellenic liberty; so little did the Romans exhibit during this period the lust of conquest, that they, on the contrary, displayed a very judicious dread of it The policy of Rome throughout was not projected by a single mighty intellect and bequeathed traditionally from generation to generation ; it was the policy of a very able but somewhat narrow-minded deliberative assembly, which had far too little power of grand combination, and far too much of a right instinct for the preservation of its own commonwealth, to devise projects in the spirit of a Caesar or a Napoleon. The universal empire of Rome had its ultimate ground in the political development of antiquity in general. The ancient world knew nothing of a balance of power among nations ; and therefore every nation which had attained internal unity strove either directly to subdue its neighbours, as did the Hellenic states, or at any rate to render them innocuous, as Rome did, —an effort, it is true, which also issued ultimately in subjugation. Egypt was perhaps the only great power in antiquity which seriously pursued a system of equilibrium : on the opposite system Seleucus and Antigonus, Hannibal and Scipio, came into collision. And, if it seems to us sad that all the other richly -endowed and highly -developed nations of antiquity had to perish in order to enrich a single one out of the whole, and that all in the long run appear to have only arisen to contribute to the greatness of Italy and to the decay involved in that greatness, yet historical justice must acknowledge that this result was not produced by the military superiority of the legion over the phalanx, but was the necessary development of the international relations of antiquity generally —so that the issue was not decided by provoking chance, but was the fulfilment of an unchangeable, and therefore endurable, destiny.
APPENDIX
THE TREATIES BETWEEN ROME AND CARTHAGE
[Extracted from Dr. Mommsen's work on Roman Chronology (p. 273 ff. ) — a book which, in addition to its intrinsic merits, derives a peculiar interest from the fact that it is written in friendly controversy
with the author's own brother. ]
THE earliest treaty between Rome and Carthage, given by Polybius, is stated by him to have been concluded xari. Ktixum 'Iotfrtoi' Bpo&ror KttX liipKor '(lpdruw. 1 I have formerly endeavoured to defend this date as documentary,1 but I have now to confess myself mistaken. Painful as it is to witness the disappearance of the last star which seemed to light the anxious pilot in navigating the dark seas of early history, an unprejudiced consideration shows that the Polybian date is not documentary, and is probably erroneous.
Cum Carihaginiensibus eodem anno foedus tertio renovatum Ugatisque arum, qui ad id ventrant, comiter munera
missa. — —
475 U. C. Livy:8 Cum Carthaginiensibus quarto foedus reno
vatum est. This treaty is indisputably the third of Polybius.
The inconsistency between Polybius on the one hand and Fabius on the other is manifest. The former too says expressly that even in his time the oldest men, and those most cognisant of public matters in
Rome and in Carthage, were unacquainted with these documents,7 and, as on that account he excuses Philinus for having remained ignorant of them, he must have held a similar view regarding the
448 u. c. Livy :
1 Polyb. Bin. * In earlier editions of the History. • xvi. 60.
* viL 37 ; and thence Orosius, iii. 7 : primum illud ictum cum Carthaginitnsi-
busfoedus. ^ ■ be. 4*^ • Ep. 13.
' iii. 26, a twvto — naff qsw irt uu 'Vtt/iaxvr koI Kapxifioviw el wp9rfivra. nn ml
ftiAiOTe SMCOvmt »«p* T* mowA vnvSafttv vyyeovr.
(to Page 41)
Respecting the treaties between Rome and Carthage, we have, in addition to the evidence of Polybius, the following statements.
406 v. C — Diodorus,3 undoubtedly on the authority of Fabius : 'Erl Si ratnvjp (under the consuls of this year) 'Pw/udoit fib rpbt KapxijSertovt -rpwror awSijuai tytnrro. Livy : * — Cum Carthaginien- sibus Itgatis foedus ictum, cum amicitiam ac societatem petentes venissenU — * —
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expression of Fabius, that the treaty of 406 was the first treaty between Rome and Carthage. On the other hand Polybius by no means says —what he has often been made to say—that he had himself discovered the documents, and that no one had made use of them before him. On the contrary, it is probable that they came to light on occasion of the endless diplomatic negotiations which preceded the third Punic war, and that it then became apparent that they were unknown to the leading statesmen in the Roman and Carthaginian senates. Perhaps they were brought to light by Cato, who had sufficient inducement to search for them in the Roman archives, and who, when he charged the Carthaginians with having six times before 536 broken their compacts with Rome,1 must have taken some trouble to ascertain the contents of the earlier treaties. Polybius either gained his knowledge of them from the oral communications of Cato or of some third person, or—as there is nothing to prevent us from assuming —derived them from Cato's historical work. Livy follows, as he so often does, different authorities —as to 406 Fabius, as to 448 and 475 an authority agreeing with Polybius. *
The traditional testimony therefore stands thus : the one party reckons the treaties of 5i4$, 4487 47ij, as first, third, and fourth; the other reckons that 0P466 as the first, and therefore, beyond doubt, those of 448 and 475 as the second and third. In the first place, the latter view is supported by the fact that it has the older authorities in its favour. In the second place, it is evident that there were in the Roman archives in Cato's time only two treaties with Carthage, which preceded that of 475 ; which would suit very well, if that were the third, but not if it were the fourth, treaty, especially as the missing treaty must have been not the first, but either the second or the third, of the four. In the third place, it would be very delightful to meet with a document dating from the legendary period ; but on that very account such an occurrence is far from probable.
While all these considerations tell in favour of the earlier and evidently more unbiassed tradition, in reality neither on internal nor external grounds can the Polybian date be vindicated. The document does not bear internal traces of so great an antiquity ; if it lay before us without date, we should simply infer from it that it must be earlier than 416. That in the seventh century treaties of alliance had the date officially attached to them, at least if they were concluded by the
1 Cato, Orig. L iv. afi. Nonium, v. dwdmcesimo, p. loo M. : Dsinds duodrvi- cesimo (rather duostvicssimo) anno post dintiitum folium, quod quattuor it rriginti artnos fuit, Carthaginisnsis ssxtunt de footers decenure (rather decssstrdy The fifth breach of the peace was probably constituted in his view by the occurrences which led to the cession of Sardinia in 517, the fourth by the declaration of war in
400, the third by the attempt on Tarentum in 48a. The first two I know no means of determining. In reference to the number and order of the treaties— to throw light on which the passage has often been employed — nothing is deducible from it.
* The proposal to harmonize the statements of Livy by counting the diplomatic congratulations of the Carthaginians in 411 (Liv. vii. 43) as a second treaty, simply substitutes one piece of negligence for another, because Livy ought to have said this, had he meant it- It moreover, unwarranted, when an inconsistency between Fabius and Polybius established, to explain away the traces of the same incon sistency in Livy.
is
is,
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senate, b no doubt evident from the treaty with the community of Astypalaea ( Corp. Inscr. Grace. 2485), and that relating to Asclepiades the Clazomenian and others (C. I. Gr. 5879) ; but the age of this custom is not incontestably established, and the only inference which it warrants is, that the first treaty with Carthage might, not that it must, have been dated. Polybius himself by no means refers his statement of the year to this source which would dispel all doubt, and
moreover he specifies the time of the second and third treaties in so general and reserved a manner, that in these cases at least he cannot possibly have found a specification of the year. The circumstance (to which I was formerly disposed to attach some weight) that the second treaty of Polybius seemed not to suit the year 448 well, because Tyre after the time of Alexander the Great can hardly have had the independent right of stipulating with a foreign power, was of some importance, so long as the choice between 406 and 448 seemed open : but the constitutional relations subsisting between the Greek and Phoenician mercantile cities and the crown of Asia, as well as those between Tyre and Carthage, are far from being ascertained to such an extent that on that ground we should refuse to believe other important testimonies. The only grounds that remain are, the impossibility of discovering the source of the mistake, and the weight of the authority of Polybius. But, desirable as it is, with a view to complete con viction, to point out not only the error, but also the truth from which every error proceeds, we cannot possibly be required, in the case of such a specification of time presenting itself wholly apart from its original connection, to hold it as true until we have shown in what way the author came by the erroneous number. Lastly, the authority of Polybius is undoubtedly, in his own field of investigation, one of the
highest furnished to us by antiquity ; but in this case his account refers to an epoch which he did not seek independently to investigate, and as to which he took his facts in good faith from some Roman work. He specifies the year of the foundation of the city, and the duration of the reigns of the kings ; but fable does not become converted into history because he has placed it on record. Histori cal criticism must therefore place the first treaty between Rome and Carthage in 406, and the two following, accordingly, in 448 and
It follows that no proof can be drawn from the statement of Polybius in favour of the historical character of the pair of consuls marking the year at the head of our list ; while conversely, after their unhistorical character has been otherwise demonstrated, the Polybian date necessarily falls with them.
END OF VOL. II
475.
