We cannot but
sympathise
with
such a sentiment.
such a sentiment.
Demosthenese - 1869 - Brodribb
org/access_use#pd-google
? ? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? ? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? ? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? DEMOSTHENES
BY THE
REV. W. J. IQRODRIBB, M. A.
UTE FELLOW OF ST JOHN'S COI-I-BGl|
CAMBRIDGE
PHILADELPHIA:
J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO.
18? 0. .
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 3605
I880
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? NOTE.
FOR the extracts from the speeches of Demosthenes
given in this volume I am to a considerable extent
indebted to the scholarly version of the late Mr C. R.
Kennedy. For the famous speech on the Crown, I
have made occasional use of a translation recently
published by an eminent English lawyer, the Right
Hon_ Sir Robert Collier. The same speech was, some
years ago, translated by Mr William Brandt, a scholar
of Oriel College, Oxford, whose premature death cut
short a. life of great promise. His rendering of the
Greek orator is spirited and vigorous, and I wish to
express my obligations to it.
W. J. B.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? ? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? CONTENTS
. PAC!
INTRODUCTION, . . . . . . . . 1
CHAP. I. GREECE IN THE FOURTH CENTURY 13. 0. , . 4
u II. MACEDON AND PHILIP, . . . . 13
II III. EARLY LIFE or DEMOSTHENES, . . . 22
00 IV. DEMosTIIENEs ENTERs POLITICAL LIFE, . 32
N v. EARLY SPEECHES or DEMOSTHENES DN FOR-
EIGN POLICY, . . . . . . 44
II VI. FIRST sPEEoII OF DEMosTIIENEs AGAINST
PHILIP--SPEECH FOR THE FREEDOM or
THE PEOPLE or RIIoDEs, . . . . 67
" VII. PHILIP AND 0LYNTHUS----SPEEOHES or DEMos~
THENES 0N BEHALF or THE OLYNTHIANS, 72
u VIII. DEMOSTHENES AND MEIDIAS, . . . 84
II III. PHILIP MASTER or THERMOPYLJE AND OF
PIIooIs--PEAcE BETwEEN HIM AND ATHENS
-ooUNsEL OF DEMOSTIIENES, . . . 92
n x. DEMOSTHENES ooNTINUEs ms sPEEoIIEs
AGAINST PHILIP, . . . . . 102
" xr. CH1E1l. ONEIA--FALL or oREEoE, . . . 122
xu. CONTEST BETwEEN DEMOSTBENES AND
BSCHINE'3, . . . . . . 135
n xm. LAST DAYS or DEMOSTHENES, . . . 147
n XIV. DEMOSTHENES AT THE BAR, ' . . . 153
coNoLUsIoN, . . . . . . 172
MAP: GREECE AND ITS ADJACENT IsLANDs.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? ? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? DEMOSTHENES
INTRODUCTION.
THE familiar names of Demosthenes _and Cicero will
always be linked together. They are specially repre-
sentative names. The eloquence Of the ancient world
seems to be summed up in them. There is a further
reason why we should think of them together. Both
attached themselves to a falling cause; both had to go
into exile ; both had the satisfaction of being welcomed
back from exile; both, finally, when all was lost, were
willing to die rather than survive their country's dis-
grace. There is, indeed, a striking resemblance between
the lives and fortunes of the two men, and none of
P1utarch's parallels is more appropriate than that in
which he has compared them.
The best and noblest eloquence must be the product
of earnest political conviction. Cicero clung to the
traditions of the old republic, and regarded the concen-
tration of power in one man as equivalent to his
country's degradation and fall. The Greek statesman
A. o. s. s. vol. iv. A
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 2 DEAIOSTIIENES.
could not imagine a worse calamity than that Greece
should cease to exist as an aggregate of free, self-goverm
ing communities, and become a dependency on a foreign
kingdom or empire.
We cannot but sympathise with
such a sentiment. It was a noble one, though at the
time it may have been becoming more and more in-
capable of realisation, as indeed was the sincere belief
of some perfectly honest men who were politically
opposed to Demosthenes. The highest aspects of Greek
life, and its best influences on _the civilisation of
the world, were intimately connected with Greece as
existing according to his conception of what she ought
to be. His eloquence is at its highest when he dwells
on her fixed resolution in past days to resist to the
death anything like foreign dictation or interference.
Greece, in his view, was nothing if she once brought
herself to endure it.
On the whole, perhaps the Greek was rather a
greater figure than the Roman orator. He was at least
more single-minded and courageous. His political
career was more dignified and consistent, and there were
fewer weak moments in his life. Cicero, it is true,
was' a singularly amiable and a most accomplished
man; but he was unquestionably vain and self-com-
placent. Demosthenes gives us the idea that Athens
and Greece were always foremost in his thoughts. As
an orator and statesman he may claim to rank above
Cicero. As an orator, he was the master of a more
fervid and impressive eloquence; as a statesman, he
had more simplicity of purpose and greater moral
courage.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? INTROD UGTION. 3
The period of Demosthenes is the fourth century 13. 0.
A brief sketch of it seems almost due to our readers.
The speeches of Demosthenes cannot be understood
without some acquaintance with Greek politics. Macc-
don, too, and its rise to importance under king Philip,
deserves at least a short notice. The history of the
time is somewhat intricate, and could not be thoroughly
elucidated in a very moderate compass. An endeavour
has been made in the two following chapters to pre-
sent the reader with a view of its general character.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? CHAPTER I.
GREECE IN THE FOURTH CENTURY B. C.
ATHENS in the fifth century 13. 0. was at the head of
the Greek world. Her empire, like our own, was a
"government of dependencies. " In its nature it was
somewhat precarious. Although it was not specially
oppressive, it was in many quarters an object of ex-
treme jealousy. When Athens attempted the conquest
of Sicily, it was felt that this was but a step towards
ulterior and more dangerous designs. It was a most
hazardous attempt, under existing circumstances. On
the sea, indeed, Athens was all-powerful ; but she had
formidable enemies on land very near her--Thebes to
the north, Sparta to the south. After her great reverse
in Sicily, she was hardly a match for Sparta at the
head of the Peloponnese. She still struggled on, and
even won some victories, till the long contest, known as
the Peloponnesian War, came to an end in 405 13. 0.
with the decisive battle of fEgos-potami. There, in
the waters of the Hellespont, almost her entire fleet
was captured by the Spartan admiral, Lysander.
Sparta now succeeded to the headship of Greece.
She retained it down to the year 371 13. 0. During this
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? GREECE IN THE FOURTH CENTURY 13. 0. 5
period she contrived to make herself thoroughly hated.
Her system was to rule by means of Oligarchical factions
in the different states. These factions she supported
by military garrisons. There was a garrison for a
time in the Cadmea, or the citadel of Thebes. It was
forced into the city, and subsequently maintained there
with a flagrant disregard of justice and equity. The
Spartan king Agesilaus coolly asserted that if it was for
Sparta's interest it was right. Altogether, the Spartan
rule was much more galling than the Athenian had
been. Sparta, indeed, always seems to have been a
more selfish state than Athens. It is true that Athens
in her greatness had been spoken of as " a despot city,"
but there was at the same time a feeling that she
worthily represented Greece. This could hardly be
said of Sparta She was now cultivating friendly re-
lations with Persia, and had procured the conclusion of
a peace with that power, the terms of which were by
no means honourable to Greece. This was the peace
of Antalcidas in 387 B. o. --one of the landmarks, so to
say, in Greek history. It had ever been a Greek tra-
dition that the freedom and independence of the Greeks
in Asia ought to be upheld. By the peace of Antel-
cidas they were put under the dominion of Persia.
Athens would hardly have yielded such a point, and
in the days of her maritime supremacy she could and
would have made it impossible. Sparta was respon-
sible for this disgraceful concession. She made matters
worse by seeking to convert her headship of Greece
into a downright despotism. In doing this she wrought
infinite mischief, and may be almost said to have pre-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 6 DEMOSTHENES.
pared the way for the subsequent calamities of Greece
and its subjection to Macedon. She endeavoured per-
sistently to break up the Greek world into a number
of petty dependencies, which she might hold under
her absolute control. Her systematic policy was to
reduce Greece to a collection of separate towns and
even villages, each of which should be completely in
her own power. The idea which lay at the root of
Greek strength and greatness was, that Greece should
be made up of federations, with the leading cities at
the head of them. In the face of a common foe these
federations, it was hoped and believed, would be at-
tracted to each other, and would feel that they had a
common cause. This was Panhellenism. Sparta, by
her methods of rule, weakened this idea, and thereby
undermined the foundations of the Greek world. The
feebleness and disunion of Greece in the fourth century
13. 0. , which were so favourable to Macedon, were, in
part at least, due to Sparta's influence. In one in-
stance she inflicted the most direct and positive mischief
upon Greece. At the head of the Gulf of Torone, in
the peninsula of Ghalcidice, was the prosperous city of
Olynthus, round which had grown up a confederacy
of Greek towns that might have been an effectual
barrier against Macedon, or any other northern power.
This confederacy Sparta, true to her policy, broke up
in 379 B. (:. , and thus gave a heavy blow to Greek in-
_terests on the coasts of Macedon and Thrace. But for
this, the ZEgean and the Propontis might never have
known the presence of Macedonian cruisers, and Philip's
kingdom might have remained a poor and barbarous
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? GREECE IN THE FOURTH CENTURY B. C'u 7
territory. Olynthus, indeed, to a certain extent re-
covered herself, and became again a flourishing and
independent city; but the mischief which had been
already done was past re? medy.
With the great battle of Leuctra in 371 13. 0. Sparta's
ascendancy ceased. Thebes was now raised by the
illustrious Epameinondas into the first place in Greece.
North of the Peloponnese she could do as she pleased.
She had Thessaly quite under her control, and Macedon
was little better than a dependency. Her next step,
after Leuctra, was to strengthen herself in the Pelopon-
Iiese, and to complete the humiliation of Sparta. This _
was done by the founding of the two cities Megalopolis
:indMessene, under the direction of Epameinondas.
Sparta, as we have seen, aimed at breaking up and dis-
solving federations; Thebes, on the contrary, formed
the Arcadian townships, forty in number, into a con-
federacy, of which Megalopolis, the Great City, was
made the centre. Messeno was then founded on Mount
Ithome, and became the rallying-place of a population
Which had long been unwillingly subject to Sparta.
What had hitherto been Spartan territory was actually
annexed to it. Sparta's limits were thus greatly nar-
rowed. On the north and on the west she was con-
fronted by independent mmmunities, and her position
in the Peloponnese was wellnigh destroyed. Though
Thebes soon fell back from the pre-eminence to which
the genius of Epameinondas had lifted her, Sparta was
never able to regain her ancient prestige.
Athens, from some cause or other, had much more
elasticity and power of recovery than Sparta. There
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 8 DEMOSTHENES. _ _ '
was a life and sprightliness about her citizens which
made them quickly forget calamities and rise to new
hopes and aspirations. So it was with them after
Leuetra. Athens at once was fired with the ambition
of winning back her old empire; and she actually suc-
ceeded in again becoming the head of a powerful con-
federacy. The disgust which Sparta had provoked
throughout the Greek world was no doubt a great help
to Athens. Once more her fleet sailed supreme over
the . /Egean. As a matter of course, the chief islands
joined her alliance. A synod of deputies from her allies
and dependents obeyed her summons, and contribu-
tions were voted for the common cause. She had able.
men--such as Timotheus, Iphicrates, and Chabrias---
to command her forces. At the time of Philip's acces-
sion to the throne of Macedon in 359 B. o. , Athens was
the first state in Greece. She was not specially well
fitted for war on land, and was in this respect inferior
to Thebes, which could send out an army in the highest
efficiency. But by sea she was, beyond comparison,
the first power. Rhodes, Chios, Cos, and the important_
cities of Perinthus and Byzantium, were her allies. -
Samos, off the coast of Lydia, and Thasos, Lemnos,
Imbros in the north of the ]Egean, had been recently
conquered by her; she was in possession of the Thra-
cian Chersonese, of Pydna and Methone on the coast
of Macedon, and of Potideea and other towns in the
peninsula of Chalcidice. The waters of the ZEgean
were thus an Athenian lake. But she could not hold
together this confederation. She had no proper control
over her generals. They were not in fact the servants
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? GREECE IN THE 'FOURTH CENTURY RC'. 9
of the state, but men of the " Condottieri" type. As a
rule, they commanded mercenaries, for whom they could
not provide pay without systematically plundering the
allies. These generals really maintained their troops
by means of "forced benevolences. " It could hardly
be expected that all this would be patiently endured.
In 358 B. 0. the Social War, as it was termed, broke
out--Rhodes and Byzantium, it would seem, leading
the revolt. It lasted two years. The efforts of Athens
appear to have been rather fitful and wanting in vigour.
When a rumour came that Persia was about to support
the revolted allies with a fleet of 300 ships, Athens
gave up the struggle and acknowledged their indepen-
dence. The confederation, of which for a brief space
she had been the head, was thus at an end.
This was a great blow to Athens. She was still
powerful by sea, but she was very much impoverished,
a large part of her revenue having been lost to her
through the secession of several of her richest allies.
VVas it not now best for her to rest from her ambition,
and to think no more of " a spirited foreign policy '''I So
argued one of her citizens, the famous orator Isocrates.
He complains that his countrymen "were so infatuated
that while they themselves wanted the means of sub-
sistence they were undertaking to maintain mercenaries,
and were maltreating their allies and levying tribute
from them, in order that they might provide pay for
the common enemies of mankind. " By these he means
the generals, of whom also Demosthenes, his political
opponent, says, in one of his speeches, that "they go
ranging about and behaving everywhere as the common
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 10 DEMOSTHENES.
enemies of all who wish to live in freedom according to
their own laws. " Athens, he contends, might recover
from the losses and disasters of the Social War, if
she would only eschew for the future a meddling and
aggressive policy, be prepared for self-defence, and de-
vote herself to commerce and to the arts of peace. In
this way she would, with the great natural advantages
she possessed, very soon again become rich and pros-
perous. This was the advice of Isocrates.
? ? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? ? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? ? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? DEMOSTHENES
BY THE
REV. W. J. IQRODRIBB, M. A.
UTE FELLOW OF ST JOHN'S COI-I-BGl|
CAMBRIDGE
PHILADELPHIA:
J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO.
18? 0. .
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 3605
I880
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? NOTE.
FOR the extracts from the speeches of Demosthenes
given in this volume I am to a considerable extent
indebted to the scholarly version of the late Mr C. R.
Kennedy. For the famous speech on the Crown, I
have made occasional use of a translation recently
published by an eminent English lawyer, the Right
Hon_ Sir Robert Collier. The same speech was, some
years ago, translated by Mr William Brandt, a scholar
of Oriel College, Oxford, whose premature death cut
short a. life of great promise. His rendering of the
Greek orator is spirited and vigorous, and I wish to
express my obligations to it.
W. J. B.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? ? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? CONTENTS
. PAC!
INTRODUCTION, . . . . . . . . 1
CHAP. I. GREECE IN THE FOURTH CENTURY 13. 0. , . 4
u II. MACEDON AND PHILIP, . . . . 13
II III. EARLY LIFE or DEMOSTHENES, . . . 22
00 IV. DEMosTIIENEs ENTERs POLITICAL LIFE, . 32
N v. EARLY SPEECHES or DEMOSTHENES DN FOR-
EIGN POLICY, . . . . . . 44
II VI. FIRST sPEEoII OF DEMosTIIENEs AGAINST
PHILIP--SPEECH FOR THE FREEDOM or
THE PEOPLE or RIIoDEs, . . . . 67
" VII. PHILIP AND 0LYNTHUS----SPEEOHES or DEMos~
THENES 0N BEHALF or THE OLYNTHIANS, 72
u VIII. DEMOSTHENES AND MEIDIAS, . . . 84
II III. PHILIP MASTER or THERMOPYLJE AND OF
PIIooIs--PEAcE BETwEEN HIM AND ATHENS
-ooUNsEL OF DEMOSTIIENES, . . . 92
n x. DEMOSTHENES ooNTINUEs ms sPEEoIIEs
AGAINST PHILIP, . . . . . 102
" xr. CH1E1l. ONEIA--FALL or oREEoE, . . . 122
xu. CONTEST BETwEEN DEMOSTBENES AND
BSCHINE'3, . . . . . . 135
n xm. LAST DAYS or DEMOSTHENES, . . . 147
n XIV. DEMOSTHENES AT THE BAR, ' . . . 153
coNoLUsIoN, . . . . . . 172
MAP: GREECE AND ITS ADJACENT IsLANDs.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? ? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? DEMOSTHENES
INTRODUCTION.
THE familiar names of Demosthenes _and Cicero will
always be linked together. They are specially repre-
sentative names. The eloquence Of the ancient world
seems to be summed up in them. There is a further
reason why we should think of them together. Both
attached themselves to a falling cause; both had to go
into exile ; both had the satisfaction of being welcomed
back from exile; both, finally, when all was lost, were
willing to die rather than survive their country's dis-
grace. There is, indeed, a striking resemblance between
the lives and fortunes of the two men, and none of
P1utarch's parallels is more appropriate than that in
which he has compared them.
The best and noblest eloquence must be the product
of earnest political conviction. Cicero clung to the
traditions of the old republic, and regarded the concen-
tration of power in one man as equivalent to his
country's degradation and fall. The Greek statesman
A. o. s. s. vol. iv. A
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 2 DEAIOSTIIENES.
could not imagine a worse calamity than that Greece
should cease to exist as an aggregate of free, self-goverm
ing communities, and become a dependency on a foreign
kingdom or empire.
We cannot but sympathise with
such a sentiment. It was a noble one, though at the
time it may have been becoming more and more in-
capable of realisation, as indeed was the sincere belief
of some perfectly honest men who were politically
opposed to Demosthenes. The highest aspects of Greek
life, and its best influences on _the civilisation of
the world, were intimately connected with Greece as
existing according to his conception of what she ought
to be. His eloquence is at its highest when he dwells
on her fixed resolution in past days to resist to the
death anything like foreign dictation or interference.
Greece, in his view, was nothing if she once brought
herself to endure it.
On the whole, perhaps the Greek was rather a
greater figure than the Roman orator. He was at least
more single-minded and courageous. His political
career was more dignified and consistent, and there were
fewer weak moments in his life. Cicero, it is true,
was' a singularly amiable and a most accomplished
man; but he was unquestionably vain and self-com-
placent. Demosthenes gives us the idea that Athens
and Greece were always foremost in his thoughts. As
an orator and statesman he may claim to rank above
Cicero. As an orator, he was the master of a more
fervid and impressive eloquence; as a statesman, he
had more simplicity of purpose and greater moral
courage.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? INTROD UGTION. 3
The period of Demosthenes is the fourth century 13. 0.
A brief sketch of it seems almost due to our readers.
The speeches of Demosthenes cannot be understood
without some acquaintance with Greek politics. Macc-
don, too, and its rise to importance under king Philip,
deserves at least a short notice. The history of the
time is somewhat intricate, and could not be thoroughly
elucidated in a very moderate compass. An endeavour
has been made in the two following chapters to pre-
sent the reader with a view of its general character.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:55 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? CHAPTER I.
GREECE IN THE FOURTH CENTURY B. C.
ATHENS in the fifth century 13. 0. was at the head of
the Greek world. Her empire, like our own, was a
"government of dependencies. " In its nature it was
somewhat precarious. Although it was not specially
oppressive, it was in many quarters an object of ex-
treme jealousy. When Athens attempted the conquest
of Sicily, it was felt that this was but a step towards
ulterior and more dangerous designs. It was a most
hazardous attempt, under existing circumstances. On
the sea, indeed, Athens was all-powerful ; but she had
formidable enemies on land very near her--Thebes to
the north, Sparta to the south. After her great reverse
in Sicily, she was hardly a match for Sparta at the
head of the Peloponnese. She still struggled on, and
even won some victories, till the long contest, known as
the Peloponnesian War, came to an end in 405 13. 0.
with the decisive battle of fEgos-potami. There, in
the waters of the Hellespont, almost her entire fleet
was captured by the Spartan admiral, Lysander.
Sparta now succeeded to the headship of Greece.
She retained it down to the year 371 13. 0. During this
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? GREECE IN THE FOURTH CENTURY 13. 0. 5
period she contrived to make herself thoroughly hated.
Her system was to rule by means of Oligarchical factions
in the different states. These factions she supported
by military garrisons. There was a garrison for a
time in the Cadmea, or the citadel of Thebes. It was
forced into the city, and subsequently maintained there
with a flagrant disregard of justice and equity. The
Spartan king Agesilaus coolly asserted that if it was for
Sparta's interest it was right. Altogether, the Spartan
rule was much more galling than the Athenian had
been. Sparta, indeed, always seems to have been a
more selfish state than Athens. It is true that Athens
in her greatness had been spoken of as " a despot city,"
but there was at the same time a feeling that she
worthily represented Greece. This could hardly be
said of Sparta She was now cultivating friendly re-
lations with Persia, and had procured the conclusion of
a peace with that power, the terms of which were by
no means honourable to Greece. This was the peace
of Antalcidas in 387 B. o. --one of the landmarks, so to
say, in Greek history. It had ever been a Greek tra-
dition that the freedom and independence of the Greeks
in Asia ought to be upheld. By the peace of Antel-
cidas they were put under the dominion of Persia.
Athens would hardly have yielded such a point, and
in the days of her maritime supremacy she could and
would have made it impossible. Sparta was respon-
sible for this disgraceful concession. She made matters
worse by seeking to convert her headship of Greece
into a downright despotism. In doing this she wrought
infinite mischief, and may be almost said to have pre-
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? 6 DEMOSTHENES.
pared the way for the subsequent calamities of Greece
and its subjection to Macedon. She endeavoured per-
sistently to break up the Greek world into a number
of petty dependencies, which she might hold under
her absolute control. Her systematic policy was to
reduce Greece to a collection of separate towns and
even villages, each of which should be completely in
her own power. The idea which lay at the root of
Greek strength and greatness was, that Greece should
be made up of federations, with the leading cities at
the head of them. In the face of a common foe these
federations, it was hoped and believed, would be at-
tracted to each other, and would feel that they had a
common cause. This was Panhellenism. Sparta, by
her methods of rule, weakened this idea, and thereby
undermined the foundations of the Greek world. The
feebleness and disunion of Greece in the fourth century
13. 0. , which were so favourable to Macedon, were, in
part at least, due to Sparta's influence. In one in-
stance she inflicted the most direct and positive mischief
upon Greece. At the head of the Gulf of Torone, in
the peninsula of Ghalcidice, was the prosperous city of
Olynthus, round which had grown up a confederacy
of Greek towns that might have been an effectual
barrier against Macedon, or any other northern power.
This confederacy Sparta, true to her policy, broke up
in 379 B. (:. , and thus gave a heavy blow to Greek in-
_terests on the coasts of Macedon and Thrace. But for
this, the ZEgean and the Propontis might never have
known the presence of Macedonian cruisers, and Philip's
kingdom might have remained a poor and barbarous
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? GREECE IN THE FOURTH CENTURY B. C'u 7
territory. Olynthus, indeed, to a certain extent re-
covered herself, and became again a flourishing and
independent city; but the mischief which had been
already done was past re? medy.
With the great battle of Leuctra in 371 13. 0. Sparta's
ascendancy ceased. Thebes was now raised by the
illustrious Epameinondas into the first place in Greece.
North of the Peloponnese she could do as she pleased.
She had Thessaly quite under her control, and Macedon
was little better than a dependency. Her next step,
after Leuctra, was to strengthen herself in the Pelopon-
Iiese, and to complete the humiliation of Sparta. This _
was done by the founding of the two cities Megalopolis
:indMessene, under the direction of Epameinondas.
Sparta, as we have seen, aimed at breaking up and dis-
solving federations; Thebes, on the contrary, formed
the Arcadian townships, forty in number, into a con-
federacy, of which Megalopolis, the Great City, was
made the centre. Messeno was then founded on Mount
Ithome, and became the rallying-place of a population
Which had long been unwillingly subject to Sparta.
What had hitherto been Spartan territory was actually
annexed to it. Sparta's limits were thus greatly nar-
rowed. On the north and on the west she was con-
fronted by independent mmmunities, and her position
in the Peloponnese was wellnigh destroyed. Though
Thebes soon fell back from the pre-eminence to which
the genius of Epameinondas had lifted her, Sparta was
never able to regain her ancient prestige.
Athens, from some cause or other, had much more
elasticity and power of recovery than Sparta. There
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? 8 DEMOSTHENES. _ _ '
was a life and sprightliness about her citizens which
made them quickly forget calamities and rise to new
hopes and aspirations. So it was with them after
Leuetra. Athens at once was fired with the ambition
of winning back her old empire; and she actually suc-
ceeded in again becoming the head of a powerful con-
federacy. The disgust which Sparta had provoked
throughout the Greek world was no doubt a great help
to Athens. Once more her fleet sailed supreme over
the . /Egean. As a matter of course, the chief islands
joined her alliance. A synod of deputies from her allies
and dependents obeyed her summons, and contribu-
tions were voted for the common cause. She had able.
men--such as Timotheus, Iphicrates, and Chabrias---
to command her forces. At the time of Philip's acces-
sion to the throne of Macedon in 359 B. o. , Athens was
the first state in Greece. She was not specially well
fitted for war on land, and was in this respect inferior
to Thebes, which could send out an army in the highest
efficiency. But by sea she was, beyond comparison,
the first power. Rhodes, Chios, Cos, and the important_
cities of Perinthus and Byzantium, were her allies. -
Samos, off the coast of Lydia, and Thasos, Lemnos,
Imbros in the north of the ]Egean, had been recently
conquered by her; she was in possession of the Thra-
cian Chersonese, of Pydna and Methone on the coast
of Macedon, and of Potideea and other towns in the
peninsula of Chalcidice. The waters of the ZEgean
were thus an Athenian lake. But she could not hold
together this confederation. She had no proper control
over her generals. They were not in fact the servants
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? GREECE IN THE 'FOURTH CENTURY RC'. 9
of the state, but men of the " Condottieri" type. As a
rule, they commanded mercenaries, for whom they could
not provide pay without systematically plundering the
allies. These generals really maintained their troops
by means of "forced benevolences. " It could hardly
be expected that all this would be patiently endured.
In 358 B. 0. the Social War, as it was termed, broke
out--Rhodes and Byzantium, it would seem, leading
the revolt. It lasted two years. The efforts of Athens
appear to have been rather fitful and wanting in vigour.
When a rumour came that Persia was about to support
the revolted allies with a fleet of 300 ships, Athens
gave up the struggle and acknowledged their indepen-
dence. The confederation, of which for a brief space
she had been the head, was thus at an end.
This was a great blow to Athens. She was still
powerful by sea, but she was very much impoverished,
a large part of her revenue having been lost to her
through the secession of several of her richest allies.
VVas it not now best for her to rest from her ambition,
and to think no more of " a spirited foreign policy '''I So
argued one of her citizens, the famous orator Isocrates.
He complains that his countrymen "were so infatuated
that while they themselves wanted the means of sub-
sistence they were undertaking to maintain mercenaries,
and were maltreating their allies and levying tribute
from them, in order that they might provide pay for
the common enemies of mankind. " By these he means
the generals, of whom also Demosthenes, his political
opponent, says, in one of his speeches, that "they go
ranging about and behaving everywhere as the common
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? 10 DEMOSTHENES.
enemies of all who wish to live in freedom according to
their own laws. " Athens, he contends, might recover
from the losses and disasters of the Social War, if
she would only eschew for the future a meddling and
aggressive policy, be prepared for self-defence, and de-
vote herself to commerce and to the arts of peace. In
this way she would, with the great natural advantages
she possessed, very soon again become rich and pros-
perous. This was the advice of Isocrates.
