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282
? TRANSLATORS' PREFACE
What is printed here is a translation of the first volume of Frege's posthumous writings and correspondence published by Felix Meiner, Hamburg 1969, under the editorship of Hans Hermes, Friedrich Kambartel and Friedrich Kaulbach. Whilst we have naturally translated everything in the volume which is by Frege's hand, we have chosen to omit much of the editorial apparatus. Thus we have not translated the three introductory exegetical essays by the editors, though we have translated their history of the Frege NachlajJ-leaving out, however, parts that are taken up with editorial minutiae and a general discussion of the difficulties of deciding on dates and titles for some of the pieces. Again, we have not translated all of their footnotes, many of which are exegetical, though we have translated such as relate to the composition or dating of the individual pieces, or give the provenance of some quotation in the text or (where we think it helpful) the authorship of some view that Frege is discussing. We have, finally, omitted the bibliography of Frege's published work and translations thereof.
We ourselves have added footnotes where some difficulty in translation seemed to call for comment or where we thought one necessary if the reader was to follow the argument. Asterisked footnotes are Frege's own; numbered footnotes are either ours or the editors' and are marked accordingly. Matter within square brackets is either editorial or added by ourselves where we have made some interpolation to assist the reader-as, for instance, where there is some play on words in the German which is inevitably lost in the English translation. It should be clear in each case whether the intervention is ours or the editors'.
We have not thought it necessary to provide the reader with a glossary, but some key terms call for comment here either because of their inherent difficulty or because we have adopted different renderings from previous translators.
First and foremost we have parted company with all previous English translators of Frege by rendering 'bedeuten' and 'Bedeutung' as 'mean' and 'meaning'. We have done this throughout, both before and after he formulated his celebrated distinction between Sinn (sense) and Bedeutung (except of course where the obvious translation of 'Bedeutung' is 'importance' or 'significance'). And cognate terms such as 'bedeutungsvotr and 'gleichbedeutend' we have accordingly rendered by 'meaningful' and 'having the same meaning'. 'Meaning' is, after all, the natural English equivalent for? 'Bedeutung', and renderings such as 'reference' and 'denotation' are strictly incorrect and have only been adopted by other
? Translators' Preface VII
translators for exegetical reasons. We have thought it better not to beg questions of exegesis by suggesting through translation a certain view of what Frege meant in his later writings by 'Bedeutung', leaving it rather to the reader to form his own judgement of the contrast Frege intended by his Sinn-Bedeutung distinction. If his later use of 'bedeuten' and 'Bedeutung' reads oddly in German, this oddness should be reflected in translation and uot ironed out by mistranslation.
? Satz' we have almost always rendered by 'sentence'. For Frege a Satz is 11 series of sounds or written signs which, unlike the thought or sense expressed by it, can be perceived by the senses. That this is how Frege normally used the word is clear from many passages in these writings; the reader may be referred, for instance, to the discussion of truth at the beginning of the second piece entitled 'Logic' or to his remarks at the hcginning of the short piece entitled 'A brief Survey of my logical I>octrines'. Sometimes, however, the word is rather to be translated 'theorem', as in the notes on Hilbert's Foundations ofGeometry. Where the word creates difficulties, as in certain compound nouns, we have helped the 1eader by giving the German alongside the English.
? Vorstellung' is a notorious crux for translators and we have by and large rendered it by 'idea', preferring this in general to the quasi-technical 'representation' with its Kantian overtones and the too narrow 'image'. Admittedly our rendering reads awkwardly in some contexts and may mislead the unwary. But Frege, again in the second piece entitled 'Logic', helps the reader by explaining how he is there using 'Vorstellung' and we have occasionally singled out the word for special mention where we thought there was a danger of misunderstanding.
Another term which has occasioned us some difficulty is 'anerkennen'. It is tempting at first sight to render this by 'acknowledge' or 'accept', reserving 'recognize' for 'erkennen'. But when Frege says that to assert (hehaupten) something is to express the Anerkennen of a thought, the more lllttural rendering seems to be 'recognition'. On the other hand, when he says that to reject (verwerfen) a thought is to anerkennen the opposite thought, the natural rendering seems to be 'accept' or 'acknowledge'.
'Begriffsschrift' we have translated 'concept-script', preferring this to the other translations we have seen. For 'beurteilbarer Inhalt' we have used 'content of possible judgement' in preference to 'possible content of judgement'. For 'vertreten' as used by Frege of what he calls 'indefinitely indicating letters' we have preferred 'stand in for' to 'represent'. And finally, where 'Anzahl' ('natural number') occurs in the text, as opposed to 'Zahl' ('number'), we have usually noted the fact.
Perhaps we should point out, by way of conclusion, that many of the pieces printed here were not written up by Frege for publication. Some, for instance, are preliminary drafts ofpapers, some merely summarize his views or are in the form of diary notes, and the longest piece in the book-Logic In Mathematics-is probably a set of lecture notes. The reader should not
? VIII Translators' Preface
therefore hold it against the author if the style is occasionally rough and some of the constructions awkward, or if here and there points are laboured too heavily. Still, throughout these writings, whether polished or not, we find that formidable clarity which distinguishes the work he published. If one chose a motto for the title page of this volume, what could be more apt than Vauvernarques' 'La clarte est la bonne foi des philosophes'?
? ? IIISTORY OF THE FREGE NACHLAjJ AND THE BASIS FOR THIS EDITION1
When Frege died in Bad Kleinen on 26 July 1925, he left to his adopted son, 1he engineer Alfred Frege, a quantity of important scientific papers. 2 These mduded unpublished manuscripts of some length, almost all of which, however, were incomplete or in the form of drafts; notes and drafts of lcllers, as well as a large number of letters from his most important m:ademic correspondents. In a short note attached to his will dated 1 January 1925 Frege wrote concerning his bequest:
Dear Alfred,
Do not despise the pieces I have written. Even if all is not gold, there is gold in them. I believe there are things here which will one day be prized much more highly than they are now. Take care that nothing gets lost.
Your loving father. It is a large part of myself which I bequeath to you herewith.
The papers Frege left remained in Alfred Frege's keeping for more than a decade; on 26 November 1925 he handed over, amongst other things, a series of letters addressed to Frege (these included Russell's letters) to the t:hemist and historian of science Ludwig Darmstaedter for the latter's wllection in the Prussian State Library. He may have been moved to do this hy the fact that Darmstaedter had some time previous been in touch with Frege concerning the collection he was compiling, with the result that in 1919 he had received from Frege the piece printed on pp. 253-257. The manuscripts handed over to Darmstaedter in 1925 also included drafts of Frege's letters to Russell and rough copies of the hand-written sheets that Darmstaedter had received in 1919.
1 Cf. the account Der wissenschqftliche Nachlass von Gottlob Frege by H. Scholz and F. Bachmann in the Actes du congres international de philosophie scientifique, Paris 1935, Vol. VIII: Histoire de la logique et de la philosophie scientifique (published Paris 1936), pp. 24-30 (ed. ).
2 The papers here called 'scientific ['wissenschqftlich'] dealt of course with logic, philosophy and the foundations of mathematics. We have no equivalent in English for the German term: the noun ? Wissenschqft', which in the main text we have sometimes rendered by 'discipline', may be applied to any field of study, and not only to such as we should normally call 'scientific'. AI other places in this history we have used the word 'scientific' in the same convenient, if improper, sense (trans. ).
? X History ofthe Frege Nachlal3 and the Basisfor this Edition
In the thirties particular attention was devoted to Frege's writings by what was known at the time as 'Philosophisches Seminar B' [Department of Philosophy (B)] of the University of Munster; the head of department was H. Scholz and the department later became the well-known first German Institut fiir mathematische Logik und Grundlagenforschung [Institute for Mathematical Logic and Foundation Studies]. It was in this connection that Scholz tried to find out what had become of the writings Frege had left behind at his death [Frege's NachlajJ]. In 1935 he discovered where Frege's adopted son was living and entered into correspondence with him. Alfred Frege said that he was prepared to hand over Frege's NachlajJ to Scholz and his collaborators 'on the understanding', as Scholz and Bachmann write, 'that we should go over the papers and see whether they were suitable for publication and then deposit them in the library of the University of Munster in Westphalia'. Alfred Frege retained proprietary rights over Frege's NachlajJ, but on 26 July 1935 he made a written statement to the effect that in the event of his death Scholz should have the right of disposing
of the NachlajJ as he thought fit.
Scholz and Bachmann, his collaborator at that time, set to work
immediately and were able to report in detail on the Frege NachlajJ in their paper to the International Congress for scientific Philosophy which was held in Paris from 15 to 21 September 1935. In their address they issued a request that any letters of Frege's should be made available for the Frege archives in Munster. In the following years Scholz was able to get hold of a large number of Frege's letters, either originals or copies, for the Munster collection. In particular, Russell gave him the letters Frege had written to him.
Once Scholz had achieved an overall picture of the Frege NachlajJ, he decided to prepare a selection of shorter writings which was to include important unpublished papers and the correspondence with Russell. Three volumes of roughly 300 pages each were planned. Scholz was able to elicit the support of the Notgemeinschaft der deutschen Wissenschaft for this project. The group which then took up work on the edition included, besides Scholz and Bachmann, Dr Albrecht Becker and Marga Tietz. Where reference is made by the present editors to 'previous editors' of the NachlajJ, in nearly every case it is this group which is meant.
A letter written to Scholz on 2 March 1936 by the then Librarian of the University Library in Munster reveals that as early as 15 February 1936 Scholz had announced his intention of handing over to the Library, in accordance with the disposition made by Alfred Frege, the pieces entrusted to him. It was quite clear, however, that the NachlajJ remained in Department of Philosophy (B) right up to October 1943 and was only then deposited in the University Library because of the danger of its being destroyed by the air raids which were growing more and more frequent. However, this safety precaution pro~ed futile. The Frege NachlqjJ was destroyed by fire during the bombing of the city of Munster on 25 March 1945, in the course of which
? History ofthe Frege Nachlaf3 and the Basisfor this Edition XI
the University Library was badly hit. Scholz later wrote 'The work we were t? ngaged on has suffered immeasurably from the bombing.
The whole of the original material, which after an initial shock to the foundations in October I
After months of enquiries this information was communicated to me, a few weeks ago, by the present University I,ibrarian.
' Information subsequently obtained from Dr Heinrich Jansen, who had been in charge of the manuscript section of the University Library, confirmed the fact of the destruction of the NachlajJ and that it had happened on the date given above.
The Second World War not only led to the loss of the Frege manuscripts deposited at Munster; it brought the work on the three volume edition of 1:rcge's shorter writings to a virtual standstill. Nevertheless, in the course of preparing this edition typescript copies of most of the important pieces from the Nachla}J had been made. Scholz has managed to save the majority of these typescripts, either top copies or carbons, from being destroyed. It is these typescripts which have formed the basis of all subsequent projects for editing the NachlajJ.
Not long after the end of the war Scholz again took up his plan of preparing a three volume selection of Frege's writings. In 1947, with the support of the Forderergesellschaft of Munster University, he had copies made of most of the surviving pieces. The following extract from a letter he wrote gives one some idea of the stringencies of the post-war situation with which Scholz had to contend and the characteristic way in which he tried to cope with them:
The Rector,
Professor Dr E. Lehnartz
Dear Rector,
I request that, in the event of a supplementary delivery of coal becoming available for next winter, urgently required heating material should be allocated to mefor my study in Melcherstr. 26 II. This is far and away the largest room in our flat. The large library, which I was able to preserve, is kept there. The room is at least 25 metres square and is adjoined on one side by a glass verandah which inevitably acts as a cold-trap in winter. The room is heated by an efficient cylindrical stove.
The reason for my request:
I have to edit Gottlob Frege's 'Shorter Writings' for the occasion of the centenary of his birth in July of next year; these include the large corpus of writings which I unearthed, writings which this great German master, who pioneered work into the foundations of mathematics, left behind at his death. Until the outbreak of war this work was supported by the Notgemeinschaft der deutschen Wissenschqft. At that time the material existed in its entirety in carefully prepared transcripts divided into three
Munster, 23. 5. 47 Westring 17 I
? ? XII History ofthe Frege Nachlal3 and the Basisfor this Edition
volumes of around 300 pages each. The outbreak of war prevented this edition from appearing. With the exception of a series of carbon copies, I handed over this valuable material, along with the originals, to the University Library for safe keeping. Nevertheless it was all destroyed. I therefore have to have everything copied out once more from the surviving carbon copies,1 since I cannot possibly part with the only documents now remaining to me. A few weeks ago I was at last able to obtain a suitable person for the work of copying this material. She is paid out of the funds which have been placed at my disposal for this purpose by the Forderergesellschaft of the University acting under your chair- manship. I myself have made the large typewriter in my study available for this purpose. The work has to be done in this room since no other is available. It will, in any event, take up the whole of the winter. It cannot be postponed if the first volume at least is to come out in the course of next year. . . .
Yours sincerely,
Heinrich Scholz
The first volume did not, however, come out in 1948 or later. During the last decade of his life, serious illness made it increasingly difficult for Scholz to do sustained work. And so the edition at which he had laboured so doggedly since 1935 was still incomplete when he died at the end of 1956. Upon Scholz's retirement he was succeeded in the chair of Mathematical Logic and Foundation Studies by his pupil H. Hermes. And so, in accordance with the disposition made by Alfred Frege, Hermes, as Scholz's nominee, became responsible for preparing the edition ofFrege's Nachlaft.
The first impetus to renew work on this edition came in 1957 when Michael Dummett, the English Frege scholar, spent a period of study in the Institute for Mathematical Logic and Foundation Studies in Munster. Working from the notes Scholz had made in the thirties and the copies to be found in Scholz's Nachlaft, he made a preliminary conspectus of the material that Scholz had originally gathered together and the corpus that had survived. In addition, he tried to enlist the support of English trusts for the planned edition. Since this proved fruitless, nothing further came of this first initiative that succeeded Scholz's death. Nevertheless, Dummett's spade-work was an important help to the present editors, which they were thankful to receive. In a second effort to get things moving Hermes succeeded in persuading his two co-editors in 1961 to form a team, and this team has subsequently been engaged in preparing Frege's posthumous writings and his scientific correspondence for publication. In 1962 the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft gave its support for the undertaking, with the result that work could be delegated to assistants. Among these assistants Dr Walburga Schwering, now Dr R6dding, and Herr Gottfried Gabriel have
1 Though, as we mentioned earlier, some of the top copies were found in Scholz's NachlqfJ (ed. ).
? History ofthe Frege Nachlaf3 and the Basis for this Edition Xlll
JJJadc such a substantial contribution to the completion of this volume that they are named on the title page.
l'hc first thing the editors decided was that they would depart from the plan that Scholz had followed so consistently. They gave up the idea of a ? . rkctcd edition, and decided upon a complete edition of Frege's extant ? ,rJL'ntitic writings and letters whether these were available as originals, mpics or transcripts. They made an exception only of drafts that had been written up and published. Since it was expected that a new impression or phlltomechanical reproduction-now completed-of all Frege's previously published writings would be published by the Wissenschaftlichen llut'hgesellschaft (Darmstadt) and the publishing house of G. Olms (Hildes- ll! 'im), the editors were able to exclude these. The editors therefore l? onlined themselves to preparing a complete edition in three volumes of <lottlob Frege's posthumous writings and scientific correspondence, the present first volume of which contains the whole of the extant Nachla}J, rxcluding the letters.
Scholz's death meant that the transcripts of the Frege Nachla}J that had ? . urvived became in turn part of a Nachla}J. Since in the post-war years Scholz had worked alone on his projected edition, all that was known about the history of the material, of how it was arranged and of how complete it was, was lost with him. As a result the editors had first to set to work and dassify anew the pieces from amongst Scholz's papers that he had managed to preserve.
lt is most unlikely that any scientific writings of Frege that Alfred Frege did not pass on to Scholz could have survived the war. Alfred Frege died in action on 15 June 1944 at Montesson near Paris. What became of his possessions is not known.
l'hc editors thank the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft for their financial support in the preparation and printing of this volume, the University Libraries in Constance and Munster for their help in obtaining literature, the publishing house of Meiner for the care and patience it devoted, to such ! (nod effect, to this difficult text, Dr Lothar Kreiser (Leipzig) and Dr llcinrich Schepers (Munster) for valuable suggestions, and in particular those who collaborated in preparing this edition, amongst whom special mention must be made of Heinz Albert Veraart, as well as Gottfried Gabriel nnd Dr Walburga Rodding. Those others who have contributed from the thirties to the present day to the preparation and publication of the Frege Nachla}J with advice, information and assistance are too numerous to be listed here. To these, too, we wish to extend our warm gratitude.
H. Hermes F. Kambartel F. Kaulbach
? Logic 1 [between 1879 and 1891]
A. Introduction.
Essence, subject-matter.
Different from psychology, related to ethics. On method.
11 <'ontent of possible judgement. Negation. duplex negatio.
Combining contents of possible judgement into a new content. and, neither-nor and not etc.
Inferences.
( ? Analysis of a judgement. Concept, object.
Generality, condition, consequence. Or. Subordination of concepts. Existential judgements. (There is).
Elimination of auxiliary objects. Inferences involving particular judgements. Relation-concepts. Pairs.
I>. Ikfinitionofconcepts.
By means of characteristic marks. More complicated cases.
1'. . I>efinition of objects.
Indirect by means of concepts. Direct. Judgements in which something is recognized as the same again.
Improper existential judgements.
[A. Introduction]
121'. 1 Truth. Judging. Asserting.
Truth independent of our recognition.
Grounds that do-and grounds that do not-justify such recognition. The latter take place according to psychological laws, have no relation to truth.
1 In this piece (cf. Frege's footnote, p. 6) we clearly have a fragment of what was Intended as a textbook on logic.
! 'he footnote on p. 6 refers to the Begriffschrift {1879). In section B of the table 111' (on tents Frege uses the expression 'content of possible judgement'. From a letter 111 llusscrl dated 24. 5. 1891 it is clear that he had given up using this designation by lhr first half of 1891 at the latest. Therefore the present piece should be dated ! Jetween 1879 and 1891 (ed. ).
? ? 2 [2f. ] [3]
[4] [5]
[5f. ]
Logic
Superstitions about the weather have a basis in experience. Furnishing grounds of this kind is no proof.
Grounds that aflord a justification are often found in other truths. Inference. To establish laws of inference is the task of logic. Logic, like psychology, has for its subject-matter things that cannot be perceived by the senses. There is a sharp divide, however, marked by 'true'. Logic considers its objects in so far as they are true. What is true is true independently of the person who recognizes it to be true, and so is not a product of an inner process.
Comparison with ethics.
Comment on technical terms of logic. Rejection of psychological distinctions.
Isolating what is psychological, by consciously marking it off. Warning against confusing points of view and switching from one question to another. Danger lies in language. Translation possible? Yes, so far as the logical kernel is concerned. Value of learning languages for one's logical education.
[6] The formula-language of algebra: analysis of the logically complex. Reducing the laws of logic to one another.
The goal of scientific endeavour is truth. Inwardly to recognize something as true is to make a judgement, and to give expression to this judgement is to make an assertion.
What is true is true independently of our recognizing it as such. We can make mistakes. The grounds on which we make a judgement may justify our recognizing it as true; they may, however, merely give rise to our making a judgement, or make up our minds for us, without containing a justification for our judgement. Although each judgement we make is causally conditioned, it is nevertheless not the case that all these causes are grounds that afford a justification. There is an empirical tendency in philosophy which does not take sufficient heed of this distinction, and so, because our thinking takes its rise from experience, philosophy ends up by declaring all our knowledge to be empirical. The causes which merely give rise to acts of judgement do so in accordance with psychological laws; they are just as capable of leading to error as of leading to truth; theY. have no inherent relation to truth whatsoever; they know nothing of the opposition of true and false. The farmer whose fortunes are, for good or ill, bound up with the weather, seeks for means of determining what it will be like in advance. Little wonder that he attempts to link phases of the moon with variations in the weather and asks himself whether a full moon does not herald a change in the weather. If this appears to be confirmed-as may well be the case, since by and large the weather does not change abruptly and since it is not altogether easy to say whether the weather has changed-from that moment on he believes the weather is connected with
? Logic 3
1ht? moon, and this belief takes root because the cases that speak in its lnvour make a greater impression than those that do not and imprint themselves more firmly on his memory; and he thinks he now knows this 1mm experience. This is exactly what experience is in the case of the said t'mpirical tendency amongst philosophers. And so it is with every ~uperstition. Usually it is possible to make out the psychological causes. <'learly such an account of how men have come to hold something to be 1rue is no proof; and in science, too, the history of how a mathematical law wns discovered cannot take the place of the grounds that justify it. These will always be ahistorical; in other words, it will never depend on who first ~tnve them, what provided him with the incentive to follow up such a fruitful line of thought, when and where this occurred, and so forth.
Now the grounds which justify the recognition of a truth often reside in ol her truths which have already been recognized. But if there are any truths 1ccognized by us at all, this cannot be the only form that justification takes.
l'here must be judgements whose justification rests on something else, if 1hey stand in need ofjustification at all.
And this is where epistemology comes in. Logic is concerned only with 1hose grounds ofjudgement which are truths. To make a judgement because we are cognisant of other truths as providing a justification for it is known us inferring. There are laws governing this kind ofjustification, and to set up lhese laws of valid inference is the goal of logic.
The subject-matter of logic is therefore such as cannot be perceived by 1he senses and in this respect it compares with that of psychology and contrasts with that of the natural sciences. Instincts, ideas etc. are also neither visible nor tangible. All the same there is a sharp divide between 1hese disciplines, and it is marked by the word 'true'. Psychology is only concerned with truth in the way every other science is, in that its goal is to extend the domain of truths; but in the field it investigates it does not study the property 'true' as, in its field, physics focuses on the properties 'heavy', 'warm', etc. This is what logic does. It would not perhaps be beside the mark tu say that the laws of logic are nothing other than an unfolding of the content of the word 'true'. Anyone who has failed to grasp the meaning of this word-what marks it ofT from others-cannot attain to any clear idea uf what the task of logic is.
For psychology it is neither here nor there whether the products of the mental processes it studies may be called true. What is true is true independently of the person who recognizes it as true. What is true is therefore not a product of a mental process or inner act; for the product of one person's mind is not that of another's, however similar they may seem 10 be, just as the hunger of one person is not that of another or the eye of one person is not that of another, however close the resemblance may be. We do not directly observe the processes in the mind of another, only the
effects they have in the physical world. Strictly speaking, therefore, we can only form a superficial judgement of the similarity between mental
? 4 Logic
processes, since we are unable to unite the inner states experienced by different people in one consciousness and so compare them. If the content of the sentence 2 + 3 = 5 is exactly the same, in the strictest sense, for all those who recognize it to be true, this means that it is not a product of the mind of this person and a product of the mind of that person, but that it is grasped and recognized as true by both equally. Even if subjective elements are a necessary part and parcel of this grasping of a content, we shall not include them in what we call 'true'.
? TRANSLATORS' PREFACE
What is printed here is a translation of the first volume of Frege's posthumous writings and correspondence published by Felix Meiner, Hamburg 1969, under the editorship of Hans Hermes, Friedrich Kambartel and Friedrich Kaulbach. Whilst we have naturally translated everything in the volume which is by Frege's hand, we have chosen to omit much of the editorial apparatus. Thus we have not translated the three introductory exegetical essays by the editors, though we have translated their history of the Frege NachlajJ-leaving out, however, parts that are taken up with editorial minutiae and a general discussion of the difficulties of deciding on dates and titles for some of the pieces. Again, we have not translated all of their footnotes, many of which are exegetical, though we have translated such as relate to the composition or dating of the individual pieces, or give the provenance of some quotation in the text or (where we think it helpful) the authorship of some view that Frege is discussing. We have, finally, omitted the bibliography of Frege's published work and translations thereof.
We ourselves have added footnotes where some difficulty in translation seemed to call for comment or where we thought one necessary if the reader was to follow the argument. Asterisked footnotes are Frege's own; numbered footnotes are either ours or the editors' and are marked accordingly. Matter within square brackets is either editorial or added by ourselves where we have made some interpolation to assist the reader-as, for instance, where there is some play on words in the German which is inevitably lost in the English translation. It should be clear in each case whether the intervention is ours or the editors'.
We have not thought it necessary to provide the reader with a glossary, but some key terms call for comment here either because of their inherent difficulty or because we have adopted different renderings from previous translators.
First and foremost we have parted company with all previous English translators of Frege by rendering 'bedeuten' and 'Bedeutung' as 'mean' and 'meaning'. We have done this throughout, both before and after he formulated his celebrated distinction between Sinn (sense) and Bedeutung (except of course where the obvious translation of 'Bedeutung' is 'importance' or 'significance'). And cognate terms such as 'bedeutungsvotr and 'gleichbedeutend' we have accordingly rendered by 'meaningful' and 'having the same meaning'. 'Meaning' is, after all, the natural English equivalent for? 'Bedeutung', and renderings such as 'reference' and 'denotation' are strictly incorrect and have only been adopted by other
? Translators' Preface VII
translators for exegetical reasons. We have thought it better not to beg questions of exegesis by suggesting through translation a certain view of what Frege meant in his later writings by 'Bedeutung', leaving it rather to the reader to form his own judgement of the contrast Frege intended by his Sinn-Bedeutung distinction. If his later use of 'bedeuten' and 'Bedeutung' reads oddly in German, this oddness should be reflected in translation and uot ironed out by mistranslation.
? Satz' we have almost always rendered by 'sentence'. For Frege a Satz is 11 series of sounds or written signs which, unlike the thought or sense expressed by it, can be perceived by the senses. That this is how Frege normally used the word is clear from many passages in these writings; the reader may be referred, for instance, to the discussion of truth at the beginning of the second piece entitled 'Logic' or to his remarks at the hcginning of the short piece entitled 'A brief Survey of my logical I>octrines'. Sometimes, however, the word is rather to be translated 'theorem', as in the notes on Hilbert's Foundations ofGeometry. Where the word creates difficulties, as in certain compound nouns, we have helped the 1eader by giving the German alongside the English.
? Vorstellung' is a notorious crux for translators and we have by and large rendered it by 'idea', preferring this in general to the quasi-technical 'representation' with its Kantian overtones and the too narrow 'image'. Admittedly our rendering reads awkwardly in some contexts and may mislead the unwary. But Frege, again in the second piece entitled 'Logic', helps the reader by explaining how he is there using 'Vorstellung' and we have occasionally singled out the word for special mention where we thought there was a danger of misunderstanding.
Another term which has occasioned us some difficulty is 'anerkennen'. It is tempting at first sight to render this by 'acknowledge' or 'accept', reserving 'recognize' for 'erkennen'. But when Frege says that to assert (hehaupten) something is to express the Anerkennen of a thought, the more lllttural rendering seems to be 'recognition'. On the other hand, when he says that to reject (verwerfen) a thought is to anerkennen the opposite thought, the natural rendering seems to be 'accept' or 'acknowledge'.
'Begriffsschrift' we have translated 'concept-script', preferring this to the other translations we have seen. For 'beurteilbarer Inhalt' we have used 'content of possible judgement' in preference to 'possible content of judgement'. For 'vertreten' as used by Frege of what he calls 'indefinitely indicating letters' we have preferred 'stand in for' to 'represent'. And finally, where 'Anzahl' ('natural number') occurs in the text, as opposed to 'Zahl' ('number'), we have usually noted the fact.
Perhaps we should point out, by way of conclusion, that many of the pieces printed here were not written up by Frege for publication. Some, for instance, are preliminary drafts ofpapers, some merely summarize his views or are in the form of diary notes, and the longest piece in the book-Logic In Mathematics-is probably a set of lecture notes. The reader should not
? VIII Translators' Preface
therefore hold it against the author if the style is occasionally rough and some of the constructions awkward, or if here and there points are laboured too heavily. Still, throughout these writings, whether polished or not, we find that formidable clarity which distinguishes the work he published. If one chose a motto for the title page of this volume, what could be more apt than Vauvernarques' 'La clarte est la bonne foi des philosophes'?
? ? IIISTORY OF THE FREGE NACHLAjJ AND THE BASIS FOR THIS EDITION1
When Frege died in Bad Kleinen on 26 July 1925, he left to his adopted son, 1he engineer Alfred Frege, a quantity of important scientific papers. 2 These mduded unpublished manuscripts of some length, almost all of which, however, were incomplete or in the form of drafts; notes and drafts of lcllers, as well as a large number of letters from his most important m:ademic correspondents. In a short note attached to his will dated 1 January 1925 Frege wrote concerning his bequest:
Dear Alfred,
Do not despise the pieces I have written. Even if all is not gold, there is gold in them. I believe there are things here which will one day be prized much more highly than they are now. Take care that nothing gets lost.
Your loving father. It is a large part of myself which I bequeath to you herewith.
The papers Frege left remained in Alfred Frege's keeping for more than a decade; on 26 November 1925 he handed over, amongst other things, a series of letters addressed to Frege (these included Russell's letters) to the t:hemist and historian of science Ludwig Darmstaedter for the latter's wllection in the Prussian State Library. He may have been moved to do this hy the fact that Darmstaedter had some time previous been in touch with Frege concerning the collection he was compiling, with the result that in 1919 he had received from Frege the piece printed on pp. 253-257. The manuscripts handed over to Darmstaedter in 1925 also included drafts of Frege's letters to Russell and rough copies of the hand-written sheets that Darmstaedter had received in 1919.
1 Cf. the account Der wissenschqftliche Nachlass von Gottlob Frege by H. Scholz and F. Bachmann in the Actes du congres international de philosophie scientifique, Paris 1935, Vol. VIII: Histoire de la logique et de la philosophie scientifique (published Paris 1936), pp. 24-30 (ed. ).
2 The papers here called 'scientific ['wissenschqftlich'] dealt of course with logic, philosophy and the foundations of mathematics. We have no equivalent in English for the German term: the noun ? Wissenschqft', which in the main text we have sometimes rendered by 'discipline', may be applied to any field of study, and not only to such as we should normally call 'scientific'. AI other places in this history we have used the word 'scientific' in the same convenient, if improper, sense (trans. ).
? X History ofthe Frege Nachlal3 and the Basisfor this Edition
In the thirties particular attention was devoted to Frege's writings by what was known at the time as 'Philosophisches Seminar B' [Department of Philosophy (B)] of the University of Munster; the head of department was H. Scholz and the department later became the well-known first German Institut fiir mathematische Logik und Grundlagenforschung [Institute for Mathematical Logic and Foundation Studies]. It was in this connection that Scholz tried to find out what had become of the writings Frege had left behind at his death [Frege's NachlajJ]. In 1935 he discovered where Frege's adopted son was living and entered into correspondence with him. Alfred Frege said that he was prepared to hand over Frege's NachlajJ to Scholz and his collaborators 'on the understanding', as Scholz and Bachmann write, 'that we should go over the papers and see whether they were suitable for publication and then deposit them in the library of the University of Munster in Westphalia'. Alfred Frege retained proprietary rights over Frege's NachlajJ, but on 26 July 1935 he made a written statement to the effect that in the event of his death Scholz should have the right of disposing
of the NachlajJ as he thought fit.
Scholz and Bachmann, his collaborator at that time, set to work
immediately and were able to report in detail on the Frege NachlajJ in their paper to the International Congress for scientific Philosophy which was held in Paris from 15 to 21 September 1935. In their address they issued a request that any letters of Frege's should be made available for the Frege archives in Munster. In the following years Scholz was able to get hold of a large number of Frege's letters, either originals or copies, for the Munster collection. In particular, Russell gave him the letters Frege had written to him.
Once Scholz had achieved an overall picture of the Frege NachlajJ, he decided to prepare a selection of shorter writings which was to include important unpublished papers and the correspondence with Russell. Three volumes of roughly 300 pages each were planned. Scholz was able to elicit the support of the Notgemeinschaft der deutschen Wissenschaft for this project. The group which then took up work on the edition included, besides Scholz and Bachmann, Dr Albrecht Becker and Marga Tietz. Where reference is made by the present editors to 'previous editors' of the NachlajJ, in nearly every case it is this group which is meant.
A letter written to Scholz on 2 March 1936 by the then Librarian of the University Library in Munster reveals that as early as 15 February 1936 Scholz had announced his intention of handing over to the Library, in accordance with the disposition made by Alfred Frege, the pieces entrusted to him. It was quite clear, however, that the NachlajJ remained in Department of Philosophy (B) right up to October 1943 and was only then deposited in the University Library because of the danger of its being destroyed by the air raids which were growing more and more frequent. However, this safety precaution pro~ed futile. The Frege NachlqjJ was destroyed by fire during the bombing of the city of Munster on 25 March 1945, in the course of which
? History ofthe Frege Nachlaf3 and the Basisfor this Edition XI
the University Library was badly hit. Scholz later wrote 'The work we were t? ngaged on has suffered immeasurably from the bombing.
The whole of the original material, which after an initial shock to the foundations in October I
The Second World War not only led to the loss of the Frege manuscripts deposited at Munster; it brought the work on the three volume edition of 1:rcge's shorter writings to a virtual standstill. Nevertheless, in the course of preparing this edition typescript copies of most of the important pieces from the Nachla}J had been made. Scholz has managed to save the majority of these typescripts, either top copies or carbons, from being destroyed. It is these typescripts which have formed the basis of all subsequent projects for editing the NachlajJ.
Not long after the end of the war Scholz again took up his plan of preparing a three volume selection of Frege's writings. In 1947, with the support of the Forderergesellschaft of Munster University, he had copies made of most of the surviving pieces. The following extract from a letter he wrote gives one some idea of the stringencies of the post-war situation with which Scholz had to contend and the characteristic way in which he tried to cope with them:
The Rector,
Professor Dr E. Lehnartz
Dear Rector,
I request that, in the event of a supplementary delivery of coal becoming available for next winter, urgently required heating material should be allocated to mefor my study in Melcherstr. 26 II. This is far and away the largest room in our flat. The large library, which I was able to preserve, is kept there. The room is at least 25 metres square and is adjoined on one side by a glass verandah which inevitably acts as a cold-trap in winter. The room is heated by an efficient cylindrical stove.
The reason for my request:
I have to edit Gottlob Frege's 'Shorter Writings' for the occasion of the centenary of his birth in July of next year; these include the large corpus of writings which I unearthed, writings which this great German master, who pioneered work into the foundations of mathematics, left behind at his death. Until the outbreak of war this work was supported by the Notgemeinschaft der deutschen Wissenschqft. At that time the material existed in its entirety in carefully prepared transcripts divided into three
Munster, 23. 5. 47 Westring 17 I
? ? XII History ofthe Frege Nachlal3 and the Basisfor this Edition
volumes of around 300 pages each. The outbreak of war prevented this edition from appearing. With the exception of a series of carbon copies, I handed over this valuable material, along with the originals, to the University Library for safe keeping. Nevertheless it was all destroyed. I therefore have to have everything copied out once more from the surviving carbon copies,1 since I cannot possibly part with the only documents now remaining to me. A few weeks ago I was at last able to obtain a suitable person for the work of copying this material. She is paid out of the funds which have been placed at my disposal for this purpose by the Forderergesellschaft of the University acting under your chair- manship. I myself have made the large typewriter in my study available for this purpose. The work has to be done in this room since no other is available. It will, in any event, take up the whole of the winter. It cannot be postponed if the first volume at least is to come out in the course of next year. . . .
Yours sincerely,
Heinrich Scholz
The first volume did not, however, come out in 1948 or later. During the last decade of his life, serious illness made it increasingly difficult for Scholz to do sustained work. And so the edition at which he had laboured so doggedly since 1935 was still incomplete when he died at the end of 1956. Upon Scholz's retirement he was succeeded in the chair of Mathematical Logic and Foundation Studies by his pupil H. Hermes. And so, in accordance with the disposition made by Alfred Frege, Hermes, as Scholz's nominee, became responsible for preparing the edition ofFrege's Nachlaft.
The first impetus to renew work on this edition came in 1957 when Michael Dummett, the English Frege scholar, spent a period of study in the Institute for Mathematical Logic and Foundation Studies in Munster. Working from the notes Scholz had made in the thirties and the copies to be found in Scholz's Nachlaft, he made a preliminary conspectus of the material that Scholz had originally gathered together and the corpus that had survived. In addition, he tried to enlist the support of English trusts for the planned edition. Since this proved fruitless, nothing further came of this first initiative that succeeded Scholz's death. Nevertheless, Dummett's spade-work was an important help to the present editors, which they were thankful to receive. In a second effort to get things moving Hermes succeeded in persuading his two co-editors in 1961 to form a team, and this team has subsequently been engaged in preparing Frege's posthumous writings and his scientific correspondence for publication. In 1962 the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft gave its support for the undertaking, with the result that work could be delegated to assistants. Among these assistants Dr Walburga Schwering, now Dr R6dding, and Herr Gottfried Gabriel have
1 Though, as we mentioned earlier, some of the top copies were found in Scholz's NachlqfJ (ed. ).
? History ofthe Frege Nachlaf3 and the Basis for this Edition Xlll
JJJadc such a substantial contribution to the completion of this volume that they are named on the title page.
l'hc first thing the editors decided was that they would depart from the plan that Scholz had followed so consistently. They gave up the idea of a ? . rkctcd edition, and decided upon a complete edition of Frege's extant ? ,rJL'ntitic writings and letters whether these were available as originals, mpics or transcripts. They made an exception only of drafts that had been written up and published. Since it was expected that a new impression or phlltomechanical reproduction-now completed-of all Frege's previously published writings would be published by the Wissenschaftlichen llut'hgesellschaft (Darmstadt) and the publishing house of G. Olms (Hildes- ll! 'im), the editors were able to exclude these. The editors therefore l? onlined themselves to preparing a complete edition in three volumes of <lottlob Frege's posthumous writings and scientific correspondence, the present first volume of which contains the whole of the extant Nachla}J, rxcluding the letters.
Scholz's death meant that the transcripts of the Frege Nachla}J that had ? . urvived became in turn part of a Nachla}J. Since in the post-war years Scholz had worked alone on his projected edition, all that was known about the history of the material, of how it was arranged and of how complete it was, was lost with him. As a result the editors had first to set to work and dassify anew the pieces from amongst Scholz's papers that he had managed to preserve.
lt is most unlikely that any scientific writings of Frege that Alfred Frege did not pass on to Scholz could have survived the war. Alfred Frege died in action on 15 June 1944 at Montesson near Paris. What became of his possessions is not known.
l'hc editors thank the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft for their financial support in the preparation and printing of this volume, the University Libraries in Constance and Munster for their help in obtaining literature, the publishing house of Meiner for the care and patience it devoted, to such ! (nod effect, to this difficult text, Dr Lothar Kreiser (Leipzig) and Dr llcinrich Schepers (Munster) for valuable suggestions, and in particular those who collaborated in preparing this edition, amongst whom special mention must be made of Heinz Albert Veraart, as well as Gottfried Gabriel nnd Dr Walburga Rodding. Those others who have contributed from the thirties to the present day to the preparation and publication of the Frege Nachla}J with advice, information and assistance are too numerous to be listed here. To these, too, we wish to extend our warm gratitude.
H. Hermes F. Kambartel F. Kaulbach
? Logic 1 [between 1879 and 1891]
A. Introduction.
Essence, subject-matter.
Different from psychology, related to ethics. On method.
11 <'ontent of possible judgement. Negation. duplex negatio.
Combining contents of possible judgement into a new content. and, neither-nor and not etc.
Inferences.
( ? Analysis of a judgement. Concept, object.
Generality, condition, consequence. Or. Subordination of concepts. Existential judgements. (There is).
Elimination of auxiliary objects. Inferences involving particular judgements. Relation-concepts. Pairs.
I>. Ikfinitionofconcepts.
By means of characteristic marks. More complicated cases.
1'. . I>efinition of objects.
Indirect by means of concepts. Direct. Judgements in which something is recognized as the same again.
Improper existential judgements.
[A. Introduction]
121'. 1 Truth. Judging. Asserting.
Truth independent of our recognition.
Grounds that do-and grounds that do not-justify such recognition. The latter take place according to psychological laws, have no relation to truth.
1 In this piece (cf. Frege's footnote, p. 6) we clearly have a fragment of what was Intended as a textbook on logic.
! 'he footnote on p. 6 refers to the Begriffschrift {1879). In section B of the table 111' (on tents Frege uses the expression 'content of possible judgement'. From a letter 111 llusscrl dated 24. 5. 1891 it is clear that he had given up using this designation by lhr first half of 1891 at the latest. Therefore the present piece should be dated ! Jetween 1879 and 1891 (ed. ).
? ? 2 [2f. ] [3]
[4] [5]
[5f. ]
Logic
Superstitions about the weather have a basis in experience. Furnishing grounds of this kind is no proof.
Grounds that aflord a justification are often found in other truths. Inference. To establish laws of inference is the task of logic. Logic, like psychology, has for its subject-matter things that cannot be perceived by the senses. There is a sharp divide, however, marked by 'true'. Logic considers its objects in so far as they are true. What is true is true independently of the person who recognizes it to be true, and so is not a product of an inner process.
Comparison with ethics.
Comment on technical terms of logic. Rejection of psychological distinctions.
Isolating what is psychological, by consciously marking it off. Warning against confusing points of view and switching from one question to another. Danger lies in language. Translation possible? Yes, so far as the logical kernel is concerned. Value of learning languages for one's logical education.
[6] The formula-language of algebra: analysis of the logically complex. Reducing the laws of logic to one another.
The goal of scientific endeavour is truth. Inwardly to recognize something as true is to make a judgement, and to give expression to this judgement is to make an assertion.
What is true is true independently of our recognizing it as such. We can make mistakes. The grounds on which we make a judgement may justify our recognizing it as true; they may, however, merely give rise to our making a judgement, or make up our minds for us, without containing a justification for our judgement. Although each judgement we make is causally conditioned, it is nevertheless not the case that all these causes are grounds that afford a justification. There is an empirical tendency in philosophy which does not take sufficient heed of this distinction, and so, because our thinking takes its rise from experience, philosophy ends up by declaring all our knowledge to be empirical. The causes which merely give rise to acts of judgement do so in accordance with psychological laws; they are just as capable of leading to error as of leading to truth; theY. have no inherent relation to truth whatsoever; they know nothing of the opposition of true and false. The farmer whose fortunes are, for good or ill, bound up with the weather, seeks for means of determining what it will be like in advance. Little wonder that he attempts to link phases of the moon with variations in the weather and asks himself whether a full moon does not herald a change in the weather. If this appears to be confirmed-as may well be the case, since by and large the weather does not change abruptly and since it is not altogether easy to say whether the weather has changed-from that moment on he believes the weather is connected with
? Logic 3
1ht? moon, and this belief takes root because the cases that speak in its lnvour make a greater impression than those that do not and imprint themselves more firmly on his memory; and he thinks he now knows this 1mm experience. This is exactly what experience is in the case of the said t'mpirical tendency amongst philosophers. And so it is with every ~uperstition. Usually it is possible to make out the psychological causes. <'learly such an account of how men have come to hold something to be 1rue is no proof; and in science, too, the history of how a mathematical law wns discovered cannot take the place of the grounds that justify it. These will always be ahistorical; in other words, it will never depend on who first ~tnve them, what provided him with the incentive to follow up such a fruitful line of thought, when and where this occurred, and so forth.
Now the grounds which justify the recognition of a truth often reside in ol her truths which have already been recognized. But if there are any truths 1ccognized by us at all, this cannot be the only form that justification takes.
l'here must be judgements whose justification rests on something else, if 1hey stand in need ofjustification at all.
And this is where epistemology comes in. Logic is concerned only with 1hose grounds ofjudgement which are truths. To make a judgement because we are cognisant of other truths as providing a justification for it is known us inferring. There are laws governing this kind ofjustification, and to set up lhese laws of valid inference is the goal of logic.
The subject-matter of logic is therefore such as cannot be perceived by 1he senses and in this respect it compares with that of psychology and contrasts with that of the natural sciences. Instincts, ideas etc. are also neither visible nor tangible. All the same there is a sharp divide between 1hese disciplines, and it is marked by the word 'true'. Psychology is only concerned with truth in the way every other science is, in that its goal is to extend the domain of truths; but in the field it investigates it does not study the property 'true' as, in its field, physics focuses on the properties 'heavy', 'warm', etc. This is what logic does. It would not perhaps be beside the mark tu say that the laws of logic are nothing other than an unfolding of the content of the word 'true'. Anyone who has failed to grasp the meaning of this word-what marks it ofT from others-cannot attain to any clear idea uf what the task of logic is.
For psychology it is neither here nor there whether the products of the mental processes it studies may be called true. What is true is true independently of the person who recognizes it as true. What is true is therefore not a product of a mental process or inner act; for the product of one person's mind is not that of another's, however similar they may seem 10 be, just as the hunger of one person is not that of another or the eye of one person is not that of another, however close the resemblance may be. We do not directly observe the processes in the mind of another, only the
effects they have in the physical world. Strictly speaking, therefore, we can only form a superficial judgement of the similarity between mental
? 4 Logic
processes, since we are unable to unite the inner states experienced by different people in one consciousness and so compare them. If the content of the sentence 2 + 3 = 5 is exactly the same, in the strictest sense, for all those who recognize it to be true, this means that it is not a product of the mind of this person and a product of the mind of that person, but that it is grasped and recognized as true by both equally. Even if subjective elements are a necessary part and parcel of this grasping of a content, we shall not include them in what we call 'true'.