The best
students
make an even worse showing in this respect.
Applied Eugenics by Roswell H. Johnson and Paul Popenoe
In the interest of eugenics, the
various difficulties must be met in appropriate ways.
Marriage is not desirable for those who are eugenically inferior, from
weak constitutions, defective sexuality, or inherent mental deficiency.
But beyond these groups of women are the much larger groups of celibates
who are distinctly superior, and whose chances of marriage have been
reduced for one of the reasons mentioned above or through living in
cities with an undue proportion of female residents. Then there are,
besides these, superior women who, because they are brought up in
families without brothers or brothers' friends, are so unnaturally shy
that they are unable to become friendly with men, however much they may
care to. It is evident that life in a separate college for women often
intensifies this defect. There are still other women who repel men by a
manner of extreme self-repression and coldness, sometimes the result of
parents' or teachers' over-zealous efforts to inculcate modesty and
reserve, traits valuable in due degree but harmful in excess.
When will educators learn that the education of the emotions is as
important as that of the intellect? When will the schools awake to the
fact that a large part of life consists in relations with other human
beings, and that much of their educational effort is absolutely
valueless, or detrimental, to success in the fundamentally necessary
practice of dealing with other individuals which is imposed on every
one? Many a college girl of the finest innate qualities, who sincerely
desires to enter matrimony, is unable to find a husband of her own
class, simply because she has been rendered so cold and unattractive, so
over-stuffed intellectually and starved emotionally, that a typical man
does not desire to spend the rest of his life in her company. The same
indictment applies in a less degree to men. It is generally believed
that an only child is frequently to be found in this class.
On the other hand, it is equally true--perhaps more important--that many
innately superior young men are rejected, because of their manner of
life. Superior young men should be induced to keep their physical
records clean, in order that they may not suffer the severe depreciation
which they would otherwise sustain in the eyes of superior women.
But in efforts to teach chastity, sex itself must not be made to appear
an evil thing. This is a grave mistake and all too common since the rise
of the sex-hygiene movement. Undoubtedly a considerable amount of the
celibacy in sensitive women may be traced to ill-balanced mothers and
teachers who, in word and attitude, build up an impression that sex is
indecent and bestial, and engender in general a damaging suspicion of
men. [115]
Level heads are necessary in the sex ethics campaign. Whereas the
venereal diseases will probably, with a continuation of present progress
in treatment and prophylaxis, be brought under control in the course of
a century, the problem of differential mating will exist as long as the
race does, which can hardly be less than tens of millions of years.
Lurid presentation, by drama, novel, or magazine-story, of dramatic and
highly-colored individual sex histories, is to be avoided. These often
impress an abnormal situation on sensitive girls so strongly that
aversion to marriage, or sex antagonism, is aroused. Every effort should
be made to permeate art--dramatic, plastic, or literary--with the
highest ideals of sex and parenthood. A glorification of motherhood and
fatherhood in these ways would have a portentous influence on public
opinion.
"The true, intimate chronicle of an everyday married life has not been
written. Here is a theme for genius; for only genius can divine and
reveal the beauty, the pathos, and the wonder of the normal or the
commonplace. A felicitous marriage has its comedy, its complexities, its
element, too, of tragedy and grief, as well as its serenity and fealty.
Matrimony, whether the pair fare well or ill, is always a great
adventure, a play of deep instincts and powerful emotions, a drama of
two psyches. Every marriage provides a theme for the literary artist. No
lives are free from enigmas. "[116]
More "temperance" in work would probably promote marriage of able and
ambitious young people. Walter Gallichan complains that "we do not even
recognize love as a finer passion than money greed. It is a kind of
luxury, or pleasant pastime, for the sentimentally minded. Love is so
undervalued as a source of happiness, a means of grace, and a completion
of being, that many men would sooner work to keep a motor car than to
marry. "
Men should be taught greater respect for the individuality of women, so
that no high-minded girl will shrink from marriage with the idea that it
means a surrender of her personality and a state of domestic servitude.
A more discriminating idea of sex-equality is desirable, and a
recognition by men that women are not necessarily creatures of inferior
mentality. It would be an advantage if men's education included some
instruction along these lines. It would be a great gain, also if
intelligent women had more knowledge of domestic economy and
mothercraft, because one of the reasons why the well-educated girl is
handicapped in seeking a mate is the belief all too frequently well
founded of many young men that she is a luxury which he can not afford.
Higher education in general needs to be reoriented. It has too much
glorified individualism, and put a premium on "white collar" work. The
trend toward industrial education will help to correct this situation.
Professor Sprague[117] points out another very important fault, when he
says: "More strong men are needed on the staffs of public schools and
women's colleges, and in all of these institutions more married
instructors of both sexes are desirable. The catalogue of one of the
[women's] colleges referred to above shows 114 professors and
instructors, of whom 100 are women, of whom only two have ever married.
Is it to be expected that the curriculum created by such a staff would
idealize and prepare for family and home life as the greatest work of
the world and the highest goal of woman, and teach race survival as a
patriotic duty? Or, would it be expected that these bachelor staffs
would glorify the independent vocation and life for women and create
employment bureaus to enable their graduates to get into the offices,
schools and other lucrative jobs? The latter seems to be what occurs. "
Increase of opportunity for superior young people to meet each other, as
discussed in our chapter on sexual selection, will play a very large
part in raising the marriage rate. And finally, the delayed or avoided
marriage of the intellectual classes is in large part a reflection of
public opinion, which has wrongly represented other things as being more
worth while than marriage.
"The promotion of marriage in early adult life, as a part of social
hygiene, must begin with a new canonization of marriage," Mr. Gallichan
declares. "This is equally the task of the fervent poet and the
scientific thinker, whose respective labors for humanity are never at
variance in essentials. . . . The sentiment for marriage can be deepened by
a rational understanding of the passion that attracts and unites the
sexes. We need an apotheosis of conjugal love as a basis for a new
appreciation of marriage. Reverence for love should be fostered from the
outset of the adolescent period by parents and pedagogues. "
If, in addition to this "diffusion of healthier views of the conjugal
relation," some of the economic changes suggested in later chapters are
put in effect, it seems probable that the present racially disastrous
tendency of the most superior young men and women to postpone or avoid
marriage would be checked.
CHAPTER XIII
INCREASE OF THE BIRTH-RATE OF THE SUPERIOR
Imagine 200 babies born to parents of native stock in the United States.
On the average, 103 of them will be boys and 97 girls. By the time the
girls reach a marriageable age (say 20 years), at least 19 will have
died, leaving 78 possible wives, on whom the duty of perpetuating that
section of the race depends.
We said "Possible" wives, not probable; for not all will marry. It is
difficult to say just how many will become wives, but Robert J. Sprague
has reported on several investigations that illuminate the point.
In a selected New England village in 1890, he says, "there were forty
marriageable girls between the ages of 20 and 35. To-day thirty-two of
these are married, 20 per cent. are spinsters.
"An investigation of 260 families of the Massachusetts Agricultural
College students shows that out of 832 women over 40 years of age 755 or
91 per cent. have married, leaving only 9 per cent. spinsters. This and
other observations indicate that the daughters of farmers marry more
generally than those of some other classes.
"In sixty-nine (reporting) families represented by the freshman class of
Amherst College (1914) there are 229 mothers and aunts over 40 years of
age, of whom 186 or 81 per cent. have already married.
"It would seem safe to conclude that about 15 per cent. of native women
in general American society do not marry during the child-bearing
period. " Deducting 15 per cent. from the 78 possible wives leaves
sixty-six probable wives. Now among the native wives of Massachusetts 20
per cent. do not produce children, and deducting these thirteen
childless ones from the sixty-six probable wives leaves fifty-three
probable, married, child-bearing women, who must be depended on to
reproduce the original 200 individuals with whom we began this chapter.
That means that each woman who demonstrates ability to bear offspring
must bear 3. 7 children. This it must be noted, is a minimum number, for
no account has been taken of those who, through some defect or disease
developed late in life, become unmarriageable. In general, unless every
married woman brings three children to maturity, the race will not even
hold its own in numbers. And this means that each woman must bear four
children, since not all the children born will live. If the married
women of the country bear fewer than nearly four children each, the race
is in danger of losing ground.
Such a statement ought to strike the reader as one of grave importance;
but we labor under no delusion that it will do so. For we are painfully
aware that the bugaboo of the declining birth-rate of superior people
has been raised so often in late years, that it has become stale by
repetition. It no longer causes any alarm. The country is filled with
sincere but mentally short-sighted individuals, who are constantly ready
to vociferate that numbers are no very desirable thing in a birth-rate;
that quality is wanted, not quantity; that a few children given ideal
care are of much more value to the state and the race than are many
children, who can not receive this attention.
And this attitude toward the subject, we venture to assert, is a graver
peril to the race than is the declining birth-rate itself. For there is
enough truth in it to make it plausible, and to separate the truth from
the dangerous untruth it contains, and to make the bulk of the
population see the distinction, is a task which will tax every energy of
the eugenist.
Unfortunately, this is not a case of mere difference of opinion between
men; it is a case of antagonism between men and nature. If a race
hypnotize itself into thinking that its views about race suicide are
superior to nature's views, it may make its own end a little less
painful; but it will not postpone that end for a single minute. The
contest is to the strong, and although numbers are not the most
important element in strength, it is very certain that a race made up
of families containing one child each will not be the survivor in the
struggle for existence.
The idea, therefore, that race suicide and general limitation of births
to the irreducible minimum, can be effectively justified by any
conceivable appeal to economic or sociological factors, is a mistake
which will eventually bring about the extinction of the people making
it.
This statement must not be interpreted wrongly. Certainly we would not
argue that a high birth-rate in itself is necessarily a desirable thing.
It is not the object of eugenics to achieve as big a population as
possible, regardless of quality. But in the last analysis, the only
wealth of a nation is its people; moreover some people, are as national
assets, worth more than others. The goal, then, might be said to be: a
population adjusted in respect to its numbers to the resources of the
country, and that number of the very best quality possible. Great
diversity of people is required in modern society, but of each desirable
kind the best obtainable representatives are to be desired.
It is at once evident that a decline, rather than an increase, in the
birth-rate of some sections of the population, is wanted. There are some
strata at the bottom that are a source of weakness rather than of
strength to the race, and a source of unhappiness rather than of
happiness to themselves and those around them. These should be reduced
in number, as we have shown at some length earlier in this book.
The other parts of the population should be perpetuated by the best,
rather than the worst. In no other way can the necessary leaders be
secured, without whom, in commerce, industry, politics, science, the
nation is at a great disadvantage. The task of eugenics is by no means
what it is sometimes supposed to be: to breed a superior caste. But a
very important part of its task is certainly to increase the number of
leaders in the race. And it is this part of its task, in particular,
which is menaced by the declining birth-rate in the United States.
As every one knows, race suicide is proceeding more rapidly among the
native whites than among any other large section of the population; and
it is exactly this part of the population which has in the past
furnished most of the eminent men of the country.
It has been shown in previous chapters that eminent men do not appear
wholly by chance in the population. The production of eminence is
largely a family affair; and in America, "the land of opportunity" as
well as in older countries, people of eminence are much more
interrelated than chance would allow. It has been shown, indeed, that in
America it is at least a 500 to 1 bet that an eminent person will be
rather closely related to some other eminent person, and will not be a
sporadic appearance in the population. [118]
Taken with other considerations advanced in earlier chapters, this means
that a falling off in the reproduction of the old American best strains
means a falling off in the number of eminent men which the United States
will produce. No improvement in education can prevent a serious loss,
for the strong minds get more from education.
The old American stock has produced a vastly greater proportion of
eminence, has accomplished a great deal more proportionately, in modern
times, than has other any stock whose representatives have been coming
in large numbers as immigrants to these shores during the last
generation. It is, therefore, likely to continue to surpass them, unless
it declines too greatly in numbers. For this reason, we feel justified
in concluding that the decline of the birth-rate in the old American
stock represents a decline in the birth-rate of a superior element.
There is another way of looking at this point. The stock under
discussion has been, on the whole, economically ahead of such stocks as
are now immigrating. In competition with them under equal conditions, it
appears to remain pretty consistently ahead, economically. Now,
although we would not insist on this point too strongly, it can hardly
be questioned that eugenic value is to some extent correlated with
economic success in life, as all desirable qualities tend to be
correlated together. Within reasonable limits, it is justifiable to
treat the economically superior sections of the nation as the
eugenically superior. And it is among these economically superior
sections of the nation that the birth-rate has most rapidly and
dangerously fallen.
The constant influx of highly fecund immigrant women tends to obscure
the fact that the birth-rate of the older residents is falling below
par, and analysis of the birth-rate in various sections of the community
is necessary to give an understanding of what is actually taking place.
In Rhode Island, F. L. Hoffmann found the average number of children for
each foreign-born woman to be 3. 35, and for each native-born woman to be
2. 06. There were wide racial differences among the foreign born; the
various elements were represented by the following average number of
children per wife:
French-Canadians 4. 42
Russians 3. 51
Italians 3. 49
Irish 3. 45
Scotch and Welsh 3. 09
English 2. 89
Germans 2. 84
Swedes 2. 58
English-Canadians 2. 56
Poles 2. 31
In short, the native-born whites in this investigation fell below every
one of the foreign nationalities.
The Massachusetts censuses for 1875 and 1884 showed similar results: the
foreign-born women had 4. 5 children each, and the native-born women 2. 7
each.
Frederick S. Crum's careful investigation[119] of New England
genealogies, including 12,722 wives, has thrown a great deal of light
on the steady decline in their birth-rate. He found the average number
of children to be:
1750-1799 6. 43
1800-1849 4. 94
1850-1869 3. 47
1870-1879 2. 77
There, in four lines, is the story of the decline of the old American
stock. At present, it is barely reproducing itself, probably not even
that, for there is reason to believe that 1879 does not mark the lowest
point reached. Before 1700, less than 2% of the wives in this
investigation had only one child, now 20% of them have only one. With
the emigration of old New England families to the west, and the constant
immigration of foreign-born people to take their places, it is no cause
for surprise that New England no longer exercises the intellectual
leadership that she once held.
For Massachusetts as a whole, the birth-rate among the native-born
population was 12. 7 per 1,000 in 1890, 14. 9 in 1910, while in the
foreign-born population it was 38. 6 in 1890 and 49. 1 in 1910. After
excluding all old women and young women, the birth-rate of the
foreign-born women in Massachusetts is still found to be 3/4 greater
than that of the native-born. [120]
In short, the birth-rate of the old American stock is now so low that
that stock is dying out and being supplanted by immigrants. In order
that the stock might even hold its own, we have shown that each married
woman should bear three to four children. At present the married women
of the old white American race in New England appear to be bringing two
or less to maturity.
It will be profitable to digress for a moment to consider farther what
this disappearance of the ancient population of Massachusetts means to
the country. When all the distinguished men of the United States are
graded, in accordance with their distinction, it is regularly found, as
Frederick Adams Woods says, that "Some states in the union, some
sections of the country, have produced more eminence than others, far
beyond the expectation from their respective white populations. In this
regard Massachusetts always leads, and Connecticut is always second, and
certain southern states are always behind and fail to render their
expected quota. " The accurate methods used by Dr. Woods in this
investigation leave no room for doubt that in almost every way
Massachusetts has regularly produced twice as many eminent men as its
population would lead one to expect, and has for some ranks and types of
achievement produced about four times the expectation.
Scott Nearing's studies[121] confirm those of Dr. Woods. Taking the most
distinguished men and women America has produced, he found that the
number produced in New England, per 100,000 population, was much larger
than that produced by any other part of the country. Rhode Island, the
poorest New England state in this respect, was yet 30% above New York,
the best state outside New England.
The advantage of New England, however, he found to be rapidly
decreasing. Of the eminent persons born before 1850, 30% were New
Englanders although the population of New England in 1850 was only 11. 8%
of that of the whole country. But of the eminent younger men,--those
born between 1880 and 1889, New England, with 7. 5% of the country's
population, could claim only 12% of the genius. Cambridge, Mass. , has
produced more eminent younger men of the present time than any other
city, he discovered, but the cities which come next in order are
Nashville, Tenn. , Columbus, Ohio, Lynn, Mass. , Washington, D. C. ,
Portland, Ore. , Hartford, Conn. , Boston, Mass. , New Haven, Conn. , Kansas
City, Mo. , and Chicago, Ill.
There is reason to believe that some of the old New England stock, which
emigrated to the West, retains a higher fecundity than does that part of
the stock which remains on the Atlantic seaboard. This fact, while a
gratifying one, of course does not compensate for the low fertility of
the families which still live in New England.
Within this section of the population, the decline is undoubtedly taking
place faster in some parts than in others. Statistical evidence is not
available, to tell a great deal about this, but the birth-rate for the
graduates of some of the leading women's colleges is known, and their
student bodies are made up largely of girls of superior stork. At
Wellesley, the graph in Fig. 36 shows at a glance just what is
happening. Briefly, the graduates of that college contribute less than
one child apiece to the race. The classes do not even reproduce their
own numbers. Instead of the 3. 7 children which, according to Sprague's
calculation, they ought to bear, they are bearing . 86 of a child.
The foregoing study is one of the few to carefully distinguish between
families which were complete at the time of study and those families
where additional children may yet be born. In the studies to follow this
distinction may in some cases be made by the reader in interpreting the
data while in other cases families having some years of possible
productiveness ahead are included with others and the relative
proportion of the types is not indicated. The error in these cases is
therefore important and the reader is warned to accept them only with a
mental allowance for this factor.
The best students make an even worse showing in this respect. The
Wellesley alumnae who are members of Phi Beta Kappa,--that is, the
superior scholars--have not . 86 of a child each, but only . 65 of a
child; while the holders of the Durant and Wellesley scholarships,
awarded for intellectual superiority,[122] make the following pathetic
showing in comparison with the whole class.
WELLESLEY COLLEGE
Graduates of '01, '02, '03, '04, Status of Fall of 1912
_All_ _Durant or Wellesley_
_scholars_
Per cent married 44 35
Number of children:
Per graduate . 37 . 20
Per wife . 87 . 57
It must not be thought that Wellesley's record is an exception, for most
of the large women's colleges furnish deplorable figures. Mount
Holyoke's record is:
_Children per_ _Children per_
_Decade of graduation_ _married_ _graduate_
_graduate_
1842-1849 2. 77 2. 37
1850-1859 3. 38 2. 55
1860-1869 2. 64 1. 60
1870-1879 2. 75 1. 63
1880-1889 2. 54 1. 46
1890-1892 1. 91 0. 95
Nor can graduation from Bryn Mawr College be said to favor motherhood.
By the 376 alumnae graduated there between 1888 and 1900, only 138
children had been produced up to Jan. 1, 1913. This makes . 84 of a child
per married alumna, or . 37 of a child per graduate, since less than half
of the graduates marry. These are the figures published by the college
administration.
Professor Sprague's tabulation of the careers of Vassar college
graduates, made from official records of the college, is worth quoting
in full, for the light it throws on the histories of college girls,
after they leave college:
CLASSES FROM 1867 TO 1892
Number of graduates 959
Number that taught 431 (45%)
Number that married 509 (53%)
Number that did not marry 450 (47%)
Number that taught and afterward
married 166 (39% of all who taught)
Number that taught, married and had
children 112 (67% of all who taught
and married)
Number that taught, married and
were childless 54 (33%)
Number of children of those who
taught and had children 287 (1. 73 children per family)
Number of children of those who
married but did not teach 686 (2 per married graduate
that did not teach)
Total number of children of all
graduates 973 (1 child per graduate)
Average number of children per
married graduate 1. 91
Average number of children per
graduate 1. 00
CLASSES FROM 1867 TO 1900
Number of graduates 1739
Number that taught 800 (46%)
Number that married 854 (49%)
Number that did not marry 885 (51%)
Number that taught and afterward
married 294 (31%)
Number that taught, married and had
children 203 (69% of all who taught and married)
Number that taught, married and were
childless 91 (31%)
Number of children of those who
taught and had children 463 (1. 57 children per family)
Number of children of those who
married but did not teach 1025 (2 each)
Total number of children of all
graduates 1488 (. 8 child per graduate)
Average number of children per
married graduate 1. 74 (per married graduate)
Average number of children per graduate 0. 8
If the women's colleges were fulfilling what the writers consider to be
their duty toward their students, their graduates would have a higher
marriage and birth-rate than that of their sisters, cousins and friends
who do not go to college. But the reverse is the case. M. R. Smith's
investigation showed the comparison between college girls and girls of
equivalent social position and of the same or similar families, as
follows:
_Number of_ _Per cent childless_
_children_ _at time_
College 1. 65 25. 36
Equivalent Non-College 1. 874 17. 89
Now if education is tending toward race suicide, then the writers
believe there is something wrong with modern educational methods. And
certainly all statistics available point to the fact that girls who have
been in such an atmosphere as that of some colleges for four years, are,
from a eugenic point of view, of diminished value to the race. This is
not an argument against higher education for women, but it is a potent
argument for a different kind of higher education than many of the
colleges of America are now giving them.
This is one of the causes for the decline of the birth-rate in the old
American stock. But of course it is only one. A very large number of
causes are unquestionably at work to the same end, and the result can be
adequately changed only if it is analyzed into as many of its component
parts as possible, and each one of these dealt with separately. The
writers have emphasized the shortcoming of women's colleges, because it
is easily demonstrated and, they believe, relatively easily mitigated.
But the record of men's colleges is not beyond criticism.
Miss Smith found that among the college graduates of the 18th century in
New England, only 2% remained unmarried, while in the Yale classes of
1861-1879, 21% never married, and of the Harvard graduates from
1870-1879 26% remained single. The average number of children per
Harvard graduate of the earlier period was found to be 3. 44, for the
latest period studied 1. 92. Among the Yale graduates it was found that
the number of children per father had declined from 5. 16 to 2. 55.
[Illustration: BIRTH RATE OF HARVARD AND YALE GRADUATES
FIG. 37. --During the period under consideration it declined
steadily, although marriage was about as frequent and as early at the
end as at the beginning of the period. It is necessary to suppose that
the decline in the birth rate is due principally to voluntary limitation
of families. J. C. Phillips, who made the above graph, thinks that since
1890 the birth rate among these college graduates may be tending
slightly to rise again. ]
Figures were obtained from some other colleges, which are incomplete and
should be taken with reservation. Their incompleteness probably led the
number of children to be considerably underestimated. At Amherst,
1872-1879, it was found that 44 of the 440 graduates of the period
remained unmarried. The average number of children per married man was
1. 72. At Wesleyan it was found that 20 of the 208 graduates, from 1863
to 1870, remained single; the average number of children per married man
was 2. 31.
The only satisfactory study of the birth-rate of graduates of men's
colleges is that recently made by John C. Phillips from the class lists
of Harvard and Yale, 1850-1890, summarized in the accompanying graph
(Fig. 37). In discussing his findings, Dr. Phillips writes:
"Roughly, the number of children born per capita per married graduate
has fallen from about 3. 25 in the first decade to 2. 50 in the last
decade. The per cent of graduates marrying has remained about the same
for forty years, and is a trifle higher for Yale; but the low figure,
68% for the first decade of Harvard, is probably due to faulty records,
and must not be taken as significant.
"The next most interesting figure is the 'Children Surviving per Capita
per Graduate. ' This has fallen from over 2. 50 to about 1. 9. The per cent
of childless marriages increased very markedly during the first two
decades and held nearly level for the last two decades. For the last
decade at Yale it has even dropped slightly, an encouraging sign. It is
worthy of note that the number of children born to Yale graduates is
almost constantly a trifle higher than that for Harvard, while the
number of childless marriages is slightly less. " This is probably owing
to the larger proportion of Harvard students living in a large city.
If the birth-rate of graduates both of separate men's colleges and of
separate women's colleges is alarmingly low, that of graduates of
coeducational institutions is not always satisfactory, either. To some
extent the low birth-rate is a characteristic of educated people,
without regard to the precise nature of their education. In a study of
the graduates of Syracuse University, one of the oldest coeducational
colleges of the eastern United States, H. J. Banker found[123] that the
number of children declined with each decade. Thus married women
graduates prior to the Civil War had 2 surviving children each; in the
last decade of the nineteenth century they had only one. For married men
graduates, the number of surviving children had fallen in the same
length of time from 2. 62 to 1. 38. When all graduates, married or not,
are counted in the decade 1892-1901, it is found that the men of
Syracuse have contributed to the next generation one surviving child
each, the women only half a child apiece.
Dr. Cattell's investigation of the families of 1,000 contemporary
American men of science all of which were probably not complete however,
shows that they leave, on the average, less than two surviving children.
Only one family in 75 is larger than six, and 22% of them are childless.
Obviously, as far as those families are concerned, there will be fewer
men of inherent scientific eminence in the next generation than in this.
The decline in the birth-rate is sometimes attributed to the fact that
people as a whole are marrying later than they used to; we have already
shown that this idea is, on the whole, false. The idea that people as a
whole are marrying less than they used to is also, as we have shown,
mistaken. The decline in the general birth-rate can be attributed to
only one fact, and that is that married people are having fewer
children.
The percentage of childless wives in the American stock is steadily
increasing. Dr. Crum's figures show the following percentage of
childless wives, in the New England genealogies with which he worked:
1750-1799 1. 88
1800-1849 4. 07
1850-1869 5. 91
1870-1879 8. 10
J. A. Hill[124] found, from the 1910 census figures, that one in eight
of the native-born wives is childless, as compared with one in five
among the Negroes, one in nineteen among the foreign born. Childlessness
of American wives is therefore a considerable, although not a
preponderant factor, in this decline of the birth rate.
Dr. Hill further found that from 10 marriages, in various stocks, the
following numbers of children could be expected:
Native-born women 27
Negro-born women 31
English-born women 34
Russian-born women 54
French Canada-born women 56
Polish-born women 62
The women of the old American stock are on the whole more sterile or, if
not sterile, less fecund, than other women in the United States. Why?
In answer, various physiological causes are often alleged. It is said
that the dissemination of venereal diseases has caused an increase of
sterility; that luxurious living lowers fecundity, and so on. It is
impossible to take the time to analyze the many explanations of this
sort which have been offered, and which are familiar to the reader; we
must content ourselves with saying that evidence of a great many kinds,
largely statistical and, in our opinion, reliable, indicates that
physiological causes play a minor part in the decrease of the
birth-rate. [125]
Or, plainly, women no longer bear as many children, because they don't
want to.
This accords with Dr. Cattel's inquiry of 461 American men of science;
in 285 cases it was stated that the family was voluntarily limited, the
cause being given as health in 133 cases, expense in 98 cases, and
various in 54 cases. Sidney Webb's investigation among "intellectuals"
in London showed an even greater proportion of voluntary limitation. The
exhaustive investigation of the Galton Laboratory of National Eugenics
leaves little room for doubt that in England the decline in the
birth-rate began about 1876-78, when the trial of Charles Bradlaugh and
the Theosophist leader, Mrs. Annie Besant, on the charge of circulating
"neo-Malthusian" literature, focused public attention on the
possibility of birth control, and gradually brought a knowledge of the
means of contraception within reach of many. In the United States
statistics are lacking, but medical men and others in a position to form
opinions generally agree that the limitation of births has been steadily
increasing for the last few decades; and with the propaganda at present
going on, it is pretty sure to increase much more rapidly during the
next decade or two.
Some instructive results can be drawn, in this connection, from a study
of the families of Methodist clergymen in the United States. [126]
Although 98 out of every hundred of them marry, and they marry early,
the birth-rate is not high. Its distribution is presented in the
accompanying graph (Fig. 38). It is evident that they have tended to
standardize the two-child family which is so much in evidence among
college professors and educated classes generally, all over the world.
The presence of a considerable number of large families raises the
average number of surviving children of prominent Methodists to 3. 12.
And in so explaining the cause of the declining birth-rate among
native-born Americans, we have also found the principal reason for the
_differential_ nature of the decline in the nation at large, which is
the feature that alarms the eugenist. The more intelligent and
well-to-do part of the population has been able to get and use the
needed information, and limit its birth-rate; the poor and ignorant has
been less able to do so, and their rate of increase has therefore been
more natural in a large percentage of cases.
It is not surprising, therefore, that many eugenists should have
advocated wider dissemination of the knowledge of means of limiting
births, with the idea that if this practice were extended to the lower
classes, their birth-rate would decrease just the same as has that of
the upper classes, and the alarming differential rate would therefore be
abolished.
[Illustration: FAMILIES OF PROMINENT METHODISTS
FIG. 38. --The heavy line shows the distribution of families of
prominent Methodists (mostly clergymen) who married only once. Eleven
percent had no surviving children and nearly half of the families
consisted of two children or less. The dotted line shows the families of
those who were twice married. It would naturally be expected that two
women would bear considerably more children than one woman, but as an
average fact it appears that a second wife means the addition of only
half a child to the minister's family. It is impossible to avoid the
conclusion that the birth-rate in these families is determined more by
the desire of the parents (based on economic grounds) than on the
natural fecundity of the women. In other words, the number of children
is limited to the number whom the minister can afford to bring up on his
inadequate salary. ]
Against this it might be argued that the desired result will never be
wholly attained, because the most effective means of birth control
involve some expense, and because their effective use presupposes a
certain amount of foresight and self-control which is not always found
among the lower strata of society.
Despite certain dangers accompanying a widespread dissemination of the
knowledge of how to limit births, it seems to be the opinion of most
eugenists that if free access to such information be not permitted that
at least such knowledge ought to be given in many families, where it
would be to the advantage of society that fewer children be produced.
Such a step, of course, must be taken on the individual responsibility
of a doctor, nurse or other social worker. A propaganda has arisen
during recent years, in the United States, for the repeal of all laws
which prohibit giving knowledge about and selling contraceptives.
Whether or not it succeeds in changing the law it will, like the
Bradlaugh-Besant episode, spread contraception widely. This propaganda
is based largely on social and economic grounds, and is sometimes
unscientific in its methods and avowed aims. But whatever its nature may
be, there seems little reason (judging from analogy in European
countries) to believe that it can be stopped.
The "infant mortality movement" also has an effect here which is rarely
recognized. It is a stock argument of birth control propagandists that a
high birth-rate means a high rate of infant mortality; but A. O. Powys
has demonstrated that cause and effect are to some extent reversed in
this statement, and that it is equally true that a high rate of infant
mortality means a high birth-rate, in a section of the population where
birth control is not practiced. The explanation is the familiar fact
that conception takes place less often in nursing mothers. But if a
child dies early or is bottle-fed, a new conception is likely to occur
much sooner than would otherwise be the case. By reducing infant
mortality and teaching mothers to feed their babies naturally, the
infant mortality movement is thereby reducing the birth-rate in the
poorer part of the population, a eugenic service which to some extent
offsets the dysgenic results that, as we shall show in the last chapter,
follow the "Save the Babies" propaganda.
With the spread of the birth control and infant mortality movements one
may therefore look forward to some diminution of the differential
element in the birth-rate, together with a further decline in that
birth-rate as a whole.
Such a situation, which seems to us almost a certainty within the next
decade or two, will not change the duty of eugenics, on which we have
been insisting in this chapter and, to a large extent, throughout the
present book. It will be just as necessary as ever that the families
which are, and have been in the past, of the greatest benefit and value
to the country, have a higher birth-rate. The greatest task of eugenics,
as we see it, will still be to find means by which the birth-rate among
such families can be increased. This increase in the birth-rate among
superior people must depend largely on a change in public sentiment.
Such a change may be brought about in many ways. The authority of
religion may be invoked, as it is by the Roman Catholic and Mormon
churches[127] whose communicants are constantly taught that fecundity is
a virtue and voluntary sterility a sin. Unfortunately their appeal fails
to make proper discriminations. Whatever may be the theological reasons
for such an attitude on the part of the churches, its practical eugenic
significance is clear enough.
Nothing can be more certain than that, if present conditions continue,
Roman Catholics will soon be in an overwhelming preponderance in the
eastern United States, because of the differential birth-rate, if for no
other reason; and that the Mormon population will steadily gain ground
in the west. Similarly, it is alleged that the population of France is
gradually assuming the characteristics of the Breton race, because that
race is the notably fecund section of the population, while nearly all
the other components of the nation are committing race suicide (although
not so rapidly as is the old white stock in New England). Again, the
role of religion in eugenics is shown in China, where ancestor worship
leads to a desire for children, and makes it a disgrace to be childless.
A process analogous to natural selection applies to religions much as it
does to races; and if the Chinese religion, with its requirement of a
high birth-rate, and the present-day American Protestant form of the
Christian religion, with its lack of eugenic teaching, should come into
direct competition, under equal conditions of environment, it is obvious
that the Chinese form would be the eventual survivor, just because its
adherents would steadily increase and those of its rival would as
steadily decrease. Such a situation may seem fanciful; yet the leaders
of every church may well consider whether the religion which they preach
is calculated to fill all the needs of its adherents, if it is silent on
the subject of eugenics.
The influence of economic factors on the birth-rate is marked. The
child, under modern urban conditions, is not an economic asset, as he
was on the farm in earlier days. He is an economic liability instead.
And with the constant rise of the standard of living, with the increase
of taxation, the child steadily becomes more of a liability. Many
married people desire children, or more children, but feel that they can
not have them without sacrificing something that they are unwilling to
sacrifice.
Analysis of this increase in the cost of children, reveals not less than
five main elements which deserve attention from eugenists.
1. It costs more to clothe children than it used to. Not only does
clothing of a given quality cost more now than it did a decade or two
ago, but there are more fabrics and designs available, and many of
these, while attractive, are costly and not durable. Compliance to
fashion has increasingly made itself felt in the clothing of the child.
2. It costs more to feed them than it used to. Not only has food for
everyone increased in price, but the standards for feeding children
have been raised. Once children were expected to be content with plain
fare; now it is more frequently the custom to give them just what the
rest of the family eats.
3. The cost of medical attention has increased. All demand more of the
doctors now than they did in the last generation. The doctors are able
to do more than they formerly could, and particularly for his children,
every man wants the best that he can possibly afford. Hence medical
attendance for a child is constantly becoming more costly, because more
frequent; and further, the amount of money which parents spend on
medical attendance for their children usually increases with any
increase in their income.
4. The cost of domestic labor is greater. Most kinds of domestic service
have more than doubled in price within the memory of relatively young
people. Moreover, it is gradually being realized that a high standard is
desirable in selecting a nurse for children. As a fact, a children's
nurse ought to have much greater qualifications than the nurse whose
duty is to care for sick adults. If a mother is obliged to delegate part
of the work of bringing up her children to some other woman, she is
beginning to recognize that this substitute mother should have superior
ability; and the teachers of subconscious psychology have emphasized the
importance of giving a child only the best possible intellectual
surroundings. Ignorant nursemaids are unwillingly tolerated, and as the
number of competent assistants for mothers is very small, the cost is
correspondingly high. An increase in the number of persons trained for
such work is to be anticipated, but it is likely that the demand for
them will grow even more rapidly; hence there is no reason to expect
that competent domestic help will become any less costly than it is now.
various difficulties must be met in appropriate ways.
Marriage is not desirable for those who are eugenically inferior, from
weak constitutions, defective sexuality, or inherent mental deficiency.
But beyond these groups of women are the much larger groups of celibates
who are distinctly superior, and whose chances of marriage have been
reduced for one of the reasons mentioned above or through living in
cities with an undue proportion of female residents. Then there are,
besides these, superior women who, because they are brought up in
families without brothers or brothers' friends, are so unnaturally shy
that they are unable to become friendly with men, however much they may
care to. It is evident that life in a separate college for women often
intensifies this defect. There are still other women who repel men by a
manner of extreme self-repression and coldness, sometimes the result of
parents' or teachers' over-zealous efforts to inculcate modesty and
reserve, traits valuable in due degree but harmful in excess.
When will educators learn that the education of the emotions is as
important as that of the intellect? When will the schools awake to the
fact that a large part of life consists in relations with other human
beings, and that much of their educational effort is absolutely
valueless, or detrimental, to success in the fundamentally necessary
practice of dealing with other individuals which is imposed on every
one? Many a college girl of the finest innate qualities, who sincerely
desires to enter matrimony, is unable to find a husband of her own
class, simply because she has been rendered so cold and unattractive, so
over-stuffed intellectually and starved emotionally, that a typical man
does not desire to spend the rest of his life in her company. The same
indictment applies in a less degree to men. It is generally believed
that an only child is frequently to be found in this class.
On the other hand, it is equally true--perhaps more important--that many
innately superior young men are rejected, because of their manner of
life. Superior young men should be induced to keep their physical
records clean, in order that they may not suffer the severe depreciation
which they would otherwise sustain in the eyes of superior women.
But in efforts to teach chastity, sex itself must not be made to appear
an evil thing. This is a grave mistake and all too common since the rise
of the sex-hygiene movement. Undoubtedly a considerable amount of the
celibacy in sensitive women may be traced to ill-balanced mothers and
teachers who, in word and attitude, build up an impression that sex is
indecent and bestial, and engender in general a damaging suspicion of
men. [115]
Level heads are necessary in the sex ethics campaign. Whereas the
venereal diseases will probably, with a continuation of present progress
in treatment and prophylaxis, be brought under control in the course of
a century, the problem of differential mating will exist as long as the
race does, which can hardly be less than tens of millions of years.
Lurid presentation, by drama, novel, or magazine-story, of dramatic and
highly-colored individual sex histories, is to be avoided. These often
impress an abnormal situation on sensitive girls so strongly that
aversion to marriage, or sex antagonism, is aroused. Every effort should
be made to permeate art--dramatic, plastic, or literary--with the
highest ideals of sex and parenthood. A glorification of motherhood and
fatherhood in these ways would have a portentous influence on public
opinion.
"The true, intimate chronicle of an everyday married life has not been
written. Here is a theme for genius; for only genius can divine and
reveal the beauty, the pathos, and the wonder of the normal or the
commonplace. A felicitous marriage has its comedy, its complexities, its
element, too, of tragedy and grief, as well as its serenity and fealty.
Matrimony, whether the pair fare well or ill, is always a great
adventure, a play of deep instincts and powerful emotions, a drama of
two psyches. Every marriage provides a theme for the literary artist. No
lives are free from enigmas. "[116]
More "temperance" in work would probably promote marriage of able and
ambitious young people. Walter Gallichan complains that "we do not even
recognize love as a finer passion than money greed. It is a kind of
luxury, or pleasant pastime, for the sentimentally minded. Love is so
undervalued as a source of happiness, a means of grace, and a completion
of being, that many men would sooner work to keep a motor car than to
marry. "
Men should be taught greater respect for the individuality of women, so
that no high-minded girl will shrink from marriage with the idea that it
means a surrender of her personality and a state of domestic servitude.
A more discriminating idea of sex-equality is desirable, and a
recognition by men that women are not necessarily creatures of inferior
mentality. It would be an advantage if men's education included some
instruction along these lines. It would be a great gain, also if
intelligent women had more knowledge of domestic economy and
mothercraft, because one of the reasons why the well-educated girl is
handicapped in seeking a mate is the belief all too frequently well
founded of many young men that she is a luxury which he can not afford.
Higher education in general needs to be reoriented. It has too much
glorified individualism, and put a premium on "white collar" work. The
trend toward industrial education will help to correct this situation.
Professor Sprague[117] points out another very important fault, when he
says: "More strong men are needed on the staffs of public schools and
women's colleges, and in all of these institutions more married
instructors of both sexes are desirable. The catalogue of one of the
[women's] colleges referred to above shows 114 professors and
instructors, of whom 100 are women, of whom only two have ever married.
Is it to be expected that the curriculum created by such a staff would
idealize and prepare for family and home life as the greatest work of
the world and the highest goal of woman, and teach race survival as a
patriotic duty? Or, would it be expected that these bachelor staffs
would glorify the independent vocation and life for women and create
employment bureaus to enable their graduates to get into the offices,
schools and other lucrative jobs? The latter seems to be what occurs. "
Increase of opportunity for superior young people to meet each other, as
discussed in our chapter on sexual selection, will play a very large
part in raising the marriage rate. And finally, the delayed or avoided
marriage of the intellectual classes is in large part a reflection of
public opinion, which has wrongly represented other things as being more
worth while than marriage.
"The promotion of marriage in early adult life, as a part of social
hygiene, must begin with a new canonization of marriage," Mr. Gallichan
declares. "This is equally the task of the fervent poet and the
scientific thinker, whose respective labors for humanity are never at
variance in essentials. . . . The sentiment for marriage can be deepened by
a rational understanding of the passion that attracts and unites the
sexes. We need an apotheosis of conjugal love as a basis for a new
appreciation of marriage. Reverence for love should be fostered from the
outset of the adolescent period by parents and pedagogues. "
If, in addition to this "diffusion of healthier views of the conjugal
relation," some of the economic changes suggested in later chapters are
put in effect, it seems probable that the present racially disastrous
tendency of the most superior young men and women to postpone or avoid
marriage would be checked.
CHAPTER XIII
INCREASE OF THE BIRTH-RATE OF THE SUPERIOR
Imagine 200 babies born to parents of native stock in the United States.
On the average, 103 of them will be boys and 97 girls. By the time the
girls reach a marriageable age (say 20 years), at least 19 will have
died, leaving 78 possible wives, on whom the duty of perpetuating that
section of the race depends.
We said "Possible" wives, not probable; for not all will marry. It is
difficult to say just how many will become wives, but Robert J. Sprague
has reported on several investigations that illuminate the point.
In a selected New England village in 1890, he says, "there were forty
marriageable girls between the ages of 20 and 35. To-day thirty-two of
these are married, 20 per cent. are spinsters.
"An investigation of 260 families of the Massachusetts Agricultural
College students shows that out of 832 women over 40 years of age 755 or
91 per cent. have married, leaving only 9 per cent. spinsters. This and
other observations indicate that the daughters of farmers marry more
generally than those of some other classes.
"In sixty-nine (reporting) families represented by the freshman class of
Amherst College (1914) there are 229 mothers and aunts over 40 years of
age, of whom 186 or 81 per cent. have already married.
"It would seem safe to conclude that about 15 per cent. of native women
in general American society do not marry during the child-bearing
period. " Deducting 15 per cent. from the 78 possible wives leaves
sixty-six probable wives. Now among the native wives of Massachusetts 20
per cent. do not produce children, and deducting these thirteen
childless ones from the sixty-six probable wives leaves fifty-three
probable, married, child-bearing women, who must be depended on to
reproduce the original 200 individuals with whom we began this chapter.
That means that each woman who demonstrates ability to bear offspring
must bear 3. 7 children. This it must be noted, is a minimum number, for
no account has been taken of those who, through some defect or disease
developed late in life, become unmarriageable. In general, unless every
married woman brings three children to maturity, the race will not even
hold its own in numbers. And this means that each woman must bear four
children, since not all the children born will live. If the married
women of the country bear fewer than nearly four children each, the race
is in danger of losing ground.
Such a statement ought to strike the reader as one of grave importance;
but we labor under no delusion that it will do so. For we are painfully
aware that the bugaboo of the declining birth-rate of superior people
has been raised so often in late years, that it has become stale by
repetition. It no longer causes any alarm. The country is filled with
sincere but mentally short-sighted individuals, who are constantly ready
to vociferate that numbers are no very desirable thing in a birth-rate;
that quality is wanted, not quantity; that a few children given ideal
care are of much more value to the state and the race than are many
children, who can not receive this attention.
And this attitude toward the subject, we venture to assert, is a graver
peril to the race than is the declining birth-rate itself. For there is
enough truth in it to make it plausible, and to separate the truth from
the dangerous untruth it contains, and to make the bulk of the
population see the distinction, is a task which will tax every energy of
the eugenist.
Unfortunately, this is not a case of mere difference of opinion between
men; it is a case of antagonism between men and nature. If a race
hypnotize itself into thinking that its views about race suicide are
superior to nature's views, it may make its own end a little less
painful; but it will not postpone that end for a single minute. The
contest is to the strong, and although numbers are not the most
important element in strength, it is very certain that a race made up
of families containing one child each will not be the survivor in the
struggle for existence.
The idea, therefore, that race suicide and general limitation of births
to the irreducible minimum, can be effectively justified by any
conceivable appeal to economic or sociological factors, is a mistake
which will eventually bring about the extinction of the people making
it.
This statement must not be interpreted wrongly. Certainly we would not
argue that a high birth-rate in itself is necessarily a desirable thing.
It is not the object of eugenics to achieve as big a population as
possible, regardless of quality. But in the last analysis, the only
wealth of a nation is its people; moreover some people, are as national
assets, worth more than others. The goal, then, might be said to be: a
population adjusted in respect to its numbers to the resources of the
country, and that number of the very best quality possible. Great
diversity of people is required in modern society, but of each desirable
kind the best obtainable representatives are to be desired.
It is at once evident that a decline, rather than an increase, in the
birth-rate of some sections of the population, is wanted. There are some
strata at the bottom that are a source of weakness rather than of
strength to the race, and a source of unhappiness rather than of
happiness to themselves and those around them. These should be reduced
in number, as we have shown at some length earlier in this book.
The other parts of the population should be perpetuated by the best,
rather than the worst. In no other way can the necessary leaders be
secured, without whom, in commerce, industry, politics, science, the
nation is at a great disadvantage. The task of eugenics is by no means
what it is sometimes supposed to be: to breed a superior caste. But a
very important part of its task is certainly to increase the number of
leaders in the race. And it is this part of its task, in particular,
which is menaced by the declining birth-rate in the United States.
As every one knows, race suicide is proceeding more rapidly among the
native whites than among any other large section of the population; and
it is exactly this part of the population which has in the past
furnished most of the eminent men of the country.
It has been shown in previous chapters that eminent men do not appear
wholly by chance in the population. The production of eminence is
largely a family affair; and in America, "the land of opportunity" as
well as in older countries, people of eminence are much more
interrelated than chance would allow. It has been shown, indeed, that in
America it is at least a 500 to 1 bet that an eminent person will be
rather closely related to some other eminent person, and will not be a
sporadic appearance in the population. [118]
Taken with other considerations advanced in earlier chapters, this means
that a falling off in the reproduction of the old American best strains
means a falling off in the number of eminent men which the United States
will produce. No improvement in education can prevent a serious loss,
for the strong minds get more from education.
The old American stock has produced a vastly greater proportion of
eminence, has accomplished a great deal more proportionately, in modern
times, than has other any stock whose representatives have been coming
in large numbers as immigrants to these shores during the last
generation. It is, therefore, likely to continue to surpass them, unless
it declines too greatly in numbers. For this reason, we feel justified
in concluding that the decline of the birth-rate in the old American
stock represents a decline in the birth-rate of a superior element.
There is another way of looking at this point. The stock under
discussion has been, on the whole, economically ahead of such stocks as
are now immigrating. In competition with them under equal conditions, it
appears to remain pretty consistently ahead, economically. Now,
although we would not insist on this point too strongly, it can hardly
be questioned that eugenic value is to some extent correlated with
economic success in life, as all desirable qualities tend to be
correlated together. Within reasonable limits, it is justifiable to
treat the economically superior sections of the nation as the
eugenically superior. And it is among these economically superior
sections of the nation that the birth-rate has most rapidly and
dangerously fallen.
The constant influx of highly fecund immigrant women tends to obscure
the fact that the birth-rate of the older residents is falling below
par, and analysis of the birth-rate in various sections of the community
is necessary to give an understanding of what is actually taking place.
In Rhode Island, F. L. Hoffmann found the average number of children for
each foreign-born woman to be 3. 35, and for each native-born woman to be
2. 06. There were wide racial differences among the foreign born; the
various elements were represented by the following average number of
children per wife:
French-Canadians 4. 42
Russians 3. 51
Italians 3. 49
Irish 3. 45
Scotch and Welsh 3. 09
English 2. 89
Germans 2. 84
Swedes 2. 58
English-Canadians 2. 56
Poles 2. 31
In short, the native-born whites in this investigation fell below every
one of the foreign nationalities.
The Massachusetts censuses for 1875 and 1884 showed similar results: the
foreign-born women had 4. 5 children each, and the native-born women 2. 7
each.
Frederick S. Crum's careful investigation[119] of New England
genealogies, including 12,722 wives, has thrown a great deal of light
on the steady decline in their birth-rate. He found the average number
of children to be:
1750-1799 6. 43
1800-1849 4. 94
1850-1869 3. 47
1870-1879 2. 77
There, in four lines, is the story of the decline of the old American
stock. At present, it is barely reproducing itself, probably not even
that, for there is reason to believe that 1879 does not mark the lowest
point reached. Before 1700, less than 2% of the wives in this
investigation had only one child, now 20% of them have only one. With
the emigration of old New England families to the west, and the constant
immigration of foreign-born people to take their places, it is no cause
for surprise that New England no longer exercises the intellectual
leadership that she once held.
For Massachusetts as a whole, the birth-rate among the native-born
population was 12. 7 per 1,000 in 1890, 14. 9 in 1910, while in the
foreign-born population it was 38. 6 in 1890 and 49. 1 in 1910. After
excluding all old women and young women, the birth-rate of the
foreign-born women in Massachusetts is still found to be 3/4 greater
than that of the native-born. [120]
In short, the birth-rate of the old American stock is now so low that
that stock is dying out and being supplanted by immigrants. In order
that the stock might even hold its own, we have shown that each married
woman should bear three to four children. At present the married women
of the old white American race in New England appear to be bringing two
or less to maturity.
It will be profitable to digress for a moment to consider farther what
this disappearance of the ancient population of Massachusetts means to
the country. When all the distinguished men of the United States are
graded, in accordance with their distinction, it is regularly found, as
Frederick Adams Woods says, that "Some states in the union, some
sections of the country, have produced more eminence than others, far
beyond the expectation from their respective white populations. In this
regard Massachusetts always leads, and Connecticut is always second, and
certain southern states are always behind and fail to render their
expected quota. " The accurate methods used by Dr. Woods in this
investigation leave no room for doubt that in almost every way
Massachusetts has regularly produced twice as many eminent men as its
population would lead one to expect, and has for some ranks and types of
achievement produced about four times the expectation.
Scott Nearing's studies[121] confirm those of Dr. Woods. Taking the most
distinguished men and women America has produced, he found that the
number produced in New England, per 100,000 population, was much larger
than that produced by any other part of the country. Rhode Island, the
poorest New England state in this respect, was yet 30% above New York,
the best state outside New England.
The advantage of New England, however, he found to be rapidly
decreasing. Of the eminent persons born before 1850, 30% were New
Englanders although the population of New England in 1850 was only 11. 8%
of that of the whole country. But of the eminent younger men,--those
born between 1880 and 1889, New England, with 7. 5% of the country's
population, could claim only 12% of the genius. Cambridge, Mass. , has
produced more eminent younger men of the present time than any other
city, he discovered, but the cities which come next in order are
Nashville, Tenn. , Columbus, Ohio, Lynn, Mass. , Washington, D. C. ,
Portland, Ore. , Hartford, Conn. , Boston, Mass. , New Haven, Conn. , Kansas
City, Mo. , and Chicago, Ill.
There is reason to believe that some of the old New England stock, which
emigrated to the West, retains a higher fecundity than does that part of
the stock which remains on the Atlantic seaboard. This fact, while a
gratifying one, of course does not compensate for the low fertility of
the families which still live in New England.
Within this section of the population, the decline is undoubtedly taking
place faster in some parts than in others. Statistical evidence is not
available, to tell a great deal about this, but the birth-rate for the
graduates of some of the leading women's colleges is known, and their
student bodies are made up largely of girls of superior stork. At
Wellesley, the graph in Fig. 36 shows at a glance just what is
happening. Briefly, the graduates of that college contribute less than
one child apiece to the race. The classes do not even reproduce their
own numbers. Instead of the 3. 7 children which, according to Sprague's
calculation, they ought to bear, they are bearing . 86 of a child.
The foregoing study is one of the few to carefully distinguish between
families which were complete at the time of study and those families
where additional children may yet be born. In the studies to follow this
distinction may in some cases be made by the reader in interpreting the
data while in other cases families having some years of possible
productiveness ahead are included with others and the relative
proportion of the types is not indicated. The error in these cases is
therefore important and the reader is warned to accept them only with a
mental allowance for this factor.
The best students make an even worse showing in this respect. The
Wellesley alumnae who are members of Phi Beta Kappa,--that is, the
superior scholars--have not . 86 of a child each, but only . 65 of a
child; while the holders of the Durant and Wellesley scholarships,
awarded for intellectual superiority,[122] make the following pathetic
showing in comparison with the whole class.
WELLESLEY COLLEGE
Graduates of '01, '02, '03, '04, Status of Fall of 1912
_All_ _Durant or Wellesley_
_scholars_
Per cent married 44 35
Number of children:
Per graduate . 37 . 20
Per wife . 87 . 57
It must not be thought that Wellesley's record is an exception, for most
of the large women's colleges furnish deplorable figures. Mount
Holyoke's record is:
_Children per_ _Children per_
_Decade of graduation_ _married_ _graduate_
_graduate_
1842-1849 2. 77 2. 37
1850-1859 3. 38 2. 55
1860-1869 2. 64 1. 60
1870-1879 2. 75 1. 63
1880-1889 2. 54 1. 46
1890-1892 1. 91 0. 95
Nor can graduation from Bryn Mawr College be said to favor motherhood.
By the 376 alumnae graduated there between 1888 and 1900, only 138
children had been produced up to Jan. 1, 1913. This makes . 84 of a child
per married alumna, or . 37 of a child per graduate, since less than half
of the graduates marry. These are the figures published by the college
administration.
Professor Sprague's tabulation of the careers of Vassar college
graduates, made from official records of the college, is worth quoting
in full, for the light it throws on the histories of college girls,
after they leave college:
CLASSES FROM 1867 TO 1892
Number of graduates 959
Number that taught 431 (45%)
Number that married 509 (53%)
Number that did not marry 450 (47%)
Number that taught and afterward
married 166 (39% of all who taught)
Number that taught, married and had
children 112 (67% of all who taught
and married)
Number that taught, married and
were childless 54 (33%)
Number of children of those who
taught and had children 287 (1. 73 children per family)
Number of children of those who
married but did not teach 686 (2 per married graduate
that did not teach)
Total number of children of all
graduates 973 (1 child per graduate)
Average number of children per
married graduate 1. 91
Average number of children per
graduate 1. 00
CLASSES FROM 1867 TO 1900
Number of graduates 1739
Number that taught 800 (46%)
Number that married 854 (49%)
Number that did not marry 885 (51%)
Number that taught and afterward
married 294 (31%)
Number that taught, married and had
children 203 (69% of all who taught and married)
Number that taught, married and were
childless 91 (31%)
Number of children of those who
taught and had children 463 (1. 57 children per family)
Number of children of those who
married but did not teach 1025 (2 each)
Total number of children of all
graduates 1488 (. 8 child per graduate)
Average number of children per
married graduate 1. 74 (per married graduate)
Average number of children per graduate 0. 8
If the women's colleges were fulfilling what the writers consider to be
their duty toward their students, their graduates would have a higher
marriage and birth-rate than that of their sisters, cousins and friends
who do not go to college. But the reverse is the case. M. R. Smith's
investigation showed the comparison between college girls and girls of
equivalent social position and of the same or similar families, as
follows:
_Number of_ _Per cent childless_
_children_ _at time_
College 1. 65 25. 36
Equivalent Non-College 1. 874 17. 89
Now if education is tending toward race suicide, then the writers
believe there is something wrong with modern educational methods. And
certainly all statistics available point to the fact that girls who have
been in such an atmosphere as that of some colleges for four years, are,
from a eugenic point of view, of diminished value to the race. This is
not an argument against higher education for women, but it is a potent
argument for a different kind of higher education than many of the
colleges of America are now giving them.
This is one of the causes for the decline of the birth-rate in the old
American stock. But of course it is only one. A very large number of
causes are unquestionably at work to the same end, and the result can be
adequately changed only if it is analyzed into as many of its component
parts as possible, and each one of these dealt with separately. The
writers have emphasized the shortcoming of women's colleges, because it
is easily demonstrated and, they believe, relatively easily mitigated.
But the record of men's colleges is not beyond criticism.
Miss Smith found that among the college graduates of the 18th century in
New England, only 2% remained unmarried, while in the Yale classes of
1861-1879, 21% never married, and of the Harvard graduates from
1870-1879 26% remained single. The average number of children per
Harvard graduate of the earlier period was found to be 3. 44, for the
latest period studied 1. 92. Among the Yale graduates it was found that
the number of children per father had declined from 5. 16 to 2. 55.
[Illustration: BIRTH RATE OF HARVARD AND YALE GRADUATES
FIG. 37. --During the period under consideration it declined
steadily, although marriage was about as frequent and as early at the
end as at the beginning of the period. It is necessary to suppose that
the decline in the birth rate is due principally to voluntary limitation
of families. J. C. Phillips, who made the above graph, thinks that since
1890 the birth rate among these college graduates may be tending
slightly to rise again. ]
Figures were obtained from some other colleges, which are incomplete and
should be taken with reservation. Their incompleteness probably led the
number of children to be considerably underestimated. At Amherst,
1872-1879, it was found that 44 of the 440 graduates of the period
remained unmarried. The average number of children per married man was
1. 72. At Wesleyan it was found that 20 of the 208 graduates, from 1863
to 1870, remained single; the average number of children per married man
was 2. 31.
The only satisfactory study of the birth-rate of graduates of men's
colleges is that recently made by John C. Phillips from the class lists
of Harvard and Yale, 1850-1890, summarized in the accompanying graph
(Fig. 37). In discussing his findings, Dr. Phillips writes:
"Roughly, the number of children born per capita per married graduate
has fallen from about 3. 25 in the first decade to 2. 50 in the last
decade. The per cent of graduates marrying has remained about the same
for forty years, and is a trifle higher for Yale; but the low figure,
68% for the first decade of Harvard, is probably due to faulty records,
and must not be taken as significant.
"The next most interesting figure is the 'Children Surviving per Capita
per Graduate. ' This has fallen from over 2. 50 to about 1. 9. The per cent
of childless marriages increased very markedly during the first two
decades and held nearly level for the last two decades. For the last
decade at Yale it has even dropped slightly, an encouraging sign. It is
worthy of note that the number of children born to Yale graduates is
almost constantly a trifle higher than that for Harvard, while the
number of childless marriages is slightly less. " This is probably owing
to the larger proportion of Harvard students living in a large city.
If the birth-rate of graduates both of separate men's colleges and of
separate women's colleges is alarmingly low, that of graduates of
coeducational institutions is not always satisfactory, either. To some
extent the low birth-rate is a characteristic of educated people,
without regard to the precise nature of their education. In a study of
the graduates of Syracuse University, one of the oldest coeducational
colleges of the eastern United States, H. J. Banker found[123] that the
number of children declined with each decade. Thus married women
graduates prior to the Civil War had 2 surviving children each; in the
last decade of the nineteenth century they had only one. For married men
graduates, the number of surviving children had fallen in the same
length of time from 2. 62 to 1. 38. When all graduates, married or not,
are counted in the decade 1892-1901, it is found that the men of
Syracuse have contributed to the next generation one surviving child
each, the women only half a child apiece.
Dr. Cattell's investigation of the families of 1,000 contemporary
American men of science all of which were probably not complete however,
shows that they leave, on the average, less than two surviving children.
Only one family in 75 is larger than six, and 22% of them are childless.
Obviously, as far as those families are concerned, there will be fewer
men of inherent scientific eminence in the next generation than in this.
The decline in the birth-rate is sometimes attributed to the fact that
people as a whole are marrying later than they used to; we have already
shown that this idea is, on the whole, false. The idea that people as a
whole are marrying less than they used to is also, as we have shown,
mistaken. The decline in the general birth-rate can be attributed to
only one fact, and that is that married people are having fewer
children.
The percentage of childless wives in the American stock is steadily
increasing. Dr. Crum's figures show the following percentage of
childless wives, in the New England genealogies with which he worked:
1750-1799 1. 88
1800-1849 4. 07
1850-1869 5. 91
1870-1879 8. 10
J. A. Hill[124] found, from the 1910 census figures, that one in eight
of the native-born wives is childless, as compared with one in five
among the Negroes, one in nineteen among the foreign born. Childlessness
of American wives is therefore a considerable, although not a
preponderant factor, in this decline of the birth rate.
Dr. Hill further found that from 10 marriages, in various stocks, the
following numbers of children could be expected:
Native-born women 27
Negro-born women 31
English-born women 34
Russian-born women 54
French Canada-born women 56
Polish-born women 62
The women of the old American stock are on the whole more sterile or, if
not sterile, less fecund, than other women in the United States. Why?
In answer, various physiological causes are often alleged. It is said
that the dissemination of venereal diseases has caused an increase of
sterility; that luxurious living lowers fecundity, and so on. It is
impossible to take the time to analyze the many explanations of this
sort which have been offered, and which are familiar to the reader; we
must content ourselves with saying that evidence of a great many kinds,
largely statistical and, in our opinion, reliable, indicates that
physiological causes play a minor part in the decrease of the
birth-rate. [125]
Or, plainly, women no longer bear as many children, because they don't
want to.
This accords with Dr. Cattel's inquiry of 461 American men of science;
in 285 cases it was stated that the family was voluntarily limited, the
cause being given as health in 133 cases, expense in 98 cases, and
various in 54 cases. Sidney Webb's investigation among "intellectuals"
in London showed an even greater proportion of voluntary limitation. The
exhaustive investigation of the Galton Laboratory of National Eugenics
leaves little room for doubt that in England the decline in the
birth-rate began about 1876-78, when the trial of Charles Bradlaugh and
the Theosophist leader, Mrs. Annie Besant, on the charge of circulating
"neo-Malthusian" literature, focused public attention on the
possibility of birth control, and gradually brought a knowledge of the
means of contraception within reach of many. In the United States
statistics are lacking, but medical men and others in a position to form
opinions generally agree that the limitation of births has been steadily
increasing for the last few decades; and with the propaganda at present
going on, it is pretty sure to increase much more rapidly during the
next decade or two.
Some instructive results can be drawn, in this connection, from a study
of the families of Methodist clergymen in the United States. [126]
Although 98 out of every hundred of them marry, and they marry early,
the birth-rate is not high. Its distribution is presented in the
accompanying graph (Fig. 38). It is evident that they have tended to
standardize the two-child family which is so much in evidence among
college professors and educated classes generally, all over the world.
The presence of a considerable number of large families raises the
average number of surviving children of prominent Methodists to 3. 12.
And in so explaining the cause of the declining birth-rate among
native-born Americans, we have also found the principal reason for the
_differential_ nature of the decline in the nation at large, which is
the feature that alarms the eugenist. The more intelligent and
well-to-do part of the population has been able to get and use the
needed information, and limit its birth-rate; the poor and ignorant has
been less able to do so, and their rate of increase has therefore been
more natural in a large percentage of cases.
It is not surprising, therefore, that many eugenists should have
advocated wider dissemination of the knowledge of means of limiting
births, with the idea that if this practice were extended to the lower
classes, their birth-rate would decrease just the same as has that of
the upper classes, and the alarming differential rate would therefore be
abolished.
[Illustration: FAMILIES OF PROMINENT METHODISTS
FIG. 38. --The heavy line shows the distribution of families of
prominent Methodists (mostly clergymen) who married only once. Eleven
percent had no surviving children and nearly half of the families
consisted of two children or less. The dotted line shows the families of
those who were twice married. It would naturally be expected that two
women would bear considerably more children than one woman, but as an
average fact it appears that a second wife means the addition of only
half a child to the minister's family. It is impossible to avoid the
conclusion that the birth-rate in these families is determined more by
the desire of the parents (based on economic grounds) than on the
natural fecundity of the women. In other words, the number of children
is limited to the number whom the minister can afford to bring up on his
inadequate salary. ]
Against this it might be argued that the desired result will never be
wholly attained, because the most effective means of birth control
involve some expense, and because their effective use presupposes a
certain amount of foresight and self-control which is not always found
among the lower strata of society.
Despite certain dangers accompanying a widespread dissemination of the
knowledge of how to limit births, it seems to be the opinion of most
eugenists that if free access to such information be not permitted that
at least such knowledge ought to be given in many families, where it
would be to the advantage of society that fewer children be produced.
Such a step, of course, must be taken on the individual responsibility
of a doctor, nurse or other social worker. A propaganda has arisen
during recent years, in the United States, for the repeal of all laws
which prohibit giving knowledge about and selling contraceptives.
Whether or not it succeeds in changing the law it will, like the
Bradlaugh-Besant episode, spread contraception widely. This propaganda
is based largely on social and economic grounds, and is sometimes
unscientific in its methods and avowed aims. But whatever its nature may
be, there seems little reason (judging from analogy in European
countries) to believe that it can be stopped.
The "infant mortality movement" also has an effect here which is rarely
recognized. It is a stock argument of birth control propagandists that a
high birth-rate means a high rate of infant mortality; but A. O. Powys
has demonstrated that cause and effect are to some extent reversed in
this statement, and that it is equally true that a high rate of infant
mortality means a high birth-rate, in a section of the population where
birth control is not practiced. The explanation is the familiar fact
that conception takes place less often in nursing mothers. But if a
child dies early or is bottle-fed, a new conception is likely to occur
much sooner than would otherwise be the case. By reducing infant
mortality and teaching mothers to feed their babies naturally, the
infant mortality movement is thereby reducing the birth-rate in the
poorer part of the population, a eugenic service which to some extent
offsets the dysgenic results that, as we shall show in the last chapter,
follow the "Save the Babies" propaganda.
With the spread of the birth control and infant mortality movements one
may therefore look forward to some diminution of the differential
element in the birth-rate, together with a further decline in that
birth-rate as a whole.
Such a situation, which seems to us almost a certainty within the next
decade or two, will not change the duty of eugenics, on which we have
been insisting in this chapter and, to a large extent, throughout the
present book. It will be just as necessary as ever that the families
which are, and have been in the past, of the greatest benefit and value
to the country, have a higher birth-rate. The greatest task of eugenics,
as we see it, will still be to find means by which the birth-rate among
such families can be increased. This increase in the birth-rate among
superior people must depend largely on a change in public sentiment.
Such a change may be brought about in many ways. The authority of
religion may be invoked, as it is by the Roman Catholic and Mormon
churches[127] whose communicants are constantly taught that fecundity is
a virtue and voluntary sterility a sin. Unfortunately their appeal fails
to make proper discriminations. Whatever may be the theological reasons
for such an attitude on the part of the churches, its practical eugenic
significance is clear enough.
Nothing can be more certain than that, if present conditions continue,
Roman Catholics will soon be in an overwhelming preponderance in the
eastern United States, because of the differential birth-rate, if for no
other reason; and that the Mormon population will steadily gain ground
in the west. Similarly, it is alleged that the population of France is
gradually assuming the characteristics of the Breton race, because that
race is the notably fecund section of the population, while nearly all
the other components of the nation are committing race suicide (although
not so rapidly as is the old white stock in New England). Again, the
role of religion in eugenics is shown in China, where ancestor worship
leads to a desire for children, and makes it a disgrace to be childless.
A process analogous to natural selection applies to religions much as it
does to races; and if the Chinese religion, with its requirement of a
high birth-rate, and the present-day American Protestant form of the
Christian religion, with its lack of eugenic teaching, should come into
direct competition, under equal conditions of environment, it is obvious
that the Chinese form would be the eventual survivor, just because its
adherents would steadily increase and those of its rival would as
steadily decrease. Such a situation may seem fanciful; yet the leaders
of every church may well consider whether the religion which they preach
is calculated to fill all the needs of its adherents, if it is silent on
the subject of eugenics.
The influence of economic factors on the birth-rate is marked. The
child, under modern urban conditions, is not an economic asset, as he
was on the farm in earlier days. He is an economic liability instead.
And with the constant rise of the standard of living, with the increase
of taxation, the child steadily becomes more of a liability. Many
married people desire children, or more children, but feel that they can
not have them without sacrificing something that they are unwilling to
sacrifice.
Analysis of this increase in the cost of children, reveals not less than
five main elements which deserve attention from eugenists.
1. It costs more to clothe children than it used to. Not only does
clothing of a given quality cost more now than it did a decade or two
ago, but there are more fabrics and designs available, and many of
these, while attractive, are costly and not durable. Compliance to
fashion has increasingly made itself felt in the clothing of the child.
2. It costs more to feed them than it used to. Not only has food for
everyone increased in price, but the standards for feeding children
have been raised. Once children were expected to be content with plain
fare; now it is more frequently the custom to give them just what the
rest of the family eats.
3. The cost of medical attention has increased. All demand more of the
doctors now than they did in the last generation. The doctors are able
to do more than they formerly could, and particularly for his children,
every man wants the best that he can possibly afford. Hence medical
attendance for a child is constantly becoming more costly, because more
frequent; and further, the amount of money which parents spend on
medical attendance for their children usually increases with any
increase in their income.
4. The cost of domestic labor is greater. Most kinds of domestic service
have more than doubled in price within the memory of relatively young
people. Moreover, it is gradually being realized that a high standard is
desirable in selecting a nurse for children. As a fact, a children's
nurse ought to have much greater qualifications than the nurse whose
duty is to care for sick adults. If a mother is obliged to delegate part
of the work of bringing up her children to some other woman, she is
beginning to recognize that this substitute mother should have superior
ability; and the teachers of subconscious psychology have emphasized the
importance of giving a child only the best possible intellectual
surroundings. Ignorant nursemaids are unwillingly tolerated, and as the
number of competent assistants for mothers is very small, the cost is
correspondingly high. An increase in the number of persons trained for
such work is to be anticipated, but it is likely that the demand for
them will grow even more rapidly; hence there is no reason to expect
that competent domestic help will become any less costly than it is now.
