No More Learning

Reply to Objection 1: The effect of operating grace is the
justification of the ungodly (as stated in the [4771]FS, Q[113]),
wherein there is, as was there stated ([4772]AA[1],2,3), not only
infusion of grace and forgiveness of sin, but also a movement of the
free-will towards God, which is an act of faith quickened by charity,
and a movement of the free-will against sin, which is the act of
penance. Yet these human acts are there as the effects of operating
grace, and are produced at the same time as the forgiveness of sin.
Consequently the forgiveness of sin does not take place without an act
of the virtue of penance, although it is the effect of operating grace.

Reply to Objection 2: In the justification of the ungodly there is not
only an act of penance, but also an act of faith, as stated above (ad
1: [4773]FS, Q[113], A[4]). Wherefore the forgiveness of sin is
accounted the effect not only of the virtue of penance, but also, and
that chiefly, of faith and charity.

Reply to Objection 3: The act of the virtue of penance is subordinate
to Christ's Passion both by faith, and by its relation to the keys of
the Church; and so, in both ways, it causes the forgiveness of sin, by
the power of Christ's Passion.

To the argument advanced in the contrary sense we reply that the act of
the virtue of penance is necessary for the forgiveness of sin, through
being an inseparable effect of grace, whereby chiefly is sin pardoned,
and which produces its effect in all the sacraments. Consequently it
only follows that grace is a higher cause of the forgiveness of sin
than the sacrament of Penance. Moreover, it must be observed that,
under the Old Law and the law of nature, there was a sacrament of
Penance after a fashion, as stated above ([4774]Q[84], A[7], ad 2).
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE REMISSION OF VENIAL SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the forgiveness of venial sins, under which head
there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether venial sin can be forgiven without Penance?

(2) Whether it can be forgiven without the infusion of grace?

(3) Whether venial sins are forgiven by the sprinkling of holy water, a
bishop's blessing, the beating of the breast, the Lord's Prayer, and
the like?

(4) Whether a venial sin can be taken away without a mortal sin?
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Whether venial sin can be forgiven without Penance?

Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin can be forgiven without
penance. For, as stated above ([4775]Q[84], A[10], ad 4), it is
essential to true penance that man should not only sorrow for his past
sins, but also that he should purpose to avoid them for the future. Now
venial sins are forgiven without any such purpose, for it is certain
that man cannot lead the present life without committing venial sins.
Therefore venial sins can be forgiven without penance.

Objection 2: Further, there is no penance without actual displeasure at
one's sins. But venial sins can be taken away without any actual
displeasure at them, as would be the case if a man were to be killed in
his sleep, for Christ's sake, since he would go to heaven at once,
which would not happen if his venial sins remained. Therefore venial
sins can be forgiven without penance.

Objection 3: Further, venial sins are contrary to the fervor of
charity, as stated in the [4776]SS, Q[24], A[10]. Now one contrary is
removed by another. Therefore forgiveness of venial sins is caused by
the fervor of charity, which may be without actual displeasure at
venial sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa
Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown], that "there is a
penance which is done for venial sins in the Church every day" which
would be useless if venial sins could be forgiven without Penance.

I answer that, Forgiveness of sin, as stated above ([4777]Q[86], A[2]),
is effected by man being united to God from Whom sin separates him in
some way. Now this separation is made complete by mortal sin, and
incomplete by venial sin: because, by mortal sin, the mind through
acting against charity is altogether turned away from God; whereas by
venial sin man's affections are clogged, so that they are slow in
tending towards God. Consequently both kinds of sin are taken away by
penance, because by both of them man's will is disordered through
turning inordinately to a created good; for just as mortal sin cannot
be forgiven so long as the will is attached to sin, so neither can
venial sin, because while the cause remains, the effect remains.

Yet a more perfect penance is requisite for the forgiveness of mortal
sin, namely that man should detest actually the mortal sin which he
committed, so far as lies in his power, that is to say, he should
endeavor to remember each single mortal sin, in order to detest each
one. But this is, not required for the forgiveness of venial sins;
although it does not suffice to have habitual displeasure, which is
included in the habit of charity or of penance as a virtue, since then
venial sin would be incompatible with charity, which is evidently
untrue. Consequently it is necessary to have a certain virtual
displeasure, so that, for instance, a man's affections so tend to God
and Divine things, that whatever might happen to him to hamper that
tendency would be displeasing to him, and would grieve him, were he to
commit it, even though he were not to think of it actually: and this is
not sufficient for the remission of mortal sin, except as regards those
sins which he fails to remember after a careful examination.

Reply to Objection 1: When man is in a state of grace, he can avoid all
mortal sins, and each single one; and he can avoid each single venial
sin, but not all, as was explained in the [4778]FS, Q[74], A[8], ad 2;
[4779]FS, Q[109], A[8]. Consequently penance for mortal sins requires
man to purpose abstaining from mortal sins, all and each; whereas
penance for venial sins requires man to purpose abstaining from each,
but not from all, because the weakness of this life does not allow of
this. Nevertheless he needs to have the purpose of taking steps to
commit fewer venial sins, else he would be in danger of falling back,
if he gave up the desire of going forward, or of removing the obstacles
to spiritual progress, such as venial sins are.

Reply to Objection 2: Death for Christ's sake, as stated above
([4780]Q[66], A[11]), obtains the power of Baptism, wherefore it washes
away all sin, both venial and mortal, unless it find the will attached
to sin.

Reply to Objection 3: The fervor of charity implies virtual displeasure
at venial sins, as stated above ([4781]Q[79], A[4]).
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Whether infusion of grace is necessary for the remission of venial sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that infusion of grace is necessary for the
remission of venial sins. Because an effect is not produced without its
proper cause. Now the proper cause of the remission of sins is grace;
for man's sins are not forgiven through his own merits; wherefore it is
written (Eph. 2:4,5): "God, Who is rich in mercy, for His exceeding
charity, wherewith He loved us, even when we were dead in sins, hath
quickened us together in Christ, by Whose grace you are saved. "
Therefore venial sins are not forgiven without infusion of grace.

Objection 2: Further, venial sins are not forgiven without Penance. Now
grace is infused, in Penance as in the other sacraments of the New Law.
Therefore venial sins are not forgiven without infusion of grace.

Objection 3: Further, venial sin produces a stain on the soul. Now a
stain is not removed save by grace which is the spiritual beauty of the
soul. Therefore it seems that venial sins are not forgiven without
infusion of grace.

On the contrary, The advent of venial sin neither destroys nor
diminishes grace, as stated in the [4782]SS, Q[24], A[10]. Therefore,
in like manner, an infusion of grace is not necessary in order to
remove venial sin.

I answer that, Each thing is removed by its contrary. But venial sin is
not contrary to habitual grace or charity, but hampers its act, through
man being too much attached to a created good, albeit not in opposition
to God, as stated in the [4783]FS, Q[88], A[1]; [4784]SS, Q[24], A[10].
Therefore, in order that venial sin be removed, it is not necessary
that habitual grace be infused, but a movement of grace or charity
suffices for its forgiveness.

Nevertheless, since in those who have the use of free-will (in whom
alone can there be venial sins), there can be no infusion of grace
without an actual movement of the free-will towards God and against
sin, consequently whenever grace is infused anew, venial sins are
forgiven.

Reply to Objection 1: Even the forgiveness of venial sins is an effect
of grace, in virtue of the act which grace produces anew, but not
through any habit infused anew into the soul.

Reply to Objection 2: Venial sin is never forgiven without some act,
explicit or implicit, of the virtue of penance, as stated above
[4785](A[1]): it can, however, be forgiven without the sacrament of
Penance, which is formally perfected by the priestly absolution, as
stated above (Q[87], A[2]). Hence it does not follow that infusion of
grace is required for the forgiveness of venial sin, for although this
infusion takes place in every sacrament, it does not occur in every act
of virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as there are two kinds of bodily stain, one
consisting in the privation of something required for beauty, e. g. the
right color or the due proportion of members, and another by the
introduction of some hindrance to beauty, e. g. mud or dust; so too, a
stain is put on the soul, in one way, by the privation of the beauty of
grace through mortal sin, in another, by the inordinate inclination of
the affections to some temporal thing, and this is the result of venial
sin. Consequently, an infusion of grace is necessary for the removal of
mortal sin, but in order to remove venial sin, it is necessary to have
a movement proceeding from grace, removing the inordinate attachment to
the temporal thing.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether venial sins are removed by the sprinkling of holy water and the
like?

Objection 1: It would seem that venial sins are not removed by the
sprinkling of holy water, a bishop's blessing, and the like. For venial
sins are not forgiven without Penance, as stated above [4786](A[1]).
But Penance suffices by itself for the remission of venial sins.
Therefore the above have nothing to do with the remission of venial
sins.

Objection 2: Further, each of the above bears the same relation to one
venial sin as to all. If therefore, by means of one of them, some
venial sin is remitted, it follows that in like manner all are
remitted, so that by beating his breast once, or by being sprinkled
once with holy water, a man would be delivered from all his venial
sins, which seems unreasonable.

Objection 3: Further, venial sins occasion a debt of some punishment,
albeit temporal; for it is written (1 Cor. 3:12, 15) of him that builds
up "wood, hay, stubble" that "he shall be saved, yet so as by fire. "
Now the above things whereby venial sins are said to be taken away,
contain either no punishment at all, or very little. Therefore they do
not suffice for the full remission of venial sins.

On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia [*Hom. 30 inter 1;
Ep. cclxv] that "for our slight sins we strike our breasts, and say:
Forgive us our trespasses," and so it seems that striking one's breast,
and the Lord's Prayer cause the remission of venial sins: and the same
seems to apply to the other things.

I answer that, As stated above [4787](A[2]), no infusion of fresh grace
is required for the forgiveness of a venial sin, but it is enough to
have an act proceeding from grace, in detestation of that venial sin,
either explicit or at least implicit, as when one is moved fervently to
God. Hence, for three reasons, certain things cause the remission of
venial sins: first, because they imply the infusion of grace, since the
infusion of grace removes venial sins, as stated above [4788](A[2]);
and so, by the Eucharist, Extreme Unction, and by all the sacraments of
the New Law without exception, wherein grace is conferred, venial sins
are remitted. Secondly, because they imply a movement of detestation
for sin, and in this way the general confession [*i. e. the recital of
the Confiteor or of an act of contrition], the beating of one's breast,
and the Lord's Prayer conduce to the remission of venial sins, for we
ask in the Lord's Prayer: "Forgive us our trespasses. " Thirdly, because
they include a movement of reverence for God and Divine things; and in
this way a bishop's blessing, the sprinkling of holy water, any
sacramental anointing, a prayer said in a dedicated church, and
anything else of the kind, conduce to the remission of venial sins.

Reply to Objection 1: All these things cause the remission of venial
sins, in so far as they incline the soul to the movement of penance,
viz. , the implicit or explicit detestation of one's sins.

Reply to Objection 2: All these things, so far as they are concerned,
conduce to the remission of all venial sins: but the remission may be
hindered as regards certain venial sins, to which the mind is still
actually attached, even as insincerity sometimes impedes the effect of
Baptism.

Reply to Objection 3: By the above things, venial sins are indeed taken
away as regards the guilt, both because those things are a kind of
satisfaction, and through the virtue of charity whose movement is
aroused by such things.

Yet it does not always happen that, by means of each one, the whole
guilt of punishment is taken away, because, in that case, whoever was
entirely free from mortal sin, would go straight to heaven if sprinkled
with holy water: but the debt of punishment is remitted by means of the
above, according to the movement of fervor towards God, which fervor is
aroused by such things, sometimes more, sometimes less.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether venial sin can be taken away without mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin can be taken away without
mortal sin. For, on Jn. 8:7: "He that is without sin among you, let him
first cast a stone at her," a gloss says that "all those men were in a
state of mortal sin: for venial offenses were forgiven them through the
legal ceremonies. " Therefore venial sin can be taken away without
mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, no infusion of grace is required for the
remission of venial sin. but it is required for the forgiveness of
mortal sin. Therefore venial sin can be taken away without mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, a venial sin differs from a mortal sin more than
from another venial sin. But one venial sin can be pardoned without
another, as stated above (A[3], ad 2;[4789] Q[87], A[3]). Therefore a
venial sin can be taken away without a mortal sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 5:26): "Amen I say to thee, thou
shalt not go out from thence," viz. , from the prison, into which a man
is cast for mortal sin, "till thou repay the last farthing," by which
venial sin is denoted. Therefore a venial sin is not forgiven without
mortal sin.

I answer that, As stated above ([4790]Q[87], A[3]), there is no
remission of any sin whatever except by the power of grace, because, as
the Apostle declares (Rom. 4:8), it is owing to God's grace that He
does not impute sin to a man, which a gloss on that passage expounds as
referring to venial sin. Now he that is in a state of mortal sin is
without the grace of God. Therefore no venial sin is forgiven him.

Reply to Objection 1: Venial offenses, in the passage quoted, denote
the irregularities or uncleannesses which men contracted in accordance
with the Law.

Reply to Objection 2: Although no new infusion of habitual grace is
requisite for the remission of venial sin, yet it is necessary to
exercise some act of grace, which cannot be in one who is a subject of
mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 3: Venial sin does not preclude every act of grace
whereby all venial sins can be removed; whereas mortal sin excludes
altogether the habit of grace, without which no sin, either mortal or
venial, is remitted. Hence the comparison fails.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE RETURN OF SINS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN AWAY BY PENANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the return of sins which have been taken away by
Penance: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether sins which have been taken away by Penance return simply
through a subsequent sin?

(2) Whether more specially as regards certain sins they return, in a
way, on account of ingratitude?

(3) Whether the debt of punishment remains the same for sins thus
returned?

(4) Whether this ingratitude, on account of which sins return, is a
special sin?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether sins once forgiven return through a subsequent sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that sins once forgiven return through a
subsequent sin. For Augustine says (De Bapt. contra Donat. i, 12): "Our
Lord teaches most explicitly in the Gospel that sins which have been
forgiven return, when fraternal charity ceases, in the example of the
servant from whom his master exacted the payment of the debt already
forgiven, because he had refused to forgive the debt of his
fellow-servant. " Now fraternal charity is destroyed through each mortal
sin. Therefore sins already taken away through Penance, return through
each subsequent mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, on Lk. 11:24, "I will return into my house,
whence I came out," Bede says: "This verse should make us tremble, we
should not endeavor to explain it away lest through carelessness we
give place to the sin which we thought to have been taken away, and
become its slave once more. " Now this would not be so unless it
returned. Therefore a sin returns after once being taken away by
Penance.

Objection 3: Further, the Lord said (Ezech. 18:24): "If the just man
turn himself away from his justice, and do iniquity . . . all his
justices which he hath done, shall not be remembered. " Now among the
other "justices" which he had done, is also his previous penance, since
it was said above ([4791]Q[85], A[3]) that penance is a part of
justice. Therefore when one who has done penance, sins, his previous
penance, whereby he received forgiveness of his sins, is not imputed to
him. Therefore his sins return.

Objection 4: Further, past sins are covered by grace, as the Apostle
declares (Rom. 4:7) where he quotes Ps. 31:1: "Blessed are they whose
iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered. " But a subsequent
mortal sin takes away grace. Therefore the sins committed previously,
become uncovered: and so, seemingly, they return.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 11:29): "The gifts and the
calling of God are without repentance. " Now the penitent's sins are
taken away by a gift of God. Therefore the sins which have been taken
away do not return through a subsequent sin, as though God repented His
gift of forgiveness.

Moreover, Augustine says (Lib. Resp. Prosperi i [*Cf. Prosper,
Responsiones ad Capitula Gallorum ii]): "When he that turns away from
Christ, comes to the end of this life a stranger to grace, whither does
he go, except to perdition? Yet he does not fall back into that which
had been forgiven, nor will he be condemned for original sin. "

I answer that, As stated above ([4792]Q[86], A[4]), mortal sin contains
two things, aversion from God and adherence to a created good. Now, in
mortal sin, whatever attaches to the aversion, is, considered in
itself, common to all mortal sins, since man turns away from God by
every mortal sin, so that, in consequence, the stain resulting from the
privation of grace, and the debt of everlasting punishment are common
to all mortal sins. This is what is meant by what is written (James
2:10): "Whosoever . . . shall offend in one point, is become guilty of
all. " On the other hand, as regards their adherence they are different
from, and sometimes contrary to one another. Hence it is evident, that
on the part of the adherence, a subsequent mortal sin does not cause
the return of mortal sins previously dispelled, else it would follow
that by a sin of wastefulness a man would be brought back to the habit
or disposition of avarice previously dispelled, so that one contrary
would be the cause of another, which is impossible. But if in mortal
sins we consider that which attaches to the aversion absolutely, then a
subsequent mortal sin [causes the return of that which was comprised in
the mortal sins before they were pardoned, in so far as the subsequent
mortal sin] [*The words in brackets are omitted in the Leonine
edition. ] deprives man of grace, and makes him deserving of everlasting
punishment, just as he was before. Nevertheless, since the aversion of
mortal sin is [in a way, caused by the adherence, those things which
attach to the aversion are*] diversified somewhat in relation to
various adherences, as it were to various causes, so that there will be
a different aversion, a different stain, a different debt of
punishment, according to the different acts of mortal sin from which
they arise; hence the question is moved whether the stain and the debt
of eternal punishment, as caused by acts of sins previously pardoned,
return through a subsequent mortal sin.

Accordingly some have maintained that they return simply even in this
way. But this is impossible, because what God has done cannot be undone
by the work of man. Now the pardon of the previous sins was a work of
Divine mercy, so that it cannot be undone by man's subsequent sin,
according to Rom. 3:3: "Shall their unbelief make the faith of God
without effect? "

Wherefore others who maintained the possibility of sins returning, said
that God pardons the sins of a penitent who will afterwards sin again,
not according to His foreknowledge, but only according to His present
justice: since He foresees that He will punish such a man eternally for
his sins, and yet, by His grace, He makes him righteous for the
present. But this cannot stand: because if a cause be placed
absolutely, its effect is placed absolutely; so that if the remission
of sins were effected by grace and the sacraments of grace, not
absolutely but under some condition dependent on some future event, it
would follow that grace and the sacraments of grace are not the
sufficient causes of the remission of sins, which is erroneous, as
being derogatory to God's grace.

Consequently it is in no way possible for the stain of past sins and
the debt of punishment incurred thereby, to return, as caused by those
acts. Yet it may happen that a subsequent sinful act virtually contains
the debt of punishment due to the previous sin, in so far as when a man
sins a second time, for this very reason he seems to sin more
grievously than before, as stated in Rom. 2:5: "According to thy
hardness and impenitent heart, thou treasurest up to thyself wrath
against the day of wrath," from the mere fact, namely, that God's
goodness, which waits for us to repent, is despised. And so much the
more is God's goodness despised, if the first sin is committed a second
time after having been forgiven, as it is a greater favor for the sin
to be forgiven than for the sinner to be endured.

Accordingly the sin which follows repentance brings back, in a sense,
the debt of punishment due to the sins previously forgiven, not as
caused by those sins already forgiven but as caused by this last sin
being committed, on account of its being aggravated in view of those
previous sins. This means that those sins return, not simply, but in a
restricted sense, viz. , in so far as they are virtually contained in
the subsequent sin.

Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Augustine seems to refer to the
return of sins as to the debt of eternal punishment considered in
itself, namely, that he who sins after doing penance incurs a debt of
eternal punishment, just as before, but not altogether for the same
"reason. " Wherefore Augustine, after saying (Lib. Resp. Prosperi i
[*Cf. Prosper, Responsiones ad Capitula Gallorum ii]) that "he does not
fall back into that which was forgiven, nor will he be condemned for
original sin," adds: "Nevertheless, for these last sins he will be
condemned to the same death, which he deserved to suffer for the
former," because he incurs the punishment of eternal death which he
deserved for his previous sins.

Reply to Objection 2: By these words Bede means that the guilt already
forgiven enslaves man, not by the return of his former debt of
punishment, but by the repetition of his act.

Reply to Objection 3: The effect of a subsequent sin is that the former
"justices" are not remembered, in so far as they were deserving of
eternal life, but not in so far as they were a hindrance to sin.
Consequently if a man sins mortally after making restitution, he does
not become guilty as though he had not paid back what he owed; and much
less is penance previously done forgotten as to the pardon of the
guilt, since this is the work of God rather than of man.

Reply to Objection 4: Grace removes the stain and the debt of eternal
punishment simply; but it covers the past sinful acts, lest, on their
account, God deprive man of grace, and judge him deserving of eternal
punishment; and what grace has once done, endures for ever.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether sins that have been forgiven, return through ingratitude which is
shown especially in four kinds of sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that sins do not return through ingratitude,
which is shown especially in four kinds of sin, viz. , hatred of one's
neighbor, apostasy from faith, contempt of confession and regret for
past repentance, and which have been expressed in the following verse:

"Fratres odit, apostata fit, spernitque, fateri,

Poenituisse piget, pristina culpa redit. "

For the more grievous the sin committed against God after one has
received the grace of pardon, the greater the ingratitude. But there
are sins more grievous than these, such as blasphemy against God, and
the sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore it seems that sins already
pardoned do not return through ingratitude as manifested in these sins,
any more than as shown in other sins.

Objection 2: Further, Rabanus says: "God delivered the wicked servant
to the torturers, until he should pay the whole debt, because a man
will be deemed punishable not only for the sins he commits after
Baptism, but also for original sin which was taken away when he was
baptized. " Now venial sins are reckoned among our debts, since we pray
in their regard: "Forgive us our trespasses [debita]. " Therefore they
too return through ingratitude; and, in like manner seemingly, sins
already pardoned return through venial sins, and not only through those
sins mentioned above.

Objection 3: Further, ingratitude is all the greater, according as one
sins after receiving a greater favor. Now innocence whereby one avoids
sin is a Divine favor, for Augustine says (Confess. ii): "Whatever sins
I have avoided committing, I owe it to Thy grace. " Now innocence is a
greater gift, than even the forgiveness of all sins. Therefore the
first sin committed after innocence is no less an ingratitude to God,
than a sin committed after repentance, so that seemingly ingratitude in
respect of the aforesaid sins is not the chief cause of sins returning.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xviii [*Cf. Dial. iv]): "It is
evident from the words of the Gospel that if we do not forgive from our
hearts the offenses committed against us, we become once more
accountable for what we rejoiced in as forgiven through Penance": so
that ingratitude implied in the hatred of one's brother is a special
cause of the return of sins already forgiven: and the same seems to
apply to the others.

I answer that, As stated above [4793](A[1]), sins pardoned through
Penance are said to return, in so far as their debt of punishment, by
reason of ingratitude, is virtually contained in the subsequent sin.
Now one may be guilty of ingratitude in two ways: first by doing
something against the favor received, and, in this way, man is
ungrateful to God in every mortal sin whereby he offends God Who
forgave his sins, so that by every subsequent mortal sin, the sins
previously pardoned return, on account of the ingratitude. Secondly,
one is guilty of ingratitude, by doing something not only against the
favor itself, but also against the form of the favor received. If this
form be considered on the part of the benefactor, it is the remission
of something due to him; wherefore he who does not forgive his brother
when he asks pardon, and persists in his hatred, acts against this
form. If, however, this form be taken in regard to the penitent who
receives this favor, we find on his part a twofold movement of the
free-will. The first is the movement of the free-will towards God, and
is an act of faith quickened by charity; and against this a man acts by
apostatizing from the faith. The second is a movement of the free-will
against sin, and is the act of penance. This act consists first, as we
have stated above (Q[85], AA[2],5) in man's detestation of his past
sins; and against this a man acts when he regrets having done penance.
Secondly, the act of penance consists in the penitent purposing to
subject himself to the keys of the Church by confession, according to
Ps. 31:5: "I said: I will confess against myself my injustice to the
Lord: and Thou hast forgiven the wickedness of my sin": and against
this a man acts when he scorns to confess as he had purposed to do.

Accordingly it is said that the ingratitude of sinners is a special
cause of the return of sins previously forgiven.

Reply to Objection 1: This is not said of these sins as though they
were more grievous than others, but because they are more directly
opposed to the favor of the forgiveness of sin.

Reply to Objection 2: Even venial sins and original sin return in the
way explained above, just as mortal sins do, in so far as the favor
conferred by God in forgiving those sins is despised. A man does not,
however, incur ingratitude by committing a venial sin, because by
sinning venially man does not act against God, but apart from Him,
wherefore venial sins nowise cause the return of sins already forgiven.

Reply to Objection 3: A favor can be weighed in two ways. First by the
quantity of the favor itself, and in this way innocence is a greater
favor from God than penance, which is called the second plank after
shipwreck (cf. [4794] Q[84], A[6]). Secondly, a favor may be weighed
with regard to the recipient, who is less worthy, wherefore a greater
favor is bestowed on him, so that he is the more ungrateful if he
scorns it. In this way the favor of the pardon of sins is greater when
bestowed on one who is altogether unworthy, so that the ingratitude
which follows is all the greater.
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Whether the debt of punishment that arises through ingratitude in respect of
a subsequent sin is as great as that of the sins previously pardoned?

Objection 1: It would seem that the debt of punishment arising through
ingratitude in respect of a subsequent sin is as great as that of the
sins previously pardoned. Because the greatness of the favor of the
pardon of sins is according to the greatness of the sin pardoned, and
so too, in consequence, is the greatness of the ingratitude whereby
this favor is scorned. But the greatness of the consequent debt of
punishment is in accord with the greatness of the ingratitude.
Therefore the debt of punishment arising through ingratitude in respect
of a subsequent sin is as great as the debt of punishment due for all
the previous sins.

Objection 2: Further, it is a greater sin to offend God than to offend
man. But a slave who is freed by his master returns to the same state
of slavery from which he was freed, or even to a worse state. Much more
therefore he that sins against God after being freed from sin, returns
to the debt of as great a punishment as he had incurred before.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 18:34) that "his lord being
angry, delivered him" (whose sins returned to him on account of his
ingratitude) "to the torturers, until he paid all the debt. " But this
would not be so unless the debt of punishment incurred through
ingratitude were as great as that incurred through all previous sins.
Therefore an equal debt of punishment returns through ingratitude.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 25:2): "According to the measure of
the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be," whence it is evident
that a great debt of punishment does not arise from a slight sin. But
sometimes a subsequent mortal sin is much less grievous than any one of
those previously pardoned. Therefore the debt of punishment incurred
through subsequent sins is not equal to that of sins previously
forgiven.

I answer that, Some have maintained that the debt of punishment
incurred through ingratitude in respect of a subsequent sin is equal to
that of the sins previously pardoned, in addition to the debt proper to
this subsequent sin. But there is no need for this, because, as stated
above [4795](A[1]), the debt of punishment incurred by previous sins
does not return on account of a subsequent sin, as resulting from the
acts of the subsequent sin. Wherefore the amount of the debt that
returns must be according to the gravity of the subsequent sin.

It is possible, however, for the gravity of the subsequent sin to equal
the gravity of all previous sins. But it need not always be so, whether
we speak of the gravity which a sin has from its species (since the
subsequent sin may be one of simple fornication, while the previous
sins were adulteries, murders, or sacrileges); or of the gravity which
it incurs through the ingratitude connected with it. For it is not
necessary that the measure of ingratitude should be exactly equal to
the measure of the favor received, which latter is measured according
to the greatness of the sins previously pardoned. Because it may happen
that in respect of the same favor, one man is very ungrateful, either
on account of the intensity of his scorn for the favor received, or on
account of the gravity of the offense committed against the benefactor,
while another man is slightly ungrateful, either because his scorn is
less intense, or because his offense against the benefactor is less
grave. But the measure of ingratitude is proportionately equal to the
measure of the favor received: for supposing an equal contempt of the
favor, or an equal offense against the benefactor, the ingratitude will
be so much the greater, as the favor received is greater.

Hence it is evident that the debt of punishment incurred by a
subsequent sin need not always be equal to that of previous sins; but
it must be in proportion thereto, so that the more numerous or the
greater the sins previously pardoned, the greater must be the debt of
punishment incurred by any subsequent mortal sin whatever.

Reply to Objection 1: The favor of the pardon of sins takes its
absolute quantity from the quantity of the sins previously pardoned:
but the sin of ingratitude does not take its absolute quantity from the
measure of the favor bestowed, but from the measure of the contempt or
of the offense, as stated above: and so the objection does not prove.

Reply to Objection 2: A slave who has been given his freedom is not
brought back to his previous state of slavery for any kind of
ingratitude, but only when this is grave.

Reply to Objection 3: He whose forgiven sins return to him on account
of subsequent ingratitude, incurs the debt for all, in so far as the
measure of his previous sins is contained proportionally in his
subsequent ingratitude, but not absolutely, as stated above.
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Whether the ingratitude whereby a subsequent sin causes the return of
previous sins, is a special sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that the ingratitude, whereby a subsequent
sin causes the return of sins previously forgiven, is a special sin.
For the giving of thanks belongs to counterpassion which is a necessary
condition of justice, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. v, 5). But
justice is a special virtue. Therefore this ingratitude is a special
sin.

Objection 2: Further, Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that thanksgiving
is a special virtue. But ingratitude is opposed to thanksgiving.
Therefore ingratitude is a special sin.

Objection 3: Further, a special effect proceeds from a special cause.
Now ingratitude has a special effect, viz. the return, after a fashion,
of sins already forgiven. Therefore ingratitude is a special sin.

On the contrary, That which is a sequel to every sin is not a special
sin. Now by any mortal sin whatever, a man becomes ungrateful to God,
as evidenced from what has been said [4796](A[1]). Therefore
ingratitude is not a special sin.

I answer that, The ingratitude of the sinner is sometimes a special
sin; and sometimes it is not, but a circumstance arising from all
mortal sins in common committed against God. For a sin takes its
species according to the sinner's intention, wherefore the Philosopher
says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he who commits adultery in order to steal is a
thief rather than an adulterer. "

If, therefore, a sinner commits a sin in contempt of God and of the
favor received from Him, that sin is drawn to the species of
ingratitude, and in this way a sinner's ingratitude is a special sin.
If, however, a man, while intending to commit a sin, e. g. murder or
adultery, is not withheld from it on account of its implying contempt
of God, his ingratitude will not be a special sin, but will be drawn to
the species of the other sin, as a circumstance thereof. And, as
Augustine observes (De Nat. et Grat. xxix), not every sin implies
contempt of God in His commandments. Therefore it is evident that the
sinner's ingratitude is sometimes a special sin, sometimes not.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first (three)
objections prove that ingratitude is in itself a special sin; while the
last objection proves that ingratitude, as included in every sin, is
not a special sin.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE RECOVERY OF VIRTUE BY MEANS OF PENANCE (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the recovery of virtues by means of Penance, under
which head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether virtues are restored through Penance?

(2) Whether they are restored in equal measure?

(3) Whether equal dignity is restored to the penitent?

(4) Whether works of virtue are deadened by subsequent sin?

(5) Whether works deadened by sin revive through Penance?

(6) Whether dead works, i. e. works that are done without charity, are
quickened by Penance?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the virtues are restored through Penance?

Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues are not restored through
penance. Because lost virtue cannot be restored by penance, unless
penance be the cause of virtue. But, since penance is itself a virtue,
it cannot be the cause of all the virtues, and all the more, since some
virtues naturally precede penance, viz. , faith, hope, and charity, as
stated above ([4797]Q[85], A[6]). Therefore the virtues are not
restored through penance.

Objection 2: Further, Penance consists in certain acts of the penitent.
But the gratuitous virtues are not caused through any act of ours: for
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18: In Ps. 118) that "God forms the
virtues in us without us. " Therefore it seems that the virtues are not
restored through Penance.

Objection 3: Further, he that has virtue performs works of virtue with
ease and pleasure: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8) that "a
man is not just if he does not rejoice in just deeds. " Now many
penitents find difficulty in performing deeds of virtue. Therefore the
virtues are not restored through Penance.

On the contrary, We read (Lk. 15:22) that the father commanded his
penitent son to be clothed in "the first robe," which, according to
Ambrose (Expos. in Luc. vii), is the "mantle of wisdom," from which all
the virtues flow together, according to Wis. 8:7: "She teacheth
temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such
things as men can have nothing more profitable in life. " Therefore all
the virtues are restored through Penance.

I answer that, Sins are pardoned through Penance, as stated above
(Q[86] , A[1]). But there can be no remission of sins except through
the infusion of grace. Wherefore it follows that grace is infused into
man through Penance. Now all the gratuitous virtues flow from grace,
even as all the powers result from the essence of the soul; as stated
in the [4798]FS, Q[110], A[4], ad 1. Therefore all the virtues are
restored through Penance.

Reply to Objection 1: Penance restores the virtues in the same way as
it causes grace, as stated above ([4799]Q[86], A[1]). Now it is a cause
of grace, in so far as it is a sacrament, because, in so far as it is a
virtue, it is rather an effect of grace. Consequently it does not
follow that penance, as a virtue, needs to be the cause of all the
other virtues, but that the habit of penance together with the habits
of the other virtues is caused through the sacrament of Penance.

Reply to Objection 2: In the sacrament of Penance human acts stand as
matter, while the formal power of this sacrament is derived from the
power of the keys. Consequently the power of the keys causes grace and
virtue effectively indeed, but instrumentally; and the first act of the
penitent, viz. , contrition, stands as ultimate disposition to the
reception of grace, while the subsequent acts of Penance proceed from
the grace and virtues which are already there.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4800]Q[86], A[5]), sometimes
after the first act of Penance, which is contrition, certain remnants
of sin remain, viz. dispositions caused by previous acts, the result
being that the penitent finds difficulty in doing deeds of virtue.
Nevertheless, so far as the inclination itself of charity and of the
other virtues is concerned, the penitent performs works of virtue with
pleasure and ease. even as a virtuous man may accidentally find it hard
to do an act of virtue, on account of sleepiness or some indisposition
of the body.
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Whether, after Penance, man rises again to equal virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that, after Penance, man rises again to
equal virtue. For the Apostle says (Rom. 8:28): "To them that love God
all things work together unto good," whereupon a gloss of Augustine
says that "this is so true that, if any such man goes astray and
wanders from the path, God makes even this conduce to his good. " But
this would not be true if he rose again to lesser virtue. Therefore it
seems that a penitent never rises again to lesser virtue.

Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says [*Cf. Hypognosticon iii, an
anonymous work falsely ascribed to St. Augustine] that "Penance is a
very good thing, for it restores every defect to a state of
perfection. " But this would not be true unless virtues were recovered
in equal measure. Therefore equal virtue is always recovered through
Penance.

Objection 3: Further, on Gn. 1:5: "There was evening and morning, one
day," a gloss says: "The evening light is that from which we fall the
morning light is that to which we rise again. " Now the morning light is
greater than the evening light. Therefore a man rises to greater grace
or charity than that which he had before; which is confirmed by the
Apostle's words (Rom. 5:20): "Where sin abounded, grace did more
abound. "

On the contrary, Charity whether proficient or perfect is greater than
incipient charity. But sometimes a man falls from proficient charity,
and rises again to incipient charity. Therefore man always rises again
to less virtue.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[86], A[6], ad 3; Q[89], A[1], ad 2),
the movement of the free-will, in the justification of the ungodly, is
the ultimate disposition to grace; so that in the same instant there is
infusion of grace together with the aforesaid movement of the
free-will, as stated in the [4801]FS, Q[113], AA[5],7, which movement
includes an act of penance, as stated above (Q[86], A[2]). But it is
evident that forms which admit of being more or less, become intense or
remiss, according to the different dispositions of the subject, as
stated in the [4802]FS, Q[52], AA[1],2; [4803]FS, Q[66], A[1]. Hence it
is that, in Penance, according to the degree of intensity or remissness
in the movement of the free-will, the penitent receives greater or
lesser grace. Now the intensity of the penitent's movement may be
proportionate sometimes to a greater grace than that from which man
fell by sinning, sometimes to an equal grace, sometimes to a lesser.
Wherefore the penitent sometimes arises to a greater grace than that
which he had before, sometimes to an equal, sometimes to a lesser
grace: and the same applies to the virtues, which flow from grace.

Reply to Objection 1: The very fact of falling away from the love of
God by sin, does not work unto the good of all those who love God,
which is evident in the case of those who fall and never rise again, or
who rise and fall yet again; but only to the good of "such as according
to His purpose are called to be saints," viz. the predestined, who,
however often they may fall, yet rise again finally. Consequently good
comes of their falling, not that they always rise again to greater
grace, but that they rise to more abiding grace, not indeed on the part
of grace itself, because the greater the grace, the more abiding it is,
but on the part of man, who, the more careful and humble he is, abides
the more steadfastly in grace. Hence the same gloss adds that "their
fall conduces to their good, because they rise more humble and more
enlightened. "

Reply to Objection 2: Penance, considered in itself, has the power to
bring all defects back to perfection, and even to advance man to a
higher state; but this is sometimes hindered on the part of man, whose
movement towards God and in detestation of sin is too remiss, just as
in Baptism adults receive a greater or a lesser grace, according to the
various ways in which they prepare themselves.

Reply to Objection 3: This comparison of the two graces to the evening
and morning light is made on account of a likeness of order, since the
darkness of night follows after the evening light, and the light of day
after the light of morning, but not on account of a likeness of greater
or lesser quantity. Again, this saying of the Apostle refers to the
grace of Christ, which abounds more than any number of man's sins. Nor
is it true of all, that the more their sins abound, the more abundant
grace they receive, if we measure habitual grace by the quantity. Grace
is, however, more abundant, as regards the very notion of grace,
because to him who sins more a more "gratuitous" favor is vouchsafed by
his pardon; although sometimes those whose sins abound, abound also in
sorrow, so that they receive a more abundant habit of grace and virtue,
as was the case with Magdalen.

To the argument advanced in the contrary sense it must be replied that
in one and the same man proficient grace is greater than incipient
grace, but this is not necessarily the case in different men, for one
begins with a greater grace than another has in the state of
proficiency: thus Gregory says (Dial. ii, 1): "Let all, both now and
hereafter, acknowledge how perfectly the boy Benedict turned to the
life of grace from the very beginning. "
__________________________________________________________________

Whether, by Penance, man is restored to his former dignity?

Objection 1: It would seem that man is not restored by Penance to his
former dignity: because a gloss on Amos 5:2, "The virgin of Israel is
cast down," observes: "It is not said that she cannot rise up, but that
the virgin of Israel shall not rise; because the sheep that has once
strayed, although the shepherd bring it back on his shoulder, has not
the same glory as if it had never strayed. " Therefore man does not,
through Penance, recover his former dignity.

Objection 2: Further, Jerome says: "Whoever fail to preserve the
dignity of the sacred order, must be content with saving their souls;
for it is a difficult thing to return to their former degree. " Again,
Pope Innocent I says (Ep. vi ad Agapit. ) that "the canons framed at the
council of Nicaea exclude penitents from even the lowest orders of
clerics. " Therefore man does not, through Penance, recover his former
dignity.

Objection 3: Further, before sinning a man can advance to a higher
sacred order. But this is not permitted to a penitent after his sin,
for it is written (Ezech. 44:10, 13): "The Levites that went away . . .
from Me . . . shall never [Vulg. : 'not'] come near to Me, to do the
office of priest": and as laid down in the Decretals (Dist. 1, ch. 52),
and taken from the council of Lerida: "If those who serve at the Holy
Altar fall suddenly into some deplorable weakness of the flesh, and by
God's mercy do proper penance, let them return to their duties, yet so
as not to receive further promotion. " Therefore Penance does not
restore man to his former dignity.

On the contrary, As we read in the same Distinction, Gregory writing to
Secundinus (Regist. vii) says: "We consider that when a man has made
proper satisfaction, he may return to his honorable position": and
moreover we read in the acts of the council of Agde: "Contumacious
clerics, so far as their position allows, should be corrected by their
bishops. so that when Penance has reformed them, they may recover their
degree and dignity. "

I answer that, By sin, man loses a twofold dignity, one in respect of
God, the other in respect of the Church. In respect of God he again
loses a twofold dignity. one is his principal dignity, whereby he was
counted among the children of God, and this he recovers by Penance,
which is signified (Lk. 15) in the prodigal son, for when he repented,
his father commanded that the first garment should be restored to him,
together with a ring and shoes. The other is his secondary dignity,
viz. innocence, of which, as we read in the same chapter, the elder son
boasted saying (Lk. 15:29): "Behold, for so many years do I serve thee,
and I have never transgressed thy commandments": and this dignity the
penitent cannot recover. Nevertheless he recovers something greater
sometimes; because as Gregory says (Hom. de centum Ovibus, 34 in
Evang. ), "those who acknowledge themselves to have strayed away from
God, make up for their past losses, by subsequent gains: so that there
is more joy in heaven on their account, even as in battle, the
commanding officer thinks more of the soldier who, after running away,
returns and bravely attacks the foe, than of one who has never turned
his back, but has done nothing brave. "

By sin man loses his ecclesiastical dignity, because thereby he becomes
unworthy of those things which appertain to the exercise of the
ecclesiastical dignity. This he is debarred from recovering: first,
because he fails to repent; wherefore Isidore wrote to the bishop
Masso, and as we read in the Distinction quoted above (OBJ[3]): "The
canons order those to be restored to their former degree, who by
repentance have made satisfaction for their sins, or have made worthy
confession of them. On the other hand, those who do not mend their
corrupt and wicked ways are neither allowed to exercise their order,
nor received to the grace of communion. "

Secondly, because he does penance negligently, wherefore it is written
in the same Distinction (OBJ 3): "We can be sure that those who show no
signs of humble compunction, or of earnest prayer, who avoid fasting or
study, would exercise their former duties with great negligence if they
were restored to them. "

Thirdly, if he has committed a sin to which an irregularity is
attached; wherefore it is said in the same Distinction (OBJ[3]),
quoting the council of Pope Martin [*Martin, bishop of Braga]: "If a
man marry a widow or the relict of another, he must not be admitted to
the ranks of the clergy: and if he has succeeded in creeping in, he
must be turned out. In like manner, if anyone after Baptism be guilty
of homicide, whether by deed, or by command, or by counsel, or in
self-defense. " But this is in consequence not of sin, but of
irregularity.

Fourthly, on account of scandal, wherefore it is said in the same
Distinction (OBJ[3]): "Those who have been publicly convicted or caught
in the act of perjury, robbery, fornication, and of such like crimes,
according to the prescription of the sacred canons must be deprived of
the exercise of their respective orders, because it is a scandal to
God's people that such persons should be placed over them. But those
who commit such sins occultly and confess them secretly to a priest,
may be retained in the exercise of their respective orders, with the
assurance of God's merciful forgiveness, provided they be careful to
expiate their sins by fasts and alms, vigils and holy deeds. " The same
is expressed (Extra, De Qual. Ordinand.