They had preserved the tradition of Greek thought and knowledge more
immediately
and more completely than had the cloisters of the West.
Windelband - History of Philosophy
, 183 ft.
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A. Harnack, Dogmengeschichte, III. 322.
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Chap. 1, f 24. ] Dualism of Body and Soul. 301
In fact, his controversy with Bernard of Glairvaux is the conflict of knowledge with faith, of reason with authority, of science with the Church. And if Abelard lacked ultimately the weight and staying power of personality to prevail in such a contest,1 it will be remem bered, on the other hand, that a science such as the twelfth century i-ould offer — even aside from the external power to which the Church at that time had attained — must have been inferior to the mighty inward strength of faith, even if it had not been supported by so great and high a personality. For that bold postulate, so full of the future, that only unprejudiced scientific insight should deter mine faith, — what means did it then possess for its fulfilment ? Its only means were the hollow rules of dialectic ; and the content which this science had to exhibit, it owed just to that tradition against which it rebelled with its intellectualistic criticism. This science lacked the material strength to carry out the part to which
she felt herself called ; but she set herself a problem which, while she herself was not able to solve has never again vanished from the memory of European peoples.
We hear, indeed, of the disturbing practices of those who would have everything treated only "scientifically ";* complaints multiply after the time of Anselm over the growing rationalism of the Zeitgeist, over the evil men who will believe only what they can comprehend and prove, over the Sophists who, with impudent dexterity, know how to dispute pro el contra, over the " deniers," who from ration alists are said to have become materialists and nihilists — but not even the names of the men who answer to this description have been preserved, to say nothing of their doctrines. And just this lack in proper material of its own was the reason that the dialectic
movement, whose prince was Abelard, in spite of all its zeal and all its acuteness, ran out and became exhausted without direct and immediate results.
24. The Dualism of Body and Soul.
On these grounds explicable that in the twelfth and, in part. even in the eleventh century, we find the feeling of the unfruitful- ness of dialectic as widely extended as the feverish impulse to attain through to true knowledge. tendency that indicates disillusion manifested in this period by the side of the ardent desire for knowledge. Discontented with the subtilties of dialectic,
which, even in men like Anselm. had laid itself under obligation to
Ct Th. Zlegler, AbatlanTi Ethica, In Strat$hurg. Ahh. *. Philot. (Freiburg, lt*4),p. Ml.
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302 Mediaeval Philosophy : Firtt Period. [Part III.
place the ultimate mysteries of faith upon a rational basis, some plunged from unfruitful theory into practical life, " in das Rauschen der Zeit, ins Rollen der Begebenheit," — into the rush of time, the rolling of events, — others plunged into a revelry in supra-rational Mysticism ; others, finally, into diligent work in empirical research. All the opposites, into which an intellectual activity that is predom inantly logical can pass over, develop by the side of dialectic^ and take their position against it in a more or less firmly concluded league, ■— Practice, Mysticism, and Empiricism.
There resulted from this at first a peculiarly distorted relation to scientific tradition. Aristotle was known only as the father of formal logic and master of dialectic, and in consequence of this igno rance was regarded as the hero of the purely intellectual mode of considering the world. Plato, on ihe contrary, was known partly as the creator of the doctrine of Ideas (unwittingly falsified in accordance with Neo-Platonic processes), partly, by virtue of the preservation of the Timasus, as the founder of a philosophy of Nature whose fundamental teleological character found the live-
, liest assent in religious thought. Hence when Gerbert, as a counter- poise against the pride of dialectic in which he himself had at first sjr made some not very successful attempts, commended the study of Nature, to which he had been stimulated by the example of the Arabians, and which corresponded to his own vigorous practical
bent toward active life, he could count on approval for this en deavour onto among men who, like him, were working toward an extension of raaterial information, and who, in aid of this, were appropriating tire results of ancient researches. Thus the return to antiquity makes hare its first appearance as the source of material knowledge in opposition to the Aristotelian dialectic, — a first weak
V*became the seat of the Platonism that was intimately associated with the study of Nature. Here worked the brothers Theodoric and Bernard of Chartres ; from this school William of Conches received his tendency. In their writings the powerful stimulus of classical antiquity unites with the interest of an active and vigorous
1 The cloister Monte Cassino in Italy formed one of the main seats of this movement. Here (about 1060) the monk Constantinus Africanus worked, who, as is known to have been the case also with the I'latonist Adelard of Bath, gathered his learning on his journeys in the Orient, and was especially active in the translation of medical treatises by Hippocrates and Galen. The effects of the activity in this cloister are shown not only in literature, but also in the
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Chap. 1, § 24. ] Body and Soul : School of Chartret. 303
knowledge of Nature. We see here one of the most peculiar shift-
ings that have occurred in the history of literature. Plato and \ ■v>- r> 5.
Aristotle have exchanged their r61es : the latter appears asjhejdeal - /■ ' v
at an abstract science of conceptions, the former as the starting- *
point for a concrete knowledge of Nature. The knowledge of ex- (r^\ Cernal reality that meets us in this period of mediaeval science is attached to the name of Plato. So far as there is a natural science
in this age, it is that of the Platonists, — of a Bernard of Chart res.
of a William of Conches, and their associates. 1
Middle Ages directed its activity to the investigation of the mental
life, and unfolded the full energy of real observation and acute/^ Ait^* analysis in the domain of inner experience — in psychology. This is^ ^*\
the field of scientific work in which the Middle Ages attained the
most valuable results. ' In this, the experience of practical life as
well as that of the sublimest piety was filled with a substantial con
tent, and as such set itself in opposition to the dialectical play of
conceptions.
1. The natural leader in this field was Augustine, whose psychologi cal views exercised a mastery that was the stronger in proportion as his views were interwoven with the current religious conviction, and in proportion, also, to the slight extent to which the Aristotelian psychology was known. But Augustine had maintained in his system the complete dualism which regarded the soul as an imma terial substance, and man as a union of two substances, body and soul. Just for this reason he could not expect to gain a knowledge of the soul from its relations to the body, and took with full con sciousness of his procedure the standpoint of inner experience.
The new principle of method which had thus arisen from meta physical presuppositions could unfold itself undisturbed so long as the monistic metaphysical psychology of the Peripatetic school re-
1 This humanistic natural science of the early Middle Ages was not at all discriminating in its adoption of ancient tradition ; so, for example, if we may trast the account of Walter of St. Victor (in the extracts made by Bulvus,
Mtgtit, Vol. 180, p. 1170), William of Conches regarded an atomistic conception of Nature as capable of union with his Platonism. (Migne, Vol. 90, pp. 1132 li . 1 Cf. for this and for what follows (as also for § 27, later) the article* by II. Siebeck in Vols. 1. —III. of the Arrhiv fur (ir*chirhlr dtr 1'hiloiophir, and
also in Vol*. 93, 84, Ztitschrift fur Philot. v. philot. Krit. (1888-90).
But this disposition toward concrete reality, which makes the
Piatonists of the Middle Ages conspicuous as contrasted with the high-soaring metaphysics of the dialecticians, assumed still another
form, which was much more valuable. Incapable as yet of gaining
from outer experience better results than those already at its hand As
in the transmitted Greek science, the empirical impulse of theO^oM^! j
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304 Mediaeval Philosophy : First Period. [Part III
mained unknown. And this unfolding was furthered emphatically by those needs which brought the Middle Ages to psychology. Faith sought knowledge of the soul for the purpose of the soul's salvation, and this salvation was fouud just in those transcendent activities through which the soul, estranged from the body, strives toward a higher world. It was, therefore, principally the Mystics who sought to spy out the secrets of the inner life, and thus became psychologists.
Weightier and philosophically more significant than the individual doctrines propounded in this line, which were often very fantastic and hazy, is the fact that by means of these and connected theories, the dualism of the sensuous and super-sensuous worlds was maintained in its full strength, and thus formed a strong counterpoise to the Neo-Platonic monism. But it was not destined to exercise this metaphysical influence till later : at first, in the more limited form of the anthropological dualism of body and soul, it became the starting-point for psychology as the science of inner experience. 1
It therefore, very noteworthy phenomenon that the sup porters of this psychology as " natural science of the inner sense," as was later called, are precisely the same men who are faithfully exerting themselves to gain a knowledge of the outer world from all available material. Having turned away from dialectic, they seek knowledge of what real in experience, philosophy of Nature but they divide this into two completely separated fields, physica corporis and physica animce. Among the Platonists the preference for the study of external Nature predominant, among the Mystics that for the study of the internal Nature. 5
But we must regard as the characteristic, the essentially new and beneficial mark of this empirical psychology, the endeavour, not only to classify the psychical activities and states, but to appre hend them in the living stream of mental life, and to comprehend their development. These men in their pious feelings, in their struggles for the enjoyment of divine grace, were conscious of an inner experience, of history of the soul, and were impelled to write this history and while in so doing they used Platonic, Augustinian,
Cf. also K. Werner, Knsmologie und Naturlehre des scholastischen Mit- telalters, unit specieller Beziehung auf Wilhelm von Conches; and Der Enticick- lungsgang der mittelalterlichen Psychologit von Alcuin bis Albtrtus Magnus (off-prints from the Sitzungsberichten (Vol. 76), and Denkschrijlen (Vol. 26) respectively of the Vienna Acad. , 1870).
Nevertheless must be mentioned that Hugo of St. Victor not only shows an encyclnpsedic knowledge in his Eruditio Didascalica, but also shows that he
acquainted, even to the most exact detail, with the teachings of ancient medi cine, particularly with the theories of physiological psychology (explanation of
perceptions, temperaments,
etc. ).
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Chap. 1, $ 24. ] Body and Soul: Victorines. 305
and Neo-Platonic conceptions in motley mixture to designate in dividual facts, the essential and decisive point is that they under took to exhibit the development of the inner life.
These Mystics, who were not seeking a metaphysics but already possessed one in their faith, were not much troubled by the ques tion which later became so important, of how this duality of body and soul should be understood. Hugo of St. Victor is indeed con scious that though the soul is lowest in the immaterial world, and the human body highest in the material world, the two are yet so opposite in constitution that their union (unto) remains an incom prehensible enigma ; but he thinks that in this very fact God has shown, and desired to show, that for him nothing is impossible. Instead of racking their brains dialetically upon this point, the Mystics rather assume this dualism as a presupposition, in order to isolate the soul for their scientific consideration, and to observe its inner life.
This life, however, for Mysticism, development of the soul to God, and so this first form of the psychology of the inner sense the his tory of salvation itt the individual soul. The Mystics regarded the soul essentially as Oemiith heart," the seat of sentiment and feeling, rather than intellect]. They show the development of its vital pro cess out of the feelings, and prove their literary virtuosoship in their depicting of the states and movements of feeling. They are also the genuine successors of Augustine in examining, in their analysis of this process, the motive forces of the will, in investigating the decisions of the will, by virtue of which faith conditions the course of knowledge, and finally in the fact that they ultimately regard as the highest stage in the soul's development the mystical contempla tion of God, which, to be sure, here held to be the same with love. Such, at least, was the activity of the two Victorines. Hugo and
Richard, who were completely sustained by the spirit of science, while in the case of Bernard of Clairvaux, the practical factor of the will much more strongly emphasised. Bernard unwearied in denouncing as heathenish that pure impulse after knowledge for its own sake which comports with all the virtues and vices, and yet, even for him, the last of the twelve stages of humility that ecstasy of deification with which the individual disappears in the eternal essence, " as the drop of water in a cask of wine. "
The psychology of knowledge, also, built up with the Victorines upon Augustinian lines. Three eyes are given to man, — the eye of flesh to know the cor|>oreal world, the eye of reason to know himself in his inner nature, the eye of contemplation to know the spiritual world and the deity. While, then, according to Hugo, cogitatio,
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306 Mediaeval Philotophy : First Period. [Part III
meditatio, and contemplatio are the three stages of intellectual activ ity, the degree to which he emphasises the co-operation of the imag ination (imaginatio) in all kinds of knowledge is interesting and characteristic of his personality. Even contemplation is a visio intellectualis, a mental beholding which alone grasps the highest truth undistorted, while thought is not capable of this.
Old and new are thus variously mingled in the writings of the Victorines. Fantasies of mystic rapture force their way amid the most acute observations and the most delicate portrayals of the psy chical functions. The method of self-observation doubtless falls here, too, into the danger of leading to Schw&rmerei,1 or ecstatic enthusi asm ; but, on the other hand, it wins much fruit of its own, it breaks up the soil for the research of the future, and, above all, it marks off the field on which modern psychology is to grow.
3. This new science received support and enrichment likewise from quite another direction : a side-result of the controversy over universals — and that, too, not the worst result — came to its aid- When Nominalism and Conceptualism combated the doctrine that universals exist in themselves, and declared the species and genera to be subjective creations in the knowing mind, the duty fell on them of making intelligible the process by which these universal ideas arise in the human mind. They found themselves thus sent directly to the empirical study of the development of ideas, and sup plemented the sublime poesy of the Mystics with results which were indeed sober and dry, but all the more valuable on that account. For, just because the matter in hand required an exhibition of the origin of purely subjective contents of thought, which were to be explained as the products of man's development in time, this inves tigation could become only a contribution to the psychology of inner experience.
The very thesis of extreme Nominalism afforded its opponents occasion to treat the relation of word to thought, and in the case of Abelard led to a searching investigation of the co-operating activity that belongs to language in connection with the development of thought. The question as to the meaning of signs and designations in the movement of ideas was by this means raised anew. A still deeper entrance into the heart of theoretical psychology was made by the investigation which is conducted as to the necessary connec tion between intellect and perception in the treatise De Intellectibus. It is here shown how sensation, as confused idea (confusa conceptio), enters into the perception (imaginatio) which grasps and holds it
1 Cf. Kant, Anthropologie, <j 4.
Chap. 1, § 24. ] Body and Soul : John of Salisbury. 307
together with others, and remains preserved reproducible in this imagination; how, then, the understanding by successively running through this manifold material (discursive activity) elaborates it to concepts and judgments; and how, after all these conditions have been fulfilled, opinion, faith, and knowledge arise, in which ulti mately the intellect knows its object in a single collective perception or intuition (intuitive activity).
In a similar way John of Salisbury set forth the process of psychical development : but in his case the tendency peculiar to the Augustinian conception of the soul asserts itself most strongly, — the tendency to regard the different forms of activity not as strata lying above one another or beside one another, but as ways of functioning in which the same living unity manifests itself. He sees already in the sensation, and in a higher degree in perception or imagination, an act of judgment; and as union of the newly entering sensations with those which are reproduced, imagination contains at the same time the emotional states (passiones) of fear and hope. Thus out of imagination as fundamental psychical state develops a twofold series of states of consciousness; in the theoretical series appear first, opinion, and by comparison of opinions, knowledge and rational conviction (ratio), both in con nection with prudence (prudentia), which is an operation of the will; finally, by virtue of the striving after calm wisdom (sapientia), we have the contemplative knowledge of the intellect ; — in the practical series are given the feelings of pleasure and pain with all their diversifications in the changing states of life.
Thus with John we have indicated the whole programme of the later associational psychology in which his countrymen were to become leaders. And he may be regarded as their prototype not only in his problems, but also in the mode of their treatment. He keeps at a distance from the speculations of dialectic that were so alien to the active world ; he has the practical ends of knowledge
in his mind, he desires to find his way in the world in which man is to live, and above all in man's actual inner life, and brings with him into philosophy a fineness and freedom of mind character istic of the man of the world, such as aside from him we do not find at that time. He owes this in no small degree to the education of the taste and of sound cosmopolitan thought which classical studies afford ; and in this, too, his countrymen have followed him, not to their injury. He is the precursor of the English Enlightenment as Abelard is of the French. 1
1 Reuter, op. tit. , II. 80, aeU thus Roger Bacon and Abelard over against each other ; yet precisely the decisive tendency of empirical psychology is present store strongly in the case of John.
308 Mediaeval Philosophy : First Period. [Part IIL
4. We notice finally Abelard's ethics as a peculiar side-phenomenon in this process of making more rigid the contrast of outer and inner, and of transferring the scientific first principle to the inner nature. 1 Its very title, Scito Te Ipsum, announces it as a science based on inner experience, and its importance consists just in the fact that here for the first time ethics is again treated as a proper philo sophical discipline, and freed from dogmatic metaphysical efforts. * This is true of this ethics although too, proceeds from the Christian consciousness of sin as its fundamental fact. But here
strives to go at once to the heart of the matter. Good and evil, says, consist not in the outward act, but in the action's inner
cause. Nor yet do they consist in the thoughts (suggestio), feelings, and desires (delectatio) which precede the decision of the will, but solely in this resolve or consent to the deed (consensus). For the inclination {voluntas), founded in the whole natural disposition and in part in the bodily constitution, which may lead toward good or evil, not itself in the proper sense good or evil. Fault or error
(vitium) — to this Abelard reduces inherited sin — becomes sin (jpeccatum) only through the consensus. But this present, the sin fully and completely there with and the bodily executed
action with its external consequences adds nothing ethically.
The essence of the moral thus placed by Abelard solely in the resolve of the will (animi intentio). But what now the norm according to which this resolve of the will to be characterised as good or evil Here, too, Abelard rejects with contempt all external
and objective determination by law he finds the norm of judg ment solely within the deciding individual, and consists in the agreement or non-agreement with the conscience (conscientia) That action good which in accord with the agent's own conviction that only bad which contradicts this.
And what conscience Where Abelard teaches as philoso pher, as the rationalistic dialectician that he was, there conscience for him (in accordance with ancient example, Cicero) the natural
moral law, which, though known in varying degree, common to all men, and which, as Abelard was convinced, was wakened to new clearness in the Christian religion, after had become ob scured through human sin and weakness (cf. above, 23, 7). But
Cf. on this Th. Ziegler in the Strassburger Ahhdl. z. Phil. (Freiburg,
1884).
- It throws surprising light upon the clearness of Abelard's thought when
he incidentally separates the metaphysical conception of the good (perfection = reality) carefully from the moral conception of the good, with which alone ethics has to do. He shows in this that he had penetrated this complication of prob lems, one of the most intricate in history.
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Chap. 1, § 24. ] Body and Soul: Abelard. 309
for the theologian this lex naturalis is identical with the will of God. 1 To follow the conscience means, therefore, to obey God; to act against the conscience is to despise God. But where the import of the natural moral law is in any wise doubtful, the only resort for the individual is to decide according to his conscience, that according to his knowledge of the divine command.
The ethics of intention which was presented by the head of the dialecticians and Peripatetics proves itself to be an enhancement of the Augustinian principles of internalisation and of the individual ism of the will, which forces its way out of the system of the great Church teacher and beyond its bounds, to fruitful operation in the future.
In his theological metaphysics Abelard seems occasionally to have gone so far as to reduce the content of the moral law to the arbitrary choice of the divine will (Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, II. 241).
The important contrast here presented in various directions to Church theory and practice cannot be brought out here.
*1
*
is,
CHAPTER II. SECOND PERIOD.
(After about 1200. )
Karl Werner, Der hi. Thomas von Aquino. 3 vols. , Regensburg, 1858 ft
Karl Werner, Die Scholastik des spateren Mittelalters. 3 vols. , Vienna, 1881 ft
The felt need for real knowledge, which mastered Western science after the first enthusiasm for dialectic was past, was very soon to find a satisfaction of unsuspected extent. Contact with the Oriental civilisation which at first maintained itself victoriously against the shock of the Crusades, disclosed to the peoples of Europe new worlds of intellectual life. Arabian, and in its train Jewish, science ' made their entry into Paris.
They had preserved the tradition of Greek thought and knowledge more immediately and more completely than had the cloisters of the West. A stronger and richer stream of scientific material poured over Bagdad and Cordova than over Rome and York. But the former brought not much more that was new with it than did the latter. Rather, as regards thoughts which dis cover or establish principles, the Oriental philosophy of the Middle Ages is still poorer than the European. Only, in the breadth and quantity of tradition, in the compass of learned material and in the extent of information in matters of science, the East was far superior, and these treasures now passed over into the possession of the Christian peoples.
From the point of view of philosophy, however, the matter of chief importance was that Parisian science became acquainted not
1 The author believes that he may and ought to decline to give a full exposi tion of the Arabian and Jewish philosophy of the Middle Ages — ought to, in so far as he is here in great part excluded from penetrating to the original sources, and would therefore find himself forced to reproduce others' expositions at second hand, — may , however, because that which passed over with fructifying influence into European science from this large literature — and it is only this element that could be treated in this presentation of the development of philos ophy as a whole — is found to be, with very small exceptions, the spiritual possession of antiquity, of the Greek or the Hellenistic philosophy. On this account there will be given only a brief survey of the Arabian and Jewish phi losophy in the Middle Ages, which will be found at the close of the introductory material of this chapter, pp. 310-318.
310
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Chap. 2. ]
only with the entire logic of Aristotle, but also with all parts of his philosophy that furnished material knowledge. By this "new logic " fresh blood was infused into the already dying dialectic, and while the task of rationally expounding the view of the world held by faith was attacked anew and with a matured technique of thought, there was presented at the same time an almost immeasurable mate rial for arrangement in the metaphysico-religious system.
Mediaeval thought showed itself abundantly ready for the problem thus enhanced, and solved it under the after-working of the impres sion of that most brilliant period in the development of the papacy which Innocent III. had brought about. The Neo-Platonic-Arabian Aristotelianism, which at the first, with its naturalistic consequences, seemed only to strengthen the rationalistic courage of dialectic to victorious pride, was mastered with admirable swiftness and bent to the service of the system of the Church. This, indeed, was possible only in a form in which the intellectualistic elements of Augustinian thought and those allied to Neo-Platonism gained a decided pre
ponderance in this now completely systematic development of a philosophy conformed to the doctrine of faith. In this way was completed an adjustment and arrangement of world-moving thoughts upon the largest and most imposing scale that history has seen, and that, too, without the. creative activity of any properly new philosophical principle as its impulse toward the formation of a system. The intellectual founder of this system was Albert of Boll- stadt. It owes its organic completion in all directions, its literary codification, and thus its historical designation, to Thomas Aquinas, and finds its poetical exposition in Dante's Divine Comedy.
But while Hellenistic science and Christian faith seemed to be brought into complete harmony in Thomism, the opposition between them broke forth at once all the more violently. Under the influ ence of Arabian doctrines, the pantheism involved in the logical consequence of Realism from being potential became actual in ex tended circles, and immediately after Thomas, his fellow-Domin ican, Master Eckhart, developed scholastic intellectualism to the heterodoxy of an idealistic Mysticism.
Hence it is comprehensible that Thomism also encountered the resistance of a Platonic-Augustinian tendency, which indeed gladly adopted the increase in the knowledge of Nature (as had been the t-^w VWore) and thp perfection of the logical apparatus, but put aside the intellectualistic metaphysics and developed all the mure energetically the opposite elements of AuKustinianism.
This tendency reached its full strength in the acutest and deepest thinker of the Christian Middle Ages, Duns Scotus, who brought the
Second Period. 311
312 Mediaeval Philo»ophy. [Part ILL
germs of the philosophy of the will, contained in Augustine's system, to their first important development, and so from the meta physical side gave the impulse for a complete change in the direc tion of philosophical thought. With him religious and scientific interests, whose fusion had begun in the Hellenistic philosophy, begin to separate.
The renewal of Nominalism, in which the intellectual movement of the last century of the Middle Ages culminated in an extremely interesting combination, led to the same result with still more last ing force. Dialectic, which had anew obtained the mastery and was flaunting itself in various disputations, developed in its text books on logic the Aristotelian schematism. This was worked out especially on the grammatical side, and there developed to a theory which attached the doctrine of judgment and the syllogism to the view that regarded the concepts {termini) as subjective signs for really existing individual things. This Terminism became united in William of Occam with the naturalistic tendencies of the Arabian- Aristotelian theory of knowledge, and these combined combated
Realism, which had been maintained alike in Thomism and Scotism. But Terminism also became united with the Augustinian doctrine of the will into a powerful individualism, with the beginnings of the empirical psychology which studied the history of develop ment, to a kind of idealism of the inner experience, and with the natural investigation which was conquering wider and wider territory, to an empiricism that was to be fruitful in the future. Thus under the scholastic covering were sprouting the germs of new thought.
Here and there in this extremely diversified movement men still vainly appear with the confidence that they can create a rational system of religious metaphysics, and finally a man of the signifi cance of Nicolaus Cusamis sought vainly to force all these elements of a new secular science back under the power of a half scholastic, half mystic intellectualism : it was just from his system that those elements exercised an influence upon the future, that was all the stronger because of his work.
The reception of Aristotle falls in the century 1160-1260 (for this topic see principally the work of A. Jourdain, cited p. 273). It began with the more val uable parts of the Organon, hitherto unknown 'veins — nova logica), and pro ceeded to the metaphysical, physical, and ethical books, always accompanied by the introduction of the Arabian explanatory writings. The Church slowly admitted the new logic, although dialectic was again set in fluctuation thereby ; for it soon became convinced that the new method which was introduced with the aid of the doctrine of the syllogism, was advantageous for presenting its own teachings.
This scholastic method in the proper sense is as follows : a text used a* the basis for discussion is broken up by division and explanation into a number of propositions ; questions are attached and the possible answers brought to
Cuat. 2. ] Second Period. 813
gether finally the arguments to be adduced for -establishing or refuting these answers are presented in the form of chain of syllogistic reasoning, leading ultimately to decision upon the subject.
This scheme was first employed by Alexander of Halea (died 1245) in his Summa Univerta; Theologicc, with mastery which was far superior to the mode of treatment of the earlier Summists in wealth of contents, clearness of development, and definiteness of results, and was scarcely surpassed even later.
An analogous change in method was worked out with regard to the material in the encyclopedias of natural science by Vincent of Beauvaia (Vincentius Bellovacensis, died about 1265), by his Speculum Quadruple! , and Johannes Ki'lanza. called Bonaventura (1221-1274), did the same work for the doctrines of Mysticism, especially those of the Victorines. Among Bonaventura's works the Reductio Artium ad Theologiain especially characteristic. Cf. K. Werner, Die Psychologic und Erkenntnisslehre ties B. (Vienna, 1876).
The Church proceeded in a much more hesitating manner in regard to Aris totle's Metaphysics and Physics, because these made their entrance in intimate connection with Averroism, and because this latter theory had developed to open pantheism the Neo-Platonic Mysticism which had never been entirely forgotten since Scotus Erigena. As the defenders of such system appear Amalrich of Bena near Chartres, and David of Dinant. about 1200, concern ing whose doctrines we are informed only by later writers, especially Albert and Thomas. With the widely extended sect of the Amalricans, which, after the Lateran council of 1216, was persecuted with fire and sword, the " Eternal
Gospel" of Joachim Floris was also connected. Cf. on this J. N. Schneider (Dttlingen, 1873).
The judgment of condemnation passed upon the Averroistic Pan-psychism (cf. {27) applied at first to Aristotle also. It the service of the two men- dicant orders, the Dominicans and Franciscans, to have broken this connec tion, and to have brought over the power of the Church to the recognition of the Peripatetic system. By a long conflict, which frequently wavered this way and that, they succeeded In founding two chairs of the Aristotelian philosophy at the University of Paris, and finally in having them taken into the faculty (cf. Kaufmann, Gesch. d. Univ. , 276 ft. ). Aft«r this victory in 1264, respect for Aristotle rose fast, until he became the highest philosophical authority. He was praised as the forerunner of Christ in matters of Nature as was John the Baptist in matters of grace, and from this time on Christian science (like Averrofis) held bitn to be in such sense the incarnation of scientific truth, that in the following literature he often cited only as " Philosophus. "
The doctrine of the Dominicans, which has remained until the present time the official doctrine of the Catholic Church, was created by Albert and Thomas. Albert of Bollatadt (Albertus Magnus) was born 1103 at Lauingen in Swabia, studied in Padua and Bologna, taught in Cologne and Paris, became
Bishop of Regensburg, and died in Cologne in 1280. His writings consist for the most part of paraphrases and commentaries upon Aristotle aside from the Summa his Botany is particularly of independent value (De Vegetabilibus, Lihri VII. ed. by Meyer and Jessen. Berlin, 1867). Cf. J. Sighart, Al. Mag. sein l-ebcn und seine Wissenschafl (Regensburg, 1867 v. Hertling, Al. Mag.
J. Bach, Al.
Italy,
TrrtlaU idei Catholica- contra gentiles (Summa contra gentiles). The treatise De Rcgimine Principum belongs to him only In part. From the very copious literature concerning him, the following may be named Ch. Jourdain, La Philosophic deSt. Th. (Paris, 1H68); Z. Gonzalez, Studien uber die Philns. de*. hi. Th. v. A. , translated from the Spanish by Nolte (Regensburg, 1886); R. Eoeken, Die Phllos. d. Th. r. A. und die CnUus der Xeuzcit (Halle, 188»l);
und die Wissenschafl seiner Zeit (in Hist. -pol. Blatter, 1874)
Mag. (Vienna, 1888). Roccasicca, Lower Thomas) of Aquino, born 1225 or 27 in
was edu cated at first in the cloister Monte Cassino, famous of old for study in natural •cience, then in Naples. Cologne, and Paris. After this he taught alternately at these universities and also at Rome and Bologna, and died, 1274, in cloister near Terracina. Besides minor treatises, his works contain commentaries on Aruuotle, on the Liber de Causis and the Sentences of Peter Lombard, and In addition to these, principally the Snmma Theologirr and the treatise De
rtohschammer. Die Philosophic de* Th. v. A. (Leips. 1880).
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314 Mediaeval Philosophy. [Paf. t lit
The philosophical importance of Dante Alighieri has heen best recognised among his editors by Fhilalethes in the commentary on his translation of the Divina Commedia. 3esides his great world-poem, the treatise De Monorchia should not be forgotten in a philosophical consideration. Cf. A. F. Ozanam, D. el la Philosophie Catholique au 13"" Steele (Paris, 1845); G. Baur, Boeihius und Dante (Leips. 1873).
Interest in other Thoinists, whose number is great, is only literary -historical .
To the Dominican Order belonged also the father of German Mysticism. Master Eckhart, a younger contemporary of Thomas. Born in the middle of the thirteenth century, probably in Saxony, at about 1300 he was Professor of Philosophy in Paris, became then Provincial of his Order for Saxony, lived for a time in Cologne and Strassburg, and died during the painful discussions con cerning the orthodoxy of his doctrine in 1329. The extant writings (collected by F. Pfeiffer, II. Leips. 1867) are principally sermons, tracts, and aphorisms. Cf. C. Ullman, Refurmatoren vor der Reformation, Vol. II. (Hamburg, 1842); W. Preger, Gesch'. d. dentschen Mystik im Mittelalter (Leips. 1876, 1881) ; also the different editions and articles by S. Denifle. On Eckhart in particular, J. Bach, M. E. der Vater der dentschen Speculation (Vienna, 1864); A. Lasson, M. E. *r Mystiker (Berlin, 1868).
In its farther development German Mysticism branched into the heresies of the Beghards and of the " Friends of God " of Basle ; in the case of the former it led to the most radical connection with the Averroistic pantheism. It took the form of popular preaching with John Tauler at Strassburg (1300-1361), and of poetic song with Heinrich Sato of Constance (1300-1366). Its theoretical doctrines maintained themselves, while the heterodoxy was diminished, in the " German Theology" (first edited by Luther, 1616).
The Augustinian Platonic opposition against the suspected Aristotelianism of the Arabians has as its main supporters : —
William of Auvorgno, from Aurillac, teacher and Bishop in Paris, where he died in 1249, author of a work De Universo. He is treated by K. Werner, Die Philosophie des W. v. A. (Vienna, 1873).
Henry of Ghent (Henricus Gandavensis, Heinrich Goethals of Muda near Ghent, 1217-1293), the valiant defender of the primacy of the will against Thomism. Besides a theological compendium, he wrote a Summa QuaMionum
Ordinarium, and principally Quodlibeta Theologica. Cf . K. Werner, H. v. G. als Jieprdsentant des chrUtlichen Platonismus im 13 Jahrhundert (Vienna, 1878).
Richard of Middletown (R. de Mediavia, died 1300) and William de la Marre, the author of a violent Correctorium Fratris Thomm, may also be named here. In the following centuries an Augustinian theology proper main tained itself by the side of Thomism and Scotism. jEgydius of Colonna is regarded as its leader (Mg. Romanus, 1247-1316). Cf. K. Werner, Schol. d. spat. M. -A. , III.
The sharpest opposition to Thomism grew out of the Franciscan order. Roger Bacon's was a mind fruitfully stimulating in all directions, but not appearing in a fixed and definite form in any one of them. He was born in 1214, near Ilchester, educated in Oxford and Paris, several times persecuted on account of his occupations and theories, which were directed in the line of natural research, protected only for a time by Pope Clement IV. . and died soon after 1292. His doctrines are embodied in the Opus Mains (ed. by Bridges, Oxford, 1897), and in the form of extracts in his Opus Minus (ed. by Brewer, Iiond. 1869). Cf. E. Charles, R. B. , sa vie, ses outrages, ses doctrines (Paris, 1861), and K. Werner, in two articles on his psychology, theory of knowledge, and physics (Vienna, 1879).
A. Harnack, Dogmengeschichte, III. 322.
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Chap. 1, f 24. ] Dualism of Body and Soul. 301
In fact, his controversy with Bernard of Glairvaux is the conflict of knowledge with faith, of reason with authority, of science with the Church. And if Abelard lacked ultimately the weight and staying power of personality to prevail in such a contest,1 it will be remem bered, on the other hand, that a science such as the twelfth century i-ould offer — even aside from the external power to which the Church at that time had attained — must have been inferior to the mighty inward strength of faith, even if it had not been supported by so great and high a personality. For that bold postulate, so full of the future, that only unprejudiced scientific insight should deter mine faith, — what means did it then possess for its fulfilment ? Its only means were the hollow rules of dialectic ; and the content which this science had to exhibit, it owed just to that tradition against which it rebelled with its intellectualistic criticism. This science lacked the material strength to carry out the part to which
she felt herself called ; but she set herself a problem which, while she herself was not able to solve has never again vanished from the memory of European peoples.
We hear, indeed, of the disturbing practices of those who would have everything treated only "scientifically ";* complaints multiply after the time of Anselm over the growing rationalism of the Zeitgeist, over the evil men who will believe only what they can comprehend and prove, over the Sophists who, with impudent dexterity, know how to dispute pro el contra, over the " deniers," who from ration alists are said to have become materialists and nihilists — but not even the names of the men who answer to this description have been preserved, to say nothing of their doctrines. And just this lack in proper material of its own was the reason that the dialectic
movement, whose prince was Abelard, in spite of all its zeal and all its acuteness, ran out and became exhausted without direct and immediate results.
24. The Dualism of Body and Soul.
On these grounds explicable that in the twelfth and, in part. even in the eleventh century, we find the feeling of the unfruitful- ness of dialectic as widely extended as the feverish impulse to attain through to true knowledge. tendency that indicates disillusion manifested in this period by the side of the ardent desire for knowledge. Discontented with the subtilties of dialectic,
which, even in men like Anselm. had laid itself under obligation to
Ct Th. Zlegler, AbatlanTi Ethica, In Strat$hurg. Ahh. *. Philot. (Freiburg, lt*4),p. Ml.
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302 Mediaeval Philosophy : Firtt Period. [Part III.
place the ultimate mysteries of faith upon a rational basis, some plunged from unfruitful theory into practical life, " in das Rauschen der Zeit, ins Rollen der Begebenheit," — into the rush of time, the rolling of events, — others plunged into a revelry in supra-rational Mysticism ; others, finally, into diligent work in empirical research. All the opposites, into which an intellectual activity that is predom inantly logical can pass over, develop by the side of dialectic^ and take their position against it in a more or less firmly concluded league, ■— Practice, Mysticism, and Empiricism.
There resulted from this at first a peculiarly distorted relation to scientific tradition. Aristotle was known only as the father of formal logic and master of dialectic, and in consequence of this igno rance was regarded as the hero of the purely intellectual mode of considering the world. Plato, on ihe contrary, was known partly as the creator of the doctrine of Ideas (unwittingly falsified in accordance with Neo-Platonic processes), partly, by virtue of the preservation of the Timasus, as the founder of a philosophy of Nature whose fundamental teleological character found the live-
, liest assent in religious thought. Hence when Gerbert, as a counter- poise against the pride of dialectic in which he himself had at first sjr made some not very successful attempts, commended the study of Nature, to which he had been stimulated by the example of the Arabians, and which corresponded to his own vigorous practical
bent toward active life, he could count on approval for this en deavour onto among men who, like him, were working toward an extension of raaterial information, and who, in aid of this, were appropriating tire results of ancient researches. Thus the return to antiquity makes hare its first appearance as the source of material knowledge in opposition to the Aristotelian dialectic, — a first weak
V*became the seat of the Platonism that was intimately associated with the study of Nature. Here worked the brothers Theodoric and Bernard of Chartres ; from this school William of Conches received his tendency. In their writings the powerful stimulus of classical antiquity unites with the interest of an active and vigorous
1 The cloister Monte Cassino in Italy formed one of the main seats of this movement. Here (about 1060) the monk Constantinus Africanus worked, who, as is known to have been the case also with the I'latonist Adelard of Bath, gathered his learning on his journeys in the Orient, and was especially active in the translation of medical treatises by Hippocrates and Galen. The effects of the activity in this cloister are shown not only in literature, but also in the
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Chap. 1, § 24. ] Body and Soul : School of Chartret. 303
knowledge of Nature. We see here one of the most peculiar shift-
ings that have occurred in the history of literature. Plato and \ ■v>- r> 5.
Aristotle have exchanged their r61es : the latter appears asjhejdeal - /■ ' v
at an abstract science of conceptions, the former as the starting- *
point for a concrete knowledge of Nature. The knowledge of ex- (r^\ Cernal reality that meets us in this period of mediaeval science is attached to the name of Plato. So far as there is a natural science
in this age, it is that of the Platonists, — of a Bernard of Chart res.
of a William of Conches, and their associates. 1
Middle Ages directed its activity to the investigation of the mental
life, and unfolded the full energy of real observation and acute/^ Ait^* analysis in the domain of inner experience — in psychology. This is^ ^*\
the field of scientific work in which the Middle Ages attained the
most valuable results. ' In this, the experience of practical life as
well as that of the sublimest piety was filled with a substantial con
tent, and as such set itself in opposition to the dialectical play of
conceptions.
1. The natural leader in this field was Augustine, whose psychologi cal views exercised a mastery that was the stronger in proportion as his views were interwoven with the current religious conviction, and in proportion, also, to the slight extent to which the Aristotelian psychology was known. But Augustine had maintained in his system the complete dualism which regarded the soul as an imma terial substance, and man as a union of two substances, body and soul. Just for this reason he could not expect to gain a knowledge of the soul from its relations to the body, and took with full con sciousness of his procedure the standpoint of inner experience.
The new principle of method which had thus arisen from meta physical presuppositions could unfold itself undisturbed so long as the monistic metaphysical psychology of the Peripatetic school re-
1 This humanistic natural science of the early Middle Ages was not at all discriminating in its adoption of ancient tradition ; so, for example, if we may trast the account of Walter of St. Victor (in the extracts made by Bulvus,
Mtgtit, Vol. 180, p. 1170), William of Conches regarded an atomistic conception of Nature as capable of union with his Platonism. (Migne, Vol. 90, pp. 1132 li . 1 Cf. for this and for what follows (as also for § 27, later) the article* by II. Siebeck in Vols. 1. —III. of the Arrhiv fur (ir*chirhlr dtr 1'hiloiophir, and
also in Vol*. 93, 84, Ztitschrift fur Philot. v. philot. Krit. (1888-90).
But this disposition toward concrete reality, which makes the
Piatonists of the Middle Ages conspicuous as contrasted with the high-soaring metaphysics of the dialecticians, assumed still another
form, which was much more valuable. Incapable as yet of gaining
from outer experience better results than those already at its hand As
in the transmitted Greek science, the empirical impulse of theO^oM^! j
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304 Mediaeval Philosophy : First Period. [Part III
mained unknown. And this unfolding was furthered emphatically by those needs which brought the Middle Ages to psychology. Faith sought knowledge of the soul for the purpose of the soul's salvation, and this salvation was fouud just in those transcendent activities through which the soul, estranged from the body, strives toward a higher world. It was, therefore, principally the Mystics who sought to spy out the secrets of the inner life, and thus became psychologists.
Weightier and philosophically more significant than the individual doctrines propounded in this line, which were often very fantastic and hazy, is the fact that by means of these and connected theories, the dualism of the sensuous and super-sensuous worlds was maintained in its full strength, and thus formed a strong counterpoise to the Neo-Platonic monism. But it was not destined to exercise this metaphysical influence till later : at first, in the more limited form of the anthropological dualism of body and soul, it became the starting-point for psychology as the science of inner experience. 1
It therefore, very noteworthy phenomenon that the sup porters of this psychology as " natural science of the inner sense," as was later called, are precisely the same men who are faithfully exerting themselves to gain a knowledge of the outer world from all available material. Having turned away from dialectic, they seek knowledge of what real in experience, philosophy of Nature but they divide this into two completely separated fields, physica corporis and physica animce. Among the Platonists the preference for the study of external Nature predominant, among the Mystics that for the study of the internal Nature. 5
But we must regard as the characteristic, the essentially new and beneficial mark of this empirical psychology, the endeavour, not only to classify the psychical activities and states, but to appre hend them in the living stream of mental life, and to comprehend their development. These men in their pious feelings, in their struggles for the enjoyment of divine grace, were conscious of an inner experience, of history of the soul, and were impelled to write this history and while in so doing they used Platonic, Augustinian,
Cf. also K. Werner, Knsmologie und Naturlehre des scholastischen Mit- telalters, unit specieller Beziehung auf Wilhelm von Conches; and Der Enticick- lungsgang der mittelalterlichen Psychologit von Alcuin bis Albtrtus Magnus (off-prints from the Sitzungsberichten (Vol. 76), and Denkschrijlen (Vol. 26) respectively of the Vienna Acad. , 1870).
Nevertheless must be mentioned that Hugo of St. Victor not only shows an encyclnpsedic knowledge in his Eruditio Didascalica, but also shows that he
acquainted, even to the most exact detail, with the teachings of ancient medi cine, particularly with the theories of physiological psychology (explanation of
perceptions, temperaments,
etc. ).
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Chap. 1, $ 24. ] Body and Soul: Victorines. 305
and Neo-Platonic conceptions in motley mixture to designate in dividual facts, the essential and decisive point is that they under took to exhibit the development of the inner life.
These Mystics, who were not seeking a metaphysics but already possessed one in their faith, were not much troubled by the ques tion which later became so important, of how this duality of body and soul should be understood. Hugo of St. Victor is indeed con scious that though the soul is lowest in the immaterial world, and the human body highest in the material world, the two are yet so opposite in constitution that their union (unto) remains an incom prehensible enigma ; but he thinks that in this very fact God has shown, and desired to show, that for him nothing is impossible. Instead of racking their brains dialetically upon this point, the Mystics rather assume this dualism as a presupposition, in order to isolate the soul for their scientific consideration, and to observe its inner life.
This life, however, for Mysticism, development of the soul to God, and so this first form of the psychology of the inner sense the his tory of salvation itt the individual soul. The Mystics regarded the soul essentially as Oemiith heart," the seat of sentiment and feeling, rather than intellect]. They show the development of its vital pro cess out of the feelings, and prove their literary virtuosoship in their depicting of the states and movements of feeling. They are also the genuine successors of Augustine in examining, in their analysis of this process, the motive forces of the will, in investigating the decisions of the will, by virtue of which faith conditions the course of knowledge, and finally in the fact that they ultimately regard as the highest stage in the soul's development the mystical contempla tion of God, which, to be sure, here held to be the same with love. Such, at least, was the activity of the two Victorines. Hugo and
Richard, who were completely sustained by the spirit of science, while in the case of Bernard of Clairvaux, the practical factor of the will much more strongly emphasised. Bernard unwearied in denouncing as heathenish that pure impulse after knowledge for its own sake which comports with all the virtues and vices, and yet, even for him, the last of the twelve stages of humility that ecstasy of deification with which the individual disappears in the eternal essence, " as the drop of water in a cask of wine. "
The psychology of knowledge, also, built up with the Victorines upon Augustinian lines. Three eyes are given to man, — the eye of flesh to know the cor|>oreal world, the eye of reason to know himself in his inner nature, the eye of contemplation to know the spiritual world and the deity. While, then, according to Hugo, cogitatio,
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306 Mediaeval Philotophy : First Period. [Part III
meditatio, and contemplatio are the three stages of intellectual activ ity, the degree to which he emphasises the co-operation of the imag ination (imaginatio) in all kinds of knowledge is interesting and characteristic of his personality. Even contemplation is a visio intellectualis, a mental beholding which alone grasps the highest truth undistorted, while thought is not capable of this.
Old and new are thus variously mingled in the writings of the Victorines. Fantasies of mystic rapture force their way amid the most acute observations and the most delicate portrayals of the psy chical functions. The method of self-observation doubtless falls here, too, into the danger of leading to Schw&rmerei,1 or ecstatic enthusi asm ; but, on the other hand, it wins much fruit of its own, it breaks up the soil for the research of the future, and, above all, it marks off the field on which modern psychology is to grow.
3. This new science received support and enrichment likewise from quite another direction : a side-result of the controversy over universals — and that, too, not the worst result — came to its aid- When Nominalism and Conceptualism combated the doctrine that universals exist in themselves, and declared the species and genera to be subjective creations in the knowing mind, the duty fell on them of making intelligible the process by which these universal ideas arise in the human mind. They found themselves thus sent directly to the empirical study of the development of ideas, and sup plemented the sublime poesy of the Mystics with results which were indeed sober and dry, but all the more valuable on that account. For, just because the matter in hand required an exhibition of the origin of purely subjective contents of thought, which were to be explained as the products of man's development in time, this inves tigation could become only a contribution to the psychology of inner experience.
The very thesis of extreme Nominalism afforded its opponents occasion to treat the relation of word to thought, and in the case of Abelard led to a searching investigation of the co-operating activity that belongs to language in connection with the development of thought. The question as to the meaning of signs and designations in the movement of ideas was by this means raised anew. A still deeper entrance into the heart of theoretical psychology was made by the investigation which is conducted as to the necessary connec tion between intellect and perception in the treatise De Intellectibus. It is here shown how sensation, as confused idea (confusa conceptio), enters into the perception (imaginatio) which grasps and holds it
1 Cf. Kant, Anthropologie, <j 4.
Chap. 1, § 24. ] Body and Soul : John of Salisbury. 307
together with others, and remains preserved reproducible in this imagination; how, then, the understanding by successively running through this manifold material (discursive activity) elaborates it to concepts and judgments; and how, after all these conditions have been fulfilled, opinion, faith, and knowledge arise, in which ulti mately the intellect knows its object in a single collective perception or intuition (intuitive activity).
In a similar way John of Salisbury set forth the process of psychical development : but in his case the tendency peculiar to the Augustinian conception of the soul asserts itself most strongly, — the tendency to regard the different forms of activity not as strata lying above one another or beside one another, but as ways of functioning in which the same living unity manifests itself. He sees already in the sensation, and in a higher degree in perception or imagination, an act of judgment; and as union of the newly entering sensations with those which are reproduced, imagination contains at the same time the emotional states (passiones) of fear and hope. Thus out of imagination as fundamental psychical state develops a twofold series of states of consciousness; in the theoretical series appear first, opinion, and by comparison of opinions, knowledge and rational conviction (ratio), both in con nection with prudence (prudentia), which is an operation of the will; finally, by virtue of the striving after calm wisdom (sapientia), we have the contemplative knowledge of the intellect ; — in the practical series are given the feelings of pleasure and pain with all their diversifications in the changing states of life.
Thus with John we have indicated the whole programme of the later associational psychology in which his countrymen were to become leaders. And he may be regarded as their prototype not only in his problems, but also in the mode of their treatment. He keeps at a distance from the speculations of dialectic that were so alien to the active world ; he has the practical ends of knowledge
in his mind, he desires to find his way in the world in which man is to live, and above all in man's actual inner life, and brings with him into philosophy a fineness and freedom of mind character istic of the man of the world, such as aside from him we do not find at that time. He owes this in no small degree to the education of the taste and of sound cosmopolitan thought which classical studies afford ; and in this, too, his countrymen have followed him, not to their injury. He is the precursor of the English Enlightenment as Abelard is of the French. 1
1 Reuter, op. tit. , II. 80, aeU thus Roger Bacon and Abelard over against each other ; yet precisely the decisive tendency of empirical psychology is present store strongly in the case of John.
308 Mediaeval Philosophy : First Period. [Part IIL
4. We notice finally Abelard's ethics as a peculiar side-phenomenon in this process of making more rigid the contrast of outer and inner, and of transferring the scientific first principle to the inner nature. 1 Its very title, Scito Te Ipsum, announces it as a science based on inner experience, and its importance consists just in the fact that here for the first time ethics is again treated as a proper philo sophical discipline, and freed from dogmatic metaphysical efforts. * This is true of this ethics although too, proceeds from the Christian consciousness of sin as its fundamental fact. But here
strives to go at once to the heart of the matter. Good and evil, says, consist not in the outward act, but in the action's inner
cause. Nor yet do they consist in the thoughts (suggestio), feelings, and desires (delectatio) which precede the decision of the will, but solely in this resolve or consent to the deed (consensus). For the inclination {voluntas), founded in the whole natural disposition and in part in the bodily constitution, which may lead toward good or evil, not itself in the proper sense good or evil. Fault or error
(vitium) — to this Abelard reduces inherited sin — becomes sin (jpeccatum) only through the consensus. But this present, the sin fully and completely there with and the bodily executed
action with its external consequences adds nothing ethically.
The essence of the moral thus placed by Abelard solely in the resolve of the will (animi intentio). But what now the norm according to which this resolve of the will to be characterised as good or evil Here, too, Abelard rejects with contempt all external
and objective determination by law he finds the norm of judg ment solely within the deciding individual, and consists in the agreement or non-agreement with the conscience (conscientia) That action good which in accord with the agent's own conviction that only bad which contradicts this.
And what conscience Where Abelard teaches as philoso pher, as the rationalistic dialectician that he was, there conscience for him (in accordance with ancient example, Cicero) the natural
moral law, which, though known in varying degree, common to all men, and which, as Abelard was convinced, was wakened to new clearness in the Christian religion, after had become ob scured through human sin and weakness (cf. above, 23, 7). But
Cf. on this Th. Ziegler in the Strassburger Ahhdl. z. Phil. (Freiburg,
1884).
- It throws surprising light upon the clearness of Abelard's thought when
he incidentally separates the metaphysical conception of the good (perfection = reality) carefully from the moral conception of the good, with which alone ethics has to do. He shows in this that he had penetrated this complication of prob lems, one of the most intricate in history.
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Chap. 1, § 24. ] Body and Soul: Abelard. 309
for the theologian this lex naturalis is identical with the will of God. 1 To follow the conscience means, therefore, to obey God; to act against the conscience is to despise God. But where the import of the natural moral law is in any wise doubtful, the only resort for the individual is to decide according to his conscience, that according to his knowledge of the divine command.
The ethics of intention which was presented by the head of the dialecticians and Peripatetics proves itself to be an enhancement of the Augustinian principles of internalisation and of the individual ism of the will, which forces its way out of the system of the great Church teacher and beyond its bounds, to fruitful operation in the future.
In his theological metaphysics Abelard seems occasionally to have gone so far as to reduce the content of the moral law to the arbitrary choice of the divine will (Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, II. 241).
The important contrast here presented in various directions to Church theory and practice cannot be brought out here.
*1
*
is,
CHAPTER II. SECOND PERIOD.
(After about 1200. )
Karl Werner, Der hi. Thomas von Aquino. 3 vols. , Regensburg, 1858 ft
Karl Werner, Die Scholastik des spateren Mittelalters. 3 vols. , Vienna, 1881 ft
The felt need for real knowledge, which mastered Western science after the first enthusiasm for dialectic was past, was very soon to find a satisfaction of unsuspected extent. Contact with the Oriental civilisation which at first maintained itself victoriously against the shock of the Crusades, disclosed to the peoples of Europe new worlds of intellectual life. Arabian, and in its train Jewish, science ' made their entry into Paris.
They had preserved the tradition of Greek thought and knowledge more immediately and more completely than had the cloisters of the West. A stronger and richer stream of scientific material poured over Bagdad and Cordova than over Rome and York. But the former brought not much more that was new with it than did the latter. Rather, as regards thoughts which dis cover or establish principles, the Oriental philosophy of the Middle Ages is still poorer than the European. Only, in the breadth and quantity of tradition, in the compass of learned material and in the extent of information in matters of science, the East was far superior, and these treasures now passed over into the possession of the Christian peoples.
From the point of view of philosophy, however, the matter of chief importance was that Parisian science became acquainted not
1 The author believes that he may and ought to decline to give a full exposi tion of the Arabian and Jewish philosophy of the Middle Ages — ought to, in so far as he is here in great part excluded from penetrating to the original sources, and would therefore find himself forced to reproduce others' expositions at second hand, — may , however, because that which passed over with fructifying influence into European science from this large literature — and it is only this element that could be treated in this presentation of the development of philos ophy as a whole — is found to be, with very small exceptions, the spiritual possession of antiquity, of the Greek or the Hellenistic philosophy. On this account there will be given only a brief survey of the Arabian and Jewish phi losophy in the Middle Ages, which will be found at the close of the introductory material of this chapter, pp. 310-318.
310
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Chap. 2. ]
only with the entire logic of Aristotle, but also with all parts of his philosophy that furnished material knowledge. By this "new logic " fresh blood was infused into the already dying dialectic, and while the task of rationally expounding the view of the world held by faith was attacked anew and with a matured technique of thought, there was presented at the same time an almost immeasurable mate rial for arrangement in the metaphysico-religious system.
Mediaeval thought showed itself abundantly ready for the problem thus enhanced, and solved it under the after-working of the impres sion of that most brilliant period in the development of the papacy which Innocent III. had brought about. The Neo-Platonic-Arabian Aristotelianism, which at the first, with its naturalistic consequences, seemed only to strengthen the rationalistic courage of dialectic to victorious pride, was mastered with admirable swiftness and bent to the service of the system of the Church. This, indeed, was possible only in a form in which the intellectualistic elements of Augustinian thought and those allied to Neo-Platonism gained a decided pre
ponderance in this now completely systematic development of a philosophy conformed to the doctrine of faith. In this way was completed an adjustment and arrangement of world-moving thoughts upon the largest and most imposing scale that history has seen, and that, too, without the. creative activity of any properly new philosophical principle as its impulse toward the formation of a system. The intellectual founder of this system was Albert of Boll- stadt. It owes its organic completion in all directions, its literary codification, and thus its historical designation, to Thomas Aquinas, and finds its poetical exposition in Dante's Divine Comedy.
But while Hellenistic science and Christian faith seemed to be brought into complete harmony in Thomism, the opposition between them broke forth at once all the more violently. Under the influ ence of Arabian doctrines, the pantheism involved in the logical consequence of Realism from being potential became actual in ex tended circles, and immediately after Thomas, his fellow-Domin ican, Master Eckhart, developed scholastic intellectualism to the heterodoxy of an idealistic Mysticism.
Hence it is comprehensible that Thomism also encountered the resistance of a Platonic-Augustinian tendency, which indeed gladly adopted the increase in the knowledge of Nature (as had been the t-^w VWore) and thp perfection of the logical apparatus, but put aside the intellectualistic metaphysics and developed all the mure energetically the opposite elements of AuKustinianism.
This tendency reached its full strength in the acutest and deepest thinker of the Christian Middle Ages, Duns Scotus, who brought the
Second Period. 311
312 Mediaeval Philo»ophy. [Part ILL
germs of the philosophy of the will, contained in Augustine's system, to their first important development, and so from the meta physical side gave the impulse for a complete change in the direc tion of philosophical thought. With him religious and scientific interests, whose fusion had begun in the Hellenistic philosophy, begin to separate.
The renewal of Nominalism, in which the intellectual movement of the last century of the Middle Ages culminated in an extremely interesting combination, led to the same result with still more last ing force. Dialectic, which had anew obtained the mastery and was flaunting itself in various disputations, developed in its text books on logic the Aristotelian schematism. This was worked out especially on the grammatical side, and there developed to a theory which attached the doctrine of judgment and the syllogism to the view that regarded the concepts {termini) as subjective signs for really existing individual things. This Terminism became united in William of Occam with the naturalistic tendencies of the Arabian- Aristotelian theory of knowledge, and these combined combated
Realism, which had been maintained alike in Thomism and Scotism. But Terminism also became united with the Augustinian doctrine of the will into a powerful individualism, with the beginnings of the empirical psychology which studied the history of develop ment, to a kind of idealism of the inner experience, and with the natural investigation which was conquering wider and wider territory, to an empiricism that was to be fruitful in the future. Thus under the scholastic covering were sprouting the germs of new thought.
Here and there in this extremely diversified movement men still vainly appear with the confidence that they can create a rational system of religious metaphysics, and finally a man of the signifi cance of Nicolaus Cusamis sought vainly to force all these elements of a new secular science back under the power of a half scholastic, half mystic intellectualism : it was just from his system that those elements exercised an influence upon the future, that was all the stronger because of his work.
The reception of Aristotle falls in the century 1160-1260 (for this topic see principally the work of A. Jourdain, cited p. 273). It began with the more val uable parts of the Organon, hitherto unknown 'veins — nova logica), and pro ceeded to the metaphysical, physical, and ethical books, always accompanied by the introduction of the Arabian explanatory writings. The Church slowly admitted the new logic, although dialectic was again set in fluctuation thereby ; for it soon became convinced that the new method which was introduced with the aid of the doctrine of the syllogism, was advantageous for presenting its own teachings.
This scholastic method in the proper sense is as follows : a text used a* the basis for discussion is broken up by division and explanation into a number of propositions ; questions are attached and the possible answers brought to
Cuat. 2. ] Second Period. 813
gether finally the arguments to be adduced for -establishing or refuting these answers are presented in the form of chain of syllogistic reasoning, leading ultimately to decision upon the subject.
This scheme was first employed by Alexander of Halea (died 1245) in his Summa Univerta; Theologicc, with mastery which was far superior to the mode of treatment of the earlier Summists in wealth of contents, clearness of development, and definiteness of results, and was scarcely surpassed even later.
An analogous change in method was worked out with regard to the material in the encyclopedias of natural science by Vincent of Beauvaia (Vincentius Bellovacensis, died about 1265), by his Speculum Quadruple! , and Johannes Ki'lanza. called Bonaventura (1221-1274), did the same work for the doctrines of Mysticism, especially those of the Victorines. Among Bonaventura's works the Reductio Artium ad Theologiain especially characteristic. Cf. K. Werner, Die Psychologic und Erkenntnisslehre ties B. (Vienna, 1876).
The Church proceeded in a much more hesitating manner in regard to Aris totle's Metaphysics and Physics, because these made their entrance in intimate connection with Averroism, and because this latter theory had developed to open pantheism the Neo-Platonic Mysticism which had never been entirely forgotten since Scotus Erigena. As the defenders of such system appear Amalrich of Bena near Chartres, and David of Dinant. about 1200, concern ing whose doctrines we are informed only by later writers, especially Albert and Thomas. With the widely extended sect of the Amalricans, which, after the Lateran council of 1216, was persecuted with fire and sword, the " Eternal
Gospel" of Joachim Floris was also connected. Cf. on this J. N. Schneider (Dttlingen, 1873).
The judgment of condemnation passed upon the Averroistic Pan-psychism (cf. {27) applied at first to Aristotle also. It the service of the two men- dicant orders, the Dominicans and Franciscans, to have broken this connec tion, and to have brought over the power of the Church to the recognition of the Peripatetic system. By a long conflict, which frequently wavered this way and that, they succeeded In founding two chairs of the Aristotelian philosophy at the University of Paris, and finally in having them taken into the faculty (cf. Kaufmann, Gesch. d. Univ. , 276 ft. ). Aft«r this victory in 1264, respect for Aristotle rose fast, until he became the highest philosophical authority. He was praised as the forerunner of Christ in matters of Nature as was John the Baptist in matters of grace, and from this time on Christian science (like Averrofis) held bitn to be in such sense the incarnation of scientific truth, that in the following literature he often cited only as " Philosophus. "
The doctrine of the Dominicans, which has remained until the present time the official doctrine of the Catholic Church, was created by Albert and Thomas. Albert of Bollatadt (Albertus Magnus) was born 1103 at Lauingen in Swabia, studied in Padua and Bologna, taught in Cologne and Paris, became
Bishop of Regensburg, and died in Cologne in 1280. His writings consist for the most part of paraphrases and commentaries upon Aristotle aside from the Summa his Botany is particularly of independent value (De Vegetabilibus, Lihri VII. ed. by Meyer and Jessen. Berlin, 1867). Cf. J. Sighart, Al. Mag. sein l-ebcn und seine Wissenschafl (Regensburg, 1867 v. Hertling, Al. Mag.
J. Bach, Al.
Italy,
TrrtlaU idei Catholica- contra gentiles (Summa contra gentiles). The treatise De Rcgimine Principum belongs to him only In part. From the very copious literature concerning him, the following may be named Ch. Jourdain, La Philosophic deSt. Th. (Paris, 1H68); Z. Gonzalez, Studien uber die Philns. de*. hi. Th. v. A. , translated from the Spanish by Nolte (Regensburg, 1886); R. Eoeken, Die Phllos. d. Th. r. A. und die CnUus der Xeuzcit (Halle, 188»l);
und die Wissenschafl seiner Zeit (in Hist. -pol. Blatter, 1874)
Mag. (Vienna, 1888). Roccasicca, Lower Thomas) of Aquino, born 1225 or 27 in
was edu cated at first in the cloister Monte Cassino, famous of old for study in natural •cience, then in Naples. Cologne, and Paris. After this he taught alternately at these universities and also at Rome and Bologna, and died, 1274, in cloister near Terracina. Besides minor treatises, his works contain commentaries on Aruuotle, on the Liber de Causis and the Sentences of Peter Lombard, and In addition to these, principally the Snmma Theologirr and the treatise De
rtohschammer. Die Philosophic de* Th. v. A. (Leips. 1880).
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314 Mediaeval Philosophy. [Paf. t lit
The philosophical importance of Dante Alighieri has heen best recognised among his editors by Fhilalethes in the commentary on his translation of the Divina Commedia. 3esides his great world-poem, the treatise De Monorchia should not be forgotten in a philosophical consideration. Cf. A. F. Ozanam, D. el la Philosophie Catholique au 13"" Steele (Paris, 1845); G. Baur, Boeihius und Dante (Leips. 1873).
Interest in other Thoinists, whose number is great, is only literary -historical .
To the Dominican Order belonged also the father of German Mysticism. Master Eckhart, a younger contemporary of Thomas. Born in the middle of the thirteenth century, probably in Saxony, at about 1300 he was Professor of Philosophy in Paris, became then Provincial of his Order for Saxony, lived for a time in Cologne and Strassburg, and died during the painful discussions con cerning the orthodoxy of his doctrine in 1329. The extant writings (collected by F. Pfeiffer, II. Leips. 1867) are principally sermons, tracts, and aphorisms. Cf. C. Ullman, Refurmatoren vor der Reformation, Vol. II. (Hamburg, 1842); W. Preger, Gesch'. d. dentschen Mystik im Mittelalter (Leips. 1876, 1881) ; also the different editions and articles by S. Denifle. On Eckhart in particular, J. Bach, M. E. der Vater der dentschen Speculation (Vienna, 1864); A. Lasson, M. E. *r Mystiker (Berlin, 1868).
In its farther development German Mysticism branched into the heresies of the Beghards and of the " Friends of God " of Basle ; in the case of the former it led to the most radical connection with the Averroistic pantheism. It took the form of popular preaching with John Tauler at Strassburg (1300-1361), and of poetic song with Heinrich Sato of Constance (1300-1366). Its theoretical doctrines maintained themselves, while the heterodoxy was diminished, in the " German Theology" (first edited by Luther, 1616).
The Augustinian Platonic opposition against the suspected Aristotelianism of the Arabians has as its main supporters : —
William of Auvorgno, from Aurillac, teacher and Bishop in Paris, where he died in 1249, author of a work De Universo. He is treated by K. Werner, Die Philosophie des W. v. A. (Vienna, 1873).
Henry of Ghent (Henricus Gandavensis, Heinrich Goethals of Muda near Ghent, 1217-1293), the valiant defender of the primacy of the will against Thomism. Besides a theological compendium, he wrote a Summa QuaMionum
Ordinarium, and principally Quodlibeta Theologica. Cf . K. Werner, H. v. G. als Jieprdsentant des chrUtlichen Platonismus im 13 Jahrhundert (Vienna, 1878).
Richard of Middletown (R. de Mediavia, died 1300) and William de la Marre, the author of a violent Correctorium Fratris Thomm, may also be named here. In the following centuries an Augustinian theology proper main tained itself by the side of Thomism and Scotism. jEgydius of Colonna is regarded as its leader (Mg. Romanus, 1247-1316). Cf. K. Werner, Schol. d. spat. M. -A. , III.
The sharpest opposition to Thomism grew out of the Franciscan order. Roger Bacon's was a mind fruitfully stimulating in all directions, but not appearing in a fixed and definite form in any one of them. He was born in 1214, near Ilchester, educated in Oxford and Paris, several times persecuted on account of his occupations and theories, which were directed in the line of natural research, protected only for a time by Pope Clement IV. . and died soon after 1292. His doctrines are embodied in the Opus Mains (ed. by Bridges, Oxford, 1897), and in the form of extracts in his Opus Minus (ed. by Brewer, Iiond. 1869). Cf. E. Charles, R. B. , sa vie, ses outrages, ses doctrines (Paris, 1861), and K. Werner, in two articles on his psychology, theory of knowledge, and physics (Vienna, 1879).
