Neutral dharmas are not
retributive
causes, because they are weak: as rotten seeds, even though moistened, do not grow.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-1-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
"
[The Vaibhasikas:] This text does not contradict the first; for the Jndnaprasthdna does not refer to that which is a cause in the quality of a similar cause (sabhdgahetu), but rather that which is a cause in the
qualities of sahabhuhetu, samprayuktakahetu, or vipdkahetu. According to another opinion, that of the "followers of the last
place" (paramavasthdvddin), the answer of the Jndnaprasthdna, "There is never a time when this dharma is not a cause" refers to sabhdgahetu, and they justify themselves as follows: A future dharma, in an arising state, is certainly sabhdgahetu. Hence, taking into account a future dharma in its last place, the Jndnaprasthdna can say that there is never a time when the dharma is not a cause, that it is always a cause, since, at a certain moment in the future, it is a cause.
This explanation does not resolve the difficulty. In fact, if a future dharma, after not having been a cause becomes a cause by arriving at a state of arising, then it has not always been a cause: but now the Jndnaprasthdna says absolutely that there is never a time when it is not a cause.
Furthermore, this explanation cannot be reconciled with the answer that the Jndnaprasthdna (p. 1026M9; Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 87a2) gives to another question, "Is there a period in which the dharma that is an immediately antecedent condition (samanantara, ii. 62a-b) of a certain dharma is not samanantara! Yes, when it has not yet arisen. " Now the case of samanantara is analogous to that of sabhdgahetu: future samanantara, arriving at a state of arising, is samanantara.
? Hence if the interpretation of the answer, "There is never a time when this dharma is not a cause," in the sense of "In the future, in an arising state, it is sabhdgahetu" is correct, then the Jndnaprasthdna, dealing with samanantara, should answer as for sabhdgahetu, "This dharma is never samanantara! * Now the Jndnaprasthdna answers, "It is not samanantara when it has not arisen. " Hence the word "cause" in the first answer should not be understood as sabhdgahetu.
The "followers of the last place" say that the Jndnaprasthdna answers the first question by saying, "There is never a time when it is not a cause," and the second by saying, "It is not a cause when it has not arisen," in order to show that one can answer in these two ways in order to express the same sense. One can answer the first question as the second, and the second as the first.
What a singular process of explanation! The author of the Sastra would then be totally useless! Hence the first explanation proposed is the best explanation.
3. If a future dharma is not a similar cause {sabhdgahetu), why does
the Prakaranapdda teach that future satkdyadrsti has satkdyadrsti as its
cause, and is in turn the cause of sa&kdyadrstfi We read, in faa (in the
text quoted in note 342, para. Bl(b)), "with the exception of
future satkdyadrstiand the Truth of Suffering which is associated
with it" (andgatdm satkdyadrsti tatsamprayuktam ca duhkhasatyam 349
This reading, [answer the Vaibhasikas,] is corrupted. It should read, "with the exception of the Truth of Suffering associated with future satkdyadrsti {andgatasatkdyadrstisamprayuktam). If we were to suppose that your reading is authentic, we must, because of the sense that the text expresses, consider it as without authority (na tantram), and as having been determined by the context of discourse (that is, through imitation of the preceeding phrase).
sthapayitvd. )
4. If a future dharma is not sabhdgahetu, how do you explain the m
following bhdfyam of the Prajnapti? This Treatise says in faa, "All the dharmas are determined from a fourfold point of view: cause,
m result, support (dsraya), and objea (dlambana). "
[The Vaibhasikas answer:] When it says, "This dharma is never
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the cause of that dharma** the Treatise does not mean to speak of all types of causes. By cause, we must understand sarhprayuktakahetu and
352 sahabhuhetw, by result, adhipatiphala and purusakdraphala (ii. 58);
by support, the six organs (organ of sight, etc. ); and by object, the six spheres {visaya), visible things, etc.
5. If a future dharma is not sabhagahetu, then sabhagahetu did not exist at first, but then does exist.
But this is precisely what the Vaibhasikas affirm! The condition {avastha) of sabhagahetu of the sabhagahetu is new, that is, it exists after having been non-existent; but the thing itself, the dravya which is
a certain sabhagahetu, is not new. A future dharma is not sabhagahetu, but once it has arisen, it becomes sabhagahetu. In fact, the result of the complex of causes, is the condition of a thing and not the thing itself {dravya), the dharma. (A future dharma exists as a thing, dravyatas\ the complex of causes causes it to pass from the future into the
present, endows it with the condition of the present, and endows it, by this fact, with the quality of sabhagahetu', see v. 25. )
6. What harm do you see in this future dharma being a similar cause {sabhagahetu) in the same way that it is a retributive cause {vipakahetu, ii. 54)?
It it were sabhagahetu, it would be mentioned as such in the Jndnaprasthdna (see above p. 263 line 27); now the Jnsnaprasthana,
answering the question, "What is sabhagahetu? ** does not say that future roots of good are sabhagahetu of future roots of good.
We do not think that the omission of future dharma from this text creates an argument against us. This text, in fact mentions only the sabhdgahetus that are capable of "grasping" and of "giving forth" a result {phaladanagrahanasamartha, ii. 59).
No, for the result of sabhagahetu is an "out-flowing result of out-flowing," a result similar to its cause {nisyandaphala, ii. 57c), and this type of result does not suit a future dharma, because, in the future, there is no anteriority and posteriority. One cannot, on the other hand, admit that a past or present dharma already arisen is an out-flowing of a future dharma, in the same way that a past dharma is not an out-flowing of a present dharma, for a result is not anterior to its cause.
? Hence a future dharma is not a similar cause.
7. If this is the case, then a future dharma would no longer be a
vipakahetu, a retributive cause (ii. 54c), for 1) a retributive result (vtpdkaphala, ii. 56a) cannot be either simultaneous or anterior to its cause; and 2) because future dharmas have no earlier or later periods of time.
[The Vaibhasikas answer that] the cause is not the same. A similar cause (sabhagahetu) and its out-flowing (nisyanda) result are similar dharmas. Now this is to suppose that they exist in the future, that they lack anteriority and posteriority, and that they are the mutual cause of one another, and as a consequences the results of one another: now it is not admissable that two dharmas are an out flowing of one another. On the contrary, a retributive cause and a retributive result are dissimilar. Even if the anteriority and the posteriority were absent, a cause remains only a cause, and a result remains only a result. The quality of sabhagahetu results from a condition or state (avastha): a future dharma is not sabhdgahetu\ but when it enters into a present or a past condition, it becomes sabhagahetu. Its quality of retributive cause results from the nature of the dharma itself.
***
We have said that a dharma is a similar cause (sabhagahetu) of only those dharmas that belong to its stage. Does this restriction apply to all the dharmas?
It applies only to impure dharmas, not to pure dharmas:
52c-d. But the Path is sabhagahetu to the Path, without
distinguishing the nine stages.
The Path is of nine stages or spheres--the anagamya, the dhyandntara, the Four primary (mula) Dhyanas, and the three inferior, primary Arupyas (vi. 20c)--in the sense that an ascetic, abiding in these nine states of absorption, can cultivate the Path.
The dharmas that constitute the Path are similar causes of the dharmas that constitute the Path, from stage to stage. In fact, the Path
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resides in the different stages as a visitor, without forming part of the spheres of existence to which these stages belong: the desire of Kamadhatu, of Rupadhatu, of ArQpyadhatu, are not on the Path. The Path, whatever be the stage upon which the ascetic relies in order to cultivate it, stays of the same nature; the Path is hence a similar cause of the Path.
Nevertheless, the complete Path is not a similar cause of the complete Path. One does not have to take into account the stage in which it is cultivated, but rather the characteristics proper to the Path itself.
52d. The Path is sabhdgahetu to an equal or superior Path.
Not of an inferior Path, because the Path is always acquired through effort.
Let us define the terms, "inferior," "equal," and "superior Path. "
1. When past or present duhkhe dharmajndnaksdnti (the first moment of the Path of Seeing, darfanamdrga, vi. 25d) is a similar cause of this same ksdnti of the future, the caused Path is equal to the causing Path.
When this ksdnti is a similar cause of duhkhe dharmajndna (the second moment of the Path of Seeing, darsanamdrga, vi. 26a) the caused Path is superior to the causing Path.
And thus following up to anutpddajndna (vi. 50) which, not having a superior, can only be the similar cause of an equal Path, namely a future anutpddajndna.
To state it more precisely, the Path of Seeing (darsanamdrga) is a similar cause of the Path of Seeing, the Path of Meditation (bhdvand- mdrga), and the Path of the Asaiksas (asaiksamdrga); the Path of Meditation is a similar cause of the Path of Meditation and the Path of the Asaiksa; and the Path of the Asaiksa is a similar cause of an equal or superior Path of the Asaiksa.
3. Any Path can be cultivated by an ascetic of weak faculties or active faculties: a Path of weak faculties is the similar cause of the same Path of weak faculties and of active faculties; a Path of active faculties is the similar cause of the same Path of active faculties. Consequently
? the Paths of sraddhdnusdrin (vi. 29), sraddhddhimukta (vi. 31) and samayavimukta (vi. 56-7) are, respectively, the similar causes of six, four, and two Paths; the Paths of dharmdnusdrin (vi. 29), drstiprdpti (vi. 31) and asamayavimukta (vi56-7) are, respectively, the similar causes of three, two, and one Path.
When a Path cultivated in a higher stage is the similar cause of a Path cultivated in a lower stage, how can it be the cause of an equal or higher Path?
The Path cultivated in a lower stage can be equal or higher 1) from
the point of view of the faculties {indriyas) which can be weak or active
in any stage, or 2) from the point of view of the accumulation of
354 causes.
It does not follow that the same person successively grasps
sraddhdnusdrin and dharmdnusdrin Paths; yet the first, in the past or 355
present, is a similar cause of the second, the later one.
***
Does the rule of equal or higher results apply only to the pure dharmas, that is, to the dharmas that form part of the Path?
53a. The dharmas acquired through cultivation are sabhdgahetu of the same two classes, the equal and the higher.
Worldly dharmas acquired through effort or exercise are similar causes of equal or higher dharmas, but not of inferior dharmas.
What are the dharmas acquired through effort?
53b. Those which arise through hearing, through reflection,
etc
The dharmas "acquired through effort" are the opposite of the "innate" dharmas. These former dharmas are qualities (guna) proceed- ing from hearing {sruta)y that is, from the Word of the Buddha, from reflection (cintd), and from meditation (bhdvand).
Since they are acquired through effort, they are the similar cause of greater or of equal, but not of lesser, good
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The dharmas of hearing in Kamadhatu are similar causes of the dharmas of hearing and reflection in Kamadhatu; but not of the dharmas of meditation, because these dharmas do not exist in Kamadhatu, and because a dharma is a similar cause of dharmas of the same sphere of existence.
The dharmas of hearing in Rupadhatu are similar causes of the dharmas of hearing and meditation in Rupadhatu; but not of the dharmas of reflection, because these dharmas do not exist in this sphere of existence: in Rupadhatu, as soon as one begins to reflect, one immediately enters into absorption (samddhi).
The dharmas of meditation in Rupadhatu are similar causes of the dharmas of meditation in Rupadhatu, but not of the dharmas of hearing in Rupadhatu, because these are less good.
The dharmas of meditation in Arupyadhatu are the similar causes of the dharmas of meditation in Arupyadhatu. The dharmas of hearing and of reflection do not exist in this sphere of existence.
Furthermore, one must consider that the dharmas acquired through effort are of nine classes: weak-weak, medium-weak, etc. The weak-weak are the similar causes of dharmas of nine classes; the medium-weak, of dharmas of eight classes, with the exception of the weak-weak; and thus following.
The nine classes of the "innate" good dharmas are similar cause of one another. The same holds for the defiled dharmas.
The undefiled-neutral dharmas are of four categories (ii. 72), the following being "better" than the preceding: dharmas arisen from retribution (vipakaja, i. 37); dharmas relative to lying down, to sitting attitudes, etc. ; dharmas relative to professional work; and the mind that can create fictive beings {nirmanacitta, vii. 48). These four categories are, respectively, the similar cause of four, three, two, and one category.
Furthermore, as a mind capable of creating fictive beings of the sphere of Kamadhatu can be the result of each of the Four Dhyanas {Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 89al2), there is reason to establish here the same distinctions: the minds capable of creating fiaive beings constitute four classes, and are, according to their class, similar causes of four, three,
? two, or one mind capable of creating fictive beings. In fact, since it is a result of a higher Dhyana, the mind capable of creating fictive beings is not the similar cause of a mind capable of creating fictive beings which is the result of a lower Dhyana: from one similar cause (a mind capable of creating fictive beings) realized with the greatest effort, there cannot proceed a dharma less good, realized with less effort.
***
Once these principles have been established, the following ques-
356 tions are stated and resolved:
1. Is there a pure dharma, already arisen, which is not the cause of a pure dharma not destined to arise?
Yes. Duhkhe dharmajndna already arisen is a cause of duhkhe dharmajndnaksdntis not destined to arise. Furthermore, a better good is not the cause of lesser good.
2. Is there, in a series, a pure dharma, previously acquired (of which one has first obtained the prapti), which is not the cause of a pure dharma arisen later?
Yes. Future duhkhe dharmajnanaksdnti [whose possession (prdpti) has been obtained in the first moment of the Path] are not the cause of duhkhe dharmajndna already arisen. This is because a result cannot be anterior to its cause, and because a future dharma is not a similar cause.
3. Is there a pure dharma, arisen previously, which is not the cause of a pure dharma arisen later?
Yes. The best is not the cause of less good. For example, when one realizes an inferior result after having fallen from a superior result, the superior result was not the cause of this inferior result. Furthermore, possession of duhkhe dharmajndna which has previously arisen is not a cause of the possession of the dharmajndnaksdnti which will arise in the following moments {duhkhe'nvayajndnaksdntiksane, etc. ), because these new possessions are less good
***
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Chapter Two
53c-d. The mind and its mental states are only samprayuk- 357
takahetu, causes through association.
Mind and mental states are samprayuktakahetu.
Is this to say that minds and mental states, arisen at different moments and in different series, are among themselves samprayuk- takahetu}
No.
Would you then say that the mind and mental states of the same aspect, that is, having the same aspect of blue, etc. , and of the same object (ekMambana), that is, having for their object the same blue, etc, are samprayuktakahetu}
No. This definition gives rise to the same criticism: minds and mental states of different time periods and of different series can have the same aspect and the same object.
Would you say that the mind and mental states of the same aspect and the same object, can be, furthermore, of the same time period?
This still does not suffice: for many persons can see a new moon at one and the same time.
Consequently, the author adds
53d. Which has the same support.
The mind and mental states which have the same support are,
among themselves, samprayuktakahetu. 358
"Same" signifies single or undivided.
For example, a given moment (ksana) of the organ of sight is the support 1) of a visual consciousness, and 2) of the sensation {vedana) and the other mental states which are associated with this conscious- ness. And the same for the other organs until manas: a certain moment of the mental organ {manas) is the support of a mental consciousness and of the mental states associated with this consciousness.
Whatever is samprayuktakahetu is also sahabhilhetu. What is the 359
difference between these two causes?
Some dharmas are called sahabhuhetu because they are mutually
the results of one another. As companions in a caravan travel thanks to
? the support that they give one another, in this same way the mind is the result of mental states, and the mental states are the result of the mind
Some dharmas are called samprayuktakahetu, mutual cause through association, because they function identically, that is, because there is among them the five similarities or identities defined above ii. 34. The travel of the companions in a caravan is assured by the mutual support that they give one another; furthermore, they use the same food, the same drinks, etc In this same way, the mind and its mental states use the same support, have the same aspect, etc: if one of these five identities is missing, they no longer function in the same way and are not associated
**#
54a-b. Former universals are sarvatragahetu or universal causes of the defiled dharmas of their own stage.
Universals, which we shall study in the Chapter on the Defile- ments (v. 12), arisen previously, that is, of the past or present, and belonging to a certain stage (bhumi), are the universal cause of later defiled dharmas, of the same stage, which are defiled by nature, either through association or through their origin (iv. 9c).
Universals are only the cause of defiled dharmas\ they are the cause
of defiled dharmas in their own category and in other categories
(nikaya, ii. 52b): it is through their power that there arises, with their 36
following, defilements belonging to categories different from them. ?
561 They then constitute a cause different from sabhagahetu
Then would the defiled dharmas of an Aryan (rdga or lust, etc) have the universals for their cause? Yet the Aryan has abandoned all universals, for these are abandoned by Seeing the Truths.
The Vaibhasikas of Ka? mir admit that all defiled dharmas have the dharmas abandoned through Seeing the Truths for their cause. For the
562
Prakaranapdda expresses itself in these terms: "What dharmas have
for a cause the dharmas abandoned through Seeing the Truths? Defiled
565
dharmas and the retribution of the dharmas abandoned through
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Seeing the Truths.
"What dharmas have for a cause neutral (avyakrta) [dharmas]}
m
Neutral conditioned dharmas
"Is there a duhkhasatya which has for its cause a belief in self
and bad dharmas.
(satkayadrsti) and which is not in turn the cause of a belief in self? . . . "
and the rest to: "with the exception of the arising-old age-duration-
365
impermanence of the belief in a future self and its following, and of
1 all other defiled duhkhasatya!
[Objection:] If some bad dharmas have for their causes not only
some bad dharmas but some neutral dharmas as well, how should one
explain this bhasyam of the Prajnapti^ "Is there a bad dharma which
has only a bad dharma for its cause? Yes; the first defiled volition 367
(cetana) that an Aryan produces upon falling from detachment. " [Answer:] The neutral dharmas, which are abandoned through
Seeing the Truths, are the cause (i. e. , sarvatragahetu) of this bad volition. If the Prajnapti does not mention it, it is because it intends to name only the causes that have not been abandoned.
***
54c-d. Bad dharmas and impure good dharmas are retributive 368
causes.
1. Bad dharmas--which are all impure--and impure good dharmas are only retributive causes, because their nature is to ripen.
Neutral dharmas are not retributive causes, because they are weak: as rotten seeds, even though moistened, do not grow.
Pure dharmas are not retributive causes because they are not 369
moistened through desire (trsnd): as intact seeds, not moistened, do not grow.
Furthermore, pure dharmas are not bound to any sphere of existence: thus to which sphere could the result of retribution that they would produce belong?
The dharmas that are neither neutral nor pure possess the two qualities necessary for retribution, the proper force, and the moisten-
? ing of thirst, the same as intact and moistened seeds.
2. [Objection:] What is the meaning of the expression vipdkahetu!
You have a choice between two interpretations of this compound: vipdkahetu signifies either "cause of vipaka* or "cause which is vipaka! *
In the first case, the suffix a (ghan) marks the state (bhdva): the vipaka (-vipakti) is the result of the operation indicated by the root vi-pac.
In the second case, the suffix a marks the operation (karman): the vipaka is that which become ripe (vipacyate), that is to say, the action arrives at the moment when it gives forth a result.
To which of these two interpretations do you hold? If you accept the first, how would you justify the text (Jndnaprasthdna, TD 26, p. 974a26), "The eye arises from vipdkaT If you accept the second, how would you justify the expression, "vipaka of action? "
[Answer:] We have shown (i. 37) that both explanations of the word vipaka are correct. When one examines results, one must understand the word vipaka according to the first explanation; the meaning is result of retribution. The text, "The eye arises from vipaka* should be understood as "The eye arises from the cause of vipdka?
3. What is the meaning of the compound vi-pakal
The prefix vi indicates difference. Vipaka is a pdka or result
37 dissimilar from its cause. ?
How is that?
In Kamadhatu, 1) a retributive cause (vipdkahetu) consisting of only one skandha can produce a single result: possession (prdpti, ii. 36b) with its characteristics (laksanas, ii. 45c); 2) a retributive cause consisting of two skandhas can produce a single result: bodily and vocal action with its characteristics; 3) a retributive cause consisting of four skandhas can produce a single result: the mind and its mental states, good and bad, with their laksanas.
In Rupadhatu, 1) a retributive cause consisting of a single skandha can produce a single result: possession with its characteristics, that is, asamjnisamapatti (ii. 42a) with its characteristics; 2) a retributive cause consisting of two skandhas can produce a single result: vijnapti (iv. 2)
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of the First Dhy3na with its characteristics; 3) a retributive cause consisting of four skandhas can produce a single result: a good mind, not of absorption (for the mind of absorption always consists of rupa and discipline, iv. 13, and is thus five skandhas), with its characteristics; 4) a retributive cause consisting of five skandhas can produce a single result: the mind of absorption with its characteristics.
In Arupyadhatu, 1) a retributive cause consisting of a single skandha can produce a single result: possession, nirodhasamdpatti (ii. 43), with their respective characteristics; 2) a retributive cause consisting of four skandhas can produce a single result: the mind and its mental states with their characteristics.
4. There is action the retribution of which is included in a single
dyatana, in a single dharmayatana (i. 15): action that has for its 371
retribution the vital organ (jivitendriya, ii. 45a).
In fact, action that has the vital organ for its retribution necessarily
has the vital organ and its characteristics (ii. 45c) for its retribution; both form part of the dharmayatana.
Action that has the mental organ (rnanas) for its retribution necessarily has two ayatanas for its retribution, namely the mana- dyatana (i. l6b) and the dharmayatana (which embraces sensations, etc. , and the characteristics which necessarily accompany the mental organ).
Action that has tangible things (sprastavydyatana, i. lOd) for its retribution necessarily has two ayatanas for its retribution, namely the tangible things and the dharmayatana (which includes the character- istics of tangible things).
Action that has the organ of touch (kdydyatana, i. 9a) for its retribution necessarily has three ayatanas for its retribution, the organ of touch, tangibles (namely the four primary elements that support the organ of touch), and the dharmayatana (which includes its character- istics).
In the same way, action which has either physical matter (rupdyatana), odors (gandhdyatana), or taste {rasdyatana) for its retribution, necessarily has three ayatanas for its retribution: tangible things and the dharmayatana as above, plus, according to the cause, the
? dyatana of physical matter, odor, or taste.
Aaion which has either the eye, the ear, the nose, or the tongue for
its retribution, necessarily has four dyatanas for its retribution: 1) one of the four organs, 2) the organ of touch, 3) tangible things, and 4) the dharmdyatana.
An aaion can have five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, or eleven 372
dyatanas for its retribution.
Action, in fact, is of two types: of varied result and of non-varied
result. The same holds for seeds: lotus, pomegranate, fig, millet, corn, etc.
5. The retribution of an aaion can belong to a single time period or
373 374
to three time periods; but the reverse is not true, for a result
cannot be inferior to its cause. The retribution from an aaion lasting an instant can last numerous instants; but the reverse is not true, for the same reason (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 98a7).
Retribution is not simultaneous to the aaion which produces it, for a retributive result is not experienced at the moment when the aaion is accomplished Retribution does not immediately follow an aaion, for it is the immediately antecedent condition (samanantarapratyaya, ii. 63b) that attracts the moment that immediately follows the aaion: in faa, the retributive cause depends on the development of the series for the realization of its result.
***
To which time period should a dharma belong in order that it might be each of these six causes? We have implicitely stated this rule, but we have not yet taught it in the Karika:
55a-b. Sarvatragahetu and sabhdgahetu are of two time periods; 375
three causes are of three time periods.
A past and present dharma can be sarvatraga and sabhdgahetu (ii. 52b). Past, present, and future dharmas can be samprayuktaka, sahabhu, and vipdkahetu. The Karika does not speak of kdranahetu (ii. 50a)): the conditioned dharmas of the three time periods are
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karanahetu\ the unconditioned dharmas are outside of time. ***
Which causes correspond to which results? By reason of which results are they recognized as causes?
376 55c-d. Conditioned things and disconneaion are results.
The Mulasastra says, "What dharmas are results? Conditioned
377 things and pratisamkhyanirodha. "
[Objection:] If the unconditioned is a result, it should have a cause, from which cause one could say that it is the result. Furthermore, since you maintain that it is a cause {kdranahetu, ii. 50a), it should have a result, from which result one could say that it is a cause.
Only conditioned things, [the Sarvastivadins answer,] have cause and result.
378 55d. The unconditioned has neither cause nor result.
For we cannot attribute to it any of the six causes, nor any of the five results.
i. 1. Why not admit that the part of the Path which is called
m
anantaryamarga is the kdranahetu of the result of disconneaion
(visamyogaphala, ii. 57d)?
We have seen that kdranahetu is a cause that does not create any
obstacles to arising; but disconneaion, being unconditioned, does not arise. Thus one cannot attribute a kdrannahetu to it.
2. Then how is disconneaion a result? Of what is it the result?
It is the result of the Path, for it is obtained due to the force of the Path (vi. 51): in other words, it is through the Path that an ascetic obtains possession (prdpti, ii. 36c-d) of disconneaion.
3. Hence it is the obtaining or the possession of disconnection which is the result of the Path, and not disconneaion itself: for the Path is efficacious with regard to the obtaining of disconneaion, but not with regard to disconneaion.
Wrong! The efficacy of the Path possesses diversity with regard to
? both obtaining and disconnection.
The Path produces obtaining; the Path causes one to obtain
disconnection. Hence, although the Path is not the cause of disconnec- tion {-prastisarhkhyanirodha)y one can say that it is the result of the
380
Path.
4. Since no unconditioned thing has adhipatiphala (ii. 58d), how
can one define it as karanahetul
Any unconditioned thing is karanahetu, for it does not create an
obstacle to the arising of any dharma', but it does not have any result, for, being outside of time, it can neither project nor produce a result (ii. 59a-b).
[5. The Sautrantikas deny that] an unconditioned thing is a cause. In fact, the Sutra does not say that a cause can be unconditioned; it says that a cause is only conditioned, "All the hetus, all the pratyayas which have for a result the production of physical matter . . . of the
381
consciousiness, are also impermanent. Produced by impermanent
hetus and pratyayas> how can physical matter . . . and consciousness be permanent? "
[The Sarvastivadins answer:] If a permanent thing, that is, an unconditioned thing is not a cause, it will not be "an object as condition" {atambanapratyaya, ii. 63) of the conciousness that it refers to.
[The Sautrantikas:] The Sutra declares that the hetus and the pratyayas which are capable of producing are impermanent. Itcloes not say that all conditions (pratyayas) of the consciousness are imperma- nent. An unconditioned thing could then be "an object as condition" of the consciousness; for "an object as condition" is not itself productive.
[The Sarvastivadins:] The Sutra says that productive causes are impermanent: hence the Sutra does not deny that an unconditioned thing is kdranahetu, that is, "a cause that does not create an obstacle. "
[The Sautrantikas:] The Sutra admits the existence of "an object as a condition" (ii. 61c); but it does not speak of a karanahetu, "a cause that does not create an obstacle. " It is not proven that an uncondi- tioned thing is a cause.
[The Sarvastivadins:] In fact, the Sutra does not say that that
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which does not create an obstacle is a cause; but it does not contradict this. Many Sfctras have disappeared How can you be sure that some Sutra does not attribute the quality of kdranahetu to unconditioned things?
***
[ii. The Sautrantikas:] What is the dharma that is called visamyoga or disconnection?
[The Sarvastivadins: The Mulasastra (Jndnaprasthdna, TD 26, p. 923b6) says that] disconnection is pratisarhkhyanirodha (ii. 57d).
[The Sautrantikas:] When I asked you (i. 6) what pratisamkhya- nirodha is, you answered, "It is disconnection;" I asked you what disconnection is, and you answered, "It is pratisarhkhyanirodha^ The two answers are circular and do not explain the nature of the dharma, the unconditioned, to which they refer. You owe us another explanation.
[The Sarvastivadins:] This dharma, in its nature, is real, but indescribable; only the Aryans "realize" it internally, each for himself. It is only possible to indicate its general characteristics, by saying that there is a real entity (dravya), distinct from others, which is good and eternal, and which receives the name of pratisarhkhyanirodha, and which is also called disconnection or visamyoga.
***
iii. The Sautrantikas affirm that the three types of unconditioned
things (i. 5b) are not real. The three dharmas that it refers to are not 382
distinct and real entities like color, sensation, etc.
1. What is called "space" (dkdsa) is solely the absence of any
tangible thing, that is, the absence of a resistant body. Persons say, in their obscurity, that there is space when they do not encounter any obstacle.
2. What is called pratisarhkhyanirodha or Nirvana is--when both the defilements already produced and the existence already produced
? are destroyed--the absence of any other defilements or any other
existence, and that by reason of the force of the consciousness 383
(pratisamkhyd-prajnd).
3. When, independent of the force of consciousness (pratisamkhyd)
and by reason of the mere absence of causes there is an absence of arising dharmas, this is what is called apratisamkhyanirodha. For example, when premature death interrupts existence (nikdyasabhdga, ii. 10,14), there is apratisamkhyanirodha of the dharmas which would have arisen in the course of this existence if it had continued
384
4. According to another school, pratisamkhyanirodha is the
future non-arising of the defilements by reason of consciousness (prajnd); apratisamkhyanirodha is the future non-arising of suffering, that is, of existence, by reason of the disappearance of the defilements, and not directly by reason of consciousness. (The first would then be sopadhisesa nirvdnadhdtu, and the second would be nirupadhisesa nirvdanadhdtu).
But, [the Sautrantikas remark,] the future non-arising of suffering supposes consciousness (pratisamkhyd)',it is then included within pratisamkhyanirodha.
***
385
5. Another School defines apratisamkhyanirodha as "later non-
existence of the dharmas which have arisen" by virtue of their 386
spontaneous destruction.
In this hypothesis, apratisamkhyanirodha would not be eternal,
since it is non-existent as long as the dharma as cause (i. e. , the defilement) has not perished.
But does not pratisamkhyanirodha have a certain consciousness, the pratisamkhya, for its antecedent? Consequently it too would not be eternal, for, if its antecedent were absent, its consequence would also be absent.
You cannot say that pratisamkhyanirodha is not eternal because its antecedent is pratisamkhyd: in faa, it does not have pratisamkhyd for its antecedent. One cannot say that pratisamkhyd is earlier, or that the
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"non-arising of the non-arisen dharmas' is later. Let us explain. Non- arising always exists in and of itself. If pratisamkhyd is absent, the dharmas would arise; but if pratisamkhyd arises, the dharmas would absolutely not arise. The efficacy of pratisamkhyd with regard to their non-arising consists in this: 1) that before pratisamkhyd, there is no obstacle to their arising; 2) but given pratisamkhyd, the dharmas, the arising of which has not been previously hindered, do not arise.
***
[iv. The Sarvastivadins refute the Sautrantikas. ] If Nirvana is simply non-arising {anutpdda), how does one explain the Sutra (Samyuktagama, TD 2, p. 182bl5) which says, "The cultivation of the five faculties,--faith, etc. ,--has for its result the abandoning of past,
387
present, and future suffering"?
other than Nirvana, and there can only be non-arising of a future dharma, not of a past or present dharma.
[1. The Sautrantikas:] This Sutra does not contradict our definition
of Nirvana. In fact, "the abandoning of past and present suffering"
means the abandoning of the defilements bearing past and present
In fact, this abandoning is nothing
suffering. Our interpretation is justified by another text (Samyukta, m
TD 2, p. l9a8? ) which says, "Abandon desire (chandardga ) relative
to rupa, to sensation . . . and to consciousness. When desire is
abandoned, rupa, . . . and consciousness will be abandoned and
389
comprehended by you. "
understand "the abandoning of past and present suffering" of which the Sutra speaks when it speaks of the faculties.
If one adopts another reading of this Sutra on the faculties, to wit, "The cultivation of the faculties . . . has for its result the abandoning of past, present, and future defilements," the explanation is the same.
Or rather, past defilement is the defilement of a previous existence; present defilement is the defilement of the present exis- tence; these do not refer to the defilement of a given past or present moment. The same for the eighteen trsnavicaritas (Anguttara, ii. 212) or "modes of thirst": the modes (vicaritas) that are related to a past
It is in this manner that we should
? existence are called past modes, those that are related to a present existence are called present modes, and those that are related to a future existence are called future modes.
Past defilements and present defilements place in the present series seeds that bring forth the arising of future defilement: when these seeds are abandoned, past and present defilement is abandoned: in the same way as one says that an action is exhausted when its retribution is exhausted.
The "abandoning" of future suffering and future defilement is the fact that they absolutely do not arise, given the absence of seeds.
How does one otherwise understand the abandoning of past or present suffering? There is no good reason to make an effort to destroy that which has perished or that which is perishing.
[2. The Sarvastivadins:] If unconditioned things do not exist, how
can the Sutra say "Detachment (viraga) is the best of all conditioned
be the best among the dharmas which do not exist? ?
[The Sautrantikas:] We do not say that unconditioned things do not exist.
[The Vaibhasikas:] This text does not contradict the first; for the Jndnaprasthdna does not refer to that which is a cause in the quality of a similar cause (sabhdgahetu), but rather that which is a cause in the
qualities of sahabhuhetu, samprayuktakahetu, or vipdkahetu. According to another opinion, that of the "followers of the last
place" (paramavasthdvddin), the answer of the Jndnaprasthdna, "There is never a time when this dharma is not a cause" refers to sabhdgahetu, and they justify themselves as follows: A future dharma, in an arising state, is certainly sabhdgahetu. Hence, taking into account a future dharma in its last place, the Jndnaprasthdna can say that there is never a time when the dharma is not a cause, that it is always a cause, since, at a certain moment in the future, it is a cause.
This explanation does not resolve the difficulty. In fact, if a future dharma, after not having been a cause becomes a cause by arriving at a state of arising, then it has not always been a cause: but now the Jndnaprasthdna says absolutely that there is never a time when it is not a cause.
Furthermore, this explanation cannot be reconciled with the answer that the Jndnaprasthdna (p. 1026M9; Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 87a2) gives to another question, "Is there a period in which the dharma that is an immediately antecedent condition (samanantara, ii. 62a-b) of a certain dharma is not samanantara! Yes, when it has not yet arisen. " Now the case of samanantara is analogous to that of sabhdgahetu: future samanantara, arriving at a state of arising, is samanantara.
? Hence if the interpretation of the answer, "There is never a time when this dharma is not a cause," in the sense of "In the future, in an arising state, it is sabhdgahetu" is correct, then the Jndnaprasthdna, dealing with samanantara, should answer as for sabhdgahetu, "This dharma is never samanantara! * Now the Jndnaprasthdna answers, "It is not samanantara when it has not arisen. " Hence the word "cause" in the first answer should not be understood as sabhdgahetu.
The "followers of the last place" say that the Jndnaprasthdna answers the first question by saying, "There is never a time when it is not a cause," and the second by saying, "It is not a cause when it has not arisen," in order to show that one can answer in these two ways in order to express the same sense. One can answer the first question as the second, and the second as the first.
What a singular process of explanation! The author of the Sastra would then be totally useless! Hence the first explanation proposed is the best explanation.
3. If a future dharma is not a similar cause {sabhdgahetu), why does
the Prakaranapdda teach that future satkdyadrsti has satkdyadrsti as its
cause, and is in turn the cause of sa&kdyadrstfi We read, in faa (in the
text quoted in note 342, para. Bl(b)), "with the exception of
future satkdyadrstiand the Truth of Suffering which is associated
with it" (andgatdm satkdyadrsti tatsamprayuktam ca duhkhasatyam 349
This reading, [answer the Vaibhasikas,] is corrupted. It should read, "with the exception of the Truth of Suffering associated with future satkdyadrsti {andgatasatkdyadrstisamprayuktam). If we were to suppose that your reading is authentic, we must, because of the sense that the text expresses, consider it as without authority (na tantram), and as having been determined by the context of discourse (that is, through imitation of the preceeding phrase).
sthapayitvd. )
4. If a future dharma is not sabhdgahetu, how do you explain the m
following bhdfyam of the Prajnapti? This Treatise says in faa, "All the dharmas are determined from a fourfold point of view: cause,
m result, support (dsraya), and objea (dlambana). "
[The Vaibhasikas answer:] When it says, "This dharma is never
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the cause of that dharma** the Treatise does not mean to speak of all types of causes. By cause, we must understand sarhprayuktakahetu and
352 sahabhuhetw, by result, adhipatiphala and purusakdraphala (ii. 58);
by support, the six organs (organ of sight, etc. ); and by object, the six spheres {visaya), visible things, etc.
5. If a future dharma is not sabhagahetu, then sabhagahetu did not exist at first, but then does exist.
But this is precisely what the Vaibhasikas affirm! The condition {avastha) of sabhagahetu of the sabhagahetu is new, that is, it exists after having been non-existent; but the thing itself, the dravya which is
a certain sabhagahetu, is not new. A future dharma is not sabhagahetu, but once it has arisen, it becomes sabhagahetu. In fact, the result of the complex of causes, is the condition of a thing and not the thing itself {dravya), the dharma. (A future dharma exists as a thing, dravyatas\ the complex of causes causes it to pass from the future into the
present, endows it with the condition of the present, and endows it, by this fact, with the quality of sabhagahetu', see v. 25. )
6. What harm do you see in this future dharma being a similar cause {sabhagahetu) in the same way that it is a retributive cause {vipakahetu, ii. 54)?
It it were sabhagahetu, it would be mentioned as such in the Jndnaprasthdna (see above p. 263 line 27); now the Jnsnaprasthana,
answering the question, "What is sabhagahetu? ** does not say that future roots of good are sabhagahetu of future roots of good.
We do not think that the omission of future dharma from this text creates an argument against us. This text, in fact mentions only the sabhdgahetus that are capable of "grasping" and of "giving forth" a result {phaladanagrahanasamartha, ii. 59).
No, for the result of sabhagahetu is an "out-flowing result of out-flowing," a result similar to its cause {nisyandaphala, ii. 57c), and this type of result does not suit a future dharma, because, in the future, there is no anteriority and posteriority. One cannot, on the other hand, admit that a past or present dharma already arisen is an out-flowing of a future dharma, in the same way that a past dharma is not an out-flowing of a present dharma, for a result is not anterior to its cause.
? Hence a future dharma is not a similar cause.
7. If this is the case, then a future dharma would no longer be a
vipakahetu, a retributive cause (ii. 54c), for 1) a retributive result (vtpdkaphala, ii. 56a) cannot be either simultaneous or anterior to its cause; and 2) because future dharmas have no earlier or later periods of time.
[The Vaibhasikas answer that] the cause is not the same. A similar cause (sabhagahetu) and its out-flowing (nisyanda) result are similar dharmas. Now this is to suppose that they exist in the future, that they lack anteriority and posteriority, and that they are the mutual cause of one another, and as a consequences the results of one another: now it is not admissable that two dharmas are an out flowing of one another. On the contrary, a retributive cause and a retributive result are dissimilar. Even if the anteriority and the posteriority were absent, a cause remains only a cause, and a result remains only a result. The quality of sabhagahetu results from a condition or state (avastha): a future dharma is not sabhdgahetu\ but when it enters into a present or a past condition, it becomes sabhagahetu. Its quality of retributive cause results from the nature of the dharma itself.
***
We have said that a dharma is a similar cause (sabhagahetu) of only those dharmas that belong to its stage. Does this restriction apply to all the dharmas?
It applies only to impure dharmas, not to pure dharmas:
52c-d. But the Path is sabhagahetu to the Path, without
distinguishing the nine stages.
The Path is of nine stages or spheres--the anagamya, the dhyandntara, the Four primary (mula) Dhyanas, and the three inferior, primary Arupyas (vi. 20c)--in the sense that an ascetic, abiding in these nine states of absorption, can cultivate the Path.
The dharmas that constitute the Path are similar causes of the dharmas that constitute the Path, from stage to stage. In fact, the Path
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resides in the different stages as a visitor, without forming part of the spheres of existence to which these stages belong: the desire of Kamadhatu, of Rupadhatu, of ArQpyadhatu, are not on the Path. The Path, whatever be the stage upon which the ascetic relies in order to cultivate it, stays of the same nature; the Path is hence a similar cause of the Path.
Nevertheless, the complete Path is not a similar cause of the complete Path. One does not have to take into account the stage in which it is cultivated, but rather the characteristics proper to the Path itself.
52d. The Path is sabhdgahetu to an equal or superior Path.
Not of an inferior Path, because the Path is always acquired through effort.
Let us define the terms, "inferior," "equal," and "superior Path. "
1. When past or present duhkhe dharmajndnaksdnti (the first moment of the Path of Seeing, darfanamdrga, vi. 25d) is a similar cause of this same ksdnti of the future, the caused Path is equal to the causing Path.
When this ksdnti is a similar cause of duhkhe dharmajndna (the second moment of the Path of Seeing, darsanamdrga, vi. 26a) the caused Path is superior to the causing Path.
And thus following up to anutpddajndna (vi. 50) which, not having a superior, can only be the similar cause of an equal Path, namely a future anutpddajndna.
To state it more precisely, the Path of Seeing (darsanamdrga) is a similar cause of the Path of Seeing, the Path of Meditation (bhdvand- mdrga), and the Path of the Asaiksas (asaiksamdrga); the Path of Meditation is a similar cause of the Path of Meditation and the Path of the Asaiksa; and the Path of the Asaiksa is a similar cause of an equal or superior Path of the Asaiksa.
3. Any Path can be cultivated by an ascetic of weak faculties or active faculties: a Path of weak faculties is the similar cause of the same Path of weak faculties and of active faculties; a Path of active faculties is the similar cause of the same Path of active faculties. Consequently
? the Paths of sraddhdnusdrin (vi. 29), sraddhddhimukta (vi. 31) and samayavimukta (vi. 56-7) are, respectively, the similar causes of six, four, and two Paths; the Paths of dharmdnusdrin (vi. 29), drstiprdpti (vi. 31) and asamayavimukta (vi56-7) are, respectively, the similar causes of three, two, and one Path.
When a Path cultivated in a higher stage is the similar cause of a Path cultivated in a lower stage, how can it be the cause of an equal or higher Path?
The Path cultivated in a lower stage can be equal or higher 1) from
the point of view of the faculties {indriyas) which can be weak or active
in any stage, or 2) from the point of view of the accumulation of
354 causes.
It does not follow that the same person successively grasps
sraddhdnusdrin and dharmdnusdrin Paths; yet the first, in the past or 355
present, is a similar cause of the second, the later one.
***
Does the rule of equal or higher results apply only to the pure dharmas, that is, to the dharmas that form part of the Path?
53a. The dharmas acquired through cultivation are sabhdgahetu of the same two classes, the equal and the higher.
Worldly dharmas acquired through effort or exercise are similar causes of equal or higher dharmas, but not of inferior dharmas.
What are the dharmas acquired through effort?
53b. Those which arise through hearing, through reflection,
etc
The dharmas "acquired through effort" are the opposite of the "innate" dharmas. These former dharmas are qualities (guna) proceed- ing from hearing {sruta)y that is, from the Word of the Buddha, from reflection (cintd), and from meditation (bhdvand).
Since they are acquired through effort, they are the similar cause of greater or of equal, but not of lesser, good
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The dharmas of hearing in Kamadhatu are similar causes of the dharmas of hearing and reflection in Kamadhatu; but not of the dharmas of meditation, because these dharmas do not exist in Kamadhatu, and because a dharma is a similar cause of dharmas of the same sphere of existence.
The dharmas of hearing in Rupadhatu are similar causes of the dharmas of hearing and meditation in Rupadhatu; but not of the dharmas of reflection, because these dharmas do not exist in this sphere of existence: in Rupadhatu, as soon as one begins to reflect, one immediately enters into absorption (samddhi).
The dharmas of meditation in Rupadhatu are similar causes of the dharmas of meditation in Rupadhatu, but not of the dharmas of hearing in Rupadhatu, because these are less good.
The dharmas of meditation in Arupyadhatu are the similar causes of the dharmas of meditation in Arupyadhatu. The dharmas of hearing and of reflection do not exist in this sphere of existence.
Furthermore, one must consider that the dharmas acquired through effort are of nine classes: weak-weak, medium-weak, etc. The weak-weak are the similar causes of dharmas of nine classes; the medium-weak, of dharmas of eight classes, with the exception of the weak-weak; and thus following.
The nine classes of the "innate" good dharmas are similar cause of one another. The same holds for the defiled dharmas.
The undefiled-neutral dharmas are of four categories (ii. 72), the following being "better" than the preceding: dharmas arisen from retribution (vipakaja, i. 37); dharmas relative to lying down, to sitting attitudes, etc. ; dharmas relative to professional work; and the mind that can create fictive beings {nirmanacitta, vii. 48). These four categories are, respectively, the similar cause of four, three, two, and one category.
Furthermore, as a mind capable of creating fictive beings of the sphere of Kamadhatu can be the result of each of the Four Dhyanas {Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 89al2), there is reason to establish here the same distinctions: the minds capable of creating fiaive beings constitute four classes, and are, according to their class, similar causes of four, three,
? two, or one mind capable of creating fictive beings. In fact, since it is a result of a higher Dhyana, the mind capable of creating fictive beings is not the similar cause of a mind capable of creating fictive beings which is the result of a lower Dhyana: from one similar cause (a mind capable of creating fictive beings) realized with the greatest effort, there cannot proceed a dharma less good, realized with less effort.
***
Once these principles have been established, the following ques-
356 tions are stated and resolved:
1. Is there a pure dharma, already arisen, which is not the cause of a pure dharma not destined to arise?
Yes. Duhkhe dharmajndna already arisen is a cause of duhkhe dharmajndnaksdntis not destined to arise. Furthermore, a better good is not the cause of lesser good.
2. Is there, in a series, a pure dharma, previously acquired (of which one has first obtained the prapti), which is not the cause of a pure dharma arisen later?
Yes. Future duhkhe dharmajnanaksdnti [whose possession (prdpti) has been obtained in the first moment of the Path] are not the cause of duhkhe dharmajndna already arisen. This is because a result cannot be anterior to its cause, and because a future dharma is not a similar cause.
3. Is there a pure dharma, arisen previously, which is not the cause of a pure dharma arisen later?
Yes. The best is not the cause of less good. For example, when one realizes an inferior result after having fallen from a superior result, the superior result was not the cause of this inferior result. Furthermore, possession of duhkhe dharmajndna which has previously arisen is not a cause of the possession of the dharmajndnaksdnti which will arise in the following moments {duhkhe'nvayajndnaksdntiksane, etc. ), because these new possessions are less good
***
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Chapter Two
53c-d. The mind and its mental states are only samprayuk- 357
takahetu, causes through association.
Mind and mental states are samprayuktakahetu.
Is this to say that minds and mental states, arisen at different moments and in different series, are among themselves samprayuk- takahetu}
No.
Would you then say that the mind and mental states of the same aspect, that is, having the same aspect of blue, etc. , and of the same object (ekMambana), that is, having for their object the same blue, etc, are samprayuktakahetu}
No. This definition gives rise to the same criticism: minds and mental states of different time periods and of different series can have the same aspect and the same object.
Would you say that the mind and mental states of the same aspect and the same object, can be, furthermore, of the same time period?
This still does not suffice: for many persons can see a new moon at one and the same time.
Consequently, the author adds
53d. Which has the same support.
The mind and mental states which have the same support are,
among themselves, samprayuktakahetu. 358
"Same" signifies single or undivided.
For example, a given moment (ksana) of the organ of sight is the support 1) of a visual consciousness, and 2) of the sensation {vedana) and the other mental states which are associated with this conscious- ness. And the same for the other organs until manas: a certain moment of the mental organ {manas) is the support of a mental consciousness and of the mental states associated with this consciousness.
Whatever is samprayuktakahetu is also sahabhilhetu. What is the 359
difference between these two causes?
Some dharmas are called sahabhuhetu because they are mutually
the results of one another. As companions in a caravan travel thanks to
? the support that they give one another, in this same way the mind is the result of mental states, and the mental states are the result of the mind
Some dharmas are called samprayuktakahetu, mutual cause through association, because they function identically, that is, because there is among them the five similarities or identities defined above ii. 34. The travel of the companions in a caravan is assured by the mutual support that they give one another; furthermore, they use the same food, the same drinks, etc In this same way, the mind and its mental states use the same support, have the same aspect, etc: if one of these five identities is missing, they no longer function in the same way and are not associated
**#
54a-b. Former universals are sarvatragahetu or universal causes of the defiled dharmas of their own stage.
Universals, which we shall study in the Chapter on the Defile- ments (v. 12), arisen previously, that is, of the past or present, and belonging to a certain stage (bhumi), are the universal cause of later defiled dharmas, of the same stage, which are defiled by nature, either through association or through their origin (iv. 9c).
Universals are only the cause of defiled dharmas\ they are the cause
of defiled dharmas in their own category and in other categories
(nikaya, ii. 52b): it is through their power that there arises, with their 36
following, defilements belonging to categories different from them. ?
561 They then constitute a cause different from sabhagahetu
Then would the defiled dharmas of an Aryan (rdga or lust, etc) have the universals for their cause? Yet the Aryan has abandoned all universals, for these are abandoned by Seeing the Truths.
The Vaibhasikas of Ka? mir admit that all defiled dharmas have the dharmas abandoned through Seeing the Truths for their cause. For the
562
Prakaranapdda expresses itself in these terms: "What dharmas have
for a cause the dharmas abandoned through Seeing the Truths? Defiled
565
dharmas and the retribution of the dharmas abandoned through
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Seeing the Truths.
"What dharmas have for a cause neutral (avyakrta) [dharmas]}
m
Neutral conditioned dharmas
"Is there a duhkhasatya which has for its cause a belief in self
and bad dharmas.
(satkayadrsti) and which is not in turn the cause of a belief in self? . . . "
and the rest to: "with the exception of the arising-old age-duration-
365
impermanence of the belief in a future self and its following, and of
1 all other defiled duhkhasatya!
[Objection:] If some bad dharmas have for their causes not only
some bad dharmas but some neutral dharmas as well, how should one
explain this bhasyam of the Prajnapti^ "Is there a bad dharma which
has only a bad dharma for its cause? Yes; the first defiled volition 367
(cetana) that an Aryan produces upon falling from detachment. " [Answer:] The neutral dharmas, which are abandoned through
Seeing the Truths, are the cause (i. e. , sarvatragahetu) of this bad volition. If the Prajnapti does not mention it, it is because it intends to name only the causes that have not been abandoned.
***
54c-d. Bad dharmas and impure good dharmas are retributive 368
causes.
1. Bad dharmas--which are all impure--and impure good dharmas are only retributive causes, because their nature is to ripen.
Neutral dharmas are not retributive causes, because they are weak: as rotten seeds, even though moistened, do not grow.
Pure dharmas are not retributive causes because they are not 369
moistened through desire (trsnd): as intact seeds, not moistened, do not grow.
Furthermore, pure dharmas are not bound to any sphere of existence: thus to which sphere could the result of retribution that they would produce belong?
The dharmas that are neither neutral nor pure possess the two qualities necessary for retribution, the proper force, and the moisten-
? ing of thirst, the same as intact and moistened seeds.
2. [Objection:] What is the meaning of the expression vipdkahetu!
You have a choice between two interpretations of this compound: vipdkahetu signifies either "cause of vipaka* or "cause which is vipaka! *
In the first case, the suffix a (ghan) marks the state (bhdva): the vipaka (-vipakti) is the result of the operation indicated by the root vi-pac.
In the second case, the suffix a marks the operation (karman): the vipaka is that which become ripe (vipacyate), that is to say, the action arrives at the moment when it gives forth a result.
To which of these two interpretations do you hold? If you accept the first, how would you justify the text (Jndnaprasthdna, TD 26, p. 974a26), "The eye arises from vipdkaT If you accept the second, how would you justify the expression, "vipaka of action? "
[Answer:] We have shown (i. 37) that both explanations of the word vipaka are correct. When one examines results, one must understand the word vipaka according to the first explanation; the meaning is result of retribution. The text, "The eye arises from vipaka* should be understood as "The eye arises from the cause of vipdka?
3. What is the meaning of the compound vi-pakal
The prefix vi indicates difference. Vipaka is a pdka or result
37 dissimilar from its cause. ?
How is that?
In Kamadhatu, 1) a retributive cause (vipdkahetu) consisting of only one skandha can produce a single result: possession (prdpti, ii. 36b) with its characteristics (laksanas, ii. 45c); 2) a retributive cause consisting of two skandhas can produce a single result: bodily and vocal action with its characteristics; 3) a retributive cause consisting of four skandhas can produce a single result: the mind and its mental states, good and bad, with their laksanas.
In Rupadhatu, 1) a retributive cause consisting of a single skandha can produce a single result: possession with its characteristics, that is, asamjnisamapatti (ii. 42a) with its characteristics; 2) a retributive cause consisting of two skandhas can produce a single result: vijnapti (iv. 2)
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of the First Dhy3na with its characteristics; 3) a retributive cause consisting of four skandhas can produce a single result: a good mind, not of absorption (for the mind of absorption always consists of rupa and discipline, iv. 13, and is thus five skandhas), with its characteristics; 4) a retributive cause consisting of five skandhas can produce a single result: the mind of absorption with its characteristics.
In Arupyadhatu, 1) a retributive cause consisting of a single skandha can produce a single result: possession, nirodhasamdpatti (ii. 43), with their respective characteristics; 2) a retributive cause consisting of four skandhas can produce a single result: the mind and its mental states with their characteristics.
4. There is action the retribution of which is included in a single
dyatana, in a single dharmayatana (i. 15): action that has for its 371
retribution the vital organ (jivitendriya, ii. 45a).
In fact, action that has the vital organ for its retribution necessarily
has the vital organ and its characteristics (ii. 45c) for its retribution; both form part of the dharmayatana.
Action that has the mental organ (rnanas) for its retribution necessarily has two ayatanas for its retribution, namely the mana- dyatana (i. l6b) and the dharmayatana (which embraces sensations, etc. , and the characteristics which necessarily accompany the mental organ).
Action that has tangible things (sprastavydyatana, i. lOd) for its retribution necessarily has two ayatanas for its retribution, namely the tangible things and the dharmayatana (which includes the character- istics of tangible things).
Action that has the organ of touch (kdydyatana, i. 9a) for its retribution necessarily has three ayatanas for its retribution, the organ of touch, tangibles (namely the four primary elements that support the organ of touch), and the dharmayatana (which includes its character- istics).
In the same way, action which has either physical matter (rupdyatana), odors (gandhdyatana), or taste {rasdyatana) for its retribution, necessarily has three ayatanas for its retribution: tangible things and the dharmayatana as above, plus, according to the cause, the
? dyatana of physical matter, odor, or taste.
Aaion which has either the eye, the ear, the nose, or the tongue for
its retribution, necessarily has four dyatanas for its retribution: 1) one of the four organs, 2) the organ of touch, 3) tangible things, and 4) the dharmdyatana.
An aaion can have five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, or eleven 372
dyatanas for its retribution.
Action, in fact, is of two types: of varied result and of non-varied
result. The same holds for seeds: lotus, pomegranate, fig, millet, corn, etc.
5. The retribution of an aaion can belong to a single time period or
373 374
to three time periods; but the reverse is not true, for a result
cannot be inferior to its cause. The retribution from an aaion lasting an instant can last numerous instants; but the reverse is not true, for the same reason (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 98a7).
Retribution is not simultaneous to the aaion which produces it, for a retributive result is not experienced at the moment when the aaion is accomplished Retribution does not immediately follow an aaion, for it is the immediately antecedent condition (samanantarapratyaya, ii. 63b) that attracts the moment that immediately follows the aaion: in faa, the retributive cause depends on the development of the series for the realization of its result.
***
To which time period should a dharma belong in order that it might be each of these six causes? We have implicitely stated this rule, but we have not yet taught it in the Karika:
55a-b. Sarvatragahetu and sabhdgahetu are of two time periods; 375
three causes are of three time periods.
A past and present dharma can be sarvatraga and sabhdgahetu (ii. 52b). Past, present, and future dharmas can be samprayuktaka, sahabhu, and vipdkahetu. The Karika does not speak of kdranahetu (ii. 50a)): the conditioned dharmas of the three time periods are
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karanahetu\ the unconditioned dharmas are outside of time. ***
Which causes correspond to which results? By reason of which results are they recognized as causes?
376 55c-d. Conditioned things and disconneaion are results.
The Mulasastra says, "What dharmas are results? Conditioned
377 things and pratisamkhyanirodha. "
[Objection:] If the unconditioned is a result, it should have a cause, from which cause one could say that it is the result. Furthermore, since you maintain that it is a cause {kdranahetu, ii. 50a), it should have a result, from which result one could say that it is a cause.
Only conditioned things, [the Sarvastivadins answer,] have cause and result.
378 55d. The unconditioned has neither cause nor result.
For we cannot attribute to it any of the six causes, nor any of the five results.
i. 1. Why not admit that the part of the Path which is called
m
anantaryamarga is the kdranahetu of the result of disconneaion
(visamyogaphala, ii. 57d)?
We have seen that kdranahetu is a cause that does not create any
obstacles to arising; but disconneaion, being unconditioned, does not arise. Thus one cannot attribute a kdrannahetu to it.
2. Then how is disconneaion a result? Of what is it the result?
It is the result of the Path, for it is obtained due to the force of the Path (vi. 51): in other words, it is through the Path that an ascetic obtains possession (prdpti, ii. 36c-d) of disconneaion.
3. Hence it is the obtaining or the possession of disconnection which is the result of the Path, and not disconneaion itself: for the Path is efficacious with regard to the obtaining of disconneaion, but not with regard to disconneaion.
Wrong! The efficacy of the Path possesses diversity with regard to
? both obtaining and disconnection.
The Path produces obtaining; the Path causes one to obtain
disconnection. Hence, although the Path is not the cause of disconnec- tion {-prastisarhkhyanirodha)y one can say that it is the result of the
380
Path.
4. Since no unconditioned thing has adhipatiphala (ii. 58d), how
can one define it as karanahetul
Any unconditioned thing is karanahetu, for it does not create an
obstacle to the arising of any dharma', but it does not have any result, for, being outside of time, it can neither project nor produce a result (ii. 59a-b).
[5. The Sautrantikas deny that] an unconditioned thing is a cause. In fact, the Sutra does not say that a cause can be unconditioned; it says that a cause is only conditioned, "All the hetus, all the pratyayas which have for a result the production of physical matter . . . of the
381
consciousiness, are also impermanent. Produced by impermanent
hetus and pratyayas> how can physical matter . . . and consciousness be permanent? "
[The Sarvastivadins answer:] If a permanent thing, that is, an unconditioned thing is not a cause, it will not be "an object as condition" {atambanapratyaya, ii. 63) of the conciousness that it refers to.
[The Sautrantikas:] The Sutra declares that the hetus and the pratyayas which are capable of producing are impermanent. Itcloes not say that all conditions (pratyayas) of the consciousness are imperma- nent. An unconditioned thing could then be "an object as condition" of the consciousness; for "an object as condition" is not itself productive.
[The Sarvastivadins:] The Sutra says that productive causes are impermanent: hence the Sutra does not deny that an unconditioned thing is kdranahetu, that is, "a cause that does not create an obstacle. "
[The Sautrantikas:] The Sutra admits the existence of "an object as a condition" (ii. 61c); but it does not speak of a karanahetu, "a cause that does not create an obstacle. " It is not proven that an uncondi- tioned thing is a cause.
[The Sarvastivadins:] In fact, the Sutra does not say that that
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which does not create an obstacle is a cause; but it does not contradict this. Many Sfctras have disappeared How can you be sure that some Sutra does not attribute the quality of kdranahetu to unconditioned things?
***
[ii. The Sautrantikas:] What is the dharma that is called visamyoga or disconnection?
[The Sarvastivadins: The Mulasastra (Jndnaprasthdna, TD 26, p. 923b6) says that] disconnection is pratisarhkhyanirodha (ii. 57d).
[The Sautrantikas:] When I asked you (i. 6) what pratisamkhya- nirodha is, you answered, "It is disconnection;" I asked you what disconnection is, and you answered, "It is pratisarhkhyanirodha^ The two answers are circular and do not explain the nature of the dharma, the unconditioned, to which they refer. You owe us another explanation.
[The Sarvastivadins:] This dharma, in its nature, is real, but indescribable; only the Aryans "realize" it internally, each for himself. It is only possible to indicate its general characteristics, by saying that there is a real entity (dravya), distinct from others, which is good and eternal, and which receives the name of pratisarhkhyanirodha, and which is also called disconnection or visamyoga.
***
iii. The Sautrantikas affirm that the three types of unconditioned
things (i. 5b) are not real. The three dharmas that it refers to are not 382
distinct and real entities like color, sensation, etc.
1. What is called "space" (dkdsa) is solely the absence of any
tangible thing, that is, the absence of a resistant body. Persons say, in their obscurity, that there is space when they do not encounter any obstacle.
2. What is called pratisarhkhyanirodha or Nirvana is--when both the defilements already produced and the existence already produced
? are destroyed--the absence of any other defilements or any other
existence, and that by reason of the force of the consciousness 383
(pratisamkhyd-prajnd).
3. When, independent of the force of consciousness (pratisamkhyd)
and by reason of the mere absence of causes there is an absence of arising dharmas, this is what is called apratisamkhyanirodha. For example, when premature death interrupts existence (nikdyasabhdga, ii. 10,14), there is apratisamkhyanirodha of the dharmas which would have arisen in the course of this existence if it had continued
384
4. According to another school, pratisamkhyanirodha is the
future non-arising of the defilements by reason of consciousness (prajnd); apratisamkhyanirodha is the future non-arising of suffering, that is, of existence, by reason of the disappearance of the defilements, and not directly by reason of consciousness. (The first would then be sopadhisesa nirvdnadhdtu, and the second would be nirupadhisesa nirvdanadhdtu).
But, [the Sautrantikas remark,] the future non-arising of suffering supposes consciousness (pratisamkhyd)',it is then included within pratisamkhyanirodha.
***
385
5. Another School defines apratisamkhyanirodha as "later non-
existence of the dharmas which have arisen" by virtue of their 386
spontaneous destruction.
In this hypothesis, apratisamkhyanirodha would not be eternal,
since it is non-existent as long as the dharma as cause (i. e. , the defilement) has not perished.
But does not pratisamkhyanirodha have a certain consciousness, the pratisamkhya, for its antecedent? Consequently it too would not be eternal, for, if its antecedent were absent, its consequence would also be absent.
You cannot say that pratisamkhyanirodha is not eternal because its antecedent is pratisamkhyd: in faa, it does not have pratisamkhyd for its antecedent. One cannot say that pratisamkhyd is earlier, or that the
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"non-arising of the non-arisen dharmas' is later. Let us explain. Non- arising always exists in and of itself. If pratisamkhyd is absent, the dharmas would arise; but if pratisamkhyd arises, the dharmas would absolutely not arise. The efficacy of pratisamkhyd with regard to their non-arising consists in this: 1) that before pratisamkhyd, there is no obstacle to their arising; 2) but given pratisamkhyd, the dharmas, the arising of which has not been previously hindered, do not arise.
***
[iv. The Sarvastivadins refute the Sautrantikas. ] If Nirvana is simply non-arising {anutpdda), how does one explain the Sutra (Samyuktagama, TD 2, p. 182bl5) which says, "The cultivation of the five faculties,--faith, etc. ,--has for its result the abandoning of past,
387
present, and future suffering"?
other than Nirvana, and there can only be non-arising of a future dharma, not of a past or present dharma.
[1. The Sautrantikas:] This Sutra does not contradict our definition
of Nirvana. In fact, "the abandoning of past and present suffering"
means the abandoning of the defilements bearing past and present
In fact, this abandoning is nothing
suffering. Our interpretation is justified by another text (Samyukta, m
TD 2, p. l9a8? ) which says, "Abandon desire (chandardga ) relative
to rupa, to sensation . . . and to consciousness. When desire is
abandoned, rupa, . . . and consciousness will be abandoned and
389
comprehended by you. "
understand "the abandoning of past and present suffering" of which the Sutra speaks when it speaks of the faculties.
If one adopts another reading of this Sutra on the faculties, to wit, "The cultivation of the faculties . . . has for its result the abandoning of past, present, and future defilements," the explanation is the same.
Or rather, past defilement is the defilement of a previous existence; present defilement is the defilement of the present exis- tence; these do not refer to the defilement of a given past or present moment. The same for the eighteen trsnavicaritas (Anguttara, ii. 212) or "modes of thirst": the modes (vicaritas) that are related to a past
It is in this manner that we should
? existence are called past modes, those that are related to a present existence are called present modes, and those that are related to a future existence are called future modes.
Past defilements and present defilements place in the present series seeds that bring forth the arising of future defilement: when these seeds are abandoned, past and present defilement is abandoned: in the same way as one says that an action is exhausted when its retribution is exhausted.
The "abandoning" of future suffering and future defilement is the fact that they absolutely do not arise, given the absence of seeds.
How does one otherwise understand the abandoning of past or present suffering? There is no good reason to make an effort to destroy that which has perished or that which is perishing.
[2. The Sarvastivadins:] If unconditioned things do not exist, how
can the Sutra say "Detachment (viraga) is the best of all conditioned
be the best among the dharmas which do not exist? ?
[The Sautrantikas:] We do not say that unconditioned things do not exist.
