Threats and signs of opposition simply confirm the impression of hos- tility, while concessions and signs of approval are regarded as
insincere
ges- tures masking the opponent's true intentions.
Revolution and War_nodrm
Thus, Mao warned his followers to "despise the enemy strategically while taking full acount of him tacti- cally": overcoming the enemy would require careful preparation and re- peated sacrifices, but victory was assured because the enemy was vulnerable.
35 lin the same way, Lenin warned his followers that faith in vic- tory should neither lead to overconfidence nor preclude setbacks and tacti- cal retreats along the path to power.
36
The worldview of most revolutionary movements will thus exhibit a strong tension between optimism and prudence. Two important questions, therefore, are which of these tendencies will exert the greatest influence on the perceptions and behavior of the new state, and how its external situation and the responses of other powers will affect the relative weight given to these competing imperatives.
The third key theme is an insistence that the revolution has universal meaning. Specifically, revolutionary movements often believe that the prin-
33 See the testimony in Dennis Gilbert, Sandinistas: The Party and the Revolution (London: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 5, 56.
34 Lenin "Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism," in his Selected Works, 1:667-768.
35 Peter Van Ness, Revolu tion and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Supportfor Wars ofNational Liberation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 4o-41. Mao also told his followers that imperialism was "rotten and had no fUture" and "we have reason to despise them. " Yet he cautioned, "We should never take the enemy lightly . . . and concentrate all our strength for battle in order to win victory. " Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), 4:181; and Tang Tsou and Morton Halperin, "Mao Tse-tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International Behavior," American Political Science Review 59, no. 3 (1965), 89.
36 In 1919, Lenin warned, "We may suffer grave and sometimes even decisive defeats. . . . If, however, we use all the methods of struggle, victory will be certain. " Selected Works, J:41o-11.
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ciples of the revolution are relevant for other societies and should not be confined within the boundaries of a single state. In extreme cases, the ideol- ogy may go so far as to reject the nation-state as a legitimate political unit and call for the eventual elimination of the state system itself.
That revolutionary ideologies contain universalist elements should not surprise us. If the failures of an old regime are the result of external forces such as tlhe "tyranny of kings," "capitalist exploitation," or "Western inter- ference," then action beyond the state's own borders may be necessary to eliminate these evils once and for all. Such views promise adherents an ad- ditional reward for their sacrifices: the revolution will not only be good for one's own society but will ultimately benefit others as well. Moreover, in order to attract popular support, revolutionary ideologists tend to portray their new political ideas as self-evident truths-creating a strong bias to- ward universalism. After all, how can a self-evident political principle be valid for one group but not others? Could the Jacobins argue that the "Rights of Man" applied only to the French? Could Marx's disciples claim that his inexorable "laws of history" were valid in Russia alone? Could the Iranian revolutionaries think that an Islamic republic was essential for Per- sians but not for other Muslims?
A few caveats are in order here. These ideological themes are neither nec- essary nor sufficient conditions for revolutionary success. One or more may be missing in some cases. Nor do revolutions automatically occur whenever some group adopts these ideological formulas. The likelihood of a revolutio:rll is also affected by a number of other conditions and by the old regime's abill- ity to respond to the challenge. 37 But it is striking that, as we shall see, the ide-
37 For macro theories of revolution, see Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions; and Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley: University of Califor- nia Press, 1991 ). On the importance of political opportunities, social networks, and mass com- munication in facilitating (revolutionary) collective action, see Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, chaps. 3-4; Doug McAdam, "Micromobilization Contexts and Recruitment to Ac- tivism," in Klandersman, Kriesi, and Tarrow, From Structure to Action; and Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Susanne Lohmann has recently analyzed the problem of collective action as a signaling game in which decisions to rebel are based on an individual's personal "threshold ? or action" and the information he or she receives about the likelihood that others will act as welL Information indicating that the old regime has weakened will lower the ex- pected costs of protest and allow potential dissidents to send "costly" (i. e. , credible) signals of their own willingness to act. Under certain conditions, seemingly isolated acts of protest can produce a "cascade" of such information and trigger a sudden outburst of revolutionary activity. See her article "Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-91," World Politics 47, no. 1 (1994); as well as the related works by DeNardo, Power in Numbers; Dennis Chong, Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Mark Granovetter, "Threshold Models of Col- lective Behavior," American Journal ofSociology 83, no. 6 (1978); and Timur Kuran, "Sparks and Prairie Fires: ATheory of Unanticipated Revolution," Public Choice 61, no. 1 (1989). These per-
? ? spectives complement the focus on ideology I have adopted here. In my account, revolution-
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ological programs of revolutionary movements as varied as those of the American Founding Fathers, the Russian and Chinese Communists, and the Iranian fundamentalists all incorporated variations on these three principles. Moreover, even when the social and organizational prerequisites are present, it is hard to imagine a mass revolution succeeding without some kind of ide- ological program that justifies revolt and also gives participants a reason to believe they will win. 38 In short, although the inherent difficulty of revolution and the logic of the free-rider problem do not require that revolutionary movements adopt these ideological formulas, such tenets are likely to give them an advantage over rivals who lack a similar set of ideas.
Revolutionary ideologies should not be seen as wholly different from other forms of political belief. Indeed, often they are simply more extreme versions of the patriotic ideals that established regimes use to encourage individual sacrifice. Just as states in war portray their enemies as evil, victory as certain, and their own goals as pure and idealistic ("to make the world safe for democracy," "to promote a new world order," etc. ), revolutionary movements encourage similar sacrific? s through the three ideological themes described above. Because the risks are great and the odds of success low, however, rev- olutionary movements will try to indoctrinate members even more enthusi-
astically than other states. And whereas states ordinarily abandon wartime propaganda when the conflict is over, revolutionary movements that face continued internal opposition may continue using the ideology as a mobi- lizational device even after the struggle for power has been won.
The elements of revolutionary ideology identified here will be most com- mon in mass revolutions. Because elite revolutions originate within ele- ments of the existing state bureaucracy and are usually less violent, they face less severe collective-action problems than other revolutionary move- ments. And because such revolutions ordinarily arise in response to the threat of foreign domination, elite leaders can rely primarily on nationalism to mobilize their followers and legitimize the seizure of power. As a result, elite revolutions present less fertile ground for the Manichean worldview and universalistic ambitions that mass revolutions often foster.
By definition, revolutions are conducted by movements that oppose the policies of the old regime. If they succeed in taking power, they invariably attempt to implement policies designed to correct the objectionable features of the old order. Thus, all revolutions entail the emergence of a new state
ary ideologies seek to lower the individual threshold for rebellion by portraying the existing regime as evil and doomed to defeat. In other words, revolutionary ideologies try to create conditions in which an "informational cascade" is more likely to occur.
38 According to Franz Borkenau, "if violence is the father of every great upheaval, its mother is illusion. The belief which is always reborn in every great and decisive historical struggle is that this is the last fight, that after this struggle all poverty, all suffering, all op- pression will be a thing of the past. " "State and Revolution," 74-75.
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whose preferences differ in important ways from those of the old regime. The new government is virtually certain to adopt new domestic and foreign policies, even at the risk of provoking both internal and external opposition.
The revollutionary process will shape the perceptions of the new ruling elite as well. The ideologies of many revolutionary movements describe op- ponents as incorrigibly evil and destined for the dustbin of history. As we shall see, this trait encourages them to assume the worst about their enemies and intensifies each side's perceptions of threat. This is most true of mass revolutions, but elements of these ideas appear in elite revolutions are well.
Uncertainty and Misinformation
In the wake of revolutions, uncertainty about the balance of power grows, and so does the danger of war via miscalculation. Estimating intentions is harder, and prior commitments and understandings are called into question as soon as the new leaders take power.
Other states are equally uncertain about the new regime's true aims and its willingness to bear costs and run risks; the old regime's reputation for credi- bility, restraint, prudence, and so on is of little or no use. Thus, other states have to start from scratch in gauging how the new regime is likely to behave. The same is also true in reverse: the new regime cannot know exactly how others will respond, although it can use their past behavior as a rough guide to their future conduct. These conditions magnify the importance of ideol- ogy. Lacking direct experience, the revolutionary regime will rely on its ide- ology to predict how others will behave, while the other powers will use the same ideology as a guide to the likely conduct of the new regime.
The problem of uncertainty is not confined to relations between the revo- lutionary state and other powers. In addition, states observing a revolution cannot know how other actors in the system will respond to it. Revolutions thus exert direct and indirect effects on the foreign policies of other states, which must respond both to the new regime and to the uncertain reactions of the entire international community.
Third, revolutions exert unpredictable effects on other societies. As dis- cussed at greater length below, a central issue in the aftermath of a revolu- tion is the likelihood of its spreading to other states. The question of whether (or how easily) it will spread is of tremendous importance to both sides, yet neither side can form a reliable answer. This problem stems partly from sheer ignorance about political conditions in other countries but even more importantly from the fundamental incalculability of a revo- lutionary upheaval. As Timur Kuran has shown, an individual's willing- ness to rebel is a form of private information that cannot be reliably estimated in advance, especially when there is a threat of repression, giving the potential revolutionaries a strong incentive to misrepresent their true
? ? ? ? ? A Theory ofRevolution and War
preferences. 39 As a result, neither the new revolutionary regime nor its po- tential adversaries can obtain an accurate assessment of the odds that the revolution will move beyond its original borders, a situation creating addi- tional room for miscalculation. And because an individual's true level of support (or opposition) to the new regime cannot be directly observed, nei- ther the new regime nor its foreign counterparts can estimate either its own popularity or the likelihood of counterrevolution.
Unfortunately, the available evidence on these issues is virtually certain to be ambiguous. Amass revolution will always attract some adherents in other countries. . ,-thereby supporting the new regime's hopes and its neighbors' worries-but neither side will know if these sympathizers are merely iso- lated extremists or the tip of a subversive iceberg. Similarly, there will almost always be some evidence of internal resistance after a revolution, yet neither the new regime nor its adversaries will know how strong or widespread such sentiments are. Because these appraisals are central to each side's decisions
and yet unreliable at best, the danger of miscalculation is especially severe. To make matters even worse, the information that both sides receive is likely to be biased by the transnational migration of exiles and revolution- ary sympathizers. Revolutions invariably produce a large population of ex- iles who flee abroad to escape its consequences. 40 Many of them are members of the old regime, and therefore hostile to the revolutionary gov- ernment and eager to return to power. They tend to settle in countries that are sympathetic to their plight, where they may try to obtain foreign assis- tance for their counterrevolutionary efforts. To do so, they will portray the new regime as a grave threat to other states and will stress its potential vul- nerability to counterrevolutionary action. Moreover, despite their obvious biases, exiles are often seen as experts on conditions in their home country at a time when other sources of information are scarce, so their testimony is overvalued. 41 In much the same way, revolutionary sympathizers flock to
39 See Timur Kuran, "Sparks and Prairie Fires," and "Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the Revolutions of 1989,'' World Politics 44, no. 3 . (1991); but see also Nikki Keddie, "Can Revolutions Be Predicted; Can Their Causes Be Understood? " Contention 1, no. 2 (1992); and Jack A . Goldstone, "Predicting Revolutions: Why We Could (and Should) Have Foreseen the Revolutions of 1989-91 in the USSR and Eastern Europe," Contention 2, no. 2 (1993).
40 Yossi Shain, The Frontier of Loyalty: Political Exiles in the Age of the Nation-State (Middle- town, Conn. : Wesleyan University Press, 1989).
41 This is not a new phenomenon. As Machiavelli observed: "How vain the faith and promises of men are who are exiles from their own country. . . . Whenever they can return to their country by other means than your assistance, they will abandon you and look to the other means, regardless of their promises to you. . . . Such is their extreme desire to return to their homes that they naturally believe many things that are not true, and add many others on purpose; so that, with what they really believe and what they say they believe, they will fill you with hopes to that degree that if you attempt to act upon them, you will incur a fruit- less expense, or engage in an undertaking that will involve you in ruin. " The Prince and the Discourses (New York: Modem Library, 1950), 388-89.
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the new capital after the revolution, eager to learn from its experiences, lend support to its efforts, or seek assistance for their own struggles. 42 Such groups portray their home countries as both hostile and ripe for revolution, in order to obtain external support for their efforts. In the revolutionary state, these newcomers are regarded as having special knowledge about conditions lback home, despite their obvious interest in providing a dis- torted picture. The two-way, parallel migration of exiles and sympathizers is a feature of most revolutions, and it increases the danger that each sides' perceptions and policies will be based on biased evidence.
Finally, revolutions damage the normal channels of communication be- tween states at precisely the time when the need for accurate information is greatest, hindering even more the ability of both sides to understand the infor- mation they do have. Diplomatic representatives are often withdrawn or re- placed and intelligence networks disrupted, making it more difficult for each side to determine what the other is doing and why. A shortage of adequate fa- cilities and trained personnel can also impair the new regime's ability to eval- uate others' conduct and to communicate its intentions. These various sources of uncertainty enhance the probability of miscalculation, as we shall see.
In sum, the process of revolution exerts a profound influence on the state that emerges from it, as well as its peers. Revolutions reduce a state's capabil- ities in the short term (although they often produce dramatic increases over time). Revo]utionary movements are often based on optimistic and univer- salistic ideologies that portray opponents as irredeemably hostile, and they come to power in circumstances where accurate information about capabili- ties, intentions, and future prospects is difficult or impossible to obtain. These characteristics help explain how revolutions encourage international conflict.
WHY REVOLUTIONS CAUSE CONFLICT AND WAR The Balance of Power and Windows of Opportunity
By altering the balance of power, revolutions intensify the security com- petition between states in at least two ways. First, other states may see the revolutionary state's weakness as an opportunity to improve their relative positions-either by seizing valuable territory or by seeking important diplomatic concessions-or as a chance to attack a state that was previously protected by the old regime. In either case, the revolution creates a window of opportunity for others to exploit.
42 Examples are ubiquitous: the American Thomas Paine traveled to France in the 1 790s, along with would-be revolutionaries from the rest of Europe, and socialists such as John Reed, Louise Bryant, and Emma Goldman journeyed to Russia after the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917. Havana, Tehran, and Managua have been minor meccas for foreign revolu- tionaries as well.
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Second, revolutions can exacerbate security competition among other states. If a foreign power becomes concerned that one of its rivals will take advantage of the revolution in order to improve its own position, the for- eign power may be forced to take action either to obtain spoils for itself or to prevent its rival from doing the same thing. Thus, the window of opportu- nity created by the revolution may inspire conflict among third parties so that they intervene, even if they have no particular quarrel with the new regimeY
Ideology, Intentions, and Spirals of Suspicion
The movements that revolutions bring to power are by definition opposed to most (if not all) of the policies of the old regime. States with close ties to the old regime will naturally view the revolution as potentially dangerous and its new initiatives as a threat to their own interests. For purely rational reasons, therefore, revolutionary states and foreign powers are likely to experience sharp conflicts of interest and to regard each other's intentions with suspicion.
In addition, actions that one state takes to increase its security-such as strengthening its military forces-will tend to reduce the security of other states. 44 The other states may consequently exaggerate the hostility or ag- gressiveness of their adversary, thereby inflating the level of threat even more. The resulting spiral of suspicion raises the odds of war, as compro- mise appears infeasible and both sides begin to search for some way to elim- inate the threat entirely. 45
Revolutionary states are prone to spirals of suspicion for several reasons.
First, as noted above, a revolutionary regime will be unsure about other states' intentions, simply because it has little or no direct experience in deal- ing with them. Lacking direct evidence, it will fall back on ideology, which in most revolutionary situations tends to portray opponents as incorrigibly hostile. 46 Thus, even a mild diplomatic dispute is likely to escalate. Conces-
43 Jennifer Bailey, "Revolution in the International System," in Superpowers and Revolution, ed. Jonathan Adelman (New York: Praeger, 1986), 19.
44 This is the familiar security dilemma identified by John Herz in "Idealist International- ism and the Secu[ity Dilemma," World Politics 2, no. 2 (1950). See also Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma. "
45 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 3? For important refinements to Jervis's presentation, see Charles L. Glaser, "The Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics 44, no. 4 (1992). ;
46 Thus, at the end of World War I, Lenin predicted that , world capital will now start an of- fensive against us. " Quoted in Chamberlin, Russian Revolution, 2:155-56. He also told the Third Comintern Congress in June 1921 that "the international bourgeoisie . . . is waiting, al- ways on the lookout for the moment when conditions will permit the renewal of this war" with Soviet Russia. Quoted in Leites, Study ofBolshevism, 405.
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sions may be viewed with skepticism, because conflict is seen as inevitable and compromise as naive or even dangerous.
Second, revolutionary regimes may harbor suspicions based on historical experience. If the revolutionary leaders are eager to redress past wrongs (as is generally the case), they will be especially wary of the foreign powers they hold responsible for earlier transgressions. Thus, Mao Tse-tung's sus- picions of the United States were based in part on past Western interference in China, and revolutionary forces in Mexico, Nicaragua, and Iran preoccu- pied themselves with the possibility of U. S. intervention for similar rea- sons. 47
Under these conditions, revolutionary regimes, assuming the worst about other states, will interpret ambiguous or inconsistent policies in a negative light.
Threats and signs of opposition simply confirm the impression of hos- tility, while concessions and signs of approval are regarded as insincere ges- tures masking the opponent's true intentions. 48 Unfortunately, the other states' policies are almost sure to be ambiguous, if only because it takes time for them to decide how to respond to the new situation. This problem is compounded by the difficulty of trying to understand the new political order, by the states' ignorance of the background and beliefs of the new regime, and by the obstacles to obtaining reliable information. Even when foreign powers are not especially hostile, therefore, some of their actions and statements will probably reinforce the suspicions of the revolutionary regime.
Third, a spiral of suspicion will be more likely if the elite (or a faction within it) exaggerates a foreign threat in order to improve its internal posi- tion, exploiting it either to rally nationalist support for the new leaders or to justify harsh measures against their internal opponents. Such exaggerations will be especially effective when there is some truth to the accusations: for example, if foreign powers that had been allied with the old regime now seem to be suspicious of the new government. This tactic can be dangerous if it magnifies a conflict that might otherwise have been avoided or mini- mized, but the risk can be reduced if the revolutionary elite continues to base its policy decisions on its true assessment of others' intentions rather than the myth it has manufactured. Maintaining such fine control is tricky, however. Even if the revolutionary leadership knows the myths to be myths, the campaign may be so convincing that it becomes the basis for pol- icy. Moreover, efforts to enhance domestic support by exaggerating external threats can be self-fulfilling: if foreign powers do not recognize the real mo-
47 See Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, 4:447-50; Gilbert, Sandinistas, 153-75; and James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy ofAmerican-Iranian Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 96-97.
48 On the tendency to fit ambiguous information into existing beliefs, see Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 143-54.
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tive behind such a campaign, they will take the revolutionary state's accu- sations at face value and conduct themselves accordingly. If they react de- fensively-as one would expect-it will merely confirm the bellicose image that they have been given.
Other states contribute to the spiral of hostility. To begin with, they may fail to understand that the revolutionary state's version of history probably differs from their own. Revolutionary states ordinarily emphasize past in- justices, including what they regard as illegitimate foreign interference. But because all states view their own history in a favorable light, foreign powers will not understand why the new regime sees them as objects of hatred and suspicion and will consider the new state's defensive responses to be evi- dence of its aggressive character. 49 Thus, U. S. policy makers saw Chinese in- tervention in the Korean War as evidence of the expansionist tendencies of international Communism, in part because politicians such as Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who believed that U. S. policy in the Far East was in China's best interest, failed to appreciate that Western actions in the Far East had actually left a far more negative impression on the minds of China's new leaders. 50 Similar problems afflicted U. S. relations with Fidel Castro: be-
cause U. S. leaders such as President Dwight D. Eisenhower believed that U. S. policy had been largely beneficial for Cuba, they saw Castro's hostility as unjustified aggression rather than as an understandable (if excessive) re- action to past U. S. behavior. 51 Even where tangible grounds for conflict exist (as they did in both these cases), ignorance of the historical basis for suspi- cion will cause the foreign powers to misinterpret the revolutionary state's bellicosity.
Foreign powers may also start a negative spiral if the new regime's do- mestic programs affect their interests adversely. Such a situation is a legiti- mate basis for conflict, of course, but the threat will be magnified if actions taken for internal reasons are also viewed as evidence of aggressive intent. Groups whose interests are harmed (such as foreign corporations whose as- sets have been seized) may try to convince their home governments that the new regime is a threat to security, in the hope of obtaining diplomatic or military support. Thus, Castro's land reform program exacerbated the spi- ral of hostility between the United States and Cuba, and Arbenz's land re- forms in Guatemala moved the United Fruit Company to organize a public
49 Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, vol. 2: National Misperceptions and the Roots of War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), chap. n; and E. H. Dance, History the Be- trayer: A Study in Bias (London: Hutchinson, 1960).
50 Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 205-16; and Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 7o-'J2. 51 Richard Welch, Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution,
1959-1961 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 41.
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relations campaign that formed the backdrop for the U. S. -led coup that overthrew him. 52
To make matters worse, revolutions alter international relations in ways that exacerbate perceptions of hostility. First, each side is likely to underes- timate the other's sense of vulnerability, leading it to discount the role of de- fensive motivations in explaining the other side's conduct. In addition to the burdens of organizing a government and rebuilding a damaged society, rev- olutionary states usually face continued domestic opposition. Fearful of having only a precarious hold on power, they are more likely to overreact to threats. 53 Yet revolutionary states also try to portray themselves as firmly in control, in order to discourage counterrevolution at home and to attract recognition abroad. If this public relations effort is successful, however, other states will underestimate the extent to which the revolutionary state's actions are driven by insecurity, interpreting its defensive actions as a sign of aggressive intent rather than as a reaction to legitimate fears. Further- more, the other states may not recognize, first, that a new regime must build a reputation for defending its interests in order to deter future challenges and, second, that this will motivate it to respond vigorously when conflicts of interest arise.
The same tendency can occur in reverse as well. Fully aware of its own weaknesses, a revolutionary state may find it hard to understand why it is considered dangerous. If so, it may view the opposition of other states as ev- idence of their intrinsic hostility rather than as a response to its own actions. Foreign powers will be concerned with building a reputation as well, in order to teach the new regime that they cannot be exploited. Thus, both sides will be prone to see even purely defensive policies as signs of aggres- sive intent, especially when real conflicts of interest are also present.
A second exacerbating factor is the pernicious influence of exiles and rev- olutionary sympathizers. As suggested above, exiles from the revolutionary state have an incentive to portray the new regime as especially hostile, in order to convince other states to support their counterrevolutionary ambi- tions. Similarly, revolutionary sympathizers from other countries are likely to reinforce the new regime's own suspicions by portraying foreign govern- ments as deeply hostile. The more vocal and visible these groups are, the
52 On Cuba, see Richard Moss, "The Limits of Policy: An Investigation of the Spiral Model, The Deterrence Model, and Miscalculations in U. S. -Third World Relations" (Ph. D. diss. , Princeton University, 1987), t6o-64, 193-94. On Guatemala, see Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy ofIntervention (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982); and Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold? Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (Garden City, N. Y. : Anchor Books, 1983).
53 According fto George Pettee, "revolutionists enter the limelight, not like men on horse- back, as victorious conspirators appearing in the forum, but like fearful children, exploring an empty house, not sure that it is empty. " The Process ofRevolution (New York: Harper Broth- ers, 1938), 1oo-101.
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greater the tendency for both sides to conclude that the host country sup- ports their aims. A large and vocal population of exiles will be seen as a sign that the host country is hostile to the revolution, just as a large and vocal group of foreign sympathizers will be taken as evidence that the new regime is actively seeking to spread its ideals elsewhere. Taken together, the parallel migration of exiles and sympathizers and the testimony they pro- vide to their hosts will strongly reinforce each side's beliefs that the other is inherently dangerous.
A third factor inflating the perception of hostility is the loss of expertise that accompanies a revolution, particularly when revolutionary govern- ments purge people with ties to perceived or potential enemies. The Iranian revolutionaries removed officials with close links to the United States, and Communist China persecuted its own "America Hands" in the 1950s. Ironi- cally, as the treatment of the State Department's "China Hands" suggests, the same process may occur within the nonrevolutionary states as well. 54 By re- moving experienced individuals, each side further reduces its capacity to un- derstand the other. Thus, the personnel changes set in motion by a revolution will exacerbate the prevailing uncertainty and reinforce mutual suspicion.
Because revolutions unleash a variety of forces that make it more difficult for the revolutionary state and its neighbors to assess each others' intentions accurately, each is likely to view the other as more hostile than it really is. Such a conclusion hampers their ability to reach a satisfactory modus vivendi and strengthens the position of those who favor direct action to eliminate the threat.
Each side's tendency to exaggerate the other's hostility helps explain why security competition increases after a revolution, but it does not explain why war occurs. After all, the United States and the Soviet Union were ex- tremely hostile for much of the Cold War, but neither saw actual war as an attractive option for dealing with the situation. Thus, the next question is why war is often seen as a reasonable response.
Revolution, the Offense-Defense Balance, and War
All else being equal, war is more likely when national leaders believe that offense is easier than defense. When offense is easy, states are less secure yet simultaneously have greater incentives to try to improve their relative posi- tions. At the same time, using force promises greater benefits because it will be simpler to gain a decisive victory over the opponents. Thus, offense dom- inance both raises the perceived level of threat and suggests that it will be
54 The "China Hands" were a group of China experts accused of disloyalty and purged from the State Department during the McCarthy era. See E. J. Kahn, The China Hands: Amer- ica's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them (New York: Viking, 1975).
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easy to reduce. The result is more international competition and a higher risk of war. 55
RevolutioltlS are a powerful source of this danger. In addition to creating distorted perceptions of hostility, revolutions also encourage both sides to exaggerate their own vulnerability and also the vulnerability of their oppo- nents. This tendency is partly due to the inherent difficulty of estimating the balance of power after a revolution, which makes it more likely that each will exaggerate its military prospects. In addition, the belief that the revolu- tion will either spread to other countries or readily succumb to counterrev- olutionary pressure magnifies this sense of vulnerability. Unable to estimate with high confidence the likelihood of either possibility, all sides will tend to assume the worst. For both military and political reasons, therefore, a rev- olution heightens each side's sense of threats and opportunities.
Taken together, these factors encourage both parties to believe that the other presents a grave threat, yet they also encourage the belief that the threat can be eliminated fairly easily. Furthermore, these perceptions may encourage third parties to intervene either to eliminate a potential revolu- tionary threat or to prevent other powers from gaining an advantage by doing it themselves. Once again, we can best understand these dynamics by examining revolutionary states and foreign powers separately.
Why are revolutionary states simultaneously insecure and overconfident?
To begin with, the inherent optimism of most revolutionary ideologies en- courages the new leaders to overstate the odds of victory, so they become more willing to contemplate the use of force. Arguments of this sort are dif- ficult to counter without appearing disloyal; if victory is inevitable and op- ponents are destined for the dustbin of history, then expressing doubts about the certainty of victory betrays a lack of confidence in the revolution and could easily undermine one's political position at home.
Second, the optimism of revolutionary states rests on the belief that op- ponents will be undermined by the irresistible spread of revolutionary ideas. This hope reflects the universalism common to many revolutionary ideologies and the assumption that their opponents will be unable to fight effectively owing to lack of popular support. Mao's claim that "a single spark can ignite a prairie fire" nicely conveys this faith in the catalytic ef- fects of revolutionary action, as does the so-called foco theory of guerrilla warfare developed by Che Guevara. 56 This view is also fueled by the ten-
55 See the references in n. 2 above.
56 On the basis of his experience in the Cuban revolution, Guevara argued that acts of vio- lence by a small revolutionary band (the foco) could spark a successful revolution even if strong indigenous support were Jacking. The strategy was a dismal failure, and Guevara was killed trying to implement it in Bolivia. See Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1961); and also Regis Debray, "Revolution in the Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America," Monthly Review 19, no. 3 (1967).
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dency for rebellious collective action to occur in distinct waves or cycles. Al- though most dissident social movements do not lead to a revolution, the leaders of a revolutionary state are likely to interpret signs of turbulence in other societies as evidence that their own victory is merely the first of many. 57
Revolutionary states can be further misled if they give too much credence to the testimony of foreign sympathizers, whose desire for external support inspires them to exaggerate the prospects for revolution back home. Such testimony will encourage active efforts to export the revolution (which will exacerbate tensions with other states) and fortify the new regime's confi- dence when it contemplates war. Moreover, their own success in gaining power against seemingly impossible odds may convince the revolutionary leaders that they can triumph over more powerful international opponents (this tendency will be compounded if other societies show signs of a similar level of discontent, even if rebellious action elsewhere does not lead to a full- fledged revolution). Furthermore, divisions within the revolutionary elite may encourage overly ambitious objectives, particularly if a willingness to export the revolution becomes a litmus test of revolutionary convictions. 58
Finally, and somewhat paradoxically, a revolutionary state's own vulner- ability may cause its interest in expansion to grow, at least in ideological terms. Fearing that their hold on power is fragile, revolutionary leaders are likely to view domestic opponents as potential fifth columns for their exter- nal foes. Exporting the revolution becomes the only way to preserve their positions at home: unless opposing states are swiftly overthrown, the argu- ment runs, they will eventually join forces with domestic counterrevolu- tionaries in order to crush the revolutionary state. To avoid this fate, the revolutionaries may conclude their only hope is to strike first.
Meanwhile, foreign powers are also both insecure and overconfident after a revolution. Why them as well?
Other states fear the spread of revolutionary ideas, especially when the ideas challenge their own form of government directly. But they also think this threat an easy problem to solve. Because of the disorder that accompa- nies a revolution, other states view the new regime as weak and vulnerable, especially because of the inherent difficulty of estimating a new state's abil- ity to fight. (By definition, revolutionary states rest on novel forms of social organization; revolutionary movements succeed because they exploit new
57 Sidney Tarrow, Struggle, Politics, and Reform: Collective Action, Social Movements, and Cy- cles ofProtest, Occasional Paper 21, Western Studies Program (Ithaca: Center for International Studies, Cornell University, 1989).
58 This is one variant of the domestic politics approach discussed in chapter 1. When a rev- olutionary movement is deeply divided, extremists may advocate an aggressive foreign pol- icy as a means of undermining the revolutionary credentials of their more moderate opponents.
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ways to mobilize previously untapped sources of social power. Unfortu- nately, the novelty of these institutions renders any meaningful evaluation of their impact on national capabilities nearly impossible. ) Ideological bi- ases may amplify this tendency, because states based on different political principles have trouble acknowledging that a revolutionary government could be popular or effective. (This problem affected U. S. perceptions of revolutionary states such as China, Cuba, and Nicaragua, for instance; be- cause U. S. leaders believed that Communism was illegitimate and immoral, they had difficulty recognizing these regimes as independent states com- manding substantial popular support. 59) And if they believe that a revolu- tionary state is inherently unpopular, the other states will exaggerate their own ability to confront it successfully.
The uncertainty surrounding a revolution contributes to the problem; as discussed above, foreign powers will exaggerate the threat of subversion. Having witnessed an unexpected revolutionary upheaval, mindful of the confident proclamations of the revolutionary forces, and aware that some members of their own society might harbor similar ideas (especially when there are clear signs of unrest), other states are likely to see contagion as more likely than it really is. The universalism of most revolutionary ideolo- gies compounds these worries, because the other states fear that an alliance of like-minded revolutionary powers could leave them adrift in a hostile ideological sea.
Even in the absence of clear evidence of the revolution spreading, other states cannot be completely confident that subversive movements do not lurk beneath the surface. European fears of a Jacobin conspiracy and the U. S. "Red scares" of the 1920s and the 1950s illustrate the tendency for for- eign powers to misread the ideological appeal (and therefore the offensive power) of revolutionary states. Because the threat these states pose is not simply a function of material capabilities, revolutions will seem even more dangerous than they are. And a similar logic applies to counterrevolutions: the inevitable signs of internal discord will encourage other states to try to reverse the revolution, even when it is impossible to determine the chances of success.
Once again, the perception of the threat from a revolutionary state and its susceptibility to outside pressure will be exacerbated by testimony from self-interested exiles and revolutionary sympathizers. The former portrays the revolutionary state as both a dangerous adversary and a disorganized, unpopular, and vulnerable target, while the latter depicts foreign powers as
59 Thus, Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk claimed that the Communist regime in China was "a colonial Russian government . . . it is not Chinese. " Quoted in Michael J. Schaller, The United States and China in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 125.
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both hostile and ripe for revolution. And if their respective hosts do not dis- count this testimony accordingly, they are more likely to fall into a precari- ous web of fear and overconfidence.
Thus, in addition to altering the balance of power, revolutions also shape perceptions of intent and estimates of the offense-defense balance in espe- cially dangerous ways. Both the revolutionary regime and the leaders of outside states view the other's existence as a serious challenge, yet neither can estimate the danger accurately. Lacking reliable information about the magnitude of the threat or their ability to overcome it, both will rely on ide- ology to fill in the gaps in their understanding, and will be susceptible to self-interested testimony from emigres or itinerant revolutionaries, particu- larly when this advice confirms preexisting beliefs. Therefore, although each side fears the other, it is also likely to conclude that the threat can be elimi- nated at relatively low cost. In short, the beliefs that opponents are hostile, dangerous, and vulnerable readily combine to support preventive and pre- emptive wars.
When a revolution topples an apparently viable regime, it is not surpris- ing that other states fear that they might be next. Similarly, if the revolu- tionary state has suffered extensive damage and faces continued internal opposition, its leaders have reason to worry that their success will be short lived. As subsequent chapters will show, however, both sides are usually wrong.
Revolutions are a relatively poor export commodity, and although coun- terrevolutionary efforts face somewhat better prospects, reversing a revolu- tion from outside usually proves more difficult than its advocates expect. 60 If each side's hopes and fears were accurate, the struggle between them would be a swift and decisive triumph for one side or the other. But instead of a wave of revolutionary upheavals or the swift collapse of the new regime, the normal result is either a brief, inconclusive clash (such as the Al- lied intervention in Russia or the Bay of Pigs invasion) or a protracted, bloody struggle (such as the Iran-Iraq war or the contra war in Nicaragua). The final irony, therefore, is that each side's perceptions of threats and vul- nerabilities are usually mistaken.
Why are revolutions hard to export, and why do foreign interventions fail? First, the universalist ideological rhetoric notwithstanding, a revolution
60 Examples of successful counterrevolutions include the Austro-Prussian intervention in Belgium in 1790, the Russian and Austrian interventions in Italy and Greece in the 1830s, the U. S. -backed coups in Iran, Guatemala, and Chile, the U. S. invasion of Grenada in 1983- and the Vietnamese overthrow of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in 1979.
The worldview of most revolutionary movements will thus exhibit a strong tension between optimism and prudence. Two important questions, therefore, are which of these tendencies will exert the greatest influence on the perceptions and behavior of the new state, and how its external situation and the responses of other powers will affect the relative weight given to these competing imperatives.
The third key theme is an insistence that the revolution has universal meaning. Specifically, revolutionary movements often believe that the prin-
33 See the testimony in Dennis Gilbert, Sandinistas: The Party and the Revolution (London: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 5, 56.
34 Lenin "Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism," in his Selected Works, 1:667-768.
35 Peter Van Ness, Revolu tion and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Supportfor Wars ofNational Liberation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 4o-41. Mao also told his followers that imperialism was "rotten and had no fUture" and "we have reason to despise them. " Yet he cautioned, "We should never take the enemy lightly . . . and concentrate all our strength for battle in order to win victory. " Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), 4:181; and Tang Tsou and Morton Halperin, "Mao Tse-tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International Behavior," American Political Science Review 59, no. 3 (1965), 89.
36 In 1919, Lenin warned, "We may suffer grave and sometimes even decisive defeats. . . . If, however, we use all the methods of struggle, victory will be certain. " Selected Works, J:41o-11.
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ciples of the revolution are relevant for other societies and should not be confined within the boundaries of a single state. In extreme cases, the ideol- ogy may go so far as to reject the nation-state as a legitimate political unit and call for the eventual elimination of the state system itself.
That revolutionary ideologies contain universalist elements should not surprise us. If the failures of an old regime are the result of external forces such as tlhe "tyranny of kings," "capitalist exploitation," or "Western inter- ference," then action beyond the state's own borders may be necessary to eliminate these evils once and for all. Such views promise adherents an ad- ditional reward for their sacrifices: the revolution will not only be good for one's own society but will ultimately benefit others as well. Moreover, in order to attract popular support, revolutionary ideologists tend to portray their new political ideas as self-evident truths-creating a strong bias to- ward universalism. After all, how can a self-evident political principle be valid for one group but not others? Could the Jacobins argue that the "Rights of Man" applied only to the French? Could Marx's disciples claim that his inexorable "laws of history" were valid in Russia alone? Could the Iranian revolutionaries think that an Islamic republic was essential for Per- sians but not for other Muslims?
A few caveats are in order here. These ideological themes are neither nec- essary nor sufficient conditions for revolutionary success. One or more may be missing in some cases. Nor do revolutions automatically occur whenever some group adopts these ideological formulas. The likelihood of a revolutio:rll is also affected by a number of other conditions and by the old regime's abill- ity to respond to the challenge. 37 But it is striking that, as we shall see, the ide-
37 For macro theories of revolution, see Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions; and Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley: University of Califor- nia Press, 1991 ). On the importance of political opportunities, social networks, and mass com- munication in facilitating (revolutionary) collective action, see Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, chaps. 3-4; Doug McAdam, "Micromobilization Contexts and Recruitment to Ac- tivism," in Klandersman, Kriesi, and Tarrow, From Structure to Action; and Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Susanne Lohmann has recently analyzed the problem of collective action as a signaling game in which decisions to rebel are based on an individual's personal "threshold ? or action" and the information he or she receives about the likelihood that others will act as welL Information indicating that the old regime has weakened will lower the ex- pected costs of protest and allow potential dissidents to send "costly" (i. e. , credible) signals of their own willingness to act. Under certain conditions, seemingly isolated acts of protest can produce a "cascade" of such information and trigger a sudden outburst of revolutionary activity. See her article "Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-91," World Politics 47, no. 1 (1994); as well as the related works by DeNardo, Power in Numbers; Dennis Chong, Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Mark Granovetter, "Threshold Models of Col- lective Behavior," American Journal ofSociology 83, no. 6 (1978); and Timur Kuran, "Sparks and Prairie Fires: ATheory of Unanticipated Revolution," Public Choice 61, no. 1 (1989). These per-
? ? spectives complement the focus on ideology I have adopted here. In my account, revolution-
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ological programs of revolutionary movements as varied as those of the American Founding Fathers, the Russian and Chinese Communists, and the Iranian fundamentalists all incorporated variations on these three principles. Moreover, even when the social and organizational prerequisites are present, it is hard to imagine a mass revolution succeeding without some kind of ide- ological program that justifies revolt and also gives participants a reason to believe they will win. 38 In short, although the inherent difficulty of revolution and the logic of the free-rider problem do not require that revolutionary movements adopt these ideological formulas, such tenets are likely to give them an advantage over rivals who lack a similar set of ideas.
Revolutionary ideologies should not be seen as wholly different from other forms of political belief. Indeed, often they are simply more extreme versions of the patriotic ideals that established regimes use to encourage individual sacrifice. Just as states in war portray their enemies as evil, victory as certain, and their own goals as pure and idealistic ("to make the world safe for democracy," "to promote a new world order," etc. ), revolutionary movements encourage similar sacrific? s through the three ideological themes described above. Because the risks are great and the odds of success low, however, rev- olutionary movements will try to indoctrinate members even more enthusi-
astically than other states. And whereas states ordinarily abandon wartime propaganda when the conflict is over, revolutionary movements that face continued internal opposition may continue using the ideology as a mobi- lizational device even after the struggle for power has been won.
The elements of revolutionary ideology identified here will be most com- mon in mass revolutions. Because elite revolutions originate within ele- ments of the existing state bureaucracy and are usually less violent, they face less severe collective-action problems than other revolutionary move- ments. And because such revolutions ordinarily arise in response to the threat of foreign domination, elite leaders can rely primarily on nationalism to mobilize their followers and legitimize the seizure of power. As a result, elite revolutions present less fertile ground for the Manichean worldview and universalistic ambitions that mass revolutions often foster.
By definition, revolutions are conducted by movements that oppose the policies of the old regime. If they succeed in taking power, they invariably attempt to implement policies designed to correct the objectionable features of the old order. Thus, all revolutions entail the emergence of a new state
ary ideologies seek to lower the individual threshold for rebellion by portraying the existing regime as evil and doomed to defeat. In other words, revolutionary ideologies try to create conditions in which an "informational cascade" is more likely to occur.
38 According to Franz Borkenau, "if violence is the father of every great upheaval, its mother is illusion. The belief which is always reborn in every great and decisive historical struggle is that this is the last fight, that after this struggle all poverty, all suffering, all op- pression will be a thing of the past. " "State and Revolution," 74-75.
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whose preferences differ in important ways from those of the old regime. The new government is virtually certain to adopt new domestic and foreign policies, even at the risk of provoking both internal and external opposition.
The revollutionary process will shape the perceptions of the new ruling elite as well. The ideologies of many revolutionary movements describe op- ponents as incorrigibly evil and destined for the dustbin of history. As we shall see, this trait encourages them to assume the worst about their enemies and intensifies each side's perceptions of threat. This is most true of mass revolutions, but elements of these ideas appear in elite revolutions are well.
Uncertainty and Misinformation
In the wake of revolutions, uncertainty about the balance of power grows, and so does the danger of war via miscalculation. Estimating intentions is harder, and prior commitments and understandings are called into question as soon as the new leaders take power.
Other states are equally uncertain about the new regime's true aims and its willingness to bear costs and run risks; the old regime's reputation for credi- bility, restraint, prudence, and so on is of little or no use. Thus, other states have to start from scratch in gauging how the new regime is likely to behave. The same is also true in reverse: the new regime cannot know exactly how others will respond, although it can use their past behavior as a rough guide to their future conduct. These conditions magnify the importance of ideol- ogy. Lacking direct experience, the revolutionary regime will rely on its ide- ology to predict how others will behave, while the other powers will use the same ideology as a guide to the likely conduct of the new regime.
The problem of uncertainty is not confined to relations between the revo- lutionary state and other powers. In addition, states observing a revolution cannot know how other actors in the system will respond to it. Revolutions thus exert direct and indirect effects on the foreign policies of other states, which must respond both to the new regime and to the uncertain reactions of the entire international community.
Third, revolutions exert unpredictable effects on other societies. As dis- cussed at greater length below, a central issue in the aftermath of a revolu- tion is the likelihood of its spreading to other states. The question of whether (or how easily) it will spread is of tremendous importance to both sides, yet neither side can form a reliable answer. This problem stems partly from sheer ignorance about political conditions in other countries but even more importantly from the fundamental incalculability of a revo- lutionary upheaval. As Timur Kuran has shown, an individual's willing- ness to rebel is a form of private information that cannot be reliably estimated in advance, especially when there is a threat of repression, giving the potential revolutionaries a strong incentive to misrepresent their true
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preferences. 39 As a result, neither the new revolutionary regime nor its po- tential adversaries can obtain an accurate assessment of the odds that the revolution will move beyond its original borders, a situation creating addi- tional room for miscalculation. And because an individual's true level of support (or opposition) to the new regime cannot be directly observed, nei- ther the new regime nor its foreign counterparts can estimate either its own popularity or the likelihood of counterrevolution.
Unfortunately, the available evidence on these issues is virtually certain to be ambiguous. Amass revolution will always attract some adherents in other countries. . ,-thereby supporting the new regime's hopes and its neighbors' worries-but neither side will know if these sympathizers are merely iso- lated extremists or the tip of a subversive iceberg. Similarly, there will almost always be some evidence of internal resistance after a revolution, yet neither the new regime nor its adversaries will know how strong or widespread such sentiments are. Because these appraisals are central to each side's decisions
and yet unreliable at best, the danger of miscalculation is especially severe. To make matters even worse, the information that both sides receive is likely to be biased by the transnational migration of exiles and revolution- ary sympathizers. Revolutions invariably produce a large population of ex- iles who flee abroad to escape its consequences. 40 Many of them are members of the old regime, and therefore hostile to the revolutionary gov- ernment and eager to return to power. They tend to settle in countries that are sympathetic to their plight, where they may try to obtain foreign assis- tance for their counterrevolutionary efforts. To do so, they will portray the new regime as a grave threat to other states and will stress its potential vul- nerability to counterrevolutionary action. Moreover, despite their obvious biases, exiles are often seen as experts on conditions in their home country at a time when other sources of information are scarce, so their testimony is overvalued. 41 In much the same way, revolutionary sympathizers flock to
39 See Timur Kuran, "Sparks and Prairie Fires," and "Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the Revolutions of 1989,'' World Politics 44, no. 3 . (1991); but see also Nikki Keddie, "Can Revolutions Be Predicted; Can Their Causes Be Understood? " Contention 1, no. 2 (1992); and Jack A . Goldstone, "Predicting Revolutions: Why We Could (and Should) Have Foreseen the Revolutions of 1989-91 in the USSR and Eastern Europe," Contention 2, no. 2 (1993).
40 Yossi Shain, The Frontier of Loyalty: Political Exiles in the Age of the Nation-State (Middle- town, Conn. : Wesleyan University Press, 1989).
41 This is not a new phenomenon. As Machiavelli observed: "How vain the faith and promises of men are who are exiles from their own country. . . . Whenever they can return to their country by other means than your assistance, they will abandon you and look to the other means, regardless of their promises to you. . . . Such is their extreme desire to return to their homes that they naturally believe many things that are not true, and add many others on purpose; so that, with what they really believe and what they say they believe, they will fill you with hopes to that degree that if you attempt to act upon them, you will incur a fruit- less expense, or engage in an undertaking that will involve you in ruin. " The Prince and the Discourses (New York: Modem Library, 1950), 388-89.
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the new capital after the revolution, eager to learn from its experiences, lend support to its efforts, or seek assistance for their own struggles. 42 Such groups portray their home countries as both hostile and ripe for revolution, in order to obtain external support for their efforts. In the revolutionary state, these newcomers are regarded as having special knowledge about conditions lback home, despite their obvious interest in providing a dis- torted picture. The two-way, parallel migration of exiles and sympathizers is a feature of most revolutions, and it increases the danger that each sides' perceptions and policies will be based on biased evidence.
Finally, revolutions damage the normal channels of communication be- tween states at precisely the time when the need for accurate information is greatest, hindering even more the ability of both sides to understand the infor- mation they do have. Diplomatic representatives are often withdrawn or re- placed and intelligence networks disrupted, making it more difficult for each side to determine what the other is doing and why. A shortage of adequate fa- cilities and trained personnel can also impair the new regime's ability to eval- uate others' conduct and to communicate its intentions. These various sources of uncertainty enhance the probability of miscalculation, as we shall see.
In sum, the process of revolution exerts a profound influence on the state that emerges from it, as well as its peers. Revolutions reduce a state's capabil- ities in the short term (although they often produce dramatic increases over time). Revo]utionary movements are often based on optimistic and univer- salistic ideologies that portray opponents as irredeemably hostile, and they come to power in circumstances where accurate information about capabili- ties, intentions, and future prospects is difficult or impossible to obtain. These characteristics help explain how revolutions encourage international conflict.
WHY REVOLUTIONS CAUSE CONFLICT AND WAR The Balance of Power and Windows of Opportunity
By altering the balance of power, revolutions intensify the security com- petition between states in at least two ways. First, other states may see the revolutionary state's weakness as an opportunity to improve their relative positions-either by seizing valuable territory or by seeking important diplomatic concessions-or as a chance to attack a state that was previously protected by the old regime. In either case, the revolution creates a window of opportunity for others to exploit.
42 Examples are ubiquitous: the American Thomas Paine traveled to France in the 1 790s, along with would-be revolutionaries from the rest of Europe, and socialists such as John Reed, Louise Bryant, and Emma Goldman journeyed to Russia after the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917. Havana, Tehran, and Managua have been minor meccas for foreign revolu- tionaries as well.
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Second, revolutions can exacerbate security competition among other states. If a foreign power becomes concerned that one of its rivals will take advantage of the revolution in order to improve its own position, the for- eign power may be forced to take action either to obtain spoils for itself or to prevent its rival from doing the same thing. Thus, the window of opportu- nity created by the revolution may inspire conflict among third parties so that they intervene, even if they have no particular quarrel with the new regimeY
Ideology, Intentions, and Spirals of Suspicion
The movements that revolutions bring to power are by definition opposed to most (if not all) of the policies of the old regime. States with close ties to the old regime will naturally view the revolution as potentially dangerous and its new initiatives as a threat to their own interests. For purely rational reasons, therefore, revolutionary states and foreign powers are likely to experience sharp conflicts of interest and to regard each other's intentions with suspicion.
In addition, actions that one state takes to increase its security-such as strengthening its military forces-will tend to reduce the security of other states. 44 The other states may consequently exaggerate the hostility or ag- gressiveness of their adversary, thereby inflating the level of threat even more. The resulting spiral of suspicion raises the odds of war, as compro- mise appears infeasible and both sides begin to search for some way to elim- inate the threat entirely. 45
Revolutionary states are prone to spirals of suspicion for several reasons.
First, as noted above, a revolutionary regime will be unsure about other states' intentions, simply because it has little or no direct experience in deal- ing with them. Lacking direct evidence, it will fall back on ideology, which in most revolutionary situations tends to portray opponents as incorrigibly hostile. 46 Thus, even a mild diplomatic dispute is likely to escalate. Conces-
43 Jennifer Bailey, "Revolution in the International System," in Superpowers and Revolution, ed. Jonathan Adelman (New York: Praeger, 1986), 19.
44 This is the familiar security dilemma identified by John Herz in "Idealist International- ism and the Secu[ity Dilemma," World Politics 2, no. 2 (1950). See also Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma. "
45 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 3? For important refinements to Jervis's presentation, see Charles L. Glaser, "The Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics 44, no. 4 (1992). ;
46 Thus, at the end of World War I, Lenin predicted that , world capital will now start an of- fensive against us. " Quoted in Chamberlin, Russian Revolution, 2:155-56. He also told the Third Comintern Congress in June 1921 that "the international bourgeoisie . . . is waiting, al- ways on the lookout for the moment when conditions will permit the renewal of this war" with Soviet Russia. Quoted in Leites, Study ofBolshevism, 405.
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sions may be viewed with skepticism, because conflict is seen as inevitable and compromise as naive or even dangerous.
Second, revolutionary regimes may harbor suspicions based on historical experience. If the revolutionary leaders are eager to redress past wrongs (as is generally the case), they will be especially wary of the foreign powers they hold responsible for earlier transgressions. Thus, Mao Tse-tung's sus- picions of the United States were based in part on past Western interference in China, and revolutionary forces in Mexico, Nicaragua, and Iran preoccu- pied themselves with the possibility of U. S. intervention for similar rea- sons. 47
Under these conditions, revolutionary regimes, assuming the worst about other states, will interpret ambiguous or inconsistent policies in a negative light.
Threats and signs of opposition simply confirm the impression of hos- tility, while concessions and signs of approval are regarded as insincere ges- tures masking the opponent's true intentions. 48 Unfortunately, the other states' policies are almost sure to be ambiguous, if only because it takes time for them to decide how to respond to the new situation. This problem is compounded by the difficulty of trying to understand the new political order, by the states' ignorance of the background and beliefs of the new regime, and by the obstacles to obtaining reliable information. Even when foreign powers are not especially hostile, therefore, some of their actions and statements will probably reinforce the suspicions of the revolutionary regime.
Third, a spiral of suspicion will be more likely if the elite (or a faction within it) exaggerates a foreign threat in order to improve its internal posi- tion, exploiting it either to rally nationalist support for the new leaders or to justify harsh measures against their internal opponents. Such exaggerations will be especially effective when there is some truth to the accusations: for example, if foreign powers that had been allied with the old regime now seem to be suspicious of the new government. This tactic can be dangerous if it magnifies a conflict that might otherwise have been avoided or mini- mized, but the risk can be reduced if the revolutionary elite continues to base its policy decisions on its true assessment of others' intentions rather than the myth it has manufactured. Maintaining such fine control is tricky, however. Even if the revolutionary leadership knows the myths to be myths, the campaign may be so convincing that it becomes the basis for pol- icy. Moreover, efforts to enhance domestic support by exaggerating external threats can be self-fulfilling: if foreign powers do not recognize the real mo-
47 See Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, 4:447-50; Gilbert, Sandinistas, 153-75; and James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy ofAmerican-Iranian Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 96-97.
48 On the tendency to fit ambiguous information into existing beliefs, see Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 143-54.
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tive behind such a campaign, they will take the revolutionary state's accu- sations at face value and conduct themselves accordingly. If they react de- fensively-as one would expect-it will merely confirm the bellicose image that they have been given.
Other states contribute to the spiral of hostility. To begin with, they may fail to understand that the revolutionary state's version of history probably differs from their own. Revolutionary states ordinarily emphasize past in- justices, including what they regard as illegitimate foreign interference. But because all states view their own history in a favorable light, foreign powers will not understand why the new regime sees them as objects of hatred and suspicion and will consider the new state's defensive responses to be evi- dence of its aggressive character. 49 Thus, U. S. policy makers saw Chinese in- tervention in the Korean War as evidence of the expansionist tendencies of international Communism, in part because politicians such as Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who believed that U. S. policy in the Far East was in China's best interest, failed to appreciate that Western actions in the Far East had actually left a far more negative impression on the minds of China's new leaders. 50 Similar problems afflicted U. S. relations with Fidel Castro: be-
cause U. S. leaders such as President Dwight D. Eisenhower believed that U. S. policy had been largely beneficial for Cuba, they saw Castro's hostility as unjustified aggression rather than as an understandable (if excessive) re- action to past U. S. behavior. 51 Even where tangible grounds for conflict exist (as they did in both these cases), ignorance of the historical basis for suspi- cion will cause the foreign powers to misinterpret the revolutionary state's bellicosity.
Foreign powers may also start a negative spiral if the new regime's do- mestic programs affect their interests adversely. Such a situation is a legiti- mate basis for conflict, of course, but the threat will be magnified if actions taken for internal reasons are also viewed as evidence of aggressive intent. Groups whose interests are harmed (such as foreign corporations whose as- sets have been seized) may try to convince their home governments that the new regime is a threat to security, in the hope of obtaining diplomatic or military support. Thus, Castro's land reform program exacerbated the spi- ral of hostility between the United States and Cuba, and Arbenz's land re- forms in Guatemala moved the United Fruit Company to organize a public
49 Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, vol. 2: National Misperceptions and the Roots of War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), chap. n; and E. H. Dance, History the Be- trayer: A Study in Bias (London: Hutchinson, 1960).
50 Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 205-16; and Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 7o-'J2. 51 Richard Welch, Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution,
1959-1961 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 41.
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relations campaign that formed the backdrop for the U. S. -led coup that overthrew him. 52
To make matters worse, revolutions alter international relations in ways that exacerbate perceptions of hostility. First, each side is likely to underes- timate the other's sense of vulnerability, leading it to discount the role of de- fensive motivations in explaining the other side's conduct. In addition to the burdens of organizing a government and rebuilding a damaged society, rev- olutionary states usually face continued domestic opposition. Fearful of having only a precarious hold on power, they are more likely to overreact to threats. 53 Yet revolutionary states also try to portray themselves as firmly in control, in order to discourage counterrevolution at home and to attract recognition abroad. If this public relations effort is successful, however, other states will underestimate the extent to which the revolutionary state's actions are driven by insecurity, interpreting its defensive actions as a sign of aggressive intent rather than as a reaction to legitimate fears. Further- more, the other states may not recognize, first, that a new regime must build a reputation for defending its interests in order to deter future challenges and, second, that this will motivate it to respond vigorously when conflicts of interest arise.
The same tendency can occur in reverse as well. Fully aware of its own weaknesses, a revolutionary state may find it hard to understand why it is considered dangerous. If so, it may view the opposition of other states as ev- idence of their intrinsic hostility rather than as a response to its own actions. Foreign powers will be concerned with building a reputation as well, in order to teach the new regime that they cannot be exploited. Thus, both sides will be prone to see even purely defensive policies as signs of aggres- sive intent, especially when real conflicts of interest are also present.
A second exacerbating factor is the pernicious influence of exiles and rev- olutionary sympathizers. As suggested above, exiles from the revolutionary state have an incentive to portray the new regime as especially hostile, in order to convince other states to support their counterrevolutionary ambi- tions. Similarly, revolutionary sympathizers from other countries are likely to reinforce the new regime's own suspicions by portraying foreign govern- ments as deeply hostile. The more vocal and visible these groups are, the
52 On Cuba, see Richard Moss, "The Limits of Policy: An Investigation of the Spiral Model, The Deterrence Model, and Miscalculations in U. S. -Third World Relations" (Ph. D. diss. , Princeton University, 1987), t6o-64, 193-94. On Guatemala, see Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy ofIntervention (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982); and Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold? Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (Garden City, N. Y. : Anchor Books, 1983).
53 According fto George Pettee, "revolutionists enter the limelight, not like men on horse- back, as victorious conspirators appearing in the forum, but like fearful children, exploring an empty house, not sure that it is empty. " The Process ofRevolution (New York: Harper Broth- ers, 1938), 1oo-101.
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greater the tendency for both sides to conclude that the host country sup- ports their aims. A large and vocal population of exiles will be seen as a sign that the host country is hostile to the revolution, just as a large and vocal group of foreign sympathizers will be taken as evidence that the new regime is actively seeking to spread its ideals elsewhere. Taken together, the parallel migration of exiles and sympathizers and the testimony they pro- vide to their hosts will strongly reinforce each side's beliefs that the other is inherently dangerous.
A third factor inflating the perception of hostility is the loss of expertise that accompanies a revolution, particularly when revolutionary govern- ments purge people with ties to perceived or potential enemies. The Iranian revolutionaries removed officials with close links to the United States, and Communist China persecuted its own "America Hands" in the 1950s. Ironi- cally, as the treatment of the State Department's "China Hands" suggests, the same process may occur within the nonrevolutionary states as well. 54 By re- moving experienced individuals, each side further reduces its capacity to un- derstand the other. Thus, the personnel changes set in motion by a revolution will exacerbate the prevailing uncertainty and reinforce mutual suspicion.
Because revolutions unleash a variety of forces that make it more difficult for the revolutionary state and its neighbors to assess each others' intentions accurately, each is likely to view the other as more hostile than it really is. Such a conclusion hampers their ability to reach a satisfactory modus vivendi and strengthens the position of those who favor direct action to eliminate the threat.
Each side's tendency to exaggerate the other's hostility helps explain why security competition increases after a revolution, but it does not explain why war occurs. After all, the United States and the Soviet Union were ex- tremely hostile for much of the Cold War, but neither saw actual war as an attractive option for dealing with the situation. Thus, the next question is why war is often seen as a reasonable response.
Revolution, the Offense-Defense Balance, and War
All else being equal, war is more likely when national leaders believe that offense is easier than defense. When offense is easy, states are less secure yet simultaneously have greater incentives to try to improve their relative posi- tions. At the same time, using force promises greater benefits because it will be simpler to gain a decisive victory over the opponents. Thus, offense dom- inance both raises the perceived level of threat and suggests that it will be
54 The "China Hands" were a group of China experts accused of disloyalty and purged from the State Department during the McCarthy era. See E. J. Kahn, The China Hands: Amer- ica's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them (New York: Viking, 1975).
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easy to reduce. The result is more international competition and a higher risk of war. 55
RevolutioltlS are a powerful source of this danger. In addition to creating distorted perceptions of hostility, revolutions also encourage both sides to exaggerate their own vulnerability and also the vulnerability of their oppo- nents. This tendency is partly due to the inherent difficulty of estimating the balance of power after a revolution, which makes it more likely that each will exaggerate its military prospects. In addition, the belief that the revolu- tion will either spread to other countries or readily succumb to counterrev- olutionary pressure magnifies this sense of vulnerability. Unable to estimate with high confidence the likelihood of either possibility, all sides will tend to assume the worst. For both military and political reasons, therefore, a rev- olution heightens each side's sense of threats and opportunities.
Taken together, these factors encourage both parties to believe that the other presents a grave threat, yet they also encourage the belief that the threat can be eliminated fairly easily. Furthermore, these perceptions may encourage third parties to intervene either to eliminate a potential revolu- tionary threat or to prevent other powers from gaining an advantage by doing it themselves. Once again, we can best understand these dynamics by examining revolutionary states and foreign powers separately.
Why are revolutionary states simultaneously insecure and overconfident?
To begin with, the inherent optimism of most revolutionary ideologies en- courages the new leaders to overstate the odds of victory, so they become more willing to contemplate the use of force. Arguments of this sort are dif- ficult to counter without appearing disloyal; if victory is inevitable and op- ponents are destined for the dustbin of history, then expressing doubts about the certainty of victory betrays a lack of confidence in the revolution and could easily undermine one's political position at home.
Second, the optimism of revolutionary states rests on the belief that op- ponents will be undermined by the irresistible spread of revolutionary ideas. This hope reflects the universalism common to many revolutionary ideologies and the assumption that their opponents will be unable to fight effectively owing to lack of popular support. Mao's claim that "a single spark can ignite a prairie fire" nicely conveys this faith in the catalytic ef- fects of revolutionary action, as does the so-called foco theory of guerrilla warfare developed by Che Guevara. 56 This view is also fueled by the ten-
55 See the references in n. 2 above.
56 On the basis of his experience in the Cuban revolution, Guevara argued that acts of vio- lence by a small revolutionary band (the foco) could spark a successful revolution even if strong indigenous support were Jacking. The strategy was a dismal failure, and Guevara was killed trying to implement it in Bolivia. See Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1961); and also Regis Debray, "Revolution in the Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America," Monthly Review 19, no. 3 (1967).
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dency for rebellious collective action to occur in distinct waves or cycles. Al- though most dissident social movements do not lead to a revolution, the leaders of a revolutionary state are likely to interpret signs of turbulence in other societies as evidence that their own victory is merely the first of many. 57
Revolutionary states can be further misled if they give too much credence to the testimony of foreign sympathizers, whose desire for external support inspires them to exaggerate the prospects for revolution back home. Such testimony will encourage active efforts to export the revolution (which will exacerbate tensions with other states) and fortify the new regime's confi- dence when it contemplates war. Moreover, their own success in gaining power against seemingly impossible odds may convince the revolutionary leaders that they can triumph over more powerful international opponents (this tendency will be compounded if other societies show signs of a similar level of discontent, even if rebellious action elsewhere does not lead to a full- fledged revolution). Furthermore, divisions within the revolutionary elite may encourage overly ambitious objectives, particularly if a willingness to export the revolution becomes a litmus test of revolutionary convictions. 58
Finally, and somewhat paradoxically, a revolutionary state's own vulner- ability may cause its interest in expansion to grow, at least in ideological terms. Fearing that their hold on power is fragile, revolutionary leaders are likely to view domestic opponents as potential fifth columns for their exter- nal foes. Exporting the revolution becomes the only way to preserve their positions at home: unless opposing states are swiftly overthrown, the argu- ment runs, they will eventually join forces with domestic counterrevolu- tionaries in order to crush the revolutionary state. To avoid this fate, the revolutionaries may conclude their only hope is to strike first.
Meanwhile, foreign powers are also both insecure and overconfident after a revolution. Why them as well?
Other states fear the spread of revolutionary ideas, especially when the ideas challenge their own form of government directly. But they also think this threat an easy problem to solve. Because of the disorder that accompa- nies a revolution, other states view the new regime as weak and vulnerable, especially because of the inherent difficulty of estimating a new state's abil- ity to fight. (By definition, revolutionary states rest on novel forms of social organization; revolutionary movements succeed because they exploit new
57 Sidney Tarrow, Struggle, Politics, and Reform: Collective Action, Social Movements, and Cy- cles ofProtest, Occasional Paper 21, Western Studies Program (Ithaca: Center for International Studies, Cornell University, 1989).
58 This is one variant of the domestic politics approach discussed in chapter 1. When a rev- olutionary movement is deeply divided, extremists may advocate an aggressive foreign pol- icy as a means of undermining the revolutionary credentials of their more moderate opponents.
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ways to mobilize previously untapped sources of social power. Unfortu- nately, the novelty of these institutions renders any meaningful evaluation of their impact on national capabilities nearly impossible. ) Ideological bi- ases may amplify this tendency, because states based on different political principles have trouble acknowledging that a revolutionary government could be popular or effective. (This problem affected U. S. perceptions of revolutionary states such as China, Cuba, and Nicaragua, for instance; be- cause U. S. leaders believed that Communism was illegitimate and immoral, they had difficulty recognizing these regimes as independent states com- manding substantial popular support. 59) And if they believe that a revolu- tionary state is inherently unpopular, the other states will exaggerate their own ability to confront it successfully.
The uncertainty surrounding a revolution contributes to the problem; as discussed above, foreign powers will exaggerate the threat of subversion. Having witnessed an unexpected revolutionary upheaval, mindful of the confident proclamations of the revolutionary forces, and aware that some members of their own society might harbor similar ideas (especially when there are clear signs of unrest), other states are likely to see contagion as more likely than it really is. The universalism of most revolutionary ideolo- gies compounds these worries, because the other states fear that an alliance of like-minded revolutionary powers could leave them adrift in a hostile ideological sea.
Even in the absence of clear evidence of the revolution spreading, other states cannot be completely confident that subversive movements do not lurk beneath the surface. European fears of a Jacobin conspiracy and the U. S. "Red scares" of the 1920s and the 1950s illustrate the tendency for for- eign powers to misread the ideological appeal (and therefore the offensive power) of revolutionary states. Because the threat these states pose is not simply a function of material capabilities, revolutions will seem even more dangerous than they are. And a similar logic applies to counterrevolutions: the inevitable signs of internal discord will encourage other states to try to reverse the revolution, even when it is impossible to determine the chances of success.
Once again, the perception of the threat from a revolutionary state and its susceptibility to outside pressure will be exacerbated by testimony from self-interested exiles and revolutionary sympathizers. The former portrays the revolutionary state as both a dangerous adversary and a disorganized, unpopular, and vulnerable target, while the latter depicts foreign powers as
59 Thus, Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk claimed that the Communist regime in China was "a colonial Russian government . . . it is not Chinese. " Quoted in Michael J. Schaller, The United States and China in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 125.
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both hostile and ripe for revolution. And if their respective hosts do not dis- count this testimony accordingly, they are more likely to fall into a precari- ous web of fear and overconfidence.
Thus, in addition to altering the balance of power, revolutions also shape perceptions of intent and estimates of the offense-defense balance in espe- cially dangerous ways. Both the revolutionary regime and the leaders of outside states view the other's existence as a serious challenge, yet neither can estimate the danger accurately. Lacking reliable information about the magnitude of the threat or their ability to overcome it, both will rely on ide- ology to fill in the gaps in their understanding, and will be susceptible to self-interested testimony from emigres or itinerant revolutionaries, particu- larly when this advice confirms preexisting beliefs. Therefore, although each side fears the other, it is also likely to conclude that the threat can be elimi- nated at relatively low cost. In short, the beliefs that opponents are hostile, dangerous, and vulnerable readily combine to support preventive and pre- emptive wars.
When a revolution topples an apparently viable regime, it is not surpris- ing that other states fear that they might be next. Similarly, if the revolu- tionary state has suffered extensive damage and faces continued internal opposition, its leaders have reason to worry that their success will be short lived. As subsequent chapters will show, however, both sides are usually wrong.
Revolutions are a relatively poor export commodity, and although coun- terrevolutionary efforts face somewhat better prospects, reversing a revolu- tion from outside usually proves more difficult than its advocates expect. 60 If each side's hopes and fears were accurate, the struggle between them would be a swift and decisive triumph for one side or the other. But instead of a wave of revolutionary upheavals or the swift collapse of the new regime, the normal result is either a brief, inconclusive clash (such as the Al- lied intervention in Russia or the Bay of Pigs invasion) or a protracted, bloody struggle (such as the Iran-Iraq war or the contra war in Nicaragua). The final irony, therefore, is that each side's perceptions of threats and vul- nerabilities are usually mistaken.
Why are revolutions hard to export, and why do foreign interventions fail? First, the universalist ideological rhetoric notwithstanding, a revolution
60 Examples of successful counterrevolutions include the Austro-Prussian intervention in Belgium in 1790, the Russian and Austrian interventions in Italy and Greece in the 1830s, the U. S. -backed coups in Iran, Guatemala, and Chile, the U. S. invasion of Grenada in 1983- and the Vietnamese overthrow of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in 1979.
