The more strained Anglo-French relations
became, the greater became the likelihood of such assist-
ance; the better Anglo-German relations became, the
better would become the relations of Great Britain and
?
became, the greater became the likelihood of such assist-
ance; the better Anglo-German relations became, the
better would become the relations of Great Britain and
?
Robertson - Bismarck
The effort to effect by diplomacy and intrigue
what the Treaty of San Stefano would have established
by war and a treaty--the Balkan States controlled by
Petersburg, and a Constantinople living under the fiat of
the Tsar--the policy of Kutchuk-Kainardji (1774) and of
Unkiar Skelessi (1833) gave a wholly new turn to the
Near Eastern question. Such a policy, with Pan-Slavism
behind it, cut right across the Austrian line of develop-
ment and was wholly opposed to the ambitions of
1 'I have thus succeeded in carrying out the first stage in my political policy
--that of placing a barrier between Austria and the Western Powers. . . . I do
not despair of realising the second, that of the reconstruction of the Drei Kaiser
Bund . . . an idea that I have followed all my life . . . they will never devise
a political system offering greater guarantees for safeguarding all the Conserva-
tive elements in the modern world. '--Prince Bismarck to Prince SabourofF,
quoted in the (unpublished) memoirs by Professor J. Y. Simpson,- Nintteettth
Century, December 1917.
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BISMARCK
Germany, masked behind the Dual Alliance. It involved
Russia in desperate and tortuous courses in which the
weakness of her statesmanship was continuously revealed,
witness the folly and blindness of her treatment of Roumania
and Bulgaria, but it made a new and torturing problem
for Bismarck. The antagonism of Great Britain and
Russia was superimposed on the antagonism of Austria
and Russia; it had been recreated by the events of 1876-8,
and henceforward was a standing menace to both countries.
Russian expansion eastwards into the heart of Asia inflamed
the old quarrel of the Crimean War and of 1875-8, and
for Russia the expansion eastwards into Central Asia was
inevitable, apart from its merits as a riposte to Great
Britain, though it imposed a fresh drain on her resources,
while it restated the old problem: Was Russia to concen-
trate on her Eastern Empire, or on establishing her
position in Europe? Pan-Slavism, voiced by Skobeleff,
Katkoff, Ignatieff, and Pobodonostzev, could not decide
whether it was better to proclaim the Holy War against
the Teuton, and reach Constantinople via Berlin and
Vienna, or ignore Teutonic ingratitude and establish the
Slav in the capital of the Moguls at Delhi, and thereby
destroy the British Empire. Skobeleff at one moment
proclaimed the Eastern ideal, at another denounced the
Germans and deplored the Russians ' as dupes of German
policy, victims to German intrigues, and slaves to German
strength, only to be delivered by the sword from the
baneful influence of Germany. '
After 1878 Nihilism honeycombed Russia, and the
assassination of Alexander n. on the banks of the Catherine
Canal in 1881 terrified his successor, credited, as heirs to
the throne often are, with Liberal sympathies, into
terrorism. The necessity of an international union of
dynasties and governments against the menace of revo-
lution, sharpened by dismay at the unending surrender of
Great Britain to democracy, and detestation of republics
and republicanism, obsessed Alexander h1. Nihilism,
more than any other force, held France and Russia apart,
poisoned the relations of Great Britain and Russia, and, in
Bismarck's skilful hands, laid the basis of the compacts of
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? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR
1884 and 1887. Alexander, swayed by Nationalism,
religion, and ambition, was continually breaking away
from the principle of a modern Holy Alliance of the Three
Monarchies, and continually being lured back by the fear
of revolution into the charmed circle of the magician at
Berlin. Well-informed statesmen were convinced that in
1880 Russia was on the point of returning to the entente
of 1872, when the assassination of Alexander n. and
the confusion caused by a change on the throne and the
internal peril to the autocracy, snapped for the time
the 'new wire' between Berlin and Petersburg. The
opposing schools of policy strove round the person of
Alexander in. , but it was not until death removed Gort-
schakov, Skobeleff, and Katkoff, and the Nihilist danger
had been comparatively mastered, that Russia and the
Tsar had both ears for Bismarck's arguments. Through
all the evidence available runs a persistent principle--the
desirability of uniting the monarchies on a common basis
of resistance to democracy and revolution--the old prin-
ciples of the historic Holy Alliance in a modern form.
Apart from the political considerations underlying a
German hegemony of Central Europe, this dynastic unity
was a bulwark of the existing social order, and no one felt
more strongly than Bismarck that his system at bottom in
Germany and without rested on the maintenance of a
defined social structure correlated to, and a guarantee of,
a distribution of political authority and defined political
principles. He could and did cordially agree with
Alexander in. that the political evolution of France and
the ideas underlying the Republic, together with the con-
tinuous lapse of Great Britain from aristocratic grace to
democracy, constituted a real peril and set up a perpetual
antithesis between the Liberal west and the Conservative
and Monarchical centre and east. The danger of infection
from the west was serious. For all the facts went to prove
that the west might inoculate and sap the centre and east,
but there was small prospect of the centre and the east
curing democratic Great Britain and France of their
deplorable heresies. Dual or Triple Alliances were of no
avail unless they aimed at ends deeper and more sub-
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? 400
BISMARCK
stantial than a nicely and perpetually readjusted political
equilibrium. A coalition of ideas and principles could be
more fatal to German supremacy than a coalition of fleets
or armies. The return, therefore, to a reactionary Con-
servatism, discussed in the previous section, was partly the
reflex, partly the inspiration, of Bismarck's foreign policy.
The disturbing elements in the situation were not con-
fined to Russia. Europe in 1880 was on the threshold of
an era with a very different outlook and ambition. Five
other characteristics can be broadly disentangled--the
Eastern Question, the problem of the Mediterranean, the
renaissance of France, the revived activity and policy of
Great Britain, and the colonial movement. Their com-
bination provided the problem for Bismarck, and his ex-
ploitation of them makes the history of his foreign policy
from 1879 to n*s faH-
After 1878 the Powers were much concerned with the
execution of the terms of the Treaty of Berlin. But the
military occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
question of Dulcigno--' Dulcigno far niente,' as was
wittily said--and similar items of the Berlin programme,
very soon faded into much larger issues--the Roumanian,
Serbian, Bulgarian, and Greek questions; Egypt, Tunis,
Syria and Tripoli. Was the liquidation of the Ottoman
Empire to continue? Who were the lawful creditors of
the estate, if from any quarter a petition in bankruptcy was
seriously pressed? What was to be the dividend, and to
whom and in what shares was it to be assigned? The
Congress of Berlin had proclaimed the integrity of a
'consolidated ' and reduced Ottoman Empire, which like
the immortal' Peau de Chagrin' was always being pegged
out, and was always shrinking in defiance of every effort
to prevent it. Bismarck, therefore, had to decide what
was the interest of Germany in the Near East, and he
found the decision very difficult.
If we may judge from events, everything strengthened
his conclusion in 1879 that safety lay in a firm control of
Austria-Hungary. 1 He could pivot on the Dual Alliance
1 'Germany in view of her own lecurity could not possibly allow Austria to
have any other alliance than with herself. '--(From the Sabouroff Memoirs. )
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? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR 401
more securely than on any other nodal, strategic, and
diplomatic point. The remarkable analysis at the end of
his Memoirs, with all its obvious omissions and veiled
allusions, shows how continuously and with what micro-
scopic diligence he watched and weighed every symptom
in Austrian policy. Austria was essential to Germany, for
if Austria collapsed the Near Eastern Question threat-
ened a catastrophe. The heart of the problem lay there-
fore in this issue: if it was easier to control Austria
than to control Russia--and to secure Russia if Austria
had been first secured--to what extent could Germany
'back the Austrian bill'? That Berlin must back the
bill drawn at Vienna broadly was clear. But the analysis
in the Memoirs and the crisis of 1890 reveal that Bismarck
fully recognised very precise limits to the German credit
placed behind the Austrian draft, and showed that he was
not prepared to support 'an unreasonable Austria' at
the price of a complete rupture with Russia. He decided,
in effect, that Germany and Austria might at some future
date have to part company, under the pressure of events:
and the decision brought him into sharp antagonism with
the new school of policy which made an Austro-German
alliance, co&te que coute, the basis of German policy in the
Near East. (See Holstein's criticisms in Hohenlohe, ii. 451. )
The main argument of that school was profoundly in-
fluenced by the growing ambition to substitute, also coute
que coute, a German ascendency at Constantinople (with
all its illimitable possibilities) for a Russian, a British, or
French ascendency; or, in other words, the integrity and
the revival of the shrinking Ottoman Empire could and
ought to be made a primary German interest. The Mayor
of the Sultan and the Sublime Porte was to be the German
Emperor, in close alliance with Austria. Bismarck between
1879 and 1890 was not prepared to go that length. He
recognised that it involved, for all its advantages, an irre-
concilable breach with Russia, and a serious antagonism to
Great Britain. To the end, while recognising a deepening
German interest in Constantinople and Turkey in Europe,
he had his eyes on the West and France. The ' Austrian
School' at Berlin was really interpreting Centralism in a
B. 2C
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? 402
BISMARCK
way that, in Bismarck's view, might imperil not merely
Germany^ interest in the East but the fundamental basis
of German supremacy in Europe. For Bismarck an
alliance of Russia and France, and the closing of the breach
between Great Britain and Russia, spelled the ruin of a
true system of European policy. The younger generation,
in short, was distinguishing between Bismarckian Central-
ism and a Weltpolitik. They aspired to make Germany a
Wdtmacht--a World-Empire--and not merely a Con-
tinental Power, and they saw the main road winding from
Hamburg through Berlin across the Balkans, through a
Constantinople controlled by Germany to Mesopotamia
and the Persian Gulf, with an entry to the seas not so
closely controlled as the routes down the Channel or
north of the Shetlands; they also saw it reaching across
the Atlantic to the Pacific, expressed in the formula ' ships,
colonies, and commerce. ' And for this young generation
the heart of the position lay in the closest offensive alliance
with Austria. It made Great Britain, not France or
Russia, the great rival of Germany. Bismarck's virtual
reply to such an argument was a paraphrase of Beacons-
field's judgment on Herat and Candahar. 'The Key of
East and West, of Centralism. . and Empire, was not in
Belgrade or Constantinople or Zanzibar--it was in Metz,
Berlin, and Thorn. '
In a more concrete form, the Near Eastern Question
from 1879 to 1890 was summed up in the antagonism of
Austria and Russia in the Balkans, and in the rivalry
between Great Britain and France in Egypt. These two
problems brought the Mediterranean into the main
diplomatic theatre, and kept it there.
By 1878 the isolation of France was proving exceedingly
difficult. The crisis of 1875 had shown that the European
Powers would not tolerate a further reduction of France
or French power; the International Exhibition of 1878
picturesquely mirrored the remarkable extent of France's
recovery from the collapse in 1870. Paris, as in 1867,
was still a great, if not the great, foyer de civilisation,
the attraction of which was inextinguishable. The new
France, working so hard to make good the blunders of the
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? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR 403
Second Empire, would soon be, if she was not already, an
ally worth having. But the Germany that had failed to
crush her or to isolate her completely, and that must fail
to reconcile her because of Alsace and Lorraine, might
divert her gathering strength into directions that would
involve her in a collision with all the possible allies of the
new France. There were three such possible allies--
Great Britain, Russia, and Italy. The colonial movement
combined with the situation in the Mediterranean to give
Bismarck a fine chance of checkmating the rapprochement
so necessary to France and his diplomacy was equal to it.
After 1879 Colonial questions moved sharply and sud-
denly into the forefront of European controversy and
ambition. Africa and the Pacific kept the chancelleries
busy. For Africa was the one great area, of vast extent,
and unlimited possibilities, a continent not yet properly
explored, and not yet finally allotted to, or occupied by,
any great European Power. With 1880 'the scramble
for Africa ' seriously began, and it behove the Powers that
had started late in the foundation of colonies to be quick,
or the one fine field left in a limited world would be over-
run and mastered by the Powers which had started early,
and were already settled at various points on the rim of
the Continent. Everything combined to make the
'African appeal' urgent and critical--the romance of
exploration, the prose of business and trade, missions and
religion, coaling stations, hinterlands and doctrines of
international law, struggling to establish principles which
distinguished spheres of influence, protectorates, treaty
rights, and the nature of actual or virtual possession; and
with these mingled the claims of humanity and the slave-
trade, the rights of races and civilisation,' the white man's
burden,' and the territorial ambitions that underlay the
conception of the State as the incarnation of Power, or the
State as the incarnation of Right and Law. Darkest . and
unknown Africa indeed summed up everything for Europe,
from the selfless heroism of a Livingstone, the stubborn
pertinacity of a Stanley, and the philanthropy of a
Lavigerie to the imperialism of a Rhodes or the syndicates
of gold and diamond companies, the provision of raw
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? 404
BISMARCK
materials for the workshops of Europe, or the cruder
claim to sell bad guns and the poison of potato-spirit in
return for rubber extracted by the lash. And in Africa,
with its harbours and mighty rivers and its stepping-
stones, east or west, might not prescient statecraft call a
new world into existence that would not merely redress,
but completely upset, the balance of the old? Africa
was the whole which developed the rivalries of other and
more purely local areas--for the Mediterranean was a
localised form both of the larger African and the Near
Eastern problems.
The diversion, as distinct from the isolation, of France,
began in 1878. Whether Bismarck first, in the green-
rooms of the Berlin Congress, where so many tempting
whispers were uttered, suggested the idea of France occupy-
ing Tunis, as a compensation for losses elsewhere, or
whether the suggestion fell from Beaconsfield and Salis-
bury, may be a nice question in the origin of things, the
evidence for which is still incomplete; but it is tolerably
certain that France understood after 1878 that, if she did
go to Tunis, Germany and Great Britain would not com-
bine to make the occupation a casus belli, or an occasion
for a humiliating rebuff. In 1881 France accordingly
went to Tunis--with the results that Bismarck at any
rate had foreseen and intended. Great Britain was
already hard pressed by difficulties in Egypt; her relations
with France were becoming strained, and the new Foreign
Secretary at London regretted the virtual pledge of his
predecessor.
That France should quarrel with Great Britain was just
what Bismarck desired, and the causes of quarrel could be
extended by judicious diplomacy inflaming further French
colonial ambitions in Africa, in Siam, Cochin-China, and
the Pacific. The more that France spent in men or
money on colonial expansion, the less she would have for
her eastern frontier in Europe; the more she stared
across the seas the less she would be 'hypnotised by the
gap in the Vosges'; she would not find European allies
by expeditions to the Nile, the Mekong, or the Niger,
but European rivals, whose ambitions would be reflected
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? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR 405
and refracted at London, Paris, Rome, Petersburg,
Brussels, and the Hague: colonial policy and colonial
failures have, moreover, always been since 1660 a fine
dissolvent of ministries in most European States. French
and British ministries would come to grief at home because
French or British expeditions met with reverses on the
Nile or the Niger: France must therefore be encouraged
to suffer a perpetual angina pectoris, in which colonialism
would be an irritant, very shattering to the Republic.
No less beneficial to Berlin and Central Europe, Tunis
and French Mediterranean ambitions brought France at
once into sharp collision with the sister Latin race in Italy.
The kingdom of Italy desired colonies and a sure grip on
the Mediterranean. - The French occupation of Tunis
was a bitter blow. How was France to be prevented from
adding Tripoli to Tunis? And if she had a condominium
in Egypt, what was there left in the Mediterranean for
Italy? An isolated Italy studied the map and the diplo-
matic constellations. Her position was becoming des-
perate. She could not stand alone. But with whom
could she act? A confidential explanation from Berlin
of the terms and meaning of the Dual Alliance of 1879,
made one certainty absolutely clear. 'Unredeemed
Italy' (Italia irredenta)--Trieste and Istria, the Alpine
frontier of the Napoleonic kingdom of Italy of 1810, the
Balkan littoral of the Adriatic were now postponed to
the German Kalends. If Italy could not get these from
Austria single-handed, she assuredly could not get them
by a war in which Germany stood behind Austria. The
Dual Alliance sponged from the screen of the future the
Italian dream of rounding off the unification of 1859 and
1866 by the incorporation of unredeemed Italy or securing
the Dalmatian coast of the Adriatic. And the exposed
shores of the peninsula were vulnerable to sea-power and
to French sea-power, located at Toulon, Corsica, Tunis,
Bizerta--perhaps Egypt. Given the conditions of 1882,
the accession of Italy to the Dual Alliance was--if the invi-
tation were held out from Berlin--a foregone conclusion.
On May 20, 1882, Italy's accession turned the Dual
into the Triple Alliance. The text of the treaty has
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? 406
BISMARCK
never been officially published; but it is certain that in
1882 Italy joined for five years, and that the treaty was
renewed in 1887 and at subsequent intervals, with which
Bismarck was not concerned. It is practically certain that
the three signatory Powers gave a reciprocal guarantee
for the integrity of their respective territories, undertook
to assist each other in the case of attack by any European
Power (i. e. France), and (probably by secret conventions)
agreed to allot with precision the nature and amount of
their respective military contribution to a joint effort.
It is practically certain that no guarantee was given to
Italy either by Germany or Austria of support in a colonial
policy in the Mediterranean or elsewhere, and that Italy
was in no way bound to support Balkan or other adven-
tures of Germany or Austria. The maintenance of the
existing balance of power in the Mediterranean, or the
nature of any future rearrangement of the Mediterranean
situation, probably did not fall within the scope of the
engagements undertaken in 1882.
The wisdom or the inexpediency of Italy's action in
1882 do not call for judgment here; but two other con-
siderations, besides those mentioned, unquestionably
weighed with Depretis and his successors. Alliance with
Berlin was a powerful support to the Quirinal against the
Vatican, and in 1882 the relations of Quirinal and Vatican
were severely strained: if the Dual Alliance made 'un-
redeemed Italy' an affair beyond redemption, the Triple
Alliance made the restoration of the temporal power of
the Papacy and the removal of the House of Savoy from
Rome practically impossible. The annoyance and anger
of Ultramontanism in Italy, Austria and France, and also
in Germany, are the best- proof of this consequence of the
Triple Alliance. Secondly, it did not prevent Italy from
improving an historic friendship with Great Britain, and
obtaining, if circumstances required, the assistance or
protection of the British fleet, with one of its bases
at Malta.
The more strained Anglo-French relations
became, the greater became the likelihood of such assist-
ance; the better Anglo-German relations became, the
better would become the relations of Great Britain and
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? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR
Italy. Italy was, and was desired at Berlin to be, a middle
term between Great Britain and the new Triple Alliance.
To Bismarck the conclusion of the Treaty of May 20,
1882, was the culmination of his system. Henceforward
German hegemony in Central Europe moved securely
on the pivotal point of the Triple Alliance, which gradu-
ally and naturally grew into the one grand combination
in the European State system, with which all other possible
combinations or ententes had to reckon. And for Bismarck
the accession of Italy had every advantage and no disad-
vantages. Italy from 1878 to 1882 was in a restless and
excited state. 1 She might indeed precipitate a crisis
which would upset the carefully poised equilibrium of
Europe. Crises that arise from the action of strong
States are often not as dangerous as the crises provoked
by the recklessness of weak States. Italian policy in 1882
came under the control of the Wilhelmstrasse, and control
was stealthily and relentlessly followed by the moral and
economic penetration of the German bankers, cartels,
syndicates, and commercial travellers. After 1878 the
Ottoman Empire was similarly 'penetrated. ' How
deeply the penetration had pierced in both cases--how
enmeshed had become the finance and the springs of trade
by German wheels and cogs and 'controls'--Italy and
the world learned in 1914. 'Trade followed the alliances,
and the alliances followed trade. '
In 1882 the Kulturkampf was by no means healed. The
agreement of ' May 20, 1882' was a potent schedule to
'the May Laws' of 1873 and 1875. Prussia now had a
rod, steeped in Italian brine, which it could use, if required.
Crispi, who figures so prominently in the later phases of
the story, had known and fought under great and hypnotic
men--Garibaldi and Cavour. At Friedrichsruhe he met
another hypnotic personality and succumbed. Bismarck
and Crispi, exchanging their memories over cigars and
wine at Friedrichsruhe, the old revolutionary of the red-
1 'This whole attitude shows that Italy must not be numbered to-day among
the peace-loving and conservative Powers, who must reckon with the fact. . . .
Every encouragement to Italian policy to join the bellicose and predatory
Powers in Europe is contrary to German interests. '--Bismarck to Prince Reuss
at Vienna, Jap. z8, 1880. --Busch, Bismarck, Hi. p. zn,
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? 408
BISMARCK
shirts and 'The Thousand' and the veteran Junker who
had denounced the journey to Canossa, overthrown clerical
France and Apostolic Austria, were not a pleasant thought,
we may be sure, in the Apostolic chancery of the Vatican.
But Bismarck, in concluding the Triple Alliance, was
not thinking so much of the Vatican or the British fleet,
as of Central Europe and France. The Triple Alliance
completed Central Europe; it closed the Alpine passes;
it barred the great gate to Vienna through which Napoleon
had marched in 1796; it opened the Mediterranean to
Germany; it rent away from France the ally of the sister
Latin race and made it henceforward necessary for her to
keep two of her best corps to guard against invasion
through the Maritime Alps. Best of all, it shivered the
serious menace of 1869 and 1871. France, Austria and
Italy, bound in a common war of revenge, had been a
real danger. Austria had been secured as an ally in 1879;
Italy was secured in 1882. It would take genius on the
one side or bungling on the other to undo the Triple
Alliance. Where were now the possible allies of France?
Great Britain? Russia?
In 1882, with the bombardment of Alexandria, the re-
bellion of Arabi, the fall of Gambetta (January 26), and
the Anglo-Egyptian Campaign, war was more likely than
an alliance between France and Great Britain. The
Triple Alliance, in fact, largely. undid the benefits to
France of the benevolent hint to take Tunis and to take it
at once. In the future Italy's claims in the Mediter-
ranean might be much more serious, if Berlin found it
convenient to give them 'moral' support. Bismarck's
'moral' support was unlike that of most European
Powers. It was only given because he had decided that,
if need be, behind it lay 'the immoral' support of
German force.
And there was another supreme advantage in Bismarck's
eyes. If Austria kept Italy in check, Italy could be used
to keep Austria in vassalage. There was little fear that
Italy, the weakest of the three allies, would break loose,
take the bit in her teeth, and defy Berlin and Vienna,
while France was hostile, and Great Britain vaguely
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? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR
friendly. But there was always a real danger that the
men in the Ball-Platz might lose their heads. Megalo-
mania and folly were hereditary diseases in the statesman-
ship of Imperial Vienna. Modern history was a dreary
record of Austrian blunders--from Charles VI. to Francis
Joseph; we are almost tempted to add from Charles v1.
to Aerenthal, Hotzendorf and Tisza. Italy provided the
Wilhelmstrasse with a very useful curb for keeping the
Ball-Platz 'in hand. ' In that unwritten chapter of the
relations of Berlin and Vienna after 1879 the historical
student of Bismarck's statecraft, provoked by the tempting
glimpses revealed here and there, sighs indeed for a few
weeks uninterrupted work in the archives of Vienna and
the Wilhelmstrasse with an unrestricted general warrant,
entitling him to examine all confidential documents.
Such a search would not merely satisfy a hungry curi-
osity; it would be invaluable in the scientific appreciation
of Bismarck's statecraft. The use of Italy's aspirations in
pruning the rank growth of Austrian appetites is an
obscure chapter in Bismarck's system--but would be an
illuminating one. It might, indeed probably would, fur-
nish an instructive contrast between Bismarck and the
post-Bis marckians.
Italy in 1882 was like Italy in 1866. She had concluded
a treaty which imposed obligations, but conferred prac-
tically no rights. Bismarck had, to a certainty, refused in
any way to endorse in advance the ' Italian draft' on the
future. How far he had cautiously endorsed a very limited
Austrian 'draft' is, as has been pointed out, very un-
certain; but Italian claims and aspirations in Albania or
elsewhere, that so obviously conflicted with an Austrian
programme, could be, and were, used after 1882 to keep
Austria 'in order. ' How far Bismarck's successors de-
parted from the Bismarckian system--how far they
gradually interpreted the articles of association in the very
limited liability company that constituted Bismarck's
Triple Alliance, as constituting a company of unlimited
liability, how far they gradually came to regard it as
practically a Dual Alliance in which Italy made a negli-
gible third, who would not dare to break away, and at the
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? BISMARCK
worst would observe a sulking and peevish neutrality--
it is neither necessary, nor possible, to decide here. But
to Bismarck, the Continentalist in feeling, thought, and
fibre, the Triple Alliance was of supreme importance, for
it secured the Continental position that made the marrow
and bone of Bismarckian Central Europe; and if it was
never easy from 1882 to 1890 to prevent his two allies
from snarling at, or quarrelling with each other, such
management called for all the arts and skill which Bismarck
rejoiced to prove that he had. The position of arbiter
was precisely what he desired, and in the exercise of the
office he was consummate. The Triple Alliance, in short,
was an open re-insurance against the liabilities, deliber-
ately incurred in 1879. But if we may judge from the
copious criticisms poured out in the Hamburger Nach-
richten after 1890, Bismarck was convinced that very
little of his mantle and no double portion of his spirit
had fallen on his successors. It is no less certain that
had Count Herbert Bismarck succeeded in due course, as
his father intended, to the vacant desk in the Wilhelm-
strasse that Hohenlohe and Bulow could have said with
unanswerable truth that the mantle and the double
portion of the Chancellor's spirit had not fallen on the son.
The Triple Alliance was, like all Bismarck's strokes,
aimed at France. It was the policy of isolation and diver-
sion in one. There is substantial reason for believing
that in 1882 a serious attempt was made to include Spain
in the network of alliances. But the attempt, if it was
made--which would have completed the isolation of
France--did not come to a treaty. Spain was left to
'moral penetration' by Germany--and it was effective.
Be that as it may, German emphasis was now laid on the
diversion of France. After 1882 the Republic was quietly
or openly encouraged from Berlin to pursue colonial
aims. In 1881 Bismarck compared Gambetta to a
drummer in the sick-room of Europe. But Gambetta's
fall1 and death, which soon followed, ended the Gambetta
policy of cultivating the good-will of Great Britain, uniting
1 'Gambetta,' says M. Hanotaux, 'had to learn that one cannot in France
defend French interest with impunity. '--La France Contemporaine, 4. 629.
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? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR 411
the Latin races, and making a democratic Republic a power
for democracy in Europe, while keeping the lamp of
revenge at home polished and burning with a subdued
and steady light that at the right moment could flame
into a great national beacon. 'Ne parlez jamais de la
guerre,' Gambetta had said, 'mais pensez-y toujours. '
Gambetta's radical republicanism quenched the ardour of
Russian autocracy for a Franco-Russian entente.
After 1882 Ferry's policy in Egypt and the Far East
steadily estranged France from Great Britain. The Nile
and Tonkin, Madagascar and Siam, caused the French to
forget their hostility to Germany in their hostility to
Great Britain. And Bismarck took care to hold open the
fissure between Great Britain and France. Encourage-
ment to England in Egypt was balanced by encouragement
to France in the Far East and the Pacific. The Foreign
Office in Berlin and the German Embassy in Paris were
prolific in their hints of 'the great man's' sincerity in
wishing France well, while his magisterial experience
was readily placed at French disposal. The French
consulted the oracle freely. The Ferry Ministry in 1884
could say publicly that not for two decades had the re-
lations of France and Germany been so friendly. Such
friendship with good reasons disquieted the Cabinet at
London.
Bismarck certainly hoped that a few years of this con-
ciliation by diversion would wring from a French govern-
ment a stammering renunciation of revanche. A great
and magnanimous speech in the Reichstag from the
Chancellor could then have proclaimed that a generous
and brave nation had wisely closed the account and hence-
forward with Germany's unqualified goodwill and assist-
ance would march in a common work of civilisation--in
which Great Britain must be compelled to yield to the
legitimate rights of the new entente. But, instead of
the stammering renunciation came Ferry's fall (April 2,
1885): a colonial failure sharply awakened France to the
truth that colonies might be colonies, but Alsace and
Lorraine remained the monument of German victory and
French defeat. French ministries henceforward grew
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? 412
BISMARCK
like grass in the green spring and fell like leaves in chill
October; and in the place of the great and unspoken
speech that Bismarck desired to make, we have the
Bismarckian orations of 1887 and 1888, in which France
was held up to Germany as the hereditary, irreconcilable,
and malignant foe in whose vile heart justice and con-
ciliation only whetted the impotent lust of revenge.
Worse still, the colonial movement, Egypt and the diver-
sion of Russia to the Middle East brought on a severe
Anglo-Russian crisis and involved Germany in sharp and
dangerous friction with Great Britain. The year 1884
was a momentous one in French history. It was a far
more momentous one in the history of Great Britain, of
Germany and of Bismarck.
The relations of Great Britain and Germany after 1871
and Bismarck's policy are susceptible of various and contra-
dictory interpretations. Bismarck's dislike of Gladstone
and Gladstonianism is beyond question, for Gladstone's
principles of foreign policy and theory of international
relations, no less than his system of home politics,
represented everything that Bismarck regarded as danger-
ous, detestable or futile,1 and Gladstone's noted radical
distrust of Bismarckianism, which was very apparent
from 1880 to 1885, and was largely, if not mainly, re-
sponsible for the refusal of Great Britain to enter the
German net, was no less strong. Bismarck seems to have
held the view, adopted by many continental statesmen,
that Great Britain as essentially a naval, maritime, and
colonial Power was not, and ought not to be, concerned
with the Continent of Europe. If, therefore, Great
Britain actively intervened in 'purely continental affairs,'
she was taking upon herself matters not properly sui juris,
as well as introducing an unwelcome and incalculable
element into a situation, already sufficiently complicated.
Her very disinterestedness could be disconcerting:
because it made it difficult to conclude material bargains
by material bribes. British Liberalism, in particular,
1 'It is very apparent in the Sabouroff memoirs,' writes Professor Simpson,
who has seen these unpublished papers, 'how uneasy Bismarck was at the
prospects of a Liberal England. '--Nineteenth Century, December iji7,
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? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR
introduced also into international relations ' cant' phrases
and formulae--humanity, the Concert of Europe, the
unity of European moral interests, arbitratior, moral
responsibility, Blue Books, amenability to public opinion,
and 'nations rightly struggling to be free '--and had
always done so from Canning onwards. Great Britain's
intervention in 1875 had been more than disconcerting--
it had led to a serious rebuff: and even more serious had
been the sharp action of the Beaconsfield ministry in the
crisis of 1877-8. A war between Great Britain and Russia
over Constantinople and the Balkans would create an in-
soluble dilemma for Austria, and therefore for Germany.
The steady insistence of'Mr. Gladstone's ministry in 1880
on fulfilling the pledges and terms of the Treaty of Berlin
was very annoying. A Concert of Europe, manipulated by
the Wilhelmstrasse, was one thing--a Concert of Europe
led by Great Britain was another, and did not make for
German hegemony and for peace as Bismarck under-
stood it.
But for all his gibes or snarling innuendoes Bismarck did
not underrate British strength. The British fleet, unlike
the British army, could not be dealt with by ' calling in the
police. ' And Great Britain in some mysterious way had
an uncanny gift for provoking the jealousy yet attracting
the support of European Powers. Bismarck, therefore,
after 1871, aimed mainly at encouraging British goodwill
to Austria and Italy, at keeping France and Great Britain
apart and Russia and Great Britain in strained tension, in
which German good offices could be effectively employed
to maintain the tension, yet prevent a complete rupture.
Down to 1884 Germany and Great Britain could maintain
in theory and phrase the friendliest of relations, for no
direct or serious cause of quarrel between the two Powers
existed. The two Powers might indirectly have divergent
interests in many European questions in which these
European States were largely concerned, but a direct
antagonism in which Great Britain and Germany were
the chief actors had not so far arisen.
The Egyptian question, with all the embarrassments
arising out of the tangle or created by ministerial policy in
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? 4H
BISMARCK
Great Britain, was just what Bismarck could have wished.
It made Great Britain more dependent on German good-
will, and, properly handled with the requisite air of im-
partiality, could separate France and Great Britain and
prevent an Anglo-French alliance. The evidence that
Bismarck would have welcomed a loose Anglo-German
alliance or entente between 1880 and 1890 is suggestive,
but neither precise nor conclusive. Such an 'alliance'
would have been a triumphant codicil to the Triple
Alliance, would have been warmly welcomed in Italy, and
need not have damaged a separate understanding between
Germany and Russia. The interests of Great Britain and
Russia in many respects were not more divergent than
those of Austria and Italy; and it would have been a
powerful aid in emphasising German arguments at
Petersburg. But if Bismarck went so far as to make
direct or indirect overtures, they broke down on
Mr. Gladstone's radical distrust, and no less on the direct
conflict of interest in colonial policy that came to a head
in 1884. In that year Germany was caught up in the
colonial movement.
It was inevitable after 1871 that Germany should begin
to take an interest in colonial expansion, if for no other
reason than that the most powerful of the Continental
States had no colonies, and that colonial possessions were
a proof and a guarantee of strength. German Nationalism,
after 1815, as has been emphasised earlier in these pages,
had found its deepest conviction and most stimulating
nourishment in the consciousness of German impotence
relatively to other great national States. The feeling that
a united Germany could and ought to stand in the world
as a Power, able to stand and speak for Germans as a whole
in the gate of its rivals, and on terms of equality face
France, Austria, Russia, and Great Britain, was overwhelm-
ing and reasonable. Germany had now accomplished
her unification, and the power of the German Empire
after 1871 was an indisputable fact which satisfied to the
full the passionate craving of the once impotent Germany
of the Federal Diet. After 1871 the German nation, like
its Emperor had ' drunk of the chalice of victory and would
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? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR 415
not break it. ' It now desired to be an Empire like other
great Empires--and the Empires with a future had colonies
because the future lay with colonies. Leroy Beaulieu's
remark, that colonies may not be signs of strength to-day,
but that they hold the strength of the future, sums up the
inarticulate German ambition. Just as a man who has
made himself a millionaire by his own efforts desires motor
cars, a fine picture gallery, or historic castles in the country,
not for their intrinsic value, but because they prove that
he is as rich and as powerful as other millionaires, so the
German nation also desired colonies as the appurtenances
and apparatus of Empire--to give them the external
position and framework in the world enjoyed by other
imperial nations.
what the Treaty of San Stefano would have established
by war and a treaty--the Balkan States controlled by
Petersburg, and a Constantinople living under the fiat of
the Tsar--the policy of Kutchuk-Kainardji (1774) and of
Unkiar Skelessi (1833) gave a wholly new turn to the
Near Eastern question. Such a policy, with Pan-Slavism
behind it, cut right across the Austrian line of develop-
ment and was wholly opposed to the ambitions of
1 'I have thus succeeded in carrying out the first stage in my political policy
--that of placing a barrier between Austria and the Western Powers. . . . I do
not despair of realising the second, that of the reconstruction of the Drei Kaiser
Bund . . . an idea that I have followed all my life . . . they will never devise
a political system offering greater guarantees for safeguarding all the Conserva-
tive elements in the modern world. '--Prince Bismarck to Prince SabourofF,
quoted in the (unpublished) memoirs by Professor J. Y. Simpson,- Nintteettth
Century, December 1917.
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BISMARCK
Germany, masked behind the Dual Alliance. It involved
Russia in desperate and tortuous courses in which the
weakness of her statesmanship was continuously revealed,
witness the folly and blindness of her treatment of Roumania
and Bulgaria, but it made a new and torturing problem
for Bismarck. The antagonism of Great Britain and
Russia was superimposed on the antagonism of Austria
and Russia; it had been recreated by the events of 1876-8,
and henceforward was a standing menace to both countries.
Russian expansion eastwards into the heart of Asia inflamed
the old quarrel of the Crimean War and of 1875-8, and
for Russia the expansion eastwards into Central Asia was
inevitable, apart from its merits as a riposte to Great
Britain, though it imposed a fresh drain on her resources,
while it restated the old problem: Was Russia to concen-
trate on her Eastern Empire, or on establishing her
position in Europe? Pan-Slavism, voiced by Skobeleff,
Katkoff, Ignatieff, and Pobodonostzev, could not decide
whether it was better to proclaim the Holy War against
the Teuton, and reach Constantinople via Berlin and
Vienna, or ignore Teutonic ingratitude and establish the
Slav in the capital of the Moguls at Delhi, and thereby
destroy the British Empire. Skobeleff at one moment
proclaimed the Eastern ideal, at another denounced the
Germans and deplored the Russians ' as dupes of German
policy, victims to German intrigues, and slaves to German
strength, only to be delivered by the sword from the
baneful influence of Germany. '
After 1878 Nihilism honeycombed Russia, and the
assassination of Alexander n. on the banks of the Catherine
Canal in 1881 terrified his successor, credited, as heirs to
the throne often are, with Liberal sympathies, into
terrorism. The necessity of an international union of
dynasties and governments against the menace of revo-
lution, sharpened by dismay at the unending surrender of
Great Britain to democracy, and detestation of republics
and republicanism, obsessed Alexander h1. Nihilism,
more than any other force, held France and Russia apart,
poisoned the relations of Great Britain and Russia, and, in
Bismarck's skilful hands, laid the basis of the compacts of
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? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR
1884 and 1887. Alexander, swayed by Nationalism,
religion, and ambition, was continually breaking away
from the principle of a modern Holy Alliance of the Three
Monarchies, and continually being lured back by the fear
of revolution into the charmed circle of the magician at
Berlin. Well-informed statesmen were convinced that in
1880 Russia was on the point of returning to the entente
of 1872, when the assassination of Alexander n. and
the confusion caused by a change on the throne and the
internal peril to the autocracy, snapped for the time
the 'new wire' between Berlin and Petersburg. The
opposing schools of policy strove round the person of
Alexander in. , but it was not until death removed Gort-
schakov, Skobeleff, and Katkoff, and the Nihilist danger
had been comparatively mastered, that Russia and the
Tsar had both ears for Bismarck's arguments. Through
all the evidence available runs a persistent principle--the
desirability of uniting the monarchies on a common basis
of resistance to democracy and revolution--the old prin-
ciples of the historic Holy Alliance in a modern form.
Apart from the political considerations underlying a
German hegemony of Central Europe, this dynastic unity
was a bulwark of the existing social order, and no one felt
more strongly than Bismarck that his system at bottom in
Germany and without rested on the maintenance of a
defined social structure correlated to, and a guarantee of,
a distribution of political authority and defined political
principles. He could and did cordially agree with
Alexander in. that the political evolution of France and
the ideas underlying the Republic, together with the con-
tinuous lapse of Great Britain from aristocratic grace to
democracy, constituted a real peril and set up a perpetual
antithesis between the Liberal west and the Conservative
and Monarchical centre and east. The danger of infection
from the west was serious. For all the facts went to prove
that the west might inoculate and sap the centre and east,
but there was small prospect of the centre and the east
curing democratic Great Britain and France of their
deplorable heresies. Dual or Triple Alliances were of no
avail unless they aimed at ends deeper and more sub-
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? 400
BISMARCK
stantial than a nicely and perpetually readjusted political
equilibrium. A coalition of ideas and principles could be
more fatal to German supremacy than a coalition of fleets
or armies. The return, therefore, to a reactionary Con-
servatism, discussed in the previous section, was partly the
reflex, partly the inspiration, of Bismarck's foreign policy.
The disturbing elements in the situation were not con-
fined to Russia. Europe in 1880 was on the threshold of
an era with a very different outlook and ambition. Five
other characteristics can be broadly disentangled--the
Eastern Question, the problem of the Mediterranean, the
renaissance of France, the revived activity and policy of
Great Britain, and the colonial movement. Their com-
bination provided the problem for Bismarck, and his ex-
ploitation of them makes the history of his foreign policy
from 1879 to n*s faH-
After 1878 the Powers were much concerned with the
execution of the terms of the Treaty of Berlin. But the
military occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
question of Dulcigno--' Dulcigno far niente,' as was
wittily said--and similar items of the Berlin programme,
very soon faded into much larger issues--the Roumanian,
Serbian, Bulgarian, and Greek questions; Egypt, Tunis,
Syria and Tripoli. Was the liquidation of the Ottoman
Empire to continue? Who were the lawful creditors of
the estate, if from any quarter a petition in bankruptcy was
seriously pressed? What was to be the dividend, and to
whom and in what shares was it to be assigned? The
Congress of Berlin had proclaimed the integrity of a
'consolidated ' and reduced Ottoman Empire, which like
the immortal' Peau de Chagrin' was always being pegged
out, and was always shrinking in defiance of every effort
to prevent it. Bismarck, therefore, had to decide what
was the interest of Germany in the Near East, and he
found the decision very difficult.
If we may judge from events, everything strengthened
his conclusion in 1879 that safety lay in a firm control of
Austria-Hungary. 1 He could pivot on the Dual Alliance
1 'Germany in view of her own lecurity could not possibly allow Austria to
have any other alliance than with herself. '--(From the Sabouroff Memoirs. )
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? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR 401
more securely than on any other nodal, strategic, and
diplomatic point. The remarkable analysis at the end of
his Memoirs, with all its obvious omissions and veiled
allusions, shows how continuously and with what micro-
scopic diligence he watched and weighed every symptom
in Austrian policy. Austria was essential to Germany, for
if Austria collapsed the Near Eastern Question threat-
ened a catastrophe. The heart of the problem lay there-
fore in this issue: if it was easier to control Austria
than to control Russia--and to secure Russia if Austria
had been first secured--to what extent could Germany
'back the Austrian bill'? That Berlin must back the
bill drawn at Vienna broadly was clear. But the analysis
in the Memoirs and the crisis of 1890 reveal that Bismarck
fully recognised very precise limits to the German credit
placed behind the Austrian draft, and showed that he was
not prepared to support 'an unreasonable Austria' at
the price of a complete rupture with Russia. He decided,
in effect, that Germany and Austria might at some future
date have to part company, under the pressure of events:
and the decision brought him into sharp antagonism with
the new school of policy which made an Austro-German
alliance, co&te que coute, the basis of German policy in the
Near East. (See Holstein's criticisms in Hohenlohe, ii. 451. )
The main argument of that school was profoundly in-
fluenced by the growing ambition to substitute, also coute
que coute, a German ascendency at Constantinople (with
all its illimitable possibilities) for a Russian, a British, or
French ascendency; or, in other words, the integrity and
the revival of the shrinking Ottoman Empire could and
ought to be made a primary German interest. The Mayor
of the Sultan and the Sublime Porte was to be the German
Emperor, in close alliance with Austria. Bismarck between
1879 and 1890 was not prepared to go that length. He
recognised that it involved, for all its advantages, an irre-
concilable breach with Russia, and a serious antagonism to
Great Britain. To the end, while recognising a deepening
German interest in Constantinople and Turkey in Europe,
he had his eyes on the West and France. The ' Austrian
School' at Berlin was really interpreting Centralism in a
B. 2C
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? 402
BISMARCK
way that, in Bismarck's view, might imperil not merely
Germany^ interest in the East but the fundamental basis
of German supremacy in Europe. For Bismarck an
alliance of Russia and France, and the closing of the breach
between Great Britain and Russia, spelled the ruin of a
true system of European policy. The younger generation,
in short, was distinguishing between Bismarckian Central-
ism and a Weltpolitik. They aspired to make Germany a
Wdtmacht--a World-Empire--and not merely a Con-
tinental Power, and they saw the main road winding from
Hamburg through Berlin across the Balkans, through a
Constantinople controlled by Germany to Mesopotamia
and the Persian Gulf, with an entry to the seas not so
closely controlled as the routes down the Channel or
north of the Shetlands; they also saw it reaching across
the Atlantic to the Pacific, expressed in the formula ' ships,
colonies, and commerce. ' And for this young generation
the heart of the position lay in the closest offensive alliance
with Austria. It made Great Britain, not France or
Russia, the great rival of Germany. Bismarck's virtual
reply to such an argument was a paraphrase of Beacons-
field's judgment on Herat and Candahar. 'The Key of
East and West, of Centralism. . and Empire, was not in
Belgrade or Constantinople or Zanzibar--it was in Metz,
Berlin, and Thorn. '
In a more concrete form, the Near Eastern Question
from 1879 to 1890 was summed up in the antagonism of
Austria and Russia in the Balkans, and in the rivalry
between Great Britain and France in Egypt. These two
problems brought the Mediterranean into the main
diplomatic theatre, and kept it there.
By 1878 the isolation of France was proving exceedingly
difficult. The crisis of 1875 had shown that the European
Powers would not tolerate a further reduction of France
or French power; the International Exhibition of 1878
picturesquely mirrored the remarkable extent of France's
recovery from the collapse in 1870. Paris, as in 1867,
was still a great, if not the great, foyer de civilisation,
the attraction of which was inextinguishable. The new
France, working so hard to make good the blunders of the
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? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR 403
Second Empire, would soon be, if she was not already, an
ally worth having. But the Germany that had failed to
crush her or to isolate her completely, and that must fail
to reconcile her because of Alsace and Lorraine, might
divert her gathering strength into directions that would
involve her in a collision with all the possible allies of the
new France. There were three such possible allies--
Great Britain, Russia, and Italy. The colonial movement
combined with the situation in the Mediterranean to give
Bismarck a fine chance of checkmating the rapprochement
so necessary to France and his diplomacy was equal to it.
After 1879 Colonial questions moved sharply and sud-
denly into the forefront of European controversy and
ambition. Africa and the Pacific kept the chancelleries
busy. For Africa was the one great area, of vast extent,
and unlimited possibilities, a continent not yet properly
explored, and not yet finally allotted to, or occupied by,
any great European Power. With 1880 'the scramble
for Africa ' seriously began, and it behove the Powers that
had started late in the foundation of colonies to be quick,
or the one fine field left in a limited world would be over-
run and mastered by the Powers which had started early,
and were already settled at various points on the rim of
the Continent. Everything combined to make the
'African appeal' urgent and critical--the romance of
exploration, the prose of business and trade, missions and
religion, coaling stations, hinterlands and doctrines of
international law, struggling to establish principles which
distinguished spheres of influence, protectorates, treaty
rights, and the nature of actual or virtual possession; and
with these mingled the claims of humanity and the slave-
trade, the rights of races and civilisation,' the white man's
burden,' and the territorial ambitions that underlay the
conception of the State as the incarnation of Power, or the
State as the incarnation of Right and Law. Darkest . and
unknown Africa indeed summed up everything for Europe,
from the selfless heroism of a Livingstone, the stubborn
pertinacity of a Stanley, and the philanthropy of a
Lavigerie to the imperialism of a Rhodes or the syndicates
of gold and diamond companies, the provision of raw
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? 404
BISMARCK
materials for the workshops of Europe, or the cruder
claim to sell bad guns and the poison of potato-spirit in
return for rubber extracted by the lash. And in Africa,
with its harbours and mighty rivers and its stepping-
stones, east or west, might not prescient statecraft call a
new world into existence that would not merely redress,
but completely upset, the balance of the old? Africa
was the whole which developed the rivalries of other and
more purely local areas--for the Mediterranean was a
localised form both of the larger African and the Near
Eastern problems.
The diversion, as distinct from the isolation, of France,
began in 1878. Whether Bismarck first, in the green-
rooms of the Berlin Congress, where so many tempting
whispers were uttered, suggested the idea of France occupy-
ing Tunis, as a compensation for losses elsewhere, or
whether the suggestion fell from Beaconsfield and Salis-
bury, may be a nice question in the origin of things, the
evidence for which is still incomplete; but it is tolerably
certain that France understood after 1878 that, if she did
go to Tunis, Germany and Great Britain would not com-
bine to make the occupation a casus belli, or an occasion
for a humiliating rebuff. In 1881 France accordingly
went to Tunis--with the results that Bismarck at any
rate had foreseen and intended. Great Britain was
already hard pressed by difficulties in Egypt; her relations
with France were becoming strained, and the new Foreign
Secretary at London regretted the virtual pledge of his
predecessor.
That France should quarrel with Great Britain was just
what Bismarck desired, and the causes of quarrel could be
extended by judicious diplomacy inflaming further French
colonial ambitions in Africa, in Siam, Cochin-China, and
the Pacific. The more that France spent in men or
money on colonial expansion, the less she would have for
her eastern frontier in Europe; the more she stared
across the seas the less she would be 'hypnotised by the
gap in the Vosges'; she would not find European allies
by expeditions to the Nile, the Mekong, or the Niger,
but European rivals, whose ambitions would be reflected
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? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR 405
and refracted at London, Paris, Rome, Petersburg,
Brussels, and the Hague: colonial policy and colonial
failures have, moreover, always been since 1660 a fine
dissolvent of ministries in most European States. French
and British ministries would come to grief at home because
French or British expeditions met with reverses on the
Nile or the Niger: France must therefore be encouraged
to suffer a perpetual angina pectoris, in which colonialism
would be an irritant, very shattering to the Republic.
No less beneficial to Berlin and Central Europe, Tunis
and French Mediterranean ambitions brought France at
once into sharp collision with the sister Latin race in Italy.
The kingdom of Italy desired colonies and a sure grip on
the Mediterranean. - The French occupation of Tunis
was a bitter blow. How was France to be prevented from
adding Tripoli to Tunis? And if she had a condominium
in Egypt, what was there left in the Mediterranean for
Italy? An isolated Italy studied the map and the diplo-
matic constellations. Her position was becoming des-
perate. She could not stand alone. But with whom
could she act? A confidential explanation from Berlin
of the terms and meaning of the Dual Alliance of 1879,
made one certainty absolutely clear. 'Unredeemed
Italy' (Italia irredenta)--Trieste and Istria, the Alpine
frontier of the Napoleonic kingdom of Italy of 1810, the
Balkan littoral of the Adriatic were now postponed to
the German Kalends. If Italy could not get these from
Austria single-handed, she assuredly could not get them
by a war in which Germany stood behind Austria. The
Dual Alliance sponged from the screen of the future the
Italian dream of rounding off the unification of 1859 and
1866 by the incorporation of unredeemed Italy or securing
the Dalmatian coast of the Adriatic. And the exposed
shores of the peninsula were vulnerable to sea-power and
to French sea-power, located at Toulon, Corsica, Tunis,
Bizerta--perhaps Egypt. Given the conditions of 1882,
the accession of Italy to the Dual Alliance was--if the invi-
tation were held out from Berlin--a foregone conclusion.
On May 20, 1882, Italy's accession turned the Dual
into the Triple Alliance. The text of the treaty has
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? 406
BISMARCK
never been officially published; but it is certain that in
1882 Italy joined for five years, and that the treaty was
renewed in 1887 and at subsequent intervals, with which
Bismarck was not concerned. It is practically certain that
the three signatory Powers gave a reciprocal guarantee
for the integrity of their respective territories, undertook
to assist each other in the case of attack by any European
Power (i. e. France), and (probably by secret conventions)
agreed to allot with precision the nature and amount of
their respective military contribution to a joint effort.
It is practically certain that no guarantee was given to
Italy either by Germany or Austria of support in a colonial
policy in the Mediterranean or elsewhere, and that Italy
was in no way bound to support Balkan or other adven-
tures of Germany or Austria. The maintenance of the
existing balance of power in the Mediterranean, or the
nature of any future rearrangement of the Mediterranean
situation, probably did not fall within the scope of the
engagements undertaken in 1882.
The wisdom or the inexpediency of Italy's action in
1882 do not call for judgment here; but two other con-
siderations, besides those mentioned, unquestionably
weighed with Depretis and his successors. Alliance with
Berlin was a powerful support to the Quirinal against the
Vatican, and in 1882 the relations of Quirinal and Vatican
were severely strained: if the Dual Alliance made 'un-
redeemed Italy' an affair beyond redemption, the Triple
Alliance made the restoration of the temporal power of
the Papacy and the removal of the House of Savoy from
Rome practically impossible. The annoyance and anger
of Ultramontanism in Italy, Austria and France, and also
in Germany, are the best- proof of this consequence of the
Triple Alliance. Secondly, it did not prevent Italy from
improving an historic friendship with Great Britain, and
obtaining, if circumstances required, the assistance or
protection of the British fleet, with one of its bases
at Malta.
The more strained Anglo-French relations
became, the greater became the likelihood of such assist-
ance; the better Anglo-German relations became, the
better would become the relations of Great Britain and
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? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR
Italy. Italy was, and was desired at Berlin to be, a middle
term between Great Britain and the new Triple Alliance.
To Bismarck the conclusion of the Treaty of May 20,
1882, was the culmination of his system. Henceforward
German hegemony in Central Europe moved securely
on the pivotal point of the Triple Alliance, which gradu-
ally and naturally grew into the one grand combination
in the European State system, with which all other possible
combinations or ententes had to reckon. And for Bismarck
the accession of Italy had every advantage and no disad-
vantages. Italy from 1878 to 1882 was in a restless and
excited state. 1 She might indeed precipitate a crisis
which would upset the carefully poised equilibrium of
Europe. Crises that arise from the action of strong
States are often not as dangerous as the crises provoked
by the recklessness of weak States. Italian policy in 1882
came under the control of the Wilhelmstrasse, and control
was stealthily and relentlessly followed by the moral and
economic penetration of the German bankers, cartels,
syndicates, and commercial travellers. After 1878 the
Ottoman Empire was similarly 'penetrated. ' How
deeply the penetration had pierced in both cases--how
enmeshed had become the finance and the springs of trade
by German wheels and cogs and 'controls'--Italy and
the world learned in 1914. 'Trade followed the alliances,
and the alliances followed trade. '
In 1882 the Kulturkampf was by no means healed. The
agreement of ' May 20, 1882' was a potent schedule to
'the May Laws' of 1873 and 1875. Prussia now had a
rod, steeped in Italian brine, which it could use, if required.
Crispi, who figures so prominently in the later phases of
the story, had known and fought under great and hypnotic
men--Garibaldi and Cavour. At Friedrichsruhe he met
another hypnotic personality and succumbed. Bismarck
and Crispi, exchanging their memories over cigars and
wine at Friedrichsruhe, the old revolutionary of the red-
1 'This whole attitude shows that Italy must not be numbered to-day among
the peace-loving and conservative Powers, who must reckon with the fact. . . .
Every encouragement to Italian policy to join the bellicose and predatory
Powers in Europe is contrary to German interests. '--Bismarck to Prince Reuss
at Vienna, Jap. z8, 1880. --Busch, Bismarck, Hi. p. zn,
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? 408
BISMARCK
shirts and 'The Thousand' and the veteran Junker who
had denounced the journey to Canossa, overthrown clerical
France and Apostolic Austria, were not a pleasant thought,
we may be sure, in the Apostolic chancery of the Vatican.
But Bismarck, in concluding the Triple Alliance, was
not thinking so much of the Vatican or the British fleet,
as of Central Europe and France. The Triple Alliance
completed Central Europe; it closed the Alpine passes;
it barred the great gate to Vienna through which Napoleon
had marched in 1796; it opened the Mediterranean to
Germany; it rent away from France the ally of the sister
Latin race and made it henceforward necessary for her to
keep two of her best corps to guard against invasion
through the Maritime Alps. Best of all, it shivered the
serious menace of 1869 and 1871. France, Austria and
Italy, bound in a common war of revenge, had been a
real danger. Austria had been secured as an ally in 1879;
Italy was secured in 1882. It would take genius on the
one side or bungling on the other to undo the Triple
Alliance. Where were now the possible allies of France?
Great Britain? Russia?
In 1882, with the bombardment of Alexandria, the re-
bellion of Arabi, the fall of Gambetta (January 26), and
the Anglo-Egyptian Campaign, war was more likely than
an alliance between France and Great Britain. The
Triple Alliance, in fact, largely. undid the benefits to
France of the benevolent hint to take Tunis and to take it
at once. In the future Italy's claims in the Mediter-
ranean might be much more serious, if Berlin found it
convenient to give them 'moral' support. Bismarck's
'moral' support was unlike that of most European
Powers. It was only given because he had decided that,
if need be, behind it lay 'the immoral' support of
German force.
And there was another supreme advantage in Bismarck's
eyes. If Austria kept Italy in check, Italy could be used
to keep Austria in vassalage. There was little fear that
Italy, the weakest of the three allies, would break loose,
take the bit in her teeth, and defy Berlin and Vienna,
while France was hostile, and Great Britain vaguely
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? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR
friendly. But there was always a real danger that the
men in the Ball-Platz might lose their heads. Megalo-
mania and folly were hereditary diseases in the statesman-
ship of Imperial Vienna. Modern history was a dreary
record of Austrian blunders--from Charles VI. to Francis
Joseph; we are almost tempted to add from Charles v1.
to Aerenthal, Hotzendorf and Tisza. Italy provided the
Wilhelmstrasse with a very useful curb for keeping the
Ball-Platz 'in hand. ' In that unwritten chapter of the
relations of Berlin and Vienna after 1879 the historical
student of Bismarck's statecraft, provoked by the tempting
glimpses revealed here and there, sighs indeed for a few
weeks uninterrupted work in the archives of Vienna and
the Wilhelmstrasse with an unrestricted general warrant,
entitling him to examine all confidential documents.
Such a search would not merely satisfy a hungry curi-
osity; it would be invaluable in the scientific appreciation
of Bismarck's statecraft. The use of Italy's aspirations in
pruning the rank growth of Austrian appetites is an
obscure chapter in Bismarck's system--but would be an
illuminating one. It might, indeed probably would, fur-
nish an instructive contrast between Bismarck and the
post-Bis marckians.
Italy in 1882 was like Italy in 1866. She had concluded
a treaty which imposed obligations, but conferred prac-
tically no rights. Bismarck had, to a certainty, refused in
any way to endorse in advance the ' Italian draft' on the
future. How far he had cautiously endorsed a very limited
Austrian 'draft' is, as has been pointed out, very un-
certain; but Italian claims and aspirations in Albania or
elsewhere, that so obviously conflicted with an Austrian
programme, could be, and were, used after 1882 to keep
Austria 'in order. ' How far Bismarck's successors de-
parted from the Bismarckian system--how far they
gradually interpreted the articles of association in the very
limited liability company that constituted Bismarck's
Triple Alliance, as constituting a company of unlimited
liability, how far they gradually came to regard it as
practically a Dual Alliance in which Italy made a negli-
gible third, who would not dare to break away, and at the
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? BISMARCK
worst would observe a sulking and peevish neutrality--
it is neither necessary, nor possible, to decide here. But
to Bismarck, the Continentalist in feeling, thought, and
fibre, the Triple Alliance was of supreme importance, for
it secured the Continental position that made the marrow
and bone of Bismarckian Central Europe; and if it was
never easy from 1882 to 1890 to prevent his two allies
from snarling at, or quarrelling with each other, such
management called for all the arts and skill which Bismarck
rejoiced to prove that he had. The position of arbiter
was precisely what he desired, and in the exercise of the
office he was consummate. The Triple Alliance, in short,
was an open re-insurance against the liabilities, deliber-
ately incurred in 1879. But if we may judge from the
copious criticisms poured out in the Hamburger Nach-
richten after 1890, Bismarck was convinced that very
little of his mantle and no double portion of his spirit
had fallen on his successors. It is no less certain that
had Count Herbert Bismarck succeeded in due course, as
his father intended, to the vacant desk in the Wilhelm-
strasse that Hohenlohe and Bulow could have said with
unanswerable truth that the mantle and the double
portion of the Chancellor's spirit had not fallen on the son.
The Triple Alliance was, like all Bismarck's strokes,
aimed at France. It was the policy of isolation and diver-
sion in one. There is substantial reason for believing
that in 1882 a serious attempt was made to include Spain
in the network of alliances. But the attempt, if it was
made--which would have completed the isolation of
France--did not come to a treaty. Spain was left to
'moral penetration' by Germany--and it was effective.
Be that as it may, German emphasis was now laid on the
diversion of France. After 1882 the Republic was quietly
or openly encouraged from Berlin to pursue colonial
aims. In 1881 Bismarck compared Gambetta to a
drummer in the sick-room of Europe. But Gambetta's
fall1 and death, which soon followed, ended the Gambetta
policy of cultivating the good-will of Great Britain, uniting
1 'Gambetta,' says M. Hanotaux, 'had to learn that one cannot in France
defend French interest with impunity. '--La France Contemporaine, 4. 629.
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? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR 411
the Latin races, and making a democratic Republic a power
for democracy in Europe, while keeping the lamp of
revenge at home polished and burning with a subdued
and steady light that at the right moment could flame
into a great national beacon. 'Ne parlez jamais de la
guerre,' Gambetta had said, 'mais pensez-y toujours. '
Gambetta's radical republicanism quenched the ardour of
Russian autocracy for a Franco-Russian entente.
After 1882 Ferry's policy in Egypt and the Far East
steadily estranged France from Great Britain. The Nile
and Tonkin, Madagascar and Siam, caused the French to
forget their hostility to Germany in their hostility to
Great Britain. And Bismarck took care to hold open the
fissure between Great Britain and France. Encourage-
ment to England in Egypt was balanced by encouragement
to France in the Far East and the Pacific. The Foreign
Office in Berlin and the German Embassy in Paris were
prolific in their hints of 'the great man's' sincerity in
wishing France well, while his magisterial experience
was readily placed at French disposal. The French
consulted the oracle freely. The Ferry Ministry in 1884
could say publicly that not for two decades had the re-
lations of France and Germany been so friendly. Such
friendship with good reasons disquieted the Cabinet at
London.
Bismarck certainly hoped that a few years of this con-
ciliation by diversion would wring from a French govern-
ment a stammering renunciation of revanche. A great
and magnanimous speech in the Reichstag from the
Chancellor could then have proclaimed that a generous
and brave nation had wisely closed the account and hence-
forward with Germany's unqualified goodwill and assist-
ance would march in a common work of civilisation--in
which Great Britain must be compelled to yield to the
legitimate rights of the new entente. But, instead of
the stammering renunciation came Ferry's fall (April 2,
1885): a colonial failure sharply awakened France to the
truth that colonies might be colonies, but Alsace and
Lorraine remained the monument of German victory and
French defeat. French ministries henceforward grew
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? 412
BISMARCK
like grass in the green spring and fell like leaves in chill
October; and in the place of the great and unspoken
speech that Bismarck desired to make, we have the
Bismarckian orations of 1887 and 1888, in which France
was held up to Germany as the hereditary, irreconcilable,
and malignant foe in whose vile heart justice and con-
ciliation only whetted the impotent lust of revenge.
Worse still, the colonial movement, Egypt and the diver-
sion of Russia to the Middle East brought on a severe
Anglo-Russian crisis and involved Germany in sharp and
dangerous friction with Great Britain. The year 1884
was a momentous one in French history. It was a far
more momentous one in the history of Great Britain, of
Germany and of Bismarck.
The relations of Great Britain and Germany after 1871
and Bismarck's policy are susceptible of various and contra-
dictory interpretations. Bismarck's dislike of Gladstone
and Gladstonianism is beyond question, for Gladstone's
principles of foreign policy and theory of international
relations, no less than his system of home politics,
represented everything that Bismarck regarded as danger-
ous, detestable or futile,1 and Gladstone's noted radical
distrust of Bismarckianism, which was very apparent
from 1880 to 1885, and was largely, if not mainly, re-
sponsible for the refusal of Great Britain to enter the
German net, was no less strong. Bismarck seems to have
held the view, adopted by many continental statesmen,
that Great Britain as essentially a naval, maritime, and
colonial Power was not, and ought not to be, concerned
with the Continent of Europe. If, therefore, Great
Britain actively intervened in 'purely continental affairs,'
she was taking upon herself matters not properly sui juris,
as well as introducing an unwelcome and incalculable
element into a situation, already sufficiently complicated.
Her very disinterestedness could be disconcerting:
because it made it difficult to conclude material bargains
by material bribes. British Liberalism, in particular,
1 'It is very apparent in the Sabouroff memoirs,' writes Professor Simpson,
who has seen these unpublished papers, 'how uneasy Bismarck was at the
prospects of a Liberal England. '--Nineteenth Century, December iji7,
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? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR
introduced also into international relations ' cant' phrases
and formulae--humanity, the Concert of Europe, the
unity of European moral interests, arbitratior, moral
responsibility, Blue Books, amenability to public opinion,
and 'nations rightly struggling to be free '--and had
always done so from Canning onwards. Great Britain's
intervention in 1875 had been more than disconcerting--
it had led to a serious rebuff: and even more serious had
been the sharp action of the Beaconsfield ministry in the
crisis of 1877-8. A war between Great Britain and Russia
over Constantinople and the Balkans would create an in-
soluble dilemma for Austria, and therefore for Germany.
The steady insistence of'Mr. Gladstone's ministry in 1880
on fulfilling the pledges and terms of the Treaty of Berlin
was very annoying. A Concert of Europe, manipulated by
the Wilhelmstrasse, was one thing--a Concert of Europe
led by Great Britain was another, and did not make for
German hegemony and for peace as Bismarck under-
stood it.
But for all his gibes or snarling innuendoes Bismarck did
not underrate British strength. The British fleet, unlike
the British army, could not be dealt with by ' calling in the
police. ' And Great Britain in some mysterious way had
an uncanny gift for provoking the jealousy yet attracting
the support of European Powers. Bismarck, therefore,
after 1871, aimed mainly at encouraging British goodwill
to Austria and Italy, at keeping France and Great Britain
apart and Russia and Great Britain in strained tension, in
which German good offices could be effectively employed
to maintain the tension, yet prevent a complete rupture.
Down to 1884 Germany and Great Britain could maintain
in theory and phrase the friendliest of relations, for no
direct or serious cause of quarrel between the two Powers
existed. The two Powers might indirectly have divergent
interests in many European questions in which these
European States were largely concerned, but a direct
antagonism in which Great Britain and Germany were
the chief actors had not so far arisen.
The Egyptian question, with all the embarrassments
arising out of the tangle or created by ministerial policy in
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? 4H
BISMARCK
Great Britain, was just what Bismarck could have wished.
It made Great Britain more dependent on German good-
will, and, properly handled with the requisite air of im-
partiality, could separate France and Great Britain and
prevent an Anglo-French alliance. The evidence that
Bismarck would have welcomed a loose Anglo-German
alliance or entente between 1880 and 1890 is suggestive,
but neither precise nor conclusive. Such an 'alliance'
would have been a triumphant codicil to the Triple
Alliance, would have been warmly welcomed in Italy, and
need not have damaged a separate understanding between
Germany and Russia. The interests of Great Britain and
Russia in many respects were not more divergent than
those of Austria and Italy; and it would have been a
powerful aid in emphasising German arguments at
Petersburg. But if Bismarck went so far as to make
direct or indirect overtures, they broke down on
Mr. Gladstone's radical distrust, and no less on the direct
conflict of interest in colonial policy that came to a head
in 1884. In that year Germany was caught up in the
colonial movement.
It was inevitable after 1871 that Germany should begin
to take an interest in colonial expansion, if for no other
reason than that the most powerful of the Continental
States had no colonies, and that colonial possessions were
a proof and a guarantee of strength. German Nationalism,
after 1815, as has been emphasised earlier in these pages,
had found its deepest conviction and most stimulating
nourishment in the consciousness of German impotence
relatively to other great national States. The feeling that
a united Germany could and ought to stand in the world
as a Power, able to stand and speak for Germans as a whole
in the gate of its rivals, and on terms of equality face
France, Austria, Russia, and Great Britain, was overwhelm-
ing and reasonable. Germany had now accomplished
her unification, and the power of the German Empire
after 1871 was an indisputable fact which satisfied to the
full the passionate craving of the once impotent Germany
of the Federal Diet. After 1871 the German nation, like
its Emperor had ' drunk of the chalice of victory and would
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? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR 415
not break it. ' It now desired to be an Empire like other
great Empires--and the Empires with a future had colonies
because the future lay with colonies. Leroy Beaulieu's
remark, that colonies may not be signs of strength to-day,
but that they hold the strength of the future, sums up the
inarticulate German ambition. Just as a man who has
made himself a millionaire by his own efforts desires motor
cars, a fine picture gallery, or historic castles in the country,
not for their intrinsic value, but because they prove that
he is as rich and as powerful as other millionaires, so the
German nation also desired colonies as the appurtenances
and apparatus of Empire--to give them the external
position and framework in the world enjoyed by other
imperial nations.
