No More Learning

That formulation will do, as long as we do not allow "object" and "exercise" to collapse back into the familiar modernist version of phenomenalism--the sensuous reality being rediscovered "here," on the surface, where the picture is made. There is no "here" in painting. Picturing is not a physical matter--least of all in Ce? zanne, in the nine or ten (typical) marks we have been look- ing at. The exercise called picturing is a deep, notional, physically irre- trievable dimension--a dimension of social practice. And the object of the exercise in Ce? zanne is the object posited by that strange line of thought we call eighteenth- and nineteenth-century materialism--by that project pushed and stressed (as it very often was) to its utopian limits. The world of objects reached after in Ce? zanne, and laid before us in all its manifoldness, overtness, and pungency, could hardly signal its counterfactual status more clearly. It is a horizon of meaning, an al- ternative to experience, a contentment with nonidentity. Nobody is saying, least of all me, that such contentment could be lived in more than fitfully.
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The thing to recognize about the sequence of brushmarks, then, is that there is no one point within it at which the phenomenal is dis- placed by the material or "formal. " The displacement is there and not there from the start--in the very first mark of the sequence, supposing the terms first and sequence could ever be stabilized, which they cannot. There and not there all the way through: from (not-)first to (not-)last. This is the Ce? zanne effect. Always, at every point, there appears to be reference to the nth degree, fierce and immediate, punctual, acute: but always the reference is haunted by the fact of its precisely being (only) to the nth degree: that is, a touch or a point or a patch in a merely nu- merical, repetitive, indeed "formal" sequence, of degrees to the nth quantity, with this one only implying the nth--meaning the final, infi- nite place in the series, the nonnumerical, nonrepetitive, unpredictable moment at which reference is secured. This is the anxiety, and also the utopian horizon, that drives the fanatic process forward. The next mark might (somehow) not be a mere sign in a sequence but a true fig- ure of things seen--a figure that cancels the marks preceding, or raises them to a different power.
Interminability and hesitation in Ce? zanne are thus not rooted in an epistemology of addition--though of course some such naive positivism is operative, at the level of ideological framing and self- understanding--but in an (equally naive) Hegelian prevarication, a waiting and hoping for the moment when the addition of units turns quantity into quality. What goes on in practice is not so much addi- tion as erasure: that is what the logic of the nine or ten brushmarks suggests. Or maybe "erasure" is overstressed. Call it "interference," then: a radical (at times a positively melodramatic) interference of each unit with those it is put next to: the hope being, I think, that erasure and interference might save the mere sequence from itself, and make its unities into a world. Ce? zanne is looking for a mark that would not be a further "one" in a series but a kind of "zero," with the power to replace the dab after dab of addition by connectedness and unity--by a truly magical multiplier effect. There is no such mark, of course. Effects like this are beyond painting's grasp. But the fact that they are is precisely what generates vividness in the sequence of marks that concerns us. The sequence is required to show that no feat of painterly energy, no moment of "supreme spontaneity," no demonstration of "intellectualised sensual power," can ever perform the aesthetic conjuring trick. Vividness, then, is the vividness of de- feat. The vividness of procedure. Even this, says the painting, cannot
Phenomenality and Materiality in Ce? zanne 109
secure the phenomenality of the sign. You see why the "even this" had to be so monstrously good.
Therefore, consistency of touch and color, the guarantor of phenome- nality in Ce? zanne, is always in his painting the other face of disequilib- rium or overload, or dispersal of energy. Evenness in his work has a forced, or counterfactual, quality. It is a device, not a condition. Put a Ce? zanne next to a Corot and that is immediately clear.
Writers about Ce? zanne have often felt called on to answer this ques- tion: What, do we think, was going on in the painter's mind during the famous endless minutes he sometimes spent between brushstrokes-- the minutes Vollard and others recall so ruefully? Any answer is going to be figurative. I imagine him looking around, as it were, for a rule to follow for the next mark, and hesitating because he wished not to rec- ognize that no such rule existed. He did not want to know that any next mark he might make would be accurate and inaccurate at once; and accurate above all by reason of what he would do to it--the force he would apply to it more than the sight of it in relation to whatever it was of. Marks respond to each other as rhymes, or beats. But it was ex- actly this being always inside a metric or a rhyme scheme that Ce? zanne would not accept.
Look at the way any sequence of marks, even one that strikes out for the detail of optical experience as unflinchingly as that in Trees and Houses, is overtaken by a logic of contrivance, not perception. Look at the way something so basic and constitutive of painting as "calling on the accidents of process"--which no one in their right mind (certainly not Ce? zanne) objects to--sets off an unstoppable automatism whereby accidents become what the process is directed to as well as by. And the words we need to describe the process are contingency, performance, and will, not necessity, imagination, and "half-conscious instrumentali- ty. " There is a sentence of Roger Fry's that seems to me to sum these things up. I admire it greatly, and find myself disagreeing with it more or less phrase by phrase. "[Ce? zanne's] composition," he says, "at first sight looks accidental, as though he had sat down before any odd cor- ner of nature and portrayed it; and yet the longer one looks the more satisfactory are the correspondences one discovers, the more certainly felt, beneath its subtlety, is the architectural plan; the more absolute, in spite of their astounding novelty, do we find the color harmonies. "16 Felt certainty, absoluteness, architecture, satisfactory correspondence: whatever the noise on the aesthetic message, says Fry, the message
110 T. J. Clark
comes over finally loud and clear. The Ce? zanne I am proposing is one where none of these terms of value applies, and the list of implied con- tingent negatives--I am precisely not going to name them, I want them to go on unappeasedly haunting Fry's positives--is what gives this painting its strength.
I said I did not want to end with an iconoclastic answer to the Ce? zanne problem, but inevitably my rhetoric has drifted that way. Forced and automatism are hard words. I should try to amend their tone. I realize that in putting "accident, performance, and will" in place of "neces- sity, imagination, and openness" I look to be preaching a heartless creed. But what if I settled for the words "practice, exercise, and ob- ject" rather than "spontaneity, experience, and subject"? At least then the ethical balance becomes less clear. We know what violence has been done in the name of the latter triad's brand of organicism. In any case, ultimately I refuse to go along with the notion that an aesthetic of performance and will is, by its nature, less humane and empathetic than one of totality and phenomenon. I do not think it need lead us in Nietzsche's direction. Part of Ce? zanne's importance to me is that in him it does not.
What other direction, then? Answering this question without falling into bathos involves me saying what I think Ce? zanne's art is "about"-- beyond the trying and failing to stay true to the facts of vision, which is certainly a main part of it. I flinch from doing this, or doing so more explicitly than in my description of the Ford Mont Sainte-Victoire, be- cause of course the proposals about the world and our knowledge of it--and I am sure Ce? zanne's art contains such proposals--are deeply embedded in technique. That is part of the pictures' argument. "Track- ing shots are a question of ethics. " Yet if I do not at least sketch an an- swer, I shall have colluded in what seems to me the dreariest remainder of the early-twentieth-century myth of Ce? zanne: the myth of his paint- ings' ineffability. Because a picture is not a proposition does not mean that it cannot be translated into one or more. Technical and ineffable are not cognates.
Let me put side by side the Baltimore Mont Sainte-Victoire Seen from Bibe? mus Quarry (figure 3) and the painting, probably done around the same time, now called A Pyramid of Skulls (figure 8). I re- alize the pairing is tendentious, and that A Pyramid of Skulls is excep- tional in Ce? zanne work; equally, when I suggest that we read the one (more typical) painting in light of the other, I am not meaning to elicit
Phenomenality and Materiality in Ce? zanne 111
some daft detection of a hidden iconography. The two central rocks in the quarry are not disguised skulls, and Mont Sainte-Victoire is neither a skull nor a pyramid. Yet I do want to say that the view from Bibe? mus is at one level a view from the tomb; the skulls intend, by the simple act of pyramiding, to give form to death and therefore survive it. (The pyramid is the first and last form of the aesthetic illusion. )
You see my problem. Because the embedded propositions in Ce? - zanne are so simple and primordial, and so entirely dependent on the ironic feats of matter--of paint--which breathe life and death back into them, putting them into words is exactly betraying "what they have to say" about material existence; and about where the recognition of the human world as one of accident, device, persuasion, and will might ac- tually lead us. Not necessarily, it seems, into a realm of deep nihilism or contingent power. But certainly into some kind of graveyard or charnelhouse.
I died for Beauty--but was scarce Adjusted in the Tomb
When One who died for Truth, was lain In an adjoining Room--
He questioned softly "Why I failed"? "For Beauty", I replied--
"And I--for Truth--Themself are One-- We Brethren, are", He said--
And so, as Kinsmen, met a Night-- We talked between the Rooms-- Until the Moss had reached our lips-- And covered up--our names--
We should not need Ce? zanne's picture Boy with a Skull (figure 9) to know that death is this painter's ultimate subject. Any of the later por- traits would convince us of that. In all of them costume and posture are rigid, and ineffectual, against the surrounding pressure of the void. Nature, in the landscapes, is Emily Dickinson's Moss. It goes on "deathless progressing to no death," "forever decaying and never to be decayed. " Its presence in the folds of Boy with a Skull's stiff tapestry, or on the tablecloth of Woman in Blue (figure 10), is no doubt quietly accurate about its normal place and function in Ce? zanne's bourgeois world. Most people are in no danger of dying for Beauty. Out there, on the other hand, is the mountain above the quarry. Nature reaching our
112 T. J. Clark
lips. Whether its deathly animation is consoling or enraging is some- thing, I believe, Ce? zanne's pictures never stop trying to decide.
NOTES
This essay owes much to conversations with Fred Orton and Kathryn Tuma. For Orton's de Manian reading of Ce? zanne and allegory, see Fred Orton, "(Painting) Out of Time," parallax, no. 3 (September 1996): 99-112. For Tuma's account of Ce? zanne and positivism (much more complex and historically responsible than the one gestured toward here), see Kathryn Tuma, "Ce? zanne, Lucretius and the Late Nineteenth-Century Crisis in Science," Ph. D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2000.
1. Paul de Man, "Hegel on the Sublime," in Aesthetic Ideology (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 111.
2. Paul de Man, "The Resistance to Theory," in The Resistance to Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 10.
3. Paul de Man, "Kant's Materialism," in Aesthetic Ideology, 128.
4. Paul de Man, "Hypogram and Inscription," in Resistance to Theory, 37. 5. Paul Ce? zanne to E? mile Bernard, September 21, 1906, in Paul Ce? zanne,
Correspondance (Paris: Grasset, 1978), 326.
6. My thanks to Maureen Devine and Josephine Shea, head and assistant cura-
tors of the Edsel and Eleanor Ford House, for their patience and helpfulness during my visit there.
7. Richard Wollheim, "Ce? zanne and the Object," paper presented at a confer- ence, "Ce? zanne and the Aesthetic," National Gallery, London, 1996.
8. Paul Ce? zanne to his son, October 15, 1906, in Ce? zanne, Correspondance, 332.
9. Quoted in Kurt Badt, The Art of Ce? zanne, trans. Sheila Ogilvie (London: Faber and Faber, 1965), 181.
10. Paul de Man, "Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant," in Aesthetic Ideology, 88.
11. Roger Fry, "Art. The Post-Impressionists. --II," Nation, December 3, 1910, 402.
12. Georges Lecomte, "L'Impressionisme," Revue de l'E? volution Sociale (May 1892): 217. Compare the following sentence, on Ce? zanne's paintings: "Au temps he? roi? ques du naturalisme, on se plut a` exalter l'e? quilibre incertain de quelques-unes d'entre elles, leur bizarrerie fortuite, comme si l'art pouvait s'accommoder de dis- proportion et de de? se? quilibre. " Lecomte, at this point anarchist and Symbolist in his sympathies, is presumably relaying the terms of his friend Pissarro's enthusiasm for Ce? zanne in the 1870s.
13. See for instance, Clement Greenberg, "Ce? zanne and the Unity of Modern Art," in Clement Greenberg: The Collected Essays and Criticism, ed. John O'Brian (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1986-93), 3:82-91. The fol- lowing sentences (88) sum up the argument: "No wonder he complained to the day of his death of his inability to 'realize. ' The aesthetic effect toward which his means urged was not that which his mind had conceived out of the desire for the organ- ized maximum of an illusion of solidity and depth. Every brushstroke that followed a fictive plane into fictive depth harked back by reason of its abiding, unequivocal
Phenomenality and Materiality in Ce? zanne 113
character as a mark made by a brush, to the physical fact of the medium; the shape and placing of that mark recalled the shape and position of the flat rectangle that was the original canvas, now covered with pigments that came from pots and tubes. Ce? zanne made no bones about the tangibility of the medium: there it was in all its grossness of matter. "
14. Fry, "The Post-Impressionists. --II," 402. 15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
114
Political Thrillers: Hitchcock, de Man, and Secret Agency in the "Aesthetic State"
Tom Cohen
The picture opens with a scene at St. Moritz, in Switzerland, because that's where I spent my honeymoon with my wife. From our window I could see the skating rink. And it occurred to me that we might start the picture by showing an ice-skater tracing numbers--eight--six--zero--two--on the rink. An espionage code, of course. But I dropped the idea.
--Hitchcock to Truffaut
(Teresa Wright) remembered, too, the endless series of word games and puns Hitchcock used to keep his cast and crew entertained.
--Spoto, The Dark Side of Genius
We must bear in mind that, fundamentally, there's no such thing as color; in fact, there's no such thing as face, because until the light hits it, it is nonexistent.
--Hitchcock to Truffaut
There is a road that goes from this notion of Schein to the notion of materiality.
--de Man, "Kant and Schiller"
Why the perpetual motif of writing beneath surfaces in Hitchcock--as a tracing visible, perhaps, by certain spy agencies alone, of letters, carved in the ice? In The 39 Steps, the secret formula is all letters and numbers; we are barely into Shadow of a Doubt when the motifs of telegrams and telepathy interface with a little girl's automaton-like, compulsive reading; Hitchcock, in his first overt cameo in a "talkie" (Blackmail) is interrupted reading on a train--that is, interrupted with- in a stasis within the accelerated semiosis of a cinemallographic shuttle. 1
If these examples among numerous others indicate, point to something else (and such pointing is the blackmailer Tracey's last, accusatory, yet cutoff gesture--as it will be that still of the Hitchcock opus, the last image of Family Plot), they point to an alternate scene of writing that has nothing to do with "pictures of people talking," and everything to do with an attempt to indict, displace, and politically subvert the consumerist logic of mimesis to which the history of film--and for that matter, "film theory"--has been linked.
2 Interestingly, this puts Hitchcock in contact at once with a Benjaminian practice, since the lat- ter's argument that film begins with a divestiture of "aura" is to say that it takes place as the abolition of much of what film theory has striven to restore--logics of identification, primarily, but also Oedipal maps, and the relapse of cultural studies into mimetic codes. This essay will attempt to ask where a rethinking of the trope of "materiality" through the late, and in many ways still unread, work of de Man strikes a strange accord not only with this other Hitchcock--a Hitchcock for whom the mnemonics of inscription has a political import that is irreducible--but with a transformation in the very terms of the cul- ture's hermeneutic program: what is called materiality, to be sure, but also the aesthetic, the political, "light," memory, and so on. Hitchcock's work is traversed with secret agents, yet the term itself, as in the film with John Gielgud and Peter Lorre so named, seems for him to ques- tion an irreducibly material question: that is, in a medium dependent on the projected repetition of old prints and mnemonic inscription-- like film or, perhaps, ideology--what kind of reflexive agency can in ef- fect reach into its own prerecordings to intervene in or alter history, which is at once to say the past and virtual futures?
Careful readers of Hitchcock's Secret Agent--pointedly evoked in the telescope shot of Mount Rushmore in North by Northwest--are not surprised that the turning point of the film is when Gielgud and Lorre end up at a Chocolate Factory in a multilingual Switzerland. The two ineffective and bumbling actants are tracking a "secret agent" tellingly named Marvin (Robert Young), tellingly since Hitchcock's ceaseless recurrence to the syllable Mar- in proper names draws atten- tion to an interrogation of marking that pervades this work. On the success of this disclosure of identity and reflexive chase, the film's nar- rative MacGuffin pretends, the outcome of the first world war will hang, which is to say, the fate of Britain, the "world," and so on. In fact, Marvin will have to be stopped on a train headed for Constantinople-- that is, a trope for Hitchcock of a certain cognitive realization echoed
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116 Tom Cohen
elsewhere in names such as Conway, or Constance, or Conrad, or Victor Constantine (Family Plot). What is interesting is not that it is the American "college boy"--irritating, mock-flirtatious, and overlooked-- who is the deadly agent, but that the Chocolate Factory is itself so misleading. Deafening and machinal, gigantic in its "expressionistic" troping of Lang's Metropolis, the conveyor belts that turn out the "chocolate" also purvey letters, notes in code and transliterated script sent out to all the other spies. The deafening machinal Chocolate Factory with its white-coated mutlilingual Swiss attendants and ridicu- lous gigantic churning wheels is termed the "Spies' Post Office. " The deafening roar is not new to the film: it suggests the reduction of all languages to sheer sound, a kind of Benjaminian reine Sprache, sug- gested in the first murder in Langenthal Kirche (Fritz Lang, language), where again a deafening single organ note and then a giant bell obliter- ate speech and leave us with the close-up shot of an almost deaf ear being shouted into by the linguistically incoherently and obscurely (non)ethnic and many-named General (Lorre).
The chocolate in which spy messages are transposed--like the net- works of puns and repetitions sent out across all of Hitchcock's films, binding them in transformative systems of revision and commentary-- is not just something sweet and tasty, like the bonbon of film entertain- ment itself. We know from related "political thrillers" like the first Man Who Knew Too Much, that this semiotic and migratory black hole is also allied to an eclipsed sun (the skeet-shoot, the fake Temple of Sun Worshipers which parodies a movie house and is the assassin Abbott's front [again, Lorre]), to excrement,3 to little black dogs, and again, in Secret Agent, to obliterating sound, feet, letters, and so on. The "secret agency" pointed at in the title, in short, is a kind of mne- monic trace, neither living nor dead, void of semantic content yet that on which all switchboard relays or translation or even visibility (read- ing) seems to rest. As political thrillers go, the job of Gielgud and Lorre seems inverted: Britain will thrive, the course of the world or world war will be maintained, official history of a sort will seem secure, if Marvin is kept from Constantinople, if the mnemonic network of marking on which cinema and "life" depend is not disclosed, does not alter the material premises of cognition. "Britain," again, names not the good guys for the early Hitchcock, but a certain hermeneutic state of relapse or effacement with elaborate policial networks, much as Marvin in this scenario might well count for the "knowledge" of a critic such as de Man (or, clearly, Hitchcock). What is momentarily disclosed
is the dependency of all programmatized perception on mnemonic pre- recordings, like the record player resting on a toilet in Gielgud's hotel room against the backdrop of which Lorre throws a famous tantrum. And this state has long arms. With Gielgud unable to "act" (in any sense) and Lorre unable to stop acting or acting up (in every sense), and with Marvin speeding on his train (that is, cinema) to Constantinople, it is left for the British spymaster back in London to order an air strike of the train altogether--to brutally intervene in any narrative devel- opment and simply command the latter's total derailment by extra- cinematic means. Not surprisingly within this system of specular doubles on which aesthetic politics here resides--yet on which, in turn, the "world" depends--this is done by a letter, by "old man R," as the master agent is alone named (that is, like the "R" of Rebecca, insignia of a reclaiming repetition that Marvin would break with). The victory of Britain is nothing more or less than the pretended victory of an aes- thetic state over a knowledge of technicity identifiable with Hitchcock's posthuman project.
Thus, when Hitchcock repeats certain names and syllabic or even letteral patterns across his films, they appear to link up in active net- works or mnemonic constellations--not "thematic" motifs so much as trace-chains confirming alternative modes of sense and perception (which is to say, other techniques of reading) at utter variance with the mimeticism of the film commodity. Such repetitions isolate specific signifiers--individual letters or letteral clusters, sounds (often drawn attention to with the phrase "sounds like" inserted into dialogue), vi- sual "puns," and citations--which may operate like monadic and no- madic switchboards whose proliferation continues to alter the afterlife not only of the film texts themselves (their cumulative interpretive lit- erature, their reception), but the literary or cultural mnemonics that they have become embedded in. 4 This operation, in ways a virtual sabo- tage for Hitchcock of interiorist and oculist ideology (which is to say mimeticism tout court), has the added effect of supplanting, exterioriz- ing, transposing the very memory reserve that this oeuvre would have been framed by or staged within. Memory, temporality, will have been or come to be altered. This may be the materialistic and technical crossing that many "political" plots in Hitchcock's "thrillers" covertly point to, circle, and defer. Such a focus finds an unexpected parallel with the "late" essays of de Man as well, where there is a heightened focus on the problems of memory, materiality, and intervention. Of course, in making this connection, an obvious link would be Benjamin,
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118 Tom Cohen
whose treatment of cinema parallels his own revision of allegory, on which de Man draws--and which, in fact, de Man may be seen as a penultimate technician or engineer of on the microtextual, micro- mnemonic level. I will suggest that the problem probed by the "late" de Man as a certain passage, shift, or direction which this project involves--an encounter with a formal aporia as the premise for such a "direction"--is at work in Hitchcock's cinematic project as well, and is purveyed as a political task (and task of translation), one represented by the "villain's" attempted crossing of political borders with a trans- formative and explosive secret that has the potential to alter the world (say, Mr. Memory--a transparent figure of a certain cinematic project-- in The 39 Steps, or the micro-film in North by Northwest). We will ask, in the process, what sort of politics is practiced here, why this en- tails an altered definition of the "aesthetic" itself, and why the statist enemy will be identified not with this or that political ideology (fascist, democratic, capitalist) but with an entire regime of cognition, interpre- tation, and experience governed by what de Man calls, more generally, the "aesthetic state. " Such questions frame, of course, the delayed pub- lication of Aesthetic Ideology,5 as well as the event or nonevent posed by its (impossible) reinsertion in today's alien critical registers.
Cinema, for Benjamin, is not a machine of mimetic reproduction so much as technical analogue of mnemonic orders that project and, im- plicitly, intervene in or alter the perceptual sensorium (which is al- ways already hermeneutically programmed and constituted): a virtual mnemotechnic. In "The Work of Art" essay, Benjamin links cinema to a technology associated with an alteration in the entire history and field of perception ("the mode of human sense perception changes with humanity's entire mode of existence" [222], "the entire spectrum of optical, and now also acoustical, perception" [235]): this "constitutes the shock effect of the film. . . . By means of its technical structure, the film has taken the physical shock effect out of the wrappers in which Dadaism had, as it were, kept it inside the moral shock effect" (238). Later again, we hear of "film with its shock effect" (240). Like "allego- ry," whose covert logic so-called cinema parallels in Benjamin, what is called cinema takes a traditional figure associated popularly with a logic of mimesis. It appears as one model in which the projection of inscriptions appears openly phenomenalized by way of a spectral prejection--one dependent on a naturalized technicity of light that countersigns and regenerates metaphoric premises of cognition (the Greek eidos). It, cinema, rewrites the dependency of consciousness on
the mechanics of memorization, marking "light" itself as a secondary, and not originary, effect. This material problematic informs the plot- ting of Hitchcock's work from The Lodger and The 39 Steps through Spellbound, The Birds, Marnie, and so on, and it is no surprise that Family Plot opens by likening this cinema to a faux se? ance (for which the medium-ghost will be named "Henry"); that is, precisely that hypnopoetic invocation of the putative dead by a putative "present" not for (mere) entertainment or even sham business (both are marked), but to redetermine the past as well as recast the future (Julia Rainbird's lost family progeny and heir, however disastrously). Foremost among these forms of subscripts and secret or unread agencies are bands of names and markers that assert the priority and materiality of a pre- letteral function, the prosthesis of the visible itself. Such include, in Hitchcock's oeuvre: the "bar-series" of slashes or syncopated spacing (the best example being the parallel lines of Spellbound), the chain of names with the syllable Mar- for marring and marking in it (Marnie, Marion, Mark, Martin, Marvin, Margo, and so on). 6 In Hitchcock's so-called political thrillers, what is generally conceived as "home," such as England in the early films, is always also being plotted against by an allegorical stand-in for Hitchcock's work or style. The assassin or saboteur, such as Verloc in Sabotage (who runs a movie theater, the Bijou), always also represents a failed project--let us call it, with the punning "con-" series in mind, or the title, The Man Who Knew Too Much, an epistemological critique of tropes--which is politically aimed at England, at the economy of the home, the hermeneutic state, and so on. We will call that the "aesthetic state"--a de Manian moniker we will return to--for now only noting the political and global histori- cal role given to these plots (in which, before this device was wholly taken over as a device and trivialized, a world-altering event hangs in the balance, such as the start of a "world" war, or the change of a war's outcome).
It is in fact the "villains" who are assaulting this state in the espio- nage films and they, not the "heroes," who represent the world-altering potential of Hitchcock's cinemallographic project--the ability to alter perception, reading, time, the "human. " In the terms of the narratives, such projects will always appear defeated by the "aesthetic state," England and its players or detectives. Mr. Memory (so clearly a mnemo- technic allied to cinema, like the "microfilm" in North by Northwest) will not quite cross the border in The 39 Steps, nor Marvin arrive at Constantinople, and so on. Yet in giving Hitchcock such an itinerary,
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one presupposes a system of formalized signature-effects that, some- how, allows us to connect Hitchcock not only with what is meant by "allegory" in Benjamin but with what seems to have been implied by the material, the prefigural, the inscriptive in de Man. To suggest that this conjunction might profanely illuminate what links cinema with al- legory--"materialistic historiography" and the very prospect of historial intervention in Benjamin through a kind of sabotaging mnemo- technics--is to recall, in a way, that much of "film theory" has con- trived to reinstall what Benjamin saw cinema as (elaborately) terminat- ing or foreclosing; that is, what Benjamin calls aura, implying not only tropes of personification, mimesis, and identification, but implicitly much that had been attempted by a fetishizing use of "gaze" itself.
If much of "film theory" returns us to humanizing and subjectiviz- ing tropes, under the cover of psychoanalytic codes, it regresses to a pre-Benjaminian--which is to say, in his terms, precinematic--topos. 7 This accords in general with that "relapse" or "regression" that de Man finds in the Schillerian effacement and reinscription of the Kantian event viewed as "a materialism much more radical than what can be conveyed by such terms as 'realism' or 'empiricism'" (AI 121). Such appropriating interpretation--more or less systemic--is constitutive in de Man's sense not only of the institutions of "liberal education" but of the aesthetic state. This ghost state without temporal or geographi- cal borders, technically nonexistent, is linked to the institutional grids of mimeticism and historicism, yet it also creates and reconfirms the "human" as a closed interpretive system: such a spectral "state," though it does not exist (like a drug cartel), nonetheless determines referential codes, programs nervous systems and sensoria, enforces hermeneutical programs, and services archival politics that it itself has no means to read or determine. The "aesthetic state" appears struc- tured like Hamlet's Denmark, since its ideological machinery--variant forms of referentialism, pragmatism, empiricism, realism, historicism-- contradicts and is designed to efface a materiality of inscription the facticity of which generates antithetically each linguistic evasion. What would be effaced is the programming, the mnemotechnics, so as to af- firm a putative immediacy of the perceived, of facticity, and so on--yet just this mnemotechnic order is what would have to be assaulted, or al- tered, if the prerecordings of historicism, agency, or for that matter the sensorium were to be ex-posed or suspended.
This gives Hitchcock's kaleidoscriptic system of reading--where the site of machinal memory, imprinting, and projection is allied to
language--an affiliation to Benjamin's problematic of revolutionary action, to the inadequate metaphoric category (again) of "shock" (the bomb on the bus, say, of Sabotage), of which de Man is perhaps unrec- ognizedly the most patient mnemotechnician. In the latter's sense, the traditional category of the "aesthetic"--marginal, secondary, Schillerian "play"--is here constructed to neutralize the field of inscription, of the event: "as a logical conclusion of that, the concept in Schiller of an aes- thetic state . . . would be the political institution resulting from such a conception" (AI 150). De Man will link the "humanism" of Schiller (which stands in for the general hermeneutic regression, or relapse, from the material event, from inscription) to that aesthetic education which still defines "liberal education" today, the university surely, and the "aesthetic state. " The too-familiar scandal, of course, is that what thinks itself liberal, by playing to a hermeneutic evasion (and regres- sion from) the material and nonhuman historical event, the order of in- scription that bars a closed model of interiority, perception, semantics, or the "human" as such, constitutes itself as a coercive and exclusion- ary domain. Pretending to be originary, it represents a relapse (as Schiller to Kant); it values transparency and communication, and the pretense of "liberal humanism," while enforcing a statist system of ex- clusions and foreclosures deemed the nonhuman:
That is how the human is defined also. The human is defined as a cer- tain principle of closure which is no longer accessible to rational critical analysis. . . . To say that the human is a principle of closure, and that the ultimate word, the last word, belongs to man, to the human, is to as- sume a continuity between language and man, is to assume a control of man over language, which in all kinds of ways is exceedingly problem- atic. (AI 151)
The "aesthetic state"--and recall here the root of the term in the Greek aisthanumai, for perception, where the senses are programmed-- exiles the "aesthetic" as mere play, neutralizing dialectical forces, oc- cluding the site of inscription or materiality: "Play means, first of all, Spielraum, the play, the space that you need in order to prevent the dialectical encounter from taking place" (AI 151). It reminds us that the "materiality" of the terrestrial, today, is approaching numerous historical bottlenecks or aporias on the outcome of which the relative- ly short trajectory of the "human" may be determined. Dismantling the "aesthetic state" perhaps extends beyond the MacGuffinesque logics attributed to "capital" today, where much Marxian language is
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still rooted in the ontological-referential epistemologies that the "aes- thetic state" ordains. Accordingly, perhaps the most irreducible agent in Hitchcock's signature-systems, the bar-series, a corrolary to what Benjamin calls "reine Sprache" or de Man aesthetic formalization, ap- pears a tool of disinscription, transforming allegory itself, disrupting every mimetic logic and the sensoria as such, deregulating temporality, however ghostly and officially nonexistent. In the manner of Benjamin's The Arcades Project, in which the word Konvolut names a type of folio, the anamorphic unfolding of sample or minimal texts, one may interrogate de Man's relation to Benjamin around the problematic of "cinema," then proceed to where this interfaces with Hitchcock's aesthetico-political or epistemo-political marking system. Each sus- pends historial trace-chains. As in Benjamin's Theses, the "enemy" linked even to fascism is an epistemo-critical regime of reference, of archivization: mimeticism or mimetic historicism. In addition, a re- configuration of anteriority, of inscription--which is also to say the human, perception, and the material--appears linked to the prospect of a certain passage, on which alternative pasts and futures hinge. When de Man speaks of an "irreversible" direction or passage to a theo- rization that depends on no individual--"there is a road that goes from this notion of Schein to the notion of materiality" (AI 152), "there is a single-directed movement" (AI 133), "pass from that con- ception of language to another conception of language" (AI 132), "the passage from trope . . . to the performative" (AI 132)--I will suggest that he has a particular direction in mind, what Hitchcock calls "north by northwest. "
I
There is a persistent interaction with, and frank attempt to cast off, Benjamin in the "late" de Man--often covert, as when the term aura recurs, or in direct evocations of Baudelaire and the logics of a self- destroying concept of allegory, but also in the plain address of Benjamin's "translation" essay in the only piece devoted to this precursor. 8 The en- tanglement reverts to the site where a certain invocation of materiality is conceived as mnemonic trace, from which in turn the phenomenali- zation of the sign configured as the "aesthetic" (perception or the sen- sorium) appears forgetfully generated. De Man dismisses the tropologi- cal gestures of his nonprecursor, precipitating an inversion: whereas it is Benjamin who will be generally perceived as tropologically open to history (while, in fact, warring with its mimetic-political premise inces-
santly), it is de Man who practically engages the problem of disinscrip- tion, exploring the mnemotechnic use of "materialistic" that Benjamin relies on more and more. De Man insinuates a spectral passage that at- tends this precession of aura, personification, or trope--it is a passage not from one intellectual system to another, but from a closed system of transformative if endless substitution allied to trope (eliciting Heidegger's identification of metaphor with metaphysics), toward a(n) (a)materiality inferred to be protogrammatic, allo-"human," mnemo- technic. What Derrida calls a "materiality without matter," it cannot be mapped referentially. There is "the entire transformational system of tropes" (AI 114) that sustains representation or mimetic ideologies, and there (already) is a "movement" that tries to locate itself in differ- ent indices--an interruption of "movement" as though by itself, like Hitchcock interrupted reading on a train--as if from trope to inscrip- tion, from representation to what precedes apostrophe or prosopopeia (and we will return to the problematic of face in Hitchcock), or in Hegel "from the aesthetic theory of the sublime to the political world of the law" (AI 115). It is the putative movement in or through the structure of an aporia, yet this prospect de Man appears not only to wager but to call "irreversible. "9 In Benjamin, the misleading figure of reine Sprache, "pure language" that is the sheer formalization of all (a)material elements generating linguistic memory, transformation, or effect, will emerge as a site by which an act of (literal) translation pre- cipitates transvaluation.
Why is Hitchcock's cinematic project connected, then, not only to (frustrated) scenes of border crossing--like the end of North by Northwest--but to epistemo-political subversion?
Eduardo Cadava, when commenting on the collusion in Benjamin of the snapshot with Benjamin's trope of shock (or mnemonic interven- tion), reminds us of a "convergence of photography and history, a con- vergence Benjamin often locates within the historiographical event," as well as of a "secret rapport between photography and philosophy. "10 It is in examining the purportedly sublime fiat lux in the Old Testament in Hegel's example that de Man questions what "light" itself functions as: "'Light' names the necessary phenomenality of any positing (set- zen)" (AI 113). Like the eidos ("The idea appears only as a written inscription" [110]), "light" conjures a phenomenality that is the dis- placed effect of signification ("the phenomenalization of the sign" [111]). Light, the aftereffect of a pulsion of shadows that demarcate, like measure or the bar-series, is stripped of its paternal and solar
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promise. It is the effect of a certain techne ? . Light, already, differently, undoes the mimetic ideology--politically compromised through and through--which is built upon the ideology of "light" as its epistemo- logical and metaphorical premise. 11 At times in Hitchcock this appears as overt parody of the solar itself, which too is preceded by this paral- lel bar effect: the assassin Abbott in the first Man Who Knew Too Much takes as his front the false Temple of Sun Worshipers--at which the paying audience, so to speak, worships--or the shot in To Catch a Thief of "mother" putting out a cigarette in a sunny-side-up egg. 12 "Light," in the domain of what pre-cedes the premise of perception or face, like a series of bars or aural intervals, already implies a project of translation before and outside aura, the human, that is itself proto- linguistic, an effect of reine Sprache before vision or any eye itself. 13 This dispossession of "light"--which appears nonoriginary and itself a kind of marking effect--undoes, in its path, not only that logic which centralizes human cognition in an imaginary and naturalized sight but the metaphoric thread against which the promise of (the) "Enlighten- ment" rests. Again, this time on Kant, de Man speaks of a movement from representation to something else, "a passage . . . a shift from a tropological to a different mode of language" (89), from "the phenom- enality of the aesthetic . . . to the pure materiality of Augenschein, of aesthetic vision" (88). This site, at which Benjamin too locates the pos- sibility of epistemo-political intervention, is a translational site atten- dant from the first in Hitchcock's project. It is not incidental that all those scenes in the early spy thrillers occur in an Alpine setting, in the European Babel where English, French, Italian, and German conflict and overlap as sheer sound (as in the Secret Agent scene in the Langenthal church), mutingly regressing to marks and inscriptions. How does the fact, however, that Hitchcock knows this--knows too much, in fact-- alter the politics of his text?
II
If de Man burrows into a technical zone of mnemonic intervention-- of inscription and disinscription--which Benjamin metaphorizes under the rubric of Marxian and "theological" tropes, it is at a price. Of course, Benjamin all but drops the word allegory following the Trauerspiel. For him, it is obvious, the term cannot undergo the trans- lation it names and performs intact, cannot bear and contract the fundamental alteration in the signifying structure of anteriority, in the mnemonic sensorium, that it contrives to name under a literary-
historical figure that, traditionally, like cinema, was supposed to up- hold the precise mimetic or representational system under assault. In Benjamin's sense, allegory presumes a reflexive operation upon itself within a linguistico-epistemological structure. In Hitchcock, this for- malization and reflexive marking refines itself into the effects of a signature-system in general, whose most economic and nonhuman avatar is the bar-series. Here is how Rothman first identified this mark- ing, talking about a shot in The Lodger:
The view is through the bars of the bannister, and the frame is dominat- ed by the bars in the foreground. I call this pattern of parallel vertical lines Hitchcock's / / / / sign. It recurs at significant junctures in every one of his films. At one level, the / / / / serves as Hitchcock's signature: it is his mark on the frame, akin to his ritual cameo appearances. At another level, it signifies the confinement of the camera's subject; we might say that it stands for the barrier of the screen itself. 14
As a performative, this bizarre series appears like the knocking be- neath the table at a se? ance, or like (a)rhythm, measure (metron) as such, at one moment morphing into a precession of "light," seriality (as in the Avenger's murders in The Lodger), spacing, (a)materiality, at another citing repetition or sequential narration. Virus-like, it roams textual surfaces, and may even appear ciphered by letteral names like Lil, or turn up in words ("ill"), proper names (Judy Barton, Barlow Creek), and so on. What de Man posits in "The Rhetoric of Tempo- rality" as an impacting of sign on sign in dedefining "allegory" is de- scribed, in Benjamin, as a negating power of this operation at the very site of (dis)inscription. It partakes of a reflexive shift that Benjamin calls, in the translation essay, "to turn the symbolizing into the sym- bolized. " As Benjamin elaborates it in the Trauerspiel: "(Allegory) means precisely the non-existence of what it (re)presents [Und zwar bedeutet es genau das Nichtsein dessen, was es vorstellt]. "15 This leads to what is finally called "materialistic historiography. " Something emerges here which de Man calls inevitable and irreversible: "then certain linguistic elements will remain which the concept of trope can- not reach, and which then can be, for example--though there are other possibilities--performative. That process . . . is irreversible. That goes in that direction and you cannot get back from the one to the one before. "16
Nonetheless, he allows his attraction to the theoreme of "mod- ernism" to interfere with the unpacking of allegory, which he sees as
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a reflexive and still referential function, supplanting for an abstract content an account of the work's own mode of production. He stops short of the implied "negation" that Benjamin names as the essence of allegory. 17 We have to restore to Benjaminian allegory the intervention- ist agency of "shock," in which that site of production can itself be re- ordered, altered, anteriority reengineered, out of which future "pres- ents" stand to be otherwise (re)produced. Allegory, where or if it exists, would already be dangerous as "an other conception of lan- guage," in its performativity, in which not only sensoria but tempo- rality is engaged otherwise--like a silent warplane formula that Mr. Memory would pass out of the "aesthetic state," sheer exteriority, un- readable letters and numbers.
If de Man will be dependent on a term, similarly to materiality, whose power to reinscribe itself in a flat literary-historical tradition he perhaps underestimates (allegory), he compels it to self-destruct, to turn its negative power on itself beyond the point where Benjamin abandons it or changes horses. The subject of allegory, it turns out, will be called a depersonalized grammar. It disinvests successive subjects, voids personification, precedes prosopopeia. At times, this will itself be viewed as a (mock epochal) shift in the installation of a (mock new) signifying order, that is, as the debris of a certain historial event: "Language as symbol is replaced by a new linguistic model, closer to that of the sign and of trope, yet distinct from both in a way that al- lows for a concatenation of semiotic and tropological features" (AI 116). The banality of this sublime implies the destruction of all models of interiority, including the very trope of the sublime: "The spatial metaphor of exteriority (Au? sserlichkeit) is not adequate to describe the knowledge that follows from the experience of the sublime. The sub- lime, it turns out, is self-destroying in a manner without precedent" (116). In a characterization that has general application, it is said of Hegel that "[a]llegory functions . . . like the defective cornerstone of the entire system" (104). Moreover, it first absorbs the very site of per- sonification (or aura) and interiority:
Allegory . . . is primarily a personification. . . . But this I, which is the subject of allegory, is oddly constructed. Since it has to be devoid of any individuality or human specificity, it has to be as general as can be, so much so that it can be called a "grammatical subject. " Allegories are al- legories of the most distinctively linguistic (as opposed to phenomenal) of categories, namely, grammar. (104)
As emerges in the essay on Pascal, de Man's invocation of allegory at the price of its inapplicability performs a double gesture--at once defining its pragmatic or material operation outside of any mere utility (which is renounced): "To say then, as we are actually saying, that alle- gory (as sequential narration) is the trope of irony (as the one is the trope of zero) is to say something that is true enough but not intelli- gible, which also implies that it cannot be put to work as a device of textual analysis" (61). No use then?
This problem takes on a different political import within an early British film of Hitchcock in which a persistent war on an installed mimetic regime or "aesthetic state" (then called "England") is mobi- lized as a "political thriller"--Sabotage. Here the target of Verloc's sabotage is at one point called the "center of the world" (in London, Picadilly). His front as a spy, however, is running a film house: cinema, in its prefigural logic, is the locus of this politicized assault on the sen- sorium, light, memory, the animal (we will see), and "Britain. " Where "allegory" appears in Benjamin not a mimetic genre but rather a techne ? of historial intervention, the term photo-graphesis suggests a graphics precedent to the eye, or "light" itself. This is the site where film is marked, banally enough, as an endlessly reprojected imprint by an artificial light. One might speak of an allographics or cinemallo- graphics that posits, echoed as the MacGuffin of the plot, the debris of an engineered interaction in which anteriority is exposed as prosthetic and stands to be transformed (one point of Vertigo). Hitchcock's poli- tics is not one of antithetical sides, between us and them, Britain and its (often unnamed) threats, America and its enemies, the "home" and its imaginary others (Shadow of a Doubt, Psycho). Hitchcock's politics--and the great wars, hot and cold, run throughout his films-- does not partake of the specular or fratricidal system of the enemy other, it is not left or right as such, it is already pre- and post-Cold War, regardless. Saboteur shows American industrialists as Nazis, the would-be propaganda short L'Aventure Malgache displays French racism and colonialism on Madagascar as parallel to the German. "Fascism" appears itself located not in a historical-political movement but in an epistemo-critical model and programming, Benjamin's "his- toricism," foundation of the "aesthetic state," the accord between lib- eral humanism and that mimetic ideology which "film" had been for- getfully made as if to itself police (the photograph as reproduction). 18
The exteriority of inscription that de Man associates with the mne- monic trace plays a particularly grammatical role in Hitchcock. The
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"bar-series" that Rothman identified at once pursues and is pursued as the riddle and faux cause of a general amnesia in Spellbound--in rela- tion to which the exemplary subject, Gregory Peck here, appears a cipher or identityless zero or null figure. This complex at once marks and precedes (or even disowns) the pretext of (fratricidal) murder. The "spell" that would as if be broken by this pursuit, or that fails to be broken, is simultaneously that of a general hermeneutic regime (here, Green Manors, or "psychoanalysis" ostensibly), and inversely spelling itself, which demands sequence and grammar--which the "bar-series" virtually precedes as a marking from which all visibility proceeds (and sound, when that series is converted into sequential knocking). What de Man calls exteriority is irreducible in Hitchcock (and sometimes remarked in mocking "exit" signs). Among other things, a machinal logic of inscription bars any return to interiority, subjectivity, aura-- knowing that the hermeneutic impulses of the audience will, in a pre-scripted "relapse," precisely seek to impose such humanizing, closed systems on the text. As a marking motif that constructs, pre- cedes, and suspends visibility, light, or even sequence, the bar-series ap- pears affiliated with all agency, any intervention or disinscription-- that is, the premises of semiosis or "perception. " Without any mimetic function, it nonetheless guarantees the possibility of disinscription and reinscription--like the trope of reine Sprache, which seems aurally evoked (and woven into the plot) in the "Babel" scenes where simulta- neous spoken languages appear as sheer desemanticized sound in the first Man Who Knew Too Much, The Lady Vanishes, or Secret Agent. It is not accidental that, in The Lodger, face has so much difficulty coming into being. The "Avenger's" face is swathed, and when it strug- gles to emerge it has no individual focus, occurring first in relation to the relays of information, and more specifically to typography, the giant news presses and on the box face on the back of a news truck, or else it appears multiple, faces morphing into one another, linked to the telecommunications of the wireless. This allographematic effect which subtends all imagery is also capable of dissolving any mimetic pretense into the play of lines, alternation, shadow, and from its fiat non-lux Hitchcock's cinemallography derives its usurpative (non)authority (and nonauteuriality). It mutes and assumes as banal and instan- taneous everything Benjamin would dramatize as "shock. " The cine- mallographic effect also registers a(n) (a)materiality precedent to any anthropomorphisms--as in the slashing movements of "mother's" knife. In de Man's terms, the bar-series stands not only as the remnant
of a marker that precedes "light" and constitutes a devastation in ad- vance of any aura--like the opening blackout of Sabotage. It is pre- historial. In the rendition of Mr. Memory in The 39 Steps as a music hall performer evocative of the muse Mnemosyne, Hitchcock not only allies his cinemallographics to the earliest "epical" tradition of poetics, but exposes the latter as itself forgetfully premised on the sort of me- chanical inscriptions it is openly theorizing--the secret memorized for- mula that would be smuggled across the borders, there threatening to be turned against the state, cites in advance the micro-film of North by Northwest.
Interestingly, when Jameson attempts to retheorize "allegory" with the Benjaminian legacy in mind, his example is Hitchcock ("Spatial Systems in North by Northwest"). And it is specifically when he re- turns to the bar-series effect he puzzled over inconclusively when earli- er reviewing Rothman's book. 19 Attempting to reclaim Benjamin's evis- ceration of the auratic, Jameson openly aims at "doing away with consciousness, 'character', and the anthropomorphic. "20 It would, that is, empty out the mimetic "contents" of auteurist interpretation tout court:
But [the pine wood scene] is not the only feature of the empty-field se- quence which 'rhymes' with scenes and spaces elsewhere in the film. We must also note the peculiar inscriptions, here, which streak both ver- sions of the empty surface of space--the expanse of the sky fully as much as the expanse of the empty land below. Both are furrowed with a set of parallel lines that is not without some distant affinity with the 'trauma' of Spellbound: the fateful ski tracks in the snow, reproduced by Gregory Peck's fork upon the white linen of the dining-table. The plane leaves its ephemeral traces on the sky fully as much as the empty fields retain the serrated grooves of tractor and plow.