itionary
upheaval
in Germany.
Revolution and War_nodrm
The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in January cast doubt on the Bolsheviks' commitment to democracy.
Wilson
27 See Ullman, Intervention and the War, 172; Carley, Revolu tion and Intervention, 64? 6; and Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 2:241-46.
28 Wilson told Congress in April 1917 that Russia "was always in fact democratic at. heart . . . and the great, generous Russian people have been added . . . to the forces fighting for free- dom. " Quoted i. n N. Gordon Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 42-43; and see also Kennan, Russia Leaves tlze War, 14-26; and Betsy Miller Unterberger, America's Siberian Expedition, 1918-1920:AStudyofNationalPolicy(Durham:DukeUniversity Press, 1956), ? 10.
29 In November, Wilson said to a group of labor leaders, "Any body of free men that com- pounds with the present German government is compounding for its own destruction," and he told his cabinet that the actions of Lenin and Trotsky "sounded like opera bouffe, talking of armistice when a child would know Germany would . . . destroy any chance for the democ- racy they desired. " Quoted in Levin, Wilson and World Politics, 5? 59?
30 See Levin, Wilson and World Politics, 68; Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 156-57, 174"'78; and David W. McFadden, Alternative Paths: Soviets and Americans, 1917-1920 (New York: Ox- ford University Press, 1993), chap. 2.
31 See Cumming and Pettit, Russian-American Relations, 68-74; and Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 253-55.
? ? ? ? The Russian Revolution
grew more concerned after the Congress of Soviets answered his message of congratulations with a bellicose call for world revolution. 32 An image of the Bolshevik regime as hostile and illegitimate began to take shape, and U. S. officials began considering more extensive ways to influence or replace it.
Unlike its British and French allies, however, the United States rejected di- rect intervention until the summer of 1918. Wilson and his advisors, aware of Japanese ambitions in the Far East, did not want to give Japan an opportunity to increase its own influence on the mainland. U. S. leaders also feared that in- tervention would push Russia closer to Germany, and they opposed diverting military assets from the main struggle in Europe. Wilson himself was reluctant to help former tsarist elements regain power: his experiences with the Mexi- can Revolution (discussed in chapter 6 below) having taught him there were limits to what outside forces could accomplish in a revolutionary situation. 33
The breakthrough came in June, when the United States agreed to send troops to support a British and French expeditionary force in northern Rus- sia. 34 The Soviet government tried to head off intervention by offering a se- ries of economic concessions in May, but these gestures did not reverse the growing perception of the Soviet regime as unfriendly and illegitimate. The revolt of the Czechoslovak Legion overcame the rest of Wilson's reserva- tions, and he approved a plan for joint intervention by seven thousand U. S. and seven thousand Japanese troops in July. 35
At the most general level, the U. S. decision to intervene was shaped by Wilson's idealistic faith in the strength of Russian liberalism. Pressure from Britain and France played a key role as well, and Wilson told one confidant
32 Wilson's message had expressed "the sincere sympathy which the people of the United States feel for the Russian people" and pledged that the United States "would avail itself of every opportunity to secure for Russia once more complete sovereignty and independence. " In response, the Soviet government proclaimed, "The happy day is not far distant when the laboring masses . . ? . will throw off the yoke of capitalism and will establish a socialistic state of society. " See Foreign Relations 1918, Russia, 1:399-400; Chamberlin, Russian Revolution, 1:406; and Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 509-14.
33 See Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 323-24, 466-67; and Unterberger, America's Siberian Ex- pedition, 25, 31-33. Wilson compared the Russian and Mexican situations in a speech in June, saying that "we cai! Ulot make anything out of Russia. " Quoted in Eugene P. Trani, "Woodrow Wilson and the Decision to Intervene in Russia: A Reconsideration," journal ofModern History 48, no. 3 (1976), 444?
34 Under pressure from the other members of the Entente, Wilson had briefly approved a proposal for Japanese intervention on March 2, but he withdrew his approval three days later. See Kennan, Decision to Intervene, 46cr-83; and Unterberger, America's Siberian Interven- tion, 3D-34?
35 For Wilson, the intervention in northern Russia was intended to safeguard the allied mil- itary stores, while intervention in the Far East was designed to aid the evacuation of the Czechoslovak forces, but his written orders also referred to helping "steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. " See Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:87-88; and Kennan, Decision to Intervene, chaps. 16-17 and 483-
? [139]
? ? Revolution and War
that he agreed to the intervention because it was an endeavor "upon which [the United States' allies] have so much set their hearts. " Wilson was also encouraged to act by the former tsarist ambassador in Washington and other prominent Russian exiles, and he shared the British and French fear that Russia was falling under German control. U. S. ambassador David Fran- cis had reported that the German ambassador "was practically dictator in Moscow"; British and French officials sounded similar alarms throughout this period. The growing belief that the Bolsheviks were either pro-German or German agents removed the fear that intervention might force Russia and Germany together, and some U. S. officials favored sending troops out of a fear that the Bolsheviks' internal opponents might turn toward Ger- many if they were unable to obtain Allied support. Wilson, who suspected that Japan was going to intervene anyway, decided that a U. S. presence would be the best way to keep Japan's ambitions in check. This objective linked U. S. intervention to Wilson's overall vision of a liberal Russian fu- ture: by preventing foreign powers from controlling Russia's destiny, the U. S. presence would help bring the liberal forces in Russia to the fore. Fi- nally, the plight of the Czechoslovak Legion provided a moral basis for in- tervention, as sending U. S. forces to "rescue" them was consistent with Wilsonian idealism and his commitment to national self-determination. Thus, on July 6, 1918, Wilson finally agreed to send approximately seven thousand U. S. troops to Vladivostok "to guard the line of communication of the Czecho-Slovaks . . . and cooperate with [them]," while stressing "that
there is no purpose to interfere with [the] internal affairs of Russia. "36
japan. For Japan, the Russian Revolution presented both a threat and an opportunity. On the one hand, the revolution threatened Japan's control over the former German territories it had seized at the beginning of the war and jeopardized the favorable concessions it had obtained from Russia in 1916. The Japanese government also worried that foreign intervention in Russia might lead to a long-term increase in Western influence in the re- gion. 37 On the other hand, the collapse of Russian power gave Japan the chance to expand its territorial control and political influence in Siberia and northern China. Given Western interests in the area, however, it had to pur- sue this objective without alarming the other great powers. 38 Japanese mili-
36 See Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 2:262-63, 287-90. On these various motives, see Trani, "Wilson and ? he Decision to Intervene," 442-445; Levin, Wilson and World Politics, 7o-71, 91-95, 109; Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 94- 147-48, and Decision to Intervene, 365--69, 378-79; and Unterberger, America's Siberian Expedition, 30.
37 In addition to a secret defense pact, Russia had agreed to tum over part of the Chinese Eastern Railway to Japan in exchange for military aid. See Morley, Japanese Thrust, 55, 94; Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 312-13; and Ian Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869-1942 (Lon- don: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), 1o6-11.
38 On Japanese ambitions, see Morley, Japanese Thrust, 5o-59.
? ? TheRussian Revolution
tary leaders had begun preparing plans for intervention in Russia within a week of the Bolshevik coup, but they preferred to maximize their own free- dom of action and took no interest in British or French schemes for using Japanese troops against the Central Powers. Instead, Japanese advocates of intervention hoped to obtain an invitation from the United States that would enable them to expand their country's influence without damaging relations with the West. 39
These concerns did not mean Japan was idle. Two warships were sent to Vladivostok in January, and British and Japanese troops went ashore in April after local disturbances left several Japanese citizens dead. Japanese agents were also providing financial and military assistance to Cossack forces in Siberia, as well as to an independent regime in Harbin set up by General Dmitri Horvath, the former governor-general of the Chinese East- ern Railway. In addition, the Japanese government negotiated an agreement with the Chinese government in an attempt to coordinate their actions in the
Chinese Eastern Railway Zone. 40
Pressure to act increased throughout the spring of 1918. In March, Gen- eral Horvath's decision to allow a group of U. S. railroad experts to assist in the managemenfr of the Chinese Eastern Railway spurred Japanese concerns about U. S. influence, while Britain and France again invited Japan to inter- vene "as far west as possible for the purpose of encountering the Germans. " Japanese officials were still divided, however, and the Cabinet refused to move without "the moral and material support of the United States. " And in the event that intervention did take place, the Japanese insisted that they be allowed to command the expedition. 41
By convincing Wilson to act, the Czech uprising removed the main obstacle to Japan's ambitions. The United States proposed that each state limit its forces to seven thousand men and guarantee "not to impair the political or territorial sovereignty of Russia. " Because these conditions threatened Japan's larger objectives, a series of delicate negotiations ensued between the rival factions in Japan and between Japan and the United States. The Japanese gov- ernment eventually fashioned a reply that appeared to satisfy the U. S. condi- tions without significantly restricting Japan's freedom of action, and by October Japan had landed more than seventy thousand troops in Siberia. 42
Soviet Responses. British and French troops began to arrive in northern Russia in July. The Soviet authorities in Archangel were ousted by a pro-
39 Morley, Japanese Thrust, 122-23.
40 Morley, Japanese Thrust, 118-21, 161-65.
41 See Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 2:202-3; Ullman, Intervention and the War, 202; Kennan,
Decision to Intervene, 384; and Morley, Japanese Thrust, 213-16, 226, 229-31 .
4 2 See Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 2:262-63; and Morley, japanese Thrust, chap. 12 and
307-10.
? ? Revolution and War
Entente coup in early August, and some fifty-five hundred U. S. troops joined the European forces in September. The expeditionary force's stated purpose was to guard the military stockpiles and rendezvous with the Czechoslovak Legion, but it soon found itself engaged in combat opera- tions against Bolshevik units. U. S. and Japanese troops reached the Far East in September, along with token British and French contingents, and British units entered Transcaucasia and the trans-Caspian region with the aim of countering German and Turkish influence and protecting the approaches
to India.
Although these activities were not directed against Soviet rule per se, they reinforced the Bolsheviks' impression of imperialist hostility. 43 In addition to undertaking a concerted effort to rebuild Russia's military power, the Soviet government began to move closer to Germany as the threat from the West increased. Germany's desire to evade the Allied blockade and Russia's own economic difficulties led to a trade agreement between the two states in May, and Soviet foreign minister G. V. Chicherin endorsed an earlier Ger- man proposal for intervention in Karelia in August, saying that "an open military alliance was impossible in the state of public opinion, but parallel action irl fact was possible. " Russia's leverage improved as Germany's mil- itary position decayed, and Germany agreed to modify the Treaty of Brest- Litovsk in August. 44
These shifts did not mean that the Bolsheviks had abandoned their revo- lutionary aims. A Soviet diplomat at Brest-Litovsk told his German coun- terpart that he hoped "to start a revolution in your country also," and at the signing of the treaty the Soviet representative said to the head of the Ger- man delegation, "This triumph of imperialism and militarism over the international proletarian revolution will prove only temporary and transi- tory. " Lenin informed his colleagues the Soviet government had violated the antipropaganda provisions of the peace treaty "thirty or forty times," and the Soviets continued their efforts to recruit supporters among cap- tured German and Austrian prisoners of war. 45 Thus, the tilt toward Ger-
43 Lenin told the Central Committee in July that the Czechoslovak Legion's uprising was "one link in the chain long since forged by the systematic policy of British and French impe- rialists to throttle Soviet Russia. . . . What we are faced with here is a systematic, methodical, and evidently long-planned counter-revolutionary military and financial campaign against the Soviet Republic. " Lenin, Selected Works, ):29-30.
44 Lenin wrote in August 1918, "1 shall not hesitate one second to enter into (an] 'agreement' with the German imperialist vultures if an attack upon Russia by Anglo-French troops calls for it. " See Lenin, Selected Works, 3:47; Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:7cr-85; Gerald Freund, Un- holy Alliance: Russian-German Relations from the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the Treaty of Berlin (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1957), 23; Wheeler-Bennett, Brest-Litovsk, 427-46; and Oegras, So- viet Documents, 1:9fH)8.
45 The Soviets convened an "All-Russian Congress of Internationalist Prisoners of War" in April 1918, which Lenin later called "the real foundation" of the Third International. See Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:71-76.
? ? The Russian Revolution
many was merely a temporary expedient, not a fundamental shift in Soviet intentions.
Finally, the foreign powers' decision to intervene dissolved the few re- maining contacts between the Soviet regime and the Entente. An abortive uprising in August and the wounding of Lenin by a member of an opposi- tion party triggered a "Red Terror" by the secret police, as well as a sharp rise in hostility toward the Allied powers. After the British naval attache was murdered by a mob attacking the British embassy in September, the British government promptly detained several Bolshevik representatives in England and harshly denounced the Soviet regime. British, French, and U. S. diplomats were withdrawn in August, and the Soviet government arrested and detained hundreds of Allied citizens in Moscow and Petrograd. At the time World War I ended, therefore, relations between the Bolsheviks and the West were going from bad to worse. 46
The diplomatic history of Soviet Russia and the other great powers dur- ing the first year of Soviet rule supports my theory in several ways. First, foreign states' responses to the revolution were motivated primarily by their concern for the balance of power. The Allies did not intervene in Russia be- cause hostility to Bolshevism per se; rather, they sought to prevent Germany from exploiting Russia's collapse. This preoccupation with the balance of power and the war in Europe helps elucidate why the Entente tried to per- suade the Bolsheviks to reenter the war while simultaneously providing aid to the Bolsheviks' internal opponents. The Central Powers welcomed the revolution for the same reasons that the Entente opposed it, and the emerg- ing alignment between Moscow and Berlin during the final months of the war was an obvious attempt to balance against a commori enemy.
By opening up an enormous power vacuum in Eurasia, the Russian Revo- lution also created tempting opportunities for a number of other states, most notably Japan. Japanese expansion was driven both by the government's own acquisitiveness and by the fear that other powers might exploit the sit- uation if it did not. As one Japanese official put it, failure to act might confine Japan to polking activity "while England and America are getting the gravy. "47 The awareness of Japan's ambitions had a major impact on U. S. pol- icy, and Wilson's desire to rein in Japanese expansion played a key role in overcoming his initial reluctance to intervene. Similar motives were also at work in France; although fear of Germany was the primary factor motivat-
46 On the Red Terror, see Chamberlin, Russian Revolution, vol. 2, chap. 23. Balfour termed the attache's murder an "abominable outrage" and warned that unless Britain received a sat- isfactory reply it would "make every endeavour to secure that [the Soviet government) shall be treated as outlaws by the governments of all civilized nations. " Quoted in Ullman, Inter- vention and the War, 288-91.
? 47 Quoted in Morley, Japanese Thrust, 216.
? ? Revolution and War
ing France's support for intervention in Russia, the French were also worried that inaction on their part would enable the other great powers to supplant their own prewar preeminence-and this worry both encouraged interven- tion and made it more difficult for outside powers to coordinate their actions.
The first year of Bolshevik rule also illustrates how states exaggerate each other's hostility in the wake of revolution. The Bolsheviks were already in- clined to view foreign responses in the most negative way; for example, al- though Allied aid to various non-Bolshevik groups was motivated mainly by the desire to prevent the Central Powers from exploiting Russia's col- lapse, to the Bolsheviks it was evidence of innate imperialist ill will. Simi- larly, the revolt of the Czechoslovak Legion was seen as a deliberate imperialist plot (which it was not), and the Bolsheviks failed to recognize that the Allied military intervention was either in response to local events
(such as the attacks on Japanese citizens in April) or directed primarily against Germany. Given that the Entente Powers were backing the Bolshe- viks' domestic opponents, however, their disavowal of any desire to inter- fere in Russia's internal affairs was clearly disingenuous, and it is hardly surprising that Lenin dismissed their offers of support as a transparent ploy intended to undermine the Soviet regime. 48
In the same way, the Entente saw the Soviet decision to leave the war as unambiguous evidence of Bolshevik perfidy and concluded that the Bol- sheviks were either German agents or under German control. This inference was entirely erroneous: the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had been a bitter pill that the Bolsheviks swallowed with great reluctance. The Entente was also alarmed by the growing ties between Germany and Russia during the spring of 1918, failing to realize that the alignment was formed against the threat of Allied intervention rather than being based on sympathy with Ger- many. Indeed, Lenin believed that Soviet policy should be "equally hostile to the English and the Germans" and eagerly anticipated a revoh.
itionary upheaval in Germany.
Of course, the tensions between Soviet Russia and the outside world were not due solely to these misunderstandings. The Bolsheviks' animosity to- ward the outside world was abundantly clear, and both the Central Powers and the Entente were opposed to Bolshevik rule. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that neither side understood the real motives behind each other's conduct and both drew exaggerated conclusions about their opponents' hostility.
Third, responses to the revolution were shaped by beliefs about the pos- sibility that the revolution might spread. The Bolsheviks rejected the initial
48 Lenin rejected Allied aid offers, saying, "The members of the Anglo-French bourgeoisie are laying a trap for us: 'Just come along, my little dears, and go to war right now. . . . Ger- many will strip you bare . . . and will give us better terms in the west, and incidentally Soviet power will go to the devil. ' " Quoted in Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 502.
? ? ? ? The Russian Revolution
German peace offer on the grounds that a revolution was about to engulf Germany; in other words, they believed that Marxist propaganda, together with the example they had already set, would form a potent offensive weapon that could destroy a powerful opponent virtually overnight. These hopes were soon dashed, however, and Lenin eventually persuaded his col- leagues to ground Soviet diplomacy in the realities of power rather than an unpredictable revolutionary timetable. Similarly, the Entente's decision to intervene was based on exaggerated fears about the strategic implications of the revolution. Advocates of intervention believed the Central Powers could
easily exploit vast areas of Russian territory, while simultaneously arguing that a modest Allied effort would prevent such a calamity. Thus, an unreal- istic sense of what military force could accomplish helped persuade the Al- lied leaders that intervention was both necessary and feasible. 49
Finally, each side's responses were affected by a pervasive lack of reliable information. This problem was due partly to a general breakdown in com- munications within Russia, as well as to the Soviet decision to move most foreign representatives to the isolated town of Vologda. As a result, contacts between the Soviet government and the Entente began to dissolve at pre- cisely the moment when accurate data was most needed. The dearth of trustworthy information hampered efforts to formulate clear and consistent policies, if only because advocates of different positions could not marshal compelling evidence to support their recommendations. 5?
To make matters worse, the information that was available was often mis- leading. Foreign governments were bombarded by intense lobbying from allies, domestic groups, the Czech leaders, and assorted Russian exiles, each conveying "information" intended to sway national leaders in the desired direction. 51 Allied intervention was inspired in large part by the fear that
49 Such views were not universal. Balfour noted that "Russia, however capable of fighting, is not easily overrun. Except with the active good will of the Russians themselves, German troops . . . are not going to penetrate many hundreds of miles into that vast country. " Simi- larly, Wilson reportedly told the British ambassador in May that "no military man with whom he [Wilson) had talked had been able to convince him that there was any practical scheme which would recreate a Russian front. " Quoted in David Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 5:114; and Unterberger, America's Siberian Expedition, 52-53?
;o Thus, Balfour answered complaints about the Allies' indecision by noting that they had "determined their policy as quickly as could reasonably be expected in the face of the vary- ing opinions expressed by their agents, the contradictory reports which poured into them from Russia, and the novelty of the problems presented to them for solution. " Quoted in Ull- man, Intervention and the War, 191-92.
51 KennanarguesthattheformertsaristembassyinWashington"playedanimportantpart in shaping the initial American response to the Bolshevik seizure of power," but former am- bassador Boris Bakhmetev's influence declined sharply after 1918. See Kennan, Decision to In- tervene, 322-23; 36o-61; McFadden, Alternative Paths, 48-50; Linda Killen, "The Search for a Democratic Russia: Bakhmetev and the United States," Diplomatic History 2, no. 3 (1978); and Robert J. Maddox, "Woodrow Wilson, the Russian Embassy, and Siberian Intervention," Pa- cific Historical Review 36, no. 4 ( 1 967).
? ? Revolution and War
Russia was falling under German influence-a belief supported by U. S. am- bassador Francis's report that the German ambassador "was practically dic- tator in Moscow" and the testimony of various anti-Bolshevik groups. The decision to intervene was also driven by the mistaken fear that Germany would try to seize the Allied military stockpiles in Archangel and Vladivos- tok, even though the German troops were hundreds of miles away. Even worse, Wilson agreed to send U. S. troops to Murmansk in order to protect the allied military stockpiles, but the stores were actually in Archangel, and most of the supplies had already been removed by the Bolsheviks. Thus, the purpose for which U. S. troops were originally sent to northern Russia had been rendered obsolete before the expeditionary force even arrived, in a vivid illustration of the inadequate information available on the other side of the ocean. 52
The decision to intervene in Siberia was based on equally inaccurate no- tions about conditions in Russia. Intervention was intended to aid the Czechoslovak Legion and prevent Germany from gaining a strategic ad- vantage, based on the fear that German and Austrian prisoners of war would extend German influence across Siberia or return west to reinforce the Central Powers. A group of Western military attaches led by William Webster and W. L. Hicks reported that the prisoners of war were not a seri- ous threat, but their assessment was not received until the momentum for intervention was far advanced. As Kennan notes, "here again the lack of an
effective orderly arrangement for representation and information-gathering abroad prevented the United States government from assembling and uti- lizing correctly the best information available. " The belief that the Czechs were in imminent danger was equally erroneous, and by the time U. S. troops arrived, the Czech forces had occupied Vladivostok and were aiding military operations by anti-Bolshevik forces. Finally, Wilson's desire to aid "liberal" forces in Russia showed scant appreciation for the chaotic politican situation there, where none of the competing factions could reasonably be labeled "liberal. " Like that of the other members of the Entente, in short, the U. S. involvement in Russia was founded on inaccurate and misleading in- formation from the beginning. 53
52 Wilson himself referred to the situation in Russia as "kaleidoscopic," and complained, "As soon as we have thought out a working plan there is a new dissolution of the few crys- tals that had formed there. " Quoted in Trani, "Wilson and the Decision to Intervene," 454; and see also Ullman, Intervention and the War, 194--95; and Kennan, Decision to Intervene, 41s-19.
53 In addition, a prophetic warning against intervention from the U. S. vice consul in Archangel was delayed in transmission and failed to reach Washington until after the deci- sion had been made. See Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 2:23o-31; Kennan, Decision to Inter- vene, 74-82, 363-65, 4oo-401; Levin, Wilson and World Politics, 104-105; and Unterberger, America's Siberian Expedition, 45-47. On this general point, see Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 190.
? ? ? The Russian Revolution
THE GREAT PowERS AND THE RussiAN CIVIL WAR Why Did Intervention Continue?
As Allied intervention in Russia was motivated primarily by fear of Ger- many, the surrender of the Central Powers in November 1918 should have spurred the Entente to withdraw their troops without delay. 54 Instead, foreign involvement in Russia increased after the armistice, and its objective shifted from defeating Germany to overthrowing Bolshevik rule. Yet Western policy remained inconsistent: the Allies backed several desultory efforts to eliminate Bolshevik rule in Russia while simultaneously engaging in sincere but erratic attempts to reach a modus vivendi with the Soviet regirne. 55 Soviet policy was equally contradictory; while trying to persuade the Entente to recognize their government and to cease its support for the anti-Bolshevik Whites, the Soviet leaders also reaffirmed their commitment to world revolution and conducted a propaganda campaign that reinforced Western suspicions.
Overall, the history of foreign involvement in the Russian Civil War fur- ther supports my central arguments. Soviet Russia and the Entente Powers saw each other as a serious threat, but each expected the threat to collapse quickly if it were challenged. Relations between Russia and the outside world were also affected by rivalries among the great powers, exaggerated perceptions of hostility, and the inevitable uncertainties that accompany a revolutionary upheaval.
TheRiseandFalloftheWhites. BythetimeWorldWarIended,Russiawas already engulfed in a bitter civil war. The Czechoslovak Legion's uprising and the Allied intervention had combined to halt the spread of Bolshevik control in Siberia in 1918, and a coalition of anti-Bolshevik forces set up an All-Russian Provisional Government in Omsk in September. Two months later, a group of tsarist officers ousted the socialist members of the regime and appointed Admiral Alexander Kolchak "supreme ruler" of the White forces in Siberia. 56 Bolstered by British and French assistance and support
54 Lloyd George later wrote that with the end of World War I "every practical reason for continuing our costly military efforts in Russia disappeared," and Winston Churchill recalled that the armistice "had altered all Russian values and relations. . . . Every argument which had led to intervention had disappeared. " See David Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties (London: Victor Gollancz, 1938}, 1:317; and Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis - 1918-1928: The Aftennath (New York: Charles Scribners, 1929), 165-66.
55 In August, the chairman of the British Eastern Committee, Lord Curzon, complained, "The situation is so complex, and the difficulties of arriving at a decision . . . are so great that, in some instances, it would be no exaggeration to admit that there is no policy at all. " Quoted in Churchill, Aftermath, 244? Chamberlin agrees: "One searches in vain . . . not only for a con- sistent Allied policy, but even for a steadfast policy on the part of the individual Allied pow- ecs. " Russian Revolution, 2:151.
56 The origins of the Kolchak regime are described in Richard Luckett, The White Generals: AnAccountoftheWhiteMovementandtheRussianCivilWar(NewYork:Viking, 1971},214-23;
? ? Revolution and War
from anti-Bolshevik exiles, Kolchak's forces launched a major offensive in the spring of 1919. Their advance brought them within six hundred miles of Moscow by May, but a Soviet counterattack in June soon sent Kolchak''s army reeling backacross Siberia. Omsk was abandoned in November, and Kolchak himself was captured and executed by the Red Army in February
1920. 57
A more serious challenge to the Bolsheviks came from the "Volunteer Army" led by General Anton Denikin. Denikin joined forces with several Cossack groups in 1918, and his forces also received considerable military aid from Britain and France. The Volunteer Army began an offensive nn. March 1919 and was only two hundred fifty miles from Moscow by early October. This proved to be the high-water mark of the Whites' fortunes, however. Denikin's troops were repulsed by a Red Army counterattack at the end of the month. The Volunteer Army was soon in full retreat, and Denikin resigned his command and fled into exile in April 1920. His succes- sor, General Pyotr Wrangel, managed to restore the Whites' morale and launch another abortive offensive in June, but the Volunteer Army no longer posed a real danger to Bolshevik rule. 58
The last White offensive was an unsuccessful assault on Petrograd by General Nikolai Yudenich's "Northwestern White Army," a force of roughly seventeen thousand partisans, prisoners of war, and former tsarist officers, based in Estonia. Beginning a mere hundred miles from its objective, the Northwestern Army had reached the outskirts of the city by October 20. Strengthened by reinforcements from Moscow and Trotsky's inspiring leadl- ership, the defenders soon drove Yudenich's forces back across the border, where they were disarmed and disbanded by the Estonian government. 59 Although the Soviet government still faced the remnants of the Volunteer Army and numerous rural revolts, victory over the Whites was virtually certain by the spring of 1920.
W. Bruce Lincoln, Red Victory: A History ofthe Russian Civil War (New York: Simon and Schus- ter, 1989), 234-49; and Richard M. Connaughton, The Republic of the Ushakovka: Admiral KolchakandtheAlliedIntervention in Siberia, 1918-1920(London: Routledge, 1990), 89-101. For evidence that British officers planned the coup that brought Kolchak to power; see Ullman, Intervention and the War, 279-'84.
57 This summary is based on Lincoln, Red Victory, chap. 7; Footman, Civil War in Russia, chap. 5; Chamberlin, Russian Revolution, 2:184-205; Connaughton, Republic of Ushakovka, chaps. 9-12; and Luckett, White Generals, 223-28, 26o-67, 293--99, 307-14, 343-47.
58 See Lincoln, Red Victory, chaps. 6 and 13; Luckett, White Generals, 174-95, 247-60, 271-93, 322-40, 34s-84; Brinkley, Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention, chaps. 6-8; Chamberlin, Russ- ian Revolution, vol. 2, chaps. 27, 32-33, 35; and Peter Kenez, Civil War in South Russia, 1 9 1 9-1920: The Defeat ofthe Whites (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).
59 See Ullman, Britain and the R ussian Civil War, 285, 254-56. See also Lincoln, Red Victory, chap. 8; and Luckett, White Generals, 269-70, 299-306, 314-22.
? ? ? The Russian Revolution
Foreign Involvement in the Russian Civil War. Ironically, although Prime Minister David Lloyd George was extremely skeptical about the merits of in- tervention, Great Britain was more extensively involved in Russia than any of the other members of the Entente. 60 The British reinforced the expedi- tionary force in northern Russia after the armistice, and the Allied troops fought seve? ral engagements against Red Army units before finally being withdrawn in October 1919. 61 There was also a small British contingent in Siberia, reinforced by a battalion from India and four thousand Canadians,
although British activities there were limited to arming and training Kolchak's armies. Britain recognized Kolchak's regime as the legitimate gov- ernment of Russia following his successful offensive in the spring of 1919, but its support dwindled rapidly after the Bolsheviks gained the upper hand. The British mission in Siberia withdrew in March 1920, ending what Lord Curzon, now foreign secretary, termed a "highly discreditable enterprise. "62
In southern Russia, Britain provided extensive military aid to Denikin's Volunteer Army, and British troops occupied Baku, Batum, and Tbilisi after the Central Powers withdrew. British advisors helped train and direct the Volunteer Army, British naval units provided artillery support on several occasions, and British pilots and tank units performed minor combat roles during Denikin's drive towards Moscow. When the Soviet counteroffensive threatened to destroy the Volunteer Army in the fall of 1919, the British helped evacuate the survivors and then withdrew most of their own troops. The remainder departed in June and July 1920, thereby ending direct British involvement in the civil war. 63
60 On November 14, three days after the armistice, the War Cabinet decided "to remain in occupation at Murmansk and Archangel for the time being; to continue the Siberian Expedi- tion; to try to persuade the Czechs to remain in Western Siberia, to give General Denikin . . . all possible help in the way of military material; [and] to supply the Baltic States with mili- tary materials. " Quoted in Brinkley, Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention, 75? British opera- tions in Russia between November 1918 and October 1919 cost over ? 28 million, and Britain also provided between ? 20 and ? 50 million in military assistance to the White armies during the same period! . See Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, vol. 2: Britain and the Russian Civil War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 365-68; Chamberlin, Russian Revolution, 170; and Churchill, Aftermath, 246, 250, 256.
61 The British Commonwealth contributed 6,300 soldiers to the expeditionary force, while the United States and France sent 5,200 and 1,700 respectively. See Ullman, Britain and the Russian Civil War, 2o-28, 178-81, 19o-203; Swettenham, Allied Intervention, 53-54, 7o-82, 187-231; and John Silverlight, The Victors'Dilemma: Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1970), 172-98.
62 Britain and France provided Kolchak with 200,000 uniforms, 500 million cartridges, 2,000 machine guns, 400 heavy guns, 135 airplanes, and a small number of tanks. See Foreign Rela- tions, 1919, Russia (Washington, D. C. , U. S. Government Printing Office, 1937), 389. British units also providled artillery support for the Whites on two occasions. See Ullman, Britain and the Russian Civil War, 28-3- 6, 253-
63 Ullman reports that the Volunteer Army received "more than 1,200 guns and nearly 2 million shells, 6,100 machine guns, 200,000 rifles, 500 million rounds of small-arms ammuni-
? ? Revolution and War
In the Baltic, the British gave direct military aid to the Northwestern Army and to the independent governments of Estonia, Lithuania, andl Latvia. The Royal Navy maintained the blockade of Russia that had been imposed during the latter stages of World War I. It also conducted severaR dramatic raids against Soviet naval bases during the summer of 1919. Lithuania and Latvia fell to the Bolsheviks in January 1919, but artillery sup- port and supplies from British naval forces helped Estonia retain its inde- pendence through the winter. 64
It was the French government that had been first to advocate intervention in Russia in 1918, but the struggle on the western front prevented them from playing a major role. After the war, however, France quickly reaffirmed the Anglo-French convention dividing southern Russia into French and British zones, and dispatched eighteen hundred troops to Odessa in December. Their objective, according to Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, was to achieve "the isolation of Russian Bolshevism with a view to bringing about its destruction. "65 The expedition proved to be a complete fiasco. Poorly in- formed about the chaotic political conditions in Ukraine, the French soon
? fc;mnd themselves facing Red Army units, Ukrainian separatists, and several hostile partisan groups. Efforts to convince the Ukrainians and the Whites to join forces against the Bolsheviks proved fruitless, and the expeditionary force was forced to withdraw in April. 66
Subsequent French involvement was limited to a small contingent in northern Russia, a military mission in Siberia (intended to lead the Czechoslovak Legion), and a training mission that was sent to aid Kolchak. These measures were meant to restore France's prewar position once the Bol'Sheviks were overthrown. However, French influence with Kolchak never equaled that of Great Britain, and the Czechoslovak Legion was a de-
tion, more than half a million complete uniforms, 629 trucks and ambulances, 279 motorcy- cles, 74 tanks, 6 armored cars, 100 aircraft, twelve 5oo-bed general hospitals, 25 field hospi- tals, and large amounts of communications and engineering equipment. " Britain and the Russian Civil War, 212-16. Also see Richard H. Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921, vol. 3: The Anglo-Soviet Accord (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 86-8- 7, 337; Lincoln, Red Victory, 198; Brinkley, Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention, 93-94, 100; and Luckett, White Generals, 259-6<>.
64 The Allied blockade of Russia was originally intended to prevent the shipment of war materiel from Russia to Germany; it was kept in place as a means of weakening the Soviet regime. See Geoffrey Bennett, Cowan's War: The Story ofBritish Naval Operations in the Baltic, 1918-1920 (London: Collins, 1964); and Ullman, Britain and the Russian Civil War, 52-58, 27}
65 See Brinkley, Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention, 75?
66 The French commander later described the expedition as "the complete failure of a ridiculous adventure. " Quoted in Carley, Revolution and Intervention, 176; and see also John Reshetar, The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), esp.
27 See Ullman, Intervention and the War, 172; Carley, Revolu tion and Intervention, 64? 6; and Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 2:241-46.
28 Wilson told Congress in April 1917 that Russia "was always in fact democratic at. heart . . . and the great, generous Russian people have been added . . . to the forces fighting for free- dom. " Quoted i. n N. Gordon Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 42-43; and see also Kennan, Russia Leaves tlze War, 14-26; and Betsy Miller Unterberger, America's Siberian Expedition, 1918-1920:AStudyofNationalPolicy(Durham:DukeUniversity Press, 1956), ? 10.
29 In November, Wilson said to a group of labor leaders, "Any body of free men that com- pounds with the present German government is compounding for its own destruction," and he told his cabinet that the actions of Lenin and Trotsky "sounded like opera bouffe, talking of armistice when a child would know Germany would . . . destroy any chance for the democ- racy they desired. " Quoted in Levin, Wilson and World Politics, 5? 59?
30 See Levin, Wilson and World Politics, 68; Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 156-57, 174"'78; and David W. McFadden, Alternative Paths: Soviets and Americans, 1917-1920 (New York: Ox- ford University Press, 1993), chap. 2.
31 See Cumming and Pettit, Russian-American Relations, 68-74; and Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 253-55.
? ? ? ? The Russian Revolution
grew more concerned after the Congress of Soviets answered his message of congratulations with a bellicose call for world revolution. 32 An image of the Bolshevik regime as hostile and illegitimate began to take shape, and U. S. officials began considering more extensive ways to influence or replace it.
Unlike its British and French allies, however, the United States rejected di- rect intervention until the summer of 1918. Wilson and his advisors, aware of Japanese ambitions in the Far East, did not want to give Japan an opportunity to increase its own influence on the mainland. U. S. leaders also feared that in- tervention would push Russia closer to Germany, and they opposed diverting military assets from the main struggle in Europe. Wilson himself was reluctant to help former tsarist elements regain power: his experiences with the Mexi- can Revolution (discussed in chapter 6 below) having taught him there were limits to what outside forces could accomplish in a revolutionary situation. 33
The breakthrough came in June, when the United States agreed to send troops to support a British and French expeditionary force in northern Rus- sia. 34 The Soviet government tried to head off intervention by offering a se- ries of economic concessions in May, but these gestures did not reverse the growing perception of the Soviet regime as unfriendly and illegitimate. The revolt of the Czechoslovak Legion overcame the rest of Wilson's reserva- tions, and he approved a plan for joint intervention by seven thousand U. S. and seven thousand Japanese troops in July. 35
At the most general level, the U. S. decision to intervene was shaped by Wilson's idealistic faith in the strength of Russian liberalism. Pressure from Britain and France played a key role as well, and Wilson told one confidant
32 Wilson's message had expressed "the sincere sympathy which the people of the United States feel for the Russian people" and pledged that the United States "would avail itself of every opportunity to secure for Russia once more complete sovereignty and independence. " In response, the Soviet government proclaimed, "The happy day is not far distant when the laboring masses . . ? . will throw off the yoke of capitalism and will establish a socialistic state of society. " See Foreign Relations 1918, Russia, 1:399-400; Chamberlin, Russian Revolution, 1:406; and Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 509-14.
33 See Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 323-24, 466-67; and Unterberger, America's Siberian Ex- pedition, 25, 31-33. Wilson compared the Russian and Mexican situations in a speech in June, saying that "we cai! Ulot make anything out of Russia. " Quoted in Eugene P. Trani, "Woodrow Wilson and the Decision to Intervene in Russia: A Reconsideration," journal ofModern History 48, no. 3 (1976), 444?
34 Under pressure from the other members of the Entente, Wilson had briefly approved a proposal for Japanese intervention on March 2, but he withdrew his approval three days later. See Kennan, Decision to Intervene, 46cr-83; and Unterberger, America's Siberian Interven- tion, 3D-34?
35 For Wilson, the intervention in northern Russia was intended to safeguard the allied mil- itary stores, while intervention in the Far East was designed to aid the evacuation of the Czechoslovak forces, but his written orders also referred to helping "steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. " See Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:87-88; and Kennan, Decision to Intervene, chaps. 16-17 and 483-
? [139]
? ? Revolution and War
that he agreed to the intervention because it was an endeavor "upon which [the United States' allies] have so much set their hearts. " Wilson was also encouraged to act by the former tsarist ambassador in Washington and other prominent Russian exiles, and he shared the British and French fear that Russia was falling under German control. U. S. ambassador David Fran- cis had reported that the German ambassador "was practically dictator in Moscow"; British and French officials sounded similar alarms throughout this period. The growing belief that the Bolsheviks were either pro-German or German agents removed the fear that intervention might force Russia and Germany together, and some U. S. officials favored sending troops out of a fear that the Bolsheviks' internal opponents might turn toward Ger- many if they were unable to obtain Allied support. Wilson, who suspected that Japan was going to intervene anyway, decided that a U. S. presence would be the best way to keep Japan's ambitions in check. This objective linked U. S. intervention to Wilson's overall vision of a liberal Russian fu- ture: by preventing foreign powers from controlling Russia's destiny, the U. S. presence would help bring the liberal forces in Russia to the fore. Fi- nally, the plight of the Czechoslovak Legion provided a moral basis for in- tervention, as sending U. S. forces to "rescue" them was consistent with Wilsonian idealism and his commitment to national self-determination. Thus, on July 6, 1918, Wilson finally agreed to send approximately seven thousand U. S. troops to Vladivostok "to guard the line of communication of the Czecho-Slovaks . . . and cooperate with [them]," while stressing "that
there is no purpose to interfere with [the] internal affairs of Russia. "36
japan. For Japan, the Russian Revolution presented both a threat and an opportunity. On the one hand, the revolution threatened Japan's control over the former German territories it had seized at the beginning of the war and jeopardized the favorable concessions it had obtained from Russia in 1916. The Japanese government also worried that foreign intervention in Russia might lead to a long-term increase in Western influence in the re- gion. 37 On the other hand, the collapse of Russian power gave Japan the chance to expand its territorial control and political influence in Siberia and northern China. Given Western interests in the area, however, it had to pur- sue this objective without alarming the other great powers. 38 Japanese mili-
36 See Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 2:262-63, 287-90. On these various motives, see Trani, "Wilson and ? he Decision to Intervene," 442-445; Levin, Wilson and World Politics, 7o-71, 91-95, 109; Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 94- 147-48, and Decision to Intervene, 365--69, 378-79; and Unterberger, America's Siberian Expedition, 30.
37 In addition to a secret defense pact, Russia had agreed to tum over part of the Chinese Eastern Railway to Japan in exchange for military aid. See Morley, Japanese Thrust, 55, 94; Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 312-13; and Ian Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869-1942 (Lon- don: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), 1o6-11.
38 On Japanese ambitions, see Morley, Japanese Thrust, 5o-59.
? ? TheRussian Revolution
tary leaders had begun preparing plans for intervention in Russia within a week of the Bolshevik coup, but they preferred to maximize their own free- dom of action and took no interest in British or French schemes for using Japanese troops against the Central Powers. Instead, Japanese advocates of intervention hoped to obtain an invitation from the United States that would enable them to expand their country's influence without damaging relations with the West. 39
These concerns did not mean Japan was idle. Two warships were sent to Vladivostok in January, and British and Japanese troops went ashore in April after local disturbances left several Japanese citizens dead. Japanese agents were also providing financial and military assistance to Cossack forces in Siberia, as well as to an independent regime in Harbin set up by General Dmitri Horvath, the former governor-general of the Chinese East- ern Railway. In addition, the Japanese government negotiated an agreement with the Chinese government in an attempt to coordinate their actions in the
Chinese Eastern Railway Zone. 40
Pressure to act increased throughout the spring of 1918. In March, Gen- eral Horvath's decision to allow a group of U. S. railroad experts to assist in the managemenfr of the Chinese Eastern Railway spurred Japanese concerns about U. S. influence, while Britain and France again invited Japan to inter- vene "as far west as possible for the purpose of encountering the Germans. " Japanese officials were still divided, however, and the Cabinet refused to move without "the moral and material support of the United States. " And in the event that intervention did take place, the Japanese insisted that they be allowed to command the expedition. 41
By convincing Wilson to act, the Czech uprising removed the main obstacle to Japan's ambitions. The United States proposed that each state limit its forces to seven thousand men and guarantee "not to impair the political or territorial sovereignty of Russia. " Because these conditions threatened Japan's larger objectives, a series of delicate negotiations ensued between the rival factions in Japan and between Japan and the United States. The Japanese gov- ernment eventually fashioned a reply that appeared to satisfy the U. S. condi- tions without significantly restricting Japan's freedom of action, and by October Japan had landed more than seventy thousand troops in Siberia. 42
Soviet Responses. British and French troops began to arrive in northern Russia in July. The Soviet authorities in Archangel were ousted by a pro-
39 Morley, Japanese Thrust, 122-23.
40 Morley, Japanese Thrust, 118-21, 161-65.
41 See Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 2:202-3; Ullman, Intervention and the War, 202; Kennan,
Decision to Intervene, 384; and Morley, Japanese Thrust, 213-16, 226, 229-31 .
4 2 See Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 2:262-63; and Morley, japanese Thrust, chap. 12 and
307-10.
? ? Revolution and War
Entente coup in early August, and some fifty-five hundred U. S. troops joined the European forces in September. The expeditionary force's stated purpose was to guard the military stockpiles and rendezvous with the Czechoslovak Legion, but it soon found itself engaged in combat opera- tions against Bolshevik units. U. S. and Japanese troops reached the Far East in September, along with token British and French contingents, and British units entered Transcaucasia and the trans-Caspian region with the aim of countering German and Turkish influence and protecting the approaches
to India.
Although these activities were not directed against Soviet rule per se, they reinforced the Bolsheviks' impression of imperialist hostility. 43 In addition to undertaking a concerted effort to rebuild Russia's military power, the Soviet government began to move closer to Germany as the threat from the West increased. Germany's desire to evade the Allied blockade and Russia's own economic difficulties led to a trade agreement between the two states in May, and Soviet foreign minister G. V. Chicherin endorsed an earlier Ger- man proposal for intervention in Karelia in August, saying that "an open military alliance was impossible in the state of public opinion, but parallel action irl fact was possible. " Russia's leverage improved as Germany's mil- itary position decayed, and Germany agreed to modify the Treaty of Brest- Litovsk in August. 44
These shifts did not mean that the Bolsheviks had abandoned their revo- lutionary aims. A Soviet diplomat at Brest-Litovsk told his German coun- terpart that he hoped "to start a revolution in your country also," and at the signing of the treaty the Soviet representative said to the head of the Ger- man delegation, "This triumph of imperialism and militarism over the international proletarian revolution will prove only temporary and transi- tory. " Lenin informed his colleagues the Soviet government had violated the antipropaganda provisions of the peace treaty "thirty or forty times," and the Soviets continued their efforts to recruit supporters among cap- tured German and Austrian prisoners of war. 45 Thus, the tilt toward Ger-
43 Lenin told the Central Committee in July that the Czechoslovak Legion's uprising was "one link in the chain long since forged by the systematic policy of British and French impe- rialists to throttle Soviet Russia. . . . What we are faced with here is a systematic, methodical, and evidently long-planned counter-revolutionary military and financial campaign against the Soviet Republic. " Lenin, Selected Works, ):29-30.
44 Lenin wrote in August 1918, "1 shall not hesitate one second to enter into (an] 'agreement' with the German imperialist vultures if an attack upon Russia by Anglo-French troops calls for it. " See Lenin, Selected Works, 3:47; Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:7cr-85; Gerald Freund, Un- holy Alliance: Russian-German Relations from the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the Treaty of Berlin (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1957), 23; Wheeler-Bennett, Brest-Litovsk, 427-46; and Oegras, So- viet Documents, 1:9fH)8.
45 The Soviets convened an "All-Russian Congress of Internationalist Prisoners of War" in April 1918, which Lenin later called "the real foundation" of the Third International. See Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:71-76.
? ? The Russian Revolution
many was merely a temporary expedient, not a fundamental shift in Soviet intentions.
Finally, the foreign powers' decision to intervene dissolved the few re- maining contacts between the Soviet regime and the Entente. An abortive uprising in August and the wounding of Lenin by a member of an opposi- tion party triggered a "Red Terror" by the secret police, as well as a sharp rise in hostility toward the Allied powers. After the British naval attache was murdered by a mob attacking the British embassy in September, the British government promptly detained several Bolshevik representatives in England and harshly denounced the Soviet regime. British, French, and U. S. diplomats were withdrawn in August, and the Soviet government arrested and detained hundreds of Allied citizens in Moscow and Petrograd. At the time World War I ended, therefore, relations between the Bolsheviks and the West were going from bad to worse. 46
The diplomatic history of Soviet Russia and the other great powers dur- ing the first year of Soviet rule supports my theory in several ways. First, foreign states' responses to the revolution were motivated primarily by their concern for the balance of power. The Allies did not intervene in Russia be- cause hostility to Bolshevism per se; rather, they sought to prevent Germany from exploiting Russia's collapse. This preoccupation with the balance of power and the war in Europe helps elucidate why the Entente tried to per- suade the Bolsheviks to reenter the war while simultaneously providing aid to the Bolsheviks' internal opponents. The Central Powers welcomed the revolution for the same reasons that the Entente opposed it, and the emerg- ing alignment between Moscow and Berlin during the final months of the war was an obvious attempt to balance against a commori enemy.
By opening up an enormous power vacuum in Eurasia, the Russian Revo- lution also created tempting opportunities for a number of other states, most notably Japan. Japanese expansion was driven both by the government's own acquisitiveness and by the fear that other powers might exploit the sit- uation if it did not. As one Japanese official put it, failure to act might confine Japan to polking activity "while England and America are getting the gravy. "47 The awareness of Japan's ambitions had a major impact on U. S. pol- icy, and Wilson's desire to rein in Japanese expansion played a key role in overcoming his initial reluctance to intervene. Similar motives were also at work in France; although fear of Germany was the primary factor motivat-
46 On the Red Terror, see Chamberlin, Russian Revolution, vol. 2, chap. 23. Balfour termed the attache's murder an "abominable outrage" and warned that unless Britain received a sat- isfactory reply it would "make every endeavour to secure that [the Soviet government) shall be treated as outlaws by the governments of all civilized nations. " Quoted in Ullman, Inter- vention and the War, 288-91.
? 47 Quoted in Morley, Japanese Thrust, 216.
? ? Revolution and War
ing France's support for intervention in Russia, the French were also worried that inaction on their part would enable the other great powers to supplant their own prewar preeminence-and this worry both encouraged interven- tion and made it more difficult for outside powers to coordinate their actions.
The first year of Bolshevik rule also illustrates how states exaggerate each other's hostility in the wake of revolution. The Bolsheviks were already in- clined to view foreign responses in the most negative way; for example, al- though Allied aid to various non-Bolshevik groups was motivated mainly by the desire to prevent the Central Powers from exploiting Russia's col- lapse, to the Bolsheviks it was evidence of innate imperialist ill will. Simi- larly, the revolt of the Czechoslovak Legion was seen as a deliberate imperialist plot (which it was not), and the Bolsheviks failed to recognize that the Allied military intervention was either in response to local events
(such as the attacks on Japanese citizens in April) or directed primarily against Germany. Given that the Entente Powers were backing the Bolshe- viks' domestic opponents, however, their disavowal of any desire to inter- fere in Russia's internal affairs was clearly disingenuous, and it is hardly surprising that Lenin dismissed their offers of support as a transparent ploy intended to undermine the Soviet regime. 48
In the same way, the Entente saw the Soviet decision to leave the war as unambiguous evidence of Bolshevik perfidy and concluded that the Bol- sheviks were either German agents or under German control. This inference was entirely erroneous: the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had been a bitter pill that the Bolsheviks swallowed with great reluctance. The Entente was also alarmed by the growing ties between Germany and Russia during the spring of 1918, failing to realize that the alignment was formed against the threat of Allied intervention rather than being based on sympathy with Ger- many. Indeed, Lenin believed that Soviet policy should be "equally hostile to the English and the Germans" and eagerly anticipated a revoh.
itionary upheaval in Germany.
Of course, the tensions between Soviet Russia and the outside world were not due solely to these misunderstandings. The Bolsheviks' animosity to- ward the outside world was abundantly clear, and both the Central Powers and the Entente were opposed to Bolshevik rule. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that neither side understood the real motives behind each other's conduct and both drew exaggerated conclusions about their opponents' hostility.
Third, responses to the revolution were shaped by beliefs about the pos- sibility that the revolution might spread. The Bolsheviks rejected the initial
48 Lenin rejected Allied aid offers, saying, "The members of the Anglo-French bourgeoisie are laying a trap for us: 'Just come along, my little dears, and go to war right now. . . . Ger- many will strip you bare . . . and will give us better terms in the west, and incidentally Soviet power will go to the devil. ' " Quoted in Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 502.
? ? ? ? The Russian Revolution
German peace offer on the grounds that a revolution was about to engulf Germany; in other words, they believed that Marxist propaganda, together with the example they had already set, would form a potent offensive weapon that could destroy a powerful opponent virtually overnight. These hopes were soon dashed, however, and Lenin eventually persuaded his col- leagues to ground Soviet diplomacy in the realities of power rather than an unpredictable revolutionary timetable. Similarly, the Entente's decision to intervene was based on exaggerated fears about the strategic implications of the revolution. Advocates of intervention believed the Central Powers could
easily exploit vast areas of Russian territory, while simultaneously arguing that a modest Allied effort would prevent such a calamity. Thus, an unreal- istic sense of what military force could accomplish helped persuade the Al- lied leaders that intervention was both necessary and feasible. 49
Finally, each side's responses were affected by a pervasive lack of reliable information. This problem was due partly to a general breakdown in com- munications within Russia, as well as to the Soviet decision to move most foreign representatives to the isolated town of Vologda. As a result, contacts between the Soviet government and the Entente began to dissolve at pre- cisely the moment when accurate data was most needed. The dearth of trustworthy information hampered efforts to formulate clear and consistent policies, if only because advocates of different positions could not marshal compelling evidence to support their recommendations. 5?
To make matters worse, the information that was available was often mis- leading. Foreign governments were bombarded by intense lobbying from allies, domestic groups, the Czech leaders, and assorted Russian exiles, each conveying "information" intended to sway national leaders in the desired direction. 51 Allied intervention was inspired in large part by the fear that
49 Such views were not universal. Balfour noted that "Russia, however capable of fighting, is not easily overrun. Except with the active good will of the Russians themselves, German troops . . . are not going to penetrate many hundreds of miles into that vast country. " Simi- larly, Wilson reportedly told the British ambassador in May that "no military man with whom he [Wilson) had talked had been able to convince him that there was any practical scheme which would recreate a Russian front. " Quoted in David Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 5:114; and Unterberger, America's Siberian Expedition, 52-53?
;o Thus, Balfour answered complaints about the Allies' indecision by noting that they had "determined their policy as quickly as could reasonably be expected in the face of the vary- ing opinions expressed by their agents, the contradictory reports which poured into them from Russia, and the novelty of the problems presented to them for solution. " Quoted in Ull- man, Intervention and the War, 191-92.
51 KennanarguesthattheformertsaristembassyinWashington"playedanimportantpart in shaping the initial American response to the Bolshevik seizure of power," but former am- bassador Boris Bakhmetev's influence declined sharply after 1918. See Kennan, Decision to In- tervene, 322-23; 36o-61; McFadden, Alternative Paths, 48-50; Linda Killen, "The Search for a Democratic Russia: Bakhmetev and the United States," Diplomatic History 2, no. 3 (1978); and Robert J. Maddox, "Woodrow Wilson, the Russian Embassy, and Siberian Intervention," Pa- cific Historical Review 36, no. 4 ( 1 967).
? ? Revolution and War
Russia was falling under German influence-a belief supported by U. S. am- bassador Francis's report that the German ambassador "was practically dic- tator in Moscow" and the testimony of various anti-Bolshevik groups. The decision to intervene was also driven by the mistaken fear that Germany would try to seize the Allied military stockpiles in Archangel and Vladivos- tok, even though the German troops were hundreds of miles away. Even worse, Wilson agreed to send U. S. troops to Murmansk in order to protect the allied military stockpiles, but the stores were actually in Archangel, and most of the supplies had already been removed by the Bolsheviks. Thus, the purpose for which U. S. troops were originally sent to northern Russia had been rendered obsolete before the expeditionary force even arrived, in a vivid illustration of the inadequate information available on the other side of the ocean. 52
The decision to intervene in Siberia was based on equally inaccurate no- tions about conditions in Russia. Intervention was intended to aid the Czechoslovak Legion and prevent Germany from gaining a strategic ad- vantage, based on the fear that German and Austrian prisoners of war would extend German influence across Siberia or return west to reinforce the Central Powers. A group of Western military attaches led by William Webster and W. L. Hicks reported that the prisoners of war were not a seri- ous threat, but their assessment was not received until the momentum for intervention was far advanced. As Kennan notes, "here again the lack of an
effective orderly arrangement for representation and information-gathering abroad prevented the United States government from assembling and uti- lizing correctly the best information available. " The belief that the Czechs were in imminent danger was equally erroneous, and by the time U. S. troops arrived, the Czech forces had occupied Vladivostok and were aiding military operations by anti-Bolshevik forces. Finally, Wilson's desire to aid "liberal" forces in Russia showed scant appreciation for the chaotic politican situation there, where none of the competing factions could reasonably be labeled "liberal. " Like that of the other members of the Entente, in short, the U. S. involvement in Russia was founded on inaccurate and misleading in- formation from the beginning. 53
52 Wilson himself referred to the situation in Russia as "kaleidoscopic," and complained, "As soon as we have thought out a working plan there is a new dissolution of the few crys- tals that had formed there. " Quoted in Trani, "Wilson and the Decision to Intervene," 454; and see also Ullman, Intervention and the War, 194--95; and Kennan, Decision to Intervene, 41s-19.
53 In addition, a prophetic warning against intervention from the U. S. vice consul in Archangel was delayed in transmission and failed to reach Washington until after the deci- sion had been made. See Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 2:23o-31; Kennan, Decision to Inter- vene, 74-82, 363-65, 4oo-401; Levin, Wilson and World Politics, 104-105; and Unterberger, America's Siberian Expedition, 45-47. On this general point, see Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 190.
? ? ? The Russian Revolution
THE GREAT PowERS AND THE RussiAN CIVIL WAR Why Did Intervention Continue?
As Allied intervention in Russia was motivated primarily by fear of Ger- many, the surrender of the Central Powers in November 1918 should have spurred the Entente to withdraw their troops without delay. 54 Instead, foreign involvement in Russia increased after the armistice, and its objective shifted from defeating Germany to overthrowing Bolshevik rule. Yet Western policy remained inconsistent: the Allies backed several desultory efforts to eliminate Bolshevik rule in Russia while simultaneously engaging in sincere but erratic attempts to reach a modus vivendi with the Soviet regirne. 55 Soviet policy was equally contradictory; while trying to persuade the Entente to recognize their government and to cease its support for the anti-Bolshevik Whites, the Soviet leaders also reaffirmed their commitment to world revolution and conducted a propaganda campaign that reinforced Western suspicions.
Overall, the history of foreign involvement in the Russian Civil War fur- ther supports my central arguments. Soviet Russia and the Entente Powers saw each other as a serious threat, but each expected the threat to collapse quickly if it were challenged. Relations between Russia and the outside world were also affected by rivalries among the great powers, exaggerated perceptions of hostility, and the inevitable uncertainties that accompany a revolutionary upheaval.
TheRiseandFalloftheWhites. BythetimeWorldWarIended,Russiawas already engulfed in a bitter civil war. The Czechoslovak Legion's uprising and the Allied intervention had combined to halt the spread of Bolshevik control in Siberia in 1918, and a coalition of anti-Bolshevik forces set up an All-Russian Provisional Government in Omsk in September. Two months later, a group of tsarist officers ousted the socialist members of the regime and appointed Admiral Alexander Kolchak "supreme ruler" of the White forces in Siberia. 56 Bolstered by British and French assistance and support
54 Lloyd George later wrote that with the end of World War I "every practical reason for continuing our costly military efforts in Russia disappeared," and Winston Churchill recalled that the armistice "had altered all Russian values and relations. . . . Every argument which had led to intervention had disappeared. " See David Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties (London: Victor Gollancz, 1938}, 1:317; and Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis - 1918-1928: The Aftennath (New York: Charles Scribners, 1929), 165-66.
55 In August, the chairman of the British Eastern Committee, Lord Curzon, complained, "The situation is so complex, and the difficulties of arriving at a decision . . . are so great that, in some instances, it would be no exaggeration to admit that there is no policy at all. " Quoted in Churchill, Aftermath, 244? Chamberlin agrees: "One searches in vain . . . not only for a con- sistent Allied policy, but even for a steadfast policy on the part of the individual Allied pow- ecs. " Russian Revolution, 2:151.
56 The origins of the Kolchak regime are described in Richard Luckett, The White Generals: AnAccountoftheWhiteMovementandtheRussianCivilWar(NewYork:Viking, 1971},214-23;
? ? Revolution and War
from anti-Bolshevik exiles, Kolchak's forces launched a major offensive in the spring of 1919. Their advance brought them within six hundred miles of Moscow by May, but a Soviet counterattack in June soon sent Kolchak''s army reeling backacross Siberia. Omsk was abandoned in November, and Kolchak himself was captured and executed by the Red Army in February
1920. 57
A more serious challenge to the Bolsheviks came from the "Volunteer Army" led by General Anton Denikin. Denikin joined forces with several Cossack groups in 1918, and his forces also received considerable military aid from Britain and France. The Volunteer Army began an offensive nn. March 1919 and was only two hundred fifty miles from Moscow by early October. This proved to be the high-water mark of the Whites' fortunes, however. Denikin's troops were repulsed by a Red Army counterattack at the end of the month. The Volunteer Army was soon in full retreat, and Denikin resigned his command and fled into exile in April 1920. His succes- sor, General Pyotr Wrangel, managed to restore the Whites' morale and launch another abortive offensive in June, but the Volunteer Army no longer posed a real danger to Bolshevik rule. 58
The last White offensive was an unsuccessful assault on Petrograd by General Nikolai Yudenich's "Northwestern White Army," a force of roughly seventeen thousand partisans, prisoners of war, and former tsarist officers, based in Estonia. Beginning a mere hundred miles from its objective, the Northwestern Army had reached the outskirts of the city by October 20. Strengthened by reinforcements from Moscow and Trotsky's inspiring leadl- ership, the defenders soon drove Yudenich's forces back across the border, where they were disarmed and disbanded by the Estonian government. 59 Although the Soviet government still faced the remnants of the Volunteer Army and numerous rural revolts, victory over the Whites was virtually certain by the spring of 1920.
W. Bruce Lincoln, Red Victory: A History ofthe Russian Civil War (New York: Simon and Schus- ter, 1989), 234-49; and Richard M. Connaughton, The Republic of the Ushakovka: Admiral KolchakandtheAlliedIntervention in Siberia, 1918-1920(London: Routledge, 1990), 89-101. For evidence that British officers planned the coup that brought Kolchak to power; see Ullman, Intervention and the War, 279-'84.
57 This summary is based on Lincoln, Red Victory, chap. 7; Footman, Civil War in Russia, chap. 5; Chamberlin, Russian Revolution, 2:184-205; Connaughton, Republic of Ushakovka, chaps. 9-12; and Luckett, White Generals, 223-28, 26o-67, 293--99, 307-14, 343-47.
58 See Lincoln, Red Victory, chaps. 6 and 13; Luckett, White Generals, 174-95, 247-60, 271-93, 322-40, 34s-84; Brinkley, Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention, chaps. 6-8; Chamberlin, Russ- ian Revolution, vol. 2, chaps. 27, 32-33, 35; and Peter Kenez, Civil War in South Russia, 1 9 1 9-1920: The Defeat ofthe Whites (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).
59 See Ullman, Britain and the R ussian Civil War, 285, 254-56. See also Lincoln, Red Victory, chap. 8; and Luckett, White Generals, 269-70, 299-306, 314-22.
? ? ? The Russian Revolution
Foreign Involvement in the Russian Civil War. Ironically, although Prime Minister David Lloyd George was extremely skeptical about the merits of in- tervention, Great Britain was more extensively involved in Russia than any of the other members of the Entente. 60 The British reinforced the expedi- tionary force in northern Russia after the armistice, and the Allied troops fought seve? ral engagements against Red Army units before finally being withdrawn in October 1919. 61 There was also a small British contingent in Siberia, reinforced by a battalion from India and four thousand Canadians,
although British activities there were limited to arming and training Kolchak's armies. Britain recognized Kolchak's regime as the legitimate gov- ernment of Russia following his successful offensive in the spring of 1919, but its support dwindled rapidly after the Bolsheviks gained the upper hand. The British mission in Siberia withdrew in March 1920, ending what Lord Curzon, now foreign secretary, termed a "highly discreditable enterprise. "62
In southern Russia, Britain provided extensive military aid to Denikin's Volunteer Army, and British troops occupied Baku, Batum, and Tbilisi after the Central Powers withdrew. British advisors helped train and direct the Volunteer Army, British naval units provided artillery support on several occasions, and British pilots and tank units performed minor combat roles during Denikin's drive towards Moscow. When the Soviet counteroffensive threatened to destroy the Volunteer Army in the fall of 1919, the British helped evacuate the survivors and then withdrew most of their own troops. The remainder departed in June and July 1920, thereby ending direct British involvement in the civil war. 63
60 On November 14, three days after the armistice, the War Cabinet decided "to remain in occupation at Murmansk and Archangel for the time being; to continue the Siberian Expedi- tion; to try to persuade the Czechs to remain in Western Siberia, to give General Denikin . . . all possible help in the way of military material; [and] to supply the Baltic States with mili- tary materials. " Quoted in Brinkley, Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention, 75? British opera- tions in Russia between November 1918 and October 1919 cost over ? 28 million, and Britain also provided between ? 20 and ? 50 million in military assistance to the White armies during the same period! . See Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, vol. 2: Britain and the Russian Civil War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 365-68; Chamberlin, Russian Revolution, 170; and Churchill, Aftermath, 246, 250, 256.
61 The British Commonwealth contributed 6,300 soldiers to the expeditionary force, while the United States and France sent 5,200 and 1,700 respectively. See Ullman, Britain and the Russian Civil War, 2o-28, 178-81, 19o-203; Swettenham, Allied Intervention, 53-54, 7o-82, 187-231; and John Silverlight, The Victors'Dilemma: Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1970), 172-98.
62 Britain and France provided Kolchak with 200,000 uniforms, 500 million cartridges, 2,000 machine guns, 400 heavy guns, 135 airplanes, and a small number of tanks. See Foreign Rela- tions, 1919, Russia (Washington, D. C. , U. S. Government Printing Office, 1937), 389. British units also providled artillery support for the Whites on two occasions. See Ullman, Britain and the Russian Civil War, 28-3- 6, 253-
63 Ullman reports that the Volunteer Army received "more than 1,200 guns and nearly 2 million shells, 6,100 machine guns, 200,000 rifles, 500 million rounds of small-arms ammuni-
? ? Revolution and War
In the Baltic, the British gave direct military aid to the Northwestern Army and to the independent governments of Estonia, Lithuania, andl Latvia. The Royal Navy maintained the blockade of Russia that had been imposed during the latter stages of World War I. It also conducted severaR dramatic raids against Soviet naval bases during the summer of 1919. Lithuania and Latvia fell to the Bolsheviks in January 1919, but artillery sup- port and supplies from British naval forces helped Estonia retain its inde- pendence through the winter. 64
It was the French government that had been first to advocate intervention in Russia in 1918, but the struggle on the western front prevented them from playing a major role. After the war, however, France quickly reaffirmed the Anglo-French convention dividing southern Russia into French and British zones, and dispatched eighteen hundred troops to Odessa in December. Their objective, according to Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, was to achieve "the isolation of Russian Bolshevism with a view to bringing about its destruction. "65 The expedition proved to be a complete fiasco. Poorly in- formed about the chaotic political conditions in Ukraine, the French soon
? fc;mnd themselves facing Red Army units, Ukrainian separatists, and several hostile partisan groups. Efforts to convince the Ukrainians and the Whites to join forces against the Bolsheviks proved fruitless, and the expeditionary force was forced to withdraw in April. 66
Subsequent French involvement was limited to a small contingent in northern Russia, a military mission in Siberia (intended to lead the Czechoslovak Legion), and a training mission that was sent to aid Kolchak. These measures were meant to restore France's prewar position once the Bol'Sheviks were overthrown. However, French influence with Kolchak never equaled that of Great Britain, and the Czechoslovak Legion was a de-
tion, more than half a million complete uniforms, 629 trucks and ambulances, 279 motorcy- cles, 74 tanks, 6 armored cars, 100 aircraft, twelve 5oo-bed general hospitals, 25 field hospi- tals, and large amounts of communications and engineering equipment. " Britain and the Russian Civil War, 212-16. Also see Richard H. Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921, vol. 3: The Anglo-Soviet Accord (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 86-8- 7, 337; Lincoln, Red Victory, 198; Brinkley, Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention, 93-94, 100; and Luckett, White Generals, 259-6<>.
64 The Allied blockade of Russia was originally intended to prevent the shipment of war materiel from Russia to Germany; it was kept in place as a means of weakening the Soviet regime. See Geoffrey Bennett, Cowan's War: The Story ofBritish Naval Operations in the Baltic, 1918-1920 (London: Collins, 1964); and Ullman, Britain and the Russian Civil War, 52-58, 27}
65 See Brinkley, Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention, 75?
66 The French commander later described the expedition as "the complete failure of a ridiculous adventure. " Quoted in Carley, Revolution and Intervention, 176; and see also John Reshetar, The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), esp.
