No More Learning

Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is the greatest of sins. For it
is written (Ecclus. 10:9): "Nothing is more wicked than a covetous
man," and the text continues: "There is not a more wicked thing than to
love money: for such a one setteth even his own soul to sale. " Tully
also says (De Offic. i, under the heading, 'True magnanimity is based
chiefly on two things'): "Nothing is so narrow or little minded as to
love money. " But this pertains to covetousness. Therefore covetousness
is the most grievous of sins.

Objection 2: Further, the more a sin is opposed to charity, the more
grievous it is. Now covetousness is most opposed to charity: for
Augustine says (QQ[83], qu. 36) that "greed is the bane of charity. "
Therefore covetousness is the greatest of sins.

Objection 3: Further, the gravity of a sin is indicated by its being
incurable: wherefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is said to be most
grievous, because it is irremissible. But covetousness is an incurable
sin: hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "old age and
helplessness of any kind make men illiberal. " Therefore covetousness is
the most grievous of sins.

Objection 4: Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:5) that covetousness is
"a serving of idols. " Now idolatry is reckoned among the most grievous
sins. Therefore covetousness is also.

On the contrary, Adultery is a more grievous sin than theft, according
to Prov. 6:30. But theft pertains to covetousness. Therefore
covetousness is not the most grievous of sins.

I answer that, Every sin, from the very fact that it is an evil,
consists in the corruption or privation of some good: while, in so far
as it is voluntary, it consists in the desire of some good.
Consequently the order of sins may be considered in two ways. First, on
the part of the good that is despised or corrupted by sin, and then the
greater the good the graver the sin. From this point of view a sin that
is against God is most grievous; after this comes a sin that is
committed against a man's person, and after this comes a sin against
external things, which are deputed to man's use, and this seems to
belong to covetousness. Secondly, the degrees of sin may be considered
on the part of the good to which the human appetite is inordinately
subjected; and then the lesser the good, the more deformed is the sin:
for it is more shameful to be subject to a lower than to a higher good.
Now the good of external things is the lowest of human goods: since it
is less than the good of the body, and this is less than the good of
the soul, which is less than the Divine good. From this point of view
the sin of covetousness, whereby the human appetite is subjected even
to external things, has in a way a greater deformity. Since, however,
corruption or privation of good is the formal element in sin, while
conversion to a mutable good is the material element, the gravity of
the sin is to be judged from the point of view of the good corrupted,
rather than from that of the good to which the appetite is subjected.
Hence we must assert that covetousness is not simply the most grievous
of sins.

Reply to Objection 1: These authorities speak of covetousness on the
part of the good to which the appetite is subjected. Hence (Ecclus.
10:10) it is given as a reason that the covetous man "setteth his own
soul to sale"; because, to wit, he exposes his soul---that is, his
life---to danger for the sake of money. Hence the text continues:
"Because while he liveth he hath cast away"---that is, despised---"his
bowels," in order to make money. Tully also adds that it is the mark of
a "narrow mind," namely, that one be willing to be subject to money.

Reply to Objection 2: Augustine is taking greed generally, in reference
to any temporal good, not in its special acceptation for covetousness:
because greed for any temporal good is the bane of charity, inasmuch as
a man turns away from the Divine good through cleaving to a temporal
good.

Reply to Objection 3: The sin against the Holy Ghost is incurable in
one way, covetousness in another. For the sin against the Holy Ghost is
incurable by reason of contempt: for instance, because a man contemns
God's mercy, or His justice, or some one of those things whereby man's
sins are healed: wherefore incurability of this kind points to the
greater gravity of the sin. on the other hand, covetousness is
incurable on the part of a human defect; a thing which human nature
ever seeks to remedy, since the more deficient one is the more one
seeks relief from external things, and consequently the more one gives
way to covetousness. Hence incurability of this kind is an indication
not of the sin being more grievous, but of its being somewhat more
dangerous.

Reply to Objection 4: Covetousness is compared to idolatry on account
of a certain likeness that it bears to it: because the covetous man,
like the idolater, subjects himself to an external creature, though not
in the same way. For the idolater subjects himself to an external
creature by paying it Divine honor, whereas the covetous man subjects
himself to an external creature by desiring it immoderately for use,
not for worship. Hence it does not follow that covetousness is as
grievous a sin as idolatry.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether covetousness is a spiritual sin?

Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a spiritual sin. For
spiritual sins seem to regard spiritual goods. But the matter of
covetousness is bodily goods, namely, external riches. Therefore
covetousness is not a spiritual sin.

Objection 2: Further, spiritual sin is condivided with sin of the
flesh. Now covetousness is seemingly a sin of the flesh, for it results
from the corruption of the flesh, as instanced in old people who,
through corruption of carnal nature, fall into covetousness. Therefore
covetousness is not a spiritual sin.

Objection 3: Further, a sin of the flesh is one by which man's body is
disordered, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 6:18), "He
that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body. " Now
covetousness disturbs man even in his body; wherefore Chrysostom (Hom.
xxix in Matth. ) compares the covetous man to the man who was possessed
by the devil (Mk. 5) and was troubled in body. Therefore covetousness
seems not to be a spiritual sin.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers covetousness among
spiritual vices.

I answer that, Sins are seated chiefly in the affections: and all the
affections or passions of the soul have their term in pleasure and
sorrow, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 5). Now some pleasures
are carnal and some spiritual. Carnal pleasures are those which are
consummated in the carnal senses---for instance, the pleasures of the
table and sexual pleasures: while spiritual pleasures are those which
are consummated in the mere apprehension of the soul. Accordingly, sins
of the flesh are those which are consummated in carnal pleasures, while
spiritual sins are consummated in pleasures of the spirit without
pleasure of the flesh. Such is covetousness: for the covetous man takes
pleasure in the consideration of himself as a possessor of riches.
Therefore covetousness is a spiritual sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Covetousness with regard to a bodily object seeks
the pleasure, not of the body but only of the soul, forasmuch as a man
takes pleasure in the fact that he possesses riches: wherefore it is
not a sin of the flesh. Nevertheless by reason of its object it is a
mean between purely spiritual sins, which seek spiritual pleasure in
respect of spiritual objects (thus pride is about excellence), and
purely carnal sins, which seek a purely bodily pleasure in respect of a
bodily object.

Reply to Objection 2: Movement takes its species from the term
"whereto" and not from the term "wherefrom. " Hence a vice of the flesh
is so called from its tending to a pleasure of the flesh, and not from
its originating in some defect of the flesh.

Reply to Objection 3: Chrysostom compares a covetous man to the man who
was possessed by the devil, not that the former is troubled in the
flesh in the same way as the latter, but by way of contrast, since
while the possessed man, of whom we read in Mk. 5, stripped himself,
the covetous man loads himself with an excess of riches.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether covetousness is a capital vice?

Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a capital vice. For
covetousness is opposed to liberality as the mean, and to prodigality
as extreme. But neither is liberality a principal virtue, nor
prodigality a capital vice. Therefore covetousness also should not be
reckoned a capital vice.

Objection 2: Further, as stated above ([3251]FS, Q[84], AA[3],4), those
vices are called capital which have principal ends, to which the ends
of other vices are directed. But this does not apply to covetousness:
since riches have the aspect, not of an end, but rather of something
directed to an end, as stated in Ethic. i, 5. Therefore covetousness is
not a capital vice.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xv), that "covetousness
arises sometimes from pride, sometimes from fear. For there are those
who, when they think that they lack the needful for their expenses,
allow the mind to give way to covetousness. And there are others who,
wishing to be thought more of, are incited to greed for other people's
property. " Therefore covetousness arises from other vices instead of
being a capital vice in respect of other vices.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) reckons covetousness among the
capital vices.

I answer that, As stated in the Second Objection, a capital vice is one
which under the aspect of end gives rise to other vices: because when
an end is very desirable, the result is that through desire thereof man
sets about doing many things either good or evil. Now the most
desirable end is happiness or felicity, which is the last end of human
life, as stated above ([3252]FS, Q[1], AA[4],7,8): wherefore the more a
thing is furnished with the conditions of happiness, the more desirable
it is. Also one of the conditions of happiness is that it be
self-sufficing, else it would not set man's appetite at rest, as the
last end does. Now riches give great promise of self-sufficiency, as
Boethius says (De Consol. iii): the reason of which, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5), is that we "use money in token of taking
possession of something," and again it is written (Eccles. 10:19): "All
things obey money. " Therefore covetousness, which is desire for money,
is a capital vice.

Reply to Objection 1: Virtue is perfected in accordance with reason,
but vice is perfected in accordance with the inclination of the
sensitive appetite. Now reason and sensitive appetite do not belong
chiefly to the same genus, and consequently it does not follow that
principal vice is opposed to principal virtue. Wherefore, although
liberality is not a principal virtue, since it does not regard the
principal good of the reason, yet covetousness is a principal vice,
because it regards money, which occupies a principal place among
sensible goods, for the reason given in the Article.

On the other hand, prodigality is not directed to an end that is
desirable principally, indeed it seems rather to result from a lack of
reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "a prodigal man
is a fool rather than a knave. "

Reply to Objection 2: It is true that money is directed to something
else as its end: yet in so far as it is useful for obtaining all
sensible things, it contains, in a way, all things virtually. Hence it
has a certain likeness to happiness, as stated in the Article.

Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents a capital vice from arising
sometimes out of other vices, as stated above (Q[36], A[4], ad 1;
[3253]FS, Q[84], A[4]), provided that itself be frequently the source
of others.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, restlessness, violence, and
insensibility to mercy are daughters of covetousness?

Objection 1: It seems that the daughters of covetousness are not as
commonly stated, namely, "treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury,
restlessness, violence, and insensibility to mercy. " For covetousness
is opposed to liberality, as stated above [3254](A[3]). Now treachery,
fraud, and falsehood are opposed to prudence, perjury to religion,
restlessness to hope, or to charity which rests in the beloved object,
violence to justice, insensibility to mercy. Therefore these vices have
no connection with covetousness.

Objection 2: Further, treachery, fraud and falsehood seem to pertain to
the same thing, namely, the deceiving of one's neighbor. Therefore they
should not be reckoned as different daughters of covetousness.

Objection 3: Further, Isidore (Comment. in Deut. ) enumerates nine
daughters of covetousness; which are "lying, fraud, theft, perjury,
greed of filthy lucre, false witnessing, violence, inhumanity,
rapacity. " Therefore the former reckoning of daughters is insufficient.

Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) mentions many
kinds of vices as belonging to covetousness which he calls
illiberality, for he speaks of those who are "sparing, tight-fisted,
skinflints [*{kyminopristes}], misers [*{kimbikes}], who do illiberal
deeds," and of those who "batten on whoredom, usurers, gamblers,
despoilers of the dead, and robbers. " Therefore it seems that the
aforesaid enumeration is insufficient.

Objection 5: Further, tyrants use much violence against their subjects.
But the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "tyrants who destroy
cities and despoil sacred places are not to be called illiberal," i. e.
covetous. Therefore violence should not be reckoned a daughter of
covetousness.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) assigns to covetousness the
daughters mentioned above.

I answer that, The daughters of covetousness are the vices which arise
therefrom, especially in respect of the desire of an end. Now since
covetousness is excessive love of possessing riches, it exceeds in two
things. For in the first place it exceeds in retaining, and in this
respect covetousness gives rise to "insensibility to mercy," because,
to wit, a man's heart is not softened by mercy to assist the needy with
his riches [*See[3255] Q[30], A[1]]. In the second place it belongs to
covetousness to exceed in receiving, and in this respect covetousness
may be considered in two ways. First as in the thought [affectu]. In
this way it gives rise to "restlessness," by hindering man with
excessive anxiety and care, for "a covetous man shall not be satisfied
with money" (Eccles. 5:9). Secondly, it may be considered in the
execution [effectu]. In this way the covetous man, in acquiring other
people's goods, sometimes employs force, which pertains to "violence,"
sometimes deceit, and then if he has recourse to words, it is
"falsehood," if it be mere words, "perjury" if he confirm his statement
by oath; if he has recourse to deeds, and the deceit affects things, we
have "fraud"; if persons, then we have "treachery," as in the case of
Judas, who betrayed Christ through covetousness.

Reply to Objection 1: There is no need for the daughters of a capital
sin to belong to that same kind of vice: because a sin of one kind
allows of sins even of a different kind being directed to its end;
seeing that it is one thing for a sin to have daughters, and another
for it to have species.

Reply to Objection 2: These three are distinguished as stated in the
Article.

Reply to Objection 3: These nine are reducible to the seven aforesaid.
For lying and false witnessing are comprised under falsehood, since
false witnessing is a special kind of lie, just as theft is a special
kind of fraud, wherefore it is comprised under fraud; and greed of
filthy lucre belongs to restlessness; rapacity is comprised under
violence, since it is a species thereof; and inhumanity is the same as
insensibility to mercy.

Reply to Objection 4: The vices mentioned by Aristotle are species
rather than daughters of illiberality or covetousness. For a man may be
said to be illiberal or covetous through a defect in giving. If he
gives but little he is said to be "sparing"; if nothing, he is
"tightfisted": if he gives with great reluctance, he is said to be
{kyminopristes} [skinflint], a cumin-seller, as it were, because he
makes a great fuss about things of little value. Sometimes a man is
said to be illiberal or covetous, through an excess in receiving, and
this in two ways. In one way, through making money by disgraceful
means, whether in performing shameful and servile works by means of
illiberal practices, or by acquiring more through sinful deeds, such as
whoredom or the like, or by making a profit where one ought to have
given gratis, as in the case of usury, or by laboring much to make
little profit. In another way, in making money by unjust means, whether
by using violence on the living, as robbers do, or by despoiling the
dead, or by preying on one's friends, as gamblers do.

Reply to Objection 5: Just as liberality is about moderate sums of
money, so is illiberality. Wherefore tyrants who take great things by
violence, are said to be, not illiberal, but unjust.
__________________________________________________________________

OF PRODIGALITY (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider prodigality, under which head there are three
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness?

(2) Whether prodigality is a sin?

(3) Whether it is a graver sin that covetousness?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness?

Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is not opposite to covetousness.
For opposites cannot be together in the same subject. But some are at
the same time prodigal and covetous. Therefore prodigality is not
opposite to covetousness.

Objection 2: Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But
covetousness, as opposed to liberality, relates to certain passions
whereby man is affected towards money: whereas prodigality does not
seem to relate to any passions of the soul, since it is not affected
towards money, or to anything else of the kind. Therefore prodigality
is not opposite to covetousness.

Objection 3: Further, sin takes its species chiefly from its end, as
stated above ([3256]FS, Q[62], A[3]). Now prodigality seems always to
be directed to some unlawful end, for the sake of which the prodigal
squanders his goods. Especially is it directed to pleasures, wherefore
it is stated (Lk. 15:13) of the prodigal son that he "wasted his
substance living riotously. " Therefore it seems that prodigality is
opposed to temperance and insensibility rather than to covetousness and
liberality.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 1) that
prodigality is opposed to liberality, and illiberality, to which we
give here the name of covetousness.

I answer that, In morals vices are opposed to one another and to virtue
in respect of excess and deficiency. Now covetousness and prodigality
differ variously in respect of excess and deficiency. Thus, as regards
affection for riches, the covetous man exceeds by loving them more than
he ought, while the prodigal is deficient, by being less careful of
them than he ought: and as regards external action, prodigality implies
excess in giving, but deficiency in retaining and acquiring, while
covetousness, on the contrary, denotes deficiency in giving, but excess
in acquiring and retaining. Hence it is evident that prodigality is
opposed to covetousness.

Reply to Objection 1: Nothing prevents opposites from being in the same
subject in different respects. For a thing is denominated more from
what is in it principally. Now just as in liberality, which observes
the mean, the principal thing is giving, to which receiving and
retaining are subordinate, so, too, covetousness and prodigality regard
principally giving. Wherefore he who exceeds in giving is said to be
"prodigal," while he who is deficient in giving is said to be
"covetous. " Now it happens sometimes that a man is deficient in giving,
without exceeding in receiving, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv,
1). And in like manner it happens sometimes that a man exceeds in
giving, and therefore is prodigal, and yet at the same time exceeds in
receiving. This may be due either to some kind of necessity, since
while exceeding in giving he is lacking in goods of his own, so that he
is driven to acquire unduly, and this pertains to covetousness; or it
may be due to inordinateness of the mind, for he gives not for a good
purpose, but, as though despising virtue, cares not whence or how he
receives. Wherefore he is prodigal and covetous in different respects.

Reply to Objection 2: Prodigality regards passions in respect of money,
not as exceeding, but as deficient in them.

Reply to Objection 3: The prodigal does not always exceed in giving for
the sake of pleasures which are the matter of temperance, but sometimes
through being so disposed as not to care about riches, and sometimes on
account of something else. More frequently, however, he inclines to
intemperance, both because through spending too much on other things he
becomes fearless of spending on objects of pleasure, to which the
concupiscence of the flesh is more prone; and because through taking no
pleasure in virtuous goods, he seeks for himself pleasures of the body.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) "that many a prodigal ends in
becoming intemperate. "
__________________________________________________________________

Whether prodigality is a sin?

Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is not a sin. For the Apostle
says (1 Tim. 6:10): "Covetousness [Douay: 'desire of money'] is the
root of all evils. " But it is not the root of prodigality, since this
is opposed to it. Therefore prodigality is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:17,18): "Charge the
rich of this world . . . to give easily, to communicate to others. " Now
this is especially what prodigal persons do. Therefore prodigality is
not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to prodigality to exceed in giving and
to be deficient in solicitude about riches. But this is most becoming
to the perfect, who fulfil the words of Our Lord (Mat. 6:34), "Be not .
. . solicitous for tomorrow," and (Mat. 19:21), "Sell all [Vulg. :
'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor. " Therefore prodigality is not
a sin.

On the contrary, The prodigal son is held to blame for his prodigality.

I answer that, As stated above [3257](A[1]), the opposition between
prodigality and covetousness is one of excess and deficiency; either of
which destroys the mean of virtue. Now a thing is vicious and sinful
through corrupting the good of virtue. Hence it follows that
prodigality is a sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Some expound this saying of the Apostle as
referring, not to actual covetousness, but to a kind of habitual
covetousness, which is the concupiscence of the "fomes" [*Cf. [3258]FS,
Q[81], A[3], ad 2], whence all sins arise. Others say that he is
speaking of a general covetousness with regard to any kind of good: and
in this sense also it is evident that prodigality arises from
covetousness; since the prodigal seeks to acquire some temporal good
inordinately, namely, to give pleasure to others, or at least to
satisfy his own will in giving. But to one that reviews the passage
correctly, it is evident that the Apostle is speaking literally of the
desire of riches, for he had said previously (1 Tim. 6:9): "They that
will become rich," etc. In this sense covetousness is said to be "the
root of all evils," not that all evils always arise from covetousness,
but because there is no evil that does not at some time arise from
covetousness. Wherefore prodigality sometimes is born of covetousness,
as when a man is prodigal in going to great expense in order to curry
favor with certain persons from whom he may receive riches.

Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle bids the rich to be ready to give and
communicate their riches, according as they ought. The prodigal does
not do this: since, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. iv, 1), "his
giving is neither good, nor for a good end, nor according as it ought
to be. For sometimes they give much to those who ought to be poor,
namely, to buffoons and flatterers, whereas to the good they give
nothing. "

Reply to Objection 3: The excess in prodigality consists chiefly, not
in the total amount given, but in the amount over and above what ought
to be given. Hence sometimes the liberal man gives more than the
prodigal man, if it be necessary. Accordingly we must reply that those
who give all their possessions with the intention of following Christ,
and banish from their minds all solicitude for temporal things, are not
prodigal but perfectly liberal.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness?

Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is a more grievous sin than
covetousness. For by covetousness a man injures his neighbor by not
communicating his goods to him, whereas by prodigality a man injures
himself, because the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "the wasting
of riches, which are the means whereby a man lives, is an undoing of
his very being. " Now he that injures himself sins more grievously,
according to Ecclus. 14:5, "He that is evil to himself, to whom will he
be good? " Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin than
covetousness.

Objection 2: Further, a disorder that is accompanied by a laudable
circumstance is less sinful. Now the disorder of covetousness is
sometimes accompanied by a laudable circumstance, as in the case of
those who are unwilling to spend their own, lest they be driven to
accept from others: whereas the disorder of prodigality is accompanied
by a circumstance that calls for blame, inasmuch as we ascribe
prodigality to those who are intemperate, as the Philosopher observes
(Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin than
covetousness.

Objection 3: Further, prudence is chief among the moral virtues, as
stated above (Q[56], A[1], ad 1; [3259]FS, Q[61], A[2], ad 1). Now
prodigality is more opposed to prudence than covetousness is: for it is
written (Prov. 21:20): "There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in
the dwelling of the just; and the foolish man shall spend it": and the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that "it is the mark of a fool to give
too much and receive nothing. " Therefore prodigality is a more grievous
sin than covetousness.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that "the prodigal
seems to be much better than the illiberal man. "

I answer that, Prodigality considered in itself is a less grievous sin
than covetousness, and this for three reasons. First, because
covetousness differs more from the opposite virtue: since giving,
wherein the prodigal exceeds, belongs to liberality more than receiving
or retaining, wherein the covetous man exceeds. Secondly, because the
prodigal man is of use to the many to whom he gives, while the covetous
man is of use to no one, not even to himself, as stated in Ethic. iv,
6. Thirdly, because prodigality is easily cured. For not only is the
prodigal on the way to old age, which is opposed to prodigality, but he
is easily reduced to a state of want, since much useless spending
impoverishes him and makes him unable to exceed in giving. Moreover,
prodigality is easily turned into virtue on account of its likeness
thereto. On the other hand, the covetous man is not easily cured, for
the reason given above ([3260]Q[118], A[5], ad 3).

Reply to Objection 1: The difference between the prodigal and the
covetous man is not that the former sins against himself and the latter
against another. For the prodigal sins against himself by spending that
which is his, and his means of support, and against others by spending
the wherewithal to help others. This applies chiefly to the clergy, who
are the dispensers of the Church's goods, that belong to the poor whom
they defraud by their prodigal expenditure. In like manner the covetous
man sins against others, by being deficient in giving; and he sins
against himself, through deficiency in spending: wherefore it is
written (Eccles. 6:2): "A man to whom God hath given riches . . . yet
doth not give him the power to eat thereof. " Nevertheless the prodigal
man exceeds in this, that he injures both himself and others yet so as
to profit some; whereas the covetous man profits neither others nor
himself, since he does not even use his own goods for his own profit.

Reply to Objection 2: In speaking of vices in general, we judge of them
according to their respective natures: thus, with regard to prodigality
we note that it consumes riches to excess, and with regard to
covetousness that it retains them to excess. That one spend too much
for the sake of intemperance points already to several additional sins,
wherefore the prodigal of this kind is worse, as stated in Ethic. iv,
1. That an illiberal or covetous man refrain from taking what belongs
to others, although this appears in itself to call for praise, yet on
account of the motive for which he does so it calls for blame, since he
is unwilling to accept from others lest he be forced to give to others.

Reply to Objection 3: All vices are opposed to prudence, even as all
virtues are directed by prudence: wherefore if a vice be opposed to
prudence alone, for this very reason it is deemed less grievous.
__________________________________________________________________

OF "EPIKEIA" OR EQUITY (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider "epikeia," under which head there are two points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether "epikeia" is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is a part of justice?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether "epikeia" [*{epieikeia}] is a virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that "epikeia" is not a virtue. For no virtue
does away with another virtue. Yet "epikeia" does away with another
virtue, since it sets aside that which is just according to law, and
seemingly is opposed to severity. Therefore "epikeia" is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): "With
regard to these earthly laws, although men pass judgment on them when
they make them, yet, when once they are made and established, the judge
must pronounce judgment not on them but according to them. " But
seemingly "epikeia" pronounces judgment on the law, when it deems that
the law should not be observed in some particular case. Therefore
"epikeia" is a vice rather than a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, apparently it belongs to "epikeia" to consider
the intention of the lawgiver, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v,
10). But it belongs to the sovereign alone to interpret the intention
of the lawgiver, wherefore the Emperor says in the Codex of Laws and
Constitutions, under Law i: "It is fitting and lawful that We alone
should interpret between equity and law. " Therefore the act of
"epikeia" is unlawful: and consequently "epikeia" is not a virtue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) states it to be a
virtue.

I answer that, As stated above ([3261]FS, Q[96], A[6]), when we were
treating of laws, since human actions, with which laws are concerned,
are composed of contingent singulars and are innumerable in their
diversity, it was not possible to lay down rules of law that would
apply to every single case. Legislators in framing laws attend to what
commonly happens: although if the law be applied to certain cases it
will frustrate the equality of justice and be injurious to the common
good, which the law has in view. Thus the law requires deposits to be
restored, because in the majority of cases this is just. Yet it happens
sometimes to be injurious---for instance, if a madman were to put his
sword in deposit, and demand its delivery while in a state of madness,
or if a man were to seek the return of his deposit in order to fight
against his country. In these and like cases it is bad to follow the
law, and it is good to set aside the letter of the law and to follow
the dictates of justice and the common good. This is the object of
"epikeia" which we call equity. Therefore it is evident that "epikeia"
is a virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: "Epikeia" does not set aside that which is just
in itself but that which is just as by law established. Nor is it
opposed to severity, which follows the letter of the law when it ought
to be followed. To follow the letter of the law when it ought not to be
followed is sinful. Hence it is written in the Codex of Laws and
Constitutions under Law v: "Without doubt he transgresses the law who
by adhering to the letter of the law strives to defeat the intention of
the lawgiver. "

Reply to Objection 2: It would be passing judgment on a law to say that
it was not well made; but to say that the letter of the law is not to
be observed in some particular case is passing judgment not on the law,
but on some particular contingency.

Reply to Objection 3: Interpretation is admissible in doubtful cases
where it is not allowed to set aside the letter of the law without the
interpretation of the sovereign. But when the case is manifest there is
need, not of interpretation, but of execution.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether "epikeia" is a part of justice?

Objection 1: It seems that "epikeia" is not a part of justice. For, as
stated above ([3262]Q[58], A[7]), justice is twofold, particular and
legal. Now "epikeia" is not a part of particular justice, since it
extends to all virtues, even as legal justice does. In like manner,
neither is it a part of legal justice, since its operation is beside
that which is established by law. Therefore it seems that "epikeia" is
not a part of justice.

Objection 2: Further, a more principal virtue is not assigned as the
part of a less principal virtue: for it is to the cardinal virtue, as
being principal, that secondary virtues are assigned as parts. Now
"epikeia" seems to be a more principal virtue than justice, as implied
by its name: for it is derived from {epi}, i. e. "above," and {dikaion},
i. e. "just. " Therefore "epikeia" is not a part of justice.

Objection 3: Further, it seems that "epikeia" is the same as modesty.
For where the Apostle says (Phil. 4:5), "Let your modesty be known to
all men," the Greek has {epieikeia} [*{to epieikes}]. Now, according to
Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii), modesty is a part of temperance. Therefore
"epikeia" is not a part of justice.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 10) that "epikeia is a
kind of justice. "

I answer that, As stated above ([3263]Q[48]), a virtue has three kinds
of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. A subjective part is one
of which the whole is predicated essentially, and it is less than the
whole. This may happen in two ways. For sometimes one thing is
predicated of many in one common ratio, as animal of horse and ox: and
sometimes one thing is predicated of many according to priority and
posteriority, as "being" of substance and accident.

Accordingly, "epikeia" is a part of justice taken in a general sense,
for it is a kind of justice, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10).
Wherefore it is evident that "epikeia" is a subjective part of justice;
and justice is predicated of it with priority to being predicated of
legal justice, since legal justice is subject to the direction of
"epikeia. " Hence "epikeia" is by way of being a higher rule of human
actions.

Reply to Objection 1: Epikeia corresponds properly to legal justice,
and in one way is contained under it, and in another way exceeds it.
For if legal justice denotes that which complies with the law, whether
as regards the letter of the law, or as regards the intention of the
lawgiver, which is of more account, then "epikeia" is the more
important part of legal justice. But if legal justice denote merely
that which complies with the law with regard to the letter, then
"epikeia" is a part not of legal justice but of justice in its general
acceptation, and is condivided with legal justice, as exceeding it.

Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10),
"epikeia is better than a certain," namely, legal, "justice," which
observes the letter of the law: yet since it is itself a kind of
justice, it is not better than all justice.

Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to "epikeia" to moderate something,
namely, the observance of the letter of the law. But modesty, which is
reckoned a part of temperance, moderates man's outward life---for
instance, in his deportment, dress or the like. Possibly also the term
{epieikeia} is applied in Greek by a similitude to all kinds of
moderation.
__________________________________________________________________

OF PIETY (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the gift that corresponds to justice; namely,
piety. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is a gift of the Holy Ghost?

(2) Which of the beatitudes and fruits corresponds to it?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether piety is a gift?

Objection 1: It seems that piety is not a gift. For the gifts differ
from the virtues, as stated above ([3264]FS, Q[68], A[1]). But piety is
a virtue, as stated above (Q[101], A[3]). Therefore piety is not a
gift.

Objection 2: Further, the gifts are more excellent than the virtues,
above all the moral virtues, as above ([3265]FS, Q[68], A[8]). Now
among the parts of justice religion is greater than piety. Therefore if
any part of justice is to be accounted a gift, it seems that religion
should be a gift rather than piety.

Objection 3: Further, the gifts and their acts remain in heaven, as
stated above ([3266]FS, Q[68], A[6]). But the act of piety cannot
remain in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that "piety fills the
inmost recesses of the heart with works of mercy": and so there will be
no piety in heaven since there will be no unhappiness [*Cf. Q[30],
A[1]]. Therefore piety is not a gift.

On the contrary, It is reckoned among the gifts in the eleventh chapter
of Isaias (verse 2) [Douay: 'godliness'] [*"Pietas," whence our English
word "pity," which is the same as mercy. ]

I answer that, As stated above ([3267]FS, Q[68], A[1]; [3268]FS, Q[69],
AA[1],3), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habitual dispositions of the
soul, rendering it amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the
Holy Ghost moves us to this effect among others, of having a filial
affection towards God, according to Rom. 8:15, "You have received the
spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father). " And since
it belongs properly to piety to pay duty and worship to one's father,
it follows that piety, whereby, at the Holy Ghost's instigation, we pay
worship and duty to God as our Father, is a gift of the Holy Ghost.

Reply to Objection 1: The piety that pays duty and worship to a father
in the flesh is a virtue: but the piety that is a gift pays this to God
as Father.

Reply to Objection 2: To pay worship to God as Creator, as religion
does, is more excellent than to pay worship to one's father in the
flesh, as the piety that is a virtue does. But to pay worship to God as
Father is yet more excellent than to pay worship to God as Creator and
Lord. Wherefore religion is greater than the virtue of piety: while the
gift of piety is greater than religion.

Reply to Objection 3: As by the virtue of piety man pays duty and
worship not only to his father in the flesh, but also to all his
kindred on account of their being related to his father so by the gift
of piety he pays worship and duty not only to God, but also to all men
on account of their relationship to God. Hence it belongs to piety to
honor the saints, and not to contradict the Scriptures whether one
understands them or not, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii).
Consequently it also assists those who are in a state of unhappiness.
And although this act has no place in heaven, especially after the Day
of Judgment, yet piety will exercise its principal act, which is to
revere God with filial affection: for it is then above all that this
act will be fulfilled, according to Wis. 5:5, "Behold how they are
numbered among the children of God. " The saints will also mutually
honor one another. Now, however, before the Judgment Day, the saints
have pity on those also who are living in this unhappy state.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the second beatitude, "Blessed are the meek," corresponds to the
gift of piety?

Objection 1: It seems that the second beatitude, "Blessed are the
meek," does not correspond to the gift of piety. For piety is the gift
corresponding to justice, to which rather belongs the fourth beatitude,
"Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," or the fifth
beatitude, "Blessed are the merciful," since as stated above (A[1],
OBJ[3]), the works of mercy belong to piety. Therefore the second
beatitude does not pertain to the gift of piety.

Objection 2: Further, the gift of piety is directed by the gift of
knowledge, which is united to it in the enumeration of the gifts (Is.
11). Now direction and execution extend to the same matter. Since,
then, the third beatitude, "Blessed are they that mourn," corresponds
to the gift of knowledge, it seems that the second beatitude
corresponds to piety.

Objection 3: Further, the fruits correspond to the beatitudes and
gifts, as stated above ([3269]FS, Q[70], A[2]). Now among the fruits,
goodness and benignity seem to agree with piety rather than mildness,
which pertains to meekness. Therefore the second beatitude does not
correspond to the gift of piety.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): "Piety is
becoming to the meek. "

I answer that, In adapting the beatitudes to the gifts a twofold
congruity may be observed. One is according to the order in which they
are given, and Augustine seems to have followed this: wherefore he
assigns the first beatitude to the lowest gift, namely, fear, and the
second beatitude, "Blessed are the meek," to piety, and so on. Another
congruity may be observed in keeping with the special nature of each
gift and beatitude. In this way one must adapt the beatitudes to the
gifts according to their objects and acts: and thus the fourth and
fifth beatitudes would correspond to piety, rather than the second. Yet
the second beatitude has a certain congruity with piety, inasmuch as
meekness removes the obstacles to acts of piety.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: Taking the beatitudes and gifts according to
their proper natures, the same beatitude must needs correspond to
knowledge and piety: but taking them according to their order,
different beatitudes correspond to them, although a certain congruity
may be observed, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: In the fruits goodness and benignity may be
directly ascribed to piety; and mildness indirectly in so far as it
removes obstacles to acts of piety, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the precepts of justice, under which head there
are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice?

(2) Of the first precept of the decalogue;

(3) Of the second;

(4) Of the third;

(5) Of the fourth;

(6) Of the other six.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice?

Objection 1: It seems that the precepts of the decalogue are not
precepts of justice. For the intention of a lawgiver is "to make the
citizens virtuous in respect of every virtue," as stated in Ethic. ii,
1. Wherefore, according to Ethic. v, 1, "the law prescribes about all
acts of all virtues. " Now the precepts of the decalogue are the first.