No More Learning

The formet regards the Supreme Being as the cause of the world -- whether by the necessity of his nature, or as a free agent, is left un determined ; the latter considers this being as the author of the world.
Transcendental theology aims either at inferring the exist ence of a Supreme Being from a general experience --without any closer reference to the world to which this experience belongs, and in this case it is called Cosmotheology ; or it en deavours to cognize the existence of such a being, through mere conceptions, without the aid of experience, and is then termed Ontotheology.
As we are wont to understand by the term God not merely an eternal nature, the operations of which are insensate and blind, but a Supreme Being, who is the free and intelligent author of all tilings, and as it is this latter view alone that can be of interest to humanity, we might, in strict rigour, deny to the Deist any belief in God at all, and regard him merely as a maintainer of the existence of a primal being or thing -- the supreme cause of all other things. But, as no one ought to be blamed, merely because he does not feel himself justified in maintaining a certain opinion, as if he altogether denied its truth and asserted the opposite, it is more correct --as it is
? Natural theology infers the attributes and the existence of an author of the world, from the constitution of, the order and unity observable in, the world, in which two modes of
must be admitted to exist -- those of nature and freedom. Thus it rises from this world to a supreme intelli gence, either as the principle of all natural, or of all moral order and perfection. In the former case it is termed Phy- sico- theology, in the latter Ethical or Moral-theology. *
causality
less harsh --to say, the Deist believes in a God, the Theist in a living God (summa intelligentia). We shall now proceed to
* Not theological ethics; for this science contains
which presuppose the existence of a Supreme Governor of the world; while Moral-theology, on the contrary, is the expression of a conviction of the existence of a Suprene Being, founded upon ethical laws.
ethical laws,
? ? ? ClUTlQtJE
Of AIL THEOLOGf. 389
investigate the sources of all these attempts of reason to esta blish the existence of a Supreme Being.
It may be sufficient in this place to define theoretical know ledge or cognition as knowledge of that which and prac
tical knowledge as knowledge of that which ought to be. In this view, the theoretical employment of reason that
which cognize priori (as necessary) that something is, while the practical that by which cognize a priori what ought to happen. Now, an indubitably certain, though it the same time an entirely conditioned truth, that some thing is, or ought to happen, either certain determinate condition of this truth absolutely necessary, or such con dition may be arbitrarily presupposed. In the former case the condition postulated (per thesin), in the latter supposed [per hypothesin). There are certain practical laws --those of morality -- which are absolutely necessary. Now, these laws necessarily presuppose the existence of some being, as the condition of the possibility of their obligatory power, this being must be postulated, because the conditioned, from which we reason to this determinate condition, itself cognized
? priori as absolutely necessary. We shall at some future time show that the moral laws not merely presuppose the existence of Supreme Being, but also, as themselves abso lutely necessary in different relation, demand or postulate
--although only from practical point of view. The dis cussion of this argument we postpone for the present.
When the question relates merely to that which not to that which ought to be, the conditioned which presented in experience, always cogitated as contingent. For this reason its condition cannot be regarded as absolutely necessary, but merely as relatively necessary, or rather as needful the con dition in itself and priori mere arbitrary presupposition
in aid of the cognition, reason, of the conditioned. If, then, we are to possess theoretical cognition of the absolute neces sity of thing, we cannot attain to this cognition otherwise than a priori means of conceptions while impos sible in this way to cognize the existence of a cause which bears any relation to an existence given in experience.
Theoretical cognition speculative when relates to an object or certain conceptions of an object which not given and cannot be discovered by means of experience. op
? ? It is
is,
if
is
is
is
if it
by
a
;
I a
a
it
it ;
is
a by
a a
is & is
it
is I
a
is
is
a
is
is
is, is
a
a
by
? 39(1 TBAJJSCENDENTAIi DIALECTIC.
posed to the cognition of nature, which concerns only those abjects or predicates which can be presented in a possible experience.
The principle that everything which happens (the empi rically contingent) must have a cause, is a principle of the cognition of nature, but not of speculative cognition. For, if we change it into an abstract principle, and deprive it of its reference to experience and the empirical, we shall find that it oannot with justice be regarded any longer as a syn thetical proposition, and that it is impossible to discover any mode of transition from that which exists to something en tirely different --termed cause. Nay, more, the conception of a cause -- as likewise that of the contingent--loses, in this speculative mode of employing all significance, for its
objective reality and meaning are comprehensible from expe rience alone.
? When from the existence of the universe and the things in the existence of cause of the universe inferred, reason proceeding not in the natural, but in the speculative method. For the principle of the former enounces, not that things themselves or substances, but only that which happens
or their states -- as empirically contingent, have cause: the assertion that the existence substance itself contin gent *iot justified by experience, the assertion of
reason employing its principles in speculative manner. again, infer from the form of the universe, from the way in which all things are connected and act and react upon each other, the existence of cause entirely distinct from the universe, -- this would again be judgment of purely specula tive reason because the object in this case -- the cause--can never be an object of possible experience. In both these cases the principle of causality, which valid only in the
field of experience, --useless and even meaningless beyond this region, would be diverted from its proper destination.
Now maintain that all attempts of reason to establish
the aid of speculation alone are fruitless, that the principles of reason as applied to nature do not conduct us to any theological truths, and, consequently, that rational theology can have no existence, unless founded upon Lite laws of morality. For all synthetical principles of the
understanding are valid only as immanent experience while
theology
? ? in
is
is
it is
a ;
is a If, a
it
is
I
by ;
I
is
a
a a
of
a
it,
is it
a
? OKITIQUE
OF ALL THEOLOOT. 391
the cognition of a Supreme Being necessitates their being em ployed transcendentally, and of this the understanding is
quite incapable. If the empirical law of causality is to con duct us to a Supreme Being, this being must belong *o the chain of empirical objects --in which case it would be, like all phenomena, itself conditioned. If the possibility of passing the limits of experience be admitted, by means of the dyna mical law of the relation of an effect to its cause, what kind of conception shall we obtain by this procedure ?
Certainly not the conception of a Supreme Being, because experience never presents us with the greatest of all possible effects, and
it is only an effect of this character that could witness to the
existence of a corresponding cause. If, for the purpose of
fully satisfying the requirements of Reason, we recognise her right to assert the existence of a perfect and absolutely neces sary being, this cnu be admitted only from favour, and cannot be regarded as the result of irresistible demonstration. The physico-theological proof may add weight to others --if other proofs there are --by connecting speculation with experience ; hut in itself it rather prepares the mind for theological cognition, and gives it a right and natural direction, than establishes a sure foundation for theology.
? It is now perfectly evident that transcendental questions
admit only of transcendental answers --those presented ii priori
by pure conceptions without the least empirical admixture.
But the question in the present case is evidently synthetical -- it aims at the extension of our cognition beyond the bounds
of experience --it requires an assurance respecting the exist ence of a being corresponding with the idea in our minds, to which no experience can ever be adequate. Now it has been abundantly proved that all it priori synthetical cognition is oossible only as the expression of the formal conditions of a
iossible experience ; and that the validity of all principles lepends upon their immanence in the field of experience, that 8, their relation to objects of empirical cognition, or phseno- nena. Thus all transcendental procedure in reference to
speculative theology is without result.
If any one prefers doubting the conclusiveness of the proofs
of our Analytic to losing the persuasion of the validity of these old and time-honoured arguments, he at least cannot decline answering the question --how he can pass the limits of all
? ? ? 811-2
TBAXSCESDENTAI. DIALECTIC.
possible experience by the help cf mere ideas. If he talks of new arguments, or of improvements upon old arguments-- I request him to spare me. There is certainty no great choice in this sphere of discussion, as all speculative argu ments must at last look for support to the ontologiesl, and I have, therefore, very little to fear from the argumentative fecundity of the dogmatical defenders of a non-sensuous reason. Without looking upon myself as a remarkably com bative person, I shall not decline the challenge to detect the fallacy and destroy the pretensions of every attempt of specu lative theology. And yet the hope of better fortune never deserts those who are accustomed to the dogmatical mode of procedure. I shall, therefore, restrict myself to the simple and equitable demand that such reasoners will demonstrate, from the nature of the human mind as well as from that of the other sources of knowledge, how we are to proceed to extend our cognition completely ci priori, and to carry it to that point where experience abandons us, and no means
exist of guaranteeing the objective reality of our conceptions. In whatever way the understanding may have attained to a
conception, the existence of the object of the conception cannot be discovered in it by analysis, because the cognition
of the existence of the object depends upon the object's being posited and given in itself apart from the conception. But it is utterly impossible to go beyond our conception, without the aid of experience --which presents to the mind nothing but phsenomena, or to attain by the help of mere conceptions tc a conviction of the existence of new kinds of objects or super natural beings.
But although pure speculative reason is far from sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a Supreme Being, it is of the highest utility in correcting our conception of this being --on the supposition that we can attain to the cognition of it by some other means -- in making it consistent with itself and with al. other conceptions of intelligible objects, clearing it from al. that is incompatible with the conception of an ens tummum, and eliminating from it all limitations or admixture of empi rical elements.
Transcendental theology is still therefore, notwithstanding its objective insufficiency, 01 importance in a negative respect ; it is useful as a test of the procedure of reason when engaged
? ? ? ? CRITIQUt OF Ait THEOtOGT. 393
with pure ideas, no other than a transcendental standard being in this case admissible. For from practical point of view, the hypothesis of Supreme and All-sufficient Being to maintain its validity without opposition, must be of the highest importance to define this conception in correct and rigorous manner --as the transcendental conception of ne cessary being, to eliminate all phenomenal elements (anthro pomorphism its most extended signification), and at the same time to overthrow all contradictory assertions --be they atheittie, tleistic, or anthropomorphic. This of course 7ery easy as the same arguments which demonstrated the inability of human reason to affirm the existence of <. Supreme Being, must be alike sufficient to prove the invalidity of its denial. For impossible to gain from the pure speculation of reason demonstration that there exists no Supreme Being, as the ground of all that exists, or that this being possesses none of those properties which we regard as analogical with the dynamical qualities of thinking being, or that, as the an- thropomorphists would have us believe, subject to all the limitations which sensibility imposes upon those intelligences
mere ideal, though faultless one-- conception which per fects and crowus the system of human cognition, but the objective reality of which can neither be proved nor disproved by pure reason. If this defect ever supplied Moral Theology, the problematic Transcendental Theology whicli has preceded, will have been at least serviceable as demonstrating the mental necessity existing for the conception, by the complete determine. tion of which has furnished, and the ceaseless testing of the conclusions of reason often de ceived by sense, and not always in harmony with its own ideas. The attributes of necessity, infinitude, unity, exist ence apart from the world (and not as world-soul), eternity --free from conditions of time, omnipresence -- free from conditions of space, omnipotence, and others, are pure trans cendental predicates and thus the accurate conception of
Supreme Being, which every theology require*, furnished transcendental theology alone.
? which exist in the world of experience.
Supreme Being therefore, for the speculative reason,
? ? is
is
by a
a
;
a
is,
in
a
a
a
it
it is
it
is
if, aa
by a
A
; is
a
it
a
is
a
it
? TRAKSCENDETTTAL DIALECTIC.
APPENDIX
TO TBANSCENDENTAi DIALECTIC.
Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason
The result of all the dialectical attempts of pure reason not only confirms the truth of what wr have already proved in our Transcendental Analytic, namely, that all inferences which would lead us beyond the limits of experience are fallacious and groundless, but it at the same time teaches us this im portant lesson, that human reason has a natural inclination to overstep these limits, and that transcendental ideas are as much the natural property of the reason as categories are of the understanding. There exists this difference, however, that while the categories never mislead us, outward objects being always in perfect harmony therewith, ideas are the parents of irresistible illusions, the severest and most subtle criticism being required to save us from the fallacies which
they induce.
Whatever is grounded in the nature of our powers, will be
found to be in harmony with the final purpose and proper
of these powers, when once we have discovered their true direction and aim. We are entitled to suppose, there fore, that there exists a mode of employing transcendental ideas which is proper and immanent ; although, when we mis take their meaning, and regard them as conceptions of actual things, their mode of application is transcendent and delusive. For it is not the idea itself, but only the employment of the idea in relation to possible experience, that is transcendent or immanent. An idea is employed transcendently, when it is
applied to an object falsely believed to he adequate with and to correspond to it ; immanently, when it is applied solely to the employment of the understanding in the sphere of expe rience. Thus all errors of subreptio--oi misapplication, nre to be ascribed to defects of judgment, and not to understand ing or reason.
Reason never has an immediate relation to an object ; it relates immediately to the understanding alone. It is only through the understanding that it can be employed in
the field of experience. It does not form conceptions of objects, it merely arianges them and gives to them
? employment
? ? ? OF THB IDEAS 9* PURE REABO2). . 39. 1
that unity which they are capable of possessing when the ? phere of their application has been extended as widely as possible. Reason avails itself of the conceptions of the under standing for the sole purpose of producing totality in the dif ferent series. This totality the understanding does not con cern itself with ; its only occupation is the connection of ex periences, by which series of conditions in accordance with conceptions are established. The object of reason is there fore the understanding and its proper destination. As the latter brings unity into the diversity of objects by means of its conceptions, so the former brings unity into the diversity of conceptions by means of ideas ; as it sets the final aim of a collective unity to the operations of the understanding, which without this occupies itself with a distributive unity alone.
I accordingly maintain, that transcendental ideas can never be employed as constitutive ideas, that they cannot be con ceptions of objects, and that, when thus considered, they as sume a fallacious and dialectical character. But, on the other hand, they are capable of an admirable and indispensably necessary application to objects --as regulative ideas, directing the understanding to a certain aim, the guiding lines towards which all its laws follow, and in which they all meet in one point. This point -- though a mere idea (focus imaginarius), that not point from which the conceptions of the under standing do really proceed, for lies beyond the sphere of possible experience --serves notwithstanding to give to these conceptions the greatest possible unity combined with the great est possible extension. Hence arises the natural illusion which induces us to believe that these lines proceed from an object which lies out of the sphere of empirical cognition, just as objects reflected in mirror appear to be behind it. But this illusion --which we may hinder from imposing upon us -- necessary and unavoidable, we desire to see, not only those objects which lie before us, but those which are at great distance behind us that to say, when, in the present case, we direct the aims of the understanding, beyond every given experience, towards an extension as great as can possi bly be attained.
If we review our cognitions in their entire extent, we shall find that the peculiar business of reason to arrange them into system, that to say, to give them connection accord
? ? ? a
is, a
is
a
is
;
is
if
it
a
is
? 396 TIIVNSCENDE5TAL DIALECTIC.
ing to a principle. This unity presupposes an idea--the idea of the form of a whole (of cognition), preceding the de terminate cognition of the parts, and containing the condi tions which determine a priori to every part its place and relation to the other parts of the whole system. This idea accordingly demands complete unity in the cognition of the understanding -- not the unity of a contingent aggregate, but that of a system connected according to necessary laws. It cannot be affirmed with propriety that this idea is a concep tion of an object ; it is merely a conception of the complete unity of the conceptions of objects, in so far as this unity is available to the understanding as a rule. Such concep tions of reason are not derived from nature ; on the contrary, we employ them for the interrogation and investigation of nature, and regard our cognition as defective so long as it is not adequate to them. We admit that such a thing as pure earth, pure water, or pure air, is not to be discovered.
? And yet we require these conceptions (which have their origin in the reason, so far as regards their absolute purity and completeness) for the purpose of determining the share which each of these natural causes lias in every phenomenon. Thus the different kinds of matter are all referred to earths -- as mere weight, to salts and inflammable bodies -- as pure force, and finally, to water and air--as the vehicula of the former, or the machines employed by them in their opera tions, --for the purpose of explaining the chemical action and re-action of bodies in accordance with the idea of a me chanism. For, although not actually so expressed, the in fluence of such ideas of reason is very observable in the pro cedure of natural philosophers.
If reason is the faculty of dednting the particular from the general, and if the general be certain in se and given, it is only necessary that the judgment should subsume the particular under the general, the particular being thus necessarily deter mined. I shall term this the demonstrative or apodeictic em ployment of reason. If, however, the general is admitted as problematical only, and is a mere idea, the particular case is certain, but the universality of the rule which applies to this particular case remains a problem. Several particular cases, the certainty of which is beyond doubt, are then taken and examined, for the purpose of discovering whether the rule is
? ? ? Or THE IDEAS OF PUBE REASON.
397
applicable to them ; and if it appears that all the particular cases which can be collected follow from the rule, its univer sality is inferred, and tt the same time, all the causes which have not, or cannot be presented to our observation, are con cluded to be of the same character with those which we have observed. This I shall term the hypothetical employment of the reason.
The hypothetical exercise of reason by the aid of ideas
employed as problematical conceptions is properly not consti tutive. That is to say, if we consider the subject strictly, the truth of the rule, which has been employed as an hypo thesis, does not follow from the use that is made of it by reason. For how can we know all the possible cases thai may arise ? -- some of which may, however, prove exceptions to the universality of the rule. This employment of reason is merely regulative, and its sole aim is the introduction of unity into the aggregate of our particular cognitions, and thereby the approximating of the rule to universality.
The object of the hypothetical employment of reason is therefore the systematic unity of cognitions ; and this unity is the criterion of the truth of a rule. On the other hand, this systematic unity -- as a mere idea -- is in fact merely a unity projected, not to be regarded as given, but only in the light of a problem --a problem which serves, however, as a principle for the various and particular exercise of the understanding in experience, directs it with regard to thope cases which nre not presented to our observation, and iutroditces harmony and consistency into all its operations.
All that we can be certain of from the above considerations
that this systematic unity logical principle, whose aim to assist the understanding, where cannot of itself attain to rules, means of ideas, to bring all these various rules under one principle, and thus to ensure the most complete consistency and connection that can be attained. But the assertion that objects and the understanding by which they
? are cognized are so constituted as to be determined to system atic unity, that this may be postulated a priori, without any reference to the interest of reason, and that we are justified
all possible cognitions -- empirical and others --to possess systematic unity, and to be subject to general principles from which, notwithstanding their various character, they art
declaring
? ? in
is is, by
it
is a
? TIUNSCEKDF. STAX M '. LECTIO.
all derivable, --nich an assertion can be founded only upon a transcendental principle of reason, which would render this systematic unity not subjectively and logically -- in its character cf a method, but e njectively necessary.
We shall illustrate this by an example. The conceptions of the understanding make us acquainted, among many other kinds of unity, with that of the causality of a substance, which is termed power. The different phscuomenal manifestations of the same substance appear at first view to be so very dis similar, that we are inclined to assume the existence of just as many different powers as there are different effects --as, in the case of the human mind, we have feeling, consciousness, ima gination, memory, wit, analysis, pleasure, desire, and so on. Now we are required by a logical maxim to reduce these dif ferences to as small a number as possible, by comparing them
and discovering the hidden identity which exists. We must inquire, for example, whether or not imagination, (connected with consciousness), memory, wit, and analysis are not merely different forms of understanding and reason. The idea of a fundamental power, the existence of which no effort of logic can assure us of, is the problem to be solved, for the system atic representation of the existing variety of powers. The logical principle of reason requires us lo produce as great a unity as is possible in the system of our cognitions ; and the more the phenomena of this and the other power are found to be identical, the more probable does it become, that they are nothing but different manifestations of one and the same power, which may be called, relatively speaking, a fundamental
? And so with other cases.
These relatively fundamental powers must again be com
pared with each other, to discover, if possible, the one radical and absolutely fundamental power of which they are but the manifestations. But this unity is purely hypothetical. It is not maintained, that this unity does really exist, but that we must, in the interest of reason, that is, for the establishment of principles for the various rules presented by experience, try to discover and introduce so far as practicable, into the sphere of our cognitions.
But the transeendeutnl employment of the understanding would lead us to believe that this idea of fundamental power not problematical, but that possesses objective reality,
power.
? ? ia
it
it,
a
is
? or THE IDEAS 01' l'UKE HT. \<<OW. 399
and thus the systematic unity of the various powers or forces in a substance is demanded by the understanding and erecter" into an apodeictic or necessary principle. For, without
having attempted to discover the unity of the various powers existing in nature, nay, even after all our attempts have failed, we notwithstanding presuppose that it does exist, and may be, sooner or later, discovered. And this reason does, not only, as in the case above adduced, with regard to the unity of sub stance, but where many substances, although all to a certain ex tent homogeneous, are discoverable, as in the case of matter in general. Here also docs reason presuppose the existence of the systematic unity of various powers --inasmuch as particular laws of nature are subordinate to general laws ; and parsimony in principles is not merely an economical principle of reason, but au essential law of nature.
We cannot understand, in fact, how a logical principle of unity can of right exist, unless we presuppose a transcendental principle, by which such a systematic unity--as a property of objects themselves -- is regarded as necessary & priori. For with what right can reason, in its logical exercise, require us to regard the variety of forces which nature displays, as in effect a disguised unity, and to deduce them from one funda mental force or power, when she is free to admit that it is just as possible that all forces should be different in kind, and that a systematic unity is not conformable to the design of nature 1 In this view of the case, reason would be proceed ing in direct opposition to her own destination, by setting as an aim an idea which entirely conflicts with the procedure and arrangement of nature. Neither can we assert that reason lias previously iuferred this unity from the contingent nature of phenomena. For the law of reason which requires us to seek for this unity is a necessary law, inasmuch as without it we should not possess a faculty of reason, nor without reason a consistent and self-accordant mode of employing the under standing, nor, in the absence of this, any proper and sufficient
criterion of empirical truth. In relation to this criterion, therefore, we must suppose the idea of the systematic unity of nature to possess objective validity and necessity.
We find this transcendental presupposition lurking in different
forms in the principles of philosophers, although they hava neither recognised it nor confessed to themselves its presence.
? ? ? ? 400 TKAJI8CXKDENTAL DIALECTIC.
Tli>>it the diversities cf individual things do not exclude identity of species, that the various species must he considered si merely different determinations of a few genera, and these again as divisions of still higher racet, and so on, --that, ac cordingly, a certain systematic unity of all possible empirical conceptions, in so far as they can be deduced from higher and more general conceptions, must be sought for, is a scholastic maxim or logical principle, without which reason could not be employed by us. For we can infer the particular from the general, only in so far as general properties of things constitute the foundation upon which the particular rest.
That the same unity exists in nature is presupposed by philosophers in the well-known scholastic maxim, which for bids us unnecessarily to augment the number of entities or principles [entia prater necessitalem non esse multiplicanda). This maxim asserts that nature herself assists in the establish ment of this unity of reason, and that the seemingly infinite diversity of phenomena should not deter us from the ex pectation of discovering beneath this diversity a unity of fundamental properties, of which the aforesaid variety is but a more or less determined form. This unity, although a
mere idea, has been always pursued with so much zeal, that thinkers have found it necessary rather to moderate the desire than to encourage it. It was considered a great step when chemists were able to reduce all salts to two main genera--acids and alkalis ; and they regard this difference as itself a mere rariety, or different manifestation of one and the same funda mental material. The different kinds of earths (stones and even metals) chemists have endeavoured to reduce to three, and afterwards to two; but still, not content with this ad vance, they cannot but think that behind these diversities there lurks but one genus, -- nay, that even salts and earths have a common principle. It might be conjectured that this is merely an economical plan of reason, for the purpose of
sparing itself trouble, and an attempt of a purely hypothetical character, which, when successful, gives an appearance of
? probability to the principle of explanation employ<<d by the reason.
But a selfish purpose of this kind is easily to be dis tinguished from the idea, according to which every one pre supposes that this unity is in accordance with the laws of
nature, and that reason does not in this case request, but rf
? ? ? OV THE 1DKAS OF PURE REASOS.
101
fuires, although we are quite unable to determine the proper limits of this unity.
If the diversity existing in phenomena -- a diversity not of form (for in this they may be similar) but of content --were so great that the subtlest human reason could never by com parison discover in them the least similarity, (which is not impossible), in this case the logical law of genera would oe without foundation, the conception of a genus, nay, all
? general conceptions would be impossible, and the faculty of the understanding, the exercise of which is restricted to the
world of conceptions, could not exist. The logical principle
of genera, accordingly, if it is to be applied to nature, (by
which I mean objects presented to our senses,) presupposes a
transcendental principle. In accordance with this principle,
homogeneity is necessarily presupposed in the variety of phe
nomena, (although we are unable to determine a priori the
degree of this homogeneity), because without it no empirical
conceptions, and consequently no experience, would he pos sible.
The logical principle of genera, which demands identity in phenomena, is balanced by another principle -- that of species,
which requires variety and diversity in things, notwithstanding their accordance in the same genus, and directs the under standing to attend to the one no less than to the other. This principle (of the faculty of distinction) acts as a check upon the levity of the former (the faculty of wit*) ; and reason ex hibits in this respect a double and conflicting interest, --on the one hand the interest in the extent (the interest of gene rality) in relation to genera, on the other that of the content (the interest of individuality) in relation to the variety of species. In the former case, the understanding cogitates more under its conceptions, in the latter it cogitates more in them. This distinction manifests itself likewise in the habits of thought peculiar to natural philosophers, some of whom -- the remark ably speculative heads--may be said to be hostile to hetero geneity in phenomena, and have their eyes always fixed on the unity of genera, while others --with a strong empirical tendency --aim unceasingly at the analysis of phenomena, and
? Wit is defined by Kant as the faculty which discovers the general Ik the particular. Viil Anthropologic, ',23 -- Tr.
DU
? ? ? 1. .
? 402 TRA58CE1TDBKTAL DIALECTIC.
almost destroy in us the hope of ever being able to estimate the character of these according to general principles.
The latter mode of thought is evidently based upon a logical principle, the aim of which is the systematic completeness of all cognitions. This principle authorizes me, beginning at the genus, to descend to the various and diverse contained under it ; and in this way extension, as in the former case unity, is assured to the system. For if we merely examine the sphere of the conception which indicates a genua, we cannot discover how far it is possible to proceed in the division of that sphere ; just as it is impossible, from the consideration of the space occupied by matter, to determine how far we can proceed in
the division of it. Hence every genus must contain different species, and these again different sub-species ; and as each of the latter must itself contain a sphere, (must be of a certain extent, as a conceptus communis), reason demands that no species or sub-species is to be considered as the lowest pos sible. For a species or sub-species, being nlways a conception, which contains only what is common to a number of different things, does not completely determine any individual thing, or relate immediately to and must consequently contain other conceptions, that other sub-species under it. This law of specification may be thus expressed --En turn varietates
non temere sunt minuenJce.
But easy to see that this logical, law would likewise be
without sense or application, were not based upon trans cendental law specification, which certainly does not require that the differences existing in phenomena should be infinite
number, for the logical principle, which merely maiutains the indeterminateness of the logical sphere of conception, in relation to its possible division, does not authorize this state ment; while does impose upon the undei standing the duty of searching for sub-species to every species, and minor differ ences every difference. For, were there no lower concep tions, neither could there be any higher. Now the under standing cognizes only by means of conceptions consequently, how far soever may proceed in division, never mere tuition, but always by lower and lower conceptions. The cog nition of phsenomena their complete determination
? (which possible only means of the understanding) requires au
unceasingly continued specification of conceptions, and pro
? ? is
in
by
in
is,
it,
by a
a
it it
of
in
;
a
t
in
it is
it
:
? OP THE IDEAS OF PUKE UEASOX. 403
gresaion to ever smaller differences, of which abstraction had been made in the conception of the species, and still more iu that of the genus.
This law of specification cannot be deduced from experi ence ; it can never present us with a principle of so universal an application. Empirical specification very soon stops in its distinction of diversities, and requires the guidance of the transcendental law, as a principle of the reason-- a law which imposes on us the necessity of never ceasing in our search for differences, even although these may not present themselves to the senses. That absorbent earths are of different kinds, could only be discovered by obeying the anticipatory law of reason, which imposes upon the understanding the task of discovering the differences existing between these earths, and supposes that nature is richer in substances than our senses would indicate. The faculty of the understanding belongs to us just as much under the presupposition of differences in the objects of nature, as under the condition that these objects
are homogeneous, because we could not possess conceptions, nor make any use of our understanding, were not the pheno mena included under these conceptions in some respects dis similar, as well as similar, in their character.
Reason thus prepares the sphere of the understanding for the operations of this faculty, 1. by the principle of the homogeneity of the diverse in higher genera ; 2. by the prin ciple of the variety of the homogeneous in lower species ; and, to complete the systematic unity, it adds, 2. a law of the affinity of all conceptions, which prescribes a continuous transition from one species to every other by the gradual increase of diversity. We may term these the principles of the homogeneity, the specification, and the continuity of forms. The latter results from the union of the two former, in asmuch as we regard the systematic connection as complete iu thought, in the ascent to higher genera, as well as in the
descent to lower species. For all diversities must be related to each other, as they all spring from one highest genus, descending through the different gradations of a more and more extended determination.
We may illustrate the systematic unity produced by the three logical principles in the following manner. Every con ception Tiny be regarded as n point, which, ns the stand poiu<
? ? ? ? Tk_lX<<CE5DES"T1LL DIALECTIC.
of a spectator, hu a certain horizon, which may b<< uid U enclose ? number of thing*, that may be viewed, ao to speak, from that centre. Within th:>> horizon there most be an infinite number of other points, each of which has its own horizon, smaller and more circumscribed ; in other words, erery species contains sub species, according to the principle of specification, and the logical horizon consists of smaller horizons (sub-species), but not of points (individuals), which possess no extent. But different horizons or genera, which include under them so many conceptions, mar have one com mon horizon, from which, as from a mid-point, they may be surveyed ; and we may proceed thus, till we arrive at the highest genus, or universal and true horizon, which is deter mined by the highest conception, and which contains under itself all differences and varieties, as genera, species, and sub species.
? To this highest stand-point I am conducted by the law of homogeneity, as to all lower and more variously-determined
conceptions by the law of specification. Now as iu this way there exists no void in the whole extent of all possible con ceptions, and as out of the sphere of these the mind can discover nothing, there arises from the presupposition of the universal horizon above mentioned, and its complete division, the prin ciple : Non datur vacuum formarum. This principle asserts that there are not different primitive and highest genera, which stand isolated, so to speak, from each other, but all the vari ous genera are mere divisions and limitations of one highest and universal genus ; and hence follows immediately the principle : Datur con/inuum formarum. This principle indi cates that all differences of species limit each other, and do not admit of transition from one to another by a saltus, but only through smaller degrees of the difference between the one species and the other. In one word, there are no species 01 sub-species which (in the view of reason) are the nearest
to each other ; intermediate species or sub-species being always possible, the difference of which from each of
the former is always smaller than the difference between these.
The first law, therefore, directs us to avoid the notion that there exist different primal genera, and enounces the fact of perfect homogeneity ; the second imposes it check upon this
possible
existing
? ? ? OF TUB IDEAS OF PURE KBASOTT.
401
tendency to unity and prescribes the distinction of sub-species, before proceeding to apply our general conceptions to indi viduals. The third unites both the former, by enouncing the fact of homogeneity as existing even in the most varioua diversity, by means of the gradual transition from one species to another. Thus it indicates a relationship between the different branches or species, in so far as they all spring from the same stem.
But this logical law of the continuum specierum {formarunt logicarum) presupposes a transcendental principle (lex con- tinui in natura), without which the understanding might be led into error, by following the guidance of the former, and thus perhaps pursuing a path contrary to that prescribed by nature. This law must consequently be based upon pure transcendental, and not upon empirical considerations. For,
in the latter case, it would come later than the system ; whereas it is really itself the parent of all that is systematic in our cognition of nature. These principles are not mere hypotheses employed for the purpose of experimenting upon natnre ; although when any such connection is discovered, it forms n solid ground for regarding the hypothetical unity as valid in the sphere of nature, --and thus they are in this respect not without their use. But we go farther, and main tain that it is manifest that these principles of parsimony in fundamental causes, variety in effects, and affinity in phe- nomena, are in accordance both with reason and nature, and that they are not mere methods or plans devised for the pur pose of assisting us in our observatiou of the external world.
But it is plain that this continuity of forms is a mere idea, to which no adequate object can be discovered in experience. And this for two reasons. First, because the species in nature are really divided, and hence form quanta ditcreta ;* and, if the gradual progression through their affinity were coutinuous, the intermediate members lying between two given species must be infinite in number, which is impossible.
because we cannot make any determinate empirical use of this law, inasmuch as it does not present us with any criterion of affinity which could aid us in determining how far we ought to pursue the graduation of differences : it merely contains a
* Not quanta continua, like apace or a line. See page 12i, tt mqe
? Secondly,
? ? ? 400 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
general indication that it is our duty to seek for and, if possi ble, to discover them.
When we arrange these principles of systematic unity in the order conformable to their employment in experience, they will stand thus : Variety, Affinity, Unity, each of them, as ideas, being taken in the highest degree of their completeness. Reason pre-supposes the existence of cognitions of the under standing, which have a direct relation to experience, and aims at the ideal unity of these cognitions -- a unity which far tran scends all experience or empirical notions. The affinity of the diverse, notwithstanding the differences existing between its parts, has a relation to things, but a still closer one to the
mere properties and powers of things. For example, imperfect experience may represent the orbits of the planets as circular. But we discover variations from this course, and we proceed to suppose that the planets revolve in a path which, if not a circle, is of a character very similar to it. That is to say, the movements of those planets which do not form a circle, will
? more or less to the properties of a circle, and probably form an ellipse. The paths of comets exhibit still greater variations, for, so far as our observation extends, they do not return upon their own course in a circle or ellipse. But we proceed to the conjecture that comets describe a parabola, a figure which is closely allied to the ellipse. In fact, a para bola is merely an ellipse, with its longer axis produced to an indefinite extent. Thus these principles conduct us to a unity in the genera of the forms of these orbits, and, proceeding further, to a unity as regards the cause of the motions of the
approximate
neavenly bodies --that gravitation. But we go on extending our conquests over nature, and endeavour to explain all seem ing deviations from these rules, and even make additions to our system which no experience can ever substantiate --for example, the theory, in affinity with that of ellipses, of hyper bolic paths of comets, pursuing which, these bodies leave our solar system, and, passing from sun to sun, unite the most distant parts of the infinite universe, which held together by the same moving power.
The most remarkable circumstance connected with these principles that they seem to be transcendental, and, although only containing ideas for the guidance of the empirical exer cise of reason, and although this empirical employment stands
? ? is,
is
is,
? OF THX IDEAS O1 PTTBE BEABOH. . 107
to tune iJeas in an asymptotic relation alone (to use a mathe matical term), that is, continually approximate, without ever being able to attain to them, they possess, notwithstanding, as a priori synthetical propositions, objective though undeter mined validity, and are available aa rules for possible expe rience. In the elaboration of our experience, they may also be employed with great advantage, as heuristic * principles. A transcendental deduction of them cannot be made ; such n deduction being always impossible in the case of ideas, as lias been already shown.
We distinguished, in the Transcendental Analytic, the dyna mical principles of the understanding, which are regulative principles of intuition, from the mathematical, which are con stitutive principles of intuition. These dynamical laws are, however, constitutive in relation to experience, inasmuch as t hey render the conceptions without which experience could net exist, possible a priori. But the principles of pure reason cannot be constitutive even in regard to empirical conceptions, because no sensuous schema corresponding to them can be discovered, and they cannot therefore have an object in con-
? creto. Now, if I grant that they cannot be employed in the sphere of experience, as constitutive principles, how shall I se cure for them employment and objective validity as regulative principles, and in what way can they be so employed ?
The understanding is the object of reason, as sensibility is the object of the understanding. The production of syste matic unity in all the empirical operations of the understand ing is the proper occupation of reason ; just as it is the business of the understanding to connect the various content of phenomena by means of conceptions, and subject them to empirical laws. But the operations of the understanding are, without the schemata of sensibility, undetermined ; and, in the same manner, the unity of reason is perfectly undetermined as regards the conditions under which, and the extent to which,
the understanding ought to carry the systematic connection of its conceptions. But, although it is impossible to discover in intuition a schema for the complete systematic unity of all the conceptions of the understanding, there must be some unalogon of this schema. This analogon is the idea of the maximum of the division and the connection of our cognition
* From the Greek ivpianu.
? ? ? 408
TRAJTSCESDETTTAL DIALECTIC.
m one principle. For we mny have a determinate noiinn of a maximum and an absolutely perfect, all the restrictive condi tions which are connected with an indeterminate and various content, having been abstracted. Thus the idea of reason is analogous with a sensuous schema, with this difference, that the application of the categories to the schema of reason does not present a cognition of any object (as is the case with the application of the categories to sensuous schemata), but merely provides us with a rule or principle for the systematic unity of the exercise of the understanding. Now, as evtry principle which imposes upon the exercise of the understanding a priori compliance with the rule of systematic unity, also relates, although only in nn indirect manner, to an object of experience,
the principles of pure reason will also possess objective reality
and validity in relation to experience. But they will not aim
at determining our knowledge in regard to any empirical
object ; they will merely indicate the procedure, following which, the empirical and determinate exercise of the under
standing may be in complete harmony and connection with itself -- a result which is produced by its being brought into harmony with the principle of systematic unity, so far as that is possible, and deduced from it.
I term all subjective principles, which are not derived from observation of the constitution of an object, but from the interest which Reason has in producing a certain completeness in her cognition of that object, maxims of reason. Thus there are maxims of speculative reason, which are based solely upon its speculative interest, although they appear to he objective principles.
When principles which are really regulative are regarded as constitutive, and employed as objective principles, contradic tions must arise ; but if they are considered as mere maxims, there is no room for contradictions of any kind, as they then merely indicate the different interests of reason, which occa sion differences in the mode of thought. In effect, Reason has only one single interest, and the seeming contradiction existing between her maxims merely indicates a difference in, and a reciprocal limitation of, the methods by which this interest is
satisfied. -- This rcasoner has at heart the interest of diversity in accordance with the principle of specification; a lotlier, th>>
? ? ? ? OF TUE IDEAS OF PUKB HEASON. 409
interest of unity -- in accordance with the principle of aggre gation. Each believes that his judgment rests upon a thorough insight into the subject he is examining, and yet it has been influenced solely by a greater or less degree of adherence to some one of the two principles, neither of which are objective, but originate solely from the interest of reason, and on this account to be termed maxims rather than principles. When
I observe intelligent men disputing about the distinctive cha racteristics of men, animals, or plants, and even of minerals, those on the one side assuming the existence of certain national characteristics, certain well-defined and hereditary distinctions of family, rnce, and so on, while the other side maintain that nature has endowed all races of men with the same faculties and dispositions, and that all differences are but the result of external and accidental circumstances, -- I have only to consider for a moment the real nature of the
of discussion, to arrive at the conclusion that it is a subject far too deep for us to judge of, and that there is little probability of either party being able to speak from a perfect insight into and understanding of the nature of the subject itxclf. Both have, in reality, been struggling for the two-fold
interest of reason ; the one maintaining the one interest, the other the other. But this difference between the maxims of diversity and unity may easily be reconciled and adjusted ; nl though, so long as they are regarded as objective principles, they must occasion not only contradictions and polemic, but place hindrances in the way of the advancement of truth, until some means is discovered of reconciling these conflicting interests, and bringing reason into union and harmony with
itself.
The same is the case with the so-called law discovered by
Leibnitz,* and supported with remarkable ability by Bonnetf -- the law of the continuous gradation of created beings, which is nothing more than an inference from the principle of nihility ; for observation and study of the order of nature could never present it to the mind as an objective truth. The steps of this ladder, as they appear in experience, are too fur <<part from each other, and the so-called petty differences between different kinds of animals are in nature commonly so
? Leibnitz, Nouveaux Essaii, Liv. hi. ch. 6.
1 Bonnet. Betr<<chtnn(ten iiher die Nstur, pp. 20 -- 85.
? subject
? ? ? 410 TUANSCENDMTTAl DIALECTIC.
wide separations, that no confidence can be placed in such
riews (particularly when we reflect on the great variety ol tilings, and the ease with which we can discover retera hlauces), and no faith in the laws which are said to express the aims and purposes of nature. On the other hand, the method of investigating the order of nature in the light of this principle, and the maxim which requires us to regard this order -- it being still undetermined how far it extends -- as really existing in nature, is beyond doubt a legitimate and excellent principle of reason --a principle which extends further than any experience or observation of ours, and which, without giring us any positive knowledge of anything in the region of experience, guides us to the goal of systematic unity.
Of the Ultimate End of the Natural Dialectic of Human Reaton.
? The ideas of pure reason cannot be, of themselves and in their own nature, dialectical ; it is from their misemployment alone that fallacies and illusions arise. For they originate in the nature of reason itself, and it is impossible that this supreme tribunal for all the rights and claims of speculation should be itself undeserving of confidence and
promotive of error. It is to be expected, therefore, that these ideas have
a genuine and legitimate aim. It is true, the mob of so phists raise against reason the cry of inconsistency and con tradiction, and affect to despise the government of that faculty, because they cannot understand its constitution, while it is to its beneficial influences alone that they owe the position and the intelligence which enable them to criticise and to blame its procedure.
We cannot employ an a priori conception with certainty, until we have made a transcendental deduction thereof. The ideas of pure reason do not admit of the same kind of deduc tion as the categories. But if they are to possess the least objective validity, and to represent anything but mere crea tions of thought (entia rationit ratiocinantis), a deduction of them must be possible. This deduction will complete the critical task imposed upon pure reason ; and it is to this part of our labours that we now proceed.
There is a great difference between a thing's being presented
? ? ? OF THE NA\0HAIi DIAXBCTIC OF HUMAN HEASOW. 411
to the mind as an object in an absolute sense, or merely as an ideal object. In the former case I employ my conceptions to
determine the object; in the latter case nothing is present to the mind but a mere schema, which does not relate directly to an object, not even in a hypothetical sense, but which is useful only for the purpose of representing other objects to the mind, in a mediate and indirect manner, by means of their relation to the idea in the intellect. Thus I sny, the concep tion of a supreme intelligence is a mere idea ; that is to say, its objective reality does not consist in the fact that it has an immediate relation to an object (for in this sense we have no means of establishing its objective validity), it is merely a schema constructed according to the necessary conditions of the unity of reason -- the schema of a thing in general, which is useful towards the production of the highest degree of sys tematic unity in the empirical exercise of reason, in which we deduce this or that object of experience from the imaginary object of this idea, as the ground or cause of the said object of experience. In this way, the idea is properly a heuristic, and not an ostensive conception ; it does not give us any information respecting the constitution of an object, it merely indicates how, under the guidance of the idea, we ought to investigate the constitution and the relations of objects in the world of experience. Now, if it can be shown that the three kinds of transcendental ideas (psychological, cosmological, and theological), although not relating directly to any object nor determining do nevertheless, on the supposition of the exist ence of an ideal object, produce systematic unity in the laws of the empirical employment of the reason, and extend our empirical cognition, without ever being inconsistent or iu opposition with -- must be necessary maxim of reason to regulate its procedure according to these ideas. And this forms the transcendental deduction of all speculative ideas, not as constitutive principles of the extension of our cognition beyond the limits of our experience, but as regulative princi ples of the systematic unity of empirical cognition, which
the aid of these ideas arranged and emended within its own proper limits, to an extent unattainable by the operation
the principles of the understanding alone.
shall make this plainer. Guided the principles involved these ideas, we must, the first place, so connect all the
? ? ? in I
by
in
by
of
is
it, it,
it
a
? 412 TRAKSCfiNDEJTTAL DIALXCTIC.
phenomena, actions and feelings of the mind, as if it were a simple substance, which, endowed with personal identity, possesses a permanent existence (in this life at least), while its states, among which those of the body are to be included as external conditions, are in continual change. Secondly, in cosmology, we must investigate the conditions of all natural
phenomena, internal as well as external, as if they belonged to a chain infinite and without any prime or supreme member, while we do not, on this account, deny the existence of intelli gible grounds of these phenomena, although we never employ them to explain phsenomena, for the simple reason that they are not objects of our cognition. Thirdly, in the sphere of theology, we must regard the whole system of possible experi ence as forming an absolute, but dependent and sensuously- conditioned unity, and at the same time as based upon a sole, supreme, and all-sufficient ground existing apart from the world itself -- a ground which is a self-subsistent, primeval and creative reason, in relation to which we so employ our reason in the field of experience, as if all objects drew their origin from that archetype of all reason. In other words, we ought not to deduce the internal phsenomena of the mind from a simple thinking substance, but deduce them from each other under the guidance of the regulative idea of a
simple being ; we ought not to deduce the phsenomena, order, and unity of the universe from a supreme intelligence, but merely draw from this idea of a supremely wise cause the rules which must guide reason in its connection of causes and effects.
New there is nothing to hinder us from admitting these ideas to possess an objective and hyperbolic existence, except the
? ideas, which lead reason into an antinomy : the psychological and theological ideas are not antinomial. They contain no contradiction ; and how then can any one dispute their objective reality, since he who denies it knows as little about their possibility, as we who affirm ? And yet, when we wish to admit the existence of a thing, it is not sufficient to convince ourselves that there is no positive obstacle in the
fir it cannot be allowable to regard mere creations of thought, which transcend, though they do not contradict, all our conceptions, as real and determinate objects, solely upon the authority of n speculative reason striving to compass its o<<r
cosmological
way ;
? ? ? OF THE NATURAL DIALECTIC OF HUMAH REA80H. 413
dims. They cannot, therefore, he admitted to be real iu them selves ; they can only possess a comparative reality -- that of a schema of the regulative principle of the systematic unity of all cognition. They are to be regarded not as actual things, but as in some measure analogous to them. We abstract from the object of the idea all the conditions which limit the exer cise of our understanding, but which, on the other hand, are the sole conditions of our possessing a determinate conception of any given thing. And thus we cogitate a something, of the real nature of which we have not the least conception, but which we represent to ourselves as standing in a relation to the whole system of phenomena, analogous to that in which phenomena stand to each other.
By admitting these ideal beings, we do not really extend our cognitions beyond the objects of possible experience ; we extend merely the empirical unity of our experience, by the aid of systematic unity, the schema of which is furnished by the idea, which is therefore valid --not as a constitutive, butns a regulative principle. For although we posit a tiling cor responding to the idea -- a something, an actual existence, we do not on that account aim at the extension of our cognition by means of transcendent conceptions. This existence is purely ideal, and not objective ; it is the mere expression of the systematic unity which is to be the guide of reason in the field of experience.