Only view is error, but by virtue of the
esteeming
of bad views (drspiviparydsa), ideas and thoughts associated with view and having its same aspect are also termed "errors.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-3-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991-PDF-Search-Engine
And by "seed" one should
understand a certain capacity to produce the klesa, a power
belonging to the person engendered by the previous klesa. In this
same way there exists in a certain person the capacity of producing
a consciousness of memory, a capacity engendered by a conscious-
ness of preception; in this same way the capacity to produce rice,
which belongs to the plant, the shoot, the stalk, etc. , is engendered
16 by the rice seed.
17
The masters
dharma distinct from the klesa itself, disassocated from the mind and called an anusaya, must admit a dharma existing in and of itself, disassociated from the mind and the cause of memory. And the same would hold for the plant.
***
[The Sarvastivadins answer]. You do not have the right to explain "anusaya of kdmardga" for the Sutra clearly teaches that anusaya is kdmardga itself.
for whom the seed of the kleia is a certain
The Satsatkasutra says, "This person has agreeable sensation, 1
and rdgdnufaya" * [From all evidence, the Sutra understands that, at the moment of agreeable sensation, there is active desire (rdga): and it designates this active desire by the name of anufaya].
But the Sutra says, "He has rdgdnusaya\" it does not say, "He
? then has ragdnufaya. " [At the moment of agreeable sensation, the anuiaya of desire (rdga) is in the process of arising, utpadyate; it has not yet arisen, utpanna. In other words, at the moment of the agreeable sensation, there is active rdga, awakened desire;] when this sensation ends, desire becomes dormant: then there is only the anusaya of desire, dormant desire, the seed of future awakened desire.
Or rather, we would say, when the Sutra says rdgdnusaya, it means rdga: the first is the effect of the second, and the cause can be designated by the name of its effect.
The examination of this chance problem is finished. Let us return to our subject.
***
What is this division that the Sutra sets up, attachment to agreeable objects (kdmardga) and attachment to existence (bhavardga)? What is attachment to existence?
2b. Attachment to existence arises from the two Dhatus.
Attachment to Rupadhatu and to Arupyadhatu is called bhavardga, attachment to existence [in opposition to kdmardga, attachment to agreeable objects,--kdmas or kdmagunas,--which is attachment proper to Kamadhatu, iii. 3c-d].
Why is the name of attachment to existence (bhavardga) reserved for attachment to the two higher Dhatus?
2c-d. It is so called because it is turned within, and in order
19 to avoid the idea that these two Dhatus are deliverance.
The School explains: In general, the attachment of the beings in these two Dhatus is with regard to absorption (samdpatti), (or more precisely, to "enjoyable" dhyana, asvddanasamprayuktadhydna, viii. 6). One says "in general" because these beings also have attachments with regard to their palaces, vimdnas, etc.
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This attachment, being an absorption, is turned within. This is why it alone receives the name of attachment to existence.
Further, certain persons imagine that the two Dhatus consti- tute deliverance: this is why the Blessed One gives the name "attachment to existence" to the attachment which has these two Dhatus for its object.
(According to us), existence (bhava) means the person. Beings in absorption enjoy both the absorption itself and their own persons. Being freed from attachment to pleasures, they only enjoy their own persons and not external objects. This is why attachment to the two higher Dhatus is called attachment to existence (bhavaraga).
***
According to the Abhidharma (Jnanaprasthana, TD 26, p. 943a27), these six anusayas make ten. How is this?
3. There are five (erroneous) views: a belief in a self
(satkayadrsti), false views (mithyddrsti), a belief in the
extremes (antagrahadrsti), the esteeming of views (drstipa-
ramarsa), and the esteeming of morality and ascetic
practices (silavrataparamarsa): thus there are ten anus- 20
ayas.
By dividing views (drsfi) into five, there are six anusayas, for a total of ten anusayas\ five which are not views by nature, namely desire, anger, pride, ignorance and doubt; and five which are views, satkayadrsti, etc.
*#*
In addition the Abhidharma (Jnanaprasthana, ibid. ) teaches
that these ten anusayas make up thirty-six anusayas in Kamadhatu,
thirty-one anusayas in Rupadhatu, and thirty-one anusayas in 11
Arupyadhatu: in all ninety-eight anusayas.
Thirty-two of the thirty-six anusayas of Kamadhatu are abandoned by Seeing the Truths (see i. 40, iv. 11-12).
? 4. With the exception of three or two views, ten, seven,
seven, eight anusayas are abandoned in Kamadhatu by the 22
Seeing of Suffering and the three other Truths respectively.
All of the above mentioned anufayas are, in Kamadhatu, abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering.
Seven are abandoned through the Seeing of Arising and through the Seeing of Extinction, with the exception of a belief in a self, a belief in the extremes, and the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices.
Eight are abandoned through the Seeing of the Path, with the exception of satkdyadrsti and antagrdhadrsti
This makes thirty-two anusayas abandoned through Seeing, because the mere Seeing of the Truths suffices to abandon them.
23
Namely desire, anger, ignorance and pride: because one who has seen the Truths then abandons them through Meditation on the Path.
In this way satkdyadrsti, the view of self and of things pertaining to a self, is unique, being susceptible of being abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering; and the same for antagrdhadrsti, the belief in extremes.
False views is of four types, abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, Arising, Extinction, and the Path; the same for the esteeming of bad views and doubt.
The esteeming of morality and ascetic practices is of two types, being susceptible of being abandoned through 1. ) the Seeing of Suffering and 2. ) the Path.
Desire, anger, pride, and ignorance are of five types, being abandoned through the Seeing of each of the Truths, and through Meditation.
5a. Four are abandoned through Meditation.
What is the characteristic or definition of the anusayas
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susceptible of being abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering? . . What is the def initon of the anusayas susceptible of being
abandoned through Meditation?
When it is possible to abandon the object (dlambana) of an
anusaya through the Seeing of a certain Truth, it is said that this 24
anusaya can be abandoned through the Seeing of this Truth. The others are abandoned through Meditation.
There are thus twelve views, four doubts, five desires, five angers, five ignorances, and five prides: in all thirty-six anusayas in Kamadhatu.
5b-c. The same, with the exception of the angers, for Rupadhatu.
The same sorts of anusayas, with the exception of the five angers, make up the thirty-one anusayas of Rupadhatu.
5c. The same in Arupyadhatu.
The same thirty-one.
5d. In this way, there are ninety-eight.
The Abhidharmikas {Jnanaprasthana, TD 26, p. 929c2) say that the six anusayas make ninety-eight through the differences of their aspect, their mode of expulsion (ii. 52b), and their sphere of existence (their Dhatu).
***
Among the ninety-eight anusayas, eighty-eight are abandoned through Seeing because they are struck, destroyed through the
? "patiences" (ksantis, vi. 25d), and ten are abandoned through Meditation because they are struck by the "knowledges" (jndnas)P Is this a strict rule with regard to abandoning through Seeing and Meditation?
6a-c. When they arise in Bhavagra (the highest state of Arupyadhatu), the anus ay as which are struck by the ksantis are abandoned through Seeing and through Meditation.
The word "ksantis" refers to the dharmajndnaksdntis and the anvayajndnaksdntis (vi. 26c).
Among the anusayas which are struck by the ksantis, those which are in Bhavagra are abandoned only by Seeing, for only anvayajndnak- sdntis causes them to be abandoned. [Only the Aryans, through the pure path, abandon these anusayas] (vi. 45c).
Those in the eight bhumis (i. e. , Kamadhatu, Rupadhatu and the first three stages of Arupyadhatu) are abandoned either through Seeing or through Meditation: Aryans abandon them solely through Seeing, and not through Meditation, by means of the dharmajndnaksdntis or the anvayajndnaksdntis accordingly as they belong to the anusayas of Kamadhatu or of the higher spheres, whereas Prthagjanas abandon them only through Meditation, and not though Seeing, for these anusayas can be abandoned through a worldly knowledge (lokasamvrtijndna, vii. 9).
6c-d. The anusayas which are not struck by the ksantis are only abandoned through Meditation.
The anuSayas which are struck by the "knowledges" (jndnas), at whichever stage they belong, are only abandoned through Meditation, whether they belong to an Aryan or to a Prthagjana. In fact, an Aryan abandons them through andsrava jnana meditation, or pure knowledge, whereas a Prthagjana abandons them through a worldly knowledge (lokasamvrtijndna).
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Some other masters maintain that non-Buddhists (bdhyaka) cannot abandon the anusayas abandoned through Seeing. For the Mahdkarmavibhdgasutra teaches that erroneous views are active among the non-Buddhists in Kamadhatu, although they may be "detached" (vitardga, that is, having abandoned the attachments of Kamadhatu, attachments that one abandons through Meditati- on. )And the Brahmajalasutra says that some non-Buddhists are entirely detached from all sorts of views idrsti) of Kamadhatu: there are among them some persons who conjure up systems concerning the past, eternalists, partial eternalists, or followers of chance. (As one could object: "the 'views' of these persons detached from Kamadhatu are of the sphere of Rupadhatu," we would say that) Kamadhatu cannot be, with regard to that which concerns it, the object of defilements (klesa) of Rupadhatu, because such persons are detached from Kamadhatu. But they have not abandoned the views of Kamadhatu.
The Vaibhasikas explain this difficulty by saying that those who are detached lose (this detachement) when they produce a view, in the manner that Devadatta (Rockhill, p. 85) lost his rddhi (vii. 48a).
#*#
We have seen that view is divided into five categories by reason of its aspect. What are the five views?
7. The view of self and things pertaining to self, the view of eternity and annihilation, the view of negation, the view that holds as high that which is low, and that which holds for cause and Path that which is not cause and Path: these
? are the five views.
1. To believe in a self and in things pertaining to self
26
because it perishes, and kdya because it is an accumulation or
{dtmatmtyagrdha) is satkdyadrsti',
multiplicity. Satkdya means "an accumulation of perishing things,"
2S
that is, the five updddnaskandhas (i. 8a-b).
The expression satkdya is put forth in order to discard the idea of permanence--this is why one says sat--and in order to discard the notion of a unity--this is why one says kdya. In fact, if one believes that the skandhas are a self, this is because one first and foremost attributes a permanence and unity to them.
Satkdyadrsti means, then, "a view with regard to the satkdya"
By this, all the views whose object is an impure belief in
extremes (antagrdhadrsti), etc. , are views of the satkdya, that is, of
the five skandhas. But even though they are views of the satkdya, 28
they are not "views of the self or of things pertaining to self. "
Also it is only the belief in a self or in things pertaining to a
self that receives the name of satkdyadrsti, for according to a
declaration of the Blessed One, "Oh monk, any monk or Brahmin
who in this world believes in a self, what he considers to be a self is
29 only the five updddnaskandhas"
2. To believe in the eternity or in the annihiliation of what one believes to be a self, is antagrdhadrsti, "a view that grasps extremes," for this is to falsely believe in the extreme (anta) thesis of eternity or annihilation.
3. The view that consists of negating (apavdda) that which really exists, the Truth of Suffering, etc. and which consists of
30
saying ndsti, "that is not," is mithyddrsti or false view.
conceived views are "false views", but only mithyddrsti receives this name because it is the most false of all, as the worst odor is called the bad odor. It is a negation, whereas the other views are an
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it is termed sat ("existence")
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1 affirmation or erroneous attribution (samdropikd)?
4. The view which considers that which is bad, low, abandoned (hma, iv. 127) as good, or "high," is called drstipardmarsa, "the esteeming of bad views. "
What does hma mean? It refers to everything that is impure, because the Saints abandon it (prahma). And the view that consist of esteeming this is called simply "consideration" (pardmarsa).
It would be best to say drstyadiparamarsa, "esteeming that which is low, beginning with erroneous views. " But the word ddi is
32
5. The view which considers as cause that which is not cause, or as the path that which is not the Path, is called filavratapardmarsa: namely, to consider Mahesvara, Prajapati, or any other entity which is not a cause of the world as a cause of the world; to consider the rituals of suicide,--entering into fire or drowning--as a cause of a heavenly rebirth when they do not in fact procure heaven; or to consider morality and ascetic practices as the only path to deliverance when they are themselves not the only path to deliverance, nor the "knowledges" (Jnana) of the Saiiimkhyas and the Yogins which are not a path to deliverance; and so too the rest.
Here too, [according to the Vaibhasikas,] the word ddi is
33
omitted.
These are the five erroneous views.
[Objection:] You have said that the erroneous view that regards as a cause of the world that which is not a cause of the world is the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices (stlavr- atapardmarsa). In this hypothesis, the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices is abandoned through the Seeing of the Truth of Arising, since it admits of error with regard to cause (=arising).
omitted here.
We would answer that those who consider the Lord (Isvara) or
? Prajapati as a cause of the world regard the Lord and Prajapati as eternal beings, one, personal, and active {dtman, kartar). It then follows that:
8. If one clings to the idea that the Lord, etc. , is the cause of the world, this is by reason of false conceptions of permanence and personality. Thus this clinging is to be
34 abandoned through Seeing (the Truth) of Suffering.
The belief in the eternity or in the personality of the Lord or Prajapati is abandoned through Seeing the single Truth of Suffering; as a consequence the belief in their causality, which results from this first belief, is abandoned in the same way as this same first belief is abandoned.
[Objection:] The erroneous view that suicide through fire or drowning produces a heavenly rebirth, and the erroneous view that morality and ascetic practices produce by themselves purity, have nothing to do with the false conceptions of permanence and personality. Why do you say that one abandons them through Seeing the Truth of Suffering? It is through the Seeing of the Truth of Arising that one should abandon them.
The Mulasastra {Jfidnaprasthdna, TD 26, p. 1029al2) says, "There are some non-Buddhists who give rise to this view, who posit this theory: a person who adopts the habits of bulls (gostla), the habits of deer, or the habits of dogs, shall obtain purity, deliverance, and escape; he shall obtain the absolute going beyond of the happiness and suffering (of the three spheres of existence), and he shall reach the place beyond happiness and suffering. One should know that all these types of considering as cause that which is not truly cause is the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices, which is abandoned through Seeing the Truth of Suffering. " The doctrine of the Vaibhasikas is thus that these two opinions are to be abandoned through the Seeing the Truth of Suffering, because they allow error with regard to suffering.
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But his argument is carried too far! All the defilements (klesas) which have the impure for their object embrace error with regard to suffering. (In fact, all impurity is suffering).
Furthermore, we would ask what is the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices which is abandoned through Seeing the Truth of the Path? If the Vaibhasikas answer, "The esteeming of morality and ascetic practices relative to the dharma which is abandoned through Seeing the Path, namely relative to one of the eight anusayas the first of which is wrong views," we would then answer that this esteeming of morality and ascetic practices also supposes error relative to suffering.
Moreover we do not see how the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices could be relative to a dharma to be abandoned through the Truth of the Path: 1. How could a person who entertains wrong views or doubt relative to the Path, thinking "There is no Path," or 'Is there, or is there not, a Path? ," imagine to obtain purification through this wrong view or through this doubt? 2. If this person, taking up the path of deliverance imagined by the Samkhyas, etc. , says, "This is the path; the Buddhist Path is not the path," then this non-Buddhist imagines that he obtains purification through the path of the Samkhyas, and not through wrong views relative to the Path. Furthermore, when a person imagines that he obtains purification through a wrong view abandoned through the Seeing of Arising or Extinction, why is his esteeming of morality and ascetic practices not abandoned through the Seeing of these same two Truths?
35 This point remains to be examined.
***
We have spoken (v. 8) of the two erroneous views of permanence (or eternity) and personality. Are there only two errors?
There are four errors: to hold that which is impermanent to be permanent, that which is suffering to be happiness, that which is
? impure to be pure, and that which is not a "soul" to be a soul or self.
What is the nature of these four errors?
9a-b. One distinguishes four errors within the three
36 views.
That part of the belief in extremes which is a view of permanence constitutes one error; two parts of the esteeming of bad views constitute the errors of happiness and purity; and that part of the belief in a self and of things pertaining to a self which is a view of self constitutes one error.
***
Some other masters maintain that all satkdyadrsti, that is, not simply the idea of self but also the idea of things pertaining to self, constitutes dtmavipatydsa, "error with regard to the self. "
[The Vaibhasikas say:] How could the idea of things pertaining to a self be part of error with regard to the self? In fact the Sutra of the Vipatydsas does not indicate this. (It says simply, "It is an error to say that andtman is dtman") and the following: "He who sees a self prevailing within the five updddnaskandhas sees 'mine"' [Thus the view of "mine" differs from the view of "self," a view from whence it derives. ]
But we think that the view of self has two parts: to say "I" and to say "mine. " If the idea of "mine" were a view different from the idea of "I," then the ideas expressed by other grammatical cases, such as mayd (by me) or mahyam (to me) would thus consititute so many new views. Thus all belief in a self and in things pertaining to a self is totally included in the error of self.
###
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Are not the other defilements errors because, in order for there to be error, a combination of three characteristics is indispensable? What are these three characteristics?
9b-c. Reflective judgment and affirmation because they allow complete error.
The view of annihilation (ucchedadrsti, a part of the belief in extremes, (antagrdhadrsti) and false views are not affirmations or erroneous attributions (samdropa), since they are directed towards the absence of existence.
The esteeming of morality and ascetic practices affirms that morality and practices suffice for purification: there is no total error in this, since morality and practices do contribute to purification.
The other defilements do not admit of reflective judgment, and as a consequence are not complete errors (viparyasa).
***
But the Blessed One said, 'To consider the impermanent as
permanent is an error of idea (samjndviparydsa), an error of
thought (cittaviparyasa), and an error of view (drspiviparydsa)" 37
and thus following for happiness, purity, and the self. Now neither ideas nor thoughts admit of reflective judgment. Thus the definition proposed for error (viparyasa) is inexact.
9d. Thought and idea are termed "error" by reason of view.
Only view is error, but by virtue of the esteeming of bad views (drspiviparydsa), ideas and thoughts associated with view and having its same aspect are also termed "errors. "
? Why does not the same hold for sensation and the other mental states associated with view?
Because one says in worldly language "error of idea," and "error of thought," but not "error of sensation. "
A Srotaapanna abandons all these errors (Jnanaprasthana, TD 26, p. 957a294); for the Seeing of the Truths which brings about the abandonment of views also brings about the abandoning of the ideas and thoughts associated with these views.
38
1. Another School says: The error which consists of holding
as permanent that which is impermanent contains three errors: error of idea, of thought and of view; and the rest. We then have twelve errors instead of four errors.
Among these twelve, eight are abandoned through the Seeing of the Truths. Four, namely the errors of idea and thought relative to happiness and purity, are abandoned through the Seeing of the Truths through Meditation.
In fact the Aryans, who by definition have abandoned all the anusayas that one abandons through Seeing the Truths, certainly possess ideas of happiness and purity, since, when they are not detached, they produce an attachment to pleasure.
2. The Vaibhasikas do not consider this reasoning as conclusive. From the fact that these Aryans have ideas of happiness and purity, you conclude that they have error relative to happiness and purity. You should say that they also have the error relative to self, since they certainly have the idea and thought of a living being: attachment to pleasure relative to a woman or relative to themselves evidently presupposses the idea and the thought of a being.
Moreover one reads in the Sutras, "The Aryan Sravaka teaches
39
true seeing and knowing:
moment the errors of idea, of thought and of view relative to the impermanent taken for the permanent, are abandoned by them," and the rest. As a consequence, only the ideas and thoughts provoked by erroneous views, or associated with erroneous views,
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this is the Truth of Suffering. . . At this
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are errors, and not the others, which are abandoned through Meditation.
In fact, it happens that the Aryan, through an illusion which lasts only as long as he first sees an object, produces attachment to pleasure, such as the illusion caused by the circle of a fire-brand or by a painted Yaksa. There is no error in the Aryan, but only a
40
mistaken idea and thought (samjnacittaviabhrama, vi. 60). 41
3. But the Sthavira Ananda said to the Aryan VaglSa, "Your
42
mind is burned by the error of your ideas. " How do we explain
these words if one admits the thesis of the Vaibhasikas?
43
4.
the eight errors of idea and thought. It is true that these errors are abandoned by means of correct knowledge of the Truths, and not without this knowledge.
The Sutra that the Vaibhasikas quote (p. 783, line 29) thus
As a consequence the Saiksa has not completely abandoned
indicates the means (upaya) of abandoning these said errors; there 44
is no contradiction here with the Sutra of VaglSa.
***
The anusaya of erroneous view is subdivided in this manner. Is it the same for the other anuiiayasi
It is the same for pride.
45 10a. There are seven types of pride (mana):
These are mana, adhimana, manatmana, asmimana, abhimana, unamana, and mithyamana.
In general, arrogance of the mind (ii. 33b) is called mana. Mana is subdivided on the basis of its different modes: 1. Mana: when the mind makes itself lofty or develops pride by thinking, "I am superior" or "I am equal"relative to an inferior or to an equal. 2.
? Adhimdna: to think, "I am superior," "I am equal," relative to an equal, or to a superior. 3. Mandtimdna: to think, "I am superior" relative to a superior. 4. Asmimdna: when the mind prides itself by taking the five updddnaskandhas for its "self" and "mine. " 5. Abhimdna to think that one possessess distinctions, that is, some dharmas, pure or impure, which abide in absorption, when one does not possess them (v. 27b-c). 6. Unamdna: to think, "I am slightly inferior" relative to that which is greatly superior. 7. Mithydmdna: to attribute to oneself spiritual qualities which one does not possess.
Abhimdna has a substantial basis: it is savastuka\ this is the pride of someone who has some qualities resembling the visesas. Mithydmdna has no substantial basis: this is the pride of someone who has no qualities whatsoever but who believes that he has some.
***
Yet the Sastra {Jndnaprasthdna, TD 26, p. 1028b26) teaches nine types of pride, mdnavidhd, or simply vidha, namely, 1. "I am superior;" 2. "I am equal;" 3. "I am less good;" 4. "Another is better than I;" 5. "He is equal to me;" 6. "He is worse than I;" 7. "Another is not better than I;" 8. "He is not my equal;" and 9. "He is not worse than I. "
Which of the seven types of pride make up these nine types?
lOa-b. Three make nine types.
These nine types come from three mdnas, namely mdna, adhimdna and unamdna.
The first three are the three mdnas which reside in the erroneous view of self. One first thinks "me. " Then there arises in order adhimdna, mana, and unamdna. One has a type of mana
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which consists of saying, "I am better," adhimdna which resides in erroneous views, and the rest. The second three are, in their order, unamana, mana, and adhimdna. The third three are, in their order, mana, adhimdna, and unamana.
We see that although we think "I am a bit inferior" relative to some one greatly superior, this is indeed unamana, for the mind prides itself in this thought; but how can this type of mana "He is not worse that I" be a locus of pride?
This is indeed a locus of pride, since one esteems oneself relative to a group of excellent persons which one regards as superior, even though one is really vastly inferior to them.
##*
We have reproduced the explanation of the Jndnaprasthdna: but, according to the Prakaranapdda (TD 26, p. 693a29), the first type of pride, "I am better," comes from three of the seven types of pride,--namely mdnaf adhimdna, mdndtimana,--accordingly as one judges oneself better than an inferior, better than an equal, or better than a superior.
#**
How are the seven types of pride abandoned?
10b. They perish through Seeing and Meditation.
All, including asmimdna, perish, that is, are abandoned, through Seeing and Meditation.
***
Must we believe that, among the Aryans, the anusayas which
? are abandoned though Meditation and which have not yet been
46 abandoned, are presently active?
Not necessarily.
10c-11a. The paryavasthdna of killing, etc. , is abandoned 47
through Meditation; [the thirst for non-existence, etc. ]
The paryavasthdna of killing (see v. 47), refers to the defile-
ment, klesa, by which one voluntarily commits murder. "Of killing,
etc. ," refers to killing, stealing, adultry, and lying. These
paryavasthdnas have the dharmas abandoned through Meditation 48
11a. The thirst for non-existence, etc.
49
Vibhavatrsnd "the thirst for non-existence/' is also aban-
doned through Meditation. By vibhava ("non-existence") we mean the impermance of the three Dhatus, Kamadhatu, etc. Desire
50 (trsnd) which is directed to impermanence is called vibhavatrsnd.
The word "et cetera" (tatha) shows that one should add a part of bhavatrsnd, the thirst for existence, to vibhavatrsnd, for example the desire "Would that I could become Airavana, King of the Nagas! " [The same for the desire to become Kuvera, the desire to become a woman; but not the desire to become Indra].
Ua-d. Among the Aryans the various types of pride, etc. , and egotism, [--because they are nourished by views--] and
51
The types of pride, etc. are not produced, and do not become active among the Aryans, nor is there any longer "egotism" among them.
for their object.
bad regret, are impossible.
"Et cetera" signifies the anusayas enumerated above, the
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paryavasthdnas of killing, the desire for non-existence and part of the desire for existence.
Why is this?
lib. Because they are nourished by views.
Because all these anusayas are nourished by erroneous views: 52
when their nourishment is burned up, they no longer have the power to arise (or: the Aryans no longer produce them).
Mana and asmita, "egotism," are nourished through wrong views; the desire for non-existence is nourished through the view of annihilation; and a part of the desire for existence is nourished through the view of eternalism.
Even though "bad regret" (ii. 28) is abandoned through Meditation, it does not become active among the Aryans, because it is nourished by doubt.
***
Among the ninety-eight anusayas, how many are universal? How many are not universal?
12. Universal anusayas are 1. the erroneous views and doubts which are abandoned through the Seeing of Suffer- ing and Arising, 2. the ignorance which is associated with
53 them, and 3. independent ignorance.
This makes eleven anusayas\ the five erroneous views which are abandoned by the Seeing of Suffering; wrong views and the esteeming of views abandoned through Seeing of Arising; and two doubts and two ignorances abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and the Seeing of Arising.
? These eleven anusayas are called "universal," "going every- where," because they grasp the entire Dhatu as their object. (See
54
1. Objection: Do these universals grasp their entire Dhatu succesively or all at once?
In the first hypothesis, the definition would apply to the other anusayas as well; and the second hypothesis is inadmissible: in fact no one considers the totality of the Dhatu as a means of purification; it is only certain practices which are the object of the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices. In the same way, no one considers the totality of the Dhatus as the cause of the world, but only Isvara, Prajapati, etc.
2. [Answer of the Vaibhasikas:] We do not say that the universals have the entire Dhatu for their object all at once, but rather they have the Dhatu in its five categories for their object: "entire" refers to the totality of types.
3. But, if we understand universality in this way, desire and pride {trsna and mana) would also be universals.
There is atmadrsti, "a view that there is the self," relative to the five upadanaskandhas: there will be atmatrsna, "desire for a self" relative to the same skandhas. There is agradrsti, "opinion that this is better" (a drsfiparamarsa), and suddhidrsti, "opinion that this is a means of purification" relative to a certain object: and there will be desire relative to this same object. And there will also be pride, mana, relative to the same objects.
In this hypothesis of their univerality, how are thirst and pride abandoned?
Like a belief in a self {satkayadrsti), etc. , their object is abandoned through Seeing and Meditation. Or should we think that they are to be abandoned through Seeing (like satkayadrsfi) or through Meditation.
The author answers: As their object is mixed, they are abandoned through Meditation. Or rather, they are abandoned through Seeing, for they exist through the efficacy of the view.
p. 790, line l).
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4. [The Vaibhasikas reply:] thirst and pride are special defilements and not general defilements (v. 23). This is why they are not universal. (There is thirst and pride related to an object relative to which there is dtmadrsti, but not relative to the whole of this object at once. )
We have seen that eleven anusayas are universal (that is, bearing on all the categories) in their Dhatu, in the sphere of existence wherein the person is born in whom they are found:
13a-b. Among them, nine, with the exception of the two
55
With the exception of a belief in a self (satkayadrsti) and a belief in extremes (antagrahadrstai), the nine other universals are also universals in a different Dhatu; they sometimes bear on a different Dhatu, sometimes on two, for it is said (in the Prakaran- apdda, TD 26, p. 711a24), "There are some anusayas of the realm of Kamadhatu (that is, produced among the beings of Kamadhatu) which bear on the dharmas of the realm of Rupadhatu, on the dharmas of the realm of Arupyadhatu, or on the dharmas of both the realms of Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu. (And there are some anusayas of the realm of Rupadhatu which bear on the dharmas of the realm of Arupyadhatu). "
**#
[Objection:] When some beings in Kamadhatu produce the opinion that Brahma is a being, the opinion that he is permanent, they then entertain a belief in a self and a belief in extremes with regard to a thing belonging to a different, superior Dhatu. Thus you are wrong to exclude these two erroneous views from the list of the universal anusayas in a different Dhatu.
But one does not have the idea of a self and of things pertaining to a self with regard to Brahma: thus the idea that he is
views, bear on the superior.
? a being is not a belief in a self. And a belief in extremes is created by a belief in a self; thus the idea of the permanence of Brahma is not a belief in extremes (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 93a4ff).
What sort of views would a belief in a living being and a belief in permanence be with respect to Brahma?
The Abhidharmikas say that there are no erroneous views here, but only "false knowledge/* (All speculative knowledge which errs, viparitdlambana is not considered as views).
But why are the other false opinions which have Brahma for their object (the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices, etc. ) considered as erroneous views, and not the two opinions of being and permanence?
The Siddhanta serves as authority (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 93a). ***
Are only the anusayas universals?
13c-d. With the exception of the praptis, dharmas coexist- ant with the universal anusayas are also universals.
"Coexistant dharmas* refer to sensation, etc. Not the praptis, because the prapti (adherence) and the prdpya (the thing adhered to) do not have the same result (ii. 36c).
Are universal anusayas universal causes (ii. 54c-d)?
1. Future universal anusayas are not universal causes. 2. Coexistents of past and present universal anusayas are universal causes, but not universal anusayas. 3. Past and present universal anusayas are universal causes. 4. Future coexistents of universal anusayas are neither universal anusayas nor universal causes.
##*
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Among the ninety-eight anusayas, how many have a pure dharma for their object, that is, the Third and Fourth Truth, the Truth of Extinction and the Path? How many have an impure dharma}
14. Wrong views, doubt, and the ignorance which is bound (yukta) to them, and independent ignorance, abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction and the Path, make six
56 anusayas whose object is pure.
Except for the six,--that is, the three anusayas abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction, namely wrong views, doubt, and the ignorance associated with them or independent of them, and these same three anusayas abandoned through Seeing the Path,--all the other anusayas have impure dharmas for their object.
15. The extinction of their own bhumi is the object of the anusayas which have extinction for their sphere; the Path with its six or nine bhumis, is the object of the anusayas which have the Path for their sphere, for the Paths depend
57 on one another.
The three anusayas (wrong views, doubt, and ignorance) which are abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction and which have Extinction for their object, do not have Extinction for their total object: when they belong to Kamadhatu, they bear on Extinction in Kamadhatu, and so on from bhilmi to bhumi, until: when they belong to Bhavagra {naivasamjnanasamjnanayatana) they bear on Extinction in Bhavagra.
When they are in the realm of Kamadhatu, the three anusayas which have the Path for their object bear on the totality of the Path as well as on a portion of the dharmajnana (vi. 26), with its six bhumis (namely anagamya, dhyanantara, and the four
? Dhyanas) (see ii. 52c, vii. 9).
When they are of the realm of Rupadhatu or Arupyadhatu (four Dhyanas, four Arupyas), these same anusayas bear on the totality of the Path, and on a part of the anvayajnana (vi.
understand a certain capacity to produce the klesa, a power
belonging to the person engendered by the previous klesa. In this
same way there exists in a certain person the capacity of producing
a consciousness of memory, a capacity engendered by a conscious-
ness of preception; in this same way the capacity to produce rice,
which belongs to the plant, the shoot, the stalk, etc. , is engendered
16 by the rice seed.
17
The masters
dharma distinct from the klesa itself, disassocated from the mind and called an anusaya, must admit a dharma existing in and of itself, disassociated from the mind and the cause of memory. And the same would hold for the plant.
***
[The Sarvastivadins answer]. You do not have the right to explain "anusaya of kdmardga" for the Sutra clearly teaches that anusaya is kdmardga itself.
for whom the seed of the kleia is a certain
The Satsatkasutra says, "This person has agreeable sensation, 1
and rdgdnufaya" * [From all evidence, the Sutra understands that, at the moment of agreeable sensation, there is active desire (rdga): and it designates this active desire by the name of anufaya].
But the Sutra says, "He has rdgdnusaya\" it does not say, "He
? then has ragdnufaya. " [At the moment of agreeable sensation, the anuiaya of desire (rdga) is in the process of arising, utpadyate; it has not yet arisen, utpanna. In other words, at the moment of the agreeable sensation, there is active rdga, awakened desire;] when this sensation ends, desire becomes dormant: then there is only the anusaya of desire, dormant desire, the seed of future awakened desire.
Or rather, we would say, when the Sutra says rdgdnusaya, it means rdga: the first is the effect of the second, and the cause can be designated by the name of its effect.
The examination of this chance problem is finished. Let us return to our subject.
***
What is this division that the Sutra sets up, attachment to agreeable objects (kdmardga) and attachment to existence (bhavardga)? What is attachment to existence?
2b. Attachment to existence arises from the two Dhatus.
Attachment to Rupadhatu and to Arupyadhatu is called bhavardga, attachment to existence [in opposition to kdmardga, attachment to agreeable objects,--kdmas or kdmagunas,--which is attachment proper to Kamadhatu, iii. 3c-d].
Why is the name of attachment to existence (bhavardga) reserved for attachment to the two higher Dhatus?
2c-d. It is so called because it is turned within, and in order
19 to avoid the idea that these two Dhatus are deliverance.
The School explains: In general, the attachment of the beings in these two Dhatus is with regard to absorption (samdpatti), (or more precisely, to "enjoyable" dhyana, asvddanasamprayuktadhydna, viii. 6). One says "in general" because these beings also have attachments with regard to their palaces, vimdnas, etc.
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This attachment, being an absorption, is turned within. This is why it alone receives the name of attachment to existence.
Further, certain persons imagine that the two Dhatus consti- tute deliverance: this is why the Blessed One gives the name "attachment to existence" to the attachment which has these two Dhatus for its object.
(According to us), existence (bhava) means the person. Beings in absorption enjoy both the absorption itself and their own persons. Being freed from attachment to pleasures, they only enjoy their own persons and not external objects. This is why attachment to the two higher Dhatus is called attachment to existence (bhavaraga).
***
According to the Abhidharma (Jnanaprasthana, TD 26, p. 943a27), these six anusayas make ten. How is this?
3. There are five (erroneous) views: a belief in a self
(satkayadrsti), false views (mithyddrsti), a belief in the
extremes (antagrahadrsti), the esteeming of views (drstipa-
ramarsa), and the esteeming of morality and ascetic
practices (silavrataparamarsa): thus there are ten anus- 20
ayas.
By dividing views (drsfi) into five, there are six anusayas, for a total of ten anusayas\ five which are not views by nature, namely desire, anger, pride, ignorance and doubt; and five which are views, satkayadrsti, etc.
*#*
In addition the Abhidharma (Jnanaprasthana, ibid. ) teaches
that these ten anusayas make up thirty-six anusayas in Kamadhatu,
thirty-one anusayas in Rupadhatu, and thirty-one anusayas in 11
Arupyadhatu: in all ninety-eight anusayas.
Thirty-two of the thirty-six anusayas of Kamadhatu are abandoned by Seeing the Truths (see i. 40, iv. 11-12).
? 4. With the exception of three or two views, ten, seven,
seven, eight anusayas are abandoned in Kamadhatu by the 22
Seeing of Suffering and the three other Truths respectively.
All of the above mentioned anufayas are, in Kamadhatu, abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering.
Seven are abandoned through the Seeing of Arising and through the Seeing of Extinction, with the exception of a belief in a self, a belief in the extremes, and the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices.
Eight are abandoned through the Seeing of the Path, with the exception of satkdyadrsti and antagrdhadrsti
This makes thirty-two anusayas abandoned through Seeing, because the mere Seeing of the Truths suffices to abandon them.
23
Namely desire, anger, ignorance and pride: because one who has seen the Truths then abandons them through Meditation on the Path.
In this way satkdyadrsti, the view of self and of things pertaining to a self, is unique, being susceptible of being abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering; and the same for antagrdhadrsti, the belief in extremes.
False views is of four types, abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, Arising, Extinction, and the Path; the same for the esteeming of bad views and doubt.
The esteeming of morality and ascetic practices is of two types, being susceptible of being abandoned through 1. ) the Seeing of Suffering and 2. ) the Path.
Desire, anger, pride, and ignorance are of five types, being abandoned through the Seeing of each of the Truths, and through Meditation.
5a. Four are abandoned through Meditation.
What is the characteristic or definition of the anusayas
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susceptible of being abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering? . . What is the def initon of the anusayas susceptible of being
abandoned through Meditation?
When it is possible to abandon the object (dlambana) of an
anusaya through the Seeing of a certain Truth, it is said that this 24
anusaya can be abandoned through the Seeing of this Truth. The others are abandoned through Meditation.
There are thus twelve views, four doubts, five desires, five angers, five ignorances, and five prides: in all thirty-six anusayas in Kamadhatu.
5b-c. The same, with the exception of the angers, for Rupadhatu.
The same sorts of anusayas, with the exception of the five angers, make up the thirty-one anusayas of Rupadhatu.
5c. The same in Arupyadhatu.
The same thirty-one.
5d. In this way, there are ninety-eight.
The Abhidharmikas {Jnanaprasthana, TD 26, p. 929c2) say that the six anusayas make ninety-eight through the differences of their aspect, their mode of expulsion (ii. 52b), and their sphere of existence (their Dhatu).
***
Among the ninety-eight anusayas, eighty-eight are abandoned through Seeing because they are struck, destroyed through the
? "patiences" (ksantis, vi. 25d), and ten are abandoned through Meditation because they are struck by the "knowledges" (jndnas)P Is this a strict rule with regard to abandoning through Seeing and Meditation?
6a-c. When they arise in Bhavagra (the highest state of Arupyadhatu), the anus ay as which are struck by the ksantis are abandoned through Seeing and through Meditation.
The word "ksantis" refers to the dharmajndnaksdntis and the anvayajndnaksdntis (vi. 26c).
Among the anusayas which are struck by the ksantis, those which are in Bhavagra are abandoned only by Seeing, for only anvayajndnak- sdntis causes them to be abandoned. [Only the Aryans, through the pure path, abandon these anusayas] (vi. 45c).
Those in the eight bhumis (i. e. , Kamadhatu, Rupadhatu and the first three stages of Arupyadhatu) are abandoned either through Seeing or through Meditation: Aryans abandon them solely through Seeing, and not through Meditation, by means of the dharmajndnaksdntis or the anvayajndnaksdntis accordingly as they belong to the anusayas of Kamadhatu or of the higher spheres, whereas Prthagjanas abandon them only through Meditation, and not though Seeing, for these anusayas can be abandoned through a worldly knowledge (lokasamvrtijndna, vii. 9).
6c-d. The anusayas which are not struck by the ksantis are only abandoned through Meditation.
The anuSayas which are struck by the "knowledges" (jndnas), at whichever stage they belong, are only abandoned through Meditation, whether they belong to an Aryan or to a Prthagjana. In fact, an Aryan abandons them through andsrava jnana meditation, or pure knowledge, whereas a Prthagjana abandons them through a worldly knowledge (lokasamvrtijndna).
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Some other masters maintain that non-Buddhists (bdhyaka) cannot abandon the anusayas abandoned through Seeing. For the Mahdkarmavibhdgasutra teaches that erroneous views are active among the non-Buddhists in Kamadhatu, although they may be "detached" (vitardga, that is, having abandoned the attachments of Kamadhatu, attachments that one abandons through Meditati- on. )And the Brahmajalasutra says that some non-Buddhists are entirely detached from all sorts of views idrsti) of Kamadhatu: there are among them some persons who conjure up systems concerning the past, eternalists, partial eternalists, or followers of chance. (As one could object: "the 'views' of these persons detached from Kamadhatu are of the sphere of Rupadhatu," we would say that) Kamadhatu cannot be, with regard to that which concerns it, the object of defilements (klesa) of Rupadhatu, because such persons are detached from Kamadhatu. But they have not abandoned the views of Kamadhatu.
The Vaibhasikas explain this difficulty by saying that those who are detached lose (this detachement) when they produce a view, in the manner that Devadatta (Rockhill, p. 85) lost his rddhi (vii. 48a).
#*#
We have seen that view is divided into five categories by reason of its aspect. What are the five views?
7. The view of self and things pertaining to self, the view of eternity and annihilation, the view of negation, the view that holds as high that which is low, and that which holds for cause and Path that which is not cause and Path: these
? are the five views.
1. To believe in a self and in things pertaining to self
26
because it perishes, and kdya because it is an accumulation or
{dtmatmtyagrdha) is satkdyadrsti',
multiplicity. Satkdya means "an accumulation of perishing things,"
2S
that is, the five updddnaskandhas (i. 8a-b).
The expression satkdya is put forth in order to discard the idea of permanence--this is why one says sat--and in order to discard the notion of a unity--this is why one says kdya. In fact, if one believes that the skandhas are a self, this is because one first and foremost attributes a permanence and unity to them.
Satkdyadrsti means, then, "a view with regard to the satkdya"
By this, all the views whose object is an impure belief in
extremes (antagrdhadrsti), etc. , are views of the satkdya, that is, of
the five skandhas. But even though they are views of the satkdya, 28
they are not "views of the self or of things pertaining to self. "
Also it is only the belief in a self or in things pertaining to a
self that receives the name of satkdyadrsti, for according to a
declaration of the Blessed One, "Oh monk, any monk or Brahmin
who in this world believes in a self, what he considers to be a self is
29 only the five updddnaskandhas"
2. To believe in the eternity or in the annihiliation of what one believes to be a self, is antagrdhadrsti, "a view that grasps extremes," for this is to falsely believe in the extreme (anta) thesis of eternity or annihilation.
3. The view that consists of negating (apavdda) that which really exists, the Truth of Suffering, etc. and which consists of
30
saying ndsti, "that is not," is mithyddrsti or false view.
conceived views are "false views", but only mithyddrsti receives this name because it is the most false of all, as the worst odor is called the bad odor. It is a negation, whereas the other views are an
The Latent Defilements 111
it is termed sat ("existence")
All falsely
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1 affirmation or erroneous attribution (samdropikd)?
4. The view which considers that which is bad, low, abandoned (hma, iv. 127) as good, or "high," is called drstipardmarsa, "the esteeming of bad views. "
What does hma mean? It refers to everything that is impure, because the Saints abandon it (prahma). And the view that consist of esteeming this is called simply "consideration" (pardmarsa).
It would be best to say drstyadiparamarsa, "esteeming that which is low, beginning with erroneous views. " But the word ddi is
32
5. The view which considers as cause that which is not cause, or as the path that which is not the Path, is called filavratapardmarsa: namely, to consider Mahesvara, Prajapati, or any other entity which is not a cause of the world as a cause of the world; to consider the rituals of suicide,--entering into fire or drowning--as a cause of a heavenly rebirth when they do not in fact procure heaven; or to consider morality and ascetic practices as the only path to deliverance when they are themselves not the only path to deliverance, nor the "knowledges" (Jnana) of the Saiiimkhyas and the Yogins which are not a path to deliverance; and so too the rest.
Here too, [according to the Vaibhasikas,] the word ddi is
33
omitted.
These are the five erroneous views.
[Objection:] You have said that the erroneous view that regards as a cause of the world that which is not a cause of the world is the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices (stlavr- atapardmarsa). In this hypothesis, the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices is abandoned through the Seeing of the Truth of Arising, since it admits of error with regard to cause (=arising).
omitted here.
We would answer that those who consider the Lord (Isvara) or
? Prajapati as a cause of the world regard the Lord and Prajapati as eternal beings, one, personal, and active {dtman, kartar). It then follows that:
8. If one clings to the idea that the Lord, etc. , is the cause of the world, this is by reason of false conceptions of permanence and personality. Thus this clinging is to be
34 abandoned through Seeing (the Truth) of Suffering.
The belief in the eternity or in the personality of the Lord or Prajapati is abandoned through Seeing the single Truth of Suffering; as a consequence the belief in their causality, which results from this first belief, is abandoned in the same way as this same first belief is abandoned.
[Objection:] The erroneous view that suicide through fire or drowning produces a heavenly rebirth, and the erroneous view that morality and ascetic practices produce by themselves purity, have nothing to do with the false conceptions of permanence and personality. Why do you say that one abandons them through Seeing the Truth of Suffering? It is through the Seeing of the Truth of Arising that one should abandon them.
The Mulasastra {Jfidnaprasthdna, TD 26, p. 1029al2) says, "There are some non-Buddhists who give rise to this view, who posit this theory: a person who adopts the habits of bulls (gostla), the habits of deer, or the habits of dogs, shall obtain purity, deliverance, and escape; he shall obtain the absolute going beyond of the happiness and suffering (of the three spheres of existence), and he shall reach the place beyond happiness and suffering. One should know that all these types of considering as cause that which is not truly cause is the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices, which is abandoned through Seeing the Truth of Suffering. " The doctrine of the Vaibhasikas is thus that these two opinions are to be abandoned through the Seeing the Truth of Suffering, because they allow error with regard to suffering.
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But his argument is carried too far! All the defilements (klesas) which have the impure for their object embrace error with regard to suffering. (In fact, all impurity is suffering).
Furthermore, we would ask what is the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices which is abandoned through Seeing the Truth of the Path? If the Vaibhasikas answer, "The esteeming of morality and ascetic practices relative to the dharma which is abandoned through Seeing the Path, namely relative to one of the eight anusayas the first of which is wrong views," we would then answer that this esteeming of morality and ascetic practices also supposes error relative to suffering.
Moreover we do not see how the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices could be relative to a dharma to be abandoned through the Truth of the Path: 1. How could a person who entertains wrong views or doubt relative to the Path, thinking "There is no Path," or 'Is there, or is there not, a Path? ," imagine to obtain purification through this wrong view or through this doubt? 2. If this person, taking up the path of deliverance imagined by the Samkhyas, etc. , says, "This is the path; the Buddhist Path is not the path," then this non-Buddhist imagines that he obtains purification through the path of the Samkhyas, and not through wrong views relative to the Path. Furthermore, when a person imagines that he obtains purification through a wrong view abandoned through the Seeing of Arising or Extinction, why is his esteeming of morality and ascetic practices not abandoned through the Seeing of these same two Truths?
35 This point remains to be examined.
***
We have spoken (v. 8) of the two erroneous views of permanence (or eternity) and personality. Are there only two errors?
There are four errors: to hold that which is impermanent to be permanent, that which is suffering to be happiness, that which is
? impure to be pure, and that which is not a "soul" to be a soul or self.
What is the nature of these four errors?
9a-b. One distinguishes four errors within the three
36 views.
That part of the belief in extremes which is a view of permanence constitutes one error; two parts of the esteeming of bad views constitute the errors of happiness and purity; and that part of the belief in a self and of things pertaining to a self which is a view of self constitutes one error.
***
Some other masters maintain that all satkdyadrsti, that is, not simply the idea of self but also the idea of things pertaining to self, constitutes dtmavipatydsa, "error with regard to the self. "
[The Vaibhasikas say:] How could the idea of things pertaining to a self be part of error with regard to the self? In fact the Sutra of the Vipatydsas does not indicate this. (It says simply, "It is an error to say that andtman is dtman") and the following: "He who sees a self prevailing within the five updddnaskandhas sees 'mine"' [Thus the view of "mine" differs from the view of "self," a view from whence it derives. ]
But we think that the view of self has two parts: to say "I" and to say "mine. " If the idea of "mine" were a view different from the idea of "I," then the ideas expressed by other grammatical cases, such as mayd (by me) or mahyam (to me) would thus consititute so many new views. Thus all belief in a self and in things pertaining to a self is totally included in the error of self.
###
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Are not the other defilements errors because, in order for there to be error, a combination of three characteristics is indispensable? What are these three characteristics?
9b-c. Reflective judgment and affirmation because they allow complete error.
The view of annihilation (ucchedadrsti, a part of the belief in extremes, (antagrdhadrsti) and false views are not affirmations or erroneous attributions (samdropa), since they are directed towards the absence of existence.
The esteeming of morality and ascetic practices affirms that morality and practices suffice for purification: there is no total error in this, since morality and practices do contribute to purification.
The other defilements do not admit of reflective judgment, and as a consequence are not complete errors (viparyasa).
***
But the Blessed One said, 'To consider the impermanent as
permanent is an error of idea (samjndviparydsa), an error of
thought (cittaviparyasa), and an error of view (drspiviparydsa)" 37
and thus following for happiness, purity, and the self. Now neither ideas nor thoughts admit of reflective judgment. Thus the definition proposed for error (viparyasa) is inexact.
9d. Thought and idea are termed "error" by reason of view.
Only view is error, but by virtue of the esteeming of bad views (drspiviparydsa), ideas and thoughts associated with view and having its same aspect are also termed "errors. "
? Why does not the same hold for sensation and the other mental states associated with view?
Because one says in worldly language "error of idea," and "error of thought," but not "error of sensation. "
A Srotaapanna abandons all these errors (Jnanaprasthana, TD 26, p. 957a294); for the Seeing of the Truths which brings about the abandonment of views also brings about the abandoning of the ideas and thoughts associated with these views.
38
1. Another School says: The error which consists of holding
as permanent that which is impermanent contains three errors: error of idea, of thought and of view; and the rest. We then have twelve errors instead of four errors.
Among these twelve, eight are abandoned through the Seeing of the Truths. Four, namely the errors of idea and thought relative to happiness and purity, are abandoned through the Seeing of the Truths through Meditation.
In fact the Aryans, who by definition have abandoned all the anusayas that one abandons through Seeing the Truths, certainly possess ideas of happiness and purity, since, when they are not detached, they produce an attachment to pleasure.
2. The Vaibhasikas do not consider this reasoning as conclusive. From the fact that these Aryans have ideas of happiness and purity, you conclude that they have error relative to happiness and purity. You should say that they also have the error relative to self, since they certainly have the idea and thought of a living being: attachment to pleasure relative to a woman or relative to themselves evidently presupposses the idea and the thought of a being.
Moreover one reads in the Sutras, "The Aryan Sravaka teaches
39
true seeing and knowing:
moment the errors of idea, of thought and of view relative to the impermanent taken for the permanent, are abandoned by them," and the rest. As a consequence, only the ideas and thoughts provoked by erroneous views, or associated with erroneous views,
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this is the Truth of Suffering. . . At this
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are errors, and not the others, which are abandoned through Meditation.
In fact, it happens that the Aryan, through an illusion which lasts only as long as he first sees an object, produces attachment to pleasure, such as the illusion caused by the circle of a fire-brand or by a painted Yaksa. There is no error in the Aryan, but only a
40
mistaken idea and thought (samjnacittaviabhrama, vi. 60). 41
3. But the Sthavira Ananda said to the Aryan VaglSa, "Your
42
mind is burned by the error of your ideas. " How do we explain
these words if one admits the thesis of the Vaibhasikas?
43
4.
the eight errors of idea and thought. It is true that these errors are abandoned by means of correct knowledge of the Truths, and not without this knowledge.
The Sutra that the Vaibhasikas quote (p. 783, line 29) thus
As a consequence the Saiksa has not completely abandoned
indicates the means (upaya) of abandoning these said errors; there 44
is no contradiction here with the Sutra of VaglSa.
***
The anusaya of erroneous view is subdivided in this manner. Is it the same for the other anuiiayasi
It is the same for pride.
45 10a. There are seven types of pride (mana):
These are mana, adhimana, manatmana, asmimana, abhimana, unamana, and mithyamana.
In general, arrogance of the mind (ii. 33b) is called mana. Mana is subdivided on the basis of its different modes: 1. Mana: when the mind makes itself lofty or develops pride by thinking, "I am superior" or "I am equal"relative to an inferior or to an equal. 2.
? Adhimdna: to think, "I am superior," "I am equal," relative to an equal, or to a superior. 3. Mandtimdna: to think, "I am superior" relative to a superior. 4. Asmimdna: when the mind prides itself by taking the five updddnaskandhas for its "self" and "mine. " 5. Abhimdna to think that one possessess distinctions, that is, some dharmas, pure or impure, which abide in absorption, when one does not possess them (v. 27b-c). 6. Unamdna: to think, "I am slightly inferior" relative to that which is greatly superior. 7. Mithydmdna: to attribute to oneself spiritual qualities which one does not possess.
Abhimdna has a substantial basis: it is savastuka\ this is the pride of someone who has some qualities resembling the visesas. Mithydmdna has no substantial basis: this is the pride of someone who has no qualities whatsoever but who believes that he has some.
***
Yet the Sastra {Jndnaprasthdna, TD 26, p. 1028b26) teaches nine types of pride, mdnavidhd, or simply vidha, namely, 1. "I am superior;" 2. "I am equal;" 3. "I am less good;" 4. "Another is better than I;" 5. "He is equal to me;" 6. "He is worse than I;" 7. "Another is not better than I;" 8. "He is not my equal;" and 9. "He is not worse than I. "
Which of the seven types of pride make up these nine types?
lOa-b. Three make nine types.
These nine types come from three mdnas, namely mdna, adhimdna and unamdna.
The first three are the three mdnas which reside in the erroneous view of self. One first thinks "me. " Then there arises in order adhimdna, mana, and unamdna. One has a type of mana
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which consists of saying, "I am better," adhimdna which resides in erroneous views, and the rest. The second three are, in their order, unamana, mana, and adhimdna. The third three are, in their order, mana, adhimdna, and unamana.
We see that although we think "I am a bit inferior" relative to some one greatly superior, this is indeed unamana, for the mind prides itself in this thought; but how can this type of mana "He is not worse that I" be a locus of pride?
This is indeed a locus of pride, since one esteems oneself relative to a group of excellent persons which one regards as superior, even though one is really vastly inferior to them.
##*
We have reproduced the explanation of the Jndnaprasthdna: but, according to the Prakaranapdda (TD 26, p. 693a29), the first type of pride, "I am better," comes from three of the seven types of pride,--namely mdnaf adhimdna, mdndtimana,--accordingly as one judges oneself better than an inferior, better than an equal, or better than a superior.
#**
How are the seven types of pride abandoned?
10b. They perish through Seeing and Meditation.
All, including asmimdna, perish, that is, are abandoned, through Seeing and Meditation.
***
Must we believe that, among the Aryans, the anusayas which
? are abandoned though Meditation and which have not yet been
46 abandoned, are presently active?
Not necessarily.
10c-11a. The paryavasthdna of killing, etc. , is abandoned 47
through Meditation; [the thirst for non-existence, etc. ]
The paryavasthdna of killing (see v. 47), refers to the defile-
ment, klesa, by which one voluntarily commits murder. "Of killing,
etc. ," refers to killing, stealing, adultry, and lying. These
paryavasthdnas have the dharmas abandoned through Meditation 48
11a. The thirst for non-existence, etc.
49
Vibhavatrsnd "the thirst for non-existence/' is also aban-
doned through Meditation. By vibhava ("non-existence") we mean the impermance of the three Dhatus, Kamadhatu, etc. Desire
50 (trsnd) which is directed to impermanence is called vibhavatrsnd.
The word "et cetera" (tatha) shows that one should add a part of bhavatrsnd, the thirst for existence, to vibhavatrsnd, for example the desire "Would that I could become Airavana, King of the Nagas! " [The same for the desire to become Kuvera, the desire to become a woman; but not the desire to become Indra].
Ua-d. Among the Aryans the various types of pride, etc. , and egotism, [--because they are nourished by views--] and
51
The types of pride, etc. are not produced, and do not become active among the Aryans, nor is there any longer "egotism" among them.
for their object.
bad regret, are impossible.
"Et cetera" signifies the anusayas enumerated above, the
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paryavasthdnas of killing, the desire for non-existence and part of the desire for existence.
Why is this?
lib. Because they are nourished by views.
Because all these anusayas are nourished by erroneous views: 52
when their nourishment is burned up, they no longer have the power to arise (or: the Aryans no longer produce them).
Mana and asmita, "egotism," are nourished through wrong views; the desire for non-existence is nourished through the view of annihilation; and a part of the desire for existence is nourished through the view of eternalism.
Even though "bad regret" (ii. 28) is abandoned through Meditation, it does not become active among the Aryans, because it is nourished by doubt.
***
Among the ninety-eight anusayas, how many are universal? How many are not universal?
12. Universal anusayas are 1. the erroneous views and doubts which are abandoned through the Seeing of Suffer- ing and Arising, 2. the ignorance which is associated with
53 them, and 3. independent ignorance.
This makes eleven anusayas\ the five erroneous views which are abandoned by the Seeing of Suffering; wrong views and the esteeming of views abandoned through Seeing of Arising; and two doubts and two ignorances abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and the Seeing of Arising.
? These eleven anusayas are called "universal," "going every- where," because they grasp the entire Dhatu as their object. (See
54
1. Objection: Do these universals grasp their entire Dhatu succesively or all at once?
In the first hypothesis, the definition would apply to the other anusayas as well; and the second hypothesis is inadmissible: in fact no one considers the totality of the Dhatu as a means of purification; it is only certain practices which are the object of the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices. In the same way, no one considers the totality of the Dhatus as the cause of the world, but only Isvara, Prajapati, etc.
2. [Answer of the Vaibhasikas:] We do not say that the universals have the entire Dhatu for their object all at once, but rather they have the Dhatu in its five categories for their object: "entire" refers to the totality of types.
3. But, if we understand universality in this way, desire and pride {trsna and mana) would also be universals.
There is atmadrsti, "a view that there is the self," relative to the five upadanaskandhas: there will be atmatrsna, "desire for a self" relative to the same skandhas. There is agradrsti, "opinion that this is better" (a drsfiparamarsa), and suddhidrsti, "opinion that this is a means of purification" relative to a certain object: and there will be desire relative to this same object. And there will also be pride, mana, relative to the same objects.
In this hypothesis of their univerality, how are thirst and pride abandoned?
Like a belief in a self {satkayadrsti), etc. , their object is abandoned through Seeing and Meditation. Or should we think that they are to be abandoned through Seeing (like satkayadrsfi) or through Meditation.
The author answers: As their object is mixed, they are abandoned through Meditation. Or rather, they are abandoned through Seeing, for they exist through the efficacy of the view.
p. 790, line l).
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4. [The Vaibhasikas reply:] thirst and pride are special defilements and not general defilements (v. 23). This is why they are not universal. (There is thirst and pride related to an object relative to which there is dtmadrsti, but not relative to the whole of this object at once. )
We have seen that eleven anusayas are universal (that is, bearing on all the categories) in their Dhatu, in the sphere of existence wherein the person is born in whom they are found:
13a-b. Among them, nine, with the exception of the two
55
With the exception of a belief in a self (satkayadrsti) and a belief in extremes (antagrahadrstai), the nine other universals are also universals in a different Dhatu; they sometimes bear on a different Dhatu, sometimes on two, for it is said (in the Prakaran- apdda, TD 26, p. 711a24), "There are some anusayas of the realm of Kamadhatu (that is, produced among the beings of Kamadhatu) which bear on the dharmas of the realm of Rupadhatu, on the dharmas of the realm of Arupyadhatu, or on the dharmas of both the realms of Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu. (And there are some anusayas of the realm of Rupadhatu which bear on the dharmas of the realm of Arupyadhatu). "
**#
[Objection:] When some beings in Kamadhatu produce the opinion that Brahma is a being, the opinion that he is permanent, they then entertain a belief in a self and a belief in extremes with regard to a thing belonging to a different, superior Dhatu. Thus you are wrong to exclude these two erroneous views from the list of the universal anusayas in a different Dhatu.
But one does not have the idea of a self and of things pertaining to a self with regard to Brahma: thus the idea that he is
views, bear on the superior.
? a being is not a belief in a self. And a belief in extremes is created by a belief in a self; thus the idea of the permanence of Brahma is not a belief in extremes (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 93a4ff).
What sort of views would a belief in a living being and a belief in permanence be with respect to Brahma?
The Abhidharmikas say that there are no erroneous views here, but only "false knowledge/* (All speculative knowledge which errs, viparitdlambana is not considered as views).
But why are the other false opinions which have Brahma for their object (the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices, etc. ) considered as erroneous views, and not the two opinions of being and permanence?
The Siddhanta serves as authority (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 93a). ***
Are only the anusayas universals?
13c-d. With the exception of the praptis, dharmas coexist- ant with the universal anusayas are also universals.
"Coexistant dharmas* refer to sensation, etc. Not the praptis, because the prapti (adherence) and the prdpya (the thing adhered to) do not have the same result (ii. 36c).
Are universal anusayas universal causes (ii. 54c-d)?
1. Future universal anusayas are not universal causes. 2. Coexistents of past and present universal anusayas are universal causes, but not universal anusayas. 3. Past and present universal anusayas are universal causes. 4. Future coexistents of universal anusayas are neither universal anusayas nor universal causes.
##*
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Among the ninety-eight anusayas, how many have a pure dharma for their object, that is, the Third and Fourth Truth, the Truth of Extinction and the Path? How many have an impure dharma}
14. Wrong views, doubt, and the ignorance which is bound (yukta) to them, and independent ignorance, abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction and the Path, make six
56 anusayas whose object is pure.
Except for the six,--that is, the three anusayas abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction, namely wrong views, doubt, and the ignorance associated with them or independent of them, and these same three anusayas abandoned through Seeing the Path,--all the other anusayas have impure dharmas for their object.
15. The extinction of their own bhumi is the object of the anusayas which have extinction for their sphere; the Path with its six or nine bhumis, is the object of the anusayas which have the Path for their sphere, for the Paths depend
57 on one another.
The three anusayas (wrong views, doubt, and ignorance) which are abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction and which have Extinction for their object, do not have Extinction for their total object: when they belong to Kamadhatu, they bear on Extinction in Kamadhatu, and so on from bhilmi to bhumi, until: when they belong to Bhavagra {naivasamjnanasamjnanayatana) they bear on Extinction in Bhavagra.
When they are in the realm of Kamadhatu, the three anusayas which have the Path for their object bear on the totality of the Path as well as on a portion of the dharmajnana (vi. 26), with its six bhumis (namely anagamya, dhyanantara, and the four
? Dhyanas) (see ii. 52c, vii. 9).
When they are of the realm of Rupadhatu or Arupyadhatu (four Dhyanas, four Arupyas), these same anusayas bear on the totality of the Path, and on a part of the anvayajnana (vi.
