If we try and fancy what the
opposite
kind of man would be like, we have a.
Nietzsche - Works - v15 - Will to Power - b
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derive its contradictory concept? Reason is thus a source of revelation concerning the absolute.
But the origin of the above contradictions need not necessarily be a supernatural source of reason: it is sufficient to oppose the real genesis of the concepts:----this springs from practical spheres, from utilitarian spheres, hence the strong faith it com mands (one is threatened with ruin if one's con clusions are not in conformity with this reason ; but this fact is no "proof" of what the latter asserts).
The preoccupation of metaphysicians with pain, is quite artless. " Eternal blessedness ": psycho logical nonsense. Brave and creative men never make pleasure and pain ultimate questions--they are incidental conditions: both of them must be
desired when one will attain to something. It is a sign of fatigue and illness in these meta physicians and religious men, that they should press questions of pleasure and pain into the foreground. Even morality in their eyes derives its great importance only from the fact that it is regarded as an essential condition for abolishing pain.
The same holds good of the preoccupation with ' appearance and error: the cause of pain. A superstition that happiness and truth are related
? ? (confusion:
-
happiness in "certainty," in " faith
580.
. . . . e - -
~ -. . _'. 'n"e -a. '4,, . 1
? ? 1
").
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE 81
feelings of pleasure feelings of value may also judge concerning the problem of reality
The measure of positive knowledge quite matter of indifference and beside the point: as witness the development of India.
The Buddhistic negation of reality in general (appearance=pain) perfectly consistent: un demonstrability, inaccessibility, lack of categories, not only for an "absolute world," but recogni tion of the erroneous procedures by means of which the whole concept has been reached. " Absolute reality," "Being in itself," contradiction. In world of Becoming, reality merely simplification for the purpose of practical ends, or a deception resulting from the coarseness of certain organs, or
variation in the tempo of Becoming.
The logical denial of the world and Nihilism
consequence of the fact that we must oppose nonentity with Being, " and that "Becoming" denied. Something becomes. )
58I.
Being and Becoming--"Reason" developed
? ? upon sensualistic basis upon the prejudices
the senses--that to say, with the belief in the truth of the judgment of the senses.
of "Reins? " as the. aeneralieatinn nf the rnncpnf
? ? is
a
_,_. _-. ,. "- WW aa
---/-
-~
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is a
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82 THE WILL TO POWER.
it opposed to death (for only that can be dead which can also live).
The "soul," the "ego," posited as primeval facts; and introduced wherever there is Becoming.
582.
Being--we have no other idea of it than that which we derive from "living. "--How then can everything " be " dead?
583' A.
I see with astonishment that science resigns itself to-day to the fate of being reduced to the world of appearance: we certainly have no organ of knowledge for the real world--be it ' what it may.
At this point we may well ask: With what organ of knowledge is this contradiction estab lished? . . .
The fact that a world which is accessible to our organs is also understood to be dependent upon these organs, and the fact that we should
understand a WM! "
? ? ''"' '
? ? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE
The trouble that, owing to the old antithesis " apparent " and "real," the correlative valuations "of little value" and "absolutely valuable " have been spread abroad.
The world of appearance does not strike us as "valuable" world; appearance on lower plane than the highest value. Only "real"
world can be absolutely "valuable. " .
Prejudice ofprejudices It perfectly possible in itself that the real nature of things would be
so unfriendly, so opposed to the first conditions of life, that appearance necessary in order to make life possible. . . This certainly the case in a large number of situations--for instance, mar
riage.
even in its limits to knowledge, by the instinct of self-preservation: we regard that as good, valu able, and true, which favours the preservation of the species.
We have no categories which allow us to distinguish between real and an apparent world. (At the most, there could exist world of appear
ance, but not our world of appearance. ) (In "r-"
,
_ Our empirical world would thus be conditioned,
(a)
83
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THE WILL TO POWER.
of reality), is a metaphysical postulate which starts out with the hypothesis that we know the order of rank among values; and that this order is a moral one. . . . It is only on this hypothesis that truth is necessary as a definition of all that is of a-superior value.
B.
It is of cardinal importance that the real world should be suppressed. It is the most formidable inspirer of doubts, and depreciator of values, concerning the world which we are: it was our most dangerous attempt heretofore on the life of Life.
War against all the hypotheses upon which a real world has been imagined. The notion that moral values are the highest values, belongs to this hypothesis.
The superiority of the moral valuation would be refuted, if it could be shown to be the result of an immoral valuation--a specific case of real immorality: it would thus reduce itself to an appearanceIand as an appearance it would cease from having any right to condemn appearance.
Then the " Will to Truth" would have to be examined psychologically: not mOr"'
power, but form of the Will to Pow" ",qu r. -.
degree
? ? ? a
it is
a
6'.
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
At the present moment we are face to face with the necessity of testing the assumption that moral values are the highest values. Method in research attained only when all moral prejudices have been overcome:
over morality.
584.
The aberrations of philosophy are the outcome of the fact that, instead of recognising in logic and the categories of reason merely means to the adjustment of the world for utilitarian ends
to say, "especially," useful falsification), they were taken to be the criterion of truth-- particularly of reality. The "criterion of truth " was, as matter of fact, merely the biological utility of a systematic falsification of this sort, on principle: and, since species of animals knows nothing more important than its own preservation, was indeed allowable here to speak of " truth. " Where the artlessness came in, however, was in taking this anthropocentric idiosyncrasy as the measure
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does not correspond to the concept of the world in which man lives. . . . The means were mis understood as measures of value, and even used as a condemnation of their original purpose. . . .
The purpose was, to deceive one's self in a use ful way: the means thereto was the invention of forms and signs, with the help of which the confusing multifariousness of life could be reduced to a, useful and wieldy scheme.
But woe! a moral category was now brought into the game: no creature would deceive itself, no creature may deceive itself--consequently there is only a will totruth. What is "truth"?
The principle of contradiction provided the scheme: the real world to which the way is being sought cannot be in contradiction with itself, cannot change, cannot evolve, has no beginning and no end.
That is the greatest error which has ever been committed, the really fatal error of the world: it was believed that in the forms of reason a criterion
of reality had been found--whereas their only
? ? '
-J. '_. ,,
? ? THE WILL T0 POWER IN SCIENCE.
as possible from the world of appearance? concept of the perfect being as a contrast to the real being; or, more correctly still, as the contra diction of life. .
The whole direction of values was towards the slander of life; people deliberately confounded ideal dogmatism with knowledge in general: so that the opposing parties also began to reject science with horror.
Thus the road to science was doubly barred: first, by the belief in the real world and secondly, by the opponents of this belief. Natural science. and psychology were (I) condemned in their objects, (2) deprived of their artlessness. .
Everything so absolutely bound and related to everything else in the real world, that to condemn, or to think away anything, means to condemn and think away the whole. The words "this should not be," " this ought not to be," are a farce. .
one would ruin the very source of Life by sup
anecan' everything which in any sense what
87
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585
The awful recovery of our consciousness: not of the individual, but of the human species. Let us reflect; let us think backwards; let us follow the narrow and broad highway.
A.
Man seeks "the truth ": a world that does not contradict itself, that does not deceive, that does not change, a real world--a world in which there is no suffering: contradiction, deception, varia bility--the causes of suffering! He does not
doubt that there is such a thing as a world as it
? ? ought to be; he would fain find a road to it. criticism: even the ego is apparent and not real. )
Whence does man derive the concept of reality? --Why does he make variability, deception, con
tradiction, the origin of sufi'ering; why not rather of his happiness? . . . .
The contempt and hatred of all that perishes,
(Indian
? ? '
THE WILL To POWER IN SCIENCE.
loftiest desire thus to be one with Being. That the formula for the way to happiness.
In summa: The world as oug/zt to be exists; this world in which we live an error--this our world should not exist.
he belief in Being shows itself only as result: the real primum mabz'le the disbelief in Becom ing, the mistrust of Becoming, the scorn of all Becoming. .
What kind of man reflects in this way? An unfruitful, suflring kind, a world - weary kind.
If we try and fancy what the opposite kind of man would be like, we have a. picture of creature who would not require the belief in Being; he would rather despise as dead, tedious, and in different . . .
The belief that the world which ought to be, really exists, belief proper to the unfruitful, who do not wish to create a world a: should be.
They take for granted, they seek for means and "pane A: "L4. _! . -_. . . _
89
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it
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90
THE WILL TO PO\VER.
The same species of men, grown one degree poorer, no longerpossessed of the power to inter pret and to create fictions, produces the Nihilists. A Nihilist is the man who says of the world as it
that ought not to exist, and of the world as ought to be, that does not exist. According to this, existence (action, sufi'ering, willing, and
feeling) has no sense: the pathos of the " in vain " the Nihilist's pathos--and as pathos more
over an inconsistency on the part of the Nihilist. He who not able to introduce his will into things, the man without either will or energy, at least invests them with some meaning, i. e. he
believes that will already in them.
The degree of man's will-power may be
measured from the extent to which he can dis pense with the meaning in things, from the extent to which he able to endure world without meaning:, because he himself arranges a small
? ? ? ? is a
a
a
is
it
is
is it is, it
it is
? . .
(they attribute the highest degree of reality to the things which are valued highest).
The connection between philosophers and moral men and their evaluations (the moral interpreta tion of the world as the sense of the world: after the collapse of the religious sense).
The overcoming of philosophers by the annihila tion of the world of being: intermediary period of Nihilism ; before there is sufficient strength present to transvalue values, and to make the world of becoming, and of appearance, the only world to be
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
91
deified and called good. B.
'
? Nihilism as a normal phenomenon may be a
of increasing strength or of increasing weakness z,--
Partly owing to the fact that the strength to
create and to will has grown to such an extent, . 4'
symptom
? ? 92
THE WILL TO POWER.
? C.
The belief in truth, the need of holding to some thing which is believed to be true: psychological reduction apart from the valuations that have existed hitherto. Fear and laziness.
At the same time unbelief: Reduction. In what way does it acquire a new value, if a real world does not exist at all (by this means the capacity of valuing, which hitherto has been lavished upon the world of being, becomes free
once more).
586.
The real and the " apparent" world.
A.
? The erroneous concepts which proceed from this
"s "' three kinds :--
' l '--wn are advpn'w
? ? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
93
blow and attack which we have ever received ; so many things have become encrusted in the word "true," that we involuntarily give these to the " real world ": the real world must also be a truth
ful world, such a one as would not deceive us or make fools of us: to believe in it in this way is to be almost forced to believe (from convention, as is the case among people worthy of confidence).
*
The concept, "the unknown world," suggests that this world is known to us (is tedious);
The concept, "the other world," suggests that this world might be dgferent,--it suppresses necessity and fate (it is useless to submit and to adapt one's self) ;
The concept, the true world, suggests that this
world. is untruthful, deceitful, dishonest, not "2'- . . . . ,I a-. . scanner-1 "m. "M
? ? ? ? 94
THE WILL TO POWER.
three different ways; we have made 2: our criticism of the " known world. "
B.
The first step to reason : to understand to what extent we have been :educeafl--for it might be
precisely the reverse:
The unknown world could be so constituted as to give us a liking for "this" world--it may be a more stupid and meaner form of existence.
The other world, very far from taking account of our desires which were never realised here, might be part of the mass of things which this world makes possible for us; to learn to know this world would be a means of satisfying us.
The true world: but who actually says that the apparent world must be of less value than the true world? Do not our instincts contradict this
4l
? (a)
(6)
? (a)
judgment? Is not man eternallv
o. - 'mflnr---l"----
N's"
?
? ? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
95
good as "knowing something about it,"--that is the contrary of the assumption of an x-world. . . . In short, the world x might be in every way a
more tedious, a more inhuman, and a less dignified world than this one.
It would be quite another matter if it were assumed that there were several x-worlds--that is to say, every possible kind of world besides our own. But this has never been assumed. . . .
C.
Problem : why has the image of the other world always been to the disadvantage of " this " one-- that is to say, always stood as a criticism of it; what does this point to ?
A people that are proud of themselves, and
who are on _the ascending path of Life, always ' ' "-n nnnflrflr evictean a: Inunm- nn-J 1~-- "'1"
? ? ? ? 96
THE WILL TO POWER.
adequate :--this is the root of the "true"
world.
The religious man who invents a " divine
world " :--this is the root of the "de
naturalised " and the " anti-natural " world. The moral man who invents a " free world ": --this is the root of the good, the perfect,
the just, and the holy world.
The common factor in the three places of origin :
psychological error, physiological confusion.
With what attributes is the "other world," as it actually appears in history, characterised P With the stigmata of philosophical, religious, and
moral prejudices. "
The "other world as it appears in the light
of these facts, is synonymous with not-Being, with not-living, with the will not to live. .
'General aspect : it was the instinct of the fatigue of lint-"- -----' Mr "Ms at 1:0. mama "Mam: 4. 1,,
? ? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
cerning certainty is already in itself a dependent question, a question of the second rank.
588.
The question of values is more fundamental than the question of certainty: the latter only becomes serious once the question of values has been answered.
Being and appearance, regarded psychologically, yield no " Being-in-itself," no criterion for" reality," but only degrees of appearance, measured accord ing to the strength of the sympathy which we feel for appearance.
There is no struggle for existence between ideas and observations, but only a struggle for supremacy--the vanquished idea is not anni
hilated, but only driven to the background or n. ". 4, than. ,. - w. r. _/. .
97
? ? ? ? 98
THE WILL 'ro POWER.
59?
Our values are interpreted into the heart of things. Is there, then, any sense in the absolute ?
Is not sense necessarily relative-sense and per
spective ?
All sense is Will to Power (all relative senses
may be identified with it).
591.
The desire for "established facts "--Epistem ology: how much pessimism there is in it!
592
The antagonism between the " true world," as pessimism depicts and world in which were possible to live--for this the rights of truth must be tested. It necessary to measure all these "ideal forces " according to the standard of
life, in order to understand the nature of that
? ? :-
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? ? is
it, a
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THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
99
? SCIENCE.
594
Science hitherto has been a means of dis posing of the confusion of things by hypotheses which "explain everything "--that is to say, it has been the result of the intellect's repugnance to chaos. This same repugnance takes hold of me when I contemplate myself; I should like to form some kind of representation of my inner world for myself by means of a scheme, and thus overcome intellectual confusion. Morality was a simplification of this sort: it taught man as
as known--Now we have annihilated morality--we have once more grown completely obscure to ourselves! I know that I know nothing about myself. Physics shows itself to be a hoon for the mind: science (as the road to knowledge) acquires a new charm after morality has been laid aside--and owing to the fact that we find consist ency here alone, we must order our lives in
accordance with it so that it may help us to
'
(m)
? recognised,
"Mus-n q'f This reeulte in a Qnrf nf' Adm-h3
? ? 100 THE WILL TO POWER.
596.
No " moral education " of humanity: but the disciplinary school of scientific errors is necessary, because truth disgusts and creates a dislike of life, provided a man is not already irrevocably launched upon his way, and bears the con sequences of his honest standpoint with tragic pride.
597
The first principle of scientific work: faith in the union and continuance of scientific work, so that the individual may undertake to work at any point, however small, and feel sure that his efforts will not be in vain.
There is a great paralysing force: to work in vain, to struggle in vain.
*
The periods of hoarding, when energy and power are stored, to be utilised later by sub sequent periods: Science as a half-way house, at which the mediocre, more multifarious, and more complicated beings find their most natural
? ? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE. 101
a warrior of knowledge, is unremittingly struggling with a host of hateful truths. For truth is ugly.
599
The "purposelessness of all phenomena ": the belief in this is the result of the view that all interpretations hitherto have been false, it is a
? on the part of discouragement and weakness--it is not a necessary belief.
generalisation
The arrogance of man: when he sees no
purpose,
he denies that there can be one!
600.
? The unlimited ways of interpreting the world: every interpretation is a symptom of growth or decline.
Unity (monism) is a need of inertia; Plurality
chflllld nnt [llrfii'd In Jab-"'4
in interpretation is a sign of strength. One
" ''"'"Dr"'
? ? 102 THE WILL TO POWER.
But its comprehensibility, its clearness, its practicability, its beauty, will begin to near their end if we refine our senses, just as beauty ceases to exist when the processes of its history are reflected upon: the arrangement of the end
is in itself an illusion. Let it sufiice,_that the more coarsely and more superficially it is under stood, the more valuable, the more definite, the more beautiful and important the world then
seems. The more deeply one looks into the further our valuation retreats from our view,--
per
Only as the result of certain bluntness of vision and the desire for simplicity does the beautiful and the " valuable " make its appearance
in itself purely fanciful.
paratus.
? We have created the world
senselessnessapproaches
that has any value! Knowing this, we also
ceive that the veneration of truth already the result of illusion--and that much more necessary to esteem the formative, simplifying, moulding, and romancing power.
"
? " All false--everything allowed
'1' . u
603.
. . 1 '. .
? ? q
it is
is
:
a
is
is is l
it
!
it,
? "m
things, not "explanation " (in the majority of cases a new interpretation of an old interpretation which has grown incomprehensible and little more than a mere sign). There is no such thing as an established fact, everything fluctuates, everything is intangible, yielding; after all, the most lasting of all things are our opinions.
605.
The ascertaining of " truth " and "untruth," the ascertaining of facts in general, is fundamentally
different from the creative placing, forming, mould ing, subduing, and willing which lies at the root of philosophy. To give a sense to things--this duty always remains over, provided no sense already
lies in them. The same holds good of sounds, and also of the fate of nations: they are suscept ible of the most varied interpretations and turns,
for dgferent purposes.
A higher duty is to fix a goal and to mould
facts according to it: that the interpretation action, and not merely transvaluation of con cepts.
_ v/-__
is
a
is
is
: is
is
a
:
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B
a
a
8o ' THE WILL T0 POWER.
derive its contradictory concept? Reason is thus a source of revelation concerning the absolute.
But the origin of the above contradictions need not necessarily be a supernatural source of reason: it is sufficient to oppose the real genesis of the concepts:----this springs from practical spheres, from utilitarian spheres, hence the strong faith it com mands (one is threatened with ruin if one's con clusions are not in conformity with this reason ; but this fact is no "proof" of what the latter asserts).
The preoccupation of metaphysicians with pain, is quite artless. " Eternal blessedness ": psycho logical nonsense. Brave and creative men never make pleasure and pain ultimate questions--they are incidental conditions: both of them must be
desired when one will attain to something. It is a sign of fatigue and illness in these meta physicians and religious men, that they should press questions of pleasure and pain into the foreground. Even morality in their eyes derives its great importance only from the fact that it is regarded as an essential condition for abolishing pain.
The same holds good of the preoccupation with ' appearance and error: the cause of pain. A superstition that happiness and truth are related
? ? (confusion:
-
happiness in "certainty," in " faith
580.
. . . . e - -
~ -. . _'. 'n"e -a. '4,, . 1
? ? 1
").
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE 81
feelings of pleasure feelings of value may also judge concerning the problem of reality
The measure of positive knowledge quite matter of indifference and beside the point: as witness the development of India.
The Buddhistic negation of reality in general (appearance=pain) perfectly consistent: un demonstrability, inaccessibility, lack of categories, not only for an "absolute world," but recogni tion of the erroneous procedures by means of which the whole concept has been reached. " Absolute reality," "Being in itself," contradiction. In world of Becoming, reality merely simplification for the purpose of practical ends, or a deception resulting from the coarseness of certain organs, or
variation in the tempo of Becoming.
The logical denial of the world and Nihilism
consequence of the fact that we must oppose nonentity with Being, " and that "Becoming" denied. Something becomes. )
58I.
Being and Becoming--"Reason" developed
? ? upon sensualistic basis upon the prejudices
the senses--that to say, with the belief in the truth of the judgment of the senses.
of "Reins? " as the. aeneralieatinn nf the rnncpnf
? ? is
a
_,_. _-. ,. "- WW aa
---/-
-~
("
is a
a
a
")
is ! isisa a
is
("
82 THE WILL TO POWER.
it opposed to death (for only that can be dead which can also live).
The "soul," the "ego," posited as primeval facts; and introduced wherever there is Becoming.
582.
Being--we have no other idea of it than that which we derive from "living. "--How then can everything " be " dead?
583' A.
I see with astonishment that science resigns itself to-day to the fate of being reduced to the world of appearance: we certainly have no organ of knowledge for the real world--be it ' what it may.
At this point we may well ask: With what organ of knowledge is this contradiction estab lished? . . .
The fact that a world which is accessible to our organs is also understood to be dependent upon these organs, and the fact that we should
understand a WM! "
? ? ''"' '
? ? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE
The trouble that, owing to the old antithesis " apparent " and "real," the correlative valuations "of little value" and "absolutely valuable " have been spread abroad.
The world of appearance does not strike us as "valuable" world; appearance on lower plane than the highest value. Only "real"
world can be absolutely "valuable. " .
Prejudice ofprejudices It perfectly possible in itself that the real nature of things would be
so unfriendly, so opposed to the first conditions of life, that appearance necessary in order to make life possible. . . This certainly the case in a large number of situations--for instance, mar
riage.
even in its limits to knowledge, by the instinct of self-preservation: we regard that as good, valu able, and true, which favours the preservation of the species.
We have no categories which allow us to distinguish between real and an apparent world. (At the most, there could exist world of appear
ance, but not our world of appearance. ) (In "r-"
,
_ Our empirical world would thus be conditioned,
(a)
83
? ? ? ? _,_\W\_---Q~.
"'W
. -_a___,__.
a
is
is
a
is
!
.
.
. is
.
is
.
.
a
a
a
? 84
THE WILL TO POWER.
of reality), is a metaphysical postulate which starts out with the hypothesis that we know the order of rank among values; and that this order is a moral one. . . . It is only on this hypothesis that truth is necessary as a definition of all that is of a-superior value.
B.
It is of cardinal importance that the real world should be suppressed. It is the most formidable inspirer of doubts, and depreciator of values, concerning the world which we are: it was our most dangerous attempt heretofore on the life of Life.
War against all the hypotheses upon which a real world has been imagined. The notion that moral values are the highest values, belongs to this hypothesis.
The superiority of the moral valuation would be refuted, if it could be shown to be the result of an immoral valuation--a specific case of real immorality: it would thus reduce itself to an appearanceIand as an appearance it would cease from having any right to condemn appearance.
Then the " Will to Truth" would have to be examined psychologically: not mOr"'
power, but form of the Will to Pow" ",qu r. -.
degree
? ? ? a
it is
a
6'.
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
At the present moment we are face to face with the necessity of testing the assumption that moral values are the highest values. Method in research attained only when all moral prejudices have been overcome:
over morality.
584.
The aberrations of philosophy are the outcome of the fact that, instead of recognising in logic and the categories of reason merely means to the adjustment of the world for utilitarian ends
to say, "especially," useful falsification), they were taken to be the criterion of truth-- particularly of reality. The "criterion of truth " was, as matter of fact, merely the biological utility of a systematic falsification of this sort, on principle: and, since species of animals knows nothing more important than its own preservation, was indeed allowable here to speak of " truth. " Where the artlessness came in, however, was in taking this anthropocentric idiosyncrasy as the measure
r--~~ --"~~--=~'-~ the " "'M'
85
? (that
represents conquest
? of things, as H. . . MM>>
I
"all
? ? L__v_. _-. 'MN. '
My. . .
,-\_,
it
a a
is
a
a
a
. . 7
it
is
86 . THE WILL TO POWER.
does not correspond to the concept of the world in which man lives. . . . The means were mis understood as measures of value, and even used as a condemnation of their original purpose. . . .
The purpose was, to deceive one's self in a use ful way: the means thereto was the invention of forms and signs, with the help of which the confusing multifariousness of life could be reduced to a, useful and wieldy scheme.
But woe! a moral category was now brought into the game: no creature would deceive itself, no creature may deceive itself--consequently there is only a will totruth. What is "truth"?
The principle of contradiction provided the scheme: the real world to which the way is being sought cannot be in contradiction with itself, cannot change, cannot evolve, has no beginning and no end.
That is the greatest error which has ever been committed, the really fatal error of the world: it was believed that in the forms of reason a criterion
of reality had been found--whereas their only
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as possible from the world of appearance? concept of the perfect being as a contrast to the real being; or, more correctly still, as the contra diction of life. .
The whole direction of values was towards the slander of life; people deliberately confounded ideal dogmatism with knowledge in general: so that the opposing parties also began to reject science with horror.
Thus the road to science was doubly barred: first, by the belief in the real world and secondly, by the opponents of this belief. Natural science. and psychology were (I) condemned in their objects, (2) deprived of their artlessness. .
Everything so absolutely bound and related to everything else in the real world, that to condemn, or to think away anything, means to condemn and think away the whole. The words "this should not be," " this ought not to be," are a farce. .
one would ruin the very source of Life by sup
anecan' everything which in any sense what
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585
The awful recovery of our consciousness: not of the individual, but of the human species. Let us reflect; let us think backwards; let us follow the narrow and broad highway.
A.
Man seeks "the truth ": a world that does not contradict itself, that does not deceive, that does not change, a real world--a world in which there is no suffering: contradiction, deception, varia bility--the causes of suffering! He does not
doubt that there is such a thing as a world as it
? ? ought to be; he would fain find a road to it. criticism: even the ego is apparent and not real. )
Whence does man derive the concept of reality? --Why does he make variability, deception, con
tradiction, the origin of sufi'ering; why not rather of his happiness? . . . .
The contempt and hatred of all that perishes,
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THE WILL To POWER IN SCIENCE.
loftiest desire thus to be one with Being. That the formula for the way to happiness.
In summa: The world as oug/zt to be exists; this world in which we live an error--this our world should not exist.
he belief in Being shows itself only as result: the real primum mabz'le the disbelief in Becom ing, the mistrust of Becoming, the scorn of all Becoming. .
What kind of man reflects in this way? An unfruitful, suflring kind, a world - weary kind.
If we try and fancy what the opposite kind of man would be like, we have a. picture of creature who would not require the belief in Being; he would rather despise as dead, tedious, and in different . . .
The belief that the world which ought to be, really exists, belief proper to the unfruitful, who do not wish to create a world a: should be.
They take for granted, they seek for means and "pane A: "L4. _! . -_. . . _
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THE WILL TO PO\VER.
The same species of men, grown one degree poorer, no longerpossessed of the power to inter pret and to create fictions, produces the Nihilists. A Nihilist is the man who says of the world as it
that ought not to exist, and of the world as ought to be, that does not exist. According to this, existence (action, sufi'ering, willing, and
feeling) has no sense: the pathos of the " in vain " the Nihilist's pathos--and as pathos more
over an inconsistency on the part of the Nihilist. He who not able to introduce his will into things, the man without either will or energy, at least invests them with some meaning, i. e. he
believes that will already in them.
The degree of man's will-power may be
measured from the extent to which he can dis pense with the meaning in things, from the extent to which he able to endure world without meaning:, because he himself arranges a small
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(they attribute the highest degree of reality to the things which are valued highest).
The connection between philosophers and moral men and their evaluations (the moral interpreta tion of the world as the sense of the world: after the collapse of the religious sense).
The overcoming of philosophers by the annihila tion of the world of being: intermediary period of Nihilism ; before there is sufficient strength present to transvalue values, and to make the world of becoming, and of appearance, the only world to be
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
91
deified and called good. B.
'
? Nihilism as a normal phenomenon may be a
of increasing strength or of increasing weakness z,--
Partly owing to the fact that the strength to
create and to will has grown to such an extent, . 4'
symptom
? ? 92
THE WILL TO POWER.
? C.
The belief in truth, the need of holding to some thing which is believed to be true: psychological reduction apart from the valuations that have existed hitherto. Fear and laziness.
At the same time unbelief: Reduction. In what way does it acquire a new value, if a real world does not exist at all (by this means the capacity of valuing, which hitherto has been lavished upon the world of being, becomes free
once more).
586.
The real and the " apparent" world.
A.
? The erroneous concepts which proceed from this
"s "' three kinds :--
' l '--wn are advpn'w
? ? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
93
blow and attack which we have ever received ; so many things have become encrusted in the word "true," that we involuntarily give these to the " real world ": the real world must also be a truth
ful world, such a one as would not deceive us or make fools of us: to believe in it in this way is to be almost forced to believe (from convention, as is the case among people worthy of confidence).
*
The concept, "the unknown world," suggests that this world is known to us (is tedious);
The concept, "the other world," suggests that this world might be dgferent,--it suppresses necessity and fate (it is useless to submit and to adapt one's self) ;
The concept, the true world, suggests that this
world. is untruthful, deceitful, dishonest, not "2'- . . . . ,I a-. . scanner-1 "m. "M
? ? ? ? 94
THE WILL TO POWER.
three different ways; we have made 2: our criticism of the " known world. "
B.
The first step to reason : to understand to what extent we have been :educeafl--for it might be
precisely the reverse:
The unknown world could be so constituted as to give us a liking for "this" world--it may be a more stupid and meaner form of existence.
The other world, very far from taking account of our desires which were never realised here, might be part of the mass of things which this world makes possible for us; to learn to know this world would be a means of satisfying us.
The true world: but who actually says that the apparent world must be of less value than the true world? Do not our instincts contradict this
4l
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? (a)
judgment? Is not man eternallv
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95
good as "knowing something about it,"--that is the contrary of the assumption of an x-world. . . . In short, the world x might be in every way a
more tedious, a more inhuman, and a less dignified world than this one.
It would be quite another matter if it were assumed that there were several x-worlds--that is to say, every possible kind of world besides our own. But this has never been assumed. . . .
C.
Problem : why has the image of the other world always been to the disadvantage of " this " one-- that is to say, always stood as a criticism of it; what does this point to ?
A people that are proud of themselves, and
who are on _the ascending path of Life, always ' ' "-n nnnflrflr evictean a: Inunm- nn-J 1~-- "'1"
? ? ? ? 96
THE WILL TO POWER.
adequate :--this is the root of the "true"
world.
The religious man who invents a " divine
world " :--this is the root of the "de
naturalised " and the " anti-natural " world. The moral man who invents a " free world ": --this is the root of the good, the perfect,
the just, and the holy world.
The common factor in the three places of origin :
psychological error, physiological confusion.
With what attributes is the "other world," as it actually appears in history, characterised P With the stigmata of philosophical, religious, and
moral prejudices. "
The "other world as it appears in the light
of these facts, is synonymous with not-Being, with not-living, with the will not to live. .
'General aspect : it was the instinct of the fatigue of lint-"- -----' Mr "Ms at 1:0. mama "Mam: 4. 1,,
? ? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
cerning certainty is already in itself a dependent question, a question of the second rank.
588.
The question of values is more fundamental than the question of certainty: the latter only becomes serious once the question of values has been answered.
Being and appearance, regarded psychologically, yield no " Being-in-itself," no criterion for" reality," but only degrees of appearance, measured accord ing to the strength of the sympathy which we feel for appearance.
There is no struggle for existence between ideas and observations, but only a struggle for supremacy--the vanquished idea is not anni
hilated, but only driven to the background or n. ". 4, than. ,. - w. r. _/. .
97
? ? ? ? 98
THE WILL 'ro POWER.
59?
Our values are interpreted into the heart of things. Is there, then, any sense in the absolute ?
Is not sense necessarily relative-sense and per
spective ?
All sense is Will to Power (all relative senses
may be identified with it).
591.
The desire for "established facts "--Epistem ology: how much pessimism there is in it!
592
The antagonism between the " true world," as pessimism depicts and world in which were possible to live--for this the rights of truth must be tested. It necessary to measure all these "ideal forces " according to the standard of
life, in order to understand the nature of that
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THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
99
? SCIENCE.
594
Science hitherto has been a means of dis posing of the confusion of things by hypotheses which "explain everything "--that is to say, it has been the result of the intellect's repugnance to chaos. This same repugnance takes hold of me when I contemplate myself; I should like to form some kind of representation of my inner world for myself by means of a scheme, and thus overcome intellectual confusion. Morality was a simplification of this sort: it taught man as
as known--Now we have annihilated morality--we have once more grown completely obscure to ourselves! I know that I know nothing about myself. Physics shows itself to be a hoon for the mind: science (as the road to knowledge) acquires a new charm after morality has been laid aside--and owing to the fact that we find consist ency here alone, we must order our lives in
accordance with it so that it may help us to
'
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? ? 100 THE WILL TO POWER.
596.
No " moral education " of humanity: but the disciplinary school of scientific errors is necessary, because truth disgusts and creates a dislike of life, provided a man is not already irrevocably launched upon his way, and bears the con sequences of his honest standpoint with tragic pride.
597
The first principle of scientific work: faith in the union and continuance of scientific work, so that the individual may undertake to work at any point, however small, and feel sure that his efforts will not be in vain.
There is a great paralysing force: to work in vain, to struggle in vain.
*
The periods of hoarding, when energy and power are stored, to be utilised later by sub sequent periods: Science as a half-way house, at which the mediocre, more multifarious, and more complicated beings find their most natural
? ? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE. 101
a warrior of knowledge, is unremittingly struggling with a host of hateful truths. For truth is ugly.
599
The "purposelessness of all phenomena ": the belief in this is the result of the view that all interpretations hitherto have been false, it is a
? on the part of discouragement and weakness--it is not a necessary belief.
generalisation
The arrogance of man: when he sees no
purpose,
he denies that there can be one!
600.
? The unlimited ways of interpreting the world: every interpretation is a symptom of growth or decline.
Unity (monism) is a need of inertia; Plurality
chflllld nnt [llrfii'd In Jab-"'4
in interpretation is a sign of strength. One
" ''"'"Dr"'
? ? 102 THE WILL TO POWER.
But its comprehensibility, its clearness, its practicability, its beauty, will begin to near their end if we refine our senses, just as beauty ceases to exist when the processes of its history are reflected upon: the arrangement of the end
is in itself an illusion. Let it sufiice,_that the more coarsely and more superficially it is under stood, the more valuable, the more definite, the more beautiful and important the world then
seems. The more deeply one looks into the further our valuation retreats from our view,--
per
Only as the result of certain bluntness of vision and the desire for simplicity does the beautiful and the " valuable " make its appearance
in itself purely fanciful.
paratus.
? We have created the world
senselessnessapproaches
that has any value! Knowing this, we also
ceive that the veneration of truth already the result of illusion--and that much more necessary to esteem the formative, simplifying, moulding, and romancing power.
"
? " All false--everything allowed
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603.
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things, not "explanation " (in the majority of cases a new interpretation of an old interpretation which has grown incomprehensible and little more than a mere sign). There is no such thing as an established fact, everything fluctuates, everything is intangible, yielding; after all, the most lasting of all things are our opinions.
605.
The ascertaining of " truth " and "untruth," the ascertaining of facts in general, is fundamentally
different from the creative placing, forming, mould ing, subduing, and willing which lies at the root of philosophy. To give a sense to things--this duty always remains over, provided no sense already
lies in them. The same holds good of sounds, and also of the fate of nations: they are suscept ible of the most varied interpretations and turns,
for dgferent purposes.
A higher duty is to fix a goal and to mould
facts according to it: that the interpretation action, and not merely transvaluation of con cepts.
