is the primitive motive force out of which all other motives have been derived;
That it is exceedingly illuminating to sub stitute power for individual "happiness" (after which every living organism is said to strive): " It strives after power, after more power " ;--happiness is only a symptom of the feeling of power attained, a consciousness of difference does not strive after happiness: but happiness steps in when the object attained, after which the organism has striven: happiness an accompanying, not an actuating factor);
That all motive force the will to power; that there no other force, either physical, dynamic, or psychic.
That it is exceedingly illuminating to sub stitute power for individual "happiness" (after which every living organism is said to strive): " It strives after power, after more power " ;--happiness is only a symptom of the feeling of power attained, a consciousness of difference does not strive after happiness: but happiness steps in when the object attained, after which the organism has striven: happiness an accompanying, not an actuating factor);
That all motive force the will to power; that there no other force, either physical, dynamic, or psychic.
Nietzsche - Works - v15 - Will to Power - b
Their profound antagonism
however, so great, that in those cases in which they all insist upon being gratified, man of very thorough mediocrity the outcome.
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THE WILL TO POWER.
678.
It is a question whether the origin of our apparent " knowledge " is not also a mere ofl'shoot of our older valuations, which are so completely assimilated that they belong to the very basis of our nature. In this way only the more recent needs engage in battle with results of the oldest needs.
The world is seen, felt, and interpreted thus and thus, in order that organic life may be preserved with this particular manner of interpretation. Man is not only an individual, but the continuation of collective organic life in one definite line. The fact that man survives, proves that a certain species of interpretations (even though it still be added to) has also survived; that, as a system, this method of interpreting has not changed. " Adaptation. "
Our "dissatisfaction," our "ideal," etc. , may possibly be the result of this incorporated piece of interpretation, of our particular point of view: the organic world may ultimately perish owing to it-- just as the division of labour in organisms may be the means of bringing about the ruin of the whole, if one part happen to wither or weaken. The destruction of organic life, and even of the highest form thereof, must follow the same prin ciples as the destruction of the individual.
679.
? '
descent, individuation shows the continuous break
Judged from the standpoint of the theory of
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THE WILL--TO POWER IN NATURE.
53
c-
ing up of one into two, and the equally continuous annihilation of individuals for the sake of a few individuals, which evolution bears onwards; the greater mass always perishes the body
The fundamental phenomena: innumerable in dividuals are sacrificed for the sake of a few, in order to make the few possible--One must not allow one's self to be deceived the case the same with peoples and races: they produce the "body" for the generation of isolated and valuable indi viduals, who continue the great process
680.
am opposed to the theory that the individual studies the interests of the species, or of posterity, at the cost of his own advantage all this only apparent.
The excessive importance which he attaches to the sexual instinct not the result of the latter's
? to the species; for procreation the actual performance of the individual, his
importance
interest, and therefore his highest expression of power (not judged from'the stand point of consciousness, but from the very centre of
the individual).
681.
The fundamental errors of the biologists who have lived hitherto: not matter of the
_
greatest
but of rearing stronger individuals many are only a means).
species,
Life not the continuous adjustment of internal
(the
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relations to external relations, but will to power, which, proceeding from inside, subjugates and incorporates an ever-increasing quantity of " external " phenomena.
These biologists continue the moral valuations ("the absolutely higher worth of Altruism," the antagonism towards the lust of dominion, towards war, towards all that which is not useful, and towards all order of rank and of class).
682.
In natural science, the moral depreciation of the ego still goes hand in hand with the overestimation of the species. But the species is quite as illusory as the ego: a false distinction has been made. The ego is a hundred times more than a mere unit in a chain of creatures; it is the chain itself, in every possible respect; and the species is merely
an abstraction suggested by the multiplicity and partial similarity of these chains. That the individual is sacrificed to the species, as people often say he not fact at all: rather only an example of false interpretation.
683.
The formula of the 'yfirogress"-superstition accord ing to famous physiologist of the cerebral regions :--
" L'animal ne fait jamais de progrels comme
e. spece. L'homme seulfait de progre's comme espe'ce. " No.
154
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? THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
155
684.
A nti-Darwin. --The domestication of man what definite value can have, or has domestication in itself definite value ? ---There are reasons for denying the latter proposition.
Darwin's school of thought certainly goes to great pains to convince us of the reverse: would fain prove that the influence of domestication may be profound and fundamental. For the time being, we stand firmly as we did before; up to the present no results save very superficial modification or degeneration have been shown to follow upon domestication. And everything
that escapes from the hand and discipline of man, returns almost immediately to its original natural condition. The type, remains constant, man can not " de'naturer la nature. "
Biologists reckon upon the struggle for existence, the death of the weaker creature and the survival of the most robust, most gifted combatant; on that account they imagine continuous increase in the perfection of all creatures. We, on the con trary, have convinced ourselves of the fact, that in the struggle for existence, accident serves the cause of the weak quite as much as that of the strong; that craftiness often supplements
strength with advantage; that the proli mess of species related in remarkable manner to that species' chances of destruction. .
Natural Selection also credited with the 'power of slowly effecting unlimited metamor
phoses: believed that every advantage
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THE WILL TO POWER.
transmitted by heredity, and strengthened in the course of generations (when heredity is known to be so capricious that . . the happy adaptations of certain creatures to very special conditions of life, are regarded as the result of surrounding influences.
Nowhere, however, are examples of unconscious selection to be found (absolutely nowhere). The most different individuals associate one with the other; the extremes become lost in the mass.
Each vies with the other to maintain his kind; those
creatures whose appearance shields them from certain dangers, do not alter this appearance when they are in an environment quite devoid
? If they live in places where their coats or their hides do not conceal them, they do not adapt themselves to their surroundings
in any way.
The selection qf the most beautiful has been so
exaggerated, that greatly exceeds the instincts for beauty in our own race! As matter of fact, the most beautiful creature often couples with the most debased, and the largest with the smallest. We almost always see males and females taking advantage . of their first chance meeting, and manifesting no taste or selectiveness at all. -- Modification through climate and nourishment--- but as matter of fact unimportant.
' There are no intermediate forms. --
The growing evolution of creatures assumed.
All groiinds for this assumption are entirely lacking. Every type has its limiiaiiansz beyond these evolution cannot carry it.
of danger. . .
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THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
My general point of view--First proposition: Man as species not progressing. Higher specimens are indeed attained; but they do not survive. The general level of the species not
raised.
Second proposition Man as species does not
represent any sort of progress compared with any other animal. The whole of the animal and plant world does not develop from the lower to the higher. but all simultaneously, haphazardly, confusedly, and at variance. The richest and most " complex forms--and the term "higher type means no more than this--perish more easily: only the lowest succeed in maintaining their apparent imperishableness. The former are seldom attained, and maintain their superior position with difficulty; the latter are compensated
fruitfulness. --In the human race, also, the superior specimens, the happy cases of evolution, are the first to perish amid the fluctuations of chances for and against them. They are exposed to every form of decadence: they are extreme, and, on that account alone, already decadents. . . The short duration of beauty, of genius, of the
sui generis: things are not heredi Caesar_,_ V such
wltary. ' The type inherited, there nothing extreme or particularly " happy " about type. . . not case of particular fate, or of the " evil will " Of Nature, but merely of the concept " superior
type " the higher type an example of an incom parably greater degree of complexity--a greater sum of co-ordinated elements but on this account
_
by great
disintegration
becomes thousand times more
157
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THE WILL TO POWER.
threatening. " Genius " is the sublimest machine in existence--hence it is the most fragile.
Third proposition : The domestication (culture) of man does not sink very deep. When it does sink far below the skin it immediately becomes degeneration (type: the Christian). The " wild " man (or, in moral terminology, the evil
is a reversion to Nature--and, in a certain sense, he represents a recovery, a cure from the effects of
'
685.
"culture. " . . .
Anti-Darwin--What surprises me most on making a general survey of the great destinies of man, is that I invariably see the reverse of what to-day Darwin and his school sees or will
persist in seeing: selection in favour of the stronger, the better-constituted, and the progress of the species. Precisely the reverse of this stares one in the face: the suppression of the lucky cases, the uselessness of the more highly constituted types, the inevitable mastery of the mediocre, and even of those who are below mediocrity. Unless we are shown some reason
why man is an exception among living creatures, I incline to the belief that Darwin's school is everywhere at fault. That will to power, in which I perceive the ultimate reason and character of all change, explains why it is that selection is never in favour of the exceptions and of the lucky
cases: the strongest and happiest natures are weak when they are confronted with a majority ruled by organised gregarious instincts and the
man)
? ? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
159
fear which possesses the weak. My
view of the world of values shows that in the highest values which now sway the destiny of man, the happy cases among men, the select
do not prevail but rather the decadent specimens,--perhaps there nothing more in teresting in the world than this unpleasant spectacle.
Strange as may seem, the strong always have to be upheld against the weak; and the well constituted against the ill-constituted, the healthy against the sick and physiologically botched. If we drew our morals from reality, they would read thus: the mediocre are more valuable than the
exceptional creatures, and the decadent than the mediocre the will to nonentity prevails over the will to life--and the general aim now in
specimens
general
? _
Q
deadly
_
Christian, Buddhistic, Schopenhauerian ology: " It better not to be than to be. "
protest against this formulating of reality into
a moral: and loathe Christianity with
loathing, because created sublime words and at titudes in order to deck revolting truth with all
the tawdriness of justice, virtue, and godliness. . see all philosophers and the whole of science on their knees before reality which the reverse
of " the struggle for life," as Darwin and his school understood it--that to say, wherever look, see those prevailing and surviving, who throw
doubt and suspicion upon life and the value of life--The error of the Darwinian school became problem to _me: how can one be so blind as to
make this mistake?
phrase
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That species show an ascending tendency, is the most nonsensical assertion that has ever been made: until now they have only manifested a dead level. There is nothing whatever to prove that the higher organisms have developed from the lower. I see that the lower, owing to their numerical strength, their craft, and ruse, now preponderate,---and I fail to see an instance in which an accidental change produces an advantage, at least not for a very long period: for it would be necessary to find some
reason why an accidental change should become so very strong. "
I do indeed find the " cruelty of Nature which is so often referred to; but in a different place: Nature is cruel, but against her lucky and well constituted children ; she protects and shelters and loves the lowly.
In short, the increase of a species' power, as the result of the preponderance of its particularly well-constituted and strong specimens, is perhaps less of a certainty than that it is the result of the preponderance of its mediocre and lower specimens
. in the case of the latter, we find great fruit fulness and permanence: in the case of the former, the besetting dangers are greater, waste is more rapid, and decimation is more speedy.
686.
Man as he has appeared up to the present is the embryo of the man of the future; all the formative powers which are to produce the latter, already lie in the former: and owing to the fact that
? ? ? ? the ldCI rel.
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE. 161
they are enormous, the more promising for the future the modern individual happens to be, the more sufiering falls to his lot. This the pro foundest concept of sufiering. The formative
clash--The isolation of the individual need not deceive one--as matter of fact, some uninterrupted current does actually flow through all individuals, and does thus unite them. The fact that they feel themselves isolated, the most
powerful spur in the process of setting themselves the loftiest of aims: their search for happiness the means which keeps together and moderates the for mative powers, and keeps them from being mutually destructive.
687.
Excessive intellectual strength sets itself new
powers
? not in the least satisfied by the com mand and the leadership of the inferior world, or by the preservation of the organism, of the "in dividual. "
We are mare than the individual: we are the whole chain itself, with the tasks of all the possible futures of that chain in us.
THEORY OF THE WILL 'ro POWER AND OF VALUATIONS.
688.
. T/ze unitary view ofpsychology--We are accus tomed \to regard the development of vast number of forms as compatible with one single origin.
My theory would be: that the will to power VOL. :1.
goals;
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? 162 THE WILL TO POWER.
is the primitive motive force out of which all other motives have been derived;
That it is exceedingly illuminating to sub stitute power for individual "happiness" (after which every living organism is said to strive): " It strives after power, after more power " ;--happiness is only a symptom of the feeling of power attained, a consciousness of difference does not strive after happiness: but happiness steps in when the object attained, after which the organism has striven: happiness an accompanying, not an actuating factor);
That all motive force the will to power; that there no other force, either physical, dynamic, or psychic.
In our science, where the concept cause and
effect reduced to relationship of complete equilibrium, and in which seems desirable for the same quantum of force to be found on either side, all idea of a motive power absent: we only" apprehend results, and we call these equal from the point of view of their content of force. .
It matter of mere experience that change never ceases: at bottom we have not the smallest grounds for assuming that any one particular change must follow upon any other. On the con trary, any state which has been attained would seem almost forced to maintain itself intact
had not within itself capacity for not desiring to maintain itself. . Spinoza's proposition concern ing " self-preservation " ought as matter of fact to
put stop to change. But the proposition false the contrary true. In all living organisms can
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piness lined,
strive n the has
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be clearly shown that they do everything not to remain as they are, but to become greater. .
689.
,A state which accompanies an event and already an effect of that event deemed "suffi cient cause " of the latter; the tense relationship of our feeling of power (pleasure as the feeling of power) and of an obstacle being overcome--are these things illusions?
Ifwe translate the notion "cause" back into the only sphere which known to us, and out of which we have taken we cannot imagine any change in which the will to power not inherent. We do not know how to account for any change which not trespassing of one power on another.
Mechanics only show us the results, and then
THE WILL To POWER IN NATURE
163
" Will to power " and causality--From
logical point of view the idea of " cause "
ing of power in the act which called willing--our concept "effect" the superstition that this feeling of power itself the force which moves things. .
psycho our feel
? -
only in images (movement a. figure of speech); gravitation itself has no mechanical cause, because itself the first cause of mechanical results.
The will to accumulate force confined to the phenomenon of life, to nourishment, to procreation, to inheritance, to society, states, customs, authority. Should we not be allowed to assume that this will
the motive power also of chemistry ? --and of the cosmic order?
Not only conservation of energy, but the mini mum amount of waste; so that the only reality
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? 164
THE WILL To POWER.
this: the will of every centre of power to become stronger--not self-preservation, but the desire to appropriate, to become master, to become more, to become stronger.
Is the fact that science is possible a proof of the principle of causation--" From like causes, like effects "--" A permanent law of things "--" In variable order "? Because something is calculable, is it therefore on that account necessary?
If something happens thus, and thus only, it is not the manifestation of a "principle," of a " law," of "order. " What happens is that certain quanta of power begin to operate, and their essence is to exercise their power over all other quanta of power. Can we assume the existence of a striving after power without a feeling of pleasure and pain,
i. e. without the sensation of an increase or a de crease of power? Is mechanism only a language of signs for the concealed fact of a world of fight ing and conquering quanta of will-power? All mechanical first-principles, matter, atoms, weight, pressure, and repulsion, are not facts in themselves, but interpretations arrived at with the help of psychical fictions.
Life, which is our best known form of being, is altogether" will to the accumulation of strength "-- all the processes of life hinge on this: everything aims, not at preservation, but at accretion and accumulation. Life as an individual case hypothesis which may be applied to existence in general) strives after the maximum feeling of power; life is essentially a striving after more power; striving itself is only a straining after more power;
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tion be found above development should neither
THE WILL 'ro POWER IN NATURE.
the most fundamental and innermost thing of all this will. (Mechanism merely the semeiotics of
the results. )
690.
the cause of the existence of development cannot in the course of investiga
be regarded as " evolving " nor as evolved the " will to power" cannot have been evolved.
691.
. .
What the relation of the whole of the organic process towards the rest of nature ? --Here the fundamental will reveals itself.
692.
Is the "will to power " a kind of will, or identical with the concept will? Is equivalent to desiring or commanding; the will which Schopenhauer says the essence of things?
My proposition that the will of psychologists hitherto has been an unjustifiable generalisation, and that there no such thing as this sort of will, that instead of the development of one will into several forms being taken as fact, the character of will has been cancelled owing to the fact that its content, its " whither," was subtracted from it: in Schopenhauer this so in the highest degree; what he calls " will " merely an empty word. There even less plausibility in the will live: for life simply one of the manifestations of the will to power; quite arbitrary and ridiculous
I65
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to suggest that everything is striving to enter into this particular form of the will to power.
693.
If the innermost essence of existence is the will to power; if happiness is every increase of power, and unhappiness the feeling of not being able to resist, of not being able to become master: may we not then postulate happiness and pain as cardinal facts? Is will possible without these two oscillations of yea and nay? But who feels happiness? . . . Who will have power? . Nonsensical question! If the essence of all things is itself will to power, and consequently the ability to feel pleasure and pain! Albeit: con trasts and obstacles are necessary, therefore also, relatively, units which trespass on one another.
694.
According to the obstacles which a force seeks with a view of overcoming them, the measure of the failure and the fatality thus provoked must increase: and in so far as every force can only manifest itself against some thing that opposes
an element of unhappiness necessarily inherent in every action. But this pain acts as greater incitement to life, and increases the will to power.
695.
If pleasure and pain are related to the feeling 01 power, life would have to represent such an increase in power that the difference, the "plus,"
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would have to enter consciousness. A dead level of power, maintained, would have to measure its happiness in relation to depreciations of that level, i. e. in relation to states of unhappi ness and not of happiness. . . The will to an increase lies in the essence of happiness: that power enhanced, and that this difference becomes conscious.
In state of decadence after
. .
697.
_
The normal discontent of our instincts--for instance, of the instinct of hunger, of sex, of move ment--contains nothing which in itself depress ing; rather provokes the feeling of life, and, whatever the pessimists may say to us, like all
opposite
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
167
difference becomes
decrease: the memory of former strong moments depresses the present feelings of happiness--in this state comparison reduces happiness.
696.
It not the satisfaction of the will which the cause of happiness (to this superficial theory am more particularly opposed--this absurd psychological forgery in regard to the most simple
things), but that the will always striving to overcome that which stands in its way. The feel ing of happiness lies precisely in the discontented
- ness of the will, in the fact that without opponents and Obstacles never satisfied. "The happy man ": gregarious ideal.
certain time the conscious, that
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? 168 THE WILL TO POWER.
the rhythms of small and irritating stimuli, it
Instead of this discontent making us sick of life, it is rather the great stimulus to life.
strengthens.
might even perhaps be characterised as the rhythm of small and painful stimuli. )
698.
'Kant says: " These lines of Count Verri's (Sull' indole del piacere e del dolore; 1781) I confirm with absolute certainty: ' ll solo principio motore dell' uomo e il dolore. Il dolore
(Pleasure
piacere.
Pain mean
precede ogni Il piacere non e un essere positivo. ' "
? 699.
something different from not the latter's opposite.
pleasure--I
If the essence of pleasure has been aptly char acterised as the feeling of increased power (that
to say, as feeling of difference which presupposes comparison), that does not define the nature of pain. The false contrasts which the people, and consequently the language, believes in, are always dangerous fetters which impede the march of truth. There are even cases where kind of pleasure conditioned by a certain rhythmic sequence of small, painful stjmuli: in this way very rapid growth of the feeling of power and of the feeling
* 0n the Nature of Pleasure and Pain. "The only motive force of man pain. Pain precedes every pleasure. Pleasure not positive thing. "--TR.
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THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
of pleasure attained. This the case, for instance, in tickling, also in the sexual tickling which accompanies the coitus: here we see pain acting as the ingredient of happiness. seems to be small hindrance which overcome, followed immediately by another small hindrance which once again overcome--this play of resistance
and resistance overcome the greatest excitant of that complete feeling of overflowing and surplus power which constitutes the essence of happiness.
The converse, which would be an increase in the feeling of pain through small intercalated pleasurable stimuli, does not exist: pleasure and
pain are not opposites.
Pain undoubtedly an intellectual process in
I69
? which judgment is. inherent-_the
" harmful," in which long experience
There no such thing as pain in itself. It not the wound that hurts, the experience of the harmful results wound may have for the whole organism, which here speaks in this deeply moving way, and called pain. (In the case of deleterious influences which were unknown to ancient man, as, for instance, those residing in the new combina tion of poisonous chemicals, the hint from pain lacking, and we are lost. )
That which quite peculiar in pain the pro longed disturbance, the quivering subsequent to terrible shock in the ganglia of the nervous system. As a matter of fact, nobody suffers from the cause of pain (from any sort of injury, for instance), but from the protracted disturbance of his equi librium which follows upon the shock. Pain a
judgment epitomised.
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? THE WILL TO POWER.
disease of the cerebral centres--pleasure is no disease at all.
The fact that pain may be the cause of reflex
170
actions has appearances and even
prejudice in its favour. But in very sudden accidents, if we observe closely, we find that the reflex action occurs appreciably earlier than the feeling of pain. I should be in a bad way when I stumbled if I had to wait until the fact had struck the bell of my consciousness, and until a
hint of what I had to do had been telegraphed back to me. On the contrary, what I notice as clearly as possible is, that first, in order to avoid a fall, reflex action on the part of my foot takes place, and then, after a certain measurable space of time, there follows quite suddenly a kind of painful wave in my forehead. Nobody, then, reacts to
philosophical
? Pain is subsequently projected into the wounded quarter--but the essence of this local pain is nevertheless not the expression of a kind
of local wound: it is merely a local sign, the strength and nature of which is in keeping with the severity of the wound, and of which the nerve centres have taken note. The fact that as the result of this shock the muscular power of the organism is materially reduced, does not prove in any way that the essence of pain is to be sought
in the lowering of the feeling of power.
Once more let me repeat: nobody reacts to pain: pain is no "cause" of action. Pain itself is a reaction; the reflex movement is another and earlier process--both originate at different
points. . . .
pain.
? ? ? ? ""
Are we to suppose that there are any pains which " the species " feel, and which the individual does not?
701.
" The sum of unhappiness outweighs the sum of happiness: consequently were better that the ' world did not exist "--" The world something which from rational standpoint were better did not exist, because occasions more pain than pleasure to the feeling subject "--this futile gossip now calls itself pessimism
Pleasure and pain are accompanying factors, not causes; they are second-rate valuations derived from dominating value,--they are one with the feeling " useful," " harmful," and therefore they are absolutely fugitive and relative. For in regard to all utility and harmfulness there are hundred different ways of asking " what for? "
~.
700.
The message of pain: in itself pain does not announce that which has been momentarily damaged, but the significance of this damage for the individual as whole.
THE \VILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
I71
this pessimism of sensitiveness: in itself sign of profoundly impoverished life.
702.
Man does not seek happiness and does not avoid unhappiness. Everybody knows the famous pre
judices here contradict. Pleasure and pain are mere results, mere accompanying phenomena--that which every man, which every tiny particle of
despise
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however, so great, that in those cases in which they all insist upon being gratified, man of very thorough mediocrity the outcome.
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? 152
THE WILL TO POWER.
678.
It is a question whether the origin of our apparent " knowledge " is not also a mere ofl'shoot of our older valuations, which are so completely assimilated that they belong to the very basis of our nature. In this way only the more recent needs engage in battle with results of the oldest needs.
The world is seen, felt, and interpreted thus and thus, in order that organic life may be preserved with this particular manner of interpretation. Man is not only an individual, but the continuation of collective organic life in one definite line. The fact that man survives, proves that a certain species of interpretations (even though it still be added to) has also survived; that, as a system, this method of interpreting has not changed. " Adaptation. "
Our "dissatisfaction," our "ideal," etc. , may possibly be the result of this incorporated piece of interpretation, of our particular point of view: the organic world may ultimately perish owing to it-- just as the division of labour in organisms may be the means of bringing about the ruin of the whole, if one part happen to wither or weaken. The destruction of organic life, and even of the highest form thereof, must follow the same prin ciples as the destruction of the individual.
679.
? '
descent, individuation shows the continuous break
Judged from the standpoint of the theory of
? ? ? Aw '~ __
THE WILL--TO POWER IN NATURE.
53
c-
ing up of one into two, and the equally continuous annihilation of individuals for the sake of a few individuals, which evolution bears onwards; the greater mass always perishes the body
The fundamental phenomena: innumerable in dividuals are sacrificed for the sake of a few, in order to make the few possible--One must not allow one's self to be deceived the case the same with peoples and races: they produce the "body" for the generation of isolated and valuable indi viduals, who continue the great process
680.
am opposed to the theory that the individual studies the interests of the species, or of posterity, at the cost of his own advantage all this only apparent.
The excessive importance which he attaches to the sexual instinct not the result of the latter's
? to the species; for procreation the actual performance of the individual, his
importance
interest, and therefore his highest expression of power (not judged from'the stand point of consciousness, but from the very centre of
the individual).
681.
The fundamental errors of the biologists who have lived hitherto: not matter of the
_
greatest
but of rearing stronger individuals many are only a means).
species,
Life not the continuous adjustment of internal
(the
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? THE WILL TO POWER.
relations to external relations, but will to power, which, proceeding from inside, subjugates and incorporates an ever-increasing quantity of " external " phenomena.
These biologists continue the moral valuations ("the absolutely higher worth of Altruism," the antagonism towards the lust of dominion, towards war, towards all that which is not useful, and towards all order of rank and of class).
682.
In natural science, the moral depreciation of the ego still goes hand in hand with the overestimation of the species. But the species is quite as illusory as the ego: a false distinction has been made. The ego is a hundred times more than a mere unit in a chain of creatures; it is the chain itself, in every possible respect; and the species is merely
an abstraction suggested by the multiplicity and partial similarity of these chains. That the individual is sacrificed to the species, as people often say he not fact at all: rather only an example of false interpretation.
683.
The formula of the 'yfirogress"-superstition accord ing to famous physiologist of the cerebral regions :--
" L'animal ne fait jamais de progrels comme
e. spece. L'homme seulfait de progre's comme espe'ce. " No.
154
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is, is
a
it is
? THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
155
684.
A nti-Darwin. --The domestication of man what definite value can have, or has domestication in itself definite value ? ---There are reasons for denying the latter proposition.
Darwin's school of thought certainly goes to great pains to convince us of the reverse: would fain prove that the influence of domestication may be profound and fundamental. For the time being, we stand firmly as we did before; up to the present no results save very superficial modification or degeneration have been shown to follow upon domestication. And everything
that escapes from the hand and discipline of man, returns almost immediately to its original natural condition. The type, remains constant, man can not " de'naturer la nature. "
Biologists reckon upon the struggle for existence, the death of the weaker creature and the survival of the most robust, most gifted combatant; on that account they imagine continuous increase in the perfection of all creatures. We, on the con trary, have convinced ourselves of the fact, that in the struggle for existence, accident serves the cause of the weak quite as much as that of the strong; that craftiness often supplements
strength with advantage; that the proli mess of species related in remarkable manner to that species' chances of destruction. .
Natural Selection also credited with the 'power of slowly effecting unlimited metamor
phoses: believed that every advantage
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THE WILL TO POWER.
transmitted by heredity, and strengthened in the course of generations (when heredity is known to be so capricious that . . the happy adaptations of certain creatures to very special conditions of life, are regarded as the result of surrounding influences.
Nowhere, however, are examples of unconscious selection to be found (absolutely nowhere). The most different individuals associate one with the other; the extremes become lost in the mass.
Each vies with the other to maintain his kind; those
creatures whose appearance shields them from certain dangers, do not alter this appearance when they are in an environment quite devoid
? If they live in places where their coats or their hides do not conceal them, they do not adapt themselves to their surroundings
in any way.
The selection qf the most beautiful has been so
exaggerated, that greatly exceeds the instincts for beauty in our own race! As matter of fact, the most beautiful creature often couples with the most debased, and the largest with the smallest. We almost always see males and females taking advantage . of their first chance meeting, and manifesting no taste or selectiveness at all. -- Modification through climate and nourishment--- but as matter of fact unimportant.
' There are no intermediate forms. --
The growing evolution of creatures assumed.
All groiinds for this assumption are entirely lacking. Every type has its limiiaiiansz beyond these evolution cannot carry it.
of danger. . .
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7115
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THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
My general point of view--First proposition: Man as species not progressing. Higher specimens are indeed attained; but they do not survive. The general level of the species not
raised.
Second proposition Man as species does not
represent any sort of progress compared with any other animal. The whole of the animal and plant world does not develop from the lower to the higher. but all simultaneously, haphazardly, confusedly, and at variance. The richest and most " complex forms--and the term "higher type means no more than this--perish more easily: only the lowest succeed in maintaining their apparent imperishableness. The former are seldom attained, and maintain their superior position with difficulty; the latter are compensated
fruitfulness. --In the human race, also, the superior specimens, the happy cases of evolution, are the first to perish amid the fluctuations of chances for and against them. They are exposed to every form of decadence: they are extreme, and, on that account alone, already decadents. . . The short duration of beauty, of genius, of the
sui generis: things are not heredi Caesar_,_ V such
wltary. ' The type inherited, there nothing extreme or particularly " happy " about type. . . not case of particular fate, or of the " evil will " Of Nature, but merely of the concept " superior
type " the higher type an example of an incom parably greater degree of complexity--a greater sum of co-ordinated elements but on this account
_
by great
disintegration
becomes thousand times more
157
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THE WILL TO POWER.
threatening. " Genius " is the sublimest machine in existence--hence it is the most fragile.
Third proposition : The domestication (culture) of man does not sink very deep. When it does sink far below the skin it immediately becomes degeneration (type: the Christian). The " wild " man (or, in moral terminology, the evil
is a reversion to Nature--and, in a certain sense, he represents a recovery, a cure from the effects of
'
685.
"culture. " . . .
Anti-Darwin--What surprises me most on making a general survey of the great destinies of man, is that I invariably see the reverse of what to-day Darwin and his school sees or will
persist in seeing: selection in favour of the stronger, the better-constituted, and the progress of the species. Precisely the reverse of this stares one in the face: the suppression of the lucky cases, the uselessness of the more highly constituted types, the inevitable mastery of the mediocre, and even of those who are below mediocrity. Unless we are shown some reason
why man is an exception among living creatures, I incline to the belief that Darwin's school is everywhere at fault. That will to power, in which I perceive the ultimate reason and character of all change, explains why it is that selection is never in favour of the exceptions and of the lucky
cases: the strongest and happiest natures are weak when they are confronted with a majority ruled by organised gregarious instincts and the
man)
? ? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
159
fear which possesses the weak. My
view of the world of values shows that in the highest values which now sway the destiny of man, the happy cases among men, the select
do not prevail but rather the decadent specimens,--perhaps there nothing more in teresting in the world than this unpleasant spectacle.
Strange as may seem, the strong always have to be upheld against the weak; and the well constituted against the ill-constituted, the healthy against the sick and physiologically botched. If we drew our morals from reality, they would read thus: the mediocre are more valuable than the
exceptional creatures, and the decadent than the mediocre the will to nonentity prevails over the will to life--and the general aim now in
specimens
general
? _
Q
deadly
_
Christian, Buddhistic, Schopenhauerian ology: " It better not to be than to be. "
protest against this formulating of reality into
a moral: and loathe Christianity with
loathing, because created sublime words and at titudes in order to deck revolting truth with all
the tawdriness of justice, virtue, and godliness. . see all philosophers and the whole of science on their knees before reality which the reverse
of " the struggle for life," as Darwin and his school understood it--that to say, wherever look, see those prevailing and surviving, who throw
doubt and suspicion upon life and the value of life--The error of the Darwinian school became problem to _me: how can one be so blind as to
make this mistake?
phrase
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? 160 THE WILL TO POWER.
That species show an ascending tendency, is the most nonsensical assertion that has ever been made: until now they have only manifested a dead level. There is nothing whatever to prove that the higher organisms have developed from the lower. I see that the lower, owing to their numerical strength, their craft, and ruse, now preponderate,---and I fail to see an instance in which an accidental change produces an advantage, at least not for a very long period: for it would be necessary to find some
reason why an accidental change should become so very strong. "
I do indeed find the " cruelty of Nature which is so often referred to; but in a different place: Nature is cruel, but against her lucky and well constituted children ; she protects and shelters and loves the lowly.
In short, the increase of a species' power, as the result of the preponderance of its particularly well-constituted and strong specimens, is perhaps less of a certainty than that it is the result of the preponderance of its mediocre and lower specimens
. in the case of the latter, we find great fruit fulness and permanence: in the case of the former, the besetting dangers are greater, waste is more rapid, and decimation is more speedy.
686.
Man as he has appeared up to the present is the embryo of the man of the future; all the formative powers which are to produce the latter, already lie in the former: and owing to the fact that
? ? ? ? the ldCI rel.
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE. 161
they are enormous, the more promising for the future the modern individual happens to be, the more sufiering falls to his lot. This the pro foundest concept of sufiering. The formative
clash--The isolation of the individual need not deceive one--as matter of fact, some uninterrupted current does actually flow through all individuals, and does thus unite them. The fact that they feel themselves isolated, the most
powerful spur in the process of setting themselves the loftiest of aims: their search for happiness the means which keeps together and moderates the for mative powers, and keeps them from being mutually destructive.
687.
Excessive intellectual strength sets itself new
powers
? not in the least satisfied by the com mand and the leadership of the inferior world, or by the preservation of the organism, of the "in dividual. "
We are mare than the individual: we are the whole chain itself, with the tasks of all the possible futures of that chain in us.
THEORY OF THE WILL 'ro POWER AND OF VALUATIONS.
688.
. T/ze unitary view ofpsychology--We are accus tomed \to regard the development of vast number of forms as compatible with one single origin.
My theory would be: that the will to power VOL. :1.
goals;
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it is
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? 162 THE WILL TO POWER.
is the primitive motive force out of which all other motives have been derived;
That it is exceedingly illuminating to sub stitute power for individual "happiness" (after which every living organism is said to strive): " It strives after power, after more power " ;--happiness is only a symptom of the feeling of power attained, a consciousness of difference does not strive after happiness: but happiness steps in when the object attained, after which the organism has striven: happiness an accompanying, not an actuating factor);
That all motive force the will to power; that there no other force, either physical, dynamic, or psychic.
In our science, where the concept cause and
effect reduced to relationship of complete equilibrium, and in which seems desirable for the same quantum of force to be found on either side, all idea of a motive power absent: we only" apprehend results, and we call these equal from the point of view of their content of force. .
It matter of mere experience that change never ceases: at bottom we have not the smallest grounds for assuming that any one particular change must follow upon any other. On the con trary, any state which has been attained would seem almost forced to maintain itself intact
had not within itself capacity for not desiring to maintain itself. . Spinoza's proposition concern ing " self-preservation " ought as matter of fact to
put stop to change. But the proposition false the contrary true. In all living organisms can
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(after : "It
piness lined,
strive n the has
t an that
be clearly shown that they do everything not to remain as they are, but to become greater. .
689.
,A state which accompanies an event and already an effect of that event deemed "suffi cient cause " of the latter; the tense relationship of our feeling of power (pleasure as the feeling of power) and of an obstacle being overcome--are these things illusions?
Ifwe translate the notion "cause" back into the only sphere which known to us, and out of which we have taken we cannot imagine any change in which the will to power not inherent. We do not know how to account for any change which not trespassing of one power on another.
Mechanics only show us the results, and then
THE WILL To POWER IN NATURE
163
" Will to power " and causality--From
logical point of view the idea of " cause "
ing of power in the act which called willing--our concept "effect" the superstition that this feeling of power itself the force which moves things. .
psycho our feel
? -
only in images (movement a. figure of speech); gravitation itself has no mechanical cause, because itself the first cause of mechanical results.
The will to accumulate force confined to the phenomenon of life, to nourishment, to procreation, to inheritance, to society, states, customs, authority. Should we not be allowed to assume that this will
the motive power also of chemistry ? --and of the cosmic order?
Not only conservation of energy, but the mini mum amount of waste; so that the only reality
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it is
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? 164
THE WILL To POWER.
this: the will of every centre of power to become stronger--not self-preservation, but the desire to appropriate, to become master, to become more, to become stronger.
Is the fact that science is possible a proof of the principle of causation--" From like causes, like effects "--" A permanent law of things "--" In variable order "? Because something is calculable, is it therefore on that account necessary?
If something happens thus, and thus only, it is not the manifestation of a "principle," of a " law," of "order. " What happens is that certain quanta of power begin to operate, and their essence is to exercise their power over all other quanta of power. Can we assume the existence of a striving after power without a feeling of pleasure and pain,
i. e. without the sensation of an increase or a de crease of power? Is mechanism only a language of signs for the concealed fact of a world of fight ing and conquering quanta of will-power? All mechanical first-principles, matter, atoms, weight, pressure, and repulsion, are not facts in themselves, but interpretations arrived at with the help of psychical fictions.
Life, which is our best known form of being, is altogether" will to the accumulation of strength "-- all the processes of life hinge on this: everything aims, not at preservation, but at accretion and accumulation. Life as an individual case hypothesis which may be applied to existence in general) strives after the maximum feeling of power; life is essentially a striving after more power; striving itself is only a straining after more power;
? (a
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If the
like a In,
able,
it is w," inta : is . of ing
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The thing which
tion be found above development should neither
THE WILL 'ro POWER IN NATURE.
the most fundamental and innermost thing of all this will. (Mechanism merely the semeiotics of
the results. )
690.
the cause of the existence of development cannot in the course of investiga
be regarded as " evolving " nor as evolved the " will to power" cannot have been evolved.
691.
. .
What the relation of the whole of the organic process towards the rest of nature ? --Here the fundamental will reveals itself.
692.
Is the "will to power " a kind of will, or identical with the concept will? Is equivalent to desiring or commanding; the will which Schopenhauer says the essence of things?
My proposition that the will of psychologists hitherto has been an unjustifiable generalisation, and that there no such thing as this sort of will, that instead of the development of one will into several forms being taken as fact, the character of will has been cancelled owing to the fact that its content, its " whither," was subtracted from it: in Schopenhauer this so in the highest degree; what he calls " will " merely an empty word. There even less plausibility in the will live: for life simply one of the manifestations of the will to power; quite arbitrary and ridiculous
I65
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? 166 THE WILL TO POWER.
to suggest that everything is striving to enter into this particular form of the will to power.
693.
If the innermost essence of existence is the will to power; if happiness is every increase of power, and unhappiness the feeling of not being able to resist, of not being able to become master: may we not then postulate happiness and pain as cardinal facts? Is will possible without these two oscillations of yea and nay? But who feels happiness? . . . Who will have power? . Nonsensical question! If the essence of all things is itself will to power, and consequently the ability to feel pleasure and pain! Albeit: con trasts and obstacles are necessary, therefore also, relatively, units which trespass on one another.
694.
According to the obstacles which a force seeks with a view of overcoming them, the measure of the failure and the fatality thus provoked must increase: and in so far as every force can only manifest itself against some thing that opposes
an element of unhappiness necessarily inherent in every action. But this pain acts as greater incitement to life, and increases the will to power.
695.
If pleasure and pain are related to the feeling 01 power, life would have to represent such an increase in power that the difference, the "plus,"
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it,
? er into
1e will )OWCI, ale to
may
n as
1 two
feels 'u
would have to enter consciousness. A dead level of power, maintained, would have to measure its happiness in relation to depreciations of that level, i. e. in relation to states of unhappi ness and not of happiness. . . The will to an increase lies in the essence of happiness: that power enhanced, and that this difference becomes conscious.
In state of decadence after
. .
697.
_
The normal discontent of our instincts--for instance, of the instinct of hunger, of sex, of move ment--contains nothing which in itself depress ing; rather provokes the feeling of life, and, whatever the pessimists may say to us, like all
opposite
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
167
difference becomes
decrease: the memory of former strong moments depresses the present feelings of happiness--in this state comparison reduces happiness.
696.
It not the satisfaction of the will which the cause of happiness (to this superficial theory am more particularly opposed--this absurd psychological forgery in regard to the most simple
things), but that the will always striving to overcome that which stands in its way. The feel ing of happiness lies precisely in the discontented
- ness of the will, in the fact that without opponents and Obstacles never satisfied. "The happy man ": gregarious ideal.
certain time the conscious, that
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is . a
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it
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? 168 THE WILL TO POWER.
the rhythms of small and irritating stimuli, it
Instead of this discontent making us sick of life, it is rather the great stimulus to life.
strengthens.
might even perhaps be characterised as the rhythm of small and painful stimuli. )
698.
'Kant says: " These lines of Count Verri's (Sull' indole del piacere e del dolore; 1781) I confirm with absolute certainty: ' ll solo principio motore dell' uomo e il dolore. Il dolore
(Pleasure
piacere.
Pain mean
precede ogni Il piacere non e un essere positivo. ' "
? 699.
something different from not the latter's opposite.
pleasure--I
If the essence of pleasure has been aptly char acterised as the feeling of increased power (that
to say, as feeling of difference which presupposes comparison), that does not define the nature of pain. The false contrasts which the people, and consequently the language, believes in, are always dangerous fetters which impede the march of truth. There are even cases where kind of pleasure conditioned by a certain rhythmic sequence of small, painful stjmuli: in this way very rapid growth of the feeling of power and of the feeling
* 0n the Nature of Pleasure and Pain. "The only motive force of man pain. Pain precedes every pleasure. Pleasure not positive thing. "--TR.
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riscd
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THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
of pleasure attained. This the case, for instance, in tickling, also in the sexual tickling which accompanies the coitus: here we see pain acting as the ingredient of happiness. seems to be small hindrance which overcome, followed immediately by another small hindrance which once again overcome--this play of resistance
and resistance overcome the greatest excitant of that complete feeling of overflowing and surplus power which constitutes the essence of happiness.
The converse, which would be an increase in the feeling of pain through small intercalated pleasurable stimuli, does not exist: pleasure and
pain are not opposites.
Pain undoubtedly an intellectual process in
I69
? which judgment is. inherent-_the
" harmful," in which long experience
There no such thing as pain in itself. It not the wound that hurts, the experience of the harmful results wound may have for the whole organism, which here speaks in this deeply moving way, and called pain. (In the case of deleterious influences which were unknown to ancient man, as, for instance, those residing in the new combina tion of poisonous chemicals, the hint from pain lacking, and we are lost. )
That which quite peculiar in pain the pro longed disturbance, the quivering subsequent to terrible shock in the ganglia of the nervous system. As a matter of fact, nobody suffers from the cause of pain (from any sort of injury, for instance), but from the protracted disturbance of his equi librium which follows upon the shock. Pain a
judgment epitomised.
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? THE WILL TO POWER.
disease of the cerebral centres--pleasure is no disease at all.
The fact that pain may be the cause of reflex
170
actions has appearances and even
prejudice in its favour. But in very sudden accidents, if we observe closely, we find that the reflex action occurs appreciably earlier than the feeling of pain. I should be in a bad way when I stumbled if I had to wait until the fact had struck the bell of my consciousness, and until a
hint of what I had to do had been telegraphed back to me. On the contrary, what I notice as clearly as possible is, that first, in order to avoid a fall, reflex action on the part of my foot takes place, and then, after a certain measurable space of time, there follows quite suddenly a kind of painful wave in my forehead. Nobody, then, reacts to
philosophical
? Pain is subsequently projected into the wounded quarter--but the essence of this local pain is nevertheless not the expression of a kind
of local wound: it is merely a local sign, the strength and nature of which is in keeping with the severity of the wound, and of which the nerve centres have taken note. The fact that as the result of this shock the muscular power of the organism is materially reduced, does not prove in any way that the essence of pain is to be sought
in the lowering of the feeling of power.
Once more let me repeat: nobody reacts to pain: pain is no "cause" of action. Pain itself is a reaction; the reflex movement is another and earlier process--both originate at different
points. . . .
pain.
? ? ? ? ""
Are we to suppose that there are any pains which " the species " feel, and which the individual does not?
701.
" The sum of unhappiness outweighs the sum of happiness: consequently were better that the ' world did not exist "--" The world something which from rational standpoint were better did not exist, because occasions more pain than pleasure to the feeling subject "--this futile gossip now calls itself pessimism
Pleasure and pain are accompanying factors, not causes; they are second-rate valuations derived from dominating value,--they are one with the feeling " useful," " harmful," and therefore they are absolutely fugitive and relative. For in regard to all utility and harmfulness there are hundred different ways of asking " what for? "
~.
700.
The message of pain: in itself pain does not announce that which has been momentarily damaged, but the significance of this damage for the individual as whole.
THE \VILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
I71
this pessimism of sensitiveness: in itself sign of profoundly impoverished life.
702.
Man does not seek happiness and does not avoid unhappiness. Everybody knows the famous pre
judices here contradict. Pleasure and pain are mere results, mere accompanying phenomena--that which every man, which every tiny particle of
despise
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