No More Learning

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(i. e. There is no inherently existing sounds: it is dependent on many factors among which is the mind perceiving it, and its accumulated karma. )
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(-- Question: What is wrong if the beginning of sound is not apprehended?
-- Answer: It would fail to be sound. Until it is heard it is not sound because, like smell, it is not the ear's object. It becomes sound when it is heard. If initially it was not sound but later became sound, it would follow that smell and so forth could do so too, but that is unacceptable with regard to permanent functional thing. Sutra says:
~ For instance, in dependence upon the strings and wood
~ And the hand's effort -- through these three together --
~ Sound is produced and issues from
~ Instruments like the vina and flute. ~.
~ When the wise investigate and think
~ From where it has come and where it has gone,
~ Searching in the main and intermediate directions,
~ They find no coming nor going of sound. ) .
L6: [b. Refuting apprehension by mental consciousness]
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\ ###
\ 321.
\ Without the sense organs what will mind
\ Do after it has gone?
\ If it were so, why would that which lives
\ Not always be without mind?
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(i. e. There is no truly existing consciousness: As for consciousnesses of the senses, that is also a false assumption. There could be no such thing as a truly existing consciousness of a sense. This is also another co-dependently arisen concept. Consciousness of an object is happening after having labeled the objects, after having received all the stimuli, comparing with memory patterns, assuming a lot by filtering them though accumulated karma . . . It is an illusion of something inherently existing based on accumulated karma. )
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(-- Does the mind travel toward objects or not? What is the mind's relationship to the senses?
-- Assertion: The mind apprehends objects after traveling to them.
-- Answer: That is incorrect. Auditory consciousness does not travel to the object along with the ear organ, for the organs remain in the body.
-- Even if mind, such as an auditory consciousness, approached its object without the sense organs, how could it perform the functions of listening, looking and so forth, since like a blind person it would lack the ability to perceive its objects? If it were so, why would that which lives, i. e. the self, not always be without mind? When one investigates in this way by means of reasoning, neither sense organs not consciousnesses have by way of their own entity the ability to apprehend objects. )
.
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\ ###
\ 322.
L4: [B. Refuting true existence of that which perceives objects] L5: [1. Defining the aggregate of recognition]
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\ An object already seen
\ Is perceived by mind like a mirage.
\ That which posits all phenomena
\ Is called the aggregate of recognition.
.
(i. e. The Middle Way about the perceiver, perception and the objects of perception: There is no inherently existing perceive, no true direct perception, no objects of perception existing on their own; but that doesn't mean that they are all completely non-existent, or that everything is completely from the mind only. There is no need for inherently existing perceivers, perception, and objects of perception to support relative perception based on accumulated karma and conventions. Their emptiness doesn't deny completely perception, the teachings of dependent origination, the Wheel of life, samsara, and the possibility for Liberation. )
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(-- How does recognition, which identifies things, function if things do not exist inherently?
-- Objection: If sense organs and their objects do not exist inherently, the aggregate of recognition which discerns what is exclusive to them will be non-existent.
-- Answer: Although they do not exist when analyzed by reasoning, they are not conventionally non-existent (i. e. they exist conventionally, they are dependently arisen), for mental consciousness apprehends the exclusive aspects of an object such as a visible form which has already been perceived.
-- For instance, though a mirage does not contain even a drop of water, a recognition of water occurs. Likewise that which perceives the exclusive aspects of an object, a mental factor positing the exclusive signs of all phenomena is called the aggregate of recognition. Phenomena are simply posited by recognition and do not exist by way of their own entity. )
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L5: [2. Refuting it true existence]
.
\ ###
\ 323.
\ In dependence upon the eye and form
\ Mind arises like an illusion.
\ It is not reasonable to call
\ Illusory that which has existence.
.
(i. e. Even the mind itself is empty of inherent existence because dependently arisen: not existent, not non-existent, not both, not neither - inseparability of appearances and emptiness, inseparability of the Two Truths -- dependent origination and emptiness. A flow of interdependence without any inherently existing entities in it. Like an illusion, but not a complete illusion. Dependent on the mind, but not from the mind only. )
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(-- In each case the conclusion is the same: nothing is findable nor can be pin-pointed under such analysis. Yet events, objects and perception occur, arising in dependence on a combination of many different factors.
-- Objection: If the aggregate of recognition does not exist inherently, it is impossible to posit phenomena.
-- Answer. There is no such error.
-- Even though it does not exist by way of its own entity, mind arises like a magical illusion in dependence upon the eye and visible form. Any phenomena whose existence is existence by way of its own entity cannot be called illusory, just as women who exist in the world are not called illusory. )
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L4: [C. Showing that lack of true existence is, like magic, a cause for amazement]
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\ ###
\ 324.
\ When there is nothing on earth
\ That does not amaze the wise,
\ Why think cognition by the senses
\ And suchlike are amazing.
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(i. e. The Middle Way: although things do not inherently exist, they are not completely not-existent (nor both together, nor neither). Their true way of existence is beyond all conceptualization, but meanwhile it is useful to see them as: empty of inherent existence, but still dependently arisen and functional. Those two - dependent origination and emptiness - are not in real opposition, separate, different, nor are they one. They are said to be non-dual in expressions
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like "inseparability of appearances and emptiness", "the Union of The Two Truths", "inseparability of the three kayas or of the three Gems", "the need to combine method to wisdom", etc. Seeing this is true Nirvana. But, here, non-dual means: not two, not one. It points toward transcendence of the duality by directly seeing it real nature: not accepting it, not rejecting it. )
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(-- Assertion: It is amazing to claim that the sense organs can in no way whatever apprehend objects and that visual consciousness is produced in dependence upon the eye and visible form.
-- Answer: That alone is no cause for amazement.
-- Although when analyzed by reasoning a sprout and so forth neither comes into existence from a seed which has ceased nor from one which has not ceased, [sprouts are produced in dependence upon seeds]. When to the wise there is nothing on earth which is not as amazing as magic, why should one think that recognition of objects by sense consciousnesses which do not have true existence and such-like are amazing, for this applies equally to everything. )
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L3: [II. Showing that emptiness of true existence is like magical illusions and so forth]
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\ ###
\ 325.
\ The firebrand's ring are magical creations,
\ Dreams, illusions, and the moon in water,
\ Mists, echoes, mirages, clouds
\ And worldly existence are alike.
.
(i. e. There is no direct or objective perception, everything is like an illusion: Everything is merely imputed by the mind, but not from the mind only. Like figures seen on a cloud, like swirls on the surface of the ocean. All empty of inherent existence, but still dependently arisen and functional. All perceptions are dependent on accumulated karma. )
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( -- Thus all dependently arising phenomena are like the ring formed by a firebrand which is whirled quickly. Though the woman created through meditative stabilization and the dream body do not have true existence, they act as causes for erroneous attachment to the self. Although the illusory maiden conjured by a magician does not have true existence, she confuses the mind. Similarly the moon in the water, mists and echoes resounding from mountain clefts and caves give rise to a distorted perception of them as they appear to be. A mirage causes mistaken perception, and clouds in the distance seem like mountains. Worldly existence consisting of environments and living beings, while empty of inherent existence, is able to function. Understand that it is like these analogies.
.
Sutra says:
~ 1. In a young girl's dream she sees
~ A youth arrive then die, and feels
~ Happy when he arrives, unhappy when he dies.
~ Understand all phenomena are like this. ~.
~ 2. Those who conjure illusions create forms
~ Of various kinds -- horses, elephants and chariots.
~ They are not at all as they appear.
~ Understand all phenomena are like this. ~.
~ 3. The reflection of the moon shining
~ In the sky appears in a clear pool,
~ Yet the moon does not enter the water.
~ Understand the nature of all phenomena is like this. ~.
~ 4. Echoes arise in dependence upon
~ Caves, mountain, forts and river gorges.
~ Understand all products are like this.
~ Phenomena are all like illusions and mirages. ~.
~ 5. A person who is tormented by thirst
~ In summer at noon -- that transmigrator
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~ Sees mirages as a body of water.
~ Understand all phenomena are like this. ~.
~ 6. Although a mirage contains no water
~ Confused beings want to drink it.
~ Unreal water cannot be drunk.
~ Understand all phenomena are like this. ~.
~ 7. Instantaneously in a cloudless sky
~ A circle of clouds appears,
~ But try to find from where they came --
~ Understand all phenomena are like this. ~.
~ 8. Like mirages and smell-eaters' cities,
~ Like magical illusions and like dreams,
~ Objects of meditation are empty of a real entity.
~ Understand all phenomena are like this. ) .
L3: [The summarizing stanza:]
.
\ ###
\ Thus in the illusory city of the three false worlds
\ Manipulated by the puppeteer of karmic action
\ The smell-eater maiden performs her illusory dance.
\ Amazing that desire should chase a mirage!
.
(i. e. It is about directly seeing the real nature of the three inseparable worlds: All the objects of the three worlds (desire, form, formless; or body, speech and mind; or the seven consciousnesses, the alayavijnana and the neutral alaya) are empty of inherent existence because dependently arisen. There is no direct perception of anything. All perceptions are dependent on accumulated karma. Everything in samsara is like an illusion. -- Our goal is to follow a gradual path of more and more subtle methods and wisdom that will permit us to directly realize the real nature of the objects of the three realms, and their inseparability. This threesome purification of our body, speech and mind is what can lead us to the inseparable trikaya of a Buddha. Once we directly realize the real non-dual nature of our own mind, and thus of everything in the three realms, then automatically all attachments and fears are dropped off, no more karma is produced and we are free from any accumulated karma because we see its real nature. Then seeing the non- duality of everything, everything is seen as pure, the Buddha-nature is directly seen and it is true Nirvana. )
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\ ###
\ This is the thirteenth chapter from the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing how to meditate on the refutation of sense organs and objects.
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This concludes the commentary on the thirteenth chapter, showing how to meditate on the refutation of sense organs and objects, from Essence of Good Explanations, Explanation of the "Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas".
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L2: [Chapter 14 - Refuting Extreme Conceptions [of inherent existence and complete non-existence . . . ] -
The perfection of wisdom: non-duality of dependent origination and emptiness - P. 265]
-- SHOWING HOW TO MEDITATE ON THE REFUTATION OF EXTREME CONCEPTIONS. -- Refuting extreme conceptions.
.
L3: [I. Proving that functional things are empty of inherent existence] L4: [A. Brief exposition]
.
\ ###
\ 326.
\ IF A THING DID NOT DEPEND
\ ON ANYTHING ELSE AT ALL
\ IT WOULD BE SELF-ESTABLISHED,
\ BUT SUCH A THING EXISTS NOWHERE.
.
(i. e. Everything in the three realms is dependently arisen, thus everything is empty of inherent existence. There is no exception at all - not even for the permanent basic elements described in the Abhidharma, not even for karma, dependent origination or emptiness itself, not even for the Buddha-nature, not even for the a primary awareness. Dependently arisen means dependent on its causes and conditions, on its parts or characteristics, on the mind perceiving or labeling it, on accumulated karma. Empty of inherent existence doesn't mean complete non-existence; that would be jumping to the other extreme: nihilism.
Nor does it mean both existence and non-existence together (dualism), nor neither existence nor non-existence (monism). Everything is merely imputed by the mind, but still not from the mind only. The Middle Way between all extremes consists of staying away from all extreme conceptions, thinking that any view is the absolute final truth, or rejecting them all thinking they are all useless (that is also an extreme). )
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(-- The fourteenth chapter continues by refuting extreme conceptions of reified existence and total non-existence. If phenomena were inherently existent, they should be independent and findable when sought by a reasoning consciousness analyzing their final mode of existence, but they are neither. Emphasis is placed on the fact that ultimate or inherent existence is being refuted, and that this should not be misinterpreted to mean that things do not have valid conventional existence. The reason of not being inherently one or many is first presented concisely and then applied to refute non-Buddhist as well as Buddhist contentions, in order to establish that neither what is imputed nor its basis of imputation has true existence.
-- Question: If, like the ring formed by a firebrand and so forth, worldly existence, because of being dependent arising, does not exist inherently, what has inherent existence?
-- Answer: Not the slightest thing has inherent existence.
-- Anything existing by way of its own entity would not rely on anything else at all, but not the least thing is independent or exists without relying on something else. If anything existed inherently, independence would be established as its nature when examined by the reasoning which investigates the ultimate, yet this does not exist anywhere. A mode of existence of phenomena not merely posited by nominal convention is known as independent existence, existence by way of their entity, existence by way of their character, inherent existence and true existence. This clearly indicates the object of negation through whose refutation there is no focus for conceptions of true existence. Since Candrakirti's commentary repeatedly mentions qualifying the object of negation when refuting fabrications of true existence, one should not deprecate the Madhyamika view. )
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L4: [B. Extensive explanation]
L5: [1. Refuting a truly existent composite by examining the four possibilities [same, different, one owning the other or vice versa]]
L6: [a. Exposition]
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\ ###
\ 327.
\ "The form is a pot" -- they are not one.
\ The pot that has form is not separate.
\ The pot does not have form,
\ Not does the form have a pot.
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(i. e. Interdependence of an object and its basic characteristics or parts: We usually assume there is a real object existing on its own out there, and that it has real characteristics that we can directly perceived. By analyzing the relations between the object and its characteristics with these assumptions we find that it turns into complete absurdity. Taking the pot and its form as example, we find that a pot cannot first exist on its own and then have a form that could also exist on its own. Each of those two cannot exist without the other. But still they are not the same thing. One cannot possess the other. They are not different, not the same. They are interdependent. They are two co-dependently arisen concepts. So there is no inherently existing (independent) object or characteristics. Everything is dependently arisen, thus empty of inherent existence. )
.
(The pot and the form, not one, not separate:
-- The text first examine whether the pot and its constituents, like visual form, are inherently one or different. If they were inherently one, there should be a pot wherever there is a visual form. Alternatively, if the pot possessed visual form as something inherently different from itself, the two would be unrelated, and we should be able to see a pot without necessarily seeing its form.
-- If the composite known as "pot" exists by way of its own entity, are the visible form and the pot one or different?
-- In the first case it follows that the pot in the statement "The form is a pot" are not inherently one, otherwise there would be a pot wherever there was a visible form. One might think that the pot which is something distinct from visible form possessed form the way Devadatta possesses a cow, as something separate. However it follows that the pot which has form is not inherently separate from the form, otherwise it would be apprehensible independently of its form. The pot does not have form as something apart which depends upon it, nor does the form have a pot dependent upon it, like a dish and its contents, because neither exists inherently. )
.
L6: [b. Explanation]
L7: [(1) Refuting other sectarians]
L8: [(a) Refuting the characteristics]
L9: [1: Refuting the substantial entity as basis for a distinct generality]
.
\ ###
\ 328.
\ Since the two are seen to have dissimilar
\ Characteristics, if the pot is separate
\ From existence, why would existence
\ Not also be separate from the pot?
.
(i. e. The case of an object and existence: Another example of an object and its basic characteristics: "existence". A pot cannot exist or not and then have the characteristic of "existence" added to it. Each of those two cannot exist without the other. But still they are not the same thing. One cannot possess the other. They are not different, not the same. They are interdependent. They are two co-dependently arisen concepts. )
.
(The pot and "existence", not one, not separate:
-- In developing this examination of the relationship between the pot and its parts, the text investigates Vaisesika contention regarding the relationship between the generality "existence" and specific instances such as a pot. Here, the relationship between a substantial entity (a pot) and its attributes and the relationship between one attribute and another are also investigated.
.
According to Vaisesika contentions one would not be able to say that the pot exists because the pot and existence are inherently different and thus unrelated.
-- Vaisesika assertion: Though the pot and its form are not different substantial entities, existence and the pot are. The pot is a substantial entity and is said to exist through its connection with the great generality "existence," which is something separate from it.
-- Answer: Existence and the pot are seen to have the dissimilar characteristics of a generality and of a specific. It is not feasible for the pot to be a substantial entity which is separate from existence, for if it were, why would existence not be a separate entity from the pot? It follows that it would be. If this is accepted, the pot is non-existent. )
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L9: [2: Refuting it as a basis for distinct attributes] L9: [a: Actual meaning]
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\ ###
\ 329.
\ If one is not accepted as the pot
\ The pot is not one.
\ Moreover possession is not reciprocal,
\ Therefore also it is not one.
.
(i. e. The case of an object and its numerator: Another example of an object and its basic characteristics: "one" or "two". A pot cannot exist and then have the characteristic of "one" added to it. Each of those two cannot exist without the other. But still they are not the same thing. One cannot possess the other. They are not different, not the same. They are interdependent. They are two co-dependently arisen concepts)
.
(The pot and "one", not one, not separate:
-- Neither could one say "one pot", since a substantial entity and its attributes, in this case the pot and one, are asserted to be inherently different and possession between them not reciprocal.
-- Assertion: The substantial entity, the pot, exists because it acts as a basis for attributes, such as one or two, which are distinct from it.
-- Answer: "Attribute" and "substantial entity" are different words and have different meanings.
-- ab: If the number one is not accepted as the pot, the pot is not one either because, like two and so forth, these are different words and have different meanings. if this is accepted, the term and thought "one" do not validly apply to the pot.
-- Assertion: The pot is one by virtue of possessing the attribute one, but one is not the pot.
-- Answer cd: Possession occurs between two similar things, as in the case of consciousness, and not between dissimilar things. Moreover there is no reciprocal possession between the pot and one, since the pot possesses one, but one does not possess the pot. The pot is also not one because of being a separate entity from one. )
.
L9: [b: Inconsistency with the assertion that one attribute cannot rely on another attribute]
.
\ ###
\ 330.
\ If the form is the size of the substance,
\ Why is the form not large?
\ If the opponent were not different
\ Scriptural sources could be cited.
.
(i. e. The case of characteristics of characteristics - like part of parts: As for the relations between the so called basic characteristics of the same object. If we assume those characteristics are really existing on their own - independently of each other - inherently existing, then it also ends up in much absurdity. Taking the example of form and size, a form cannot exist and then have the characteristic of "being large or not" added to it. Each of those two cannot exist without the other. But still they are not the same thing. One cannot possess the other. They are not different, not the same. They are interdependent. They are two co-dependently arisen concepts. So those characteristics are more like parts and sub- parts, and not independent of each other. )
.
(-- When we say a "large pot" we mean its form is large. According to the Vaisesikas, however, both form and size are attributes and one attribute cannot qualify another, with the absurd consequence that a large pot could not exist.
-- ab: Furthermore, your contention that attributes qualify substantial entities but that one attribute does not qualify another is contradictory.
-- If the size of the substantial entity, the pot, and the size of its visible form are the same, why is the attribute form not large just as the substantial entity is large? One must accept that the form has a separate attribute "large".
-- Objection: Small and large cannot qualify form, for according to our textual system, one attribute does not qualify another.
-- Answer cd: If your opponents were not from a school other than your own, you could cite your textual system to fault their argument, but it is inappropriate here, since we are engaged in rejecting these very tenets. )
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L8: [(b) Refuting that which is characterized]
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\ BY VIRTUE OF ITS CHARACTERISTIC
\ THE CHARACTERIZED DOES NOT EXIST.
\ Such a thing has no existence
\ As something different from number and so forth.
.
(i. e. Emptiness of the characterized and of the characteristics because co-dependently arisen: So, the characterized is empty of inherent existence because dependent on its characteristics (numerator, form, color, size, existence, . . . ), like it is dependent on its parts. And vice versa, the characteristics are empty of inherent existence because they cannot exist without the characterized as shown above. The characteristics and the characterized are interdependent, one cannot exist without the other. They are not two, but still not one; not different or separate, but still not the same. They are two co-dependently arisen concepts, all merely imputed by the mind. )
.
(The characteristics and the characterized: not one, not separate, both empty:
-- Next Sautrantika assertions regarding the relationship between characteristics and what they characterize is examined. -- Assertion: Even if distinct attributes like separateness are refuted, the pot which they characterize is not refuted and thus exists by way of its own entity.
-- Answer: If one contends that existence and so forth have the characteristic of accompanying things while the pot has the opposite characteristic, then by virtue of this opposite characteristic the pot it characterizes does not exist anywhere by way of its own entity. Such a thing, distinct from numbers like one, two and so forth, has no existence as a pot established by way of its own entity. In brief, something characterized which is a different entity from its characteristics and characteristics which are different entities from that which they characterize cannot be found. )
.
L7: [(2) Refuting our own sectarians]
L8: [(a) Extensively refuting the composite as a truly existent single unit] L9: [1: Refutation by examining for oneness or difference]
.
\ ###
\ 332.
\ Because the pot is not separate
\ From its characteristics, it is not one.
\ If there is not a pot for each,
\ Plurality is not feasible.
.
(i. e. The case of the plurality: If the is no "one" inherently existing object because it depends on its own characteristics or parts, then there cannot be "many" inherently existing objects, and the whole composed of assembling many empty objects (plurality) is also empty of inherent existence. -- So, the whole mathematical system is empty of inherent existence, but still not completely non-existent, or useless, or meaningless (that is evident by looking at its relative efficiency). So, we have to stay away from both extremes conceptions. - see also verse 344. )
.
(-- The pot, for instance, is not a truly existent single unit, since it is composed of eight constituents with their own individual properties. Nor is it a truly existent plurality, since there is not a separate pot for each of these constituents. -- Sautrantika assertion: The pot and its eight substantial particles are one truly existent entity.
-- Answer ab: It follows that the pot would be a truly single unit, because it is, by way of its own entity, one with and not separate from its eight substantial particles which have diverse characteristics.
-- Assertion: The pot is a plurality.
-- Answer cd: In that case there should be a pot for each of the eight substantial particles. Since there is no pot for each, the pot is not feasible as a plurality. )
.
L9: [2: Refuting the composite as a truly existent single unit through the coming together of its constituents]
L9: [a: Actual refutation]
.
\ ###
\ 333.
\ The tangible and the intangible
\ Cannot be said to coalesce.
\ Thus it is in no way feasible
\ For these forms to coalesce.
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.
(i. e. The case of the whole: An object composed of different parts and characteristics that are themselves empty of inherent existence, is also empty of inherent existence. The parts and characteristics do not coalesce to form an inherently existing whole. )
.
(-- The opponents argues that the constituents combine to form a truly existent pot. Yet how do tangible constituents such as the four elements combine with intangible one such as visual form?
-- Assertion: The pot is a single unit through the coming together of the eight substantial particles.
-- Answer: The pot's composite can in no way be a truly existent single unit due to the coalescence of the eight substantial particles such as visible form and so forth, because the four elements which are tangible, and visible form, smell and so forth which are intangible cannot touch and coalesce. )
.
L9: [b: Refuting the rejoinder]
.
\ ###
\ 334.
\ Form is a component of the pot
\ And thus, for a start, is not the pot.
\ SINCE THE COMPOUND DOES NOT EXIST,
\ NEITHER DO THE COMPONENTS.
.
(i. e. The whole and the parts / characteristics are not different, not the same, because the objects and its parts or characteristics are never the same, even if never separate or different. One cannot be found without the other, but they still represent different things. They are interdependent, co-dependently arisen concepts. That is why both are empty of inherent existence. )
.
(-- These constituents are merely components and not the compound itself.