Thereupon one can say in verse, "If you admit that it arises at first nonexistent,
nonexistent
it also goes to the pratyayas.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-2-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
Because the Sutra expresses itself in an intentional manner, whereas
164
the Abhidharma teaches the characteristics of things. On the one
hand Pratityasamutpada is given as static, prolongued, and pertaining to living beings (sattvdkhya); and on the other hand, as momentary, serial, and pertaining to both living and non-living beings (sattvdsattvdkhya).
Why does the Sutra teach Pratityasamutpada as only pertaining to living beings?
25c-d In order to have aberration cease with regard to the past, the future, and the interval in between.
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And it is for this same reason that it teaches a Pratityasamutpada in three sections.
Ignorance or aberration relating to the past, as when one asks, "Did I
exist or not exist in the past? How and as what did I exist? " Relating to
the future: 'Will I exist in the future? . . . " Relating to the interval in
between: 'What is this? How is this? What are we? What will we
165 be? "
This threefold aberration is destroyed by the teaching of the succession: ignorance. . . old age and death. For its is said in the Sutra, "Whoever, Oh Bhiksus, knows, through prajnd, Pratityasamutpada and the dharmas produced through dependence, will not turn himself towards the past by asking if he existed. . . "
According to others, the last three terms of the middle section,
--thirst, attachment, and bhava---are also taught in order to cause
aberration relating to the future to cease; for they are the causes of future
166 existence.
This twelvefold Pratityasamutpada is also threefold, defilement (klesa), action (karman), and foundation (vastu); it is twofold, cause and result.
26a-b. Three parts are defilement, two are action; seven are
167 foundation and also result.
Ignorance, thirst, and attachment are, by their nature, defilements; the samskaras and bhava are aaion; consciousness, namarupa, the six ayatana, contact, sensation,/***, and old age and death are foundation, so called because they are the support (ahaya-adhisthana) of the de- filements and aaion. The parts that are foundation are result: the five that are not foundation are cause, being both defilement and aaion in nature.
Why are cause and result taught at length in the seaion of present existence--two parts of defilement, two parts of aaion, five parts of foundation--whereas, a similar exposition is absent for the past and future?
In the future, one has two parts for result.
? 26b-c In two sections, cause and result are abbreviated, for one can infer them from the teaching of the middle.
From the teaching of the defilements, action and foundation, relating to present existence, one can deduce the complete exposition of cause and result in past and future existences. All useless descriptions should be omitted
***
But if Pratityasamutpada has only twelve parts, transmigration would have a beginning, since the cause of ignorance is not indicated; and it would have an end, since the result of old age and death is not indicated. Thus one must add new parts, and to infinity.
No, for the Blessed One has implicitly indicated the cause of ignorance and result of old age and death.
27. From defilement there arises defilement and action; from
whence foundation; from whence a new foundation and
defilement: such is the manner of existence of the parts of
168 existence or bhavdngas.
Defilement arises from defilement, as attachment arises from desire.
Action arises from defilement, as consciousness from attachment, or the samskdras from ignorance.
A foundation arises from action, as Vijnana from the samskdras\ or birth from existence.
A foundation arises from a foundation, as ndmarupa from con- sciousness;thesixdyatanasfromndmarupa. . . sensationfromcontact, or old age and death from birth.
Defilement arises from a foundation, as desire from sensation.
Since such is the manner of existence of the various parts of dependent orgination it is clear that ignorance has either a defilement or a foundation for its cause; it is clear that old age and death (=the rest of the foundation from consciousness to sensation, above, p. 404, line 6, has defilement for a result.
Thus the teaching is complete. That the Blessed One wanted to
The World 407
? illustrate this manner of existence of the parts results from the
conclusion of the Sutra, "Thus there takes place the production of this
169 great mass which is nothing but suffering. "
17 m But there is another explanation: ? a. It is said, in another Sutra,
that ignorance has incorrect judgment {ayoniso manasikdra) for its cause, and, in still another Sutra, that incorrea judgment has ignorance
172 for its cause.
Consequently ignorance is not without a cause and one avoids the objection of infinite regression.
b. But incorrea judgment is not named in the Sutra in question, the
Pratityasamutpddasffira.
Without doubt; but it is included in attachment: thus one does not
173 have to separately name it here.
This explanation is without value. How is incorrea judgment included in attachment? Indeed, it is associated (samprayukta) with attachment, but it can as equally well be associated with ignorance or with desire. Let us admit that it may be included in attachment, but can one draw from this the conclusion that the Sutra, by naming attachment, says that incorrea judgment is the cause of ignorance? In other words, I indeed hold that incorrea judgment is included in attachment; but it does not follow that the Sutra could dispense with terming it a separate part, the cause of ignorance. One could just as well omit ignorance and desire.
174
Another master speaks next. A Sutra teaches that ignorance has
175
incorrea judgment for its cause. A Sutra teaches that incorrea
judgment has ignorance for its cause and observes that it is produced at the moment of contaa, "By reason of the eye and a visible thing there is
176 produced a defiled judgment which arises from error (mohaFavidyd). "
A Sutra explains the origin of desire, "Desire arises by reason of a sensation which itself arose from a contaa wherein there is ig-
177
norance. "
from the incorrea judgment which is produced at the moment of contaa. Hence ignorance is not without a cause; there is no reason to add a new term:, incorrea judgment, the cause of ignorance, arise itself from
Hence the ignorance that coexists with sensation proceeds
? an ignorance designated as aberration (moha). [This is circular reasoning, cakraka. ]
Well and good, says the author; but this is not explained in the Prat&yasamutpddasutra and it should be explained there.
There is no reason to explain it in clearer terms, for one reaches these conclusions through reasoning. In fact, to the Arhats, sensation is not a cause of desire: from whence we conclude that sensation is a cause of desire only when it is defiled, associated with ignorance. Contact, when it is not accompanied by error, is not a cause of this defiled sensation; contact accompanied by error is not produced in an Arhat, who is free from ignorance; thus the contact that Pratityasamutpada indicates as the cause of sensation, a cause of desire, is the contact that is accompaned by ignorance. [We then have sdvidyasparfapratyaya vedana / savidyavedandpratyaya trsna: sensation conditioned by contact as- sociated with ignorance, desire conditioned by sensation associated with ignorance]. From there we again take up the reasoning indicated above: we prove that, according to the Sutra, incorrect judgment is produced at the moment of contact.
But, says the author, the idea that reasoning, supported on occasion by Sutras, permits omitting indispensable terms--in the incorrect judgment in question, with the reciprocal causality of incorrect judgment and ignorance--leads to absurdity. [One could just as well omit contact, sensation, the samskdras or birth].
The true answer to this objection--that, since there is no indication of any other parts before ignorance and beyond old age and death, samsdra is without beginning or end--is the following: the enumera- tion of the parts of dependent orgination is complete. In fact, doubt with reference to the question of knowing how present existence is conditioned by preceding existence, and how future existence is conditioned by present existence, is the only point that the Sutra wants teach: thus it says, "In order to cause error relating to the past, the future, and their interval to cease" (iii. 25c, p. 68).
***
The Blessed One said, "I shall teach you, Oh Bhiksus, Pratitya- samutpada and the dharmas produced in dependence (pratitya-
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178
samutpanna)" What difference is there between Pratityasamutpada
and these dharmas!
None, according to the Abhidharma. For, as we have seen above (p.
179 405), both are defined as being "all the conditioned dharmas. "
***
A difficulty. "All the conditioned dharmas" means the dharmas of the three periods. How can future dharmas which have not yet arisen, be termed "produced in dependence," pratityasamutpanna!
We would ask you how future dharmas which are not yet "created" (krta) are called "conditoned" (samskrta)?
Because they are "thought" (cetita) by the volition (cetand) which is 180
termed abhisamskdrikd, that is, "executing a retribution. "
But if this is so, how will future pure dharmas (the dharmas of the
Path) be conditioned?
They are thought by a good mind with a view to acquiring them.
But then Nirvana itself will be conditioned, for one desires to acquire
181 it.
When one calls future dharmas "produced in dependence," one uses
an inadequate expression, justified by the identity of nature of future
dharmas with past and present dharmas that are "produced," in the
same way that future rupa is called rupa by reason of the identity of its
nature with rupa, even though one cannot qualify it as rupyate in the 182
present.
***
What is the intention of the Sutra in distinguishing Pratitya- samutpada from the dharmas produced in dependence?
28a-b. Samutpdda is the cause, whereas samutpanna is the 183
result;
The part that is a cause is Pratityasamutpada, because, there takes place arising from it. The part that is a result is pratityasamutpanna, becauseitarose;butitisalsoPratityasamutpada, because,fromit,arising takes place. All the parts, being cause and result are at one and the same
? time both Pratityasamutpada and pratityasamutpanna. Without this distinction, nevertheless, there would be non-determination and con- fusion (avyavasthana), for a part is not Pratityasamutpada through connection to the part through connection to which it is also pratityasamutpanna. In the same way a father is father through connection to his son; and a son is son through connection to his father; in the same way cause and result, and the two banks of a river.
184
But the Sthavira Purna^a says: What is Pratityasamutpada cannot
be pratityasamutpanna. Four causes: 1. future dharmas [which are Pratityasamutpada because they are a cause of future dharmas\ but not pratityasamutpanna because they are not utpanna]; 2. the last dharmas of the Arhat [which are solely pratityasamutpanna]; 3. past and present dharmas, with the exception of the last dharmas of the Arhat, [which are both Pratityasamutpada and pratityasamutpanna]; and 4. the unconditioned dharmas, [which are neither Pratityasamutpada nor pratityasamutpanna, because they have no result and they do not arise,
ii. 55d].
The Sautrantikas criticize: [All this teaching, from "Static Pratitya-
pratityasamutpanna"] --are these personal theses, fantasies, or the sense of the Sutra? You say in vain that it is the sense of the Sutra. You speak of a static Pratityasamutpada of twelve parts which are so many states {avastha) made up of the five skandhas: this is in contradiction to the Sutra wherein we read, "What is ignorance? Non-knowledge
186
relating to the past . . . " This Sutra is of explicit sense, clear
{nitartha'vibhaktartha); you cannot make it a Sutra whose sense is yet
187 to be deduced (neydrtha).
[Answer of the Sarvastivadins:] Nothing proves that this Sutra is of clear sense; the fact that it expresses itself by means of a definition does not prove anything; for the Blessed One gives definitions which solely
188 bear on the essential or major elements of the object to be defined
For example, in the Hastipodopamasutra, to the question "What is the internal earth element? ", the Blessed One answers, "The hair, the
189
body-hair, etc. " Certainly hair, etc. , are still other dharmas,--visible
things, smells, etc. ,--but the Blessed One refers to their principal element, which is the earth element. In the same way, the Blessed One designates a state in which ignorance is the major element as ignorance.
samutpada . . . (p. 405)" to "What is Pratityasamutpada cannot be 185
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? [Answer of the Sautrantikas:] This example proves nothing. In fact, in the Hastipadopamasutra, the Blessed One does not define hair, etc, by the earth element; he does not say "What is hair, etc? The earth element," in which case the definition would be incomplete. But he defines the earth element through the hair, etc; and his definition is complete, for there is no earth element in the body which is not included in the description, hair, etc In the same way, the definition of Pratityasamutpada is complete; there is nothing to add to it.
[Answer of the Sarvastivadins:] The definition given in the
Hastipadopamasutra is not complete. In fact there is earth element in 190
tears, mucus, etc, as one can see by another Sutra. Yet the earth element of tears is not indicated in the Hastipadopamasutra.
[Answer of the Sautrantikas:] Perhaps the definition of the Hastipadopamasutra is incomplete, seeing that you are able to show that there is something lacking in it. It remains for you to say what is lacking in the definitions that the Sutra gives for ignorance, etc Why define ignorance as "a state with five skandhas" by introducing heterogeneous dharmas [the five skandhas] into ignorance? One can only consider as a part of dependent orgination a dharma the existence or nonexistence of which governs the existence or nonexistence of another part. Thus a state having five parts is not a "part. " The five skandhas (sensation, etc) exist in the Arhat, but he does not possess any samskdras which could produce a consciousness part of dependent orgination, that is, a
191
punyopaga, apunyopaga, or aninjyopapaga Vijnana. And thus fol-
lowing. Hence the Sutra (note 186) is not to be taken literally.
As for the four cases of Purna^a, his first case--that the future dharmas are not "produced by dependence"--is contradicted by the Sutra which gives birth and old age and death as "produced by
dependence": "What are thepratityasamuPpannasl Ignorance. . . birth, and old age and death. " Would one say that birth and old age and death are not future states? This is to take away the three sections from the theory of Pratityasamutpada.
##*
192
Certain schools maintain that Pratityasamutpada is uncon-
ditioned iasamskrtd) because the Sutra says, "Whether the Tathagatas
? appear or not, this dharma nature of the dharmas is unchanging. " This thesis is true or false according to the manner in which one
interprets it. If one means to say that it is always by reason of ignorance,
etc, that the samskaras, etc, are produced, but not by reason of any other
thing, and not without cause; that, in this sense, Pratityasamutpada is
stable, and eternal (nitya), we approve. If one means to say that there
exists a certain eternal dharma called Pratityasamutpada, then this
opinion is inadmissible. For utpdda, production or arising, is a
characteristic of anything that is conditioned (samskrtalaksana, ii. 45c);
an eternal dharma, as arising or Pratityasamutpada would be by
supposition, cannot be a characteristic of a transitory or conditioned
thing. Moreover arising is defined as "existence succeeding upon 193
nonexistence": what relationship (abhisambandha) can one suppose exists between an unconditioned arising and ignorance, etc, a re-
%t
lationship that would permit one to say Pratityasamutpada of
ignorance, etc. ? " Finally the expression Pratityasamutpada would become absurd: since prati-itya-samutpada signifies "production by having gone to the cause" (pratyayamprapya samudbhavah), how could a dharma be both eternal and Pratityasamutpada at one and the same time?
***
194 What is the meaning of the word Pratityasamutpada?
Pratt has the sense of prapti, "to obtain, attain": the root i signifies gatiy "to go;" but with the prefix modifying the sense of the root,prati-i signifies "to attain", so pratitya signifies "having attained;" pad signifies sattdy "existence;" and following are the prefixes sam-ut, "to appear, prddubhdva" Thus Pratityasamutpada signifies "having attained ap- pearance. "
###
This explanation is not admissible; the word Pratityasamutpada is not good, [say the Grammarians]. In fact, of two actions by one and the same agent, the previous action is shown by the verb in the gerundive:
195
snatva bhunkte = "after having bathed, he ate. " Now one cannot
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196 imagine a dharma that, existing before having been produced, goes
first towards the pratyayas, and is then produced There is no action (going towards) without an agent. One can put this objection in verse: "Do you say that it goes towards the pratyayas before its production? This is inadmissible because it does not exist. Do you say that it goes and is produced at the same time? The gerundive is not justified, for the gerundive indicates priority. "
197 198
The objection of the Grammarians is without value. Let us ask
them if that which arises is present or future. "Do you say that a present thing arises? If it has not already arisen, how can it be present? If it has already arisen, how could it be reborn without being reborn indefinitely?
199
Do you say that a future thing arises? How can you attribute to that
which is future, and non-existent, the quality of agent in this action of arising? Or how can you admit an action without an agent? " Consequently we would answer the Grammarians that the dharma goes towards the pratyayas in the same condition in which, according to them, the dharma arises.
In what condition, ask the Grammarians, is the dharma to be found, in your opinion, that arises?
The dharma that arises is "the future dharma disposed to be born" 20
(utpadabhimukho'nagatah). ? So too the dharma that goes toward the pratyayas.
Yet the theory of the Grammarians and the manner in which they
oppose an agent and action, is not tenable. For them there is an agent
(kartar) which is "he who arises" (bhavitar), and an action (kriya) which
here is the action of arising (bhuti). Now one does not maintain that the
action of arising (bhuti) is distinct from the one who arises (bhavitar) (ii.
English trans, p. 247). There is thus nothing wrong in using, of course as
ft
conventional expressions, the words, it arises, it is produced after
having gone to the pratyayas! * The meaning of the expression 201
Pratityasamutpada is as indicated in the Sutra, "If that exists, then this exists; through the arising of that, there is the arising of this. " (See below,p. 4l5) Thefirstphrase("Ifthatexists. . . ");referstopratttya,and the second ("Through the arising of that. . . ") to samutpdda.
Thereupon one can say in verse, "If you admit that it arises at first nonexistent, nonexistent it also goes to the pratyayas. If you admit that it arises at first existent, arisen, it will continue to rearise; hence there is
? recession ad infinitum; or rather we shall say that, for us also, it is 202
preexistent to its arising. " As for the gerundive, it also indicates concomitance: "Darkness, having attained the lamp, perishes," or rather: "Having bathed, he lies down. " One does not speak in this
203 manner of anyone who bathes, closes his mouth and lies down.
***
Some other masters avoid the objection relative to the use of the
gerundive by giving a very different explanation of the word Pratitya-
samutpada: prati has a distributive meaning; sam signifies "coming
together"; itya signifies "good at leaving," "that which does not last;"
and the root pad preceeded by ut signifies "appearance," "arising. " We
then have Pratityasamutpada which signifies "arising together, by
reason of such and such a coming together of causes, of perishable
204 things. "
This explanation holds for the expression Pratityasamutpada', but it does not take into account texts such as: a visual consciousness arises "By
205 reason (pratitya) of the eye and visible things. "
###
Why does the Blessed One define Pratityasamutpada in two ways, "1. If that exists, then this exists;" and 2. "From the arising of that, this
206 arises? "
207
i. For many reasons: 1. to be more specific. In the first formula, it
results that the samskdras exist when ignorance exists; but it does not result that the samskdras come into existence through the sole existence of ignorance. The second formula specifies that it the arising of ignorance that precedes the arising of the samskdras\ 2. in order to indicate the succession of the parts of dependent orgination: if that (ignorance) exists, then they (the samskdras) exist; from the arising of that {samskdras)--and not from any other thing--this (consciousness) arises; 3. in order to indicate the succession of existences: if previous existence existed, then there is present existence; from the arising of present existence future existence arises; 4. in order to indicate the nature of causality which differs according to the case: the causality of the
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parts is either immediate: "if that exists, then this is," or not immediate: "from the arising of that, this arises. " For example, defiled sarhskdras can immediately succeed ignorance; or they can be separated from it by good sarhskdras (ii. 62a). But ignorance is the immediate cause of the sarhskdras, and a mediate cause of consciousness.
208
it According to another explanation, the Blessed One taught in
this manner in order to refute the theory of non-causality (ahetuvdda), the thesis that a thing exists in the absence of a cause, and the theory of
one non-arisen cause, such as Prakrti, Purusa, etc
This explanation is not good, for the second formula suffices to
refute these two theories.
til But certain non-Buddhist teachers imagine that "since the atman
exists as a support (of ignorance), then the sarhskdras, consciousness, etc, exist, being produced; that if ignorance is produced, then the sarhskdras are produced," and so o a In other words, they posit an atman which serves as a substrate to the successive causation of the dharmas. In order to refute this opinion, the Blessed One specified, "That which arises (the sarhskdras) through the arising of such a thing (ignorance) exists by reason of the existence of this one thing that arises, and not by reason of the existence of a certain substrate. " The first formula would permit us to say, "If the atman exists as a support and if ignorance, etc, exists, then the sarhskddras, etc. , exist. " This second formula permits us to say, "It is true that the sarhskdras, etc. , arise by reason of the arising of ignorance, etc. ; but this is on the condition that there exists a certain substrate. " The two formulas together make these explanations untenable: 'The sarhskdras have ignorance for their cause [that is: if ignorance alone exists . . . ] . . . thus the production of this large and autonomous mass of suffering takes place. "
209
iv. The Masters think that the first formula indicates non-
abandoning, non-cutting off: "If ignorance exists, not being abandoned, then the sarhskdras exist, are not abandoned;" whereas the second formula indicates arising: "Through the production of ignorance, the
210 sarhskdras are produced. "
211
v. According to another opinion, the first formula indicates
duration, and the second indicates arising: "As long as the flux of causes lasts, the flux of results exists; by the sole production of a cause, its result is produced"
? We observe that it is a question of arising: the Blessed One said in fact: "I shall teach you Pratityasamutpada*' Further, why would the Blessed One first teach duration and then arising?
212
Another explanation (of the same master): The formula: "If that
exists, then this exists," signifies: "If the result exists, then the destruction of its cause exists. " But let us not think that a result arises without a cause: "From the arising of that, this arises. "
But, in order to express this sense, the Blessed One should have said, "If that exists, then this does not exist;" and he should have first indicated the arising of the result. Once the result arose, he could say, "When the result has arisen, the cause is no more. " If the Sutra should be understood as this master understands it, how does it happen that, wishing to explain Pratityasamutpada, the Blessed One first explained the destruction of its cause?
*##
How do the samskaras exist by reason of ignorance? How does old 213
age and death exist by reason of birth? Let us briefly answer this question.
The fool or Prthagjana does not understand (aprajanari) that 214
Pratityasamutpada is merely the samskaras, that is, conditioned
(samskrta) dharmas--[this lack of prajnd is avidya aveniki, only non-
wisdom, not associated with desire]--and this produces a belief in an
atman (v. 7, 12), and egotism (v. lOa); it accomplishes the threefold
aaion,--bodily, vocal, mental,--with a view to agreeable sensation, and
to the sensation of indifference; non-meritorious action, with a view to
agreeable sensation in this life; meritorbus aaion, with a view to
agreeable sensation in a future life in Kamadhatu; and "immoveable" 215
(dninjya) aaion, with a view to agreeable sensation of the first three Dhyanas and the sensation of indifference of the higher stages (iv. 46a). These aaions are the samskaras that exist by reason of ignorance.
Given the force of the projeaion of aaion, the series of the consciousness, due to the series of the intermediary existence, goes into such and such a realm of rebirth, as long as it may be, in the manner in which a flame goes, that is, in a perpetual renewing. That is the consciousness which exists by reason of the samskaras: in thus
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understanding the consciousness, we are in agreement with the
definition that the Pratltyasamutpadasutra gives for the consciousness: 216
"What is the consciousness? The six groups of consciousnesses. " With the consciousness as an antecedent, ndmarupa arises in this
realm of rebirth. This is the five skandhas, conforming to the definition 211
of the Vibbanga: "What is ndman? The four nonmaterial skandhas. WhatisrupaiAllrupa. . . Thesetwo,--thendmanandtherupa,--are called ndmarupa! '
Then, through the development of namarupa, there arises in their times, the six organs: these are the six ayatanas.
Then, encountering their object, a consciousness arises, and, through the coming together of the three (consciousness, the six dyatanas and a visaya), there is contact, which is susceptible of being experienced agreeably, etc.
From that, the threefold sensation, agreeable, etc, arises.
From this threefold sensation, there arises a threefold desire; desire for kdma or desire for agreeable sensation of the sphere of Kamadhatu, in a being tormented by suffering; desire for rupa, or desire for agreeable sensation of the three Dhyanas and the sensation of indifference of the Fourth; all desire for Ariipya.
Then, from the desire relating to sensation, there arises a fourfold
attachment (updddna): attachment to the object of sense pleasure
(kdmopdddna), attachment to views (drstyupddddna), attachment to
rules and rituals (silavratopdddna), and attachment to theories con- 218
cerning the soul {dtmavddopdddna). The kdmas are the five objects of
pleasure (kdmaguna, iii. 3, p. 368). The views, sixty-two in number, are
as explained in the Brahmajalasutra. $Ua is rejecting immorality {dauhsUya, 219
iv. l22a); vrata is the vow to act like a dog, a bull, etc. ; for example the
Nirgranthas and their nudity, the Brahmanas with their staffs and
antelope hides, the PaSupatas with their tuft of hair and their ashes, the
Parivrajakas with their three staffs and their nudity, and the rest: to tie
oneself down to the observation of these rules is iilavratopdddna (v. 7).
(dtmadrsti) and thoughts pertaining to a soul (asmimdna), for it is by reason of these two that one says atman, that one affirms the existence
Atmavdda is the person himself, and dtmabhava, is that relating to 22
which one says atman. ?
According to another opinion, atmavdda is both a view of soul
221
? of an atman {dtmavada)\ if Scripture uses the word vdda, "affirmation," it is because the atman does not exist. It is said in faa, "The fool, the ignorant, the Prthagjana, conforming to the manners of vulgar speech,
222 thinks 'me,' or 'mine;' but there is not any 'me* or 'mine. *"
Attachment to the kdmas, views, etc. , is chanda or desire, and raga or 2V>
craving, with regard to them. As the Blessed One said in the Sarva 224
'What is attachment? It is chandardga. "
Because of attachment, accumulated action produces a new existence:
this is bhava. The Sutra says, "Ananda, action that produces a new
225 existence is the nature of bhava! *
By reason of bhava, and by means of the descent of the con- 226
sciousness, future arising (janman) is birth, which is made up of the five skandhas, being namarupa in nature.
227 Because of birth, there is old age and death as defined in the Sutra.
It is in this manner that, sufficient unto itself (kevala)--that is, without any relation to an atman--there is produced this great mass of suffering, great because it has neither beginning nor end
##*
The theory that has just been taught--according to which the twelve parts of dependent origination are twelve states made up of the five skandhas--is a theory of the Vaibhasikas.
***
What is avidya (ignorance)?
The non-vidyd9 that which is not vidyd.
Impossible; for the eye is also non-vidyd.
It is an absence of vidyd, "ignorance. "
This is also impossible, for an absence is not a thing (dravya) (iv.
2b-3b) and avidya must be a thing, since it is a cause (pratyaya). Thus 28c-dAvidyaisaseparateentity{dharma),theoppositeofvidyd
228
The non-friend (amitra) is the opposite of a friend, not a non-friend, that is, anyone other than a friend, not the absence of the friend Ifra or
or knowledge, like a non-friend, the untrue, etc
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satya is truth; non-truth (anrta) is speech contrary to true speech; so too non-righteousness (adharma), non-useful (anattha) and the not-to-be-
229 done (akdrya) are the opposite of righteousness, useful, and duty.
Thus avidya--"non-knowledge"--is the opposite of vidyd, a real separate dharma. The Sutra defines it as the cause of the samskdras, from whence it results that it is not a mere negatioa Further,
230
The Sutra regards ignorance as a separate yoke (samyojana), a bond (bandhana), a latent defilement (anuSayd), a canker (dsrava), a torrent or flood (ogha), and a yoke (yoga). Thus ignorance cannot be a mere negation; it cannot be everything that is not vidyd, the eyes, etc
Yet the prefix nan--the privative a--has a pejorative sense. One terms a bad wife a "non-wife" (akalatra), and a bad son, a "non-son" (aputra). Should we not think then that avidya is bad vidyd, that is, bad prajtidl
231 29b. Avidydisnotbadprajnd,becausethisisseeing(dar/ana).
Bad prajfid (kuprajnd) or defiled prajfid would be a type of seeing
(drspi); one of the five bad views (v. 3). Now avidya or ignorance is
certainly not seeing, for ignorance and seeing are two distinct yokes
252 (samyojanas).
[TheSautrantikas:]Avidyawouldbethedefiledprajfidwhichisnot seeing by nature, [for example prajnd associated with rdga or craving].
This is impossible,
29c. Because views are associated with ignorance,
In fact moha (error or aberration), which is defined as avidya (ignorance) is among the mahdbhUmika kief as (defilements which are found in all defiled minds, ii. 26a); now all the mahdbhumika kief as are associated with them, thus avidya (under the name of moha) is associated with seeing (fivefold bad view) which is prajfid in nature; thus avidya is not prajfid, for two items of prajnd cannot be associated.
29d and because ignorance is defined as a defilement ofprajnd. The Sutra says, "The mind defiled by desire is not liberated; prajnd
233
defiled by ignorance is not purified. " Now prajnd cannot be defiled by
29a. Because it is declared to be bound (sarhyojana), etc
? prajnd: if desire is a defilement of the mind, then desire is not the mind; if ignorance is a defilement of prajnd, then ignorance is not prajOd.
[Reply of the Sautrantikas]. Good prajnd can be mixed with defiled prajnd, as when moments of good and defiled prajnd succeed one another. In the same way, when one says that a mind defiled by desire is not liberated, one is speaking of a mind that is not necessarily associated with aaving, but which is oppressed by craving [craving is not aaive,
samuddcaran\ but its traces remain and the mind is oppressed]. When an ascetic avoids aaving, [that is, by suppressing its traces and repairing the bad state, dausfhulya, of the mind], then the mind is liberated. In the same way prajnd, defiled by ignorance (bad prajnd), is not pure: it is oppressed, even when it is good, by ignorance.
234
What is capable of arresting the imaginations of a scholar?
Ignorance is not, in its nature, prajna-
The scholar who maintains that ignorance is all the defilements
236
(kiefas) is refuted at the same time. If ignorance is all the defilements,
it cannot be named separately among the yokes (samyojanas), etc; it is not associated with views and with the other defilements; Scripture should not say, "The mind, defiled by desire, is not liberated," but rather, "The mind defiled by ignorance . . . " Do you say that one expresses oneself in this manner in order to be more specific, and that the Sutra should say, "The mind, defiled by ignorance which consists of desire, is not liberated? " In this hypothesis, Scripture should specify what type of ignorance it is that hinders the purity of the prajnd: now it says, "Prajnd defiled by ignorance is not purified. "
If you hold that ignorance is a separate dharma, and not merely a certain type of prajnd, you should define it.
Ignorance is the non-samprakhydna of the Four Truths, the Three Jewels, of aaion and its result. [Samprakhydna is the same thing as
237 prajrid, discernment, orJnana, knowledge].
What is non-samprakhydna?
It is Tiot'Samprakhydna, nor absenceof->samprakhyana, in the same way that avidydis not non-vidyd or absence-of-f*/^. It is then a certain separate dharma, the opposite of samprakhydna.
Good enough; but as for ignorance, you have not told us the nature of asamprakhyana.
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Definitions are often thus, that is, not definitions through self lature or essence, but definitions through funaioa For example, the eye
s defined as "the pure rupa that serves as a support for the eye ronsciousness" because one does not know this invisible rupa except :hrough inference (Chap, ix, French trans, p. 231. ). [In the same way the inique nature oiavidyd is known through its aaion {karman) or aaivity [kdritra); this aaion is contrary to vidyddso it is thus a dharma contrary [vipaksa) to vidyd].
***
The Bhadanta Dharmatrata defines ignorance in the following
238 erms: asmUi sattvamayana.
Does this mayanddiffer from asmimdna (v. 10)? 239
The Bhadanta answers: As the Sutra says, "I know, I see--
hrough the perfe a abandoning and the perfea knowledge of desire, of
iews, mayands, attachments and latent defilements to the idea of self 240
a$magrdha)\ to the idea of mine (mamagrdha), to asmindna -- 241
without shade, Parinirvana. " [This Sutra shows that mayand--in the ingular since it is a genre--is distina from asmimdna].
So be it, there is mayand; but from whence do you hold that it is jnorance?
The Bhadanta answers: Because one cannot identify mayand with ny other defilement, since it is named separately from desire, views, nd asmimdna.
But could it not be a mdna other than asmimdna} [Mdna is in faa six r sevenfold, v. 10]. However we would have to say too much in order to smplete this examination. Let us stop here.
***
242
As for ndmarupa rupa has already been explained (19).
245 30a. Ndman are the skandhas that are not rupa.
The four nonmaterial skandhas,--sensation, ideas, samskdras, and >nsciousness, are called ndman, for ndman signifies "that which bends, elds," (namatiti ndma).
? The nonmaterial skandhas bend, [that is, "are active," pravartante, "arise," utpadyante], towards the objea (artha) by reason of name
244 (ndman), the organs, and the object.
In this phrase, "by reason of name," one takes the word "name" in its popular sense, (samjndkarana, ii. 47a, English trans, p. 250), as a "designation," which designates and causes to be understood either a collection, "cattle," "horses," etc. ,ora single thing, "rupa" "taste," etc.
Why is samjndkarana termed "name? "
Because the samjndkarana causes the nonmaterial skandhas to bend (namayatiti noma) towards their objea.
According to another explanation, the nonmaterial skandhas are termed ndman, because, then the body dissolves, these skandhas bend,
245 that is, go towards another existence.
***
We have already explained the six dyatanas (i. 9). *#*
246 30b. There are six contaas. They arise from encounter.
The first is the contaa of the eye, and the sixth is contaa of the manas or mind (Digha, iii. 243, etc. )
They arise from the coming together of three things, an organ, its objea, and a consciousness.
One can see indeed that there can be a coming together of the five material organs, with their objeas and their corresponding con- sciousnesses, for the three are simultaneous. But the mental organ or manas (manodhdtu) is destroyed when a mental consciousness (mano- vijnana) arises (i. 172); and the objea (i. e. , dharmas) of this con- sciousness can be future: how can there be a coming together of the three?
There is a coming together because the organ (the manas) and the objea (the dharmas) are the causal conditions of the mental con- sciousness; or rather because the organ, the objea and the consciousness produce the same single effea, namely the contaa.
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***
What is the nature of contact?
The masters are not in agreement.
Some--[the Sautrantikas]--say: Contact is merely the coming
together itself. According to the Sutra, 'The coming together, the 247
encounter, the meeting of these dharmas is contact. "
Others--[the Sarvastivadins]--say: Contact is a dharma associated
with the mind (ii. 24, English trans, p. 190), distina from any coming 248 249
together. According to the Smra of the Six Hexades, "The six internal sources of consciousness (ayatanas, eye, etc. ), the six external sources of consciousness (visible things, etc), the six consciousness, the six contacts, the six sensations, and the six desires. " The Sutra thus knows of the six contacts, together with the six categories of internal ayatanas, external ayatanas, and the consciousnesses: [thus the contacts are separate dharmas; for the Sutra does not contain any repetition or double usages].
[The Sautrantikas explain this Sutra:] If the Sutra does not contain any repetition, it follows that sensations and desires exist apart from the dharmayatana which is the sixth internal source of consciousness (the object of the manas), since you can hold only that the first two categories (six organs and six objects) refer to the organs and their objects without any relation to the consciousness.
[Reply of the Sautrantika, the Bhadanta Srllabha:] Every eye and
visible thing is not the cause of a visual consciousness, as all visual
25 consciousness is not the result of the eye and a visible thing. ? Thus
what is defined as contact in the Sutra, "Six collections of contacts," is the eye, a visible thing and the consciousnesses which are cause and effect. (See p. 428, line 13a).
But how do the Sarvastivadins, who maintain that contact exists
apart from the coming together of any eye, a visible thing and a
consciousness, explain the Sutra, 'The coming together (samgati), the
encounter, the meeting of these dharmas is contact? " 251
They do not read the Sutra in this form; or rather they say that the
252
expression is metaphorical: when the text says "the coming
together," it means "the result of the coming together.
