e
oppiniou{n}
be so?
Chaucer - Boethius
]
? and ? ilke
god for he loke? {and} see? alle ? inges al oon. ? ou maist [[pg 154]]
seyn ? at he is ? e verray sonne. 4436
[Linenotes:
4425 _mou? e_--Mowth
4428 _percen_--MS. p{er}te{n}, C. p{er}cen
_inwarde_--inward
4430 _worlde_--world
_on heye_--an hegh
4431 _nat_--omitted
4434 _schullen come_--shollen comyn
4435 _al oon_--alone]
[Headnote:
GOD'S FOREKNOWLEDGE AND MAN'S FREE WILL. ]
TAMEN EGO EN INQ{UA}M.
[Sidenote: [The . 3^de. p{ro}se. ]]
[Sidenote: _B. _ I am distracted by a more difficult doubt than
ever. ]
++? An seide I now am I co{n}fou{n}ded by a more harde
doute ? an I was. what doute is ? at q{uo}d she.
? For certys I coniecte now by whiche ? inges ? ou art
troubled.
[Sidenote: God's foreknowledge seems to me inconsistent with man's
free-will. ]
It seme? q{uo}d I to repugnen {and} to contrarien 4440
gretly ? at god knowe? byforn alle ? inges. {and}
? at ? er is any fredom of liberte.
[Sidenote: For if God foresees all things, and cannot be deceived,
then that which Providence hath foreseen must needs happen. ]
for yif so be ? at god
loke? alle ? inges byforn. ne god ne may nat ben
desseiuid in no manere. ? an mot it nedes ben ? at alle 4444
? inges bytyden ? e whiche ? at ? e purueaunce of god ha?
sein byforn to comen.
[Sidenote: If God from eternity doth foreknow not only the works,
but the designs and wills of men, there can be no liberty of
will--nor can there be any other action or will than that which a
Divine and infallible Providence hath foreseen. ]
? For whiche yif ? at god
knowe? by-forn nat oonly ? e werkes of men. but also
hir conseils {and} hir willes. ? an ne shal ? er be no 4448
liberte of arbitre. ne certys ? er ne may ben noon o? er
dede ne no wille but ? ilke whiche ? e deuyne purueaunce
? at ne may nat ben desseiued ha? feled byforn
[Sidenote: For if things fall out contrary to such foreseeing, and
are wrested another way, the prescience of God in regard to
futurity would not be sure and unerring--it would be nothing but
an uncertain opinion of them: but I take it to be impious and
unlawful to believe this of God. ]
? For
yif ? at ? ei my? ten wry? en awey in o? er manere ? an ? ei 4452
ben purueyed. ? an ne sholde ? er ben no stedfast p{re}science
of ? inge to comen but ra? er an vncerteyn
oppiniou{n}. ? e whiche ? inge to trowen on god I deme it
felonie {and} vnleueful.
[Sidenote: Nor do I approve of the reasoning made use of by some.
For they say that a thing is not necessarily to happen because God
hath foreseen it, but rather because it is to happen it cannot be
hid from the divine Providence. ]
? Ne I ne proeue nat ? ilk 4456
same resou{n}. as who sei? I ne allowe nat. or I ne p{re}ise
nat ? ilke same resou{n} by whiche ? at som men wenen
? at ? ei mowen assoilen {and} vnknytten ? e knot of ? is
questiou{n}. ? For certys ? ei seyn ? {a}t ? ing nis nat to 4460
come for ? at ? e purueaunce of god ha? seyn it byforn{e}.
? at is to comen but ra? er ? e cont{ra}rie. ? And ? at
is ? is ? at for ? at ? e ? ing is to comen ? at ? erfore
ne may it nat ben hyd fro ? e purueaunce of god. 4464
[Sidenote: [* fol. 35. ]]
[Sidenote: Now by this reason necessity appears to change sides.
For it is not necessary that the things which are foreseen should
happen, but it is necessary that the things which are to befall
should be foreseen. ]
*{and} in ? is manere ? is necessite slydi? a? ein in to ? e [[pg 155]]
contrarie p{ar}tie. ne it ne byhoue? [nat] nedes ? at ? inges
bytiden ? at ben ypurueid. [but it by-houeth nedes /
? {a}t thinges ? {a}t ben to comyn ben yporueyid] but as it 4468
were yt{ra}uailed.
[Sidenote: As if the question was, which was the cause of the
other--_prescience_ the cause of the necessity of future events,
or the _necessity_ the cause of the prescience of future events? ]
as who sei? . ? at ? ilke answere p{ro}cedi?
ry? t as ? ou? men trauailden or weren bysy to
enqueren ? e whiche ? ing is cause of whiche ? inges. as
whe? er ? e p{re}science is cause of ? e necessite of ? inges to 4472
comen. or ellys ? at ? e necessite of ? i{n}ges to comen is
cause of ? e purueau{n}ce.
[Sidenote: But I will prove that, however the order of causes may
stand, the event of things foreseen is necessary, although
prescience doth not seem to impose a necessity upon future things
to fall out. ]
? But I ne enforce me nat now
to shewe{n} it ? at ? e bytidyng of ? inges y-wist byforn is
necessarie. how so or in what manere ? at ? e ordre of 4476
causes ha? it self. al ? ou? ? at it ne seme nat ? at ? e
p{re}science brynge in necessite of bytydynge of ? inges
to comen.
[Sidenote: For if a man sit--the belief in the sitting is true;
and, on the other hand, if the opinion is true of his sitting, he
must needs sit. ]
? For certys yif ? at any wy? t sitte? it byhoue?
by necessite ? at ? e oppiniou{n} be so? e of hym 4480
? {a}t coniecti? ? at he sitte? . and a? einward. al so is it of
? e contrarie. yif ?
e oppiniou{n} be so? e of any wy? t for
? at he sitte? it byhoue? by necessite ? at he sitte
[Sidenote: In both cases there is a necessity--in the latter that
the person sits--in the former, that the opinion concerning the
other is true. ]
? ? an
is here necessite in ? at oon {and} in ? {a}t o? er. for in ? at 4484
oon is necessite of sittynge.
[Sidenote: But the man does not sit because the opinion of his
sitting is true, but the opinion is true because the action of his
being seated was antecedent in time. ]
{and} certys in ? at o? er is
necessite of so? e but ? erfore ne sitte? nat a wy? t for ? at
? e oppiniou{n} of sittyng is so? e. but ? e oppiniou{n} is
ra? er so? e for ? at a wy? t sitte? by-forn.
[Sidenote: So that although the cause of truth arises from the
sitting, there is a common necessity in both. ]
and ? us al 4488
? ou? ? {a}t ? e cause of so? e come? of [? e] syttyng. and
nat of ? e trewe oppiniou{n}. Algates ? itte is ? er comune
necessite in ? at oon {and} in ? at o? er.
[Sidenote: Thus may we reason concerning Providence and future
events. ]
? ? us shewe? it
? {a}t I may make semblable skils of ? e p{ur}ueau{n}ce of god 4492
{and} of ? inges to come.
[Sidenote: For allowing things are foreseen because they are to
happen, and that they do not befall because they are foreseen, it
is necessary that future events should be foreseen of God, or if
foreseen that they should happen; and this alone is sufficient to
destroy all idea of _free-will_. ]
? For al ? ou? for ? at ? at ? inges
ben to comen. ? er-fore ben ? ei p{ur}ueid. nat certys for
? ei ben p{ur}ueid. ? er-fore ne bytide ? ei nat. ? it na? eles
byhoue? it by necessite ? at ei? er ? e ? inges to comen 4496
ben yp{ur}ueied of god. or ellys ? at ? e ? inges ? at ben
p{ur}ueied of god bitiden [. s. ] by necessite. ? And ? is [[pg 156]]
? ing oonly suffise? I-nou? to distroien ? e fredome of
oure arbitre. ? at is to seyn of oure fre wille
[Sidenote: But it is preposterous to make the happening of
temporal things the cause of eternal prescience, which we do in
imagining that God foresees future events because they are to
happen. ]
? But now 4500
[certes] shewe? it wel how fer fro ? e so? e {and} how vp
so dou{n} is ? is ? ing ? at we seyn ? at ? e bytidinge of
temp{or}el ? inges is ? e cause of ? e eterne p{re}science.
? But forto wenen ? at god p{ur}uei? [the] ? inges to comen. 4504
for ? ei ben to comen. what o? er ? ing is it but forto
wene ? at ? ilke ? inges ? at bitiden som tyme ben causes
of ? ilke souereyne p{ur}ueaunce ? at is i{n} god.
[Sidenote: And, moreover, when I know that anything exists, it is
necessary for my belief that it should be. ]
? And
her-to I adde ? itte ? is ? ing ? at ry? t as whan ? at I woot 4508
? at o ? ing is it byhoue? by necessite ? at ? ilke self ? ing be.
[Sidenote: So also when I know that an event shall come to pass,
it must needs happen. ]
{and} eke ? at whan I haue knowe ? at any ? i{n}ge shal
bitiden so byhoue? it by necessite ? {a}t ? ilk[e] same
? ing bytide.
[Sidenote: The event, therefore, of a thing foreseen must befall. ]
so folwe? it ? an ? at ? e bytydynge of ? e 4512
? inge Iwist by-forn ne may nat ben eschewed.
[Sidenote: Lastly, if a person judge a thing to be different to
what it is--this is not knowledge, but a false opinion of it, and
far from the true knowledge. ]
? And
at ? e last[e] yif ? at any wy? t wene a ? ing to ben o? er
weyes ? an it is. it nys nat oonly vnscience. but it is deceiuable
oppiniou{n} ful diuerse {and} fer fro ? e so? e of 4516
science.
[Linenotes:
4437 _harde_--hard
4445 _ha? _--MS. ha? {e}
4446 _whiche_--which
4450 _wille_--wil
_whiche_--which ? {a}t
4451 _ha? _--MS. ha? e
4453 _stedfast_--stydefast
4454-55 _? inge_--thing
4455 _on_--of
4456 _? ilk_--thilke
4458 _whiche_--which
4459 _knot_--knotte
4461 _come_--comyn
_ha? _--MS. ha? e
4464 _hyd_--MS. hydde, C. hidde
4466 [_nat_]--from C.
4467-8 [_but----yporueyid_]--from C.
4471 _? inges_--thing
4477 _ha? _--MS. ha? e
4480-82 _so? e_--soth
4486 _so? e_--sooth
4487 _so? e_--soth
4488 _so? e_--sooth
4489 _so? e come? _--sooth comth
[_? e_]--from C.
? and ? ilke
god for he loke? {and} see? alle ? inges al oon. ? ou maist [[pg 154]]
seyn ? at he is ? e verray sonne. 4436
[Linenotes:
4425 _mou? e_--Mowth
4428 _percen_--MS. p{er}te{n}, C. p{er}cen
_inwarde_--inward
4430 _worlde_--world
_on heye_--an hegh
4431 _nat_--omitted
4434 _schullen come_--shollen comyn
4435 _al oon_--alone]
[Headnote:
GOD'S FOREKNOWLEDGE AND MAN'S FREE WILL. ]
TAMEN EGO EN INQ{UA}M.
[Sidenote: [The . 3^de. p{ro}se. ]]
[Sidenote: _B. _ I am distracted by a more difficult doubt than
ever. ]
++? An seide I now am I co{n}fou{n}ded by a more harde
doute ? an I was. what doute is ? at q{uo}d she.
? For certys I coniecte now by whiche ? inges ? ou art
troubled.
[Sidenote: God's foreknowledge seems to me inconsistent with man's
free-will. ]
It seme? q{uo}d I to repugnen {and} to contrarien 4440
gretly ? at god knowe? byforn alle ? inges. {and}
? at ? er is any fredom of liberte.
[Sidenote: For if God foresees all things, and cannot be deceived,
then that which Providence hath foreseen must needs happen. ]
for yif so be ? at god
loke? alle ? inges byforn. ne god ne may nat ben
desseiuid in no manere. ? an mot it nedes ben ? at alle 4444
? inges bytyden ? e whiche ? at ? e purueaunce of god ha?
sein byforn to comen.
[Sidenote: If God from eternity doth foreknow not only the works,
but the designs and wills of men, there can be no liberty of
will--nor can there be any other action or will than that which a
Divine and infallible Providence hath foreseen. ]
? For whiche yif ? at god
knowe? by-forn nat oonly ? e werkes of men. but also
hir conseils {and} hir willes. ? an ne shal ? er be no 4448
liberte of arbitre. ne certys ? er ne may ben noon o? er
dede ne no wille but ? ilke whiche ? e deuyne purueaunce
? at ne may nat ben desseiued ha? feled byforn
[Sidenote: For if things fall out contrary to such foreseeing, and
are wrested another way, the prescience of God in regard to
futurity would not be sure and unerring--it would be nothing but
an uncertain opinion of them: but I take it to be impious and
unlawful to believe this of God. ]
? For
yif ? at ? ei my? ten wry? en awey in o? er manere ? an ? ei 4452
ben purueyed. ? an ne sholde ? er ben no stedfast p{re}science
of ? inge to comen but ra? er an vncerteyn
oppiniou{n}. ? e whiche ? inge to trowen on god I deme it
felonie {and} vnleueful.
[Sidenote: Nor do I approve of the reasoning made use of by some.
For they say that a thing is not necessarily to happen because God
hath foreseen it, but rather because it is to happen it cannot be
hid from the divine Providence. ]
? Ne I ne proeue nat ? ilk 4456
same resou{n}. as who sei? I ne allowe nat. or I ne p{re}ise
nat ? ilke same resou{n} by whiche ? at som men wenen
? at ? ei mowen assoilen {and} vnknytten ? e knot of ? is
questiou{n}. ? For certys ? ei seyn ? {a}t ? ing nis nat to 4460
come for ? at ? e purueaunce of god ha? seyn it byforn{e}.
? at is to comen but ra? er ? e cont{ra}rie. ? And ? at
is ? is ? at for ? at ? e ? ing is to comen ? at ? erfore
ne may it nat ben hyd fro ? e purueaunce of god. 4464
[Sidenote: [* fol. 35. ]]
[Sidenote: Now by this reason necessity appears to change sides.
For it is not necessary that the things which are foreseen should
happen, but it is necessary that the things which are to befall
should be foreseen. ]
*{and} in ? is manere ? is necessite slydi? a? ein in to ? e [[pg 155]]
contrarie p{ar}tie. ne it ne byhoue? [nat] nedes ? at ? inges
bytiden ? at ben ypurueid. [but it by-houeth nedes /
? {a}t thinges ? {a}t ben to comyn ben yporueyid] but as it 4468
were yt{ra}uailed.
[Sidenote: As if the question was, which was the cause of the
other--_prescience_ the cause of the necessity of future events,
or the _necessity_ the cause of the prescience of future events? ]
as who sei? . ? at ? ilke answere p{ro}cedi?
ry? t as ? ou? men trauailden or weren bysy to
enqueren ? e whiche ? ing is cause of whiche ? inges. as
whe? er ? e p{re}science is cause of ? e necessite of ? inges to 4472
comen. or ellys ? at ? e necessite of ? i{n}ges to comen is
cause of ? e purueau{n}ce.
[Sidenote: But I will prove that, however the order of causes may
stand, the event of things foreseen is necessary, although
prescience doth not seem to impose a necessity upon future things
to fall out. ]
? But I ne enforce me nat now
to shewe{n} it ? at ? e bytidyng of ? inges y-wist byforn is
necessarie. how so or in what manere ? at ? e ordre of 4476
causes ha? it self. al ? ou? ? at it ne seme nat ? at ? e
p{re}science brynge in necessite of bytydynge of ? inges
to comen.
[Sidenote: For if a man sit--the belief in the sitting is true;
and, on the other hand, if the opinion is true of his sitting, he
must needs sit. ]
? For certys yif ? at any wy? t sitte? it byhoue?
by necessite ? at ? e oppiniou{n} be so? e of hym 4480
? {a}t coniecti? ? at he sitte? . and a? einward. al so is it of
? e contrarie. yif ?
e oppiniou{n} be so? e of any wy? t for
? at he sitte? it byhoue? by necessite ? at he sitte
[Sidenote: In both cases there is a necessity--in the latter that
the person sits--in the former, that the opinion concerning the
other is true. ]
? ? an
is here necessite in ? at oon {and} in ? {a}t o? er. for in ? at 4484
oon is necessite of sittynge.
[Sidenote: But the man does not sit because the opinion of his
sitting is true, but the opinion is true because the action of his
being seated was antecedent in time. ]
{and} certys in ? at o? er is
necessite of so? e but ? erfore ne sitte? nat a wy? t for ? at
? e oppiniou{n} of sittyng is so? e. but ? e oppiniou{n} is
ra? er so? e for ? at a wy? t sitte? by-forn.
[Sidenote: So that although the cause of truth arises from the
sitting, there is a common necessity in both. ]
and ? us al 4488
? ou? ? {a}t ? e cause of so? e come? of [? e] syttyng. and
nat of ? e trewe oppiniou{n}. Algates ? itte is ? er comune
necessite in ? at oon {and} in ? at o? er.
[Sidenote: Thus may we reason concerning Providence and future
events. ]
? ? us shewe? it
? {a}t I may make semblable skils of ? e p{ur}ueau{n}ce of god 4492
{and} of ? inges to come.
[Sidenote: For allowing things are foreseen because they are to
happen, and that they do not befall because they are foreseen, it
is necessary that future events should be foreseen of God, or if
foreseen that they should happen; and this alone is sufficient to
destroy all idea of _free-will_. ]
? For al ? ou? for ? at ? at ? inges
ben to comen. ? er-fore ben ? ei p{ur}ueid. nat certys for
? ei ben p{ur}ueid. ? er-fore ne bytide ? ei nat. ? it na? eles
byhoue? it by necessite ? at ei? er ? e ? inges to comen 4496
ben yp{ur}ueied of god. or ellys ? at ? e ? inges ? at ben
p{ur}ueied of god bitiden [. s. ] by necessite. ? And ? is [[pg 156]]
? ing oonly suffise? I-nou? to distroien ? e fredome of
oure arbitre. ? at is to seyn of oure fre wille
[Sidenote: But it is preposterous to make the happening of
temporal things the cause of eternal prescience, which we do in
imagining that God foresees future events because they are to
happen. ]
? But now 4500
[certes] shewe? it wel how fer fro ? e so? e {and} how vp
so dou{n} is ? is ? ing ? at we seyn ? at ? e bytidinge of
temp{or}el ? inges is ? e cause of ? e eterne p{re}science.
? But forto wenen ? at god p{ur}uei? [the] ? inges to comen. 4504
for ? ei ben to comen. what o? er ? ing is it but forto
wene ? at ? ilke ? inges ? at bitiden som tyme ben causes
of ? ilke souereyne p{ur}ueaunce ? at is i{n} god.
[Sidenote: And, moreover, when I know that anything exists, it is
necessary for my belief that it should be. ]
? And
her-to I adde ? itte ? is ? ing ? at ry? t as whan ? at I woot 4508
? at o ? ing is it byhoue? by necessite ? at ? ilke self ? ing be.
[Sidenote: So also when I know that an event shall come to pass,
it must needs happen. ]
{and} eke ? at whan I haue knowe ? at any ? i{n}ge shal
bitiden so byhoue? it by necessite ? {a}t ? ilk[e] same
? ing bytide.
[Sidenote: The event, therefore, of a thing foreseen must befall. ]
so folwe? it ? an ? at ? e bytydynge of ? e 4512
? inge Iwist by-forn ne may nat ben eschewed.
[Sidenote: Lastly, if a person judge a thing to be different to
what it is--this is not knowledge, but a false opinion of it, and
far from the true knowledge. ]
? And
at ? e last[e] yif ? at any wy? t wene a ? ing to ben o? er
weyes ? an it is. it nys nat oonly vnscience. but it is deceiuable
oppiniou{n} ful diuerse {and} fer fro ? e so? e of 4516
science.
[Linenotes:
4437 _harde_--hard
4445 _ha? _--MS. ha? {e}
4446 _whiche_--which
4450 _wille_--wil
_whiche_--which ? {a}t
4451 _ha? _--MS. ha? e
4453 _stedfast_--stydefast
4454-55 _? inge_--thing
4455 _on_--of
4456 _? ilk_--thilke
4458 _whiche_--which
4459 _knot_--knotte
4461 _come_--comyn
_ha? _--MS. ha? e
4464 _hyd_--MS. hydde, C. hidde
4466 [_nat_]--from C.
4467-8 [_but----yporueyid_]--from C.
4471 _? inges_--thing
4477 _ha? _--MS. ha? e
4480-82 _so? e_--soth
4486 _so? e_--sooth
4487 _so? e_--soth
4488 _so? e_--sooth
4489 _so? e come? _--sooth comth
[_? e_]--from C.
