Reply to Objection 2: Not only does the will need to be ready to obey
but also the intellect needs to be well disposed to follow the command
of the will, even as the concupiscible faculty needs to be well
disposed in order to follow the command of reason; hence there needs to
be a habit of virtue not only in the commanding will but also in the
assenting intellect.
but also the intellect needs to be well disposed to follow the command
of the will, even as the concupiscible faculty needs to be well
disposed in order to follow the command of reason; hence there needs to
be a habit of virtue not only in the commanding will but also in the
assenting intellect.
Summa Theologica
Therefore
human reasons in support of matters of faith diminish the merit of
faith.
Objection 3: Further, contrary things have contrary causes. Now an
inducement in opposition to faith increases the merit of faith whether
it consist in persecution inflicted by one who endeavors to force a man
to renounce his faith, or in an argument persuading him to do so.
Therefore reasons in support of faith diminish the merit of faith.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Pet. 3:15): "Being ready always to
satisfy every one that asketh you a reason of that faith [*Vulg. : 'Of
that hope which is in you. ' St. Thomas' reading is apparently taken
from Bede. ] and hope which is in you. " Now the Apostle would not give
this advice, if it would imply a diminution in the merit of faith.
Therefore reason does not diminish the merit of faith.
I answer that, As stated above [2295](A[9]), the act of faith can be
meritorious, in so far as it is subject to the will, not only as to the
use, but also as to the assent. Now human reason in support of what we
believe, may stand in a twofold relation to the will of the believer.
First, as preceding the act of the will; as, for instance, when a man
either has not the will, or not a prompt will, to believe, unless he be
moved by human reasons: and in this way human reason diminishes the
merit of faith. In this sense it has been said above ([2296]FS, Q[24],
A[3], ad 1; Q[77], A[6], ad 2) that, in moral virtues, a passion which
precedes choice makes the virtuous act less praiseworthy. For just as a
man ought to perform acts of moral virtue, on account of the judgment
of his reason, and not on account of a passion, so ought he to believe
matters of faith, not on account of human reason, but on account of the
Divine authority. Secondly, human reasons may be consequent to the will
of the believer. For when a man's will is ready to believe, he loves
the truth he believes, he thinks out and takes to heart whatever
reasons he can find in support thereof; and in this way human reason
does not exclude the merit of faith but is a sign of greater merit.
Thus again, in moral virtues a consequent passion is the sign of a more
prompt will, as stated above ([2297]FS, Q[24], A[3], ad 1). We have an
indication of this in the words of the Samaritans to the woman, who is
a type of human reason: "We now believe, not for thy saying" (Jn.
4:42).
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is referring to the case of a man who has
no will to believe what is of faith, unless he be induced by reasons.
But when a man has the will to believe what is of faith on the
authority of God alone, although he may have reasons in demonstration
of some of them, e. g. of the existence of God, the merit of his faith
is not, for that reason, lost or diminished.
Reply to Objection 2: The reasons which are brought forward in support
of the authority of faith, are not demonstrations which can bring
intellectual vision to the human intellect, wherefore they do not cease
to be unseen. But they remove obstacles to faith, by showing that what
faith proposes is not impossible; wherefore such reasons do not
diminish the merit or the measure of faith. On the other hand, though
demonstrative reasons in support of the preambles of faith [*The
Leonine Edition reads: 'in support of matters of faith which are
however, preambles to the articles of faith, diminish,' etc. ], but not
of the articles of faith, diminish the measure of faith, since they
make the thing believed to be seen, yet they do not diminish the
measure of charity, which makes the will ready to believe them, even if
they were unseen; and so the measure of merit is not diminished.
Reply to Objection 3: Whatever is in opposition to faith, whether it
consist in a man's thoughts, or in outward persecution, increases the
merit of faith, in so far as the will is shown to be more prompt and
firm in believing. Hence the martyrs had more merit of faith, through
not renouncing faith on account of persecution; and even the wise have
greater merit of faith, through not renouncing their faith on account
of the reasons brought forward by philosophers or heretics in
opposition to faith. On the other hand things that are favorable to
faith, do not always diminish the promptness of the will to believe,
and therefore they do not always diminish the merit of faith.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE OUTWARD ACT OF FAITH (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the outward act, viz. the confession of faith:
under which head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether confession is an act of faith?
(2) Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation?
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Whether confession is an act of faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that confession is not an act of faith. For
the same act does not belong to different virtues. Now confession
belongs to penance of which it is a part. Therefore it is not an act of
faith.
Objection 2: Further, man is sometimes deterred by fear or some kind of
confusion, from confessing his faith: wherefore the Apostle (Eph. 6:19)
asks for prayers that it may be granted him "with confidence, to make
known the mystery of the gospel. " Now it belongs to fortitude, which
moderates daring and fear, not to be deterred from doing good on
account of confusion or fear. Therefore it seems that confession is not
an act of faith, but rather of fortitude or constancy.
Objection 3: Further, just as the ardor of faith makes one confess
one's faith outwardly, so does it make one do other external good
works, for it is written (Gal. 5:6) that "faith . . . worketh by
charity. " But other external works are not reckoned acts of faith.
Therefore neither is confession an act of faith.
On the contrary, A gloss explains the words of 2 Thess. 1:11, "and the
work of faith in power" as referring to "confession which is a work
proper to faith. "
I answer that, Outward actions belong properly to the virtue to whose
end they are specifically referred: thus fasting is referred
specifically to the end of abstinence, which is to tame the flesh, and
consequently it is an act of abstinence.
Now confession of those things that are of faith is referred
specifically as to its end, to that which concerns faith, according to
2 Cor. 4:13: "Having the same spirit of faith . . . we believe, and
therefore we speak also. " For the outward utterance is intended to
signify the inward thought. Wherefore, just as the inward thought of
matters of faith is properly an act of faith, so too is the outward
confession of them.
Reply to Objection 1: A threefold confession is commended by the
Scriptures. One is the confession of matters of faith, and this is a
proper act of faith, since it is referred to the end of faith as stated
above. Another is the confession of thanksgiving or praise, and this is
an act of "latria," for its purpose is to give outward honor to God,
which is the end of "latria. " The third is the confession of sins,
which is ordained to the blotting out of sins, which is the end of
penance, to which virtue it therefore belongs.
Reply to Objection 2: That which removes an obstacle is not a direct,
but an indirect, cause, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 4).
Hence fortitude which removes an obstacle to the confession of faith,
viz. fear or shame, is not the proper and direct cause of confession,
but an indirect cause so to speak.
Reply to Objection 3: Inward faith, with the aid of charity, causes all
outward acts of virtue, by means of the other virtues, commanding, but
not eliciting them; whereas it produces the act of confession as its
proper act, without the help of any other virtue.
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Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation?
Objection 1: It would seem that confession of faith is not necessary
for salvation. For, seemingly, a thing is sufficient for salvation, if
it is a means of attaining the end of virtue. Now the proper end of
faith is the union of the human mind with Divine truth, and this can be
realized without any outward confession. Therefore confession of faith
is not necessary for salvation.
Objection 2: Further, by outward confession of faith, a man reveals his
faith to another man. But this is unnecessary save for those who have
to instruct others in the faith. Therefore it seems that the simple
folk are not bound to confess the faith.
Objection 3: Further, whatever may tend to scandalize and disturb
others, is not necessary for salvation, for the Apostle says (1 Cor.
10:32): "Be without offense to the Jews and to the gentiles and to the
Church of God. " Now confession of faith sometimes causes a disturbance
among unbelievers. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 10:10): "With the heart we
believe unto justice; but with the mouth, confession is made unto
salvation. "
I answer that, Things that are necessary for salvation come under the
precepts of the Divine law. Now since confession of faith is something
affirmative, it can only fall under an affirmative precept. Hence its
necessity for salvation depends on how it falls under an affirmative
precept of the Divine law. Now affirmative precepts as stated above
([2298]FS, Q[71], A[5], ad 3; [2299]FS, Q[88], A[1], ad 2) do not bind
for always, although they are always binding; but they bind as to place
and time according to other due circumstances, in respect of which
human acts have to be regulated in order to be acts of virtue.
Thus then it is not necessary for salvation to confess one's faith at
all times and in all places, but in certain places and at certain
times, when, namely, by omitting to do so, we would deprive God of due
honor, or our neighbor of a service that we ought to render him: for
instance, if a man, on being asked about his faith, were to remain
silent, so as to make people believe either that he is without faith,
or that the faith is false, or so as to turn others away from the
faith; for in such cases as these, confession of faith is necessary for
salvation.
Reply to Objection 1: The end of faith, even as of the other virtues,
must be referred to the end of charity, which is the love of God and
our neighbor. Consequently when God's honor and our neighbor's good
demand, man should not be contented with being united by faith to God's
truth, but ought to confess his faith outwardly.
Reply to Objection 2: In cases of necessity where faith is in danger,
every one is bound to proclaim his faith to others, either to give good
example and encouragement to the rest of the faithful, or to check the
attacks of unbelievers: but at other times it is not the duty of all
the faithful to instruct others in the faith.
Reply to Objection 3: There is nothing commendable in making a public
confession of one's faith, if it causes a disturbance among
unbelievers, without any profit either to the faith or to the faithful.
Hence Our Lord said (Mat. 7:6): "Give not that which is holy to dogs,
neither cast ye your pearls before swine . . . lest turning upon you,
they tear you. " Yet, if there is hope of profit to the faith, or if
there be urgency, a man should disregard the disturbance of
unbelievers, and confess his faith in public. Hence it is written (Mat.
15:12) that when the disciples had said to Our Lord that "the Pharisee,
when they heard this word, were scandalized," He answered: "Let them
alone, they are blind, and leaders of the blind. "
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE VIRTUE ITSELF OF FAITH (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the virtue itself of faith, and, in the first
place, faith itself; secondly, those who have faith; thirdly, the cause
of faith; fourthly, its effects.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) What is faith?
(2) In what power of the soul does it reside?
(3) Whether its form is charity?
(4) Whether living [formata] faith and lifeless [informis] faith are
one identically?
(5) Whether faith is a virtue?
(6) Whether it is one virtue?
(7) Of its relation to the other virtues;
(8) Of its certitude as compared with the certitude of the intellectual
virtues.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this is a fitting definition of faith: "Faith is the substance of
things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not? "
Objection 1: It would seem that the Apostle gives an unfitting
definition of faith (Heb. 11:1) when he says: "Faith is the substance
of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not. " For
no quality is a substance: whereas faith is a quality, since it is a
theological virtue, as stated above ([2300]FS, Q[62], A[3]). Therefore
it is not a substance.
Objection 2: Further, different virtues have different objects. Now
things to be hoped for are the object of hope. Therefore they should
not be included in a definition of faith, as though they were its
object.
Objection 3: Further, faith is perfected by charity rather than by
hope, since charity is the form of faith, as we shall state further on
[2301](A[3]). Therefore the definition of faith should have included
the thing to be loved rather than the thing to be hoped for.
Objection 4: Further, the same thing should not be placed in different
genera. Now "substance" and "evidence" are different genera, and
neither is subalternate to the other. Therefore it is unfitting to
state that faith is both "substance" and "evidence. "
Objection 5: Further, evidence manifests the truth of the matter for
which it is adduced. Now a thing is said to be apparent when its truth
is already manifest. Therefore it seems to imply a contradiction to
speak of "evidence of things that appear not": and so faith is
unfittingly defined.
On the contrary, The authority of the Apostle suffices.
I answer that, Though some say that the above words of the Apostle are
not a definition of faith, yet if we consider the matter aright, this
definition overlooks none of the points in reference to which faith can
be defined, albeit the words themselves are not arranged in the form of
a definition, just as the philosophers touch on the principles of the
syllogism, without employing the syllogistic form.
In order to make this clear, we must observe that since habits are
known by their acts, and acts by their objects, faith, being a habit,
should be defined by its proper act in relation to its proper object.
Now the act of faith is to believe, as stated above (Q[2], AA[2],3),
which is an act of the intellect determinate to one object of the
will's command. Hence an act of faith is related both to the object of
the will, i. e. to the good and the end, and to the object of the
intellect, i. e. to the true. And since faith, through being a
theological virtues, as stated above ([2302]FS, Q[62], A[2]), has one
same thing for object and end, its object and end must, of necessity,
be in proportion to one another. Now it has been already stated (Q[1],
AA[1],4) that the object of faith is the First Truth, as unseen, and
whatever we hold on account thereof: so that it must needs be under the
aspect of something unseen that the First Truth is the end of the act
of faith, which aspect is that of a thing hoped for, according to the
Apostle (Rom. 8:25): "We hope for that which we see not": because to
see the truth is to possess it. Now one hopes not for what one has
already, but for what one has not, as stated above ([2303]FS, Q[67],
A[4]). Accordingly the relation of the act of faith to its end which is
the object of the will, is indicated by the words: "Faith is the
substance of things to be hoped for. " For we are wont to call by the
name of substance, the first beginning of a thing, especially when the
whole subsequent thing is virtually contained in the first beginning;
for instance, we might say that the first self-evident principles are
the substance of science, because, to wit, these principles are in us
the first beginnings of science, the whole of which is itself contained
in them virtually. In this way then faith is said to be the "substance
of things to be hoped for," for the reason that in us the first
beginning of things to be hoped for is brought about by the assent of
faith, which contains virtually all things to be hoped for. Because we
hope to be made happy through seeing the unveiled truth to which our
faith cleaves, as was made evident when we were speaking of happiness
([2304]FS, Q[3], A[8]; [2305]FS, Q[4], A[3]).
The relationship of the act of faith to the object of the intellect,
considered as the object of faith, is indicated by the words, "evidence
of things that appear not," where "evidence" is taken for the result of
evidence. For evidence induces the intellect to adhere to a truth,
wherefore the firm adhesion of the intellect to the non-apparent truth
of faith is called "evidence" here. Hence another reading has
"conviction," because to wit, the intellect of the believer is
convinced by Divine authority, so as to assent to what it sees not.
Accordingly if anyone would reduce the foregoing words to the form of a
definition, he may say that "faith is a habit of the mind, whereby
eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect assent to what is
non-apparent. "
In this way faith is distinguished from all other things pertaining to
the intellect. For when we describe it as "evidence," we distinguish it
from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, which do not make the intellect
adhere to anything firmly; when we go on to say, "of things that appear
not," we distinguish it from science and understanding, the object of
which is something apparent; and when we say that it is "the substance
of things to be hoped for," we distinguish the virtue of faith from
faith commonly so called, which has no reference to the beatitude we
hope for.
Whatever other definitions are given of faith, are explanations of this
one given by the Apostle. For when Augustine says (Tract. xl in Joan. :
QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 39) that "faith is a virtue whereby we believe what
we do not see," and when Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 11) that
"faith is an assent without research," and when others say that "faith
is that certainty of the mind about absent things which surpasses
opinion but falls short of science," these all amount to the same as
the Apostle's words: "Evidence of things that appear not"; and when
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is the solid foundation of
the believer, establishing him in the truth, and showing forth the
truth in him," comes to the same as "substance of things to be hoped
for. "
Reply to Objection 1: "Substance" here does not stand for the supreme
genus condivided with the other genera, but for that likeness to
substance which is found in each genus, inasmuch as the first thing in
a genus contains the others virtually and is said to be the substance
thereof.
Reply to Objection 2: Since faith pertains to the intellect as
commanded by the will, it must needs be directed, as to its end, to the
objects of those virtues which perfect the will, among which is hope,
as we shall prove further on ([2306]Q[18], A[1]). For this reason the
definition of faith includes the object of hope.
Reply to Objection 3: Love may be of the seen and of the unseen, of the
present and of the absent. Consequently a thing to be loved is not so
adapted to faith, as a thing to be hoped for, since hope is always of
the absent and the unseen.
Reply to Objection 4: "Substance" and "evidence" as included in the
definition of faith, do not denote various genera of faith, nor
different acts, but different relationships of one act to different
objects, as is clear from what has been said.
Reply to Objection 5: Evidence taken from the proper principles of a
thing, make it apparent, whereas evidence taken from Divine authority
does not make a thing apparent in itself, and such is the evidence
referred to in the definition of faith.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether faith resides in the intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that faith does not reside in the intellect.
For Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that "faith resides in the
believer's will. " Now the will is a power distinct from the intellect.
Therefore faith does not reside in the intellect.
Objection 2: Further, the assent of faith to believe anything, proceeds
from the will obeying God. Therefore it seems that faith owes all its
praise to obedience. Now obedience is in the will. Therefore faith is
in the will, and not in the intellect.
Objection 3: Further, the intellect is either speculative or practical.
Now faith is not in the speculative intellect, since this is not
concerned with things to be sought or avoided, as stated in De Anima
iii, 9, so that it is not a principle of operation, whereas "faith . .
. worketh by charity" (Gal. 5:6). Likewise, neither is it in the
practical intellect, the object of which is some true, contingent
thing, that can be made or done. For the object of faith is the Eternal
Truth, as was shown above ([2307]Q[1], A[1]). Therefore faith does not
reside in the intellect.
On the contrary, Faith is succeeded by the heavenly vision, according
to 1 Cor. 13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then
face to face. " Now vision is in the intellect. Therefore faith is
likewise.
I answer that, Since faith is a virtue, its act must needs be perfect.
Now, for the perfection of an act proceeding from two active
principles, each of these principles must be perfect: for it is not
possible for a thing to be sawn well, unless the sawyer possess the
art, and the saw be well fitted for sawing. Now, in a power of the
soul, which is related to opposite objects, a disposition to act well
is a habit, as stated above ([2308]FS, Q[49], A[4], ad 1,2,3).
Wherefore an act that proceeds from two such powers must be perfected
by a habit residing in each of them. Again, it has been stated above
(Q[2], AA[1],2) that to believe is an act of the intellect inasmuch as
the will moves it to assent. And this act proceeds from the will and
the intellect, both of which have a natural aptitude to be perfected in
this way. Consequently, if the act of faith is to be perfect, there
needs to be a habit in the will as well as in the intellect: even as
there needs to be the habit of prudence in the reason, besides the
habit of temperance in the concupiscible faculty, in order that the act
of that faculty be perfect. Now, to believe is immediately an act of
the intellect, because the object of that act is "the true," which
pertains properly to the intellect. Consequently faith, which is the
proper principle of that act, must needs reside in the intellect.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine takes faith for the act of faith, which
is described as depending on the believer's will, in so far as his
intellect assents to matters of faith at the command of the will.
Reply to Objection 2: Not only does the will need to be ready to obey
but also the intellect needs to be well disposed to follow the command
of the will, even as the concupiscible faculty needs to be well
disposed in order to follow the command of reason; hence there needs to
be a habit of virtue not only in the commanding will but also in the
assenting intellect.
Reply to Objection 3: Faith resides in the speculative intellect, as
evidenced by its object. But since this object, which is the First
Truth, is the end of all our desires and actions, as Augustine proves
(De Trin. i, 8), it follows that faith worketh by charity just as "the
speculative intellect becomes practical by extension" (De Anima iii,
10).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether charity is the form of faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the form of faith. For
each thing derives its species from its form. When therefore two things
are opposite members of a division, one cannot be the form of the
other. Now faith and charity are stated to be opposite members of a
division, as different species of virtue (1 Cor. 13:13). Therefore
charity is not the form of faith.
Objection 2: Further, a form and the thing of which it is the form are
in one subject, since together they form one simply. Now faith is in
the intellect, while charity is in the will. Therefore charity is not
the form of faith.
Objection 3: Further, the form of a thing is a principle thereof. Now
obedience, rather than charity, seems to be the principle of believing,
on the part of the will, according to Rom. 1:5: "For obedience to the
faith in all nations. " Therefore obedience rather than charity, is the
form of faith.
On the contrary, Each thing works through its form. Now faith works
through charity. Therefore the love of charity is the form of faith.
I answer that, As appears from what has been said above ([2309]FS,
Q[1], A[3]; [2310]FS, Q[18], A[6]), voluntary acts take their species
from their end which is the will's object. Now that which gives a thing
its species, is after the manner of a form in natural things. Wherefore
the form of any voluntary act is, in a manner, the end to which that
act is directed, both because it takes its species therefrom, and
because the mode of an action should correspond proportionately to the
end. Now it is evident from what has been said [2311](A[1]), that the
act of faith is directed to the object of the will, i. e. the good, as
to its end: and this good which is the end of faith, viz. the Divine
Good, is the proper object of charity. Therefore charity is called the
form of faith in so far as the act of faith is perfected and formed by
charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity is called the form of faith because it
quickens the act of faith. Now nothing hinders one act from being
quickened by different habits, so as to be reduced to various species
in a certain order, as stated above ([2312]FS, Q[18], AA[6],7;
[2313]FS, Q[61], A[2]) when we were treating of human acts in general.
Reply to Objection 2: This objection is true of an intrinsic form. But
it is not thus that charity is the form of faith, but in the sense that
it quickens the act of faith, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: Even obedience, and hope likewise, and whatever
other virtue might precede the act of faith, is quickened by charity,
as we shall show further on ([2314]Q[23], A[8]), and consequently
charity is spoken of as the form of faith.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether lifeless faith can become living, or living faith, lifeless?
Objection 1: It would seem that lifeless faith does not become living,
or living faith lifeless. For, according to 1 Cor. 13:10, "when that
which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away. "
Now lifeless faith is imperfect in comparison with living faith.
Therefore when living faith comes, lifeless faith is done away, so that
they are not one identical habit.
Objection 2: Further, a dead thing does not become a living thing. Now
lifeless faith is dead, according to James 2:20: "Faith without works
is dead. " Therefore lifeless faith cannot become living.
Objection 3: Further, God's grace, by its advent, has no less effect in
a believer than in an unbeliever. Now by coming to an unbeliever it
causes the habit of faith. Therefore when it comes to a believer, who
hitherto had the habit of lifeless faith, it causes another habit of
faith in him.
Objection 4: Further, as Boethius says (In Categ. Arist. i), "accidents
cannot be altered. " Now faith is an accident. Therefore the same faith
cannot be at one time living, and at another, lifeless.
On the contrary, A gloss on the words, "Faith without works is dead"
(James 2:20) adds, "by which it lives once more. " Therefore faith which
was lifeless and without form hitherto, becomes formed and living.
I answer that, There have been various opinions on this question. For
some [*William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, iii, 15] have said that
living and lifeless faith are distinct habits, but that when living
faith comes, lifeless faith is done away, and that, in like manner,
when a man sins mortally after having living faith, a new habit of
lifeless faith is infused into him by God. But it seems unfitting that
grace should deprive man of a gift of God by coming to him, and that a
gift of God should be infused into man, on account of a mortal sin.
Consequently others [*Alexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. iii, 64] have
said that living and lifeless faith are indeed distinct habits, but
that, all the same, when living faith comes the habit of lifeless faith
is not taken away, and that it remains together with the habit of
living faith in the same subject. Yet again it seems unreasonable that
the habit of lifeless faith should remain inactive in a person having
living faith.
We must therefore hold differently that living and lifeless faith are
one and the same habit. The reason is that a habit is differentiated by
that which directly pertains to that habit. Now since faith is a
perfection of the intellect, that pertains directly to faith, which
pertains to the intellect. Again, what pertains to the will, does not
pertain directly to faith, so as to be able to differentiate the habit
of faith. But the distinction of living from lifeless faith is in
respect of something pertaining to the will, i. e. charity, and not in
respect of something pertaining to the intellect. Therefore living and
lifeless faith are not distinct habits.
Reply to Objection 1: The saying of the Apostle refers to those
imperfect things from which imperfection is inseparable, for then, when
the perfect comes the imperfect must needs be done away. Thus with the
advent of clear vision, faith is done away, because it is essentially
"of the things that appear not. " When, however, imperfection is not
inseparable from the imperfect thing, the same identical thing which
was imperfect becomes perfect. Thus childhood is not essential to man
and consequently the same identical subject who was a child, becomes a
man. Now lifelessness is not essential to faith, but is accidental
thereto as stated above. Therefore lifeless faith itself becomes
living.
Reply to Objection 2: That which makes an animal live is inseparable
from an animal, because it is its substantial form, viz. the soul:
consequently a dead thing cannot become a living thing, and a living
and a dead thing differ specifically. On the other hand that which
gives faith its form, or makes it live, is not essential to faith.
Hence there is no comparison.
Reply to Objection 3: Grace causes faith not only when faith begins
anew to be in a man, but also as long as faith lasts. For it has been
said above ([2315]FP, Q[104], A[1]; [2316]FS, Q[109], A[9]) that God is
always working man's justification, even as the sun is always lighting
up the air. Hence grace is not less effective when it comes to a
believer than when it comes to an unbeliever: since it causes faith in
both, in the former by confirming and perfecting it, in the latter by
creating it anew.
We might also reply that it is accidental, namely on account of the
disposition of the subject, that grace does not cause faith in one who
has it already: just as, on the other hand, a second mortal sin does
not take away grace from one who has already lost it through a previous
mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 4: When living faith becomes lifeless, faith is not
changed, but its subject, the soul, which at one time has faith without
charity, and at another time, with charity.
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Whether faith is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not a virtue. For virtue is
directed to the good, since "it is virtue that makes its subject good,"
as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 6). But faith is directed to the
true. Therefore faith is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, infused virtue is more perfect than acquired
virtue. Now faith, on account of its imperfection, is not placed among
the acquired intellectual virtues, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
vi, 3). Much less, therefore, can it be considered an infused virtue.
Objection 3: Further, living and lifeless faith are the same species,
as stated above [2317](A[4]). Now lifeless faith is not a virtue, since
it is not connected with the other virtues. Therefore neither is living
faith a virtue.
Objection 4: Further, the gratuitous graces and the fruits are distinct
from the virtues. But faith is numbered among the gratuitous graces (1
Cor. 12:9) and likewise among the fruits (Gal. 5:23). Therefore faith
is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Man is justified by the virtues, since "justice is all
virtue," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 1). Now man is justified
by faith according to Rom. 5:1: "Being justified therefore by faith let
us have peace," etc. Therefore faith is a virtue.
I answer that, As shown above, it is by human virtue that human acts
are rendered good; hence, any habit that is always the principle of a
good act, may be called a human virtue. Such a habit is living faith.
For since to believe is an act of the intellect assenting to the truth
at the command of the will, two things are required that this act may
be perfect: one of which is that the intellect should infallibly tend
to its object, which is the true; while the other is that the will
should be infallibly directed to the last end, on account of which it
assents to the true: and both of these are to be found in the act of
living faith. For it belongs to the very essence of faith that the
intellect should ever tend to the true, since nothing false can be the
object of faith, as proved above ([2318]Q[1], A[3]): while the effect
of charity, which is the form of faith, is that the soul ever has its
will directed to a good end. Therefore living faith is a virtue.
On the other hand, lifeless faith is not a virtue, because, though the
act of lifeless faith is duly perfect on the part of the intellect, it
has not its due perfection as regards the will: just as if temperance
be in the concupiscible, without prudence being in the rational part,
temperance is not a virtue, as stated above ([2319]FS, Q[65], A[1]),
because the act of temperance requires both an act of reason, and an
act of the concupiscible faculty, even as the act of faith requires an
act of the will, and an act of the intellect.
Reply to Objection 1: The truth is itself the good of the intellect,
since it is its perfection: and consequently faith has a relation to
some good in so far as it directs the intellect to the true.
Furthermore, it has a relation to the good considered as the object of
the will, inasmuch as it is formed by charity.
Reply to Objection 2: The faith of which the Philosopher speaks is
based on human reasoning in a conclusion which does not follow, of
necessity, from its premisses; and which is subject to be false: hence
such like faith is not a virtue. On the other hand, the faith of which
we are speaking is based on the Divine Truth, which is infallible, and
consequently its object cannot be anything false; so that faith of this
kind can be a virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Living and lifeless faith do not differ
specifically, as though they belonged to different species. But they
differ as perfect and imperfect within the same species. Hence lifeless
faith, being imperfect, does not satisfy the conditions of a perfect
virtue, for "virtue is a kind of perfection" (Phys. vii, text. 18).
Reply to Objection 4: Some say that faith which is numbered among the
gratuitous graces is lifeless faith. But this is said without reason,
since the gratuitous graces, which are mentioned in that passage, are
not common to all the members of the Church: wherefore the Apostle
says: "There are diversities of graces," and again, "To one is given"
this grace and "to another" that. Now lifeless faith is common to all
members of the Church, because its lifelessness is not part of its
substance, if we consider it as a gratuitous gift. We must, therefore,
say that in that passage, faith denotes a certain excellency of faith,
for instance, "constancy in faith," according to a gloss, or the "word
of faith. "
Faith is numbered among the fruits, in so far as it gives a certain
pleasure in its act by reason of its certainty, wherefore the gloss on
the fifth chapter to the Galatians, where the fruits are enumerated,
explains faith as being "certainty about the unseen. "
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Whether faith is one virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not one. For just as faith is
a gift of God according to Eph. 2:8, so also wisdom and knowledge are
numbered among God's gifts according to Is. 11:2. Now wisdom and
knowledge differ in this, that wisdom is about eternal things, and
knowledge about temporal things, as Augustine states (De Trin. xii,
14,15). Since, then, faith is about eternal things, and also about some
temporal things, it seems that faith is not one virtue, but divided
into several parts.
Objection 2: Further, confession is an act of faith, as stated above
([2320]Q[3], A[1]). Now confession of faith is not one and the same for
all: since what we confess as past, the fathers of old confessed as yet
to come, as appears from Is. 7:14: "Behold a virgin shall conceive. "
Therefore faith is not one.
Objection 3: Further, faith is common to all believers in Christ. But
one accident cannot be in many subjects. Therefore all cannot have one
faith.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 4:5): "One Lord, one faith. "
I answer that, If we take faith as a habit, we can consider it in two
ways. First on the part of the object, and thus there is one faith.
Because the formal object of faith is the First Truth, by adhering to
which we believe whatever is contained in the faith. Secondly, on the
part of the subject, and thus faith is differentiated according as it
is in various subjects. Now it is evident that faith, just as any other
habit, takes its species from the formal aspect of its object, but is
individualized by its subject. Hence if we take faith for the habit
whereby we believe, it is one specifically, but differs numerically
according to its various subjects.
If, on the other hand, we take faith for that which is believed, then,
again, there is one faith, since what is believed by all is one same
thing: for though the things believed, which all agree in believing, be
diverse from one another, yet they are all reduced to one.
Reply to Objection 1: Temporal matters which are proposed to be
believed, do not belong to the object of faith, except in relation to
something eternal, viz. the First Truth, as stated above ([2321]Q[1],
A[1]). Hence there is one faith of things both temporal and eternal. It
is different with wisdom and knowledge, which consider temporal and
eternal matters under their respective aspects.
Reply to Objection 2: This difference of past and future arises, not
from any difference in the thing believed, but from the different
relationships of believers to the one thing believed, as also we have
mentioned above ([2322]FS, Q[103], A[4]; [2323]FS, Q[107], A[1], ad 1).
Reply to Objection 3: This objection considers numerical diversity of
faith.
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Whether faith is the first of the virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not the first of the virtues.
For a gloss on Lk. 12:4, "I say to you My friends," says that fortitude
is the foundation of faith. Now the foundation precedes that which is
founded thereon. Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.
Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 36, "Be not emulous," says that
hope "leads on to faith. " Now hope is a virtue, as we shall state
further on ([2324]Q[17], A[1]). Therefore faith is not the first of the
virtues.
Objection 3: Further, it was stated above [2325](A[2]) that the
intellect of the believer is moved, out of obedience to God, to assent
to matters of faith. Now obedience also is a virtue. Therefore faith is
not the first virtue.
Objection 4: Further, not lifeless but living faith is the foundation,
as a gloss remarks on 1 Cor. 3:11 [*Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi. ].
Now faith is formed by charity, as stated above [2326](A[3]). Therefore
it is owing to charity that faith is the foundation: so that charity is
the foundation yet more than faith is (for the foundation is the first
part of a building) and consequently it seems to precede faith.
Objection 5: Further, the order of habits is taken from the order of
acts. Now, in the act of faith, the act of the will which is perfected
by charity, precedes the act of the intellect, which is perfected by
faith, as the cause which precedes its effect. Therefore charity
precedes faith. Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that "faith is the
substance of things to be hoped for. " Now the substance of a thing is
that which comes first. Therefore faith is first among the virtues.
I answer that, One thing can precede another in two ways: first, by its
very nature; secondly, by accident. Faith, by its very nature, precedes
all other virtues. For since the end is the principle in matters of
action, as stated above ([2327]FS, Q[13], A[3]; [2328]FS, Q[34], A[4],
ad 1), the theological virtues, the object of which is the last end,
must needs precede all the others. Again, the last end must of
necessity be present to the intellect before it is present to the will,
since the will has no inclination for anything except in so far as it
is apprehended by the intellect. Hence, as the last end is present in
the will by hope and charity, and in the intellect, by faith, the first
of all the virtues must, of necessity, be faith, because natural
knowledge cannot reach God as the object of heavenly bliss, which is
the aspect under which hope and charity tend towards Him.
On the other hand, some virtues can precede faith accidentally. For an
accidental cause precedes its effect accidentally. Now that which
removes an obstacle is a kind of accidental cause, according to the
Philosopher (Phys. viii, 4): and in this sense certain virtues may be
said to precede faith accidentally, in so far as they remove obstacles
to belief. Thus fortitude removes the inordinate fear that hinders
faith; humility removes pride, whereby a man refuses to submit himself
to the truth of faith. The same may be said of some other virtues,
although there are no real virtues, unless faith be presupposed, as
Augustine states (Contra Julian. iv, 3).
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Hope cannot lead to faith absolutely. For one
cannot hope to obtain eternal happiness, unless one believes this
possible, since hope does not tend to the impossible, as stated above
([2329]FS, Q[40], A[1]). It is, however, possible for one to be led by
hope to persevere in faith, or to hold firmly to faith; and it is in
this sense that hope is said to lead to faith.
human reasons in support of matters of faith diminish the merit of
faith.
Objection 3: Further, contrary things have contrary causes. Now an
inducement in opposition to faith increases the merit of faith whether
it consist in persecution inflicted by one who endeavors to force a man
to renounce his faith, or in an argument persuading him to do so.
Therefore reasons in support of faith diminish the merit of faith.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Pet. 3:15): "Being ready always to
satisfy every one that asketh you a reason of that faith [*Vulg. : 'Of
that hope which is in you. ' St. Thomas' reading is apparently taken
from Bede. ] and hope which is in you. " Now the Apostle would not give
this advice, if it would imply a diminution in the merit of faith.
Therefore reason does not diminish the merit of faith.
I answer that, As stated above [2295](A[9]), the act of faith can be
meritorious, in so far as it is subject to the will, not only as to the
use, but also as to the assent. Now human reason in support of what we
believe, may stand in a twofold relation to the will of the believer.
First, as preceding the act of the will; as, for instance, when a man
either has not the will, or not a prompt will, to believe, unless he be
moved by human reasons: and in this way human reason diminishes the
merit of faith. In this sense it has been said above ([2296]FS, Q[24],
A[3], ad 1; Q[77], A[6], ad 2) that, in moral virtues, a passion which
precedes choice makes the virtuous act less praiseworthy. For just as a
man ought to perform acts of moral virtue, on account of the judgment
of his reason, and not on account of a passion, so ought he to believe
matters of faith, not on account of human reason, but on account of the
Divine authority. Secondly, human reasons may be consequent to the will
of the believer. For when a man's will is ready to believe, he loves
the truth he believes, he thinks out and takes to heart whatever
reasons he can find in support thereof; and in this way human reason
does not exclude the merit of faith but is a sign of greater merit.
Thus again, in moral virtues a consequent passion is the sign of a more
prompt will, as stated above ([2297]FS, Q[24], A[3], ad 1). We have an
indication of this in the words of the Samaritans to the woman, who is
a type of human reason: "We now believe, not for thy saying" (Jn.
4:42).
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is referring to the case of a man who has
no will to believe what is of faith, unless he be induced by reasons.
But when a man has the will to believe what is of faith on the
authority of God alone, although he may have reasons in demonstration
of some of them, e. g. of the existence of God, the merit of his faith
is not, for that reason, lost or diminished.
Reply to Objection 2: The reasons which are brought forward in support
of the authority of faith, are not demonstrations which can bring
intellectual vision to the human intellect, wherefore they do not cease
to be unseen. But they remove obstacles to faith, by showing that what
faith proposes is not impossible; wherefore such reasons do not
diminish the merit or the measure of faith. On the other hand, though
demonstrative reasons in support of the preambles of faith [*The
Leonine Edition reads: 'in support of matters of faith which are
however, preambles to the articles of faith, diminish,' etc. ], but not
of the articles of faith, diminish the measure of faith, since they
make the thing believed to be seen, yet they do not diminish the
measure of charity, which makes the will ready to believe them, even if
they were unseen; and so the measure of merit is not diminished.
Reply to Objection 3: Whatever is in opposition to faith, whether it
consist in a man's thoughts, or in outward persecution, increases the
merit of faith, in so far as the will is shown to be more prompt and
firm in believing. Hence the martyrs had more merit of faith, through
not renouncing faith on account of persecution; and even the wise have
greater merit of faith, through not renouncing their faith on account
of the reasons brought forward by philosophers or heretics in
opposition to faith. On the other hand things that are favorable to
faith, do not always diminish the promptness of the will to believe,
and therefore they do not always diminish the merit of faith.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE OUTWARD ACT OF FAITH (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the outward act, viz. the confession of faith:
under which head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether confession is an act of faith?
(2) Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether confession is an act of faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that confession is not an act of faith. For
the same act does not belong to different virtues. Now confession
belongs to penance of which it is a part. Therefore it is not an act of
faith.
Objection 2: Further, man is sometimes deterred by fear or some kind of
confusion, from confessing his faith: wherefore the Apostle (Eph. 6:19)
asks for prayers that it may be granted him "with confidence, to make
known the mystery of the gospel. " Now it belongs to fortitude, which
moderates daring and fear, not to be deterred from doing good on
account of confusion or fear. Therefore it seems that confession is not
an act of faith, but rather of fortitude or constancy.
Objection 3: Further, just as the ardor of faith makes one confess
one's faith outwardly, so does it make one do other external good
works, for it is written (Gal. 5:6) that "faith . . . worketh by
charity. " But other external works are not reckoned acts of faith.
Therefore neither is confession an act of faith.
On the contrary, A gloss explains the words of 2 Thess. 1:11, "and the
work of faith in power" as referring to "confession which is a work
proper to faith. "
I answer that, Outward actions belong properly to the virtue to whose
end they are specifically referred: thus fasting is referred
specifically to the end of abstinence, which is to tame the flesh, and
consequently it is an act of abstinence.
Now confession of those things that are of faith is referred
specifically as to its end, to that which concerns faith, according to
2 Cor. 4:13: "Having the same spirit of faith . . . we believe, and
therefore we speak also. " For the outward utterance is intended to
signify the inward thought. Wherefore, just as the inward thought of
matters of faith is properly an act of faith, so too is the outward
confession of them.
Reply to Objection 1: A threefold confession is commended by the
Scriptures. One is the confession of matters of faith, and this is a
proper act of faith, since it is referred to the end of faith as stated
above. Another is the confession of thanksgiving or praise, and this is
an act of "latria," for its purpose is to give outward honor to God,
which is the end of "latria. " The third is the confession of sins,
which is ordained to the blotting out of sins, which is the end of
penance, to which virtue it therefore belongs.
Reply to Objection 2: That which removes an obstacle is not a direct,
but an indirect, cause, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 4).
Hence fortitude which removes an obstacle to the confession of faith,
viz. fear or shame, is not the proper and direct cause of confession,
but an indirect cause so to speak.
Reply to Objection 3: Inward faith, with the aid of charity, causes all
outward acts of virtue, by means of the other virtues, commanding, but
not eliciting them; whereas it produces the act of confession as its
proper act, without the help of any other virtue.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation?
Objection 1: It would seem that confession of faith is not necessary
for salvation. For, seemingly, a thing is sufficient for salvation, if
it is a means of attaining the end of virtue. Now the proper end of
faith is the union of the human mind with Divine truth, and this can be
realized without any outward confession. Therefore confession of faith
is not necessary for salvation.
Objection 2: Further, by outward confession of faith, a man reveals his
faith to another man. But this is unnecessary save for those who have
to instruct others in the faith. Therefore it seems that the simple
folk are not bound to confess the faith.
Objection 3: Further, whatever may tend to scandalize and disturb
others, is not necessary for salvation, for the Apostle says (1 Cor.
10:32): "Be without offense to the Jews and to the gentiles and to the
Church of God. " Now confession of faith sometimes causes a disturbance
among unbelievers. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 10:10): "With the heart we
believe unto justice; but with the mouth, confession is made unto
salvation. "
I answer that, Things that are necessary for salvation come under the
precepts of the Divine law. Now since confession of faith is something
affirmative, it can only fall under an affirmative precept. Hence its
necessity for salvation depends on how it falls under an affirmative
precept of the Divine law. Now affirmative precepts as stated above
([2298]FS, Q[71], A[5], ad 3; [2299]FS, Q[88], A[1], ad 2) do not bind
for always, although they are always binding; but they bind as to place
and time according to other due circumstances, in respect of which
human acts have to be regulated in order to be acts of virtue.
Thus then it is not necessary for salvation to confess one's faith at
all times and in all places, but in certain places and at certain
times, when, namely, by omitting to do so, we would deprive God of due
honor, or our neighbor of a service that we ought to render him: for
instance, if a man, on being asked about his faith, were to remain
silent, so as to make people believe either that he is without faith,
or that the faith is false, or so as to turn others away from the
faith; for in such cases as these, confession of faith is necessary for
salvation.
Reply to Objection 1: The end of faith, even as of the other virtues,
must be referred to the end of charity, which is the love of God and
our neighbor. Consequently when God's honor and our neighbor's good
demand, man should not be contented with being united by faith to God's
truth, but ought to confess his faith outwardly.
Reply to Objection 2: In cases of necessity where faith is in danger,
every one is bound to proclaim his faith to others, either to give good
example and encouragement to the rest of the faithful, or to check the
attacks of unbelievers: but at other times it is not the duty of all
the faithful to instruct others in the faith.
Reply to Objection 3: There is nothing commendable in making a public
confession of one's faith, if it causes a disturbance among
unbelievers, without any profit either to the faith or to the faithful.
Hence Our Lord said (Mat. 7:6): "Give not that which is holy to dogs,
neither cast ye your pearls before swine . . . lest turning upon you,
they tear you. " Yet, if there is hope of profit to the faith, or if
there be urgency, a man should disregard the disturbance of
unbelievers, and confess his faith in public. Hence it is written (Mat.
15:12) that when the disciples had said to Our Lord that "the Pharisee,
when they heard this word, were scandalized," He answered: "Let them
alone, they are blind, and leaders of the blind. "
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE VIRTUE ITSELF OF FAITH (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the virtue itself of faith, and, in the first
place, faith itself; secondly, those who have faith; thirdly, the cause
of faith; fourthly, its effects.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) What is faith?
(2) In what power of the soul does it reside?
(3) Whether its form is charity?
(4) Whether living [formata] faith and lifeless [informis] faith are
one identically?
(5) Whether faith is a virtue?
(6) Whether it is one virtue?
(7) Of its relation to the other virtues;
(8) Of its certitude as compared with the certitude of the intellectual
virtues.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this is a fitting definition of faith: "Faith is the substance of
things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not? "
Objection 1: It would seem that the Apostle gives an unfitting
definition of faith (Heb. 11:1) when he says: "Faith is the substance
of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not. " For
no quality is a substance: whereas faith is a quality, since it is a
theological virtue, as stated above ([2300]FS, Q[62], A[3]). Therefore
it is not a substance.
Objection 2: Further, different virtues have different objects. Now
things to be hoped for are the object of hope. Therefore they should
not be included in a definition of faith, as though they were its
object.
Objection 3: Further, faith is perfected by charity rather than by
hope, since charity is the form of faith, as we shall state further on
[2301](A[3]). Therefore the definition of faith should have included
the thing to be loved rather than the thing to be hoped for.
Objection 4: Further, the same thing should not be placed in different
genera. Now "substance" and "evidence" are different genera, and
neither is subalternate to the other. Therefore it is unfitting to
state that faith is both "substance" and "evidence. "
Objection 5: Further, evidence manifests the truth of the matter for
which it is adduced. Now a thing is said to be apparent when its truth
is already manifest. Therefore it seems to imply a contradiction to
speak of "evidence of things that appear not": and so faith is
unfittingly defined.
On the contrary, The authority of the Apostle suffices.
I answer that, Though some say that the above words of the Apostle are
not a definition of faith, yet if we consider the matter aright, this
definition overlooks none of the points in reference to which faith can
be defined, albeit the words themselves are not arranged in the form of
a definition, just as the philosophers touch on the principles of the
syllogism, without employing the syllogistic form.
In order to make this clear, we must observe that since habits are
known by their acts, and acts by their objects, faith, being a habit,
should be defined by its proper act in relation to its proper object.
Now the act of faith is to believe, as stated above (Q[2], AA[2],3),
which is an act of the intellect determinate to one object of the
will's command. Hence an act of faith is related both to the object of
the will, i. e. to the good and the end, and to the object of the
intellect, i. e. to the true. And since faith, through being a
theological virtues, as stated above ([2302]FS, Q[62], A[2]), has one
same thing for object and end, its object and end must, of necessity,
be in proportion to one another. Now it has been already stated (Q[1],
AA[1],4) that the object of faith is the First Truth, as unseen, and
whatever we hold on account thereof: so that it must needs be under the
aspect of something unseen that the First Truth is the end of the act
of faith, which aspect is that of a thing hoped for, according to the
Apostle (Rom. 8:25): "We hope for that which we see not": because to
see the truth is to possess it. Now one hopes not for what one has
already, but for what one has not, as stated above ([2303]FS, Q[67],
A[4]). Accordingly the relation of the act of faith to its end which is
the object of the will, is indicated by the words: "Faith is the
substance of things to be hoped for. " For we are wont to call by the
name of substance, the first beginning of a thing, especially when the
whole subsequent thing is virtually contained in the first beginning;
for instance, we might say that the first self-evident principles are
the substance of science, because, to wit, these principles are in us
the first beginnings of science, the whole of which is itself contained
in them virtually. In this way then faith is said to be the "substance
of things to be hoped for," for the reason that in us the first
beginning of things to be hoped for is brought about by the assent of
faith, which contains virtually all things to be hoped for. Because we
hope to be made happy through seeing the unveiled truth to which our
faith cleaves, as was made evident when we were speaking of happiness
([2304]FS, Q[3], A[8]; [2305]FS, Q[4], A[3]).
The relationship of the act of faith to the object of the intellect,
considered as the object of faith, is indicated by the words, "evidence
of things that appear not," where "evidence" is taken for the result of
evidence. For evidence induces the intellect to adhere to a truth,
wherefore the firm adhesion of the intellect to the non-apparent truth
of faith is called "evidence" here. Hence another reading has
"conviction," because to wit, the intellect of the believer is
convinced by Divine authority, so as to assent to what it sees not.
Accordingly if anyone would reduce the foregoing words to the form of a
definition, he may say that "faith is a habit of the mind, whereby
eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect assent to what is
non-apparent. "
In this way faith is distinguished from all other things pertaining to
the intellect. For when we describe it as "evidence," we distinguish it
from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, which do not make the intellect
adhere to anything firmly; when we go on to say, "of things that appear
not," we distinguish it from science and understanding, the object of
which is something apparent; and when we say that it is "the substance
of things to be hoped for," we distinguish the virtue of faith from
faith commonly so called, which has no reference to the beatitude we
hope for.
Whatever other definitions are given of faith, are explanations of this
one given by the Apostle. For when Augustine says (Tract. xl in Joan. :
QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 39) that "faith is a virtue whereby we believe what
we do not see," and when Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 11) that
"faith is an assent without research," and when others say that "faith
is that certainty of the mind about absent things which surpasses
opinion but falls short of science," these all amount to the same as
the Apostle's words: "Evidence of things that appear not"; and when
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is the solid foundation of
the believer, establishing him in the truth, and showing forth the
truth in him," comes to the same as "substance of things to be hoped
for. "
Reply to Objection 1: "Substance" here does not stand for the supreme
genus condivided with the other genera, but for that likeness to
substance which is found in each genus, inasmuch as the first thing in
a genus contains the others virtually and is said to be the substance
thereof.
Reply to Objection 2: Since faith pertains to the intellect as
commanded by the will, it must needs be directed, as to its end, to the
objects of those virtues which perfect the will, among which is hope,
as we shall prove further on ([2306]Q[18], A[1]). For this reason the
definition of faith includes the object of hope.
Reply to Objection 3: Love may be of the seen and of the unseen, of the
present and of the absent. Consequently a thing to be loved is not so
adapted to faith, as a thing to be hoped for, since hope is always of
the absent and the unseen.
Reply to Objection 4: "Substance" and "evidence" as included in the
definition of faith, do not denote various genera of faith, nor
different acts, but different relationships of one act to different
objects, as is clear from what has been said.
Reply to Objection 5: Evidence taken from the proper principles of a
thing, make it apparent, whereas evidence taken from Divine authority
does not make a thing apparent in itself, and such is the evidence
referred to in the definition of faith.
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Whether faith resides in the intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that faith does not reside in the intellect.
For Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that "faith resides in the
believer's will. " Now the will is a power distinct from the intellect.
Therefore faith does not reside in the intellect.
Objection 2: Further, the assent of faith to believe anything, proceeds
from the will obeying God. Therefore it seems that faith owes all its
praise to obedience. Now obedience is in the will. Therefore faith is
in the will, and not in the intellect.
Objection 3: Further, the intellect is either speculative or practical.
Now faith is not in the speculative intellect, since this is not
concerned with things to be sought or avoided, as stated in De Anima
iii, 9, so that it is not a principle of operation, whereas "faith . .
. worketh by charity" (Gal. 5:6). Likewise, neither is it in the
practical intellect, the object of which is some true, contingent
thing, that can be made or done. For the object of faith is the Eternal
Truth, as was shown above ([2307]Q[1], A[1]). Therefore faith does not
reside in the intellect.
On the contrary, Faith is succeeded by the heavenly vision, according
to 1 Cor. 13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then
face to face. " Now vision is in the intellect. Therefore faith is
likewise.
I answer that, Since faith is a virtue, its act must needs be perfect.
Now, for the perfection of an act proceeding from two active
principles, each of these principles must be perfect: for it is not
possible for a thing to be sawn well, unless the sawyer possess the
art, and the saw be well fitted for sawing. Now, in a power of the
soul, which is related to opposite objects, a disposition to act well
is a habit, as stated above ([2308]FS, Q[49], A[4], ad 1,2,3).
Wherefore an act that proceeds from two such powers must be perfected
by a habit residing in each of them. Again, it has been stated above
(Q[2], AA[1],2) that to believe is an act of the intellect inasmuch as
the will moves it to assent. And this act proceeds from the will and
the intellect, both of which have a natural aptitude to be perfected in
this way. Consequently, if the act of faith is to be perfect, there
needs to be a habit in the will as well as in the intellect: even as
there needs to be the habit of prudence in the reason, besides the
habit of temperance in the concupiscible faculty, in order that the act
of that faculty be perfect. Now, to believe is immediately an act of
the intellect, because the object of that act is "the true," which
pertains properly to the intellect. Consequently faith, which is the
proper principle of that act, must needs reside in the intellect.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine takes faith for the act of faith, which
is described as depending on the believer's will, in so far as his
intellect assents to matters of faith at the command of the will.
Reply to Objection 2: Not only does the will need to be ready to obey
but also the intellect needs to be well disposed to follow the command
of the will, even as the concupiscible faculty needs to be well
disposed in order to follow the command of reason; hence there needs to
be a habit of virtue not only in the commanding will but also in the
assenting intellect.
Reply to Objection 3: Faith resides in the speculative intellect, as
evidenced by its object. But since this object, which is the First
Truth, is the end of all our desires and actions, as Augustine proves
(De Trin. i, 8), it follows that faith worketh by charity just as "the
speculative intellect becomes practical by extension" (De Anima iii,
10).
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Whether charity is the form of faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the form of faith. For
each thing derives its species from its form. When therefore two things
are opposite members of a division, one cannot be the form of the
other. Now faith and charity are stated to be opposite members of a
division, as different species of virtue (1 Cor. 13:13). Therefore
charity is not the form of faith.
Objection 2: Further, a form and the thing of which it is the form are
in one subject, since together they form one simply. Now faith is in
the intellect, while charity is in the will. Therefore charity is not
the form of faith.
Objection 3: Further, the form of a thing is a principle thereof. Now
obedience, rather than charity, seems to be the principle of believing,
on the part of the will, according to Rom. 1:5: "For obedience to the
faith in all nations. " Therefore obedience rather than charity, is the
form of faith.
On the contrary, Each thing works through its form. Now faith works
through charity. Therefore the love of charity is the form of faith.
I answer that, As appears from what has been said above ([2309]FS,
Q[1], A[3]; [2310]FS, Q[18], A[6]), voluntary acts take their species
from their end which is the will's object. Now that which gives a thing
its species, is after the manner of a form in natural things. Wherefore
the form of any voluntary act is, in a manner, the end to which that
act is directed, both because it takes its species therefrom, and
because the mode of an action should correspond proportionately to the
end. Now it is evident from what has been said [2311](A[1]), that the
act of faith is directed to the object of the will, i. e. the good, as
to its end: and this good which is the end of faith, viz. the Divine
Good, is the proper object of charity. Therefore charity is called the
form of faith in so far as the act of faith is perfected and formed by
charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity is called the form of faith because it
quickens the act of faith. Now nothing hinders one act from being
quickened by different habits, so as to be reduced to various species
in a certain order, as stated above ([2312]FS, Q[18], AA[6],7;
[2313]FS, Q[61], A[2]) when we were treating of human acts in general.
Reply to Objection 2: This objection is true of an intrinsic form. But
it is not thus that charity is the form of faith, but in the sense that
it quickens the act of faith, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: Even obedience, and hope likewise, and whatever
other virtue might precede the act of faith, is quickened by charity,
as we shall show further on ([2314]Q[23], A[8]), and consequently
charity is spoken of as the form of faith.
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Whether lifeless faith can become living, or living faith, lifeless?
Objection 1: It would seem that lifeless faith does not become living,
or living faith lifeless. For, according to 1 Cor. 13:10, "when that
which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away. "
Now lifeless faith is imperfect in comparison with living faith.
Therefore when living faith comes, lifeless faith is done away, so that
they are not one identical habit.
Objection 2: Further, a dead thing does not become a living thing. Now
lifeless faith is dead, according to James 2:20: "Faith without works
is dead. " Therefore lifeless faith cannot become living.
Objection 3: Further, God's grace, by its advent, has no less effect in
a believer than in an unbeliever. Now by coming to an unbeliever it
causes the habit of faith. Therefore when it comes to a believer, who
hitherto had the habit of lifeless faith, it causes another habit of
faith in him.
Objection 4: Further, as Boethius says (In Categ. Arist. i), "accidents
cannot be altered. " Now faith is an accident. Therefore the same faith
cannot be at one time living, and at another, lifeless.
On the contrary, A gloss on the words, "Faith without works is dead"
(James 2:20) adds, "by which it lives once more. " Therefore faith which
was lifeless and without form hitherto, becomes formed and living.
I answer that, There have been various opinions on this question. For
some [*William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, iii, 15] have said that
living and lifeless faith are distinct habits, but that when living
faith comes, lifeless faith is done away, and that, in like manner,
when a man sins mortally after having living faith, a new habit of
lifeless faith is infused into him by God. But it seems unfitting that
grace should deprive man of a gift of God by coming to him, and that a
gift of God should be infused into man, on account of a mortal sin.
Consequently others [*Alexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. iii, 64] have
said that living and lifeless faith are indeed distinct habits, but
that, all the same, when living faith comes the habit of lifeless faith
is not taken away, and that it remains together with the habit of
living faith in the same subject. Yet again it seems unreasonable that
the habit of lifeless faith should remain inactive in a person having
living faith.
We must therefore hold differently that living and lifeless faith are
one and the same habit. The reason is that a habit is differentiated by
that which directly pertains to that habit. Now since faith is a
perfection of the intellect, that pertains directly to faith, which
pertains to the intellect. Again, what pertains to the will, does not
pertain directly to faith, so as to be able to differentiate the habit
of faith. But the distinction of living from lifeless faith is in
respect of something pertaining to the will, i. e. charity, and not in
respect of something pertaining to the intellect. Therefore living and
lifeless faith are not distinct habits.
Reply to Objection 1: The saying of the Apostle refers to those
imperfect things from which imperfection is inseparable, for then, when
the perfect comes the imperfect must needs be done away. Thus with the
advent of clear vision, faith is done away, because it is essentially
"of the things that appear not. " When, however, imperfection is not
inseparable from the imperfect thing, the same identical thing which
was imperfect becomes perfect. Thus childhood is not essential to man
and consequently the same identical subject who was a child, becomes a
man. Now lifelessness is not essential to faith, but is accidental
thereto as stated above. Therefore lifeless faith itself becomes
living.
Reply to Objection 2: That which makes an animal live is inseparable
from an animal, because it is its substantial form, viz. the soul:
consequently a dead thing cannot become a living thing, and a living
and a dead thing differ specifically. On the other hand that which
gives faith its form, or makes it live, is not essential to faith.
Hence there is no comparison.
Reply to Objection 3: Grace causes faith not only when faith begins
anew to be in a man, but also as long as faith lasts. For it has been
said above ([2315]FP, Q[104], A[1]; [2316]FS, Q[109], A[9]) that God is
always working man's justification, even as the sun is always lighting
up the air. Hence grace is not less effective when it comes to a
believer than when it comes to an unbeliever: since it causes faith in
both, in the former by confirming and perfecting it, in the latter by
creating it anew.
We might also reply that it is accidental, namely on account of the
disposition of the subject, that grace does not cause faith in one who
has it already: just as, on the other hand, a second mortal sin does
not take away grace from one who has already lost it through a previous
mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 4: When living faith becomes lifeless, faith is not
changed, but its subject, the soul, which at one time has faith without
charity, and at another time, with charity.
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Whether faith is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not a virtue. For virtue is
directed to the good, since "it is virtue that makes its subject good,"
as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 6). But faith is directed to the
true. Therefore faith is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, infused virtue is more perfect than acquired
virtue. Now faith, on account of its imperfection, is not placed among
the acquired intellectual virtues, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
vi, 3). Much less, therefore, can it be considered an infused virtue.
Objection 3: Further, living and lifeless faith are the same species,
as stated above [2317](A[4]). Now lifeless faith is not a virtue, since
it is not connected with the other virtues. Therefore neither is living
faith a virtue.
Objection 4: Further, the gratuitous graces and the fruits are distinct
from the virtues. But faith is numbered among the gratuitous graces (1
Cor. 12:9) and likewise among the fruits (Gal. 5:23). Therefore faith
is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Man is justified by the virtues, since "justice is all
virtue," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 1). Now man is justified
by faith according to Rom. 5:1: "Being justified therefore by faith let
us have peace," etc. Therefore faith is a virtue.
I answer that, As shown above, it is by human virtue that human acts
are rendered good; hence, any habit that is always the principle of a
good act, may be called a human virtue. Such a habit is living faith.
For since to believe is an act of the intellect assenting to the truth
at the command of the will, two things are required that this act may
be perfect: one of which is that the intellect should infallibly tend
to its object, which is the true; while the other is that the will
should be infallibly directed to the last end, on account of which it
assents to the true: and both of these are to be found in the act of
living faith. For it belongs to the very essence of faith that the
intellect should ever tend to the true, since nothing false can be the
object of faith, as proved above ([2318]Q[1], A[3]): while the effect
of charity, which is the form of faith, is that the soul ever has its
will directed to a good end. Therefore living faith is a virtue.
On the other hand, lifeless faith is not a virtue, because, though the
act of lifeless faith is duly perfect on the part of the intellect, it
has not its due perfection as regards the will: just as if temperance
be in the concupiscible, without prudence being in the rational part,
temperance is not a virtue, as stated above ([2319]FS, Q[65], A[1]),
because the act of temperance requires both an act of reason, and an
act of the concupiscible faculty, even as the act of faith requires an
act of the will, and an act of the intellect.
Reply to Objection 1: The truth is itself the good of the intellect,
since it is its perfection: and consequently faith has a relation to
some good in so far as it directs the intellect to the true.
Furthermore, it has a relation to the good considered as the object of
the will, inasmuch as it is formed by charity.
Reply to Objection 2: The faith of which the Philosopher speaks is
based on human reasoning in a conclusion which does not follow, of
necessity, from its premisses; and which is subject to be false: hence
such like faith is not a virtue. On the other hand, the faith of which
we are speaking is based on the Divine Truth, which is infallible, and
consequently its object cannot be anything false; so that faith of this
kind can be a virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Living and lifeless faith do not differ
specifically, as though they belonged to different species. But they
differ as perfect and imperfect within the same species. Hence lifeless
faith, being imperfect, does not satisfy the conditions of a perfect
virtue, for "virtue is a kind of perfection" (Phys. vii, text. 18).
Reply to Objection 4: Some say that faith which is numbered among the
gratuitous graces is lifeless faith. But this is said without reason,
since the gratuitous graces, which are mentioned in that passage, are
not common to all the members of the Church: wherefore the Apostle
says: "There are diversities of graces," and again, "To one is given"
this grace and "to another" that. Now lifeless faith is common to all
members of the Church, because its lifelessness is not part of its
substance, if we consider it as a gratuitous gift. We must, therefore,
say that in that passage, faith denotes a certain excellency of faith,
for instance, "constancy in faith," according to a gloss, or the "word
of faith. "
Faith is numbered among the fruits, in so far as it gives a certain
pleasure in its act by reason of its certainty, wherefore the gloss on
the fifth chapter to the Galatians, where the fruits are enumerated,
explains faith as being "certainty about the unseen. "
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Whether faith is one virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not one. For just as faith is
a gift of God according to Eph. 2:8, so also wisdom and knowledge are
numbered among God's gifts according to Is. 11:2. Now wisdom and
knowledge differ in this, that wisdom is about eternal things, and
knowledge about temporal things, as Augustine states (De Trin. xii,
14,15). Since, then, faith is about eternal things, and also about some
temporal things, it seems that faith is not one virtue, but divided
into several parts.
Objection 2: Further, confession is an act of faith, as stated above
([2320]Q[3], A[1]). Now confession of faith is not one and the same for
all: since what we confess as past, the fathers of old confessed as yet
to come, as appears from Is. 7:14: "Behold a virgin shall conceive. "
Therefore faith is not one.
Objection 3: Further, faith is common to all believers in Christ. But
one accident cannot be in many subjects. Therefore all cannot have one
faith.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 4:5): "One Lord, one faith. "
I answer that, If we take faith as a habit, we can consider it in two
ways. First on the part of the object, and thus there is one faith.
Because the formal object of faith is the First Truth, by adhering to
which we believe whatever is contained in the faith. Secondly, on the
part of the subject, and thus faith is differentiated according as it
is in various subjects. Now it is evident that faith, just as any other
habit, takes its species from the formal aspect of its object, but is
individualized by its subject. Hence if we take faith for the habit
whereby we believe, it is one specifically, but differs numerically
according to its various subjects.
If, on the other hand, we take faith for that which is believed, then,
again, there is one faith, since what is believed by all is one same
thing: for though the things believed, which all agree in believing, be
diverse from one another, yet they are all reduced to one.
Reply to Objection 1: Temporal matters which are proposed to be
believed, do not belong to the object of faith, except in relation to
something eternal, viz. the First Truth, as stated above ([2321]Q[1],
A[1]). Hence there is one faith of things both temporal and eternal. It
is different with wisdom and knowledge, which consider temporal and
eternal matters under their respective aspects.
Reply to Objection 2: This difference of past and future arises, not
from any difference in the thing believed, but from the different
relationships of believers to the one thing believed, as also we have
mentioned above ([2322]FS, Q[103], A[4]; [2323]FS, Q[107], A[1], ad 1).
Reply to Objection 3: This objection considers numerical diversity of
faith.
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Whether faith is the first of the virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not the first of the virtues.
For a gloss on Lk. 12:4, "I say to you My friends," says that fortitude
is the foundation of faith. Now the foundation precedes that which is
founded thereon. Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.
Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 36, "Be not emulous," says that
hope "leads on to faith. " Now hope is a virtue, as we shall state
further on ([2324]Q[17], A[1]). Therefore faith is not the first of the
virtues.
Objection 3: Further, it was stated above [2325](A[2]) that the
intellect of the believer is moved, out of obedience to God, to assent
to matters of faith. Now obedience also is a virtue. Therefore faith is
not the first virtue.
Objection 4: Further, not lifeless but living faith is the foundation,
as a gloss remarks on 1 Cor. 3:11 [*Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi. ].
Now faith is formed by charity, as stated above [2326](A[3]). Therefore
it is owing to charity that faith is the foundation: so that charity is
the foundation yet more than faith is (for the foundation is the first
part of a building) and consequently it seems to precede faith.
Objection 5: Further, the order of habits is taken from the order of
acts. Now, in the act of faith, the act of the will which is perfected
by charity, precedes the act of the intellect, which is perfected by
faith, as the cause which precedes its effect. Therefore charity
precedes faith. Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that "faith is the
substance of things to be hoped for. " Now the substance of a thing is
that which comes first. Therefore faith is first among the virtues.
I answer that, One thing can precede another in two ways: first, by its
very nature; secondly, by accident. Faith, by its very nature, precedes
all other virtues. For since the end is the principle in matters of
action, as stated above ([2327]FS, Q[13], A[3]; [2328]FS, Q[34], A[4],
ad 1), the theological virtues, the object of which is the last end,
must needs precede all the others. Again, the last end must of
necessity be present to the intellect before it is present to the will,
since the will has no inclination for anything except in so far as it
is apprehended by the intellect. Hence, as the last end is present in
the will by hope and charity, and in the intellect, by faith, the first
of all the virtues must, of necessity, be faith, because natural
knowledge cannot reach God as the object of heavenly bliss, which is
the aspect under which hope and charity tend towards Him.
On the other hand, some virtues can precede faith accidentally. For an
accidental cause precedes its effect accidentally. Now that which
removes an obstacle is a kind of accidental cause, according to the
Philosopher (Phys. viii, 4): and in this sense certain virtues may be
said to precede faith accidentally, in so far as they remove obstacles
to belief. Thus fortitude removes the inordinate fear that hinders
faith; humility removes pride, whereby a man refuses to submit himself
to the truth of faith. The same may be said of some other virtues,
although there are no real virtues, unless faith be presupposed, as
Augustine states (Contra Julian. iv, 3).
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Hope cannot lead to faith absolutely. For one
cannot hope to obtain eternal happiness, unless one believes this
possible, since hope does not tend to the impossible, as stated above
([2329]FS, Q[40], A[1]). It is, however, possible for one to be led by
hope to persevere in faith, or to hold firmly to faith; and it is in
this sense that hope is said to lead to faith.
