No More Learning

For the spoken word is something uttered by the mouth of man, and
expresses that which is signified by the human word. The same applies
to the human mental word, which is nothing else that something
conceived by the mind, by which man expresses his thoughts mentally. So
then in God the Word conceived by the intellect of the Father is the
name of a Person: but all things that are in the Father's knowledge,
whether they refer to the Essence or to the Persons, or to the works of
God, are expressed by this Word, as Augustine declares (De Trin. xv,
14). And among other things expressed by this Word, the eternal law
itself is expressed thereby. Nor does it follow that the eternal law is
a Personal name in God: yet it is appropriated to the Son, on account
of the kinship between type and word.

Reply to Objection 3: The types of the Divine intellect do not stand in
the same relation to things, as the types of the human intellect. For
the human intellect is measured by things, so that a human concept is
not true by reason of itself, but by reason of its being consonant with
things, since "an opinion is true or false according as it answers to
the reality. " But the Divine intellect is the measure of things: since
each thing has so far truth in it, as it represents the Divine
intellect, as was stated in the [1993]FP, Q[16], A[1]. Consequently the
Divine intellect is true in itself; and its type is truth itself.
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Whether the eternal law is known to all?

Objection 1: It would seem that the eternal law is not known to all.
Because, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:11), "the things that are of God
no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God. " But the eternal law is a type
existing in the Divine mind. Therefore it is unknown to all save God
alone.

Objection 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) "the
eternal law is that by which it is right that all things should be most
orderly. " But all do not know how all things are most orderly.
Therefore all do not know the eternal law.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi) that "the
eternal law is not subject to the judgment of man. " But according to
Ethic. i, "any man can judge well of what he knows. " Therefore the
eternal law is not known to us.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "knowledge of
the eternal law is imprinted on us. "

I answer that, A thing may be known in two ways: first, in itself;
secondly, in its effect, wherein some likeness of that thing is found:
thus someone not seeing the sun in its substance, may know it by its
rays. So then no one can know the eternal law, as it is in itself,
except the blessed who see God in His Essence. But every rational
creature knows it in its reflection, greater or less. For every
knowledge of truth is a kind of reflection and participation of the
eternal law, which is the unchangeable truth, as Augustine says (De
Vera Relig. xxxi). Now all men know the truth to a certain extent, at
least as to the common principles of the natural law: and as to the
others, they partake of the knowledge of truth, some more, some less;
and in this respect are more or less cognizant of the eternal law.

Reply to Objection 1: We cannot know the things that are of God, as
they are in themselves; but they are made known to us in their effects,
according to Rom. 1:20: "The invisible things of God . . . are clearly
seen, being understood by the things that are made. "

Reply to Objection 2: Although each one knows the eternal law according
to his own capacity, in the way explained above, yet none can
comprehend it: for it cannot be made perfectly known by its effects.
Therefore it does not follow that anyone who knows the eternal law in
the way aforesaid, knows also the whole order of things, whereby they
are most orderly.

Reply to Objection 3: To judge a thing may be understood in two ways.
First, as when a cognitive power judges of its proper object, according
to Job 12:11: "Doth not the ear discern words, and the palate of him
that eateth, the taste? " It is to this kind of judgment that the
Philosopher alludes when he says that "anyone can judge well of what he
knows," by judging, namely, whether what is put forward is true. In
another way we speak of a superior judging of a subordinate by a kind
of practical judgment, as to whether he should be such and such or not.
And thus none can judge of the eternal law.
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Whether every law is derived from the eternal law?

Objection 1: It would seem that not every law is derived from the
eternal law. For there is a law of the "fomes," as stated above
([1994]Q[91], A[6]), which is not derived from that Divine law which is
the eternal law, since thereunto pertains the "prudence of the flesh,"
of which the Apostle says (Rom. 8:7), that "it cannot be subject to the
law of God. " Therefore not every law is derived from the eternal law.

Objection 2: Further, nothing unjust can be derived from the eternal
law, because, as stated above (A[2], OBJ[2]), "the eternal law is that,
according to which it is right that all things should be most orderly. "
But some laws are unjust, according to Is. 10:1: "Woe to them that make
wicked laws. " Therefore not every law is derived from the eternal law.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) that "the law
which is framed for ruling the people, rightly permits many things
which are punished by Divine providence. " But the type of Divine
providence is the eternal law, as stated above [1995](A[1]). Therefore
not even every good law is derived from the eternal law.

On the contrary, Divine Wisdom says (Prov. 8:15): "By Me kings reign,
and lawgivers decree just things. " But the type of Divine Wisdom is the
eternal law, as stated above [1996](A[1]). Therefore all laws proceed
from the eternal law.

I answer that, As stated above ([1997]Q[90], AA[1],2), the law denotes
a kind of plan directing acts towards an end. Now wherever there are
movers ordained to one another, the power of the second mover must
needs be derived from the power of the first mover; since the second
mover does not move except in so far as it is moved by the first.
Wherefore we observe the same in all those who govern, so that the plan
of government is derived by secondary governors from the governor in
chief; thus the plan of what is to be done in a state flows from the
king's command to his inferior administrators: and again in things of
art the plan of whatever is to be done by art flows from the chief
craftsman to the under-crafts-men, who work with their hands. Since
then the eternal law is the plan of government in the Chief Governor,
all the plans of government in the inferior governors must be derived
from the eternal law. But these plans of inferior governors are all
other laws besides the eternal law. Therefore all laws, in so far as
they partake of right reason, are derived from the eternal law. Hence
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "in temporal law there is
nothing just and lawful, but what man has drawn from the eternal law. "

Reply to Objection 1: The "fomes" has the nature of law in man, in so
far as it is a punishment resulting from Divine justice; and in this
respect it is evident that it is derived from the eternal law. But in
so far as it denotes a proneness to sin, it is contrary to the Divine
law, and has not the nature of law, as stated above ([1998]Q[91],
A[6]).

Reply to Objection 2: Human law has the nature of law in so far as it
partakes of right reason; and it is clear that, in this respect, it is
derived from the eternal law. But in so far as it deviates from reason,
it is called an unjust law, and has the nature, not of law but of
violence. Nevertheless even an unjust law, in so far as it retains some
appearance of law, though being framed by one who is in power, is
derived from the eternal law; since all power is from the Lord God,
according to Rom. 13:1.

Reply to Objection 3: Human law is said to permit certain things, not
as approving them, but as being unable to direct them. And many things
are directed by the Divine law, which human law is unable to direct,
because more things are subject to a higher than to a lower cause.
Hence the very fact that human law does not meddle with matters it
cannot direct, comes under the ordination of the eternal law. It would
be different, were human law to sanction what the eternal law condemns.
Consequently it does not follow that human law is not derived from the
eternal law, but that it is not on a perfect equality with it.
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Whether necessary and eternal things are subject to the eternal law?

Objection 1: It would seem that necessary and eternal things are
subject to the eternal law. For whatever is reasonable is subject to
reason. But the Divine will is reasonable, for it is just. Therefore it
is subject to (the Divine) reason. But the eternal law is the Divine
reason. Therefore God's will is subject to the eternal law. But God's
will is eternal. Therefore eternal and necessary things are subject to
the eternal law.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is subject to the King, is subject to
the King's law. Now the Son, according to 1 Cor. 15:28,24, "shall be
subject . . . to God and the Father . . . when He shall have delivered
up the Kingdom to Him. " Therefore the Son, Who is eternal, is subject
to the eternal law.

Objection 3: Further, the eternal law is Divine providence as a type.
But many necessary things are subject to Divine providence: for
instance, the stability of incorporeal substances and of the heavenly
bodies. Therefore even necessary things are subject to the eternal law.

On the contrary, Things that are necessary cannot be otherwise, and
consequently need no restraining. But laws are imposed on men, in order
to restrain them from evil, as explained above ([1999]Q[92], A[2]).
Therefore necessary things are not subject to the eternal law.

I answer that, As stated above [2000](A[1]), the eternal law is the
type of the Divine government. Consequently whatever is subject to the
Divine government, is subject to the eternal law: while if anything is
not subject to the Divine government, neither is it subject to the
eternal law. The application of this distinction may be gathered by
looking around us. For those things are subject to human government,
which can be done by man; but what pertains to the nature of man is not
subject to human government; for instance, that he should have a soul,
hands, or feet. Accordingly all that is in things created by God,
whether it be contingent or necessary, is subject to the eternal law:
while things pertaining to the Divine Nature or Essence are not subject
to the eternal law, but are the eternal law itself.

Reply to Objection 1: We may speak of God's will in two ways. First, as
to the will itself: and thus, since God's will is His very Essence, it
is subject neither to the Divine government, nor to the eternal law,
but is the same thing as the eternal law. Secondly, we may speak of
God's will, as to the things themselves that God wills about creatures;
which things are subject to the eternal law, in so far as they are
planned by Divine Wisdom. In reference to these things God's will is
said to be reasonable [rationalis]: though regarded in itself it should
rather be called their type [ratio].

Reply to Objection 2: God the Son was not made by God, but was
naturally born of God. Consequently He is not subject to Divine
providence or to the eternal law: but rather is Himself the eternal law
by a kind of appropriation, as Augustine explains (De Vera Relig.
xxxi). But He is said to be subject to the Father by reason of His
human nature, in respect of which also the Father is said to be greater
than He.

The third objection we grant, because it deals with those necessary
things that are created.

Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 6),
some necessary things have a cause of their necessity: and thus they
derive from something else the fact that they cannot be otherwise. And
this is in itself a most effective restraint; for whatever is
restrained, is said to be restrained in so far as it cannot do
otherwise than it is allowed to.
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Whether natural contingents are subject to the eternal law?

Objection 1: It would seem that natural contingents are not subject to
the eternal law. Because promulgation is essential to law, as stated
above ([2001]Q[90], A[4]). But a law cannot be promulgated except to
rational creatures, to whom it is possible to make an announcement.
Therefore none but rational creatures are subject to the eternal law;
and consequently natural contingents are not.

Objection 2: Further, "Whatever obeys reason partakes somewhat of
reason," as stated in Ethic. i. But the eternal law, is the supreme
type, as stated above [2002](A[1]). Since then natural contingents do
not partake of reason in any way, but are altogether void of reason, it
seems that they are not subject to the eternal law.

Objection 3: Further, the eternal law is most efficient. But in natural
contingents defects occur. Therefore they are not subject to the
eternal law.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 8:29): "When He compassed the sea
with its bounds, and set a law to the waters, that they should not pass
their limits. "

I answer that, We must speak otherwise of the law of man, than of the
eternal law which is the law of God. For the law of man extends only to
rational creatures subject to man. The reason of this is because law
directs the actions of those that are subject to the government of
someone: wherefore, properly speaking, none imposes a law on his own
actions. Now whatever is done regarding the use of irrational things
subject to man, is done by the act of man himself moving those things,
for these irrational creatures do not move themselves, but are moved by
others, as stated above ([2003]Q[1], A[2]). Consequently man cannot
impose laws on irrational beings, however much they may be subject to
him. But he can impose laws on rational beings subject to him, in so
far as by his command or pronouncement of any kind, he imprints on
their minds a rule which is a principle of action.

Now just as man, by such pronouncement, impresses a kind of inward
principle of action on the man that is subject to him, so God imprints
on the whole of nature the principles of its proper actions. And so, in
this way, God is said to command the whole of nature, according to Ps.
148:6: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away. " And thus
all actions and movements of the whole of nature are subject to the
eternal law. Consequently irrational creatures are subject to the
eternal law, through being moved by Divine providence; but not, as
rational creatures are, through understanding the Divine commandment.

Reply to Objection 1: The impression of an inward active principle is
to natural things, what the promulgation of law is to men: because law,
by being promulgated, imprints on man a directive principle of human
actions, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Irrational creatures neither partake of nor are
obedient to human reason: whereas they do partake of the Divine Reason
by obeying it; because the power of Divine Reason extends over more
things than human reason does. And as the members of the human body are
moved at the command of reason, and yet do not partake of reason, since
they have no apprehension subordinate to reason; so too irrational
creatures are moved by God, without, on that account, being rational.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the defects which occur in natural
things are outside the order of particular causes, they are not outside
the order of universal causes, especially of the First Cause, i. e. God,
from Whose providence nothing can escape, as stated in the [2004]FP,
Q[22], A[2]. And since the eternal law is the type of Divine
providence, as stated above [2005](A[1]), hence the defects of natural
things are subject to the eternal law.
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Whether all human affairs are subject to the eternal law?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all human affairs are subject to
the eternal law. For the Apostle says (Gal. 5:18): "If you are led by
the spirit you are not under the law. " But the righteous who are the
sons of God by adoption, are led by the spirit of God, according to
Rom. 8:14: "Whosoever are led by the spirit of God, they are the sons
of God. " Therefore not all men are under the eternal law.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 8:7): "The prudence
[Vulg. : 'wisdom'] of the flesh is an enemy to God: for it is not
subject to the law of God. " But many are those in whom the prudence of
the flesh dominates. Therefore all men are not subject to the eternal
law which is the law of God.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "the
eternal law is that by which the wicked deserve misery, the good, a
life of blessedness. " But those who are already blessed, and those who
are already lost, are not in the state of merit. Therefore they are not
under the eternal law.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12): "Nothing evades
the laws of the most high Creator and Governor, for by Him the peace of
the universe is administered. "

I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing is subject to the
eternal law, as explained above [2006](A[5]): first, by partaking of
the eternal law by way of knowledge; secondly, by way of action and
passion, i. e. by partaking of the eternal law by way of an inward
motive principle: and in this second way, irrational creatures are
subject to the eternal law, as stated above [2007](A[5]). But since the
rational nature, together with that which it has in common with all
creatures, has something proper to itself inasmuch as it is rational,
consequently it is subject to the eternal law in both ways; because
while each rational creature has some knowledge of the eternal law, as
stated above [2008](A[2]), it also has a natural inclination to that
which is in harmony with the eternal law; for "we are naturally adapted
to the recipients of virtue" (Ethic. ii, 1).

Both ways, however, are imperfect, and to a certain extent destroyed,
in the wicked; because in them the natural inclination to virtue is
corrupted by vicious habits, and, moreover, the natural knowledge of
good is darkened by passions and habits of sin. But in the good both
ways are found more perfect: because in them, besides the natural
knowledge of good, there is the added knowledge of faith and wisdom;
and again, besides the natural inclination to good, there is the added
motive of grace and virtue.

Accordingly, the good are perfectly subject to the eternal law, as
always acting according to it: whereas the wicked are subject to the
eternal law, imperfectly as to their actions, indeed, since both their
knowledge of good, and their inclination thereto, are imperfect; but
this imperfection on the part of action is supplied on the part of
passion, in so far as they suffer what the eternal law decrees
concerning them, according as they fail to act in harmony with that
law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 15): "I esteem that the
righteous act according to the eternal law; and (De Catech. Rud.
xviii): Out of the just misery of the souls which deserted Him, God
knew how to furnish the inferior parts of His creation with most
suitable laws. "

Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Apostle may be understood in
two ways. First, so that a man is said to be under the law, through
being pinned down thereby, against his will, as by a load. Hence, on
the same passage a gloss says that "he is under the law, who refrains
from evil deeds, through fear of punishment threatened by the law, and
not from love of virtue. " In this way the spiritual man is not under
the law, because he fulfils the law willingly, through charity which is
poured into his heart by the Holy Ghost. Secondly, it can be understood
as meaning that the works of a man, who is led by the Holy Ghost, are
the works of the Holy Ghost rather than his own. Therefore, since the
Holy Ghost is not under the law, as neither is the Son, as stated above
(A[4], ad 2); it follows that such works, in so far as they are of the
Holy Ghost, are not under the law. The Apostle witnesses to this when
he says (2 Cor. 3:17): "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is
liberty.
"

Reply to Objection 2: The prudence of the flesh cannot be subject to
the law of God as regards action; since it inclines to actions contrary
to the Divine law: yet it is subject to the law of God, as regards
passion; since it deserves to suffer punishment according to the law of
Divine justice. Nevertheless in no man does the prudence of the flesh
dominate so far as to destroy the whole good of his nature: and
consequently there remains in man the inclination to act in accordance
with the eternal law. For we have seen above ([2009]Q[85], A[2]) that
sin does not destroy entirely the good of nature.

Reply to Objection 3: A thing is maintained in the end and moved
towards the end by one and the same cause: thus gravity which makes a
heavy body rest in the lower place is also the cause of its being moved
thither. We therefore reply that as it is according to the eternal law
that some deserve happiness, others unhappiness, so is it by the
eternal law that some are maintained in a happy state, others in an
unhappy state. Accordingly both the blessed and the damned are under
the eternal law.
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OF THE NATURAL LAW (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the natural law; concerning which there are six
points of inquiry:

(1) What is the natural law?

(2) What are the precepts of the natural law?

(3) Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?

(4) Whether the natural law is the same in all?

(5) Whether it is changeable?

(6) Whether it can be abolished from the heart of man?
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Whether the natural law is a habit?

Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law is a habit. Because, as
the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5), "there are three things in the
soul: power, habit, and passion. " But the natural law is not one of the
soul's powers: nor is it one of the passions; as we may see by going
through them one by one. Therefore the natural law is a habit.

Objection 2: Further, Basil [*Damascene, De Fide Orth. iv, 22] says
that the conscience or "synderesis is the law of our mind"; which can
only apply to the natural law. But the "synderesis" is a habit, as was
shown in the [2010]FP, Q[79], A[12]. Therefore the natural law is a
habit.

Objection 3: Further, the natural law abides in man always, as will be
shown further on [2011](A[6]). But man's reason, which the law regards,
does not always think about the natural law. Therefore the natural law
is not an act, but a habit.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "a habit is
that whereby something is done when necessary. " But such is not the
natural law: since it is in infants and in the damned who cannot act by
it. Therefore the natural law is not a habit.

I answer that, A thing may be called a habit in two ways. First,
properly and essentially: and thus the natural law is not a habit. For
it has been stated above ([2012]Q[90], A[1], ad 2) that the natural law
is something appointed by reason, just as a proposition is a work of
reason. Now that which a man does is not the same as that whereby he
does it: for he makes a becoming speech by the habit of grammar. Since
then a habit is that by which we act, a law cannot be a habit properly
and essentially.

Secondly, the term habit may be applied to that which we hold by a
habit: thus faith may mean that which we hold by faith. And
accordingly, since the precepts of the natural law are sometimes
considered by reason actually, while sometimes they are in the reason
only habitually, in this way the natural law may be called a habit.
Thus, in speculative matters, the indemonstrable principles are not the
habit itself whereby we hold those principles, but are the principles
the habit of which we possess.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher proposes there to discover the
genus of virtue; and since it is evident that virtue is a principle of
action, he mentions only those things which are principles of human
acts, viz. powers, habits and passions. But there are other things in
the soul besides these three: there are acts; thus "to will" is in the
one that wills; again, things known are in the knower; moreover its own
natural properties are in the soul, such as immortality and the like.

Reply to Objection 2: "Synderesis" is said to be the law of our mind,
because it is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law, which
are the first principles of human actions.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument proves that the natural law is held
habitually; and this is granted.

To the argument advanced in the contrary sense we reply that sometimes
a man is unable to make use of that which is in him habitually, on
account of some impediment: thus, on account of sleep, a man is unable
to use the habit of science. In like manner, through the deficiency of
his age, a child cannot use the habit of understanding of principles,
or the natural law, which is in him habitually.
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Whether the natural law contains several precepts, or only one?

Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law contains, not several
precepts, but one only. For law is a kind of precept, as stated above
([2013]Q[92], A[2]). If therefore there were many precepts of the
natural law, it would follow that there are also many natural laws.

Objection 2: Further, the natural law is consequent to human nature.
But human nature, as a whole, is one; though, as to its parts, it is
manifold. Therefore, either there is but one precept of the law of
nature, on account of the unity of nature as a whole; or there are
many, by reason of the number of parts of human nature. The result
would be that even things relating to the inclination of the
concupiscible faculty belong to the natural law.

Objection 3: Further, law is something pertaining to reason, as stated
above ([2014]Q[90], A[1]). Now reason is but one in man. Therefore
there is only one precept of the natural law.

On the contrary, The precepts of the natural law in man stand in
relation to practical matters, as the first principles to matters of
demonstration. But there are several first indemonstrable principles.
Therefore there are also several precepts of the natural law.

I answer that, As stated above ([2015]Q[91], A[3]), the precepts of the
natural law are to the practical reason, what the first principles of
demonstrations are to the speculative reason; because both are
self-evident principles. Now a thing is said to be self-evident in two
ways: first, in itself; secondly, in relation to us. Any proposition is
said to be self-evident in itself, if its predicate is contained in the
notion of the subject: although, to one who knows not the definition of
the subject, it happens that such a proposition is not self-evident.
For instance, this proposition, "Man is a rational being," is, in its
very nature, self-evident, since who says "man," says "a rational
being": and yet to one who knows not what a man is, this proposition is
not self-evident. Hence it is that, as Boethius says (De Hebdom. ),
certain axioms or propositions are universally self-evident to all; and
such are those propositions whose terms are known to all, as, "Every
whole is greater than its part," and, "Things equal to one and the same
are equal to one another. " But some propositions are self-evident only
to the wise, who understand the meaning of the terms of such
propositions: thus to one who understands that an angel is not a body,
it is self-evident that an angel is not circumscriptively in a place:
but this is not evident to the unlearned, for they cannot grasp it.

Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended
universally. For that which, before aught else, falls under
apprehension, is "being," the notion of which is included in all things
whatsoever a man apprehends. Wherefore the first indemonstrable
principle is that "the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the
same time," which is based on the notion of "being" and "not-being":
and on this principle all others are based, as is stated in Metaph. iv,
text. 9. Now as "being" is the first thing that falls under the
apprehension simply, so "good" is the first thing that falls under the
apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action:
since every agent acts for an end under the aspect of good.
Consequently the first principle of practical reason is one founded on
the notion of good, viz. that "good is that which all things seek
after. " Hence this is the first precept of law, that "good is to be
done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. " All other precepts of the
natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason
naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of
the natural law as something to be done or avoided.

Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of
a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a
natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good,
and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil,
and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural
inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law. Because
in man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with
the nature which he has in common with all substances: inasmuch as
every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to
its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of
preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the
natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that
pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in
common with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination, those
things are said to belong to the natural law, "which nature has taught
to all animals" [*Pandect. Just. I, tit. i], such as sexual
intercourse, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in
man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason,
which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to
know the truth about God, and to live in society: and in this respect,
whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for
instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one
has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.

Reply to Objection 1: All these precepts of the law of nature have the
character of one natural law, inasmuch as they flow from one first
precept.

Reply to Objection 2: All the inclinations of any parts whatsoever of
human nature, e. g. of the concupiscible and irascible parts, in so far
as they are ruled by reason, belong to the natural law, and are reduced
to one first precept, as stated above: so that the precepts of the
natural law are many in themselves, but are based on one common
foundation.

Reply to Objection 3: Although reason is one in itself, yet it directs
all things regarding man; so that whatever can be ruled by reason, is
contained under the law of reason.
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Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all acts of virtue are prescribed
by the natural law. Because, as stated above ([2016]Q[90], A[2]) it is
essential to a law that it be ordained to the common good. But some
acts of virtue are ordained to the private good of the individual, as
is evident especially in regards to acts of temperance. Therefore not
all acts of virtue are the subject of natural law.

Objection 2: Further, every sin is opposed to some virtuous act. If
therefore all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law, it
seems to follow that all sins are against nature: whereas this applies
to certain special sins.

Objection 3: Further, those things which are according to nature are
common to all. But acts of virtue are not common to all: since a thing
is virtuous in one, and vicious in another. Therefore not all acts of
virtue are prescribed by the natural law.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that "virtues
are natural. " Therefore virtuous acts also are a subject of the natural
law.

I answer that, We may speak of virtuous acts in two ways: first, under
the aspect of virtuous; secondly, as such and such acts considered in
their proper species. If then we speak of acts of virtue, considered as
virtuous, thus all virtuous acts belong to the natural law. For it has
been stated [2017](A[2]) that to the natural law belongs everything to
which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now each thing is
inclined naturally to an operation that is suitable to it according to
its form: thus fire is inclined to give heat. Wherefore, since the
rational soul is the proper form of man, there is in every man a
natural inclination to act according to reason: and this is to act
according to virtue. Consequently, considered thus, all acts of virtue
are prescribed by the natural law: since each one's reason naturally
dictates to him to act virtuously. But if we speak of virtuous acts,
considered in themselves, i. e. in their proper species, thus not all
virtuous acts are prescribed by the natural law: for many things are
done virtuously, to which nature does not incline at first; but which,
through the inquiry of reason, have been found by men to be conducive
to well-living.

Reply to Objection 1: Temperance is about the natural concupiscences of
food, drink and sexual matters, which are indeed ordained to the
natural common good, just as other matters of law are ordained to the
moral common good.

Reply to Objection 2: By human nature we may mean either that which is
proper to man---and in this sense all sins, as being against reason,
are also against nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): or
we may mean that nature which is common to man and other animals; and
in this sense, certain special sins are said to be against nature; thus
contrary to sexual intercourse, which is natural to all animals, is
unisexual lust, which has received the special name of the unnatural
crime.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers acts in themselves. For
it is owing to the various conditions of men, that certain acts are
virtuous for some, as being proportionate and becoming to them, while
they are vicious for others, as being out of proportion to them.
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Whether the natural law is the same in all men?

Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law is not the same in all.
For it is stated in the Decretals (Dist. i) that "the natural law is
that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel. " But this is not
common to all men; because, as it is written (Rom. 10:16), "all do not
obey the gospel. " Therefore the natural law is not the same in all men.

Objection 2: Further, "Things which are according to the law are said
to be just," as stated in Ethic. v. But it is stated in the same book
that nothing is so universally just as not to be subject to change in
regard to some men. Therefore even the natural law is not the same in
all men.

Objection 3: Further, as stated above ([2018]AA[2],3), to the natural
law belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his
nature. Now different men are naturally inclined to different things;
some to the desire of pleasures, others to the desire of honors, and
other men to other things. Therefore there is not one natural law for
all.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 4): "The natural law is common
to all nations. "

I answer that, As stated above ([2019]AA[2],3), to the natural law
belongs those things to which a man is inclined naturally: and among
these it is proper to man to be inclined to act according to reason.
Now the process of reason is from the common to the proper, as stated
in Phys. i. The speculative reason, however, is differently situated in
this matter, from the practical reason. For, since the speculative
reason is busied chiefly with the necessary things, which cannot be
otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the universal
principles, contain the truth without fail. The practical reason, on
the other hand, is busied with contingent matters, about which human
actions are concerned: and consequently, although there is necessity in
the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the
more frequently we encounter defects. Accordingly then in speculative
matters truth is the same in all men, both as to principles and as to
conclusions: although the truth is not known to all as regards the
conclusions, but only as regards the principles which are called common
notions. But in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not
the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general
principles: and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail,
it is not equally known to all.

It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles whether
of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude is the same
for all, and is equally known by all. As to the proper conclusions of
the speculative reason, the truth is the same for all, but is not
equally known to all: thus it is true for all that the three angles of
a triangle are together equal to two right angles, although it is not
known to all. But as to the proper conclusions of the practical reason,
neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is
the same, is it equally known by all. Thus it is right and true for all
to act according to reason: and from this principle it follows as a
proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to another should be restored
to their owner. Now this is true for the majority of cases: but it may
happen in a particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore
unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; for instance, if they are
claimed for the purpose of fighting against one's country. And this
principle will be found to fail the more, according as we descend
further into detail, e. g. if one were to say that goods held in trust
should be restored with such and such a guarantee, or in such and such
a way; because the greater the number of conditions added, the greater
the number of ways in which the principle may fail, so that it be not
right to restore or not to restore.

Consequently we must say that the natural law, as to general
principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to
knowledge. But as to certain matters of detail, which are conclusions,
as it were, of those general principles, it is the same for all in the
majority of cases, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge; and yet in
some few cases it may fail, both as to rectitude, by reason of certain
obstacles (just as natures subject to generation and corruption fail in
some few cases on account of some obstacle), and as to knowledge, since
in some the reason is perverted by passion, or evil habit, or an evil
disposition of nature; thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly
contrary to the natural law, was not considered wrong among the
Germans, as Julius Caesar relates (De Bello Gall. vi).

Reply to Objection 1: The meaning of the sentence quoted is not that
whatever is contained in the Law and the Gospel belongs to the natural
law, since they contain many things that are above nature; but that
whatever belongs to the natural law is fully contained in them.
Wherefore Gratian, after saying that "the natural law is what is
contained in the Law and the Gospel," adds at once, by way of example,
"by which everyone is commanded to do to others as he would be done
by. "

Reply to Objection 2: The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood
of things that are naturally just, not as general principles, but as
conclusions drawn from them, having rectitude in the majority of cases,
but failing in a few.

Reply to Objection 3: As, in man, reason rules and commands the other
powers, so all the natural inclinations belonging to the other powers
must needs be directed according to reason. Wherefore it is universally
right for all men, that all their inclinations should be directed
according to reason.
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Whether the natural law can be changed?

Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law can be changed. Because
on Ecclus. 17:9, "He gave them instructions, and the law of life," the
gloss says: "He wished the law of the letter to be written, in order to
correct the law of nature. " But that which is corrected is changed.
Therefore the natural law can be changed.

Objection 2: Further, the slaying of the innocent, adultery, and theft
are against the natural law. But we find these things changed by God:
as when God commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (Gn. 22:2); and
when he ordered the Jews to borrow and purloin the vessels of the
Egyptians (Ex. 12:35); and when He commanded Osee to take to himself "a
wife of fornications" (Osee 1:2). Therefore the natural law can be
changed.

Objection 3: Further, Isidore says (Etym. 5:4) that "the possession of
all things in common, and universal freedom, are matters of natural
law. " But these things are seen to be changed by human laws. Therefore
it seems that the natural law is subject to change.

On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (Dist. v): "The natural
law dates from the creation of the rational creature. It does not vary
according to time, but remains unchangeable. "

I answer that, A change in the natural law may be understood in two
ways. First, by way of addition. In this sense nothing hinders the
natural law from being changed: since many things for the benefit of
human life have been added over and above the natural law, both by the
Divine law and by human laws.

Secondly, a change in the natural law may be understood by way of
subtraction, so that what previously was according to the natural law,
ceases to be so. In this sense, the natural law is altogether
unchangeable in its first principles: but in its secondary principles,
which, as we have said [2020](A[4]), are certain detailed proximate
conclusions drawn from the first principles, the natural law is not
changed so that what it prescribes be not right in most cases. But it
may be changed in some particular cases of rare occurrence, through
some special causes hindering the observance of such precepts, as
stated above [2021](A[4]).

Reply to Objection 1: The written law is said to be given for the
correction of the natural law, either because it supplies what was
wanting to the natural law; or because the natural law was perverted in
the hearts of some men, as to certain matters, so that they esteemed
those things good which are naturally evil; which perversion stood in
need of correction.

Reply to Objection 2: All men alike, both guilty and innocent, die the
death of nature: which death of nature is inflicted by the power of God
on account of original sin, according to 1 Kings 2:6: "The Lord killeth
and maketh alive. " Consequently, by the command of God, death can be
inflicted on any man, guilty or innocent, without any injustice
whatever. In like manner adultery is intercourse with another's wife;
who is allotted to him by the law emanating from God. Consequently
intercourse with any woman, by the command of God, is neither adultery
nor fornication. The same applies to theft, which is the taking of
another's property. For whatever is taken by the command of God, to
Whom all things belong, is not taken against the will of its owner,
whereas it is in this that theft consists. Nor is it only in human
things, that whatever is commanded by God is right; but also in natural
things, whatever is done by God, is, in some way, natural, as stated in
the [2022]FP, Q[105], A[6], ad 1.

Reply to Objection 3: A thing is said to belong to the natural law in
two ways. First, because nature inclines thereto: e. g. that one should
not do harm to another. Secondly, because nature did not bring in the
contrary: thus we might say that for man to be naked is of the natural
law, because nature did not give him clothes, but art invented them. In
this sense, "the possession of all things in common and universal
freedom" are said to be of the natural law, because, to wit, the
distinction of possessions and slavery were not brought in by nature,
but devised by human reason for the benefit of human life. Accordingly
the law of nature was not changed in this respect, except by addition.
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Whether the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law can be abolished from
the heart of man. Because on Rom. 2:14, "When the Gentiles who have not
the law," etc. a gloss says that "the law of righteousness, which sin
had blotted out, is graven on the heart of man when he is restored by
grace. " But the law of righteousness is the law of nature. Therefore
the law of nature can be blotted out.