" This is rapidly
becoming
every-
body's attitude to-day.
body's attitude to-day.
Nietzsche - v11 - Thus Spake Zarathustra
430 (#650) ############################################
430
APPENDIX.
philosophy, because it declares Christian values to
be a danger to the future of our kind, is therefore
shelved as brutal, cold, and hard (see Note on
Chap. XXXVI. ). Nietzsche tried to be all things to
all men; he was sufficiently fond of his fellows for
that: in the Return Home he describes how he
ultimately returns to loneliness in order to recover
from the effects of his experiment.
Chapter LIV. Nietzsche is here completely in his element. Three
The Three things hitherto best-cursed and most calumniated on
Evil Things. eartn, are brought forward to be weighed. Voluptuous-
ness, thirst of power, and selfishness,—the three forces
in humanity which Christianity has done most to
garble and besmirch,—Nietzsche endeavours to rein-
state in their former places of honour. Voluptuous-
ness, or sensual pleasure, is a dangerous thing to discuss
nowadays. If we mention it with favour we may be
regarded, however unjustly, as the advocate of savages,
satyrs, and pure sensuality. If we condemn it, we
either go over to the Puritans or we join those who are
wont to come to table with no edge to their appetites
and who therefore grumble at all good fare. There
can be no doubt that the value of healthy innocent
voluptuousness, like the value of health itself, must
have been greatly discounted by all those who, resent-
ing their inability to partake of this world's goods,
cried like St Paul: "I would that all men were even
as I myself. " Now Nietzsche's philosophy might be
called an attempt at giving back to healthy and
normal men innocence and a clean conscience in
their desires—not to applaud the vulgar sensualists
who respond to every stimulus and whose passions
are out of hand; not to tell the mean, selfish individual,
whose selfishness is a pollution (see Aphorism 33,
"Twilight of the Idols"), that he is right, nor to assure
## p. 431 (#651) ############################################
NOTES. 431
the weak, the sick, and the crippled, that the thirst of
power, which they gratify by exploiting the happier
and healthier individuals, is justified;—but to save
the clean healthy man from the values of those around
him, who look at everything through the mud that is
in their own bodies,—to give him, and him alone, a
clean conscience in his manhood and the desires
of his manhood. "Do I counsel you to slay your
instincts? I counsel to innocence in your instincts. "
In verse 7 of the second paragraph (as in verse 1 of
par. 19 in "The Old and New Tables") Nietzsche
gives us a reason for his occasional obscurity (see also
verses 3 to 7 of " Poets "). As I have already pointed
out, his philosophy is quite esoteric. It can serve
no purpose with the ordinary, mediocre type of man.
I, personally, can no longer have any doubt that
Nietzsche's only object, in that part of his philosophy
where he bids his friends stand " Beyond Good and
Evil" with him, was to save higher men, whose growth
and scope might be limited by the too strict observance
of modern values from foundering on the rocks of a
"Compromise" between their own genius and tradi-
tional conventions. The only possible way in which
the great man can achieve greatness is by means of
exceptional freedom—the freedom which assists him
in experiencing himself. Verses 20 to 30 afford an
excellent supplement to Nietzsche's description of the
attitude of the noble type towards the slaves in
Aphorism 260 of the work " Beyond Good and Evil"
(see also Note B. in Foreword).
(See Note on Chap. XLVI. ) In Part II. of this Chapter LV.
discourse we meet with a doctrine not touched upon The Spirit of
hitherto, save indirectly;—I refer to the doctrine of Gravity.
self-love. We should try to understand this perfectly
before proceeding; for it is precisely views of this
## p. 431 (#652) ############################################
430 APPENDIX.
philosophy, because it declares Christian values to
be a danger to the future of our kind, is therefore
shelved as brutal, cold, and hard (see Note on
Chap. XXXVI. ). Nietzsche tried to be all things to
all men; he was sufficiently fond of his fellows for
that: in the Return Home he describes how he
ultimately returns to loneliness in order to recover
from the effects of his experiment.
Chapter LIV. Nietzsche is here completely in his element. Three
The Three things hitherto best-cursed and most calumniated on
Evil Things. earth, are brought forward to be weighed. Voluptuous-
ness, thirst of power, and selfishness,—the three forces
in humanity which Christianity has done most to
garble and besmirch,—Nietzsche endeavours to rein-
state in their former places of honour. Voluptuous-
ness, or sensual pleasure, is a dangerous thing to discuss
nowadays. If we mention it with favour we may be
regarded, however unjustly, as the advocate of savages,
satyrs, and pure sensuality. If we condemn it, we
either go over to the Puritans or we join those who are
wont to come to table with no edge to their appetites
and who therefore grumble at all good fare. There
can be no doubt that the value of healthy innocent
voluptuousness, like the value of health itself, must
have been greatly discounted by all those who, resent-
ing their inability to partake of this world's goods,
cried like St Paul: "I would that all men were even
as I myself. " Now Nietzsche's philosophy might be
called an attempt at giving back to healthy and
normal men innocence and a clean conscience in
their desires—not to applaud the vulgar sensualists
who respond to every stimulus and whose passions
are out of hand; not to tell the mean, selfish individual,
whose selfishness is a pollution (see Aphorism 33,
"Twilight of the Idols"), that he is right, nor to assure
## p. 431 (#653) ############################################
NOTES. 431
the weak, the sick, and the crippled, that the thirst of
power, which they gratify by exploiting the happier
and healthier individuals, is justified;—but to save
the clean healthy man from the values of those around
him, who look at everything through the mud that is
in their own bodies,—to give him, and him alone, a
clean conscience in his manhood and the desires
of his manhood. "Do I counsel you to slay your
instincts? I counsel to innocence in your instincts. "
In verse 7 of the second paragraph (as in verse 1 of
par. 19 in "The Old and New Tables") Nietzsche
gives us a reason for his occasional obscurity (see also
verses 3 to 7 of " Poets "). As I have already pointed
out, his philosophy is quite esoteric. It can serve
no purpose with the ordinary, mediocre type of man.
I, personally, can no longer have any doubt that
Nietzsche's only object, in that part of his philosophy
where he bids his friends stand " Beyond Good and
Evil" with him, was to save higher men, whose growth
and scope might be limited by the too strict observance
of modern values from foundering on the rocks of a
"Compromise " between their own genius and tradi-
tional conventions. The only possible way in which
the great man can achieve greatness is by means of
exceptional freedom—the freedom which assists him
in experiencing himself. Verses 20 to 30 afford an
excellent supplement to Nietzsche's description of the
attitude of the noble type towards the slaves in
Aphorism 260 of the work "Beyond Good and Evil"
(see also Note B. in Foreword).
(See Note on Chap. XLVI. ) In Part II. of this chapter LV.
discourse we meet with a doctrine not touched upon The Spirit of
hitherto, save indirectly;—I refer to the doctrine of Gravity,
self-love. We should try to understand this perfectly
before proceeding; for it is precisely views of this
## p. 432 (#654) ############################################
432 APPENDIX.
sort which, after having been cut out of the original
context, are repeated far and wide as internal evidence
proving the general unsoundness of Nietzsche's philo-
sophy. Already in the last of the "Thoughts out of
Season" Nietzsche speaks as follows about modern
men: ". . . these modern creatures wish rather to
be hunted down, wounded and torn to shreds, than
to live alone with themselves in solitary calm. Alone
with oneself! —this thought terrifies the modern soul;
it is his one anxiety, his one ghastly fear" (English
Edition, p. 141). In his feverish scurry to find
entertainment and diversion, whether in a novel, a
newspaper, or a play, the modern man condemns his
own age utterly; for he shows that in his heart of
hearts he despises himself. One cannot change a
condition of this sort in a day; to become endurable
to oneself an inner transformation is necessary. Too
long have we lost ourselves in our friends and enter-
tainments to be able to find ourselves so soon at
another's bidding. "And verily, it is no command-
ment for to-day and to-morrow to learn to love oneself.
Rather is it of all arts the finest, subtlest, last, and
patientest. "
In the last verse Nietzsche challenges us to show
that our way is the right way. In his teaching he does
not coerce us, nor does he overpersuade; he simply
says: "I am a law only for mine own, I am not a law
for all. This—is now my way,—where is yours? "
Chapter LVI. Nietzsche himself declares this to be the most
Par. a. decisive portion of the whole of "Thus Spake
The Old and Zarathustra. " It is a sort of epitome of his leading
New Tables, doctrines. In verse 12 of the second paragraph, we
learn how he himself would fain have abandoned the
poetical method of expression had he not known
only too well that the only chance a new doctrine
## p. 433 (#655) ############################################
NOTES. 433
has of surviving, nowadays, depends upon its being
given to the world in some kind of art-form. Just
as prophets, centuries ago, often had to have recourse
to the mask of madness in order to mitigate the
hatred of those who did not and could not see as
they did; so, to-day, the struggle for existence among
opinions and values is so great, that an art-form is
practically the only garb in which a new philosophy
can dare to introduce itself to us.
Many of the paragraphs will be found to be merely
reminiscent of former discourses. For instance,
par. 3 recalls "Redemption. " The last verse of Par. 3.
par. 4 is important. Freedom which, as I have Par. 4.
pointed out before, Nietzsche considered a danger-
ous acquisition in inexperienced or unworthy hands,
here receives its death-blow as a general desideratum.
In the first Part we read under "The Way of the
Creating One," that freedom as an end in itself does
not concern Zarathustra at all. He says there:
"Free from what? What doth that matter to Zara-
thustra? Clearly, however, shall thine eye answer
me: free for what? " And in "The Bedwarfing
Virtue": "Ah that ye understood my word: 'Do
ever what ye will—but first be such as can will. '"
Here we have a description of the kind of altruism Par. 5.
Nietzsche exacted from higher men. It is really
a comment upon "The Bestowing Virtue" (see
Note on Chap. XXII. ).
This refers, of course, to the reception pioneers Par. 6.
of Nietzsche's stamp meet with at the hands of their
contemporaries.
Nietzsche teaches that nothing is stable,—not even Par. 8.
values,—not even the concepts good and evil. He
likens life unto a stream. But foot-bridges and
railings span the stream, and they seem to stand firm.
2 E
## p. 434 (#656) ############################################
434 APPENDIX.
Many will be reminded of good and evil when they
look upon these structures; for thus these same
values stand over the stream of life, and life flows on
beneath them and leaves them standing. When,
however, winter comes and the stream gets frozen,
many inquire: "Should not everything—stand stilll
Fundamentally everything standeth still. " But soon
the spring cometh and with it the thaw-wind. It
breaks the ice, and the ice breaks down the foot-
bridges and railings, whereupon everything is swept
away. This state of affairs, according to Nietzsche,
has now been reached. "O, my brethren, is not
everything at present in flux 1 Have not all railings
and foot-bridges fallen into the water? Who would
still hold on to 'good' and 'evil'? "
Par. 9. This is complementary to the first three verses
of par. 2.
Par. 10. So far, this is perhaps the most important paragraph.
It is a protest against reading a moral order of things
in life. "Life is something essentially immoral! "
Nietzsche tells us in the introduction to the "Birth
of Tragedy. " Even to call life " activity," or to define
it further as "the continuous adjustment of internal
relations to external relations," as Spencer has it,
Nietzsche characterises as a "democratic idiosyncracy. "
He says to define it in this way, "is to mistake the
true nature and function of life, which is Will to
Power. . . . Life is essentially appropriation, injury,
conquest of the strange and weak, suppression,
severity, obtrusion of its own forms, incorporation
and at least, putting it mildest, exploitation. " Adapta-
tion is merely a secondary activity, a mere re-activity
(see Note on Chap. LVII. ).
Pars. 11, 12. These deal with Nietzsche's principle of the
desirability of rearing a select race. The biological
## p. 435 (#657) ############################################
NOTES. 435
and historical grounds for his insistence upon this
principle are, of course, manifold. Gobineau in his
great work, "L'Inegalite des Races Humaines," lays
strong emphasis upon the evils which arise from
promiscuous and inter-social marriages. He alone
would suffice to carry Nietzsche's point against all
those who are opposed to the other conditions, to
the conditions which would have saved Rome, which
have maintained the strength of the Jewish race,
and which are strictly maintained by every breeder
of animals throughout the world. Darwin in his
remarks relative to the degeneration of cultivated
types of animals through the action of promiscuous
breeding, brings Gobineau support from the realm of
biology.
The last two verses of par. 12 were discussed in
the Notes on Chaps. XXXVI. and LIII.
This, like the first part of "The Soothsayer," is Par. 13.
obviously a reference to Schopenhauerian Pessimism.
These are supplementary to the discourse "Back- Pars. 14, 15,
world's-men. " l6> «7-
We must be careful to separate this paragraph, Par. 18.
in sense, from the previous four paragraphs. Nietz-
sche is. still dealing with Pessimism here; but it is
the pessimism of the hero—the man most susceptible
of all to desperate views of life, owing to the obstacles
that are arrayed against him in a world where men of
his kind are very rare and are continually being
sacrificed. It was to save this man that Nietzsche
wrote. Heroism foiled, thwarted, and wrecked, hoping
and fighting until the last, is at length overtaken by
despair, and renounces all struggle for sleep. This
is not the natural or constitutional pessimism which
proceeds from an unhealthy body—the dyspeptic's
lack of appetite; it is rather the desperation of the
## p. 436 (#658) ############################################
436 APPENDIX.
netted lion that ultimately stops all movement, because
the more it moves the more involved it becomes.
Par. 20. "All that increases power is good, all that springs
from weakness is bad. The weak and ill-constituted
shall perish: first principle of our charity. And one
shall also help them thereto. " Nietzsche partly
divined the kind of reception moral values of this
stamp would meet with at the hands of the effeminate
manhood of Europe. Here we see that he had
anticipated the most likely form their criticism would
take (see also the last two verses of par. 17).
Par. 21. The first ten verses, here, are reminiscent of "War
and Warriors" and of "The Flies in the Market-
place. " Verses 11 and 12, however, are particularly
important. There is a strong argument in favour of
the sharp differentiation of castes and of races (and
even of sexes; see Note on Chap. XVIII. ) running
all through Nietzsche's writings. But sharp differentia-
tion also implies antagonism in some form or other—
hence Nietzsche's fears for modern men. What
modern men desire above all, is peace and the
cessation of pain. But neither great races nor great
castes have ever been built up in this way. "Who
still wanteth to rule? " Zarathustra asks in the
"Prologue. " "Who still wanteth to obey? Both are
too burdensome.
" This is rapidly becoming every-
body's attitude to-day. The tame moral reading of
the face of nature, together with such democratic
interpretations of life as those suggested by Herbert
Spencer, are signs of a physiological condition which
is the reverse of that bounding and irresponsible
healthiness in which harder and more tragic values
rule.
Par. 24. This should be read in conjunction with, "Child
and Marriage. " In the fifth verse wc shall recognise
## p. 437 (#659) ############################################
NOTES. 437
our old friend "Marriage on the ten-years system,"
which George Meredith suggested some years ago.
This, however, must not be taken too literally. I
do not think Nietzsche's profoundest views on
marriage were ever intended to be given over to the
public at all, at least not for the present. They
appear in the biography by his sister, and although
their wisdom is unquestionable, the nature of the
reforms he suggests render it impossible for them to
become popular just now.
See Note on "The Prologue. " Pars. 26, 27.
Nietzsche was not an iconoclast from predilection. Par. 28.
No bitterness or empty hate dictated his vitupera-
tions against existing values and against the dogmas of
his parents and forefathers. He knew too well what
these things meant to the millions who profess them,
to approach the task of uprooting them with levity
or even with haste. He saw what modern anarchists
and revolutionists do not see—namely, that man is in
danger of actual destruction when his customs and
values are broken. I need hardly point out, there-
fore, how deeply he was conscious of the responsibility
he threw upon our shoulders when he invited us to
reconsider our position. The lines in this paragraph
are evidence enough of his earnestness.
We meet with several puzzles here. Zarathustra Chapter
calls himself the advocate of the circle (the Eternal LVII.
Recurrence of all things), and he calls this doctrine :,
his abysmal thought. In the last verse of the first
paragraph, however, after hailing his deepest thought,
he cries: "Disgust, disgust, disgust! " We know
Nietzsche's ideal man was that "world-approving,
exuberant, and vivacious creature, who has not only
learnt to compromise and arrange with that which
was and is, but wishes to have it again, as it was and
## p. 438 (#660) ############################################
438 APPENDIX.
is, for all eternity insatiably calling out da capo, not
only to himself, but to the whole piece and play"
(see Note on Chap. XLIL). But if one ask oneself
what the conditions to such an attitude are, one will
realise immediately how utterly different Nietzsche
was from his ideal. The man who insatiably cries
da capo to himself and to the whole of his misc-tn-
scene, must be in a position to desire every incident
in his life to be repeated, not once, but again and
again eternally. Now, Nietzsche's life had been too
full of disappointments, illness, unsuccessful struggles,
and snubs, to allow of his thinking of the Eternal
Recurrence without loathing—hence probably the
words of the last verse.
In verses 15 and 16, we have Nietzsche declaring him-
self an evolutionist in the broadest sense—that is to
say, that he believes in the Development Hypothesis
as the description of the process by which species have
originated. Now, to understand his position correctly
we must show his relationship to the two greatest
of modern evolutionists—Darwin and Spencer. As
a philosopher, however, Nietzsche does not stand or
fall by his objections to the Darwinian or Spencerian
cosmogony. He never laid claim to a very profound
knowledge of biology, and his criticism is far more
valuable as the attitude of a fresh mind than as that
of a specialist towards the question. Moreover, in
his objections many difficulties are raised which are
not settled by an appeal to either of the men above
mentioned. We have given Nietzsche's definition of
life in the Note on Chap. LVI. , par. 10. Still, there
remains a hope that Darwin and Nietzsche may some
day become reconciled by a new description of the
processes by which varieties occur. The appearance
of varieties among animals and of "sporting plants"
## p. 439 (#661) ############################################
notes. 439
in the vegetable kingdom, is still shrouded in
mystery, and the question whether this is not
precisely the ground on which Darwin and Nietzsche
will meet, is an interesting one. The former says
in his "Origin of Species," concerning the causes of
variability: ". . . there are two factors, namely, the
nature of the organism, and the nature of the con-
ditions. The former seems to be much the more im-
portant,* for nearly similar variations sometimes arise
under, as far as we can judge, dissimilar conditions;
and on the other hand, dissimilar variations arise
under conditions which appear to be nearly uniform. "
Nietzsche, recognising this same truth, would ascribe
practically all the importance to the "highest func-
tionaries in the organism, in which the life-will
appears as an active and formative principle," and
except in certain cases (where passive organisms
alone are concerned) would not give such a prominent
place to the influence of environment. Adaptation,
according to him, is merely a secondary activity, a
mere re-activity, and he is therefore quite opposed to
Spencer's definition: "Life is the continuous adjust-
ment of internal relations to external relations. "
Again in the motive force behind animal and plant
life, Nietzsche disagrees with Darwin. He trans-
forms the "Struggle for Existence "—the passive and
involuntary condition—into the "Struggle for Power,"
which is active and creative, and much more in
harmony with Darwin's own view, given above, con-
cerning the importance of the organism itself. The
change is one of such far-reaching importance that
we cannot dispose of it in a breath, as a mere play
upon words. "Much is reckoned higher than life
* The italics are mine.
## p. 440 (#662) ############################################
440 APPENDIX.
itself by the living one. " Nietzsche says that to
speak of the activity of life as a "straggle for
existence," is to state the case inadequately. He
warns us not to confound Malthus with nature. There
is something more than this struggle between the
organic beings on this earth; want, which is supposed
to bring this struggle about, is not so common as is
supposed; some other force must be operative. The
Will to Power is this force, "the instinct of self-
preservation is only one of the indirect and most
frequent results thereof. " A certain lack of acumen
in psychological questions and the condition of affairs
in England at the time Darwin wrote, may both,
according to Nietzsche, have induced the renowned
naturalist to describe the forces of nature as he did
in his "Origin of Species. "
In verses 28, 29, and 30 of the second portion of
this discourse we meet with a doctrine which, at first
sight, seems to be merely "k manoir a fenvers,"
indeed one English critic has actually said of Nietz-
sche, that "Thus Spake Zarathustra" is no more
than a compendium of modern views and maxims
turned upside down. Examining these heterodox
pronouncements a little more closely, however, we
may possibly perceive their truth. Regarding good
and evil as purely relative values, it stands to reason
that what may be bad or evil in a given man, relative
to a certain environment, may actually be good if
not highly virtuous in him relative to a certain other
environment. If this hypothetical man represent the
ascending line of life—that is to say, if he promise all
that which is highest in a Greco-Roman sense, then
it is likely that he will be condemned as wicked if
introduced into the society of men representing the
opposite and descending line of life.
## p. 441 (#663) ############################################
NOTES. 44I
By depriving a man of his wickedness—more
particularly nowadays—therefore, one may unwittingly
be doing violence to the greatest in him. It may be
an outrage against his wholeness, just as the lopping-
off of a leg would be. Fortunately, the natural so-
called "wickedness" of higher men has in a certain
measure been able to resist this lopping process which
successive slave-moralities have practised; but signs
are not wanting which show that the noblest wicked-
ness is fast vanishing from society—the wickedness
of courage and determination—and that Nietzsche
had good reasons for crying: "Ah, that [man's]
baddest is so very small! Ah, that his best is so
very small. What is good? To be brave is good!
It is the good war which halloweth every cause! "
(see also par. 5, "Higher Man ").
This is a final pa? an which Zarathustra sings to Chapter LX.
Eternity and the marriage-ring of rings, the ring of The Seven
the Eternal Recurrence. Seals-
In my opinion this part is Nietzsche's open avowal PART IV.
that all his philosophy, together with all his hopes,
enthusiastic outbursts, blasphemies, prolixities, and
obscurities, were merely so many gifts laid at the feet
of higher men. He had no desire to save the world.
What he wished to determine was: Who is to be
master of the world? This is a very different thing.
He came to save higher men;—-to give them that
freedom by which, alone, they can develop and
reach their zenith (see Note on Chap. LIV. , end). It
has been argued, and with considerable force, that
no such philosophy is required by higher men, that,
as a matter of fact, higher men, by virtue of their
constitutions always, do stand Beyond Good and
## p. 442 (#664) ############################################
442 APPENDIX.
Evil, and never allow anything to stand in the way
of their complete growth. Nietzsche, however, was
evidently not so confident about this. He would
probably have argued that we only see the successful
cases. Being a great man himself, he was well aware
of the dangers threatening greatness in our age. In
"Beyond Good and Evil" he writes: "There are
few pains so grievous as to have seen, divined, or
experienced how an exceptional man has missed
his way and deteriorated. . . . " He knew "from
his painfullest recollections on what wretched ob-
stacles promising developments of the highest rank
have hitherto usually gone to pieces, broken
down, sunk, and become contemptible. " Now in
Part IV. we shall find that his strongest temptation
to descend to the feeling of "pity" for his con-
temporaries, is the "cry for help" which he hears
from the lips of the higher men exposed to the
dreadful danger of their modern environment.
Chapter LXI. In the fourteenth verse of this discourse Nietzsche
The Honey defines the solemn duty he imposed upon himself:
Sacrifice. « Become wnat thou art. " Surely the criticism which
has been directed against this maxim must all fall to
the ground when it is remembered, once and for all, that
Nietzsche's teaching was never intended to be other
than an esoteric one. "I am a law only. for mine
own," he says emphatically, "I am not a law for all. "
It is of the greatest importance to humanity that its
highest individuals should be allowed to attain to their
full development; for, only by means of its heroes
can the human race be led forward step by step to
higher and yet higher levels. "Become what thou
art" applied to all, of course, becomes a vicious
maxim; it is to be hoped, however, that we may learn
in time that the same action performed by a given
## p. 443 (#665) ############################################
NOTES. 443
number of men, loses its identity precisely that
same number of times. —" Quod licet Jovi, non licet
bovi. "
At the last eight verses many readers may be
tempted to laugh. In England we almost always
laugh when a man takes himself seriously at anything
save sport. And there is of course no reason why the
reader should not be hilarious. —A certain greatness
is requisite, both in order to be sublime and to have
reverence for the sublime. Nietzsche earnestly be-
lieved that the Zarathustra-kingdom—his dynasty of
a thousand years—would one day come; if he had
not believed it so earnestly, if every artist in fact had
not believed so earnestly in his Hazar, whether of
ten, fifteen, a hundred, or a thousand years, we should
have lost all our higher men; they would have become
pessimists, suicides, or merchants. If the minor poet
and philosopher has made us shy of the prophetic
seriousness which characterised an Isaiah or a Jeremiah,
it is surely our loss and the minor poet's gain.
We now meet with Zarathustra in extraordinary Chapter
circumstances. He is confronted with Schopenhauer LXII.
and tempted by the old Soothsayer to commit the sin . e Cry of
of pity. "I have come that I may seduce thee to
thy last sin ! " says the Soothsayer to Zarathustra. It
will be remembered that in Schopenhauer's ethics, pity
is elevated to the highest place among the virtues, and
very consistently too, seeing that the Weltanschauung
is a pessimistic one. Schopenhauer appeals to Nietz-
sche's deepest and strongest sentiment—his sympathy
for higher men. "Why dost thou conceal thyself? "
he cries. "It is the higlier man that calleth for thee! "
Zarathustra is almost overcome by the Soothsayer's
pleading, as he had been once already in the past;
but he resists him step by step. At length he can
## p. 444 (#666) ############################################
444
APPENDIX.
Chapter
LXIII.
Talk with
the Kings.
Chapter
LXIV.
The Leech.
withstand him no longer, and, on the plea that the
higher man is on his ground and therefore under his
protection, Zarathustra departs in search of him,
leaving Schopenhauer—a higher man in Nietzsche's
opinion—in the cave as a guest.
On his way Zarathustra meets two more higher men
of his time; two kings cross his path. They are
above the average modern type; for their instincts
tell them what real ruling is, and they despise the
mockery which they have been taught to call " Reign-
ing. " "We are not the first men," they say, "and have
nevertheless to stand for them: of this imposture have
we at last become weary and disgusted. " It is the
kings who tell Zarathustra: "There is no sorer
misfortune in all human destiny than when the
mighty of the earth are not also the first men. There
everything becometh false and distorted and mon-
strous. " The kings are also asked by Zarathustra to
accept the shelter of his cave, whereupon he proceeds
on his way.
Among the higher men whom Zarathustra wishes to
save, is also the scientific specialist—the man who
honestly and scrupulously pursues his investigations,
as Darwin did, in one department of knowledge. "I
love him who liveth in order to know, and seeketh
to know in order that the Superman may hereafter
live. Thus seeketh he his own down-going. " "The
spiritually conscientious one," he is called in this
discourse. Zarathustra steps on him unawares, and
the slave of science, bleeding from the violence he
has done to himself by his self-imposed task, speaks
proudly of his little sphere of knowledge—his little
hand's breadth of ground on Zarathustra's territory,
philosophy. "Where mine honesty ceaseth," says
the true scientific specialist, "there am I blind and
## p. 445 (#667) ############################################
NOTES. 445
want also to be blind. Where I want to know, how-
ever, there want I also to be honest—namely, severe,
rigorous, restricted, cruel, and inexorable. " Zarathus-
tra greatly respecting this man, invites him too to the
cave, and then vanishes in answer to another cry for
help.
The Magician is of course an artist, and Nietzsche's Chapter LXV.
intimate knowledge of perhaps the greatest artist ofThe Magician,
his age rendered the selection of Wagner, as the type
in this discourse, almost inevitable. Most readers
will be acquainted with the facts relating to Nietzsche's
and Wagner's friendship and ultimate separation. As
a boy and a youth Nietzsche had shown such a
remarkable gift for music that it had been a question
at one time whether he should not perhaps give up
everything else in order to develop this gift, but he
became a scholar notwithstanding, although he never
entirely gave up composing, and playing the piano.
While still in his teens, he became acquainted with
Wagner's music and grew passionately fond of it.
Long before he met Wagner he must have idealised
him in his mind to an extent which only a profoundly
artistic nature could have been capable of. Nietzsche
always had high ideals for humanity. If one were
asked whether, throughout his many changes, there
was yet one aim, one direction, and one hope to
which he held fast, one would be forced to reply in
the affirmative and declare that aim, direction, and hope
to have been "the elevation of the type man. " Now,
when Nietzsche met Wagner he was actually casting
about for an incarnation of his dreams for the German
people, and we have only to remember his youth (he
was twenty-one when he was introduced to Wagner),
his love of Wagner's music, and the undoubted power
of the great musician's personality, in order to realise
## p. 446 (#668) ############################################
446 APPENDIX.
how very uncritical his attitude must have been in the
first flood of his enthusiasm. Again, when the friend-
ship ripened, we cannot well imagine Nietzsche, the
younger man, being anything less than intoxicated by
his senior's attention and love, and we are therefore
not surprised to find him pressing Wagner forward as
the great Reformer and Saviour of mankind. "Wagner
in Bayreuth " (English Edition, 1909) gives us the best
proof of Nietzsche's infatuation, and although signs
are not wanting in this essay which show how clearly
and even cruelly he was sub-consciously "taking
stock" of his friend—even then, the work is a record
of what great love and admiration can do in the way
of endowing the object of one's affection with all
the qualities and ideals that a fertile imagination can
conceive.
When the blow came, it was therefore all the more
severe. Nietzsche at length realised that the friend
of his fancy and the real Richard Wagner—the com-
poser of Parsifal—were not one; the fact dawned
upon him slowly; disappointment upon disappoint-
ment, revelation after revelation, ultimately brought
it home to him, and though his best instincts were
naturally opposed to it at first, the revulsion of feeling
at last became too strong to be ignored, and Nietzsche
was plunged into the blackest despair. Years after
his break with Wagner, he wrote "The Case of
Wagner," and "Nietzsche contra Wagner," and these
works are with us to prove the sincerity and depth of
his views on the man who was the greatest event
of his life.
The poem in this discourse is, of course, reminiscent
of Wagner's own poetical manner, and it must be
remembered that the whole was written subsequent
to Nietzsche's final break with his friend. The
## p. 447 (#669) ############################################
NOTES. 447
dialogue between Zarathustra and the Magician reveals
pretty fully what it was that Nietzsche grew to loathe
so intensely in Wagner,—viz. , his pronounced histrionic
tendencies, his dissembling powers, his inordinate
vanity, his equivocalness, his falseness. "It honoureth
thee,"says Zarathustra, "that thou soughtest for great-
ness, but it betrayeth thee also. Thou art not
great. " The Magician is nevertheless sent as a guest
to Zarathustra's cave; for, in his heart, Zarathustra
believed until the end that the Magician was a higher
man broken by modern values.
Zarathustra now meets the last pope, and, in a Chapter
poetical form, we get Nietzsche's description of the LXVL
course Judaism and Christianity pursued before they _ u .
reached their final break-up in Atheism, Agnosticism,
and the like. The God of a strong, warlike race—
the God of Israel—is a jealous, revengeful God. He
is a power that can be pictured and endured only by
a hardy and courageous race, a race rich enough to
sacrifice and to lose in sacrifice. The image of this
God degenerates with the people that appropriate it,
and gradually He becomes a God of love—" soft and
mellow," a lower middle-class deity, who is "pitiful. "
He can no longer be a God who requires sacrifice,
for we ourselves are no longer rich enough for that.
The tables are therefore turned upon Him; He must
sacrifice to us. His pity becomes so great that he
actually does sacrifice something to us—His only
begotten Son. Such a process carried to its logical
conclusions must ultimately end in His own destruc-
tion, and thus we find the pope declaring that God
was one day suffocated by His all-too-great pity.
What follows is clear enough. Zarathustra recognises
another higher man in the ex-pope and sends him
too as a guest to the cave.
## p. 448 (#670) ############################################
448 APPENDIX.
Chapter This discourse contains perhaps the boldest of
LXVII. Nietzsche's suggestions concerning Atheism, as well
The Ugliest u some extremely penetrating remarks upon the
sentiment of pity. Zarathustra comes across the
repulsive creature sitting on the wayside, and what
does he do? He manifests the only correct feelings
that can be manifested in the presence of any great
misery—that is to say, shame, reverence, embarrass-
ment. Nietzsche detested the obtrusive and gushing
pity that goes up to misery without a blush either on
its cheek or in its heart—the pity which is only
another form of self-glorification. "Thank God that I
am not like thee ! "—only this self-glorifying sentiment
can lend a well-constituted man the impudence to
show his pity for the cripple and the ill-constituted. In
the presence of the ugliest man Nietzsche blushes,—
he blushes for his race; his own particular kind of
altruism—the altruism that might have prevented the
existence of this man—strikes him with all its force.
430
APPENDIX.
philosophy, because it declares Christian values to
be a danger to the future of our kind, is therefore
shelved as brutal, cold, and hard (see Note on
Chap. XXXVI. ). Nietzsche tried to be all things to
all men; he was sufficiently fond of his fellows for
that: in the Return Home he describes how he
ultimately returns to loneliness in order to recover
from the effects of his experiment.
Chapter LIV. Nietzsche is here completely in his element. Three
The Three things hitherto best-cursed and most calumniated on
Evil Things. eartn, are brought forward to be weighed. Voluptuous-
ness, thirst of power, and selfishness,—the three forces
in humanity which Christianity has done most to
garble and besmirch,—Nietzsche endeavours to rein-
state in their former places of honour. Voluptuous-
ness, or sensual pleasure, is a dangerous thing to discuss
nowadays. If we mention it with favour we may be
regarded, however unjustly, as the advocate of savages,
satyrs, and pure sensuality. If we condemn it, we
either go over to the Puritans or we join those who are
wont to come to table with no edge to their appetites
and who therefore grumble at all good fare. There
can be no doubt that the value of healthy innocent
voluptuousness, like the value of health itself, must
have been greatly discounted by all those who, resent-
ing their inability to partake of this world's goods,
cried like St Paul: "I would that all men were even
as I myself. " Now Nietzsche's philosophy might be
called an attempt at giving back to healthy and
normal men innocence and a clean conscience in
their desires—not to applaud the vulgar sensualists
who respond to every stimulus and whose passions
are out of hand; not to tell the mean, selfish individual,
whose selfishness is a pollution (see Aphorism 33,
"Twilight of the Idols"), that he is right, nor to assure
## p. 431 (#651) ############################################
NOTES. 431
the weak, the sick, and the crippled, that the thirst of
power, which they gratify by exploiting the happier
and healthier individuals, is justified;—but to save
the clean healthy man from the values of those around
him, who look at everything through the mud that is
in their own bodies,—to give him, and him alone, a
clean conscience in his manhood and the desires
of his manhood. "Do I counsel you to slay your
instincts? I counsel to innocence in your instincts. "
In verse 7 of the second paragraph (as in verse 1 of
par. 19 in "The Old and New Tables") Nietzsche
gives us a reason for his occasional obscurity (see also
verses 3 to 7 of " Poets "). As I have already pointed
out, his philosophy is quite esoteric. It can serve
no purpose with the ordinary, mediocre type of man.
I, personally, can no longer have any doubt that
Nietzsche's only object, in that part of his philosophy
where he bids his friends stand " Beyond Good and
Evil" with him, was to save higher men, whose growth
and scope might be limited by the too strict observance
of modern values from foundering on the rocks of a
"Compromise" between their own genius and tradi-
tional conventions. The only possible way in which
the great man can achieve greatness is by means of
exceptional freedom—the freedom which assists him
in experiencing himself. Verses 20 to 30 afford an
excellent supplement to Nietzsche's description of the
attitude of the noble type towards the slaves in
Aphorism 260 of the work " Beyond Good and Evil"
(see also Note B. in Foreword).
(See Note on Chap. XLVI. ) In Part II. of this Chapter LV.
discourse we meet with a doctrine not touched upon The Spirit of
hitherto, save indirectly;—I refer to the doctrine of Gravity.
self-love. We should try to understand this perfectly
before proceeding; for it is precisely views of this
## p. 431 (#652) ############################################
430 APPENDIX.
philosophy, because it declares Christian values to
be a danger to the future of our kind, is therefore
shelved as brutal, cold, and hard (see Note on
Chap. XXXVI. ). Nietzsche tried to be all things to
all men; he was sufficiently fond of his fellows for
that: in the Return Home he describes how he
ultimately returns to loneliness in order to recover
from the effects of his experiment.
Chapter LIV. Nietzsche is here completely in his element. Three
The Three things hitherto best-cursed and most calumniated on
Evil Things. earth, are brought forward to be weighed. Voluptuous-
ness, thirst of power, and selfishness,—the three forces
in humanity which Christianity has done most to
garble and besmirch,—Nietzsche endeavours to rein-
state in their former places of honour. Voluptuous-
ness, or sensual pleasure, is a dangerous thing to discuss
nowadays. If we mention it with favour we may be
regarded, however unjustly, as the advocate of savages,
satyrs, and pure sensuality. If we condemn it, we
either go over to the Puritans or we join those who are
wont to come to table with no edge to their appetites
and who therefore grumble at all good fare. There
can be no doubt that the value of healthy innocent
voluptuousness, like the value of health itself, must
have been greatly discounted by all those who, resent-
ing their inability to partake of this world's goods,
cried like St Paul: "I would that all men were even
as I myself. " Now Nietzsche's philosophy might be
called an attempt at giving back to healthy and
normal men innocence and a clean conscience in
their desires—not to applaud the vulgar sensualists
who respond to every stimulus and whose passions
are out of hand; not to tell the mean, selfish individual,
whose selfishness is a pollution (see Aphorism 33,
"Twilight of the Idols"), that he is right, nor to assure
## p. 431 (#653) ############################################
NOTES. 431
the weak, the sick, and the crippled, that the thirst of
power, which they gratify by exploiting the happier
and healthier individuals, is justified;—but to save
the clean healthy man from the values of those around
him, who look at everything through the mud that is
in their own bodies,—to give him, and him alone, a
clean conscience in his manhood and the desires
of his manhood. "Do I counsel you to slay your
instincts? I counsel to innocence in your instincts. "
In verse 7 of the second paragraph (as in verse 1 of
par. 19 in "The Old and New Tables") Nietzsche
gives us a reason for his occasional obscurity (see also
verses 3 to 7 of " Poets "). As I have already pointed
out, his philosophy is quite esoteric. It can serve
no purpose with the ordinary, mediocre type of man.
I, personally, can no longer have any doubt that
Nietzsche's only object, in that part of his philosophy
where he bids his friends stand " Beyond Good and
Evil" with him, was to save higher men, whose growth
and scope might be limited by the too strict observance
of modern values from foundering on the rocks of a
"Compromise " between their own genius and tradi-
tional conventions. The only possible way in which
the great man can achieve greatness is by means of
exceptional freedom—the freedom which assists him
in experiencing himself. Verses 20 to 30 afford an
excellent supplement to Nietzsche's description of the
attitude of the noble type towards the slaves in
Aphorism 260 of the work "Beyond Good and Evil"
(see also Note B. in Foreword).
(See Note on Chap. XLVI. ) In Part II. of this chapter LV.
discourse we meet with a doctrine not touched upon The Spirit of
hitherto, save indirectly;—I refer to the doctrine of Gravity,
self-love. We should try to understand this perfectly
before proceeding; for it is precisely views of this
## p. 432 (#654) ############################################
432 APPENDIX.
sort which, after having been cut out of the original
context, are repeated far and wide as internal evidence
proving the general unsoundness of Nietzsche's philo-
sophy. Already in the last of the "Thoughts out of
Season" Nietzsche speaks as follows about modern
men: ". . . these modern creatures wish rather to
be hunted down, wounded and torn to shreds, than
to live alone with themselves in solitary calm. Alone
with oneself! —this thought terrifies the modern soul;
it is his one anxiety, his one ghastly fear" (English
Edition, p. 141). In his feverish scurry to find
entertainment and diversion, whether in a novel, a
newspaper, or a play, the modern man condemns his
own age utterly; for he shows that in his heart of
hearts he despises himself. One cannot change a
condition of this sort in a day; to become endurable
to oneself an inner transformation is necessary. Too
long have we lost ourselves in our friends and enter-
tainments to be able to find ourselves so soon at
another's bidding. "And verily, it is no command-
ment for to-day and to-morrow to learn to love oneself.
Rather is it of all arts the finest, subtlest, last, and
patientest. "
In the last verse Nietzsche challenges us to show
that our way is the right way. In his teaching he does
not coerce us, nor does he overpersuade; he simply
says: "I am a law only for mine own, I am not a law
for all. This—is now my way,—where is yours? "
Chapter LVI. Nietzsche himself declares this to be the most
Par. a. decisive portion of the whole of "Thus Spake
The Old and Zarathustra. " It is a sort of epitome of his leading
New Tables, doctrines. In verse 12 of the second paragraph, we
learn how he himself would fain have abandoned the
poetical method of expression had he not known
only too well that the only chance a new doctrine
## p. 433 (#655) ############################################
NOTES. 433
has of surviving, nowadays, depends upon its being
given to the world in some kind of art-form. Just
as prophets, centuries ago, often had to have recourse
to the mask of madness in order to mitigate the
hatred of those who did not and could not see as
they did; so, to-day, the struggle for existence among
opinions and values is so great, that an art-form is
practically the only garb in which a new philosophy
can dare to introduce itself to us.
Many of the paragraphs will be found to be merely
reminiscent of former discourses. For instance,
par. 3 recalls "Redemption. " The last verse of Par. 3.
par. 4 is important. Freedom which, as I have Par. 4.
pointed out before, Nietzsche considered a danger-
ous acquisition in inexperienced or unworthy hands,
here receives its death-blow as a general desideratum.
In the first Part we read under "The Way of the
Creating One," that freedom as an end in itself does
not concern Zarathustra at all. He says there:
"Free from what? What doth that matter to Zara-
thustra? Clearly, however, shall thine eye answer
me: free for what? " And in "The Bedwarfing
Virtue": "Ah that ye understood my word: 'Do
ever what ye will—but first be such as can will. '"
Here we have a description of the kind of altruism Par. 5.
Nietzsche exacted from higher men. It is really
a comment upon "The Bestowing Virtue" (see
Note on Chap. XXII. ).
This refers, of course, to the reception pioneers Par. 6.
of Nietzsche's stamp meet with at the hands of their
contemporaries.
Nietzsche teaches that nothing is stable,—not even Par. 8.
values,—not even the concepts good and evil. He
likens life unto a stream. But foot-bridges and
railings span the stream, and they seem to stand firm.
2 E
## p. 434 (#656) ############################################
434 APPENDIX.
Many will be reminded of good and evil when they
look upon these structures; for thus these same
values stand over the stream of life, and life flows on
beneath them and leaves them standing. When,
however, winter comes and the stream gets frozen,
many inquire: "Should not everything—stand stilll
Fundamentally everything standeth still. " But soon
the spring cometh and with it the thaw-wind. It
breaks the ice, and the ice breaks down the foot-
bridges and railings, whereupon everything is swept
away. This state of affairs, according to Nietzsche,
has now been reached. "O, my brethren, is not
everything at present in flux 1 Have not all railings
and foot-bridges fallen into the water? Who would
still hold on to 'good' and 'evil'? "
Par. 9. This is complementary to the first three verses
of par. 2.
Par. 10. So far, this is perhaps the most important paragraph.
It is a protest against reading a moral order of things
in life. "Life is something essentially immoral! "
Nietzsche tells us in the introduction to the "Birth
of Tragedy. " Even to call life " activity," or to define
it further as "the continuous adjustment of internal
relations to external relations," as Spencer has it,
Nietzsche characterises as a "democratic idiosyncracy. "
He says to define it in this way, "is to mistake the
true nature and function of life, which is Will to
Power. . . . Life is essentially appropriation, injury,
conquest of the strange and weak, suppression,
severity, obtrusion of its own forms, incorporation
and at least, putting it mildest, exploitation. " Adapta-
tion is merely a secondary activity, a mere re-activity
(see Note on Chap. LVII. ).
Pars. 11, 12. These deal with Nietzsche's principle of the
desirability of rearing a select race. The biological
## p. 435 (#657) ############################################
NOTES. 435
and historical grounds for his insistence upon this
principle are, of course, manifold. Gobineau in his
great work, "L'Inegalite des Races Humaines," lays
strong emphasis upon the evils which arise from
promiscuous and inter-social marriages. He alone
would suffice to carry Nietzsche's point against all
those who are opposed to the other conditions, to
the conditions which would have saved Rome, which
have maintained the strength of the Jewish race,
and which are strictly maintained by every breeder
of animals throughout the world. Darwin in his
remarks relative to the degeneration of cultivated
types of animals through the action of promiscuous
breeding, brings Gobineau support from the realm of
biology.
The last two verses of par. 12 were discussed in
the Notes on Chaps. XXXVI. and LIII.
This, like the first part of "The Soothsayer," is Par. 13.
obviously a reference to Schopenhauerian Pessimism.
These are supplementary to the discourse "Back- Pars. 14, 15,
world's-men. " l6> «7-
We must be careful to separate this paragraph, Par. 18.
in sense, from the previous four paragraphs. Nietz-
sche is. still dealing with Pessimism here; but it is
the pessimism of the hero—the man most susceptible
of all to desperate views of life, owing to the obstacles
that are arrayed against him in a world where men of
his kind are very rare and are continually being
sacrificed. It was to save this man that Nietzsche
wrote. Heroism foiled, thwarted, and wrecked, hoping
and fighting until the last, is at length overtaken by
despair, and renounces all struggle for sleep. This
is not the natural or constitutional pessimism which
proceeds from an unhealthy body—the dyspeptic's
lack of appetite; it is rather the desperation of the
## p. 436 (#658) ############################################
436 APPENDIX.
netted lion that ultimately stops all movement, because
the more it moves the more involved it becomes.
Par. 20. "All that increases power is good, all that springs
from weakness is bad. The weak and ill-constituted
shall perish: first principle of our charity. And one
shall also help them thereto. " Nietzsche partly
divined the kind of reception moral values of this
stamp would meet with at the hands of the effeminate
manhood of Europe. Here we see that he had
anticipated the most likely form their criticism would
take (see also the last two verses of par. 17).
Par. 21. The first ten verses, here, are reminiscent of "War
and Warriors" and of "The Flies in the Market-
place. " Verses 11 and 12, however, are particularly
important. There is a strong argument in favour of
the sharp differentiation of castes and of races (and
even of sexes; see Note on Chap. XVIII. ) running
all through Nietzsche's writings. But sharp differentia-
tion also implies antagonism in some form or other—
hence Nietzsche's fears for modern men. What
modern men desire above all, is peace and the
cessation of pain. But neither great races nor great
castes have ever been built up in this way. "Who
still wanteth to rule? " Zarathustra asks in the
"Prologue. " "Who still wanteth to obey? Both are
too burdensome.
" This is rapidly becoming every-
body's attitude to-day. The tame moral reading of
the face of nature, together with such democratic
interpretations of life as those suggested by Herbert
Spencer, are signs of a physiological condition which
is the reverse of that bounding and irresponsible
healthiness in which harder and more tragic values
rule.
Par. 24. This should be read in conjunction with, "Child
and Marriage. " In the fifth verse wc shall recognise
## p. 437 (#659) ############################################
NOTES. 437
our old friend "Marriage on the ten-years system,"
which George Meredith suggested some years ago.
This, however, must not be taken too literally. I
do not think Nietzsche's profoundest views on
marriage were ever intended to be given over to the
public at all, at least not for the present. They
appear in the biography by his sister, and although
their wisdom is unquestionable, the nature of the
reforms he suggests render it impossible for them to
become popular just now.
See Note on "The Prologue. " Pars. 26, 27.
Nietzsche was not an iconoclast from predilection. Par. 28.
No bitterness or empty hate dictated his vitupera-
tions against existing values and against the dogmas of
his parents and forefathers. He knew too well what
these things meant to the millions who profess them,
to approach the task of uprooting them with levity
or even with haste. He saw what modern anarchists
and revolutionists do not see—namely, that man is in
danger of actual destruction when his customs and
values are broken. I need hardly point out, there-
fore, how deeply he was conscious of the responsibility
he threw upon our shoulders when he invited us to
reconsider our position. The lines in this paragraph
are evidence enough of his earnestness.
We meet with several puzzles here. Zarathustra Chapter
calls himself the advocate of the circle (the Eternal LVII.
Recurrence of all things), and he calls this doctrine :,
his abysmal thought. In the last verse of the first
paragraph, however, after hailing his deepest thought,
he cries: "Disgust, disgust, disgust! " We know
Nietzsche's ideal man was that "world-approving,
exuberant, and vivacious creature, who has not only
learnt to compromise and arrange with that which
was and is, but wishes to have it again, as it was and
## p. 438 (#660) ############################################
438 APPENDIX.
is, for all eternity insatiably calling out da capo, not
only to himself, but to the whole piece and play"
(see Note on Chap. XLIL). But if one ask oneself
what the conditions to such an attitude are, one will
realise immediately how utterly different Nietzsche
was from his ideal. The man who insatiably cries
da capo to himself and to the whole of his misc-tn-
scene, must be in a position to desire every incident
in his life to be repeated, not once, but again and
again eternally. Now, Nietzsche's life had been too
full of disappointments, illness, unsuccessful struggles,
and snubs, to allow of his thinking of the Eternal
Recurrence without loathing—hence probably the
words of the last verse.
In verses 15 and 16, we have Nietzsche declaring him-
self an evolutionist in the broadest sense—that is to
say, that he believes in the Development Hypothesis
as the description of the process by which species have
originated. Now, to understand his position correctly
we must show his relationship to the two greatest
of modern evolutionists—Darwin and Spencer. As
a philosopher, however, Nietzsche does not stand or
fall by his objections to the Darwinian or Spencerian
cosmogony. He never laid claim to a very profound
knowledge of biology, and his criticism is far more
valuable as the attitude of a fresh mind than as that
of a specialist towards the question. Moreover, in
his objections many difficulties are raised which are
not settled by an appeal to either of the men above
mentioned. We have given Nietzsche's definition of
life in the Note on Chap. LVI. , par. 10. Still, there
remains a hope that Darwin and Nietzsche may some
day become reconciled by a new description of the
processes by which varieties occur. The appearance
of varieties among animals and of "sporting plants"
## p. 439 (#661) ############################################
notes. 439
in the vegetable kingdom, is still shrouded in
mystery, and the question whether this is not
precisely the ground on which Darwin and Nietzsche
will meet, is an interesting one. The former says
in his "Origin of Species," concerning the causes of
variability: ". . . there are two factors, namely, the
nature of the organism, and the nature of the con-
ditions. The former seems to be much the more im-
portant,* for nearly similar variations sometimes arise
under, as far as we can judge, dissimilar conditions;
and on the other hand, dissimilar variations arise
under conditions which appear to be nearly uniform. "
Nietzsche, recognising this same truth, would ascribe
practically all the importance to the "highest func-
tionaries in the organism, in which the life-will
appears as an active and formative principle," and
except in certain cases (where passive organisms
alone are concerned) would not give such a prominent
place to the influence of environment. Adaptation,
according to him, is merely a secondary activity, a
mere re-activity, and he is therefore quite opposed to
Spencer's definition: "Life is the continuous adjust-
ment of internal relations to external relations. "
Again in the motive force behind animal and plant
life, Nietzsche disagrees with Darwin. He trans-
forms the "Struggle for Existence "—the passive and
involuntary condition—into the "Struggle for Power,"
which is active and creative, and much more in
harmony with Darwin's own view, given above, con-
cerning the importance of the organism itself. The
change is one of such far-reaching importance that
we cannot dispose of it in a breath, as a mere play
upon words. "Much is reckoned higher than life
* The italics are mine.
## p. 440 (#662) ############################################
440 APPENDIX.
itself by the living one. " Nietzsche says that to
speak of the activity of life as a "straggle for
existence," is to state the case inadequately. He
warns us not to confound Malthus with nature. There
is something more than this struggle between the
organic beings on this earth; want, which is supposed
to bring this struggle about, is not so common as is
supposed; some other force must be operative. The
Will to Power is this force, "the instinct of self-
preservation is only one of the indirect and most
frequent results thereof. " A certain lack of acumen
in psychological questions and the condition of affairs
in England at the time Darwin wrote, may both,
according to Nietzsche, have induced the renowned
naturalist to describe the forces of nature as he did
in his "Origin of Species. "
In verses 28, 29, and 30 of the second portion of
this discourse we meet with a doctrine which, at first
sight, seems to be merely "k manoir a fenvers,"
indeed one English critic has actually said of Nietz-
sche, that "Thus Spake Zarathustra" is no more
than a compendium of modern views and maxims
turned upside down. Examining these heterodox
pronouncements a little more closely, however, we
may possibly perceive their truth. Regarding good
and evil as purely relative values, it stands to reason
that what may be bad or evil in a given man, relative
to a certain environment, may actually be good if
not highly virtuous in him relative to a certain other
environment. If this hypothetical man represent the
ascending line of life—that is to say, if he promise all
that which is highest in a Greco-Roman sense, then
it is likely that he will be condemned as wicked if
introduced into the society of men representing the
opposite and descending line of life.
## p. 441 (#663) ############################################
NOTES. 44I
By depriving a man of his wickedness—more
particularly nowadays—therefore, one may unwittingly
be doing violence to the greatest in him. It may be
an outrage against his wholeness, just as the lopping-
off of a leg would be. Fortunately, the natural so-
called "wickedness" of higher men has in a certain
measure been able to resist this lopping process which
successive slave-moralities have practised; but signs
are not wanting which show that the noblest wicked-
ness is fast vanishing from society—the wickedness
of courage and determination—and that Nietzsche
had good reasons for crying: "Ah, that [man's]
baddest is so very small! Ah, that his best is so
very small. What is good? To be brave is good!
It is the good war which halloweth every cause! "
(see also par. 5, "Higher Man ").
This is a final pa? an which Zarathustra sings to Chapter LX.
Eternity and the marriage-ring of rings, the ring of The Seven
the Eternal Recurrence. Seals-
In my opinion this part is Nietzsche's open avowal PART IV.
that all his philosophy, together with all his hopes,
enthusiastic outbursts, blasphemies, prolixities, and
obscurities, were merely so many gifts laid at the feet
of higher men. He had no desire to save the world.
What he wished to determine was: Who is to be
master of the world? This is a very different thing.
He came to save higher men;—-to give them that
freedom by which, alone, they can develop and
reach their zenith (see Note on Chap. LIV. , end). It
has been argued, and with considerable force, that
no such philosophy is required by higher men, that,
as a matter of fact, higher men, by virtue of their
constitutions always, do stand Beyond Good and
## p. 442 (#664) ############################################
442 APPENDIX.
Evil, and never allow anything to stand in the way
of their complete growth. Nietzsche, however, was
evidently not so confident about this. He would
probably have argued that we only see the successful
cases. Being a great man himself, he was well aware
of the dangers threatening greatness in our age. In
"Beyond Good and Evil" he writes: "There are
few pains so grievous as to have seen, divined, or
experienced how an exceptional man has missed
his way and deteriorated. . . . " He knew "from
his painfullest recollections on what wretched ob-
stacles promising developments of the highest rank
have hitherto usually gone to pieces, broken
down, sunk, and become contemptible. " Now in
Part IV. we shall find that his strongest temptation
to descend to the feeling of "pity" for his con-
temporaries, is the "cry for help" which he hears
from the lips of the higher men exposed to the
dreadful danger of their modern environment.
Chapter LXI. In the fourteenth verse of this discourse Nietzsche
The Honey defines the solemn duty he imposed upon himself:
Sacrifice. « Become wnat thou art. " Surely the criticism which
has been directed against this maxim must all fall to
the ground when it is remembered, once and for all, that
Nietzsche's teaching was never intended to be other
than an esoteric one. "I am a law only. for mine
own," he says emphatically, "I am not a law for all. "
It is of the greatest importance to humanity that its
highest individuals should be allowed to attain to their
full development; for, only by means of its heroes
can the human race be led forward step by step to
higher and yet higher levels. "Become what thou
art" applied to all, of course, becomes a vicious
maxim; it is to be hoped, however, that we may learn
in time that the same action performed by a given
## p. 443 (#665) ############################################
NOTES. 443
number of men, loses its identity precisely that
same number of times. —" Quod licet Jovi, non licet
bovi. "
At the last eight verses many readers may be
tempted to laugh. In England we almost always
laugh when a man takes himself seriously at anything
save sport. And there is of course no reason why the
reader should not be hilarious. —A certain greatness
is requisite, both in order to be sublime and to have
reverence for the sublime. Nietzsche earnestly be-
lieved that the Zarathustra-kingdom—his dynasty of
a thousand years—would one day come; if he had
not believed it so earnestly, if every artist in fact had
not believed so earnestly in his Hazar, whether of
ten, fifteen, a hundred, or a thousand years, we should
have lost all our higher men; they would have become
pessimists, suicides, or merchants. If the minor poet
and philosopher has made us shy of the prophetic
seriousness which characterised an Isaiah or a Jeremiah,
it is surely our loss and the minor poet's gain.
We now meet with Zarathustra in extraordinary Chapter
circumstances. He is confronted with Schopenhauer LXII.
and tempted by the old Soothsayer to commit the sin . e Cry of
of pity. "I have come that I may seduce thee to
thy last sin ! " says the Soothsayer to Zarathustra. It
will be remembered that in Schopenhauer's ethics, pity
is elevated to the highest place among the virtues, and
very consistently too, seeing that the Weltanschauung
is a pessimistic one. Schopenhauer appeals to Nietz-
sche's deepest and strongest sentiment—his sympathy
for higher men. "Why dost thou conceal thyself? "
he cries. "It is the higlier man that calleth for thee! "
Zarathustra is almost overcome by the Soothsayer's
pleading, as he had been once already in the past;
but he resists him step by step. At length he can
## p. 444 (#666) ############################################
444
APPENDIX.
Chapter
LXIII.
Talk with
the Kings.
Chapter
LXIV.
The Leech.
withstand him no longer, and, on the plea that the
higher man is on his ground and therefore under his
protection, Zarathustra departs in search of him,
leaving Schopenhauer—a higher man in Nietzsche's
opinion—in the cave as a guest.
On his way Zarathustra meets two more higher men
of his time; two kings cross his path. They are
above the average modern type; for their instincts
tell them what real ruling is, and they despise the
mockery which they have been taught to call " Reign-
ing. " "We are not the first men," they say, "and have
nevertheless to stand for them: of this imposture have
we at last become weary and disgusted. " It is the
kings who tell Zarathustra: "There is no sorer
misfortune in all human destiny than when the
mighty of the earth are not also the first men. There
everything becometh false and distorted and mon-
strous. " The kings are also asked by Zarathustra to
accept the shelter of his cave, whereupon he proceeds
on his way.
Among the higher men whom Zarathustra wishes to
save, is also the scientific specialist—the man who
honestly and scrupulously pursues his investigations,
as Darwin did, in one department of knowledge. "I
love him who liveth in order to know, and seeketh
to know in order that the Superman may hereafter
live. Thus seeketh he his own down-going. " "The
spiritually conscientious one," he is called in this
discourse. Zarathustra steps on him unawares, and
the slave of science, bleeding from the violence he
has done to himself by his self-imposed task, speaks
proudly of his little sphere of knowledge—his little
hand's breadth of ground on Zarathustra's territory,
philosophy. "Where mine honesty ceaseth," says
the true scientific specialist, "there am I blind and
## p. 445 (#667) ############################################
NOTES. 445
want also to be blind. Where I want to know, how-
ever, there want I also to be honest—namely, severe,
rigorous, restricted, cruel, and inexorable. " Zarathus-
tra greatly respecting this man, invites him too to the
cave, and then vanishes in answer to another cry for
help.
The Magician is of course an artist, and Nietzsche's Chapter LXV.
intimate knowledge of perhaps the greatest artist ofThe Magician,
his age rendered the selection of Wagner, as the type
in this discourse, almost inevitable. Most readers
will be acquainted with the facts relating to Nietzsche's
and Wagner's friendship and ultimate separation. As
a boy and a youth Nietzsche had shown such a
remarkable gift for music that it had been a question
at one time whether he should not perhaps give up
everything else in order to develop this gift, but he
became a scholar notwithstanding, although he never
entirely gave up composing, and playing the piano.
While still in his teens, he became acquainted with
Wagner's music and grew passionately fond of it.
Long before he met Wagner he must have idealised
him in his mind to an extent which only a profoundly
artistic nature could have been capable of. Nietzsche
always had high ideals for humanity. If one were
asked whether, throughout his many changes, there
was yet one aim, one direction, and one hope to
which he held fast, one would be forced to reply in
the affirmative and declare that aim, direction, and hope
to have been "the elevation of the type man. " Now,
when Nietzsche met Wagner he was actually casting
about for an incarnation of his dreams for the German
people, and we have only to remember his youth (he
was twenty-one when he was introduced to Wagner),
his love of Wagner's music, and the undoubted power
of the great musician's personality, in order to realise
## p. 446 (#668) ############################################
446 APPENDIX.
how very uncritical his attitude must have been in the
first flood of his enthusiasm. Again, when the friend-
ship ripened, we cannot well imagine Nietzsche, the
younger man, being anything less than intoxicated by
his senior's attention and love, and we are therefore
not surprised to find him pressing Wagner forward as
the great Reformer and Saviour of mankind. "Wagner
in Bayreuth " (English Edition, 1909) gives us the best
proof of Nietzsche's infatuation, and although signs
are not wanting in this essay which show how clearly
and even cruelly he was sub-consciously "taking
stock" of his friend—even then, the work is a record
of what great love and admiration can do in the way
of endowing the object of one's affection with all
the qualities and ideals that a fertile imagination can
conceive.
When the blow came, it was therefore all the more
severe. Nietzsche at length realised that the friend
of his fancy and the real Richard Wagner—the com-
poser of Parsifal—were not one; the fact dawned
upon him slowly; disappointment upon disappoint-
ment, revelation after revelation, ultimately brought
it home to him, and though his best instincts were
naturally opposed to it at first, the revulsion of feeling
at last became too strong to be ignored, and Nietzsche
was plunged into the blackest despair. Years after
his break with Wagner, he wrote "The Case of
Wagner," and "Nietzsche contra Wagner," and these
works are with us to prove the sincerity and depth of
his views on the man who was the greatest event
of his life.
The poem in this discourse is, of course, reminiscent
of Wagner's own poetical manner, and it must be
remembered that the whole was written subsequent
to Nietzsche's final break with his friend. The
## p. 447 (#669) ############################################
NOTES. 447
dialogue between Zarathustra and the Magician reveals
pretty fully what it was that Nietzsche grew to loathe
so intensely in Wagner,—viz. , his pronounced histrionic
tendencies, his dissembling powers, his inordinate
vanity, his equivocalness, his falseness. "It honoureth
thee,"says Zarathustra, "that thou soughtest for great-
ness, but it betrayeth thee also. Thou art not
great. " The Magician is nevertheless sent as a guest
to Zarathustra's cave; for, in his heart, Zarathustra
believed until the end that the Magician was a higher
man broken by modern values.
Zarathustra now meets the last pope, and, in a Chapter
poetical form, we get Nietzsche's description of the LXVL
course Judaism and Christianity pursued before they _ u .
reached their final break-up in Atheism, Agnosticism,
and the like. The God of a strong, warlike race—
the God of Israel—is a jealous, revengeful God. He
is a power that can be pictured and endured only by
a hardy and courageous race, a race rich enough to
sacrifice and to lose in sacrifice. The image of this
God degenerates with the people that appropriate it,
and gradually He becomes a God of love—" soft and
mellow," a lower middle-class deity, who is "pitiful. "
He can no longer be a God who requires sacrifice,
for we ourselves are no longer rich enough for that.
The tables are therefore turned upon Him; He must
sacrifice to us. His pity becomes so great that he
actually does sacrifice something to us—His only
begotten Son. Such a process carried to its logical
conclusions must ultimately end in His own destruc-
tion, and thus we find the pope declaring that God
was one day suffocated by His all-too-great pity.
What follows is clear enough. Zarathustra recognises
another higher man in the ex-pope and sends him
too as a guest to the cave.
## p. 448 (#670) ############################################
448 APPENDIX.
Chapter This discourse contains perhaps the boldest of
LXVII. Nietzsche's suggestions concerning Atheism, as well
The Ugliest u some extremely penetrating remarks upon the
sentiment of pity. Zarathustra comes across the
repulsive creature sitting on the wayside, and what
does he do? He manifests the only correct feelings
that can be manifested in the presence of any great
misery—that is to say, shame, reverence, embarrass-
ment. Nietzsche detested the obtrusive and gushing
pity that goes up to misery without a blush either on
its cheek or in its heart—the pity which is only
another form of self-glorification. "Thank God that I
am not like thee ! "—only this self-glorifying sentiment
can lend a well-constituted man the impudence to
show his pity for the cripple and the ill-constituted. In
the presence of the ugliest man Nietzsche blushes,—
he blushes for his race; his own particular kind of
altruism—the altruism that might have prevented the
existence of this man—strikes him with all its force.
