It would be a distinct advance in the
efficiency of state and municipal financing;
and what is even more important, a long step
toward the emancipation of the people from
banker-control.
efficiency of state and municipal financing;
and what is even more important, a long step
toward the emancipation of the people from
banker-control.
Louis Brandeis - 1914 - Other People's Money, and How Bankers Use It
bonds were largely "over-subscribed.
"
And since then other cities large and small
have had their "over-the-counter" bond sales.
The experience of Utica, as stated by its Control-
ler, Fred G. Reusswig, must prove of general
interest:
"In June of the present year I advertised for
sale two issues, one of $100,000, and the other of
$19,000, bearing interest at 4 1/2 per cent. The
latter issue was purchased at par by a local bidder
and of the former we purchased $10,000 for our
sinking funds. That left $90,000 unsold, for
which there were no bidders, which was the first
time that I had been unable to sell our bonds.
About this time the 'popular sales' of Baltimore
and Philadelphia attracted my attention. The
laws in effect in those cities did not restrict the
officials as does our law and I could not copy their
methods. I realized that there was plenty of
money in this immediate vicinity and if I could
devise a plan conforming with our laws under
which I could make the sale attractive to small
investors it would undoubtedly prove successful.
I had found, in previous efforts to interest people
of small means, that they did not understand the
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? SUPERFLUOUS BANKERS 121
meaning of premium and would rather not buy
than bid above par. They also objected to mak-
ing a deposit with their bids. In arranging for
the 'popular sales' I announced in the papers
that, while I must award to the highest bidder, it
was my opinion that a par bid would be the highest
bid. I also announced that we would issue bonds
in denominations as low as $100 and that we
would not require a deposit except where the bid
was $5,000 or over. Then I succeeded in getting
the local papers to print editorials and local
notices upon the subject of municipal bonds, with
particular reference to those of Utica and the
forthcoming sale. All the prospective purchaser
had to do was to fill in the amount desired,
sign his name, seal the bid and await the day
for the award. I did not have many bidders for
very small amounts. There was only one for
$100 at the first sale and one for $100 at the
second sale and not more than ten who wanted
less than $500. Most of the bidders were looking
for from $1,000 to $5,000, but nearly all were peo-
ple of comparatively small means, and with some
the investment represented all their savings. In
awarding the bonds I gave preference to residents
of Utica and I had no difficulty in apportioning
the various maturities in a satisfactory way.
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? 122 OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
"I believe that there are a large number of per-
sons in every city who would buy their own bonds
if the way were made easier by law. Syracuse
and the neighboring village of Ilion, both of which
had been unable to sell in the usual way, came to
me for a program of procedure and both have
since had successful sales along similar lines.
We have been able by this means to keep the
interest rate on our bonds at 4 1/2 per cent. , while
cities which have followed the old plan of relying
upon bond houses have had to increase the rate
to 5 per cent. I am in favor of amending the law
in such a manner that the Common Council,
approved by the Board of Estimate and Appor-
tionment, may fix the prices at which bonds shall
be sold, instead of calling for competitive bids.
Then place the bonds on sale at the Controller's
office to any one who will pay the price. The
prices upon each issue should be graded according
to the different values of different maturities.
Under the present law, as we have it, conditions
are too complies <<k! to make a sale practicable
except upon a basis of par bids. "
THE ST. PAUL EXPERIMENT
St. Paul wisely introduced into its experiment a
more democratic feature, which Tom L. Johnson,
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? SUPERFLUOUS BANKERS 12S
Cleveland's great mayor, thought out (but did not
utilize), and which his friend W. B. Colver, now
Editor-in-Chief of the Daily News, brought to the
attention of the St. Paul officials. Mayor John-
son had recognized the importance of reaching the
small savings of the people; and concluded that
it was necessary not only to issue the bonds in
very small denominations, but also to make them
redeemable at par. He sought to combine
practically, bond investment with the savings
bank privilege. The fact that municipal bonds
are issuable ordinarily only in large denomina-
tions, say, $1,000, presented an obstacle to be
overcome. Mayor Johnson's plan was to have
the sinking fund commissioners take large blocks
of the bonds, issue against them certificates in
denominations of $10, and have the commis-
sioners agree (under their power to purchase
securities) to buy the certificates back at par and
interest. Savings bank experience, he insisted,
showed that the redemption feature would not
prove an embarrassment; as the percentage of
those wishing to withdraw their money is small;
and deposits are nearly always far in excess of
withdrawals.
The St. Paul sinking fund commissioners and
City Attorney O'Neill approved the Johnson
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? 124 OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
plan; and in the face of high money rates, sold on
a 4 per cent. basis, during July, certificates to the
net amount of $502,300; during August, $147,-
000; and during September, over $150,000, the
average net sales being about $5,700 a day.
Mr. Colver, reporting on the St. Paul experience,
said:
"There have been about 2,000 individual pur-
chasers making the average deposit about $350
or $360. There have been no certificates sold
to banks. During the first month the deposits
averaged considerably higher and for this reason:
in very many cases people who had savings which
represented the accumulation of considerable
time, withdrew their money from the postal sav-
ings banks, from the regular banks, from various
hiding places and deposited them with the citv.
Now these same people are coming once or fa ice
a month and making deposits of ten or twenty
dollars, so that the average of the individual
deposit has fallen very rapidly during September
and every indication is that the number of small
deposits will continue to increase and the rela-
tively large deposits become less frequent as
time goes on.
As a matter of fact, these certificate deposits
are stable, far more than the deposits and invest-
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? SUPERFLUOUS BANKERS 125
ments of richer people who watch for advanta-
geous reinvestments and who shift their money
about rather freely. The man with three or
four hundred dollars savings will suffer almost
anything before he will disturb that fund. We
believe that the deposits every day here, day in
and day out, will continue to take care of all the
withdrawals and still leave a net gain for the day,
that net figure at present being about $5,700 a
day. "
Many cities are now prevented from selling
bonds direct to the small investors, through laws
which compel bonds to be issued in large denomi-
nations or which require the issue to be offered
to the highest bidder. These legislative limita-
tions should be promptly removed.
SALESMANSHIP AND EDUCATION
Such success as has already been attained is
largely due to the unpaid educational work of
leading progressive newspapers. But the educa-
tional work to be done must not be confined to
teaching "the people"--the buyers of the bonds.
Municipal officials and legislators have quite as
much to learn. They must, first of all, study
salesmanship. Selling bonds to the people is a
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? 126 OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
new art, still undeveloped. The general problems
have not yet been worked out. And besides
these problems common to all states and cities,
there will be, in nearly every community, local
problems which must be solved, and local difficul-
ties which must be overcome. The proper solu-
tion even of the general problems must take con-
siderable time. There will have to be many ex-
periments made; and doubtless there will be many
failures. Every great distributor of merchandise
knows the obstacles which he had to overcome
before success was attained; and the large sums
that had to be invested in opening and preparing
a market. Individual concerns have spent mil-
lions in wise publicity; and have ultimately reaped
immense profits when the market was won.
Cities must take their lessons from these great
distributors. Cities must be ready to study the
problems and to spend prudently for proper pub-
licity work. It might, in the end, prove an econ-
omy, even to allow, on particular issues, where nec-
essary, a somewhat higher interest rate than bank-
ers would exact, if thereby a direct market for
bonds could be secured. Future operations would
yield large economies. And the obtaining of a
direct market for city bonds is growing ever more
important, because of the huge increase in loans
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? SUPERFLUOUS BANKERS 127
which must attend the constant expansion of
municipal functions. In 1898 the new munic-
ipal issues aggregated $103,084,793; in 1912,
$380,810,287.
In New York, Massachusetts and the other
sixteen states where a system of purely mutual
savings banks is general, it is possible, with a
little organization, to develop an important mar-
ket for the direct purchaser of bonds. The
bonds issued by Massachusetts cities and towns
have averaged recently about $15,000,000 a year,
and those of the state about $3,000,000. The 194
Massachusetts savings banks, with aggregate
assets of $902,105,755. 94, held on October 31,
1912, $90,536,581. 32 in bonds and notes of states
and municipalities. Of this sum about $60,000,-
000 are invested in bonds and notes of Massa-
chusetts cities and towns, and about $8,000,000 in
state issues. The deposits in the savings banks
are increasing at the rate of over $30,000,000 a
year. Massachusetts state and municipal bonds
have, within a few years, come to be issued tax
exempt in the hands of the holder, whereas other
classes of bonds usually held by savings banka
are subject to a tax of one-half of one per cent.
SAVINGS BANKS AS CUSTOMERS
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? 128 OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
of the market value. Massachusetts savings
banks, therefore, will to an increasing extent, se-
lect Massachusetts municipal issues for high-grade
bond investments. Certainly Massachusetts cit-
ies and towns might, with the cooperation of the
Commonwealth, easily develop a "home market"
for "over-the-counter" bond business with the
savings banks. And the savings banks of other
states offer similar opportunities to their munici-
palities.
COOPERATION
Bankers obtained their power through com-
bination. Why should not cities and states
by means of cooperation free themselves from
the bankers? For by cooperation between the
cities and the state, the direct marketing of
municipal bonds could be greatly facilitated.
Massachusetts has 33 cities, each with a popu-
lation of over 12,000 persons; 71 towns each
with a population of over 5,000; and 250 towns
each with a population of less than 5,000. Three
hundred and eight of these municipalities now
have funded indebtedness outstanding. The
aggregate net indebtedness is about $180,000,000.
Every year about $15,000,000 of bonds and notes
are issued by the Massachusetts cities and town!
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? SUPERFLUOUS BANKERS 129
for the purpose of meeting new requirements and
refunding old indebtedness. If these munici-
palities would cooperate in marketing securities,
the market for the bonds of each municipality
would be widened; and there would exist also a
common market for Massachusetts municipal
securities which would be usually well supplied,
would receive proper publicity and would attract
investors. Successful merchandising obviously
involves carrying an adequate, well-assorted
stock. If every city acts alone, in endeavoring
to market its bonds direct, the city's bond-selling
activity will necessarily be sporadic. Its ability
to supply the investor will be limited by its own
necessities for money. The market will also be
limited to the bonds of the particular municipal-
ity. But if a state and its cities should cooperate,
there could be developed a continuous and broad
market for the sale of bonds "over-the-counter. "
The joint selling agency of over three hundred
municipalities,--as in Massachusetts--would natu-
rally have a constant supply of assorted bonds
and notes which could be had in as small amounts
as the investor might want to buy them. It
would be a simple matter to establish such a
joint selling agency by which municipalities,
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? 130 OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
under proper regulation of, and aid from the
state, would cooperate.
And cooperation among the cities and with the
state might serve in another important respect.
These 354 Massachusetts municipalities carry in
the aggregate large bank balances. Sometimes
the balance carried by a city represents unex-,
pended revenues; sometimes unexpended pro-
ceeds of loans. On these balances they usually
receive from the banks 2 per cent. interest. The
balances of municipalities vary like those of other
depositors; one having idle funds, when another
is in need. Why should not all of these cities
and towns cooperate, making, say, the State their
common banker, and supply each other with
funds as farmers and laborers cooperate through
credit unions? Then cities would get, instead of
2 per cent. on their balances, all their money
was worth.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts holds
now in its sinking and other funds nearly $30,000-
000 of Massachusetts municipal securities, con-
stituting nearly three-fourths of all securities held
in these funds. Its annual purchases aggregate
nearly $4,000,000. Its purchases direct from
cities and towns have already exceeded $1,000,000
this year. It would be but a simple extension of
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? SUPERFLUOUS BANKERS 131
the state's function to cooperate, as indicated, in
a joint, Municipal Bond Selling Agency an dCredit
Union.
It would be a distinct advance in the
efficiency of state and municipal financing;
and what is even more important, a long step
toward the emancipation of the people from
banker-control.
Strong corporations with established reputa-
tions, locally or nationally, could emancipate
themselves from the banker in a similar manner.
Public-service corporations in some of our leading
cities could easily establish "over-the-counter"
home markets for their bonds; and would be
greatly aided in this by the supervision now being
exercised by some state commissions over the
issue of securities by such corporations. Such
corporations would gain thereby not only in
freedom from banker-control and exactions, but
in the winning of valuable local support. The
investor's money would be followed by his sym-
pathy. In things economic, as well as in things
political, wisdom and safety lie in direct appeals to
the people.
The Pennsylvania Railroad now relies largely
upon its stockholders for new capital. But a
CORPORATE SELF-HELP
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? 132 OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
corporation with its long-continued success and
reputation for stability should have much wider
financial support and should eliminate the banker
altogether. With the 2,700 stations on its
system, the Pennsylvania could, with a slight
expense, create nearly as many avenues through
which money would be obtainable to meet its
growing needs.
BANKER PROTECTORS
It may be urged that reputations often outlive
the conditions which justify them, that outlived
reputations are pitfalls to the investors; and that
the investment banker is needed to guard him
from such dangers. True; but when have the
big bankers or their little satellites protected the
people from such pitfalls?
Was there ever a more be-bankered railroad
than the New Haven? Was there ever a more
banker-led community of investors than New
England? Six years before the fall of that great
system, the hidden dangers were pointed out to
these banker-experts. Proof was furnished of
the rotting timbers. The disaster-breeding poli-
cies were laid bare. The bankers took no action.
Repeatedly, thereafter, the bankers' attention
was called to the steady deterioration of the
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? SUPERFLUOUS BANKERS 133
structure. The New Haven books disclose 11,-
481 stockholders who are residents of Massa-
chusetts; 5,682 stockholders in Connecticut; 735
in Rhode Island; and 3,510 in New York. Of
the New Haven stockholders 10,474 were women.
Of the New Haven stockholders 10,222 were of
such modest means that their holdings were from
one to ten shares only. The investors were
sorely in need of protection. The city directories
disclose 146 banking houses in Boston, 26 in
Providence, 33 in New Haven and Hartford,
and 357 in New York City. But who, connected
with those New England and New York bank-
ing houses, during the long years which pre-
ceded the recent investigation of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, raised either voice or
pen in protest against the continuous mismanage-
ment of that great trust property or warned the
public of the impending disaster? Some of the
bankers sold their own stock holdings. Some
bankers whispered to a few favored customers
advice to dispose of New Haven stock. But not
one banker joined those who sought to open the
eyes of New England to the impending disaster
and to avert it by timely measures. New
England's leading banking houses were ready to
"cooperate" with the New Haven management
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? 184 OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
in taking generous commissions for marketing the
endless supply of new securities; but they did
nothing to protect the investors. Were these
bankers blind? Or were they afraid to oppose
the will of J. P. Morgan & Co. ?
Perhaps it is the banker who, most of all,
needs the New Freedom.
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? CHAPTER VII
BIG MEN AND LITTLE BUSINESS
J. P. Morgan & Co. declare, in their letter to
the Pujo Committee, that "practically all the
railroad and industrial development of this coun-
try has taken place initially through the medium
of the great banking houses. " That statement is
entirely unfounded in fact. On the contrary
nearly every such contribution to our comfort and
prosperity was "initiated" urithont their aid.
The "great banking houses" came into relation
with these enterprises, either after success had
been attained, or upon "reorganization" after
the possibility of success had been demonstrated,
but the funds of the hardy pioneers, who had
risked their all, were exhausted.
This is true of our early railroads, of our
early street railways, and of the automobile; of
the telegraph, the telephone and the wireless;
of gas and oil; of harvesting machinery, and of
our steel industry; of the textile, paper and shoe
industries; and of nearly every other important
branch of manufacture. The initiation of each
135
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? 136 OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
of these enterprises may properly be character-
ized as "great transactions"; and the men who
contributed the financial aid and business man-
agement necessary for their introduction are
entitled to share, equally with inventors, in our
gratitude for what has been accomplished. But
the instances are extremely rare where the origi-
nal financing of such enterprises was undertaken
by investment bankers, great or small. It was
usually done by some common business man,
accustomed to taking risks; or by some well-to-
do friend of the inventor or pioneer, who was
influenced largely by considerations other than
money-getting. Here and there you will find
that banker-aid was given; but usually in those
cases it was a small local banking concern, not
a "great banking house" which helped to "initi-
ate" the undertaking.
RAILROADS
We have come to associate the great bankers
with railroads. But their part was not conspicu-
ous in the early history of the Eastern railroads;
and in the Middle West the experience was, to
some extent, similar. The Boston & Maine
Railroad owns and leases 2,215 miles of line; but
it is a composite of about 166 separate railroad
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? BIG MEN AND LITTLE BUSINESS 137
companies. The New Haven Railroad owns
and leases 1,996 miles of line; but it is a compos-
ite of 112 separate railroad companies. The
necessary capital to build these little roads was
gathered together, partly through state, county
or municipal aid; partly from business men or
landholders who sought to advance their special
interests; partly from investors; and partly from
well-to-do public-spirited men, who wished to
promote the welfare of their particular communi-
ties. About seventy-five years after the first of
these railroads was built, J. P. Morgan & Co.
became fiscal agent for all of them by creating the
New Haven-Boston & Maine monopoly.
STEAMSHIPS
The history of our steamship lines is similar.
In 1807, Robert Fulton, with the financial aid of
Robert R. Livingston, a judge and statesman--not
a banker--demonstrated with the Claremont,
that it was practicable to propel boats by steam.
In 1833 the three Cunard brothers of Halifax
and 232 other persons--stockholders of the
Quebec and Halifax Steam Navigation Com-
pany--joined in supplying about $80,000 to
build the Royal William,--the first steamer to
cross the Atlantic. In 1902, many years after
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? 138 OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
individual enterprises had developed practically-
all the great ocean lines, J. P. Morgan & Co.
floated the International Mercantile Marine
with its $52,744,000 of 4 1/2 bonds, now selling
at about 60, and $100,000,000 of stock (pre-
ferred and common) on which no dividend has
ever been paid. It was just sixty-two years after
the first regular line of transatlantic steamers--
The Cunard--was founded that Mr. Morgan
organized the Shipping Trust.
TELEGRAPH
The story of the telegraph is similar. The
money for developing Morse's invention was
supplied by his partner and co-worker, Alfred
Vail. The initial line (from Washington to Balti-
more) was built with an appropriation of $30,000
made by Congress in 1843. Sixty-six years later
J. P. Morgan & Co. became bankers for
the Western Union through financing its pur-
chase by the American Telephone & Telegraph
Company.
HARVESTING MACHINERY
Next to railroads and steamships, harvesting
machinery has probably been the most potent
factor in the development of America; and most
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? BIG MEN AND LITTLE BUSINESS 139
important of the harvesting machines was Cyrus
H. McCormick's reaper. That made it possible
to increase the grain harvest twenty- or thirty-
> fold. No investment banker had any part in in-
troducing this great business man's invention.
McCormick was without means; but William
Butler Ogden, a railroad builder, ex-Mayor and
leading citizen of Chicago, supplied $25,000 with
which the first factory was built there in 1847.
Fifty-five years later, J. P. Morgan & Co. per-
formed the service of combining the five great
harvester companies, and received a commission
of $3,000,000. The concerns then consolidated
as the International Harvester Company, with
a capital stock of $120,000,000, had, despite
their huge assets and earning power, been pre-
viously capitalized, in the aggregate, at only
$10,500,000--strong evidence that in all the
preceding years no investment banker had
financed them. Indeed, McCormick was as able
in business as in mechanical invention. Two
years after Odgen paid him $25,000 for a half
interest in the business, McCormick bought it
back for $50,000; and thereafter, until his death
in 1884, no one but members of the McCormick
family had any interest in the business.
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? 140 OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
THE BANKER ERA
It may be urged that railroads and steamships,
the telegraph and harvesting machinery were
introduced before the accumulation of investment
capital had developed the investment banker,
and before America's "great banking houses"
had been established; and that, consequently, it
would be fairer to inquire what services bankers
had rendered in connection with later industrial
development. The firm of J. P. Morgan & Co.
is fifty-five years old; Kuhn, Loeb & Co. fifty-
six years old; Lee, Higginson & Co. over fifty
years; and Kidder, Peabody & Co. forty-eight
years; and yet the investment banker seems to
have had almost as little part in "initiating"
the great improvements of the last half century,
as did bankers in the earlier period.
STEEL
The modern steel industry of America is forty-
five years old. The "great bankers" had no part
in initiating it. Andrew Carnegie, then already
a man of large means, introduced the Bessemer
process in 1868. In the next thirty years our
steel and iron industry increased greatly. By
1898 we had far outstripped all competitors.
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? BIG MEN AND LITTLE BUSINESS 141
America's production about equalled the aggre-
gate of England and Germany. We had also
reduced costs so much that Europe talked of the
"American Peril. " It was 1898, when J. P.
Morgan & Co. took their first step in forming the
Steel Trust, by organizing the Federal Steel
Company. Then followed the combination of
the tube mills into an $80,000,000 corporation,
J. P. Morgan & Co. taking for their syndicate
services $20,000,000 of common stock. About
the same time the consolidation of the bridge and
structural works, the tin plate, the sheet steel, the
hoop and other mills followed; and finally, in
1901, the Steel Trust was formed, with a capitali-
zation of $1,402,000,000. These combinations
came thirty years after the steel industry had
been "initiated".
THE TELEPHONE
The telephone industry is less than forty years
old. It is probably America's greatest contri-
bution to industrial development. The bankers
had no part in "initiating" it. The glory belongs
to a simple, enthusiastic, warm-hearted, business
man of Haverhill, Massachusetts, who was willing
to risk his own money. H. N. Casson tells of
this, most interestingly, in his "History of the
Telephone":
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And since then other cities large and small
have had their "over-the-counter" bond sales.
The experience of Utica, as stated by its Control-
ler, Fred G. Reusswig, must prove of general
interest:
"In June of the present year I advertised for
sale two issues, one of $100,000, and the other of
$19,000, bearing interest at 4 1/2 per cent. The
latter issue was purchased at par by a local bidder
and of the former we purchased $10,000 for our
sinking funds. That left $90,000 unsold, for
which there were no bidders, which was the first
time that I had been unable to sell our bonds.
About this time the 'popular sales' of Baltimore
and Philadelphia attracted my attention. The
laws in effect in those cities did not restrict the
officials as does our law and I could not copy their
methods. I realized that there was plenty of
money in this immediate vicinity and if I could
devise a plan conforming with our laws under
which I could make the sale attractive to small
investors it would undoubtedly prove successful.
I had found, in previous efforts to interest people
of small means, that they did not understand the
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? SUPERFLUOUS BANKERS 121
meaning of premium and would rather not buy
than bid above par. They also objected to mak-
ing a deposit with their bids. In arranging for
the 'popular sales' I announced in the papers
that, while I must award to the highest bidder, it
was my opinion that a par bid would be the highest
bid. I also announced that we would issue bonds
in denominations as low as $100 and that we
would not require a deposit except where the bid
was $5,000 or over. Then I succeeded in getting
the local papers to print editorials and local
notices upon the subject of municipal bonds, with
particular reference to those of Utica and the
forthcoming sale. All the prospective purchaser
had to do was to fill in the amount desired,
sign his name, seal the bid and await the day
for the award. I did not have many bidders for
very small amounts. There was only one for
$100 at the first sale and one for $100 at the
second sale and not more than ten who wanted
less than $500. Most of the bidders were looking
for from $1,000 to $5,000, but nearly all were peo-
ple of comparatively small means, and with some
the investment represented all their savings. In
awarding the bonds I gave preference to residents
of Utica and I had no difficulty in apportioning
the various maturities in a satisfactory way.
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? 122 OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
"I believe that there are a large number of per-
sons in every city who would buy their own bonds
if the way were made easier by law. Syracuse
and the neighboring village of Ilion, both of which
had been unable to sell in the usual way, came to
me for a program of procedure and both have
since had successful sales along similar lines.
We have been able by this means to keep the
interest rate on our bonds at 4 1/2 per cent. , while
cities which have followed the old plan of relying
upon bond houses have had to increase the rate
to 5 per cent. I am in favor of amending the law
in such a manner that the Common Council,
approved by the Board of Estimate and Appor-
tionment, may fix the prices at which bonds shall
be sold, instead of calling for competitive bids.
Then place the bonds on sale at the Controller's
office to any one who will pay the price. The
prices upon each issue should be graded according
to the different values of different maturities.
Under the present law, as we have it, conditions
are too complies <<k! to make a sale practicable
except upon a basis of par bids. "
THE ST. PAUL EXPERIMENT
St. Paul wisely introduced into its experiment a
more democratic feature, which Tom L. Johnson,
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? SUPERFLUOUS BANKERS 12S
Cleveland's great mayor, thought out (but did not
utilize), and which his friend W. B. Colver, now
Editor-in-Chief of the Daily News, brought to the
attention of the St. Paul officials. Mayor John-
son had recognized the importance of reaching the
small savings of the people; and concluded that
it was necessary not only to issue the bonds in
very small denominations, but also to make them
redeemable at par. He sought to combine
practically, bond investment with the savings
bank privilege. The fact that municipal bonds
are issuable ordinarily only in large denomina-
tions, say, $1,000, presented an obstacle to be
overcome. Mayor Johnson's plan was to have
the sinking fund commissioners take large blocks
of the bonds, issue against them certificates in
denominations of $10, and have the commis-
sioners agree (under their power to purchase
securities) to buy the certificates back at par and
interest. Savings bank experience, he insisted,
showed that the redemption feature would not
prove an embarrassment; as the percentage of
those wishing to withdraw their money is small;
and deposits are nearly always far in excess of
withdrawals.
The St. Paul sinking fund commissioners and
City Attorney O'Neill approved the Johnson
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? 124 OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
plan; and in the face of high money rates, sold on
a 4 per cent. basis, during July, certificates to the
net amount of $502,300; during August, $147,-
000; and during September, over $150,000, the
average net sales being about $5,700 a day.
Mr. Colver, reporting on the St. Paul experience,
said:
"There have been about 2,000 individual pur-
chasers making the average deposit about $350
or $360. There have been no certificates sold
to banks. During the first month the deposits
averaged considerably higher and for this reason:
in very many cases people who had savings which
represented the accumulation of considerable
time, withdrew their money from the postal sav-
ings banks, from the regular banks, from various
hiding places and deposited them with the citv.
Now these same people are coming once or fa ice
a month and making deposits of ten or twenty
dollars, so that the average of the individual
deposit has fallen very rapidly during September
and every indication is that the number of small
deposits will continue to increase and the rela-
tively large deposits become less frequent as
time goes on.
As a matter of fact, these certificate deposits
are stable, far more than the deposits and invest-
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? SUPERFLUOUS BANKERS 125
ments of richer people who watch for advanta-
geous reinvestments and who shift their money
about rather freely. The man with three or
four hundred dollars savings will suffer almost
anything before he will disturb that fund. We
believe that the deposits every day here, day in
and day out, will continue to take care of all the
withdrawals and still leave a net gain for the day,
that net figure at present being about $5,700 a
day. "
Many cities are now prevented from selling
bonds direct to the small investors, through laws
which compel bonds to be issued in large denomi-
nations or which require the issue to be offered
to the highest bidder. These legislative limita-
tions should be promptly removed.
SALESMANSHIP AND EDUCATION
Such success as has already been attained is
largely due to the unpaid educational work of
leading progressive newspapers. But the educa-
tional work to be done must not be confined to
teaching "the people"--the buyers of the bonds.
Municipal officials and legislators have quite as
much to learn. They must, first of all, study
salesmanship. Selling bonds to the people is a
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? 126 OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
new art, still undeveloped. The general problems
have not yet been worked out. And besides
these problems common to all states and cities,
there will be, in nearly every community, local
problems which must be solved, and local difficul-
ties which must be overcome. The proper solu-
tion even of the general problems must take con-
siderable time. There will have to be many ex-
periments made; and doubtless there will be many
failures. Every great distributor of merchandise
knows the obstacles which he had to overcome
before success was attained; and the large sums
that had to be invested in opening and preparing
a market. Individual concerns have spent mil-
lions in wise publicity; and have ultimately reaped
immense profits when the market was won.
Cities must take their lessons from these great
distributors. Cities must be ready to study the
problems and to spend prudently for proper pub-
licity work. It might, in the end, prove an econ-
omy, even to allow, on particular issues, where nec-
essary, a somewhat higher interest rate than bank-
ers would exact, if thereby a direct market for
bonds could be secured. Future operations would
yield large economies. And the obtaining of a
direct market for city bonds is growing ever more
important, because of the huge increase in loans
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? SUPERFLUOUS BANKERS 127
which must attend the constant expansion of
municipal functions. In 1898 the new munic-
ipal issues aggregated $103,084,793; in 1912,
$380,810,287.
In New York, Massachusetts and the other
sixteen states where a system of purely mutual
savings banks is general, it is possible, with a
little organization, to develop an important mar-
ket for the direct purchaser of bonds. The
bonds issued by Massachusetts cities and towns
have averaged recently about $15,000,000 a year,
and those of the state about $3,000,000. The 194
Massachusetts savings banks, with aggregate
assets of $902,105,755. 94, held on October 31,
1912, $90,536,581. 32 in bonds and notes of states
and municipalities. Of this sum about $60,000,-
000 are invested in bonds and notes of Massa-
chusetts cities and towns, and about $8,000,000 in
state issues. The deposits in the savings banks
are increasing at the rate of over $30,000,000 a
year. Massachusetts state and municipal bonds
have, within a few years, come to be issued tax
exempt in the hands of the holder, whereas other
classes of bonds usually held by savings banka
are subject to a tax of one-half of one per cent.
SAVINGS BANKS AS CUSTOMERS
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? 128 OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
of the market value. Massachusetts savings
banks, therefore, will to an increasing extent, se-
lect Massachusetts municipal issues for high-grade
bond investments. Certainly Massachusetts cit-
ies and towns might, with the cooperation of the
Commonwealth, easily develop a "home market"
for "over-the-counter" bond business with the
savings banks. And the savings banks of other
states offer similar opportunities to their munici-
palities.
COOPERATION
Bankers obtained their power through com-
bination. Why should not cities and states
by means of cooperation free themselves from
the bankers? For by cooperation between the
cities and the state, the direct marketing of
municipal bonds could be greatly facilitated.
Massachusetts has 33 cities, each with a popu-
lation of over 12,000 persons; 71 towns each
with a population of over 5,000; and 250 towns
each with a population of less than 5,000. Three
hundred and eight of these municipalities now
have funded indebtedness outstanding. The
aggregate net indebtedness is about $180,000,000.
Every year about $15,000,000 of bonds and notes
are issued by the Massachusetts cities and town!
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? SUPERFLUOUS BANKERS 129
for the purpose of meeting new requirements and
refunding old indebtedness. If these munici-
palities would cooperate in marketing securities,
the market for the bonds of each municipality
would be widened; and there would exist also a
common market for Massachusetts municipal
securities which would be usually well supplied,
would receive proper publicity and would attract
investors. Successful merchandising obviously
involves carrying an adequate, well-assorted
stock. If every city acts alone, in endeavoring
to market its bonds direct, the city's bond-selling
activity will necessarily be sporadic. Its ability
to supply the investor will be limited by its own
necessities for money. The market will also be
limited to the bonds of the particular municipal-
ity. But if a state and its cities should cooperate,
there could be developed a continuous and broad
market for the sale of bonds "over-the-counter. "
The joint selling agency of over three hundred
municipalities,--as in Massachusetts--would natu-
rally have a constant supply of assorted bonds
and notes which could be had in as small amounts
as the investor might want to buy them. It
would be a simple matter to establish such a
joint selling agency by which municipalities,
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? 130 OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
under proper regulation of, and aid from the
state, would cooperate.
And cooperation among the cities and with the
state might serve in another important respect.
These 354 Massachusetts municipalities carry in
the aggregate large bank balances. Sometimes
the balance carried by a city represents unex-,
pended revenues; sometimes unexpended pro-
ceeds of loans. On these balances they usually
receive from the banks 2 per cent. interest. The
balances of municipalities vary like those of other
depositors; one having idle funds, when another
is in need. Why should not all of these cities
and towns cooperate, making, say, the State their
common banker, and supply each other with
funds as farmers and laborers cooperate through
credit unions? Then cities would get, instead of
2 per cent. on their balances, all their money
was worth.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts holds
now in its sinking and other funds nearly $30,000-
000 of Massachusetts municipal securities, con-
stituting nearly three-fourths of all securities held
in these funds. Its annual purchases aggregate
nearly $4,000,000. Its purchases direct from
cities and towns have already exceeded $1,000,000
this year. It would be but a simple extension of
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? SUPERFLUOUS BANKERS 131
the state's function to cooperate, as indicated, in
a joint, Municipal Bond Selling Agency an dCredit
Union.
It would be a distinct advance in the
efficiency of state and municipal financing;
and what is even more important, a long step
toward the emancipation of the people from
banker-control.
Strong corporations with established reputa-
tions, locally or nationally, could emancipate
themselves from the banker in a similar manner.
Public-service corporations in some of our leading
cities could easily establish "over-the-counter"
home markets for their bonds; and would be
greatly aided in this by the supervision now being
exercised by some state commissions over the
issue of securities by such corporations. Such
corporations would gain thereby not only in
freedom from banker-control and exactions, but
in the winning of valuable local support. The
investor's money would be followed by his sym-
pathy. In things economic, as well as in things
political, wisdom and safety lie in direct appeals to
the people.
The Pennsylvania Railroad now relies largely
upon its stockholders for new capital. But a
CORPORATE SELF-HELP
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? 132 OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
corporation with its long-continued success and
reputation for stability should have much wider
financial support and should eliminate the banker
altogether. With the 2,700 stations on its
system, the Pennsylvania could, with a slight
expense, create nearly as many avenues through
which money would be obtainable to meet its
growing needs.
BANKER PROTECTORS
It may be urged that reputations often outlive
the conditions which justify them, that outlived
reputations are pitfalls to the investors; and that
the investment banker is needed to guard him
from such dangers. True; but when have the
big bankers or their little satellites protected the
people from such pitfalls?
Was there ever a more be-bankered railroad
than the New Haven? Was there ever a more
banker-led community of investors than New
England? Six years before the fall of that great
system, the hidden dangers were pointed out to
these banker-experts. Proof was furnished of
the rotting timbers. The disaster-breeding poli-
cies were laid bare. The bankers took no action.
Repeatedly, thereafter, the bankers' attention
was called to the steady deterioration of the
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? SUPERFLUOUS BANKERS 133
structure. The New Haven books disclose 11,-
481 stockholders who are residents of Massa-
chusetts; 5,682 stockholders in Connecticut; 735
in Rhode Island; and 3,510 in New York. Of
the New Haven stockholders 10,474 were women.
Of the New Haven stockholders 10,222 were of
such modest means that their holdings were from
one to ten shares only. The investors were
sorely in need of protection. The city directories
disclose 146 banking houses in Boston, 26 in
Providence, 33 in New Haven and Hartford,
and 357 in New York City. But who, connected
with those New England and New York bank-
ing houses, during the long years which pre-
ceded the recent investigation of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, raised either voice or
pen in protest against the continuous mismanage-
ment of that great trust property or warned the
public of the impending disaster? Some of the
bankers sold their own stock holdings. Some
bankers whispered to a few favored customers
advice to dispose of New Haven stock. But not
one banker joined those who sought to open the
eyes of New England to the impending disaster
and to avert it by timely measures. New
England's leading banking houses were ready to
"cooperate" with the New Haven management
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? 184 OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
in taking generous commissions for marketing the
endless supply of new securities; but they did
nothing to protect the investors. Were these
bankers blind? Or were they afraid to oppose
the will of J. P. Morgan & Co. ?
Perhaps it is the banker who, most of all,
needs the New Freedom.
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? CHAPTER VII
BIG MEN AND LITTLE BUSINESS
J. P. Morgan & Co. declare, in their letter to
the Pujo Committee, that "practically all the
railroad and industrial development of this coun-
try has taken place initially through the medium
of the great banking houses. " That statement is
entirely unfounded in fact. On the contrary
nearly every such contribution to our comfort and
prosperity was "initiated" urithont their aid.
The "great banking houses" came into relation
with these enterprises, either after success had
been attained, or upon "reorganization" after
the possibility of success had been demonstrated,
but the funds of the hardy pioneers, who had
risked their all, were exhausted.
This is true of our early railroads, of our
early street railways, and of the automobile; of
the telegraph, the telephone and the wireless;
of gas and oil; of harvesting machinery, and of
our steel industry; of the textile, paper and shoe
industries; and of nearly every other important
branch of manufacture. The initiation of each
135
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? 136 OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
of these enterprises may properly be character-
ized as "great transactions"; and the men who
contributed the financial aid and business man-
agement necessary for their introduction are
entitled to share, equally with inventors, in our
gratitude for what has been accomplished. But
the instances are extremely rare where the origi-
nal financing of such enterprises was undertaken
by investment bankers, great or small. It was
usually done by some common business man,
accustomed to taking risks; or by some well-to-
do friend of the inventor or pioneer, who was
influenced largely by considerations other than
money-getting. Here and there you will find
that banker-aid was given; but usually in those
cases it was a small local banking concern, not
a "great banking house" which helped to "initi-
ate" the undertaking.
RAILROADS
We have come to associate the great bankers
with railroads. But their part was not conspicu-
ous in the early history of the Eastern railroads;
and in the Middle West the experience was, to
some extent, similar. The Boston & Maine
Railroad owns and leases 2,215 miles of line; but
it is a composite of about 166 separate railroad
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? BIG MEN AND LITTLE BUSINESS 137
companies. The New Haven Railroad owns
and leases 1,996 miles of line; but it is a compos-
ite of 112 separate railroad companies. The
necessary capital to build these little roads was
gathered together, partly through state, county
or municipal aid; partly from business men or
landholders who sought to advance their special
interests; partly from investors; and partly from
well-to-do public-spirited men, who wished to
promote the welfare of their particular communi-
ties. About seventy-five years after the first of
these railroads was built, J. P. Morgan & Co.
became fiscal agent for all of them by creating the
New Haven-Boston & Maine monopoly.
STEAMSHIPS
The history of our steamship lines is similar.
In 1807, Robert Fulton, with the financial aid of
Robert R. Livingston, a judge and statesman--not
a banker--demonstrated with the Claremont,
that it was practicable to propel boats by steam.
In 1833 the three Cunard brothers of Halifax
and 232 other persons--stockholders of the
Quebec and Halifax Steam Navigation Com-
pany--joined in supplying about $80,000 to
build the Royal William,--the first steamer to
cross the Atlantic. In 1902, many years after
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? 138 OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
individual enterprises had developed practically-
all the great ocean lines, J. P. Morgan & Co.
floated the International Mercantile Marine
with its $52,744,000 of 4 1/2 bonds, now selling
at about 60, and $100,000,000 of stock (pre-
ferred and common) on which no dividend has
ever been paid. It was just sixty-two years after
the first regular line of transatlantic steamers--
The Cunard--was founded that Mr. Morgan
organized the Shipping Trust.
TELEGRAPH
The story of the telegraph is similar. The
money for developing Morse's invention was
supplied by his partner and co-worker, Alfred
Vail. The initial line (from Washington to Balti-
more) was built with an appropriation of $30,000
made by Congress in 1843. Sixty-six years later
J. P. Morgan & Co. became bankers for
the Western Union through financing its pur-
chase by the American Telephone & Telegraph
Company.
HARVESTING MACHINERY
Next to railroads and steamships, harvesting
machinery has probably been the most potent
factor in the development of America; and most
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? BIG MEN AND LITTLE BUSINESS 139
important of the harvesting machines was Cyrus
H. McCormick's reaper. That made it possible
to increase the grain harvest twenty- or thirty-
> fold. No investment banker had any part in in-
troducing this great business man's invention.
McCormick was without means; but William
Butler Ogden, a railroad builder, ex-Mayor and
leading citizen of Chicago, supplied $25,000 with
which the first factory was built there in 1847.
Fifty-five years later, J. P. Morgan & Co. per-
formed the service of combining the five great
harvester companies, and received a commission
of $3,000,000. The concerns then consolidated
as the International Harvester Company, with
a capital stock of $120,000,000, had, despite
their huge assets and earning power, been pre-
viously capitalized, in the aggregate, at only
$10,500,000--strong evidence that in all the
preceding years no investment banker had
financed them. Indeed, McCormick was as able
in business as in mechanical invention. Two
years after Odgen paid him $25,000 for a half
interest in the business, McCormick bought it
back for $50,000; and thereafter, until his death
in 1884, no one but members of the McCormick
family had any interest in the business.
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? 140 OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
THE BANKER ERA
It may be urged that railroads and steamships,
the telegraph and harvesting machinery were
introduced before the accumulation of investment
capital had developed the investment banker,
and before America's "great banking houses"
had been established; and that, consequently, it
would be fairer to inquire what services bankers
had rendered in connection with later industrial
development. The firm of J. P. Morgan & Co.
is fifty-five years old; Kuhn, Loeb & Co. fifty-
six years old; Lee, Higginson & Co. over fifty
years; and Kidder, Peabody & Co. forty-eight
years; and yet the investment banker seems to
have had almost as little part in "initiating"
the great improvements of the last half century,
as did bankers in the earlier period.
STEEL
The modern steel industry of America is forty-
five years old. The "great bankers" had no part
in initiating it. Andrew Carnegie, then already
a man of large means, introduced the Bessemer
process in 1868. In the next thirty years our
steel and iron industry increased greatly. By
1898 we had far outstripped all competitors.
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? BIG MEN AND LITTLE BUSINESS 141
America's production about equalled the aggre-
gate of England and Germany. We had also
reduced costs so much that Europe talked of the
"American Peril. " It was 1898, when J. P.
Morgan & Co. took their first step in forming the
Steel Trust, by organizing the Federal Steel
Company. Then followed the combination of
the tube mills into an $80,000,000 corporation,
J. P. Morgan & Co. taking for their syndicate
services $20,000,000 of common stock. About
the same time the consolidation of the bridge and
structural works, the tin plate, the sheet steel, the
hoop and other mills followed; and finally, in
1901, the Steel Trust was formed, with a capitali-
zation of $1,402,000,000. These combinations
came thirty years after the steel industry had
been "initiated".
THE TELEPHONE
The telephone industry is less than forty years
old. It is probably America's greatest contri-
bution to industrial development. The bankers
had no part in "initiating" it. The glory belongs
to a simple, enthusiastic, warm-hearted, business
man of Haverhill, Massachusetts, who was willing
to risk his own money. H. N. Casson tells of
this, most interestingly, in his "History of the
Telephone":
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 03:28 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. 32106000978228 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.
