No More Learning

The old question with which people sought to push logi
cians into a corner, so that they must either have recourse to
pitiful sophisms or confess their ignorance, "and consequently the vanity of their whole art, is this, -- What is truth ? " The definition of the word truth, to wit, "the accordance of the cognition with its object," is presupposed in the ques tion ; but we desire to be told, in the answer to what the universal and secure criterion of the truth of every cognition.
To know what questions we may reasonably propose,
in itself strong evidence of sagacity and intelligence. For
50 TRAHSOENDENTAl
? be in itself absurd and unsusceptible of rational answer, attended with the danger-- not to
question
* Vernunfler/:enntniss.
confined in this translation to the rendering of Vernunft and its derira- tires,-- Tr
The words reason, rational, will always be
? ? it is
if a
a
is a in
it,
? nrmoDUCTioiT. -- of akalytio atcd dialectic. 51
mention the shame that falls upon the person who proposes it -- of seducing the unguarded listener into making absurd answers, and we are presented with the ridiculous spectacle of one (as the ancients said) " milking the he-goat, and the other holding a sieve. "
If truth consists in the accordance of a cognition with its object, this object must be, ipsofacto, distinguished from all others ; for a cognition is false if it does not accord with the object to which it relates, although it contains something which may be affirmed of other objects. Now an universal criterion of truth would be that which is valid for all cog nitions, without distinction of their objects. But it is evident that since, in the case of such a criterion, we make abstraction of all the content of a cognition (that of all relation to its object), and truth relates precisely to this content, must be utterly absurd to ask for mark of the truth of this content of cognition and that, accordingly, sufficient, and at the same time universal, test of truth cannot
? possibly be found. As we have already termed the content of cogni tion its matter, we shall say " Of the truth of our cog
nitions in respect of their matter, no universal test can be demanded, because such demand self-contradictory. "
On the other hand, with regard to our cognition in respect of its mere form (excluding all content), equally manifest that logic, in so far as exhibits the universal and necessary laws of the understanding, must in these very laws present us with criteria of truth. Whatever contradicts these rules
false, because thereby the understanding made to contra dict its own universal laws of thought that is, to contradict itself. These criteria, however, apply solely to the form of truth, that of thought in general, and in so far they are per fectly accurate, yet not sufficient. For although cognition may be perfectly accurate as to logical form, that not self- contradictory, notwithstanding quite possible that may not stand in agreement with its object. Consequently, the merely logical criterion of truth, namely, the accordance of cognition with the universal and formal laws of understanding and reason, nothing more than the conditio tine qui non, or negative condition of all truth. Farther than this logic cannot go, and the error which depends not on the form, but on the content of the cognition, has no test to discover.
? ? x 2
is, a it
a a
it
it
:a is
is
it
is,
a
is
;
is
it is
is,
is
it
a
;
? S2 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.
General logic, then, resolves the whole formal business oi
laws before we proceed to investigate them in respect of their content, in order to discover whether they contain positive truth in regard to their object. Because, however, the mere form of a cognition, accurately as it may accord with logical laws, is insufficient to supply us with material (objective) truth, no one, by means of logic alone, can venture to predi cate any thing of or decide concerning objects, unless he has obtained, independently of logic, well-grounded information about them, in order afterwards to examine, according to logical laws, into the use and connection, in a cohering whole,
of that information, or, what is still better, merely to test it by them. Notwithstanding, there lies so seductive a charm in the possession of a specious art like this--an art which gives to all our cognitions the form of the understanding, although with respect to the content thereof we may be sadly deficient --that general logic, which is merely a canon of judgment, has been employed as an organon for the actual production, or rather for the semblance of production of objective asser tions, and has thus been grossly misapplied. Now general logic, in its assumed character of organon, is called Dialectic.
Different as are the significations in which the ancients used this term for a science or an art, we may safely infer, from their actual employment of that with them was nothing else than logic of illusion-- sophistical art for giving ignorance, nay, even intentional sophistries, the colour
ing of truth, in which the thoroughness of procedure which logic requires was imitated, and their topic* employed to cloak the empty pretensions. Now may be taken as safe and useful warning, that general logic, considered as an organon,
The Topic (Topics) of the ancients was division of the intellectual instruction then prevalent, with the design of setting forth the proper method of reasoning on any given proposition --according to certain dis tinctions of the genus, the species, &c. of the subject and predicate words, analogies, and the . Ike. of course contained also code of laws iur svllogistical disputation. was nol necessarily an aid to sophistry -- 7V.
and reason into its elements, and exhibit*
nnderstanding
them as principles of all logical judging of our cognitions. This part of logic may, therefore, be called Analytic, and is at least the negative test of truth, because all cognitions must first of all be estimated and tried according to these
? ? ? It
It
a
a
; of
a
it, a
*
it
a
it
? IWTHODTTCTIOH. -- OP rSANSCEKDENfAl ANAlYTIC,
must always be a logic of illusion, that be dialectical, for, ta teaches us nothing whatever respecting the content of our cognitions, but merely the formal conditions of their ac cordance with the understanding, which do not relate to and are quite indifferent in respect of objects, any attempt to employ as an instrument (organon) in order to extend and enlnrge the range of our knowledge must end in mere prating any one being able to maintain or oppose, with some appear ance of truth, any single assertion whatever.
Such instruction quite unbecoming the dignity of phi
For these reasons we have chosen to denominate this part of logic Dialectic, the sense of critique of dialectical illusion, and we wish the term to be so understood
this place.
IV.
Of the division of Transcendental Logic into Transcendental Analytic and Dialectic.
In transcendental logic we isolate the understanding (as
in transcendental esthetic the sensibility) and select from
our cognition merely that part of thought which has its origin the understanding alone. The exercise of this pure cogni
tion, however, depends upon this as its condition, that ohjecta to which may be applied be given to us in intuition, for without intuition, the whole of our cognition without objects, and therefore quite void. That part of transcen dental logic, then, which treats of the elements of pure cognition of the understanding, and of the principles without which no object at all can be thought, transcen dental analytic, and at the same time logic of truth. For no cognition can contradict without losing at the same time all content, that losing all reference to an object, and therefore all truth. But because we are very easily seduced
into employing these pure cognitions and principles of the understanding themselves, and that even beyond the boun daries of experience, which yet the only source whence we can obtain matter (objects) on which those pure conceptions may be employed, --understanding runs the risk of making, means of empty sophisms, material and objective use of the mere formal principles of the pure understanding, and of
losophy.
&C. 5. "i
? passing judgments on objects without distinction -- objecti
? ? a
is
it,
a
in
by
;
by
is,
is
is
is
it is
it it
in
iu
a
is,
? 54 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.
which arc no* given to us, nay, perhaps cannot be given to at in any way. Now, as it ought properly to be only a canon for judging of the empirical use of the u lderatandhig, this kind of logic is misused when we seek to employ it as an organon of the universal and unlimited exercise of the understanding, and
attempt with the pure understanding alone to judge synthe tically, affirm, and determine respecting objects in general. In this case the exercise of the pure understanding becomes dialectical. The second part of our transcendental logic must therefore be a critique of dialectical illusion, and this critique we shall term Transcendental Dialectic, -- not meaning it
as an art of producing dogmatically such illusion (an art which is unfortunately too current among the practitioners of metaphysical juggling), but as a critique of understanding and reason in regard to their hyperphysical use. This critique will expose the groundless nature of the pretensions of these two faculties, and invalidate their claims to the discovery and enlargement of our cognitions merely by means of trans cendental principles, and shew that the proper employment of these faculties is to test the judgments made by the pure un derstanding, and to guard it from sophistical delusion.
TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. FIRST DIVISION. TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC.
* I.
Fran scendental analytic is the dissection of the whole of our a priori knowledge into the elements of the pure cognition of the understanding. In order to effect our purpose, it is ne cessary, 1st, That the conceptions be pure and not empirical ; 2d, That they belong not to intuition and sensibility, but to thought and understanding ; 3d, That they be elementary conceptions, and as such, quite different from deduced ot compound conceptions ; 4th, That our table of these ele mentary conceptions be complete, and fill up the whole sphere of the pure understanding. Now this completeness of a science cannot be accepted with confidence on the gua
rantee of a mere estimate of its existence in an aggre
? ? ? ? TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC OP CONCEPTIONS.
53
gate formed only by means of repeated experiments and at tempts. The completeness which we require is possible only by means of an idea of the totality of the ik priori cognition of the understanding, and through the thereby determined division of the conceptions which form the said whole ; con sequently, only by means of their connection in a system. Pure understanding distinguishes itself not merely from every thing empirical, but also completely from all sensibility. It is a unity self-subsistent, self-sufficient, and not to be enlarged by any additions from without. Hence the sum of its cogni tion constitutes a system to be determined by and comprised under an idea ; and the completeness and articulation of this system can at the same time serve as a test of the correctness and genuineness of all the parts of cognition that belong to it. The whole of this part of transcendental logic consists of two books, of which the one contains the conceptions, and the other the principles of pure understanding.
TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC. BOOK I.
Analytic
By the term "Analytic of Conceptions," I do not under stand the analysis of these, or the usual process in phi losophical investigations of dissecting the conceptions which present themselves, according to their content, and so making them clear; but I mean the hitherto little attempted dissection of the faculty of understanding itself, in order to investigate the possibility of conceptions a priori, by looking for them in the understanding alone, as their birth-place, and analysing the pure use of this faculty. For this is the proper duty of a transcendental philosophy ; what remains is the logical treatment of the conceptions in philosophy in general. We shall therefore follow up the pure conceptions even to their germs and beginnings in the human understanding, in which they lie, until they are developed on occasions presented oy experience, and, freed by the same understanding from the empirical conditions attaching to them, are set forth in theii unalloyed purity.
? of Conceftions. ? 2.
? ? ? 66
TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.
Analytic of Conceptions.
CHAPTER I.
OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL CLUE TO THE DISCOVERY OF ALL PURE CONCEPTIONS OF THE UNDERSTANDING.
Introductory. *
? 3.
When we call into play a faculty of cognition, different
conceptions manifest themselves according to the different cir cumstances, and make known this faculty, and assemble them selves into a more or less extensive collection, according to the time or penetration that has been applied to the consider ation of them. Where this process, conducted as it me chanically, so to speak, will end, cannot be determined with certainty. Besides, the conceptions which we discover in this nap-hazard manner present themselves by no means in order and systematic unity, but are at last coupled together only according to resemblances to each other, and arranged series, according to the quantity of their content, from the simpler to the more complex, -- series which are anything but systematic, though not altogether without certain kind of method in their construction.
Transcendental philosophy has the advantage, and moreover the duty, of searching for its conception's according to prin ciple; because these conceptions spring pure and unmixed out of the understanding as an absolute unity, and therefore must be connected with each other according to one conception or idea. connection of this kind, however, furnishes us with ready prepared rule, by which its proper place may be as signed to every pure conception of the understanding, and the completeness of the system of all be determined priori, --both which would otherwise have been dependent on mere choice or chance.
TRANSCENDENTAL CLUE TO THE DISCOVERY OF ALL PURS CONCEPTIONS OF THE UNDERSTANDING.
Sect. Of the Logical use the Understanding in general.
4.
The understanding was defined above only negatively, a>>
non-sensuous faculty of cognition. Now, independently of sensibility, we cannot possibly have any intuition; rui
? ? ? f.
?
of
I.
A
&
a
a in
is,
a
? conception
THE LOGICAL USE OF UNDEBBTANDIWO.
57
sequently, the understanding is no faculty of intuition. But besides intuition there is no other mode of cognition, except
through conceptions ; consequently, the cognition of every, at least of every human, understanding is a cognition through conceptions, -- not iutuitive, but discursive. All intuitions, as sensuous, depend on affections; conceptions, therefore, upon functions. By the word function, I understand the unity of the act of arranging diverse representations under one common
representation. Conceptions, then, are based ou the spon
taneity of thought, ns sensuous intuitions are on the recepti
vity of impressions. Now, the understanding cannot make any other use of these conceptions than to judge by means of them. As no representation, except an intuition, relates immedi ately to its object, a conception never relates immediately to an object, but only to some other representation thereof, be that an intuition or itself a conception. A judgment, therefore, is the mediate cognition of an object, consequently the representation of a representation of it. In every judgment there is a con ception which applies to, and is valid for many other concep tions, and which among these comprehends also a given repre sentation, (his last being immediately connected with an object. For example, in the judgment -- "All bodies are divisible," our conception of divisible applies to vnrious other conceptions ; among these, however, it is here particularly applied to the
? of body, and this conception of body relates to certain phecuomena which occur to us. These objects, therefore, are mediately represented by the conception of divisibility. All
judgments, accordingly, are functions of unity in our represent ations, inasmuch as, instead of an immediate, a higher repre sentation, which comprises this and various others, is used for our cognition of the object, and thereby many possible cogui- tions are collected into one. But we can reduce all acts of the understanding to judgments, so that understanding may be re presented as the faculty ofjudging. For it according to what has been said above, faculty of thought. Now thought
means of conceptions. But conceptions, as pre dicates of possible judgments, relate to some representation of
yet undetermined object. Thus the conception of body in dicates something --forexample, metal--which can be cognized
means of that conception. therefore conception. for the reason alone that other representations are contained under by means of which can relate to objects. therefore th>>
cognition
? ? it
a
It is
it,
i>>
by
a
It is
a
is,
by
? 68 TEASSOElTDiiNTAL LOGIC.
predicate to a possible judgment ; for example, "Every inetal is a body. " All the functions of the understanding therefore can be discovered, when we can completely exhibit the func tions of unity in judgments. And that this may be effected very easily, the following section will shew.
Sect. II. -- Of the Logical Function in Judgments.
* 5-
If we abstract all the content of a judgment, and consider
only the intellectual form thereof, we find that the function of thought in a judgment can be brought under four heads, of which each contains three momenta. These may be con veniently represented in the following table :--
I.
Quantity of judgments.
points,
II. Quality.
Affirmative.
Negative. Infinite.
Universal. Particular.
Singular.
IT. Modality. Problematical.
Assertorical. Apodeictical.
in. Relation.
Categorical. Hypothetical.
Disjunctive.
As this division appears to differ in some, though not essential
from the usual technic of logicians, the following ob servations, for the prevention of otherwise possible misunder standing, will not be without their use.
1 . Logicians say, with justice, that in the use of judgments in syllogisms, singular judgments may be treated like universal ones. For, precisely because a singular judgment has no extent at all, its predicate cannot refer to a part of that which is con tained in the conception of the subject and be excluded from the rest. The predicate is valid for the whole conception just as if it were a general conception, and had extent, to the whole of which the predicate applied. On the other hand, let us compare
.
of the Understanding
? ? ? ? THE LOGICAL f UNCTION IN JUDGMENTS. 59
? singular with a general judgment, merely as a cognition, in regard to quantity. The singular judgment relates to the general one, as unity to infinity, and is therefore in itself essen tially different. Thus, if we estimate a singular judgment (judicium singulars) not merely according to its intrinsic valid ity as a judgment, but also as a cognition generally, according to its quantity in comparison with that of other cognitions, it is then entirely different from a general judgment (judicium commune), and in a complete table of the momenta of thought deserves a separate place, --though, indeed, this would not be necessary in a logic limited merely to the consideration of the use of judgments in reference to each other.
2. 1 n like manner, in transcendental logic, infinite mustbe dis tinguished from affirmative j udgments, although in general logic they are rightly enough classed under affirmative. General logicabstracts allcontentof thepredicate (though it be negative), and only considers whether the said predicate be affirmed or denied of the subject. But transcendental logic considers also the worth or content of this logical affirmation --an affirmation
by means of a merely negative predicate, and enquires how much the sum total of our cognition"gains by this affirmation. For example, if I say of the soul, It is not mortal," --by this ne gative judgment I should at least ward off error. Now, by the proposition, " The soul is not mortal," I have, in respect of the logical form, really affirmed, inasmuch as I thereby place the soul in the unlimited sphere of immortal beings. Now, because, of the whole sphere of possible existences, the mortal occupies one part, and the immortal the other, neither more nor less is affirmed by the proposition, than that the soul is one among the infinite multitude of things which remain over, when I take away the whole mortal part. But by this proceeding we accom plish only this much, that the infinite sphere of all possible existences is in so far limited, that the mortal is excluded from and the soul placed in the remaining part of the extent of this sphere. But this part remains, notwithstanding this exception, infinite, and more and more parts may be taken away from the wholesphere, withoutintheslightestdegreethereby augmenting or affirmatively determining our conception of the soul. These judgments, therefore, infinite inrespectof their logical extent, arc, in respect of the content of their cognition, merely limitative and are consequently entitled to a place in our transcendental table of all the momenta of thought in judgments, because tha
? ? ? ;
it,
is
? 60 TBANSCEKDENTAL LOOIC.
function of the understanding exercised by them may perhaps be of importance in the field of its pure h priori cognition.
3. All relations of thought in judgments are those (a) of the
predicate to the subject; (6) of the principle to its consequence ; (c) of the divided cognition and all the members of the division to each other.
In the first of these three classes, we consider only two conceptions; in the second, two judgments; in the third, several judgments in relation to each other. The hypothetical proposition, " If perfect justice exists, the obstinately wicked are
punished," contains properly the relation to each other of two propositions, namely, " Perfect justice exists," and " The ob stinately wicked are punished. " Whether these propositions are in themselves true, is a question not here decided. Nothing is cogitated by means of this judgment except a certain conse quence. Finally, the disjunctive judgment contains a relation of two or more propositions to each other, --a relation not of consequence, but of logical opposition, in so far as the sphere of the one proposition excludes that of the other. But it con tains at the same time a relation of community, in so far as all the propositions taken together fill up the sphere of the cog nition. The disjunctive judgment contains, therefore, the rela tion of the parts of the whole sphere of a cognition, since the sphere of each part is a complemental part of the sphere of the other, each contributing to form the sum total of the divided cognition. Take, for example, the proposition, "The world exists either through blind chance, or through internal neces sity, or through an external cause. " Each of these propo sitions embraces a part of the sphere of our possible cognition as to the existence of a world ; all of them taken together, the whole sphere. To take the cognition out of one of these spheres, is equivalent to placing it in one of the others ; and, on the other hand, to place it in one sphere is equivalent to taking it out of the rest. There therefore, in disjunctive
? certain community of cognitions, which consists this, that they mutually exclude each other, yet thereby deter mine, as whole, the true cognition, inasmuch as, taken to gether, they make up the complete content of particular given
judgment
And this all that find necessary, for the sake of what follows, to remark in this place.
4. The modality of judgments quite peculiar function, with this distinguishing characteristic, that contributes nothing to the content of judgment (for besides quantity,
cognition.
? ? is a
I a
is
is,
a it
a
a
a
in
? THE LOGICAL rX7>>CTIO>> IN JUDGMENTS. 61
quality, and relation, there ia nothing more that constitutes the content of a judgment), but concerns itself only with the value of the copula in relation to thought in general. Pro blematical judgments are those in which the affirmation or negation is accepted as merely possible (ad libitum). In the assertorical, we regard the proposition as real (true) ; in the apodeictical, we look on it as necessary. * Thus the two
judgments (antecedens et consequent), the relation of which constitutes a hypothetical judgment, likewise those (the mem bers of the division) in whose reciprocity the disjunctive con sists, are only problematical. In the example above given, the proposition, " There exists perfect justice," is not stated assertorically, but as an ad libitum judgment, which some one may choose to adopt, and the consequence alone is assertorical. Hence such judgments may be obviously false, and yet, taken problematically, be conditions of our cognition of the truth. Thus the proposition, " The world exists only by blind chance,"
? is in the disjunctive judgment of problematical import only : that is to say, one may accept it for the moment, and it helps us (like the indication of the wrong road among all the roads that one can take) to find out the true proposition. The pro blematical proposition therefore, that which expresses ouly logical possibility (which not objective) that expresses
free choice to admit the validity of such proposition, -- merely arbitrary reception of into the understanding. The assertorical speaks of logical reality or truth as, for example, in hypothetical syllogism, the antecedens presents itself in problematical form in the major, in an assertorical form in the minor, and shows that the proposition in harmony with the laws of the understanding. The apodeictical proposition cogitates the assertorical as determined these very laws ot the understanding, consequently as affirming priori, and in this manner expresses logical necessity. Now because all here gradually incorporated with the understanding, --inas much as in the first place we judge problematically then
our judgment as true lastly, affirm as inseparably united with the understanding, that as ne
Just as thought were in the first instance function of the under- itandmy in the second, of judgment ir. the third of reason. remark which will be explained in the scuuei.
accept assertorically
cessary and apodeictical, --we may safely reckon these three functions of modality as so many momenta of thought.
? ? ;
if
it
;
is is, it
A
is,
;
a
;
*
a a
it
by is ;;a
a
itis aa
is, it
? 12 TBAN8CENDENTAI, IiOOIC.
SlCT. III. -- Of the pure Conception* of the Understanding, or Categories.
? 6.
General logic, as has been repeatedly said, makes abstrac tion of all content of cognition, and expects to receive repre sentations from some other quarter, in order, by means of ana lysis, to convert them into conceptions. On the contrary, transcendental logic has lying before it the manifold content ot a priori sensibility, which transcendental esthetic presents to it in order to give matter to the pare conceptions of the un
? without which transcendental logic would have no content, and be therefore utterly void. Now space and time contain an infinite diversity of determinations* of pure a priori intuition, but are nevertheless the condition of the mind's receptivity, under which alone it can obtain repre sentations of objects, and which, consequently, must always affect the conception of these objects. But the spontaneity of thought requires that this diversity be examined after a certain manner, received into the mind, and connected, in order after wards to forma cognition out of it. This process I call synthesis.
derstanding,
By the word synthesis, in its most general signification, I understand the process of joining different representations to each other, and of comprehending their diversity in one cog nition. This synthesis is pure when the diversity is not given empirically but a priori (as that in space and time). Our re presentations must be given previously to any analysis of them ; and no conceptions can arise, quoad their content, analytically. But the synthesis of a diversity (be it given & priori or em pirically) is the first requisite for the production of a cognition, which in its beginning, indeed, may be crude and confused, and therefore in need of analysis, --still, synthesis is that by which alone the elements of our cognitions are collected and united into a certain content, consequently it is the first thing on which we must fix our attention, if we wish to investigate the origin of our knowledge.
Synthesis, generally speaking, as we shall afterwards see, the mere operation of the imagination-- blind but indis-
Kant employs the words Mannigfattige*, Mannigfaltiglmt, indiffe rently, for the infinitude of the possible determination of matter, of aa intuition (such as that of space*. 4c. -- TV.
? ? *
a
is,
? TEE CATEGOBIES. 63
penaable function of the soul, without which we should have no cognition whatever, but of the working of which we are seldom even conscious. But to reduce this synthesis to con ceptions, is a function of the understanding, by means of which we attain to cognition, in the proper meaning of the term.
Pure synthesis, represented generally, gives us the pure conception of the understanding. But by this pure synthesis, I mean that which rests upon a basis of d priori synthetical
Thus, our numeration (and this is more observable
in large numbers) is a synthesis according to conceptions, because it takes place according to a common basis of unity
(for example, the decade). By means of this conception, therefore, the unity in the synthesis of the manifold becomes
unity.
? necessary.
By means of analysis different representations are brought
under one conception, -- an operation of which general logic treats. On the other hand, the duty of transcendental
logic is to reduce to conceptions, not representations, but the pure synthesis of representations. The first thing which must be given to us in order to the & priori cognition of all objects, is the diversity of the pure intuition ; the syn
thesis of this diversity by means of the imagination is the se cond ; but this gives, as yet, no cognition. The conceptions which give unity to this pure synthesis, and which consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetical unity, furnish the thira requisite for the cognition of an object, and these conceptions are given by the understanding.
The same function which gives unity to the different repre sentations in a judgment, gives also unity to the mere syn thesis of different representations in an intuition ; and this unity we call the pure conception of the understanding. Thus, the same understanding, and by the same operations, whereby in conceptions, by means of analytical unity, it produced the logical form of a judgment, introduces, by means of the synthetical unity of the manifold in intuition, a transcendental content into its representations, on which account they are called pure conceptions of the understanding, and they apply
a prim to objects, a result not within the power of general logic. *
* Only because this is beyond the sphere of logic proper. Kant's re mark is unnecessary. --Dr.
? ? ? 64 TBAXSCtlTOEKTAL LOGIC.
In this manner, there arise exactly so many pure concep
a priori to object* of intuition in general, as there are logical functions in all possible judgments. For there is no other function or faculty existing in the understanding besides those enumerated in that table. These conceptions we shall, with Aristotle, call categories, our purpose being originally identical with his,
notwithstanding the great difference in the execution. Table or the Categobies.
tions of the understanding, applying
i.
Of Quantity.
Unity. Plurality. Totality.
ii. Of Quality.
Reality. Negation. Limitation.
? HI.
Of Relation.
Of Inherence and Subsistence (substantia et accidens).
Of Causality and Dependence (cause and effect).
Of Community (reciprocity between the agent and patient)
IT.
0/ Modality.
Possibility. --Impossibility. Existence. --Non-existence.
Necessity. -- Contingencc.
This, then, is a catalogue of all the originally pure concep tions of the synthesis which the understanding contains i priori, and these conceptions alone entitle it to be called a pure understanding ; inasmuch as only by them it can render the manifold of intuition conceivable, in other words, think an object of intuition. This division is made systematically from a common principle, namely, the faculty of judgment (which
is just the same as the power of thought), and has not arisen rhapsodically from a search at hap-hazard after pure concep tions, respecting the full number of which we never could be certain, inasmuch as we employ induction alone in our search, without considering that in this way we can never understand
? ? ? THE CATEGORIES.
65
wherefore precisely these conceptions, and none others ahide in the pure understanding. It was a desigu worthy of an acute thinker like Aristotle, to search for these fundamental
conceptions. * Destitute, however, of any guiding principle, he picked them up just as they occurred to him, and at first huuted out ten, which he called categories (predicaments). Afterwards he believed that he had discovered five others, wliich were added under the name of post predicaments. Bat his catalogue still remained defective. Besides, there arc to be fouud among them some of the modes of pure sensibility
(quando, ubi, situs, elsoprius,simul), and likewise an empirical conception (motus), --which can by no means belong to this ge nealogical register of the pure understanding. Moreover, there are deduced conceptions (actio, passio,) -esumerated among the original conceptions, and of the latter, some are entirely wanting.
With regard to these, it is to be remariced, that the categories, as the true primitive conceptions of the pure understanding, have also their pure deduced conceptions, which, in a complete system of transcendental philosophy, must by no means be
* " It is a serious error to imagine that, in his Categories, Aristotle pro posed, like Kant, ' an analysis of the elements of human reason. ' The ends proposed by the two philosophers were different, even opposed. In their several Categories, Aristotle attempted a synthesis of things in their multiplicity, --a classification of objects real, but in relation to thought ; Kant, an analysis of mind in its unity, -- a dissection of thought, pure, but in relation to its objects. The predicaments of Aristotle are thus ob jective, of things as understood ; those of Kant subjective, of the mind as understanding. The former are results a posteriori --the creations of abstraction and generalisation ; the latter, anticipations a priori--the con ditions of those acts themselves. It is true, that as the one scheme exhibits the unity of thought diverging into plurality, in appliance to its objects, and as the other exhibits the multiplicity of these objects con verging towards unity by the collective determination of thought ; while, at the same time, language usually confounds the subjective and objective under a common term ;--it is certainly true, that some elements in the one table coincide in name with some ele-nents in the other. This coinci dence is, however, only equivocal. In reality, the whole Krntian cate gories must be excluded from the Aristotelic list, as entia ratumis, at notionet secunda--in short, as determinations of thought, and not genera of real things ; while the several elements would be specially excluded, as partial, privative, transcendent," &c. -- Hamilton's (Sir W. ) Sssayi and Cunwioni
? ? ? ? 66 TIUNSCENDEJTTAL LOGIC.
passed over ; though in a merely critical essay we must bo contented with the simple mention of the fact.
Let it be allowed me to call these pure, but deduced con ceptions of the understanding, the predicables* of the pure understanding, in contradistinction to predicaments. If wc are in possession of the original and primitive, the deduced and subsidiary conceptions can easily be added, and the gene alogical tree of the understanding completely delineated. As
aim is not to set forth a complete system, but merely the principles of one, I reserve this task for another time. It may be easily executed by any one who will refer to the ontological manuals, and subordinate to the category of causality, for example, the predicables of force, action, passion ; to that of community, those of presence and resistance ; to the categories of modality, those of origination, extinction, change; and so with the rest. The categories combined with the modes of pure sensibility, or with one another, afford a great num ber of deduced h priori conceptions ; a complete enumeration of which would be a useful and not unpleasant, but in this
place a perfectly dispensable occupation.
I purposely omit the definitions of the categories in this
treatise. I shall analyze these conceptions only so far at is necessary for the doctrine of method, which is to form a part of this critique. In a system of pure reason, definitions of them would be with justice demanded of me, but to give them here would only hide from our view the main aim of our investigation, at the same time raising doubts and objections, the consideration of which, without injustice to our main pur pose, may be very well postponed till another opportunity. Meanwhile, it ought to be sufficiently clear, from the little we have already said on this subject, that the formation of a complete vocabulary of pure conceptions, accompanied by all the requisite explanations, is not only a possible, but an easy undertaking. The compartments already exist ; it is only necessary to fill them up ; and a systematic topic like the
* The predicables of Kant are quite different from those of Aristotle and ancient and modern logicians. The five predicables are of a logical, and not, like thote of Kant, of a metaphysico-ontological import. They were enounced as a complete enumeration of all the possible modes of predica tion. Kant's predicables, on the contrary, do not possess this merely formal and logical character, but have a real or metaphysical content -- TV
my present
? ? ? ? THE CATEGORIES.
67
present, indicates with perfect precision the proper place to which each conception belongs, while it readily points out any that have not yet been filled up.
? 7.
Our table of the categories suggests considerations of some importance, which may perhaps have significant results in regard to the scientific form of all rational cognitions. For, that this table is useful in the theoretical part of philosophy, nay, indispensable for the sketching of the complete plan of a science, so far as that science rests upon conceptions a priori, and for dividing it mathematically, according to fixed princi ples, is most manifest from the fact that it contains all the elementary conceptions of the understanding, nay, even the form of a system of these in the understanding itself, and
? indicates all the momenta, and also the internal
consequently
arrangement of a projected speculative science, as I have else where shown. * Here follow some of these observations.
I. This table, which contains four classes of conceptions of the understanding, may, in the first instance, be divided into two classes, the first of which relates to objects of intuition -- pure as well as empirical ; the second, to the existence of these objects, either in relation to one another, or to the un derstanding.
The former of these classes of categories I would entitle the mathematical, and the latter the dynamical categories. The former, as we see, has no correlates ; these are only to ba. found in the second class. This difference must have a ground in the nature of the human understanding.
II. The number of the categories in each class is always the same, namely, three ; -- a fact which also demands some consideration, because in all other cases division h prion through conceptions is necessarily dichotomy. It is to oe added, that the third category in each triad always arises from the combination of the second with the first.
Thus Totality is nothing else but Plurality contemplated as Unity ; Limitation is merely Reality conjoined with Ne gation ; Community is the Causality of a Substance, recipro cally determining, and determined by other substances ; and
* la the " Metaphysical l'rinciples of Natural Science. "
? ? ? 68 TRAirBOMTDEKTAL LOOTO.
is nothing but Existence, which is given
finall}, Necessity
through the Possibility itself. * Let it not be supposed, how ever, that the third category is merely a deduced, and not a primitive conception of the pure understanding. For the con junction of the first and second, in order to produce the third conception, requires a particular function of the understanding, which is by no means identical with those which are exercised in the first and second. Thus, the conception of a number
to the category of Totality), is not always possible, where the conceptions of multitude and unity exifet
(for example, in the representation of the infinite). Or, if I conjoin the conception of a cause with that of a substance, it does not follow that the conception of influence, that how one substance can be the cause of something in another sub stance, will be understood from that. Thus evident, that
(which belongs
? particular act of the understanding here necessary and so in the other instances.
III. With respect to one category, namely, that of com munity, which found in the third class, not so easy as with the others to detect its accordance with the form of the disjunctive judgment which corresponds to in the table of the logical functions.
In order to assure ourselves of this accordance, we must
observe that in every disjunctive judgment, the sphere of the judgment (that the complex of all that contained
represented as whole divided into parts and, since one part cannot be contained in the other, they arc cogitated as co-ordinated with, not subordinated to each other, so that they do not determine each other unilaterally, as in linear series, but reciprocally, as in an aggregate -- one member of the division posited, all the rest are excluded and con
versely).
Now like connection cogitated in whole of things
for one thing not subordinated, as effect, to another as cause of its existence, but, on the contrary, co-ordinated con'emporaneously and reciprocally, as cause in relation to the determination of the others (for example, in body -- the parts of which mutually attract and repel each other). And
Kant's meaning is: necessary existence aa existence whosa existence given the very possibitit] of its existence. -- Jr.
? ? * is
a
:
in isis A
is
is
a
b a it
is
a
;
; a
is
is
(if
it is
it is
; in
it) is
a
a is,
;
is,
? THE CATEGORIES.
69
this is an entirely different kind of connection from that
which we find in the mere relation of the cause to the effect
(the principle to the consequence), for in such a connection
the consequence docs not iu its turn deter. uine the principle,
nud therefore docs not constitute, with the latter, a whole, --
just as the Creator does not with the world make up a whole.
The process of understanding by which it represents to itself
the sphere of a divided conception, is employed also when we
think of a thing as divisible ; and, in the same manner as the
members of the division in the former exclude one another,
and yet are connected in one sphere, so the understanding
represents to itself the parts of the latter, as having --each of
? them -- an existence (as substances), independently of the others, and yet as united in one whole.
? 8.
In the transcendental philosophy of the ancients, there
exists one more leading division, which contains pure concep tions of the understanding, and which, although not num bered among the categories, ought, according to them, as con
ceptions a priori, to be valid of objects. But in this case they would augment the number of the categories ; which cannot ? ie. These are set forth in the proposition, so renowned among the schoolmen, --'* Quodlibtt ens est unum, vebuji, BOOTH. " Now, though the inferences from this principle were mere tautological propositions, and though it is allowed
iuly by courtesy to retain a place in modern metaphysics, yet a thought which maintained itself for such a length of time, however empty it seems to be, deserves an investigation of its origin, and justifies the conjecture that it must be grounded in some law of the understanding, which, as is often the case, has only been erroneously interpreted. These pretended transcendental predicates are, in fact, nothing but logical re quisites and criteria of all cognition of objects, and they em ploy, (is the basis for this cognition, the categories of Quan
lity, namely, Unity, Plurality, and Totality. But these, which must be taken as material conditions, that as belonging to the possibility of things themselves, they employed merely in
formal signification, as belonging to the logical requisites ' of all cognition, and yet most unguardedly changed these- criteria of thought into properties of objecft, as things
?