Hence it is clear that they
vary in so far as they are; for they are not called beings as though
they were the subject of being, but because through them something has
being.
vary in so far as they are; for they are not called beings as though
they were the subject of being, but because through them something has
being.
Summa Theologica
" Therefore
God is not everywhere.
Objection 2: Further, the relation of time to succession is the same as
the relation of place to permanence. But one indivisible part of action
or movement cannot exist in different times; therefore neither can one
indivisible part in the genus of permanent things be in every place.
Now the divine being is not successive but permanent. Therefore God is
not in many places; and thus He is not everywhere.
Objection 3: Further, what is wholly in any one place is not in part
elsewhere. But if God is in any one place He is all there; for He has
no parts. No part of Him then is elsewhere; and therefore God is not
everywhere.
On the contrary, It is written, "I fill heaven and earth. " (Jer.
23:24).
I answer that, Since place is a thing, to be in place can be understood
in a twofold sense; either by way of other things---i. e. as one thing
is said to be in another no matter how; and thus the accidents of a
place are in place; or by a way proper to place; and thus things placed
are in a place. Now in both these senses, in some way God is in every
place; and this is to be everywhere. First, as He is in all things
giving them being, power and operation; so He is in every place as
giving it existence and locative power. Again, things placed are in
place, inasmuch as they fill place; and God fills every place; not,
indeed, like a body, for a body is said to fill place inasmuch as it
excludes the co-presence of another body; whereas by God being in a
place, others are not thereby excluded from it; indeed, by the very
fact that He gives being to the things that fill every place, He
Himself fills every place.
Reply to Objection 1: Incorporeal things are in place not by contact of
dimensive quantity, as bodies are but by contact of power.
Reply to Objection 2: The indivisible is twofold. One is the term of
the continuous; as a point in permanent things, and as a moment in
succession; and this kind of the indivisible in permanent things,
forasmuch as it has a determinate site, cannot be in many parts of
place, or in many places; likewise the indivisible of action or
movement, forasmuch as it has a determinate order in movement or
action, cannot be in many parts of time. Another kind of the
indivisible is outside of the whole genus of the continuous; and in
this way incorporeal substances, like God, angel and soul, are called
indivisible. Such a kind of indivisible does not belong to the
continuous, as a part of it, but as touching it by its power; hence,
according as its power can extend itself to one or to many, to a small
thing, or to a great one, in this way it is in one or in many places,
and in a small or large place.
Reply to Objection 3: A whole is so called with reference to its parts.
Now part is twofold: viz. a part of the essence, as the form and the
matter are called parts of the composite, while genus and difference
are called parts of species. There is also part of quantity into which
any quantity is divided. What therefore is whole in any place by
totality of quantity, cannot be outside of that place, because the
quantity of anything placed is commensurate to the quantity of the
place; and hence there is no totality of quantity without totality of
place. But totality of essence is not commensurate to the totality of
place. Hence it is not necessary for that which is whole by totality of
essence in a thing, not to be at all outside of it. This appears also
in accidental forms which have accidental quantity; as an example,
whiteness is whole in each part of the surface if we speak of its
totality of essence; because according to the perfect idea of its
species it is found to exist in every part of the surface. But if its
totality be considered according to quantity which it has accidentally,
then it is not whole in every part of the surface. On the other hand,
incorporeal substances have no totality either of themselves or
accidentally, except in reference to the perfect idea of their essence.
Hence, as the soul is whole in every part of the body, so is God whole
in all things and in each one.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God is everywhere by essence, presence and power?
Objection 1: It seems that the mode of God's existence in all things is
not properly described by way of essence, presence and power. For what
is by essence in anything, is in it essentially. But God is not
essentially in things; for He does not belong to the essence of
anything. Therefore it ought not to be said that God is in things by
essence, presence and power.
Objection 2: Further, to be present in anything means not to be absent
from it. Now this is the meaning of God being in things by His essence,
that He is not absent from anything. Therefore the presence of God in
all things by essence and presence means the same thing. Therefore it
is superfluous to say that God is present in things by His essence,
presence and power.
Objection 3: Further, as God by His power is the principle of all
things, so He is the same likewise by His knowledge and will. But it is
not said that He is in things by knowledge and will. Therefore neither
is He present by His power.
Objection 4: Further, as grace is a perfection added to the substance
of a thing, so many other perfections are likewise added. Therefore if
God is said to be in certain persons in a special way by grace, it
seems that according to every perfection there ought to be a special
mode of God's existence in things.
On the contrary, A gloss on the Canticle of Canticles (5) says that,
"God by a common mode is in all things by His presence, power and
substance; still He is said to be present more familiarly in some by
grace" [*The quotation is from St. Gregory, (Hom. viii in Ezech. )].
I answer that, God is said to be in a thing in two ways; in one way
after the manner of an efficient cause; and thus He is in all things
created by Him; in another way he is in things as the object of
operation is in the operator; and this is proper to the operations of
the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and the
thing desired in the one desiring. In this second way God is especially
in the rational creature which knows and loves Him actually or
habitually. And because the rational creature possesses this
prerogative by grace, as will be shown later [40](Q[12]). He is said to
be thus in the saints by grace.
But how He is in other things created by Him, may be considered from
human affairs. A king, for example, is said to be in the whole kingdom
by his power, although he is not everywhere present. Again a thing is
said to be by its presence in other things which are subject to its
inspection; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone, who
nevertheless may not be in substance in every part of the house.
Lastly, a thing is said to be by way of substance or essence in that
place in which its substance may be. Now there were some (the
Manichees) who said that spiritual and incorporeal things were subject
to the divine power; but that visible and corporeal things were subject
to the power of a contrary principle. Therefore against these it is
necessary to say that God is in all things by His power.
But others, though they believed that all things were subject to the
divine power, still did not allow that divine providence extended to
these inferior bodies, and in the person of these it is said, "He
walketh about the poles of the heavens; and He doth not consider our
things [*Vulg. : 'He doth not consider . . . and He walketh,' etc. ]"
(Job 22:14). Against these it is necessary to say that God is in all
things by His presence.
Further, others said that, although all things are subject to God's
providence, still all things are not immediately created by God; but
that He immediately created the first creatures, and these created the
others. Against these it is necessary to say that He is in all things
by His essence.
Therefore, God is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all things
are subject to His power; He is by His presence in all things, as all
things are bare and open to His eyes; He is in all things by His
essence, inasmuch as He is present to all as the cause of their being.
Reply to Objection 1: God is said to be in all things by essence, not
indeed by the essence of the things themselves, as if He were of their
essence; but by His own essence; because His substance is present to
all things as the cause of their being.
Reply to Objection 2: A thing can be said to be present to another,
when in its sight, though the thing may be distant in substance, as was
shown in this article; and therefore two modes of presence are
necessary; viz. by essence and by presence.
Reply to Objection 3: Knowledge and will require that the thing known
should be in the one who knows, and the thing willed in the one who
wills. Hence by knowledge and will things are more truly in God than
God in things. But power is the principle of acting on another; hence
by power the agent is related and applied to an external thing; thus by
power an agent may be said to be present to another.
Reply to Objection 4: No other perfection, except grace, added to
substance, renders God present in anything as the object known and
loved; therefore only grace constitutes a special mode of God's
existence in things. There is, however, another special mode of God's
existence in man by union, which will be treated of in its own place
(TP).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?
Objection 1: It seems that to be everywhere does not belong to God
alone. For the universal, according to the Philosopher (Poster. i), is
everywhere, and always; primary matter also, since it is in all bodies,
is everywhere. But neither of these is God, as appears from what is
said above [41](Q[3]). Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to
God alone.
Objection 2: Further, number is in things numbered. But the whole
universe is constituted in number, as appears from the Book of Wisdom
(Wis. 11:21). Therefore there is some number which is in the whole
universe, and is thus everywhere.
Objection 3: Further, the universe is a kind of "whole perfect body"
(Coel. et Mund. i). But the whole universe is everywhere, because there
is no place outside it. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to
God alone.
Objection 4: Further, if any body were infinite, no place would exist
outside of it, and so it would be everywhere. Therefore to be
everywhere does not appear to belong to God alone.
Objection 5: Further, the soul, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), is
"whole in the whole body, and whole in every one of its parts. "
Therefore if there was only one animal in the world, its soul would be
everywhere; and thus to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.
Objection 6: Further, as Augustine says (Ep. 137), "The soul feels
where it sees, and lives where it feels, and is where it lives. " But
the soul sees as it were everywhere: for in a succession of glances it
comprehends the entire space of the heavens in its sight. Therefore the
soul is everywhere.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Who dares to
call the Holy Ghost a creature, Who in all things, and everywhere, and
always is, which assuredly belongs to the divinity alone? "
I answer that, To be everywhere primarily and absolutely, is proper to
God. Now to be everywhere primarily is said of that which in its whole
self is everywhere; for if a thing were everywhere according to its
parts in different places, it would not be primarily everywhere,
forasmuch as what belongs to anything according to part does not belong
to it primarily; thus if a man has white teeth, whiteness belongs
primarily not to the man but to his teeth. But a thing is everywhere
absolutely when it does not belong to it to be everywhere accidentally,
that is, merely on some supposition; as a grain of millet would be
everywhere, supposing that no other body existed. It belongs therefore
to a thing to be everywhere absolutely when, on any supposition, it
must be everywhere; and this properly belongs to God alone. For
whatever number of places be supposed, even if an infinite number be
supposed besides what already exist, it would be necessary that God
should be in all of them; for nothing can exist except by Him.
Therefore to be everywhere primarily and absolutely belongs to God and
is proper to Him: because whatever number of places be supposed to
exist, God must be in all of them, not as to a part of Him, but as to
His very self.
Reply to Objection 1: The universal, and also primary matter are indeed
everywhere; but not according to the same mode of existence.
Reply to Objection 2: Number, since it is an accident, does not, of
itself, exist in place, but accidentally; neither is the whole but only
part of it in each of the things numbered; hence it does not follow
that it is primarily and absolutely everywhere.
Reply to Objection 3: The whole body of the universe is everywhere, but
not primarily; forasmuch as it is not wholly in each place, but
according to its parts; nor again is it everywhere absolutely, because,
supposing that other places existed besides itself, it would not be in
them.
Reply to Objection 4: If an infinite body existed, it would be
everywhere; but according to its parts.
Reply to Objection 5: Were there one animal only, its soul would be
everywhere primarily indeed, but only accidentally.
Reply to Objection 6: When it is said that the soul sees anywhere, this
can be taken in two senses. In one sense the adverb "anywhere"
determines the act of seeing on the part of the object; and in this
sense it is true that while it sees the heavens, it sees in the
heavens; and in the same way it feels in the heavens; but it does not
follow that it lives or exists in the heavens, because to live and to
exist do not import an act passing to an exterior object. In another
sense it can be understood according as the adverb determines the act
of the seer, as proceeding from the seer; and thus it is true that
where the soul feels and sees, there it is, and there it lives
according to this mode of speaking; and thus it does not follow that it
is everywhere.
__________________________________________________________________
THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD (TWO ARTICLES)
We next consider God's immutability, and His eternity following on His
immutability. On the immutability of God there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether God is altogether immutable?
(2) Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God is altogether immutable?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not altogether immutable. For
whatever moves itself is in some way mutable. But, as Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit viii, 20), "The Creator Spirit moves Himself neither by
time, nor by place. " Therefore God is in some way mutable.
Objection 2: Further, it is said of Wisdom, that "it is more mobile
than all things active [Vulg. 'mobilior']" (Wis. 7:24). But God is
wisdom itself; therefore God is movable.
Objection 3: Further, to approach and to recede signify movement. But
these are said of God in Scripture, "Draw nigh to God and He will draw
nigh to you" (James 4:8). Therefore God is mutable.
On the contrary, It is written, "I am the Lord, and I change not"
(Malachi 3:6).
I answer that, From what precedes, it is shown that God is altogether
immutable. First, because it was shown above that there is some first
being, whom we call God; and that this first being must be pure act,
without the admixture of any potentiality, for the reason that,
absolutely, potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which is
in any way changed, is in some way in potentiality. Hence it is evident
that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable. Secondly,
because everything which is moved, remains as it was in part, and
passes away in part; as what is moved from whiteness to blackness,
remains the same as to substance; thus in everything which is moved,
there is some kind of composition to be found. But it has been shown
above ([42]Q[3], A[7]) that in God there is no composition, for He is
altogether simple. Hence it is manifest that God cannot be moved.
Thirdly, because everything which is moved acquires something by its
movement, and attains to what it had not attained previously. But since
God is infinite, comprehending in Himself all the plenitude of
perfection of all being, He cannot acquire anything new, nor extend
Himself to anything whereto He was not extended previously. Hence
movement in no way belongs to Him. So, some of the ancients,
constrained, as it were, by the truth, decided that the first principle
was immovable.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine there speaks in a similar way to Plato,
who said that the first mover moves Himself; calling every operation a
movement, even as the acts of understanding, and willing, and loving,
are called movements. Therefore because God understands and loves
Himself, in that respect they said that God moves Himself, not,
however, as movement and change belong to a thing existing in
potentiality, as we now speak of change and movement.
Reply to Objection 2: Wisdom is called mobile by way of similitude,
according as it diffuses its likeness even to the outermost of things;
for nothing can exist which does not proceed from the divine wisdom by
way of some kind of imitation, as from the first effective and formal
principle; as also works of art proceed from the wisdom of the artist.
And so in the same way, inasmuch as the similitude of the divine wisdom
proceeds in degrees from the highest things, which participate more
fully of its likeness, to the lowest things which participate of it in
a lesser degree, there is said to be a kind of procession and movement
of the divine wisdom to things; as when we say that the sun proceeds to
the earth, inasmuch as the ray of light touches the earth. In this way
Dionysius (Coel. Hier. i) expounds the matter, that every procession of
the divine manifestation comes to us from the movement of the Father of
light.
Reply to Objection 3: These things are said of God in Scripture
metaphorically. For as the sun is said to enter a house, or to go out,
according as its rays reach the house, so God is said to approach to
us, or to recede from us, when we receive the influx of His goodness,
or decline from Him.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?
Objection 1: It seems that to be immutable does not belong to God
alone. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that "matter is in
everything which is moved. " But, according to some, certain created
substances, as angels and souls, have not matter. Therefore to be
immutable does not belong to God alone.
Objection 2: Further, everything in motion moves to some end. What
therefore has already attained its ultimate end, is not in motion. But
some creatures have already attained to their ultimate end; as all the
blessed in heaven. Therefore some creatures are immovable.
Objection 3: Further, everything which is mutable is variable. But
forms are invariable; for it is said (Sex Princip. i) that "form is
essence consisting of the simple and invariable. " Therefore it does not
belong to God alone to be immutable.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. i), "God alone is
immutable; and whatever things He has made, being from nothing, are
mutable. "
I answer that, God alone is altogether immutable; whereas every
creature is in some way mutable. Be it known therefore that a mutable
thing can be called so in two ways: by a power in itself; and by a
power possessed by another. For all creatures before they existed, were
possible, not by any created power, since no creature is eternal, but
by the divine power alone, inasmuch as God could produce them into
existence. Thus, as the production of a thing into existence depends on
the will of God, so likewise it depends on His will that things should
be preserved; for He does not preserve them otherwise than by ever
giving them existence; hence if He took away His action from them, all
things would be reduced to nothing, as appears from Augustine (Gen. ad
lit. iv, 12). Therefore as it was in the Creator's power to produce
them before they existed in themselves, so likewise it is in the
Creator's power when they exist in themselves to bring them to nothing.
In this way therefore, by the power of another---namely, of God---they
are mutable, inasmuch as they are producible from nothing by Him, and
are by Him reducible from existence to non-existence.
If, however, a thing is called mutable by a power in itself, thus also
in some manner every creature is mutable. For every creature has a
twofold power, active and passive; and I call that power passive which
enables anything to attain its perfection either in being, or in
attaining to its end. Now if the mutability of a thing be considered
according to its power for being, in that way all creatures are not
mutable, but those only in which what is potential in them is
consistent with non-being. Hence, in the inferior bodies there is
mutability both as regards substantial being, inasmuch as their matter
can exist with privation of their substantial form, and also as regards
their accidental being, supposing the subject to coexist with privation
of accident; as, for example, this subject "man" can exist with
"not-whiteness" and can therefore be changed from white to not-white.
But supposing the accident to be such as to follow on the essential
principles of the subject, then the privation of such an accident
cannot coexist with the subject. Hence the subject cannot be changed as
regards that kind of accident; as, for example, snow cannot be made
black. Now in the celestial bodies matter is not consistent with
privation of form, because the form perfects the whole potentiality of
the matter; therefore these bodies are not mutable as to substantial
being, but only as to locality, because the subject is consistent with
privation of this or that place. On the other hand incorporeal
substances, being subsistent forms which, although with respect to
their own existence are as potentiality to act, are not consistent with
the privation of this act; forasmuch as existence is consequent upon
form, and nothing corrupts except it lose its form. Hence in the form
itself there is no power to non-existence; and so these kinds of
substances are immutable and invariable as regards their existence.
Wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "intellectual created
substances are pure from generation and from every variation, as also
are incorporeal and immaterial substances. " Still, there remains in
them a twofold mutability: one as regards their potentiality to their
end; and in that way there is in them a mutability according to choice
from good to evil, as Damascene says (De Fide ii, 3,4); the other as
regards place, inasmuch as by their finite power they attain to certain
fresh places---which cannot be said of God, who by His infinity fills
all places, as was shown above ([43]Q[8], A[2]).
Thus in every creature there is a potentiality to change either as
regards substantial being as in the case of things corruptible; or as
regards locality only, as in the case of the celestial bodies; or as
regards the order to their end, and the application of their powers to
divers objects, as in the case with the angels; and universally all
creatures generally are mutable by the power of the Creator, in Whose
power is their existence and non-existence. Hence since God is in none
of these ways mutable, it belongs to Him alone to be altogether
immutable.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection proceeds from mutability as
regards substantial or accidental being; for philosophers treated of
such movement.
Reply to Objection 2: The good angels, besides their natural endowment
of immutability of being, have also immutability of election by divine
power; nevertheless there remains in them mutability as regards place.
Reply to Objection 3: Forms are called invariable, forasmuch as they
cannot be subjects of variation; but they are subject to variation
because by them their subject is variable.
Hence it is clear that they
vary in so far as they are; for they are not called beings as though
they were the subject of being, but because through them something has
being.
__________________________________________________________________
THE ETERNITY OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the eternity of God, concerning which arise six
points of inquiry:
(1) What is eternity?
(2) Whether God is eternal?
(3) Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?
(4) Whether eternity differs from time?
(5) The difference of aeviternity, as there is one time, and one
eternity?
(6) Whether there is only one aeviternity?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this is a good definition of eternity, "The simultaneously-whole and
perfect possession of interminable life"?
Objection 1: It seems that the definition of eternity given by Boethius
(De Consol. v) is not a good one: "Eternity is the simultaneously-whole
and perfect possession of interminable life. " For the word
"interminable" is a negative one. But negation only belongs to what is
defective, and this does not belong to eternity. Therefore in the
definition of eternity the word "interminable" ought not to be found.
Objection 2: Further, eternity signifies a certain kind of duration.
But duration regards existence rather than life. Therefore the word
"life" ought not to come into the definition of eternity; but rather
the word "existence. "
Objection 3: Further, a whole is what has parts. But this is alien to
eternity which is simple. Therefore it is improperly said to be
"whole. "
Objection 4: Many days cannot occur together, nor can many times exist
all at once. But in eternity, days and times are in the plural, for it
is said, "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of
eternity" (Micah 5:2); and also it is said, "According to the
revelation of the mystery hidden from eternity" (Rom. 16:25). Therefore
eternity is not omni-simultaneous.
Objection 5: Further, the whole and the perfect are the same thing.
Supposing, therefore, that it is "whole," it is superfluously described
as "perfect. "
Objection 6: Further, duration does not imply "possession. " But
eternity is a kind of duration. Therefore eternity is not possession.
I answer that, As we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way of
compound things, so must we reach to the knowledge of eternity by means
of time, which is nothing but the numbering of movement by "before" and
"after. " For since succession occurs in every movement, and one part
comes after another, the fact that we reckon before and after in
movement, makes us apprehend time, which is nothing else but the
measure of before and after in movement. Now in a thing bereft of
movement, which is always the same, there is no before or after. As
therefore the idea of time consists in the numbering of before and
after in movement; so likewise in the apprehension of the uniformity of
what is outside of movement, consists the idea of eternity.
Further, those things are said to be measured by time which have a
beginning and an end in time, because in everything which is moved
there is a beginning, and there is an end. But as whatever is wholly
immutable can have no succession, so it has no beginning, and no end.
Thus eternity is known from two sources: first, because what is eternal
is interminable---that is, has no beginning nor end (that is, no term
either way); secondly, because eternity has no succession, being
simultaneously whole.
Reply to Objection 1: Simple things are usually defined by way of
negation; as "a point is that which has no parts. " Yet this is not to
be taken as if the negation belonged to their essence, but because our
intellect which first apprehends compound things, cannot attain to the
knowledge of simple things except by removing the opposite.
Reply to Objection 2: What is truly eternal, is not only being, but
also living; and life extends to operation, which is not true of being.
Now the protraction of duration seems to belong to operation rather
than to being; hence time is the numbering of movement.
Reply to Objection 3: Eternity is called whole, not because it has
parts, but because it is wanting in nothing.
Reply to Objection 4: As God, although incorporeal, is named in
Scripture metaphorically by corporeal names, so eternity though
simultaneously whole, is called by names implying time and succession.
Reply to Objection 5: Two things are to be considered in time: time
itself, which is successive; and the "now" of time, which is imperfect.
Hence the expression "simultaneously-whole" is used to remove the idea
of time, and the word "perfect" is used to exclude the "now" of time.
Reply to Objection 6: Whatever is possessed, is held firmly and
quietly; therefore to designate the immutability and permanence of
eternity, we use the word "possession. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God is eternal?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not eternal. For nothing made can be
predicated of God; for Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "The now that
flows away makes time, the now that stands still makes eternity;" and
Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 28) "that God is the author of
eternity. " Therefore God is not eternal.
Objection 2: Further, what is before eternity, and after eternity, is
not measured by eternity. But, as Aristotle says (De Causis), "God is
before eternity and He is after eternity": for it is written that "the
Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond [*Douay: 'for ever and
ever']" (Ex. 15:18). Therefore to be eternal does not belong to God.
Objection 3: Further, eternity is a kind of measure. But to be measured
belongs not to God. Therefore it does not belong to Him to be eternal.
Objection 4: Further, in eternity, there is no present, past or future,
since it is simultaneously whole; as was said in the preceding article.
But words denoting present, past and future time are applied to God in
Scripture. Therefore God is not eternal.
On the contrary, Athanasius says in his Creed: "The Father is eternal,
the Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eternal. "
I answer that, The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the idea
of time follows movement, as appears from the preceding article. Hence,
as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be
eternal. Nor is He eternal only; but He is His own eternity; whereas,
no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own being. Now
God is His own uniform being; and hence as He is His own essence, so He
is His own eternity.
Reply to Objection 1: The "now" that stands still, is said to make
eternity according to our apprehension. As the apprehension of time is
caused in us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the "now," so
the apprehension of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending the
"now" standing still. When Augustine says that "God is the author of
eternity," this is to be understood of participated eternity. For God
communicates His eternity to some in the same way as He communicates
His immutability.
Reply to Objection 2: From this appears the answer to the Second
Objection. For God is said to be before eternity, according as it is
shared by immaterial substances. Hence, also, in the same book, it is
said that "intelligence is equal to eternity. " In the words of Exodus,
"The Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond," eternity stands for
age, as another rendering has it. Thus it is said that the Lord will
reign beyond eternity, inasmuch as He endures beyond every age, i. e.
beyond every kind of duration. For age is nothing more than the period
of each thing, as is said in the book De Coelo i. Or to reign beyond
eternity can be taken to mean that if any other thing were conceived to
exist for ever, as the movement of the heavens according to some
philosophers, then God would still reign beyond, inasmuch as His reign
is simultaneously whole.
Reply to Objection 3: Eternity is nothing else but God Himself. Hence
God is not called eternal, as if He were in any way measured; but the
idea of measurement is there taken according to the apprehension of our
mind alone.
Reply to Objection 4: Words denoting different times are applied to
God, because His eternity includes all times; not as if He Himself were
altered through present, past and future.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?
Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to God alone to be
eternal. For it is written that "those who instruct many to justice,"
shall be "as stars unto perpetual eternities [*Douay: 'for all
eternity']" (Dan. 12:3). Now if God alone were eternal, there could not
be many eternities. Therefore God alone is not the only eternal.
Objection 2: Further, it is written "Depart, ye cursed into eternal
[Douay: 'everlasting'] fire" (Mat. 25:41). Therefore God is not the
only eternal.
Objection 3: Further, every necessary thing is eternal. But there are
many necessary things; as, for instance, all principles of
demonstration and all demonstrative propositions. Therefore God is not
the only eternal.
On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. ad Damasum. xv) that "God is the only
one who has no beginning. " Now whatever has a beginning, is not
eternal. Therefore God is the only one eternal.
I answer that, Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone,
because eternity follows on immutability; as appears from the first
article. But God alone is altogether immutable, as was shown above
([44]Q[9], A[1]). Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability
from Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive immutability
from God in the way of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is said
of the earth, "it standeth for ever" (Eccles. 1:4). Again, some things
are called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their
duration, although they are in nature corruptible; thus (Ps. 75:5) the
hills are called "eternal" and we read "of the fruits of the eternal
hills. " (Dt. 33:15). Some again, share more fully than others in the
nature of eternity, inasmuch as they possess unchangeableness either in
being or further still in operation; like the angels, and the blessed,
who enjoy the Word, because "as regards that vision of the Word, no
changing thoughts exist in the Saints," as Augustine says (De Trin.
xv). Hence those who see God are said to have eternal life; according
to that text, "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only
true God," etc. (Jn. 17:3).
Reply to Objection 1: There are said to be many eternities, accordingly
as many share in eternity, by the contemplation of God.
Reply to Objection 2: The fire of hell is called eternal, only because
it never ends. Still, there is change in the pains of the lost,
according to the words "To extreme heat they will pass from snowy
waters" (Job 24:19). Hence in hell true eternity does not exist, but
rather time; according to the text of the Psalm "Their time will be for
ever" (Ps. 80:16).
Reply to Objection 3: Necessary means a certain mode of truth; and
truth, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi), is in the mind.
Therefore in this sense the true and necessary are eternal, because
they are in the eternal mind, which is the divine intellect alone;
hence it does not follow that anything beside God is eternal.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether eternity differs from time?
Objection 1: It seems that eternity does not differ from time. For two
measures of duration cannot exist together, unless one is part of the
other; for instance two days or two hours cannot be together;
nevertheless, we may say that a day or an hour are together,
considering hour as part of a day. But eternity and time occur
together, each of which imports a certain measure of duration. Since
therefore eternity is not a part of time, forasmuch as eternity exceeds
time, and includes it, it seems that time is a part of eternity, and is
not a different thing from eternity.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv), the
"now" of time remains the same in the whole of time. But the nature of
eternity seems to be that it is the same indivisible thing in the whole
space of time. Therefore eternity is the "now" of time. But the "now"
of time is not substantially different from time. Therefore eternity is
not substantially different from time.
Objection 3: Further, as the measure of the first movement is the
measure of every movement, as said in Phys. iv, it thus appears that
the measure of the first being is that of every being. But eternity is
the measure of the first being---that is, of the divine being.
Therefore eternity is the measure of every being. But the being of
things corruptible is measured by time. Time therefore is either
eternity or is a part of eternity.
On the contrary, Eternity is simultaneously whole. But time has a
"before" and an "after. " Therefore time and eternity are not the same
thing.
I answer that, It is manifest that time and eternity are not the same.
Some have founded this difference on the fact that eternity has neither
beginning nor an end; whereas time has a beginning and an end. This,
however, makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute difference
because, granted that time always was and always will be, according to
the idea of those who think the movement of the heavens goes on for
ever, there would yet remain a difference between eternity and time, as
Boethius says (De Consol. v), arising from the fact that eternity is
simultaneously whole; which cannot be applied to time: for eternity is
the measure of a permanent being; while time is a measure of movement.
Supposing, however, that the aforesaid difference be considered on the
part of the things measured, and not as regards the measures, then
there is some reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is measured by time
which has beginning and end in time. Hence, if the movement of the
heavens lasted always, time would not be of its measure as regards the
whole of its duration, since the infinite is not measurable; but it
would be the measure of that part of its revolution which has beginning
and end in time.
Another reason for the same can be taken from these measures in
themselves, if we consider the end and the beginning as potentialities;
because, granted also that time always goes on, yet it is possible to
note in time both the beginning and the end, by considering its parts:
thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a day or of a year; which
cannot be applied to eternity. Still these differences follow upon the
essential and primary differences, that eternity is simultaneously
whole, but that time is not so.
Reply to Objection 1: Such a reason would be a valid one if time and
eternity were the same kind of measure; but this is seen not to be the
case when we consider those things of which the respective measures are
time and eternity.
Reply to Objection 2: The "now" of time is the same as regards its
subject in the whole course of time, but it differs in aspect; for
inasmuch as time corresponds to movement, its "now" corresponds to what
is movable; and the thing movable has the same one subject in all time,
but differs in aspect a being here and there; and such alteration is
movement. Likewise the flow of the "now" as alternating in aspect is
time. But eternity remains the same according to both subject and
aspect; and hence eternity is not the same as the "now" of time.
Reply to Objection 3: As eternity is the proper measure of permanent
being, so time is the proper measure of movement; and hence, according
as any being recedes from permanence of being, and is subject to
change, it recedes from eternity, and is subject to time. Therefore the
being of things corruptible, because it is changeable, is not measured
by eternity, but by time; for time measures not only things actually
changed, but also things changeable; hence it not only measures
movement but it also measures repose, which belongs to whatever is
naturally movable, but is not actually in motion.
__________________________________________________________________
The difference of aeviternity and time
Objection 1: It seems that aeviternity is the same as time. For
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22,23), that "God moves the
spiritual through time. " But aeviternity is said to be the measure of
spiritual substances. Therefore time is the same as aeviternity.
Objection 2: Further, it is essential to time to have "before" and
"after"; but it is essential to eternity to be simultaneously whole, as
was shown above in the first article. Now aeviternity is not eternity;
for it is written (Ecclus. 1:1) that eternal "Wisdom is before age. "
Therefore it is not simultaneously whole but has "before" and "after";
and thus it is the same as time.
Objection 3: Further, if there is no "before" and "after" in
aeviternity, it follows that in aeviternal things there is no
difference between being, having been, or going to be. Since then it is
impossible for aeviternal things not to have been, it follows that it
is impossible for them not to be in the future; which is false, since
God can reduce them to nothing.
Objection 4: Further, since the duration of aeviternal things is
infinite as to subsequent duration, if aeviternity is simultaneously
whole, it follows that some creature is actually infinite; which is
impossible. Therefore aeviternity does not differ from time.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) "Who commandest time to
be separate from aeviternity. "
I answer that, Aeviternity differs from time, and from eternity, as the
mean between them both. This difference is explained by some to consist
in the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor end, aeviternity, a
beginning but no end, and time both beginning and end. This difference,
however, is but an accidental one, as was shown above, in the preceding
article; because even if aeviternal things had always been, and would
always be, as some think, and even if they might sometimes fail to be,
which is possible to God to allow; even granted this, aeviternity would
still be distinguished from eternity, and from time.
Others assign the difference between these three to consist in the fact
that eternity has no "before" and "after"; but that time has both,
together with innovation and veteration; and that aeviternity has
"before" and "after" without innovation and veteration. This theory,
however, involves a contradiction; which manifestly appears if
innovation and veteration be referred to the measure itself. For since
"before" and "after" of duration cannot exist together, if aeviternity
has "before" and "after," it must follow that with the receding of the
first part of aeviternity, the after part of aeviternity must newly
appear; and thus innovation would occur in aeviternity itself, as it
does in time. And if they be referred to the things measured, even then
an incongruity would follow. For a thing which exists in time grows old
with time, because it has a changeable existence, and from the
changeableness of a thing measured, there follows "before" and "after"
in the measure, as is clear from Phys. iv. Therefore the fact that an
aeviternal thing is neither inveterate, nor subject to innovation,
comes from its changelessness; and consequently its measure does not
contain "before" and "after. " We say then that since eternity is the
measure of a permanent being, in so far as anything recedes from
permanence of being, it recedes from eternity. Now some things recede
from permanence of being, so that their being is subject to change, or
consists in change; and these things are measured by time, as are all
movements, and also the being of all things corruptible. But others
recede less from permanence of being, forasmuch as their being neither
consists in change, nor is the subject of change; nevertheless they
have change annexed to them either actually or potentially. This
appears in the heavenly bodies, the substantial being of which is
unchangeable; and yet with unchangeable being they have changeableness
of place. The same applies to the angels, who have an unchangeable
being as regards their nature with changeableness as regards choice;
moreover they have changeableness of intelligence, of affections and of
places in their own degree. Therefore these are measured by aeviternity
which is a mean between eternity and time. But the being that is
measured by eternity is not changeable, nor is it annexed to change. In
this way time has "before" and "after"; aeviternity in itself has no
"before" and "after," which can, however, be annexed to it; while
eternity has neither "before" nor "after," nor is it compatible with
such at all.
Reply to Objection 1: Spiritual creatures as regards successive
affections and intelligences are measured by time. Hence also Augustine
says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22,23) that to be moved through time, is to
be moved by affections. But as regards their nature they are measured
by aeviternity; whereas as regards the vision of glory, they have a
share of eternity.
Reply to Objection 2: Aeviternity is simultaneously whole; yet it is
not eternity, because "before" and "after" are compatible with it.
Reply to Objection 3: In the very being of an angel considered
absolutely, there is no difference of past and future, but only as
regards accidental change. Now to say that an angel was, or is, or will
be, is to be taken in a different sense according to the acceptation of
our intellect, which apprehends the angelic existence by comparison
with different parts of time. But when we say that an angel is, or was,
we suppose something, which being supposed, its opposite is not subject
to the divine power. Whereas when we say he will be, we do not as yet
suppose anything.
God is not everywhere.
Objection 2: Further, the relation of time to succession is the same as
the relation of place to permanence. But one indivisible part of action
or movement cannot exist in different times; therefore neither can one
indivisible part in the genus of permanent things be in every place.
Now the divine being is not successive but permanent. Therefore God is
not in many places; and thus He is not everywhere.
Objection 3: Further, what is wholly in any one place is not in part
elsewhere. But if God is in any one place He is all there; for He has
no parts. No part of Him then is elsewhere; and therefore God is not
everywhere.
On the contrary, It is written, "I fill heaven and earth. " (Jer.
23:24).
I answer that, Since place is a thing, to be in place can be understood
in a twofold sense; either by way of other things---i. e. as one thing
is said to be in another no matter how; and thus the accidents of a
place are in place; or by a way proper to place; and thus things placed
are in a place. Now in both these senses, in some way God is in every
place; and this is to be everywhere. First, as He is in all things
giving them being, power and operation; so He is in every place as
giving it existence and locative power. Again, things placed are in
place, inasmuch as they fill place; and God fills every place; not,
indeed, like a body, for a body is said to fill place inasmuch as it
excludes the co-presence of another body; whereas by God being in a
place, others are not thereby excluded from it; indeed, by the very
fact that He gives being to the things that fill every place, He
Himself fills every place.
Reply to Objection 1: Incorporeal things are in place not by contact of
dimensive quantity, as bodies are but by contact of power.
Reply to Objection 2: The indivisible is twofold. One is the term of
the continuous; as a point in permanent things, and as a moment in
succession; and this kind of the indivisible in permanent things,
forasmuch as it has a determinate site, cannot be in many parts of
place, or in many places; likewise the indivisible of action or
movement, forasmuch as it has a determinate order in movement or
action, cannot be in many parts of time. Another kind of the
indivisible is outside of the whole genus of the continuous; and in
this way incorporeal substances, like God, angel and soul, are called
indivisible. Such a kind of indivisible does not belong to the
continuous, as a part of it, but as touching it by its power; hence,
according as its power can extend itself to one or to many, to a small
thing, or to a great one, in this way it is in one or in many places,
and in a small or large place.
Reply to Objection 3: A whole is so called with reference to its parts.
Now part is twofold: viz. a part of the essence, as the form and the
matter are called parts of the composite, while genus and difference
are called parts of species. There is also part of quantity into which
any quantity is divided. What therefore is whole in any place by
totality of quantity, cannot be outside of that place, because the
quantity of anything placed is commensurate to the quantity of the
place; and hence there is no totality of quantity without totality of
place. But totality of essence is not commensurate to the totality of
place. Hence it is not necessary for that which is whole by totality of
essence in a thing, not to be at all outside of it. This appears also
in accidental forms which have accidental quantity; as an example,
whiteness is whole in each part of the surface if we speak of its
totality of essence; because according to the perfect idea of its
species it is found to exist in every part of the surface. But if its
totality be considered according to quantity which it has accidentally,
then it is not whole in every part of the surface. On the other hand,
incorporeal substances have no totality either of themselves or
accidentally, except in reference to the perfect idea of their essence.
Hence, as the soul is whole in every part of the body, so is God whole
in all things and in each one.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God is everywhere by essence, presence and power?
Objection 1: It seems that the mode of God's existence in all things is
not properly described by way of essence, presence and power. For what
is by essence in anything, is in it essentially. But God is not
essentially in things; for He does not belong to the essence of
anything. Therefore it ought not to be said that God is in things by
essence, presence and power.
Objection 2: Further, to be present in anything means not to be absent
from it. Now this is the meaning of God being in things by His essence,
that He is not absent from anything. Therefore the presence of God in
all things by essence and presence means the same thing. Therefore it
is superfluous to say that God is present in things by His essence,
presence and power.
Objection 3: Further, as God by His power is the principle of all
things, so He is the same likewise by His knowledge and will. But it is
not said that He is in things by knowledge and will. Therefore neither
is He present by His power.
Objection 4: Further, as grace is a perfection added to the substance
of a thing, so many other perfections are likewise added. Therefore if
God is said to be in certain persons in a special way by grace, it
seems that according to every perfection there ought to be a special
mode of God's existence in things.
On the contrary, A gloss on the Canticle of Canticles (5) says that,
"God by a common mode is in all things by His presence, power and
substance; still He is said to be present more familiarly in some by
grace" [*The quotation is from St. Gregory, (Hom. viii in Ezech. )].
I answer that, God is said to be in a thing in two ways; in one way
after the manner of an efficient cause; and thus He is in all things
created by Him; in another way he is in things as the object of
operation is in the operator; and this is proper to the operations of
the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and the
thing desired in the one desiring. In this second way God is especially
in the rational creature which knows and loves Him actually or
habitually. And because the rational creature possesses this
prerogative by grace, as will be shown later [40](Q[12]). He is said to
be thus in the saints by grace.
But how He is in other things created by Him, may be considered from
human affairs. A king, for example, is said to be in the whole kingdom
by his power, although he is not everywhere present. Again a thing is
said to be by its presence in other things which are subject to its
inspection; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone, who
nevertheless may not be in substance in every part of the house.
Lastly, a thing is said to be by way of substance or essence in that
place in which its substance may be. Now there were some (the
Manichees) who said that spiritual and incorporeal things were subject
to the divine power; but that visible and corporeal things were subject
to the power of a contrary principle. Therefore against these it is
necessary to say that God is in all things by His power.
But others, though they believed that all things were subject to the
divine power, still did not allow that divine providence extended to
these inferior bodies, and in the person of these it is said, "He
walketh about the poles of the heavens; and He doth not consider our
things [*Vulg. : 'He doth not consider . . . and He walketh,' etc. ]"
(Job 22:14). Against these it is necessary to say that God is in all
things by His presence.
Further, others said that, although all things are subject to God's
providence, still all things are not immediately created by God; but
that He immediately created the first creatures, and these created the
others. Against these it is necessary to say that He is in all things
by His essence.
Therefore, God is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all things
are subject to His power; He is by His presence in all things, as all
things are bare and open to His eyes; He is in all things by His
essence, inasmuch as He is present to all as the cause of their being.
Reply to Objection 1: God is said to be in all things by essence, not
indeed by the essence of the things themselves, as if He were of their
essence; but by His own essence; because His substance is present to
all things as the cause of their being.
Reply to Objection 2: A thing can be said to be present to another,
when in its sight, though the thing may be distant in substance, as was
shown in this article; and therefore two modes of presence are
necessary; viz. by essence and by presence.
Reply to Objection 3: Knowledge and will require that the thing known
should be in the one who knows, and the thing willed in the one who
wills. Hence by knowledge and will things are more truly in God than
God in things. But power is the principle of acting on another; hence
by power the agent is related and applied to an external thing; thus by
power an agent may be said to be present to another.
Reply to Objection 4: No other perfection, except grace, added to
substance, renders God present in anything as the object known and
loved; therefore only grace constitutes a special mode of God's
existence in things. There is, however, another special mode of God's
existence in man by union, which will be treated of in its own place
(TP).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?
Objection 1: It seems that to be everywhere does not belong to God
alone. For the universal, according to the Philosopher (Poster. i), is
everywhere, and always; primary matter also, since it is in all bodies,
is everywhere. But neither of these is God, as appears from what is
said above [41](Q[3]). Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to
God alone.
Objection 2: Further, number is in things numbered. But the whole
universe is constituted in number, as appears from the Book of Wisdom
(Wis. 11:21). Therefore there is some number which is in the whole
universe, and is thus everywhere.
Objection 3: Further, the universe is a kind of "whole perfect body"
(Coel. et Mund. i). But the whole universe is everywhere, because there
is no place outside it. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to
God alone.
Objection 4: Further, if any body were infinite, no place would exist
outside of it, and so it would be everywhere. Therefore to be
everywhere does not appear to belong to God alone.
Objection 5: Further, the soul, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), is
"whole in the whole body, and whole in every one of its parts. "
Therefore if there was only one animal in the world, its soul would be
everywhere; and thus to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.
Objection 6: Further, as Augustine says (Ep. 137), "The soul feels
where it sees, and lives where it feels, and is where it lives. " But
the soul sees as it were everywhere: for in a succession of glances it
comprehends the entire space of the heavens in its sight. Therefore the
soul is everywhere.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Who dares to
call the Holy Ghost a creature, Who in all things, and everywhere, and
always is, which assuredly belongs to the divinity alone? "
I answer that, To be everywhere primarily and absolutely, is proper to
God. Now to be everywhere primarily is said of that which in its whole
self is everywhere; for if a thing were everywhere according to its
parts in different places, it would not be primarily everywhere,
forasmuch as what belongs to anything according to part does not belong
to it primarily; thus if a man has white teeth, whiteness belongs
primarily not to the man but to his teeth. But a thing is everywhere
absolutely when it does not belong to it to be everywhere accidentally,
that is, merely on some supposition; as a grain of millet would be
everywhere, supposing that no other body existed. It belongs therefore
to a thing to be everywhere absolutely when, on any supposition, it
must be everywhere; and this properly belongs to God alone. For
whatever number of places be supposed, even if an infinite number be
supposed besides what already exist, it would be necessary that God
should be in all of them; for nothing can exist except by Him.
Therefore to be everywhere primarily and absolutely belongs to God and
is proper to Him: because whatever number of places be supposed to
exist, God must be in all of them, not as to a part of Him, but as to
His very self.
Reply to Objection 1: The universal, and also primary matter are indeed
everywhere; but not according to the same mode of existence.
Reply to Objection 2: Number, since it is an accident, does not, of
itself, exist in place, but accidentally; neither is the whole but only
part of it in each of the things numbered; hence it does not follow
that it is primarily and absolutely everywhere.
Reply to Objection 3: The whole body of the universe is everywhere, but
not primarily; forasmuch as it is not wholly in each place, but
according to its parts; nor again is it everywhere absolutely, because,
supposing that other places existed besides itself, it would not be in
them.
Reply to Objection 4: If an infinite body existed, it would be
everywhere; but according to its parts.
Reply to Objection 5: Were there one animal only, its soul would be
everywhere primarily indeed, but only accidentally.
Reply to Objection 6: When it is said that the soul sees anywhere, this
can be taken in two senses. In one sense the adverb "anywhere"
determines the act of seeing on the part of the object; and in this
sense it is true that while it sees the heavens, it sees in the
heavens; and in the same way it feels in the heavens; but it does not
follow that it lives or exists in the heavens, because to live and to
exist do not import an act passing to an exterior object. In another
sense it can be understood according as the adverb determines the act
of the seer, as proceeding from the seer; and thus it is true that
where the soul feels and sees, there it is, and there it lives
according to this mode of speaking; and thus it does not follow that it
is everywhere.
__________________________________________________________________
THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD (TWO ARTICLES)
We next consider God's immutability, and His eternity following on His
immutability. On the immutability of God there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether God is altogether immutable?
(2) Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God is altogether immutable?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not altogether immutable. For
whatever moves itself is in some way mutable. But, as Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit viii, 20), "The Creator Spirit moves Himself neither by
time, nor by place. " Therefore God is in some way mutable.
Objection 2: Further, it is said of Wisdom, that "it is more mobile
than all things active [Vulg. 'mobilior']" (Wis. 7:24). But God is
wisdom itself; therefore God is movable.
Objection 3: Further, to approach and to recede signify movement. But
these are said of God in Scripture, "Draw nigh to God and He will draw
nigh to you" (James 4:8). Therefore God is mutable.
On the contrary, It is written, "I am the Lord, and I change not"
(Malachi 3:6).
I answer that, From what precedes, it is shown that God is altogether
immutable. First, because it was shown above that there is some first
being, whom we call God; and that this first being must be pure act,
without the admixture of any potentiality, for the reason that,
absolutely, potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which is
in any way changed, is in some way in potentiality. Hence it is evident
that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable. Secondly,
because everything which is moved, remains as it was in part, and
passes away in part; as what is moved from whiteness to blackness,
remains the same as to substance; thus in everything which is moved,
there is some kind of composition to be found. But it has been shown
above ([42]Q[3], A[7]) that in God there is no composition, for He is
altogether simple. Hence it is manifest that God cannot be moved.
Thirdly, because everything which is moved acquires something by its
movement, and attains to what it had not attained previously. But since
God is infinite, comprehending in Himself all the plenitude of
perfection of all being, He cannot acquire anything new, nor extend
Himself to anything whereto He was not extended previously. Hence
movement in no way belongs to Him. So, some of the ancients,
constrained, as it were, by the truth, decided that the first principle
was immovable.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine there speaks in a similar way to Plato,
who said that the first mover moves Himself; calling every operation a
movement, even as the acts of understanding, and willing, and loving,
are called movements. Therefore because God understands and loves
Himself, in that respect they said that God moves Himself, not,
however, as movement and change belong to a thing existing in
potentiality, as we now speak of change and movement.
Reply to Objection 2: Wisdom is called mobile by way of similitude,
according as it diffuses its likeness even to the outermost of things;
for nothing can exist which does not proceed from the divine wisdom by
way of some kind of imitation, as from the first effective and formal
principle; as also works of art proceed from the wisdom of the artist.
And so in the same way, inasmuch as the similitude of the divine wisdom
proceeds in degrees from the highest things, which participate more
fully of its likeness, to the lowest things which participate of it in
a lesser degree, there is said to be a kind of procession and movement
of the divine wisdom to things; as when we say that the sun proceeds to
the earth, inasmuch as the ray of light touches the earth. In this way
Dionysius (Coel. Hier. i) expounds the matter, that every procession of
the divine manifestation comes to us from the movement of the Father of
light.
Reply to Objection 3: These things are said of God in Scripture
metaphorically. For as the sun is said to enter a house, or to go out,
according as its rays reach the house, so God is said to approach to
us, or to recede from us, when we receive the influx of His goodness,
or decline from Him.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?
Objection 1: It seems that to be immutable does not belong to God
alone. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that "matter is in
everything which is moved. " But, according to some, certain created
substances, as angels and souls, have not matter. Therefore to be
immutable does not belong to God alone.
Objection 2: Further, everything in motion moves to some end. What
therefore has already attained its ultimate end, is not in motion. But
some creatures have already attained to their ultimate end; as all the
blessed in heaven. Therefore some creatures are immovable.
Objection 3: Further, everything which is mutable is variable. But
forms are invariable; for it is said (Sex Princip. i) that "form is
essence consisting of the simple and invariable. " Therefore it does not
belong to God alone to be immutable.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. i), "God alone is
immutable; and whatever things He has made, being from nothing, are
mutable. "
I answer that, God alone is altogether immutable; whereas every
creature is in some way mutable. Be it known therefore that a mutable
thing can be called so in two ways: by a power in itself; and by a
power possessed by another. For all creatures before they existed, were
possible, not by any created power, since no creature is eternal, but
by the divine power alone, inasmuch as God could produce them into
existence. Thus, as the production of a thing into existence depends on
the will of God, so likewise it depends on His will that things should
be preserved; for He does not preserve them otherwise than by ever
giving them existence; hence if He took away His action from them, all
things would be reduced to nothing, as appears from Augustine (Gen. ad
lit. iv, 12). Therefore as it was in the Creator's power to produce
them before they existed in themselves, so likewise it is in the
Creator's power when they exist in themselves to bring them to nothing.
In this way therefore, by the power of another---namely, of God---they
are mutable, inasmuch as they are producible from nothing by Him, and
are by Him reducible from existence to non-existence.
If, however, a thing is called mutable by a power in itself, thus also
in some manner every creature is mutable. For every creature has a
twofold power, active and passive; and I call that power passive which
enables anything to attain its perfection either in being, or in
attaining to its end. Now if the mutability of a thing be considered
according to its power for being, in that way all creatures are not
mutable, but those only in which what is potential in them is
consistent with non-being. Hence, in the inferior bodies there is
mutability both as regards substantial being, inasmuch as their matter
can exist with privation of their substantial form, and also as regards
their accidental being, supposing the subject to coexist with privation
of accident; as, for example, this subject "man" can exist with
"not-whiteness" and can therefore be changed from white to not-white.
But supposing the accident to be such as to follow on the essential
principles of the subject, then the privation of such an accident
cannot coexist with the subject. Hence the subject cannot be changed as
regards that kind of accident; as, for example, snow cannot be made
black. Now in the celestial bodies matter is not consistent with
privation of form, because the form perfects the whole potentiality of
the matter; therefore these bodies are not mutable as to substantial
being, but only as to locality, because the subject is consistent with
privation of this or that place. On the other hand incorporeal
substances, being subsistent forms which, although with respect to
their own existence are as potentiality to act, are not consistent with
the privation of this act; forasmuch as existence is consequent upon
form, and nothing corrupts except it lose its form. Hence in the form
itself there is no power to non-existence; and so these kinds of
substances are immutable and invariable as regards their existence.
Wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "intellectual created
substances are pure from generation and from every variation, as also
are incorporeal and immaterial substances. " Still, there remains in
them a twofold mutability: one as regards their potentiality to their
end; and in that way there is in them a mutability according to choice
from good to evil, as Damascene says (De Fide ii, 3,4); the other as
regards place, inasmuch as by their finite power they attain to certain
fresh places---which cannot be said of God, who by His infinity fills
all places, as was shown above ([43]Q[8], A[2]).
Thus in every creature there is a potentiality to change either as
regards substantial being as in the case of things corruptible; or as
regards locality only, as in the case of the celestial bodies; or as
regards the order to their end, and the application of their powers to
divers objects, as in the case with the angels; and universally all
creatures generally are mutable by the power of the Creator, in Whose
power is their existence and non-existence. Hence since God is in none
of these ways mutable, it belongs to Him alone to be altogether
immutable.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection proceeds from mutability as
regards substantial or accidental being; for philosophers treated of
such movement.
Reply to Objection 2: The good angels, besides their natural endowment
of immutability of being, have also immutability of election by divine
power; nevertheless there remains in them mutability as regards place.
Reply to Objection 3: Forms are called invariable, forasmuch as they
cannot be subjects of variation; but they are subject to variation
because by them their subject is variable.
Hence it is clear that they
vary in so far as they are; for they are not called beings as though
they were the subject of being, but because through them something has
being.
__________________________________________________________________
THE ETERNITY OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the eternity of God, concerning which arise six
points of inquiry:
(1) What is eternity?
(2) Whether God is eternal?
(3) Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?
(4) Whether eternity differs from time?
(5) The difference of aeviternity, as there is one time, and one
eternity?
(6) Whether there is only one aeviternity?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this is a good definition of eternity, "The simultaneously-whole and
perfect possession of interminable life"?
Objection 1: It seems that the definition of eternity given by Boethius
(De Consol. v) is not a good one: "Eternity is the simultaneously-whole
and perfect possession of interminable life. " For the word
"interminable" is a negative one. But negation only belongs to what is
defective, and this does not belong to eternity. Therefore in the
definition of eternity the word "interminable" ought not to be found.
Objection 2: Further, eternity signifies a certain kind of duration.
But duration regards existence rather than life. Therefore the word
"life" ought not to come into the definition of eternity; but rather
the word "existence. "
Objection 3: Further, a whole is what has parts. But this is alien to
eternity which is simple. Therefore it is improperly said to be
"whole. "
Objection 4: Many days cannot occur together, nor can many times exist
all at once. But in eternity, days and times are in the plural, for it
is said, "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of
eternity" (Micah 5:2); and also it is said, "According to the
revelation of the mystery hidden from eternity" (Rom. 16:25). Therefore
eternity is not omni-simultaneous.
Objection 5: Further, the whole and the perfect are the same thing.
Supposing, therefore, that it is "whole," it is superfluously described
as "perfect. "
Objection 6: Further, duration does not imply "possession. " But
eternity is a kind of duration. Therefore eternity is not possession.
I answer that, As we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way of
compound things, so must we reach to the knowledge of eternity by means
of time, which is nothing but the numbering of movement by "before" and
"after. " For since succession occurs in every movement, and one part
comes after another, the fact that we reckon before and after in
movement, makes us apprehend time, which is nothing else but the
measure of before and after in movement. Now in a thing bereft of
movement, which is always the same, there is no before or after. As
therefore the idea of time consists in the numbering of before and
after in movement; so likewise in the apprehension of the uniformity of
what is outside of movement, consists the idea of eternity.
Further, those things are said to be measured by time which have a
beginning and an end in time, because in everything which is moved
there is a beginning, and there is an end. But as whatever is wholly
immutable can have no succession, so it has no beginning, and no end.
Thus eternity is known from two sources: first, because what is eternal
is interminable---that is, has no beginning nor end (that is, no term
either way); secondly, because eternity has no succession, being
simultaneously whole.
Reply to Objection 1: Simple things are usually defined by way of
negation; as "a point is that which has no parts. " Yet this is not to
be taken as if the negation belonged to their essence, but because our
intellect which first apprehends compound things, cannot attain to the
knowledge of simple things except by removing the opposite.
Reply to Objection 2: What is truly eternal, is not only being, but
also living; and life extends to operation, which is not true of being.
Now the protraction of duration seems to belong to operation rather
than to being; hence time is the numbering of movement.
Reply to Objection 3: Eternity is called whole, not because it has
parts, but because it is wanting in nothing.
Reply to Objection 4: As God, although incorporeal, is named in
Scripture metaphorically by corporeal names, so eternity though
simultaneously whole, is called by names implying time and succession.
Reply to Objection 5: Two things are to be considered in time: time
itself, which is successive; and the "now" of time, which is imperfect.
Hence the expression "simultaneously-whole" is used to remove the idea
of time, and the word "perfect" is used to exclude the "now" of time.
Reply to Objection 6: Whatever is possessed, is held firmly and
quietly; therefore to designate the immutability and permanence of
eternity, we use the word "possession. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God is eternal?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not eternal. For nothing made can be
predicated of God; for Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "The now that
flows away makes time, the now that stands still makes eternity;" and
Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 28) "that God is the author of
eternity. " Therefore God is not eternal.
Objection 2: Further, what is before eternity, and after eternity, is
not measured by eternity. But, as Aristotle says (De Causis), "God is
before eternity and He is after eternity": for it is written that "the
Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond [*Douay: 'for ever and
ever']" (Ex. 15:18). Therefore to be eternal does not belong to God.
Objection 3: Further, eternity is a kind of measure. But to be measured
belongs not to God. Therefore it does not belong to Him to be eternal.
Objection 4: Further, in eternity, there is no present, past or future,
since it is simultaneously whole; as was said in the preceding article.
But words denoting present, past and future time are applied to God in
Scripture. Therefore God is not eternal.
On the contrary, Athanasius says in his Creed: "The Father is eternal,
the Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eternal. "
I answer that, The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the idea
of time follows movement, as appears from the preceding article. Hence,
as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be
eternal. Nor is He eternal only; but He is His own eternity; whereas,
no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own being. Now
God is His own uniform being; and hence as He is His own essence, so He
is His own eternity.
Reply to Objection 1: The "now" that stands still, is said to make
eternity according to our apprehension. As the apprehension of time is
caused in us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the "now," so
the apprehension of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending the
"now" standing still. When Augustine says that "God is the author of
eternity," this is to be understood of participated eternity. For God
communicates His eternity to some in the same way as He communicates
His immutability.
Reply to Objection 2: From this appears the answer to the Second
Objection. For God is said to be before eternity, according as it is
shared by immaterial substances. Hence, also, in the same book, it is
said that "intelligence is equal to eternity. " In the words of Exodus,
"The Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond," eternity stands for
age, as another rendering has it. Thus it is said that the Lord will
reign beyond eternity, inasmuch as He endures beyond every age, i. e.
beyond every kind of duration. For age is nothing more than the period
of each thing, as is said in the book De Coelo i. Or to reign beyond
eternity can be taken to mean that if any other thing were conceived to
exist for ever, as the movement of the heavens according to some
philosophers, then God would still reign beyond, inasmuch as His reign
is simultaneously whole.
Reply to Objection 3: Eternity is nothing else but God Himself. Hence
God is not called eternal, as if He were in any way measured; but the
idea of measurement is there taken according to the apprehension of our
mind alone.
Reply to Objection 4: Words denoting different times are applied to
God, because His eternity includes all times; not as if He Himself were
altered through present, past and future.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?
Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to God alone to be
eternal. For it is written that "those who instruct many to justice,"
shall be "as stars unto perpetual eternities [*Douay: 'for all
eternity']" (Dan. 12:3). Now if God alone were eternal, there could not
be many eternities. Therefore God alone is not the only eternal.
Objection 2: Further, it is written "Depart, ye cursed into eternal
[Douay: 'everlasting'] fire" (Mat. 25:41). Therefore God is not the
only eternal.
Objection 3: Further, every necessary thing is eternal. But there are
many necessary things; as, for instance, all principles of
demonstration and all demonstrative propositions. Therefore God is not
the only eternal.
On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. ad Damasum. xv) that "God is the only
one who has no beginning. " Now whatever has a beginning, is not
eternal. Therefore God is the only one eternal.
I answer that, Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone,
because eternity follows on immutability; as appears from the first
article. But God alone is altogether immutable, as was shown above
([44]Q[9], A[1]). Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability
from Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive immutability
from God in the way of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is said
of the earth, "it standeth for ever" (Eccles. 1:4). Again, some things
are called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their
duration, although they are in nature corruptible; thus (Ps. 75:5) the
hills are called "eternal" and we read "of the fruits of the eternal
hills. " (Dt. 33:15). Some again, share more fully than others in the
nature of eternity, inasmuch as they possess unchangeableness either in
being or further still in operation; like the angels, and the blessed,
who enjoy the Word, because "as regards that vision of the Word, no
changing thoughts exist in the Saints," as Augustine says (De Trin.
xv). Hence those who see God are said to have eternal life; according
to that text, "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only
true God," etc. (Jn. 17:3).
Reply to Objection 1: There are said to be many eternities, accordingly
as many share in eternity, by the contemplation of God.
Reply to Objection 2: The fire of hell is called eternal, only because
it never ends. Still, there is change in the pains of the lost,
according to the words "To extreme heat they will pass from snowy
waters" (Job 24:19). Hence in hell true eternity does not exist, but
rather time; according to the text of the Psalm "Their time will be for
ever" (Ps. 80:16).
Reply to Objection 3: Necessary means a certain mode of truth; and
truth, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi), is in the mind.
Therefore in this sense the true and necessary are eternal, because
they are in the eternal mind, which is the divine intellect alone;
hence it does not follow that anything beside God is eternal.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether eternity differs from time?
Objection 1: It seems that eternity does not differ from time. For two
measures of duration cannot exist together, unless one is part of the
other; for instance two days or two hours cannot be together;
nevertheless, we may say that a day or an hour are together,
considering hour as part of a day. But eternity and time occur
together, each of which imports a certain measure of duration. Since
therefore eternity is not a part of time, forasmuch as eternity exceeds
time, and includes it, it seems that time is a part of eternity, and is
not a different thing from eternity.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv), the
"now" of time remains the same in the whole of time. But the nature of
eternity seems to be that it is the same indivisible thing in the whole
space of time. Therefore eternity is the "now" of time. But the "now"
of time is not substantially different from time. Therefore eternity is
not substantially different from time.
Objection 3: Further, as the measure of the first movement is the
measure of every movement, as said in Phys. iv, it thus appears that
the measure of the first being is that of every being. But eternity is
the measure of the first being---that is, of the divine being.
Therefore eternity is the measure of every being. But the being of
things corruptible is measured by time. Time therefore is either
eternity or is a part of eternity.
On the contrary, Eternity is simultaneously whole. But time has a
"before" and an "after. " Therefore time and eternity are not the same
thing.
I answer that, It is manifest that time and eternity are not the same.
Some have founded this difference on the fact that eternity has neither
beginning nor an end; whereas time has a beginning and an end. This,
however, makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute difference
because, granted that time always was and always will be, according to
the idea of those who think the movement of the heavens goes on for
ever, there would yet remain a difference between eternity and time, as
Boethius says (De Consol. v), arising from the fact that eternity is
simultaneously whole; which cannot be applied to time: for eternity is
the measure of a permanent being; while time is a measure of movement.
Supposing, however, that the aforesaid difference be considered on the
part of the things measured, and not as regards the measures, then
there is some reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is measured by time
which has beginning and end in time. Hence, if the movement of the
heavens lasted always, time would not be of its measure as regards the
whole of its duration, since the infinite is not measurable; but it
would be the measure of that part of its revolution which has beginning
and end in time.
Another reason for the same can be taken from these measures in
themselves, if we consider the end and the beginning as potentialities;
because, granted also that time always goes on, yet it is possible to
note in time both the beginning and the end, by considering its parts:
thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a day or of a year; which
cannot be applied to eternity. Still these differences follow upon the
essential and primary differences, that eternity is simultaneously
whole, but that time is not so.
Reply to Objection 1: Such a reason would be a valid one if time and
eternity were the same kind of measure; but this is seen not to be the
case when we consider those things of which the respective measures are
time and eternity.
Reply to Objection 2: The "now" of time is the same as regards its
subject in the whole course of time, but it differs in aspect; for
inasmuch as time corresponds to movement, its "now" corresponds to what
is movable; and the thing movable has the same one subject in all time,
but differs in aspect a being here and there; and such alteration is
movement. Likewise the flow of the "now" as alternating in aspect is
time. But eternity remains the same according to both subject and
aspect; and hence eternity is not the same as the "now" of time.
Reply to Objection 3: As eternity is the proper measure of permanent
being, so time is the proper measure of movement; and hence, according
as any being recedes from permanence of being, and is subject to
change, it recedes from eternity, and is subject to time. Therefore the
being of things corruptible, because it is changeable, is not measured
by eternity, but by time; for time measures not only things actually
changed, but also things changeable; hence it not only measures
movement but it also measures repose, which belongs to whatever is
naturally movable, but is not actually in motion.
__________________________________________________________________
The difference of aeviternity and time
Objection 1: It seems that aeviternity is the same as time. For
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22,23), that "God moves the
spiritual through time. " But aeviternity is said to be the measure of
spiritual substances. Therefore time is the same as aeviternity.
Objection 2: Further, it is essential to time to have "before" and
"after"; but it is essential to eternity to be simultaneously whole, as
was shown above in the first article. Now aeviternity is not eternity;
for it is written (Ecclus. 1:1) that eternal "Wisdom is before age. "
Therefore it is not simultaneously whole but has "before" and "after";
and thus it is the same as time.
Objection 3: Further, if there is no "before" and "after" in
aeviternity, it follows that in aeviternal things there is no
difference between being, having been, or going to be. Since then it is
impossible for aeviternal things not to have been, it follows that it
is impossible for them not to be in the future; which is false, since
God can reduce them to nothing.
Objection 4: Further, since the duration of aeviternal things is
infinite as to subsequent duration, if aeviternity is simultaneously
whole, it follows that some creature is actually infinite; which is
impossible. Therefore aeviternity does not differ from time.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) "Who commandest time to
be separate from aeviternity. "
I answer that, Aeviternity differs from time, and from eternity, as the
mean between them both. This difference is explained by some to consist
in the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor end, aeviternity, a
beginning but no end, and time both beginning and end. This difference,
however, is but an accidental one, as was shown above, in the preceding
article; because even if aeviternal things had always been, and would
always be, as some think, and even if they might sometimes fail to be,
which is possible to God to allow; even granted this, aeviternity would
still be distinguished from eternity, and from time.
Others assign the difference between these three to consist in the fact
that eternity has no "before" and "after"; but that time has both,
together with innovation and veteration; and that aeviternity has
"before" and "after" without innovation and veteration. This theory,
however, involves a contradiction; which manifestly appears if
innovation and veteration be referred to the measure itself. For since
"before" and "after" of duration cannot exist together, if aeviternity
has "before" and "after," it must follow that with the receding of the
first part of aeviternity, the after part of aeviternity must newly
appear; and thus innovation would occur in aeviternity itself, as it
does in time. And if they be referred to the things measured, even then
an incongruity would follow. For a thing which exists in time grows old
with time, because it has a changeable existence, and from the
changeableness of a thing measured, there follows "before" and "after"
in the measure, as is clear from Phys. iv. Therefore the fact that an
aeviternal thing is neither inveterate, nor subject to innovation,
comes from its changelessness; and consequently its measure does not
contain "before" and "after. " We say then that since eternity is the
measure of a permanent being, in so far as anything recedes from
permanence of being, it recedes from eternity. Now some things recede
from permanence of being, so that their being is subject to change, or
consists in change; and these things are measured by time, as are all
movements, and also the being of all things corruptible. But others
recede less from permanence of being, forasmuch as their being neither
consists in change, nor is the subject of change; nevertheless they
have change annexed to them either actually or potentially. This
appears in the heavenly bodies, the substantial being of which is
unchangeable; and yet with unchangeable being they have changeableness
of place. The same applies to the angels, who have an unchangeable
being as regards their nature with changeableness as regards choice;
moreover they have changeableness of intelligence, of affections and of
places in their own degree. Therefore these are measured by aeviternity
which is a mean between eternity and time. But the being that is
measured by eternity is not changeable, nor is it annexed to change. In
this way time has "before" and "after"; aeviternity in itself has no
"before" and "after," which can, however, be annexed to it; while
eternity has neither "before" nor "after," nor is it compatible with
such at all.
Reply to Objection 1: Spiritual creatures as regards successive
affections and intelligences are measured by time. Hence also Augustine
says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22,23) that to be moved through time, is to
be moved by affections. But as regards their nature they are measured
by aeviternity; whereas as regards the vision of glory, they have a
share of eternity.
Reply to Objection 2: Aeviternity is simultaneously whole; yet it is
not eternity, because "before" and "after" are compatible with it.
Reply to Objection 3: In the very being of an angel considered
absolutely, there is no difference of past and future, but only as
regards accidental change. Now to say that an angel was, or is, or will
be, is to be taken in a different sense according to the acceptation of
our intellect, which apprehends the angelic existence by comparison
with different parts of time. But when we say that an angel is, or was,
we suppose something, which being supposed, its opposite is not subject
to the divine power. Whereas when we say he will be, we do not as yet
suppose anything.
