Yet our Baltic anonymous
author is quite wrong in so representing things
as though, in Frederick William Ill's view, the
alliance with Russia had been the only possible
one.
author is quite wrong in so representing things
as though, in Frederick William Ill's view, the
alliance with Russia had been the only possible
one.
Treitschke - 1914 - His Doctrine of German Destiny
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? 270 Treitschke
ants in the Alps likewise recollected their heroic
wars against the Wallachs. The high nobility, how-
ever, and the masses in the towns persevered in the
old hatred against Prussia. The small gentry of
Imperial and Royal licensed coffee-house keepers
and tobacconists doted on the French Republic.
As always in Austria, the big financial interests
gave proof of their unprincipled meanness, and
insufficient attention has been paid in Germany to
the great dispatch of arms which went from Vienna
via Trieste to France. German national sentiment ,
however, is visibly in the ascendant, and it grows
daily on beholding the new German Empire.
National pride and hatred permeate, so to say,
the atmosphere of this unlucky State, whose future
entirely depends upon the reconciliation of national
interests. The growing hatred against the Slavs
may by and by press the broad masses of German
population into the ranks of the German nation-
alists, and unless fairly well-regulated constitu-
tional life can be established in the near future in
Cisleithania the Germans might finally also realize
that their nationality is dearer to them than their
Government.
Closer ties attach the greater part of the Slavs
to the Austrian Monarchy. When from the
distance we hear only the uncouth blustering of
Czech fanaticism, when we listen to the assurances
of German scientists in Prague, that a Czech
university by the side of a German one is at any
rate more endurable than a university with mixed
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? Austria and the German Empire 271
languages, which must infallibly lead to the de-
struction of Germanism in Bohemia; when we
thus behold the battle of the elements in the
territories of the Crown of Wenceslaus, we are apt
to think that such blind national hatred would
not shrink from the destruction of Austria. On
closer examination, however, secret fear and a
singular cowardice are easily detected, which hide
behind the uproar of the Czechs. They are noisy,
they bluster and twist the law, but they do not
dare to start war. In the midst of their roarings
they feel that they cannot dispense with the
Monarchy because, unlike the Germans, no home
is open to them outside Austria. Not even the
hotheads dare count with certainty upon the
fulfilment of Pan-slavist dreams, and that is why
for the time being the autonomous crown of
Wenceslaus or the division of Cisleithania into
five groups united by federalism suffices for them.
The tameness of the Czechs is, however, not due
to honest intentions, but to the consciousness of
weakness, which can and will change as soon as
Czechdom finds support in a great Slav power,
and it is already patent that the Poles regard
Galician autonomy only as the first step towards
the re-establishment of the Empire of the Sarmats.
Amongst all the nations of Austria the Magyars
must to-day display the greatest energy for the
maintenance of the Monarchy. The newly-estab-
lished Crown needs Cisleithanian support; those
people, with their lively ancestral recollections,
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? 272 Treitschke
know only too well how often Austria and Hungary
have mutually saved each other. The convention
was in every respect vastly in favour of the Mag-
yars. Hungary contributes thirty per cent, to-
wards the general expenditure of the Monarch
and to the payment of interest on the debt of the
country ; if closely calculated it will be found to be
even less. And in spite of all, the Magyars cannot
overcome the old mistrust of the "Hofburg";
the tribunals of Eperies and Arad can no more sink
into oblivion than the impudence of the "Bach"
Hussars. In Parliament a strong and growing
Opposition has aims beyond the convention, and
it appears full of danger that this Opposition
consists almost exclusively of pure Magyar blood.
The delegate "Nemeth" recently offered his
solemn congratulations in Parliament to the
German-Austrians on the impending union with
their German brothers. Should disorder continue
to reign in Cisleithania less hot-blooded Magyars
will also soon raise the question whether a union
with " Chaos" be really an advantage for Hungary.
Two neighbours of Austria, i. e. , Russia and Italy,
believe with the greatest positiveness in the col-
lapse of the Monarchy, and truly everything seems
possible in the vicinity of the Orient. The Oriental
question extends, moves westwards, and resembles
a stone which, when thrown into water, draws
ever-widening circles. It already enters into the
domain of the far horizon which has to be consid-
ered in the politics of the German Empire. Very
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? Austria and the German Empire 273
probably the fate of Austria and the still not
definitely solved Polish question will in time to
come be mixed up with the enigmatical future of
the Balkan population. In Russia's leading circles
fierce hatred, only too easily understood, rages
against Austria, a hatred which the prudence of
clever statesmen may temporarily suppress but
cannot stifle altogether, the highest interests of the
two neighbours in the East as well as in Poland
being in closest vicinity. Certainly one needs the
happy levity of Count Beust in order to look with
steadfast confidence into the future of Austria.
What follows? The struggle of German-Austria
against the Slavs is at the same time a struggle of
the modern States against feudal and ultramontane
Powers. The constitution of Cisleithania honestly
kept and intelligently developed offers room for all
nations of German- Austria. Whoever has the
freedom and peaceful development of Middle
Europe at heart must earnestly wish that the oft-
proved vitality of the old State may once more
assert itself, and that the Germans this side of the
Leitha may hold their own. The perfecting of this
constitution can, however, even under the most
favourable auspices, only take place very slowly;
there is an immeasurable distance between the
wretched indifference which was prevalent in
German- Austria after the battle of Koniggratz and
the present national sentiment. The German
tongue and German morals must not anticipate
great results from the Lothrings; it must suffice
18
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? 274 Treitschke
to us if Germans maintain their possessions against
Slavs and Magyars. The complete solution of a
great European task is no more to be expected
of this infirm country. Only after ten years of
internal peace will Austria, if ever, gain power to
pursue serious plans in the East. An unreservedly
sincere friendship we must not expect of the
"Hofburg. " The policy of silently preserving
all rights is understood in Vienna as well as in
Rome. And however honestly well-wishing we
might be, the Lothrings know from Italy the
mighty attraction of national States, and know
that their Germans cannot turn their eyes from
our Empire. Because of its existence alone the
German Empire is viewed by them with suspicion,
and prudent circumspection is appropriate. Every
uncalled-for attempt at intervention in Austria's
internal struggle accentuates the mistrust of the
" Hofburg" against our countrymen and prejudices
the German cause. This Prince Bismarck mag-
nificently understood when he abstained at Gastein
from all observations against the Hohenwarte
Cabinet. It was very badly understood by the
honest citizens of Breslau, Dresden, and Munich,
when they decided on their heartily well-meant
and heartily stupid declarations of sympathy
for German-Austria. Lucky for German-Austria
that, thanks to our sober-mindedness, such madcap
ideas did not find sympathy; but all our interest
in Austria does not justify us in shutting our eyes
to the possibility of her collapse. The perfection
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? Austria and the German Empire 275
of the Cisleithanian constitution presupposes the
good intentions of all parties; at present such
intention is, however, found to exist only among
part ot the German-Austrians. The Italians are
in the habit of saying, Austria is not a State but a
family. When the foundation of Hapsburg power
was laid, the expression tu felix Austria nube met
with admiration in the whole world and Emperor
Frederick III, regretfully looking at his amputated
foot, said: "Itzt ist dem Reich der ein Fuss
abgeschniedten " ("Now one leg has been cut off
the Empire ") . The times of imperial self -worship
and State-forming marriages of princes are no
more. Will a country which owes its origin to the
senseless family policy of past centuries, which in
character belongs to ancient Europe, be able to
satisfy the demands of a new era? We dare not
answer negatively, yet as brave and vigilant men
we must also contemplate that in years to come
Fate may reply to the question in the negative.
If the calamity of the destruction of Austria were
to occur, and it would also be a calamity to Ger-
many, then our Empire must be ready and pre-
pared to brave the forces of Fate to save German-
ism on the Danube from the debris. "To be
prepared is everything," saith the Poet.
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? THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN PRUSSIA
AND RUSSIA.
IN the summer of 1813, August Wilhelm Schlegel
wrote to Schleiermacher : " Is it to be wondered
at that this nation, on whose shoulders the weight
of the balance of power in Europe has been laid
for one and a half centuries, should go with a
bent back? " In these words he indicated both
the cause of the long-continued feebleness of our
country and also the ground of the constant mis-
trust with which all the Great Powers saw Germany
recovering strength. Even a cautious and unpreju-
diced German historian will find it hard to keep from
bitterness, and will easily appear to foreigners as a
Chauvinist, when he portrays in detail in how much
more just and friendly a way the public opinion of
Europe regarded the national movements of the
Italians, the Greeks, and the Southern Slavs, than
the Germans' struggle for unity. It needs even a
certain degree of self-denial in order to recognize that
the whole formation of the old system of States,
the way of looking at things of the old diplomacy,
depended on the divided state of Germany, and
consequently in our revolution we could expect
nothing better from the neighbouring Powers than,
at most, neutrality and silent non-interference.
276
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 277
A proud German will be glad of the fact that we
owe all that we are really to ourselves; he will
willingly forget past unfairness in practical politics
and simply ask what is the attitude of the neigh-
bouring Powers to the present interests of our
Empire? But he who only sees in history an
arsenal from which to draw weapons to pursue the
varying aims of the politics of the day, will, with a
moderate amount of learning and some sophistry,
be able to prove, just as it happens to suit him,
that France or Austria, Russia or England, is our
hereditary foe. A book of such a sort, thoroughly
partisan in spirit and unhistorical, is the work
Berlin and Petersburg; Prussian contributions
to the history of the Relations between Russia and
Germany, which an anonymous author has lately
published with the unconcealed purpose of arous-
ing attention and of preparing the minds of
credulous readers for a reckoning with Russia.
The book is entitled "Prussian Contributions,"
and the preface is dated from Berlin. I am quite
willing to believe that the author, when he wrote
his preface, may have happened to be passing a
few days in Berlin. But everyone who knows our
political literature must at once discern that the
author of the work is the same publicist who has
issued the little book, Russia, Before and After
the War, Pictures of Petersburg Society, and a
number of other instructive works dealing with
Russo-German relations. And this publicist is,
as is well known, no Prussian but an inhabitant
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? 278 Treitschke
of the Baltic provinces; he has, hitherto, never
claimed to concern himself with Prussian politics,
but has always, with great talent and restless
energy, represented the interests of his Baltic
home as he understood them. Among the political
authors of Germany he takes a position similar to
that which Louis Schneider once occupied on the
other side. Just as the latter, assuredly in his
way an honest Prussian patriot, regarded the
alliance with Holy Russia as a dogma, so does our
author view hostility to the Czar's Empire; only,
he is incomparably abler and quite free from that
deprecatory manner which makes Schneider's
writings so unpleasant. The restoration of Poland
and the conquest of the Baltic provinces, these
are the visions which, more or less disguised,
hover in the background of all his books. In his
view the Prussian monarchy has really no other
raison d'etre than the suppression of the Slavs;
it misses its vocation till it has engaged in hostili-
ties against the Muscovites. All the problems of
German politics are gauged by this one measure;
no inference is so startling as to alarm our author.
In 1871 he opposed the conquest of Alsace and
Lorraine, for the liberation of our western terri-
tories threatened to postpone the longed-for war
with Russia; nor could a patriot of the Baltic
provinces allow that Alsace with its Gallicized
higher classes was a German province, while on
the other hand, the German nationality of Livland
and Kurland was rooted exclusively in the nobility
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 279
and well-to-do citizen class. Such a steady di-
rection of sentiment towards one object compels
the respect, even of an opponent. So long as our
author fought with an open visor, one could pardon
his warm local patriotism when he at times spoke
somewhat contemptuously of Prussia, and held
up the wonderful political instinct of the Baltic
nobility as a shining example to our native narrow-
mindedness. But when, as at present, he assumes
the mask of a deeply-initiated Prussian statesman,
when he pares and trims our glorious history to
suit the aims of the Baltic malcontents, and wishes
to make us believe that Prussia has been for fifty
years the plaything of a foreign power, then it is
quite permissible to examine more closely whether
the cargo of this little Baltic ship is worth more
than the false flag which it flies at its masthead.
The old proverb, "Qui a compagnon, a maitre,"
is especially true of political alliances. Hardenberg
made a mistake when he once said regarding Aus-
tria and Prussia, "leurs interets se confondent. "
A community of interests between independent
Powers can only be a conditional one, and limited
by time ; in every alliance which lasts long, some-
times one of the contracting parties and sometimes
the other will consider itself overreached. Thus
our State at the commencement of the eighteenth
century made enormous sacrifices to aid the ob-
jects of the two sea-Powers, but did not finally
gain any further advantage from this long alliance
than the right of her head to use the kingly title,
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? 280 Treitschke
and some barren laurels. The history also of the
seventy-seven year-long friendship between Prus-
sia and Russia the longest alliance which has
ever existed between two great Powers presents
many such phenomena. There were times when
German patriots were fully justified in regarding
the friendship of Russia as oppressive, nay, as
disgraceful, just as on the other hand in recent
years the great majority of educated Russians
firmly believed that their country was injured by
the Prussian alliance. But when one sums up the
results, and compares the relative position in
respect of power of the two States in 1802, when
their alliance was formed, with that in 1879, when
it was dissolved, it cannot be honestly asserted that
Prussia fared badly in this alliance.
The Russo-Prussian alliance was, as is well
known, entirely the personal work of the two
monarchs, and everyone knows how much it was
helped forward by the honest and frank friend-
ship which the King Frederick William III dis-
played towards the versatile Czar. But these
personal feelings of the King never overpowered
his sound political intelligence and his strong sense
of duty. Every new advance of historical investi-
gation only reconfirms the fact that the King was
altogether right when, unseduced by the proposals
of so many cleverer men than himself, he was only
willing to venture on the attempt at rising against
Napoleon in alliance with Russia. Without the
help of the Czar Alexander, the capture of Paris,
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 281
and the restoration of the old power of Prussia
would have been impossible. Any one who doubts
this should peruse the recently published Memoirs
of Metternich regarding the real objects of the
Vienna Court at the time i. e. , not the Memoirs
themselves with their intolerable self-glorification,
but the appended authentic official documents,
which, for the most part, plainly contradict the
vain self -eulogy of the author. At the Congress of
Vienna the two courts still continued to have a
community of interests: the Czar was obliged to
support Prussia's demands for an indemnity, if
he wished to secure for himself the possession of
Poland.
At the second Peace of Paris, on the other hand,
the interests of the two Powers came into violent
collision. The Czar had indeed favoured the
restoration of the State of Prussia, so that Russia
should be rendered impregnable through this
rampart on its most vulnerable side, but he as little
wished the rise of a completely independent self-
sufficing German power as the courts of Paris,
Vienna, and London did. Therefore, the restor-
ation of our old western frontier, which Prussia
demanded, was defeated by the united opposition
of all the Great Powers. All the courts without
exception observed with anxiety what an unsus-
pected wealth of military power little Prussia had
developed during the War of Liberation ; therefore
they all eagerly vied with one another in burying
Prussia's merits in oblivion. Whether one reads
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? 282 Treitschke
the military dispatches of Wellington and his
officers, the letters of Schwarzenberg, Metternich,
and Gentz, the semi-official writings of the Russian
military authors of that period, it is difficult to
say which of the three allies had most quickly
and completely forgotten the deeds of their Prus-
sian comrades-in-arms. Nevertheless, the alliance
with Russia and Austria was a necessity for Prussia
for it still remained the most important task of our
European policy to prevent another declaration of
war on the part of France, and the Great Alliance
actually achieved this, its first purpose. When
Austria, in 1817, rendered anxious by Alexander's
grandiose schemes, proposed to the King of Prussia
a secret offensive and defensive alliance, which in
case of need might be also directed against Russia,
Hardenberg, who in those days was thoroughly
Austrian in his sympathies, was eager to accept the
proposal. But the King acted as a Prussian, and
absolutely refused, for only the union of all three
Eastern Powers could secure to his State the safety
which he especially needed after the immense
sacrifices of the war.
Yet our Baltic anonymous
author is quite wrong in so representing things
as though, in Frederick William Ill's view, the
alliance with Russia had been the only possible
one. The King knew, more thoroughly than his
present-day critic, the incalculable vicissitudes of
international relations and always kept cautiously
in view the possibility of a war against Russia.
In 1818 he surprised the Vienna Court by the
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 283
declaration that he wished also to include Posen,
East and West Prussia, in the German Confeder-
ation, because in case of a Russian attack, he
wanted to be absolutely sure of the help of Ger-
many. Frederick William held obstinately to this
idea although Hardenberg and Humboldt spoke
against it, and he did not give it up till Austria
opposed it, and thus every prospect of carrying
the proposal through in the Diet of the Confeder-
ation disappeared.
It is equally untrue that the King, as our anony-
mous author condescendingly expresses it, had
modestly renounced all wishes of bringing about
a union of the German States. His policy was
peaceful, as it was obliged to be; it shunned a
decisive contest for which at that time all the
preliminary conditions were lacking, but as soon
as affairs in the new provinces were, to some extent,
settled, he began at once to work for the com-
mercial and political unifying of Germany. In
this difficult task, which in very truth laid the
foundation for the new German Empire, Prussia en-
countered at every step the opposition of Austria,
England, and France. Russia alone among all the
Great Powers preserved a friendly neutrality.
This one fact is sufficient to justify the King in
attaching great importance to Russia's friendship.
This partiality of his, however, was by no means
blind, for nothing is more absurd than the author's
assertion that Prussia, by the mediation which
brought about the Peace of Adrianople, had merely
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? 284 Treitschke
done the Russian Court an unselfish service.
When the war of 1828 broke out, the King had
openly told the Czar that he disapproved of his
declaration of war. The next year, at the com-
mencement of the second campaign, the Euro-
pean situation assumed a very threatening aspect.
The Vienna Cabinet, alarmed in the highest degree
by the progress of the Russian arms, exerted itself
in conjunction with England to bring about a great
alliance against Russia; on the other hand the
King knew from his son-in-law's mouth (the Czar's
autograph note is still preserved in the Berlin state
archives) that there was a secret understanding
between Nicholas and Charles X of France. If
matters were allowed to go their course, there was
danger of a European war, which might oblige
Prussia to fight simultaneously against Russia
and France, and that about a question remote from
our interests. In order to avert- this danger, and
thus acting for the best for his own country, the
King resolved to act as a mediator, and brought
about a peace which, as matters then were, was
acceptable to both contending parties.
Prince Metternich was certainly alarmed at this
success of Prussian policy, and the reactionary
party in Berlin, Duke Karl of Mecklenburg,
Ancillon, Schuckmann, Knesebeck, who were all
staunch adherents of the Vienna diplomat, were
alarmed; but the ablest men at the Court, Bern-
stoff, Witzleven, Eichhorn, and above all the
younger Prince William, approved the King's
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 285
well-considered proceeding. The resolve of the
King was obviously connected with the brilliant
successes which his finance minister, Motz, had
won at the same time in the struggles of German
commercial policy. To the calm historical judg-
ment the years 1828 and 1829 appear as a fortu-
nate turning point in the history of that uneventful
period; it was the time when Prussia again began
to take up a completely independent position in
relation to the Austrian Court. Among the
liberals, indeed, who had lately been admiring the
Greeks, and now were suddenly enthusiastic for
the Turks, there arose a supplementary party-
legend, that Prussia had only undertaken the office
of mediator in order to save the Russian army from
certain destruction. This discovery, however, is
already contradicted by the calendar. On August
1 9th, Diebitch's army appeared before Adrianople;
and it was here that the victor's embarrassments
first began, and here, first, it was evident how much
his fighting power had been reduced by sickness,
and the wear and tear of the campaign. But
Prussia had commenced acting as mediator as
early as July; when General Muffling received his
instructions, the Russian army was victorious
everywhere.
Later on, also, the sober-mindedness of King
Frederick William never favoured the Czar's de-
signs against the Porte; he rather did his best
to strengthen the resisting power of the Ottoman
Empire. The only partly effective reform which
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? 286 Treitschke
the decaying Turkish State succeeded in carrying
through the reconstitution of its army was,
as is well known, the work of Prussian officers.
All the reports which the embittered scandal-
seeking opposition party of that time circulated,
regarding the influence of Russia in the domestic
concerns of Prussia, are mere inventions. The
King alone deserves blame or praise for the course
of domestic policy; his son-in-law never refused to
pay him filial reverence. Even the eccentricities
of the Berlin Court at that period, the love for
parades, the bestowing of military decorations,
which were stigmatized by the liberals as "Russian
manners," were simply due to the personal pre-
dilection of the King, and it is difficult to decide
whether Russia has learnt more in this respect
from Germany, or vice versa. During the anxious
days of the July revolution the King exhibited
again, with all his modesty, an independent and
genuinely Prussian attitude. Frederick William
resisted the legitimist outbursts of his son-in-law,
and hindered the crusade against France which
had been planned in St. Petersburg. The next
year he resisted with equal common sense the
foolish enthusiasm of the liberals for the Poles,
and by occupying the eastern frontier, assisted
in the suppression of that Polish insurrection
which was as dangerous for our Posen as for
Russian Poland. The Baltic anonymous author
conceals his vexation at this intelligent policy of
self-assertion, behind the thoughtful remark that
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 287
we had, as is well known, "paid for rendering this
assistance with the valuable life of Gneisenau. "
Should we, then, perhaps enter in our ledger on
the Russian debit side, the cholera, which swept
away our heroes?
During the whole period from 1815 to 1840, I
know only of a single fact which can be alleged to
give real occasion to the reproach that the King,
for the sake of Russia's friendship, neglected an
important interest of his State. In contrast to
the ruthless commercial policy of Russia, Prussia
showed a moderation which bordered on weakness.
But this matter, also, is not so simple as our
anonymous author thinks. He reproaches Russia
with the non-fulfilment of the Vienna Treaty of
May 3, 1815, and overlooks the fact that Prussia
herself hardly wished in earnest the carrying out
of this agreement. It was soon enough proved
that Hardenberg had been overreached at Vienna
by Prince Czartoryski. The apparently harmless
agreements regarding free transit, and free trade
with the products of all formerly Polish territories,
imposed upon our State, through which the transit
took place, only duties, without conferring any
corresponding advantages. In order to carry out
the treaty literally, Prussia would have had to
divide its Polish provinces from its other territories
by a line of custom-houses. But the Poles saw
in the treaty a welcome means of carrying their
national propaganda into our Polish territories by
settlements of commercial agents. Thus it hap-
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? 288 Treitschke
pened that Prussia, after futile negotiations,
proceeded on her own account; and by the cus-
toms law of 1818 placed her Polish territories on
precisely the same footing as her other eastern
provinces. After this necessary step, Prussia
was no more in the position to appeal successfully
to the Vienna Treaty. And what means did we,
in fact, possess to compel the neighbouring State
to give up a foolish commercial policy, which was
injurious for our own country? Only the two-
edged weapon of retaliatory duties. The relation
of the two countries assumed quite a different
aspect under Frederick William IV. It will al-
ways be one of the most bitter memories of our
history, how lacking in counsel, and wavering in
purposes the clever new King proved, in contrast
to the strong-willed Czar, how cruelly he experi-
enced, by countless failures, that in the stern
struggles for power of national life, character is
always superior to talent, and how at last, for
truth will out, he actually feared these narrow
minds. Here our author has good reason for
sharp judgments; and here also he gives us, along
with some questionable anecdotes, some reliable
matter-of-fact information regarding the history
of the confusions of 1848-50. It is quite true that
the Czar Nicholas in the autumn of 1848 asked
General Count Friedrich Dohna whether he would
not be the Prussian General Monk, and march with
the first army corps on Berlin, to restore order
there; the whole Russian army would act as his
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 289
reserve in case of need. The memories of the
Count printed from autograph, confirm the cor-
rectness of this story with the exception of some
trifling details. But even here the author cannot
rise to an unprejudiced historical estimate of the
events in question. He conceals the fact that not
only Russia but all the great Powers were against
the rise of a Prussian-German Empire. The posi-
tion which the Powers had assumed with regard
to the question of German unity had not changed
since 1814. He similarly ignores the fact that all
the great Powers opposed the liberation of Schles-
wig-Holstein ; and it is undeniable that Russia,
according to the traditions of the old diplomacy,
had better grounds to adopt such an attitude than
the other Powers. For all the cabinets believed
then decidedly although wrongly that Prussia
wished to use the struggle with Denmark as a
means of possessing herself of the Kiel harbour.
The Russian State, as a Baltic power, could not
welcome this prospect.
Russian policy, in contrast to that of England,
France, and Austria, was also peculiar in this, that
it resisted the Prussian constitutional movement.
The Czar Nicholas did not merely behave as the
head of the cause of royalty in all Europe, but
actually felt himself such; and it was precisely
this which secured him a strong following among
the Prussian conservatives. It is far from my
intention to defend, in any way, the wretched
policy which came to grief at Warsaw and Olmutz ;
19
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? 290 Treitschke
we, the old Gotha party, have all grown up as
opponents of this tendency. Meanwhile, after the
lapse of a whole generation, it seems, however, to
be time to appreciate the natural motives which
drove so many valiant patriots into the Russian
camp. It is enough to remember only the King's
ride through mutinous Berlin, the retreat of the
victorious guards before the defeated barricade-
fighters, and all the terrible humiliation which the
weakness of Frederick William IV brought on the
throne of the Hohenzollerns. The old Prussian
royalists felt as though the world were coming to
an end; they saw all that they counted most
venerable, desecrated; and amid the universal
chaos, the Czar Nicholas appeared to them to be
the last stay of monarchy. Therefore, in order to
save royalty in Prussia, they adhered to Russia.
They made a grievous error, but only blind hatred,
as with our author, can condemn them abruptly
as betrayers of their country. The head of the
pro-Russian party in Berlin was, at the beginning
of the fifties, the same Field Marshal Dohna who
had instantly rejected with Prussian pride the
above-mentioned contemptible proposal of the
Czar; of him, a diplomat said: "So long as this
old standard remains upright, I feel easy. "
Strongly conservative in political and ecclesiastical
matters though he was, this son-in-law of Scharn-
horst had never surrendered the ideal of the War
of Liberation, the hope of German unity. What
brought the noble German into the ranks of the
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 291
reactionists was certainly not regard for Russia,
but that hopeless confusion of our affairs which had
brought about such a close connexion between the
great cause of German unity and the follies of
the revolution; the imperial crown of Frankfort
seemed to him as to his King to be a couronne de
pave.
As regards the Crimean War, all unprejudiced
judges believe, nowadays, that Prussia had, as an
exception, and for once in a way undeserved good
fortune. The crushing superiority of Russia was
broken by the western Powers without our inter-
ference, and yet our friendly relations with our
eastern neighbour, which were to be so fruitful in
results for Germany's future, remained unbroken.
Even a less undecided, less inactive government
than Manteuffel's ministry could scarcely have
obtained a more favourable result than this. Our
author himself tepidly acknowledges that it was
not Prussia's duty to side with the western
Powers, and thus help on the schemes of Bona-
partism. A really brilliant statesman perhaps
might, as soon as the military forces of France were
locked up in the east, have suddenly made an
alliance with Russia, and attempted the conquest
of Schleswig-Holstein, and the solution of the
German question, without troubling himself about
mistaken public opinion. But it is obvious how
difficult this was, and how impossible for a person-
ality like the King's. Instead of quietly appreciat-
ing the difficulty of the circumstances, our author
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? 292 Treitschke
only vehemently denounces Russia's pride, and
Prussia's servility. He also again ignores the
fact that Prussia then, unfortunately, had fallen
into a state of being regarded as negligible by the
whole world, and the arrogance of the western
Powers was not less than that of Russia. Every-
one knows the letters of Prince Albert, and Napol-
eon Ill's remark, regarding the deference which
Prussia showed towards Russia; the cold disparag-
ing contempt displayed in the letters of the Prince
Consort, who was himself a German, and accus-
tomed to weigh his words carefully, is, in my
opinion, more insulting than the coarse words of
abuse which the harsh despotic Nicholas is said
to have blurted out in moments of sudden anger.
Our author also ignores the fact that the Czar
Nicholas, declared himself ready to purchase
Prussia's help in the field by surrendering Warsaw.
In the camp of the English and French allies they
were willing to pay a price also, but only offered
a slight rectification of the frontier on the left
bank of the Rhine. Which of the offers was the
more favourable?
This whole section of the book is a mixture of
truth and falsehood, of ingenious remarks and
tasteless gossip. We will give one specimen of the
author's manner of relating history. He prints
in spaced letters the following : " In February, 1864,
a Prussian State-secret the just completed plan
of mobilization was revealed to the Court of St.
Petersburg. " Then he relates how one of our
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 293
noblest patriots, a well-known writer, conveyed the
news of this betrayal, of course in perfect good faith,
to a Berlin lithographic correspondence agency;
and in consequence a secret order was issued for
the writer's arrest. I happen to be exactly
acquainted with the affair, and can confirm the
statement that the order for arrest was certainly
issued a characteristic occurrence in that time
of petty panics on the part of the police. But
more important than this secondary matter, is
the question whether that piece of information
was reliable, and whether that betrayal really took
place. The author has here again concealed
something. The report was that a brother of the
King had committed the treachery. This remark-
able disclosure, however, did not originate with any
one who was really conversant with affairs, but
with an honourable, though at the same time very
credulous and hot-headed, Liberal deputy of the
Landtag, x who had nothing to do with the Court.
Is it exaggerated loyalty when we Prussians de-
mand from the Baltic anonymous author, at
least, some attempt at a proof, before we resolve
to regard one of our royal princes as a traitor to his
country. The story simply belongs to the series
of innumerable scandals, which were only too
gladly believed by the malicious liberalism of the
fifties. It was, we must remember, the time when
Varnhagen von Ense was flourishing. In accord-
ance with the general tenor of his book, the author
1 Parliament of a single State.
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? 294 Treitschke
naturally does not relish the indisputable fact,
that the policy of Alexander II atoned for many
of the wrongs which the Czar Nicholas had com-
mitted against Germany. He seeks rather, during
this period of Russian history, to hunt up every
trace of movements hostile to Germany. It is,
for instance, a well-known fact, that after the Peace
of Paris, Russia sought for a rapprochement to
France; and it may also be safely assumed that
Prince GortschakofT, from the commencement of
his political career, regarded an alliance with
France as the most suitable for Russia. But it
is a long way from such general wishes to the acts
of State-policy. For whole decades the great
majority of French statesmen, without distinction
of party, have given a lip-adherence to the Russian
alliance; even Lamartine, the enthusiast for
freedom, spoke of this alliance as a geographical
necessity and the "cry of nature. " And yet the
course of the world's history went another way.
Then came the Polish rising of 1863. The
Court of St. Petersburg learned to know thor-
oughly the secret intrigues of Bonapartism, and
in Prussia's watchful aid found a proof of the
value of German friendship. Since then, for a
whole decade, its attitude has remained favourable
to our interests, whatever fault the Baltic anony-
mous author may find in details. Certainly it
was only the will of one man, which gave this
direction to Russian policy. The Russo- Prussian
alliance has never denied its origin; it has never
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? 270 Treitschke
ants in the Alps likewise recollected their heroic
wars against the Wallachs. The high nobility, how-
ever, and the masses in the towns persevered in the
old hatred against Prussia. The small gentry of
Imperial and Royal licensed coffee-house keepers
and tobacconists doted on the French Republic.
As always in Austria, the big financial interests
gave proof of their unprincipled meanness, and
insufficient attention has been paid in Germany to
the great dispatch of arms which went from Vienna
via Trieste to France. German national sentiment ,
however, is visibly in the ascendant, and it grows
daily on beholding the new German Empire.
National pride and hatred permeate, so to say,
the atmosphere of this unlucky State, whose future
entirely depends upon the reconciliation of national
interests. The growing hatred against the Slavs
may by and by press the broad masses of German
population into the ranks of the German nation-
alists, and unless fairly well-regulated constitu-
tional life can be established in the near future in
Cisleithania the Germans might finally also realize
that their nationality is dearer to them than their
Government.
Closer ties attach the greater part of the Slavs
to the Austrian Monarchy. When from the
distance we hear only the uncouth blustering of
Czech fanaticism, when we listen to the assurances
of German scientists in Prague, that a Czech
university by the side of a German one is at any
rate more endurable than a university with mixed
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? Austria and the German Empire 271
languages, which must infallibly lead to the de-
struction of Germanism in Bohemia; when we
thus behold the battle of the elements in the
territories of the Crown of Wenceslaus, we are apt
to think that such blind national hatred would
not shrink from the destruction of Austria. On
closer examination, however, secret fear and a
singular cowardice are easily detected, which hide
behind the uproar of the Czechs. They are noisy,
they bluster and twist the law, but they do not
dare to start war. In the midst of their roarings
they feel that they cannot dispense with the
Monarchy because, unlike the Germans, no home
is open to them outside Austria. Not even the
hotheads dare count with certainty upon the
fulfilment of Pan-slavist dreams, and that is why
for the time being the autonomous crown of
Wenceslaus or the division of Cisleithania into
five groups united by federalism suffices for them.
The tameness of the Czechs is, however, not due
to honest intentions, but to the consciousness of
weakness, which can and will change as soon as
Czechdom finds support in a great Slav power,
and it is already patent that the Poles regard
Galician autonomy only as the first step towards
the re-establishment of the Empire of the Sarmats.
Amongst all the nations of Austria the Magyars
must to-day display the greatest energy for the
maintenance of the Monarchy. The newly-estab-
lished Crown needs Cisleithanian support; those
people, with their lively ancestral recollections,
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? 272 Treitschke
know only too well how often Austria and Hungary
have mutually saved each other. The convention
was in every respect vastly in favour of the Mag-
yars. Hungary contributes thirty per cent, to-
wards the general expenditure of the Monarch
and to the payment of interest on the debt of the
country ; if closely calculated it will be found to be
even less. And in spite of all, the Magyars cannot
overcome the old mistrust of the "Hofburg";
the tribunals of Eperies and Arad can no more sink
into oblivion than the impudence of the "Bach"
Hussars. In Parliament a strong and growing
Opposition has aims beyond the convention, and
it appears full of danger that this Opposition
consists almost exclusively of pure Magyar blood.
The delegate "Nemeth" recently offered his
solemn congratulations in Parliament to the
German-Austrians on the impending union with
their German brothers. Should disorder continue
to reign in Cisleithania less hot-blooded Magyars
will also soon raise the question whether a union
with " Chaos" be really an advantage for Hungary.
Two neighbours of Austria, i. e. , Russia and Italy,
believe with the greatest positiveness in the col-
lapse of the Monarchy, and truly everything seems
possible in the vicinity of the Orient. The Oriental
question extends, moves westwards, and resembles
a stone which, when thrown into water, draws
ever-widening circles. It already enters into the
domain of the far horizon which has to be consid-
ered in the politics of the German Empire. Very
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? Austria and the German Empire 273
probably the fate of Austria and the still not
definitely solved Polish question will in time to
come be mixed up with the enigmatical future of
the Balkan population. In Russia's leading circles
fierce hatred, only too easily understood, rages
against Austria, a hatred which the prudence of
clever statesmen may temporarily suppress but
cannot stifle altogether, the highest interests of the
two neighbours in the East as well as in Poland
being in closest vicinity. Certainly one needs the
happy levity of Count Beust in order to look with
steadfast confidence into the future of Austria.
What follows? The struggle of German-Austria
against the Slavs is at the same time a struggle of
the modern States against feudal and ultramontane
Powers. The constitution of Cisleithania honestly
kept and intelligently developed offers room for all
nations of German- Austria. Whoever has the
freedom and peaceful development of Middle
Europe at heart must earnestly wish that the oft-
proved vitality of the old State may once more
assert itself, and that the Germans this side of the
Leitha may hold their own. The perfecting of this
constitution can, however, even under the most
favourable auspices, only take place very slowly;
there is an immeasurable distance between the
wretched indifference which was prevalent in
German- Austria after the battle of Koniggratz and
the present national sentiment. The German
tongue and German morals must not anticipate
great results from the Lothrings; it must suffice
18
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? 274 Treitschke
to us if Germans maintain their possessions against
Slavs and Magyars. The complete solution of a
great European task is no more to be expected
of this infirm country. Only after ten years of
internal peace will Austria, if ever, gain power to
pursue serious plans in the East. An unreservedly
sincere friendship we must not expect of the
"Hofburg. " The policy of silently preserving
all rights is understood in Vienna as well as in
Rome. And however honestly well-wishing we
might be, the Lothrings know from Italy the
mighty attraction of national States, and know
that their Germans cannot turn their eyes from
our Empire. Because of its existence alone the
German Empire is viewed by them with suspicion,
and prudent circumspection is appropriate. Every
uncalled-for attempt at intervention in Austria's
internal struggle accentuates the mistrust of the
" Hofburg" against our countrymen and prejudices
the German cause. This Prince Bismarck mag-
nificently understood when he abstained at Gastein
from all observations against the Hohenwarte
Cabinet. It was very badly understood by the
honest citizens of Breslau, Dresden, and Munich,
when they decided on their heartily well-meant
and heartily stupid declarations of sympathy
for German-Austria. Lucky for German-Austria
that, thanks to our sober-mindedness, such madcap
ideas did not find sympathy; but all our interest
in Austria does not justify us in shutting our eyes
to the possibility of her collapse. The perfection
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? Austria and the German Empire 275
of the Cisleithanian constitution presupposes the
good intentions of all parties; at present such
intention is, however, found to exist only among
part ot the German-Austrians. The Italians are
in the habit of saying, Austria is not a State but a
family. When the foundation of Hapsburg power
was laid, the expression tu felix Austria nube met
with admiration in the whole world and Emperor
Frederick III, regretfully looking at his amputated
foot, said: "Itzt ist dem Reich der ein Fuss
abgeschniedten " ("Now one leg has been cut off
the Empire ") . The times of imperial self -worship
and State-forming marriages of princes are no
more. Will a country which owes its origin to the
senseless family policy of past centuries, which in
character belongs to ancient Europe, be able to
satisfy the demands of a new era? We dare not
answer negatively, yet as brave and vigilant men
we must also contemplate that in years to come
Fate may reply to the question in the negative.
If the calamity of the destruction of Austria were
to occur, and it would also be a calamity to Ger-
many, then our Empire must be ready and pre-
pared to brave the forces of Fate to save German-
ism on the Danube from the debris. "To be
prepared is everything," saith the Poet.
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? THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN PRUSSIA
AND RUSSIA.
IN the summer of 1813, August Wilhelm Schlegel
wrote to Schleiermacher : " Is it to be wondered
at that this nation, on whose shoulders the weight
of the balance of power in Europe has been laid
for one and a half centuries, should go with a
bent back? " In these words he indicated both
the cause of the long-continued feebleness of our
country and also the ground of the constant mis-
trust with which all the Great Powers saw Germany
recovering strength. Even a cautious and unpreju-
diced German historian will find it hard to keep from
bitterness, and will easily appear to foreigners as a
Chauvinist, when he portrays in detail in how much
more just and friendly a way the public opinion of
Europe regarded the national movements of the
Italians, the Greeks, and the Southern Slavs, than
the Germans' struggle for unity. It needs even a
certain degree of self-denial in order to recognize that
the whole formation of the old system of States,
the way of looking at things of the old diplomacy,
depended on the divided state of Germany, and
consequently in our revolution we could expect
nothing better from the neighbouring Powers than,
at most, neutrality and silent non-interference.
276
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 277
A proud German will be glad of the fact that we
owe all that we are really to ourselves; he will
willingly forget past unfairness in practical politics
and simply ask what is the attitude of the neigh-
bouring Powers to the present interests of our
Empire? But he who only sees in history an
arsenal from which to draw weapons to pursue the
varying aims of the politics of the day, will, with a
moderate amount of learning and some sophistry,
be able to prove, just as it happens to suit him,
that France or Austria, Russia or England, is our
hereditary foe. A book of such a sort, thoroughly
partisan in spirit and unhistorical, is the work
Berlin and Petersburg; Prussian contributions
to the history of the Relations between Russia and
Germany, which an anonymous author has lately
published with the unconcealed purpose of arous-
ing attention and of preparing the minds of
credulous readers for a reckoning with Russia.
The book is entitled "Prussian Contributions,"
and the preface is dated from Berlin. I am quite
willing to believe that the author, when he wrote
his preface, may have happened to be passing a
few days in Berlin. But everyone who knows our
political literature must at once discern that the
author of the work is the same publicist who has
issued the little book, Russia, Before and After
the War, Pictures of Petersburg Society, and a
number of other instructive works dealing with
Russo-German relations. And this publicist is,
as is well known, no Prussian but an inhabitant
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? 278 Treitschke
of the Baltic provinces; he has, hitherto, never
claimed to concern himself with Prussian politics,
but has always, with great talent and restless
energy, represented the interests of his Baltic
home as he understood them. Among the political
authors of Germany he takes a position similar to
that which Louis Schneider once occupied on the
other side. Just as the latter, assuredly in his
way an honest Prussian patriot, regarded the
alliance with Holy Russia as a dogma, so does our
author view hostility to the Czar's Empire; only,
he is incomparably abler and quite free from that
deprecatory manner which makes Schneider's
writings so unpleasant. The restoration of Poland
and the conquest of the Baltic provinces, these
are the visions which, more or less disguised,
hover in the background of all his books. In his
view the Prussian monarchy has really no other
raison d'etre than the suppression of the Slavs;
it misses its vocation till it has engaged in hostili-
ties against the Muscovites. All the problems of
German politics are gauged by this one measure;
no inference is so startling as to alarm our author.
In 1871 he opposed the conquest of Alsace and
Lorraine, for the liberation of our western terri-
tories threatened to postpone the longed-for war
with Russia; nor could a patriot of the Baltic
provinces allow that Alsace with its Gallicized
higher classes was a German province, while on
the other hand, the German nationality of Livland
and Kurland was rooted exclusively in the nobility
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 279
and well-to-do citizen class. Such a steady di-
rection of sentiment towards one object compels
the respect, even of an opponent. So long as our
author fought with an open visor, one could pardon
his warm local patriotism when he at times spoke
somewhat contemptuously of Prussia, and held
up the wonderful political instinct of the Baltic
nobility as a shining example to our native narrow-
mindedness. But when, as at present, he assumes
the mask of a deeply-initiated Prussian statesman,
when he pares and trims our glorious history to
suit the aims of the Baltic malcontents, and wishes
to make us believe that Prussia has been for fifty
years the plaything of a foreign power, then it is
quite permissible to examine more closely whether
the cargo of this little Baltic ship is worth more
than the false flag which it flies at its masthead.
The old proverb, "Qui a compagnon, a maitre,"
is especially true of political alliances. Hardenberg
made a mistake when he once said regarding Aus-
tria and Prussia, "leurs interets se confondent. "
A community of interests between independent
Powers can only be a conditional one, and limited
by time ; in every alliance which lasts long, some-
times one of the contracting parties and sometimes
the other will consider itself overreached. Thus
our State at the commencement of the eighteenth
century made enormous sacrifices to aid the ob-
jects of the two sea-Powers, but did not finally
gain any further advantage from this long alliance
than the right of her head to use the kingly title,
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? 280 Treitschke
and some barren laurels. The history also of the
seventy-seven year-long friendship between Prus-
sia and Russia the longest alliance which has
ever existed between two great Powers presents
many such phenomena. There were times when
German patriots were fully justified in regarding
the friendship of Russia as oppressive, nay, as
disgraceful, just as on the other hand in recent
years the great majority of educated Russians
firmly believed that their country was injured by
the Prussian alliance. But when one sums up the
results, and compares the relative position in
respect of power of the two States in 1802, when
their alliance was formed, with that in 1879, when
it was dissolved, it cannot be honestly asserted that
Prussia fared badly in this alliance.
The Russo-Prussian alliance was, as is well
known, entirely the personal work of the two
monarchs, and everyone knows how much it was
helped forward by the honest and frank friend-
ship which the King Frederick William III dis-
played towards the versatile Czar. But these
personal feelings of the King never overpowered
his sound political intelligence and his strong sense
of duty. Every new advance of historical investi-
gation only reconfirms the fact that the King was
altogether right when, unseduced by the proposals
of so many cleverer men than himself, he was only
willing to venture on the attempt at rising against
Napoleon in alliance with Russia. Without the
help of the Czar Alexander, the capture of Paris,
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 281
and the restoration of the old power of Prussia
would have been impossible. Any one who doubts
this should peruse the recently published Memoirs
of Metternich regarding the real objects of the
Vienna Court at the time i. e. , not the Memoirs
themselves with their intolerable self-glorification,
but the appended authentic official documents,
which, for the most part, plainly contradict the
vain self -eulogy of the author. At the Congress of
Vienna the two courts still continued to have a
community of interests: the Czar was obliged to
support Prussia's demands for an indemnity, if
he wished to secure for himself the possession of
Poland.
At the second Peace of Paris, on the other hand,
the interests of the two Powers came into violent
collision. The Czar had indeed favoured the
restoration of the State of Prussia, so that Russia
should be rendered impregnable through this
rampart on its most vulnerable side, but he as little
wished the rise of a completely independent self-
sufficing German power as the courts of Paris,
Vienna, and London did. Therefore, the restor-
ation of our old western frontier, which Prussia
demanded, was defeated by the united opposition
of all the Great Powers. All the courts without
exception observed with anxiety what an unsus-
pected wealth of military power little Prussia had
developed during the War of Liberation ; therefore
they all eagerly vied with one another in burying
Prussia's merits in oblivion. Whether one reads
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? 282 Treitschke
the military dispatches of Wellington and his
officers, the letters of Schwarzenberg, Metternich,
and Gentz, the semi-official writings of the Russian
military authors of that period, it is difficult to
say which of the three allies had most quickly
and completely forgotten the deeds of their Prus-
sian comrades-in-arms. Nevertheless, the alliance
with Russia and Austria was a necessity for Prussia
for it still remained the most important task of our
European policy to prevent another declaration of
war on the part of France, and the Great Alliance
actually achieved this, its first purpose. When
Austria, in 1817, rendered anxious by Alexander's
grandiose schemes, proposed to the King of Prussia
a secret offensive and defensive alliance, which in
case of need might be also directed against Russia,
Hardenberg, who in those days was thoroughly
Austrian in his sympathies, was eager to accept the
proposal. But the King acted as a Prussian, and
absolutely refused, for only the union of all three
Eastern Powers could secure to his State the safety
which he especially needed after the immense
sacrifices of the war.
Yet our Baltic anonymous
author is quite wrong in so representing things
as though, in Frederick William Ill's view, the
alliance with Russia had been the only possible
one. The King knew, more thoroughly than his
present-day critic, the incalculable vicissitudes of
international relations and always kept cautiously
in view the possibility of a war against Russia.
In 1818 he surprised the Vienna Court by the
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 283
declaration that he wished also to include Posen,
East and West Prussia, in the German Confeder-
ation, because in case of a Russian attack, he
wanted to be absolutely sure of the help of Ger-
many. Frederick William held obstinately to this
idea although Hardenberg and Humboldt spoke
against it, and he did not give it up till Austria
opposed it, and thus every prospect of carrying
the proposal through in the Diet of the Confeder-
ation disappeared.
It is equally untrue that the King, as our anony-
mous author condescendingly expresses it, had
modestly renounced all wishes of bringing about
a union of the German States. His policy was
peaceful, as it was obliged to be; it shunned a
decisive contest for which at that time all the
preliminary conditions were lacking, but as soon
as affairs in the new provinces were, to some extent,
settled, he began at once to work for the com-
mercial and political unifying of Germany. In
this difficult task, which in very truth laid the
foundation for the new German Empire, Prussia en-
countered at every step the opposition of Austria,
England, and France. Russia alone among all the
Great Powers preserved a friendly neutrality.
This one fact is sufficient to justify the King in
attaching great importance to Russia's friendship.
This partiality of his, however, was by no means
blind, for nothing is more absurd than the author's
assertion that Prussia, by the mediation which
brought about the Peace of Adrianople, had merely
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? 284 Treitschke
done the Russian Court an unselfish service.
When the war of 1828 broke out, the King had
openly told the Czar that he disapproved of his
declaration of war. The next year, at the com-
mencement of the second campaign, the Euro-
pean situation assumed a very threatening aspect.
The Vienna Cabinet, alarmed in the highest degree
by the progress of the Russian arms, exerted itself
in conjunction with England to bring about a great
alliance against Russia; on the other hand the
King knew from his son-in-law's mouth (the Czar's
autograph note is still preserved in the Berlin state
archives) that there was a secret understanding
between Nicholas and Charles X of France. If
matters were allowed to go their course, there was
danger of a European war, which might oblige
Prussia to fight simultaneously against Russia
and France, and that about a question remote from
our interests. In order to avert- this danger, and
thus acting for the best for his own country, the
King resolved to act as a mediator, and brought
about a peace which, as matters then were, was
acceptable to both contending parties.
Prince Metternich was certainly alarmed at this
success of Prussian policy, and the reactionary
party in Berlin, Duke Karl of Mecklenburg,
Ancillon, Schuckmann, Knesebeck, who were all
staunch adherents of the Vienna diplomat, were
alarmed; but the ablest men at the Court, Bern-
stoff, Witzleven, Eichhorn, and above all the
younger Prince William, approved the King's
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 285
well-considered proceeding. The resolve of the
King was obviously connected with the brilliant
successes which his finance minister, Motz, had
won at the same time in the struggles of German
commercial policy. To the calm historical judg-
ment the years 1828 and 1829 appear as a fortu-
nate turning point in the history of that uneventful
period; it was the time when Prussia again began
to take up a completely independent position in
relation to the Austrian Court. Among the
liberals, indeed, who had lately been admiring the
Greeks, and now were suddenly enthusiastic for
the Turks, there arose a supplementary party-
legend, that Prussia had only undertaken the office
of mediator in order to save the Russian army from
certain destruction. This discovery, however, is
already contradicted by the calendar. On August
1 9th, Diebitch's army appeared before Adrianople;
and it was here that the victor's embarrassments
first began, and here, first, it was evident how much
his fighting power had been reduced by sickness,
and the wear and tear of the campaign. But
Prussia had commenced acting as mediator as
early as July; when General Muffling received his
instructions, the Russian army was victorious
everywhere.
Later on, also, the sober-mindedness of King
Frederick William never favoured the Czar's de-
signs against the Porte; he rather did his best
to strengthen the resisting power of the Ottoman
Empire. The only partly effective reform which
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? 286 Treitschke
the decaying Turkish State succeeded in carrying
through the reconstitution of its army was,
as is well known, the work of Prussian officers.
All the reports which the embittered scandal-
seeking opposition party of that time circulated,
regarding the influence of Russia in the domestic
concerns of Prussia, are mere inventions. The
King alone deserves blame or praise for the course
of domestic policy; his son-in-law never refused to
pay him filial reverence. Even the eccentricities
of the Berlin Court at that period, the love for
parades, the bestowing of military decorations,
which were stigmatized by the liberals as "Russian
manners," were simply due to the personal pre-
dilection of the King, and it is difficult to decide
whether Russia has learnt more in this respect
from Germany, or vice versa. During the anxious
days of the July revolution the King exhibited
again, with all his modesty, an independent and
genuinely Prussian attitude. Frederick William
resisted the legitimist outbursts of his son-in-law,
and hindered the crusade against France which
had been planned in St. Petersburg. The next
year he resisted with equal common sense the
foolish enthusiasm of the liberals for the Poles,
and by occupying the eastern frontier, assisted
in the suppression of that Polish insurrection
which was as dangerous for our Posen as for
Russian Poland. The Baltic anonymous author
conceals his vexation at this intelligent policy of
self-assertion, behind the thoughtful remark that
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 287
we had, as is well known, "paid for rendering this
assistance with the valuable life of Gneisenau. "
Should we, then, perhaps enter in our ledger on
the Russian debit side, the cholera, which swept
away our heroes?
During the whole period from 1815 to 1840, I
know only of a single fact which can be alleged to
give real occasion to the reproach that the King,
for the sake of Russia's friendship, neglected an
important interest of his State. In contrast to
the ruthless commercial policy of Russia, Prussia
showed a moderation which bordered on weakness.
But this matter, also, is not so simple as our
anonymous author thinks. He reproaches Russia
with the non-fulfilment of the Vienna Treaty of
May 3, 1815, and overlooks the fact that Prussia
herself hardly wished in earnest the carrying out
of this agreement. It was soon enough proved
that Hardenberg had been overreached at Vienna
by Prince Czartoryski. The apparently harmless
agreements regarding free transit, and free trade
with the products of all formerly Polish territories,
imposed upon our State, through which the transit
took place, only duties, without conferring any
corresponding advantages. In order to carry out
the treaty literally, Prussia would have had to
divide its Polish provinces from its other territories
by a line of custom-houses. But the Poles saw
in the treaty a welcome means of carrying their
national propaganda into our Polish territories by
settlements of commercial agents. Thus it hap-
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? 288 Treitschke
pened that Prussia, after futile negotiations,
proceeded on her own account; and by the cus-
toms law of 1818 placed her Polish territories on
precisely the same footing as her other eastern
provinces. After this necessary step, Prussia
was no more in the position to appeal successfully
to the Vienna Treaty. And what means did we,
in fact, possess to compel the neighbouring State
to give up a foolish commercial policy, which was
injurious for our own country? Only the two-
edged weapon of retaliatory duties. The relation
of the two countries assumed quite a different
aspect under Frederick William IV. It will al-
ways be one of the most bitter memories of our
history, how lacking in counsel, and wavering in
purposes the clever new King proved, in contrast
to the strong-willed Czar, how cruelly he experi-
enced, by countless failures, that in the stern
struggles for power of national life, character is
always superior to talent, and how at last, for
truth will out, he actually feared these narrow
minds. Here our author has good reason for
sharp judgments; and here also he gives us, along
with some questionable anecdotes, some reliable
matter-of-fact information regarding the history
of the confusions of 1848-50. It is quite true that
the Czar Nicholas in the autumn of 1848 asked
General Count Friedrich Dohna whether he would
not be the Prussian General Monk, and march with
the first army corps on Berlin, to restore order
there; the whole Russian army would act as his
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 289
reserve in case of need. The memories of the
Count printed from autograph, confirm the cor-
rectness of this story with the exception of some
trifling details. But even here the author cannot
rise to an unprejudiced historical estimate of the
events in question. He conceals the fact that not
only Russia but all the great Powers were against
the rise of a Prussian-German Empire. The posi-
tion which the Powers had assumed with regard
to the question of German unity had not changed
since 1814. He similarly ignores the fact that all
the great Powers opposed the liberation of Schles-
wig-Holstein ; and it is undeniable that Russia,
according to the traditions of the old diplomacy,
had better grounds to adopt such an attitude than
the other Powers. For all the cabinets believed
then decidedly although wrongly that Prussia
wished to use the struggle with Denmark as a
means of possessing herself of the Kiel harbour.
The Russian State, as a Baltic power, could not
welcome this prospect.
Russian policy, in contrast to that of England,
France, and Austria, was also peculiar in this, that
it resisted the Prussian constitutional movement.
The Czar Nicholas did not merely behave as the
head of the cause of royalty in all Europe, but
actually felt himself such; and it was precisely
this which secured him a strong following among
the Prussian conservatives. It is far from my
intention to defend, in any way, the wretched
policy which came to grief at Warsaw and Olmutz ;
19
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? 290 Treitschke
we, the old Gotha party, have all grown up as
opponents of this tendency. Meanwhile, after the
lapse of a whole generation, it seems, however, to
be time to appreciate the natural motives which
drove so many valiant patriots into the Russian
camp. It is enough to remember only the King's
ride through mutinous Berlin, the retreat of the
victorious guards before the defeated barricade-
fighters, and all the terrible humiliation which the
weakness of Frederick William IV brought on the
throne of the Hohenzollerns. The old Prussian
royalists felt as though the world were coming to
an end; they saw all that they counted most
venerable, desecrated; and amid the universal
chaos, the Czar Nicholas appeared to them to be
the last stay of monarchy. Therefore, in order to
save royalty in Prussia, they adhered to Russia.
They made a grievous error, but only blind hatred,
as with our author, can condemn them abruptly
as betrayers of their country. The head of the
pro-Russian party in Berlin was, at the beginning
of the fifties, the same Field Marshal Dohna who
had instantly rejected with Prussian pride the
above-mentioned contemptible proposal of the
Czar; of him, a diplomat said: "So long as this
old standard remains upright, I feel easy. "
Strongly conservative in political and ecclesiastical
matters though he was, this son-in-law of Scharn-
horst had never surrendered the ideal of the War
of Liberation, the hope of German unity. What
brought the noble German into the ranks of the
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 291
reactionists was certainly not regard for Russia,
but that hopeless confusion of our affairs which had
brought about such a close connexion between the
great cause of German unity and the follies of
the revolution; the imperial crown of Frankfort
seemed to him as to his King to be a couronne de
pave.
As regards the Crimean War, all unprejudiced
judges believe, nowadays, that Prussia had, as an
exception, and for once in a way undeserved good
fortune. The crushing superiority of Russia was
broken by the western Powers without our inter-
ference, and yet our friendly relations with our
eastern neighbour, which were to be so fruitful in
results for Germany's future, remained unbroken.
Even a less undecided, less inactive government
than Manteuffel's ministry could scarcely have
obtained a more favourable result than this. Our
author himself tepidly acknowledges that it was
not Prussia's duty to side with the western
Powers, and thus help on the schemes of Bona-
partism. A really brilliant statesman perhaps
might, as soon as the military forces of France were
locked up in the east, have suddenly made an
alliance with Russia, and attempted the conquest
of Schleswig-Holstein, and the solution of the
German question, without troubling himself about
mistaken public opinion. But it is obvious how
difficult this was, and how impossible for a person-
ality like the King's. Instead of quietly appreciat-
ing the difficulty of the circumstances, our author
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? 292 Treitschke
only vehemently denounces Russia's pride, and
Prussia's servility. He also again ignores the
fact that Prussia then, unfortunately, had fallen
into a state of being regarded as negligible by the
whole world, and the arrogance of the western
Powers was not less than that of Russia. Every-
one knows the letters of Prince Albert, and Napol-
eon Ill's remark, regarding the deference which
Prussia showed towards Russia; the cold disparag-
ing contempt displayed in the letters of the Prince
Consort, who was himself a German, and accus-
tomed to weigh his words carefully, is, in my
opinion, more insulting than the coarse words of
abuse which the harsh despotic Nicholas is said
to have blurted out in moments of sudden anger.
Our author also ignores the fact that the Czar
Nicholas, declared himself ready to purchase
Prussia's help in the field by surrendering Warsaw.
In the camp of the English and French allies they
were willing to pay a price also, but only offered
a slight rectification of the frontier on the left
bank of the Rhine. Which of the offers was the
more favourable?
This whole section of the book is a mixture of
truth and falsehood, of ingenious remarks and
tasteless gossip. We will give one specimen of the
author's manner of relating history. He prints
in spaced letters the following : " In February, 1864,
a Prussian State-secret the just completed plan
of mobilization was revealed to the Court of St.
Petersburg. " Then he relates how one of our
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 293
noblest patriots, a well-known writer, conveyed the
news of this betrayal, of course in perfect good faith,
to a Berlin lithographic correspondence agency;
and in consequence a secret order was issued for
the writer's arrest. I happen to be exactly
acquainted with the affair, and can confirm the
statement that the order for arrest was certainly
issued a characteristic occurrence in that time
of petty panics on the part of the police. But
more important than this secondary matter, is
the question whether that piece of information
was reliable, and whether that betrayal really took
place. The author has here again concealed
something. The report was that a brother of the
King had committed the treachery. This remark-
able disclosure, however, did not originate with any
one who was really conversant with affairs, but
with an honourable, though at the same time very
credulous and hot-headed, Liberal deputy of the
Landtag, x who had nothing to do with the Court.
Is it exaggerated loyalty when we Prussians de-
mand from the Baltic anonymous author, at
least, some attempt at a proof, before we resolve
to regard one of our royal princes as a traitor to his
country. The story simply belongs to the series
of innumerable scandals, which were only too
gladly believed by the malicious liberalism of the
fifties. It was, we must remember, the time when
Varnhagen von Ense was flourishing. In accord-
ance with the general tenor of his book, the author
1 Parliament of a single State.
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? 294 Treitschke
naturally does not relish the indisputable fact,
that the policy of Alexander II atoned for many
of the wrongs which the Czar Nicholas had com-
mitted against Germany. He seeks rather, during
this period of Russian history, to hunt up every
trace of movements hostile to Germany. It is,
for instance, a well-known fact, that after the Peace
of Paris, Russia sought for a rapprochement to
France; and it may also be safely assumed that
Prince GortschakofT, from the commencement of
his political career, regarded an alliance with
France as the most suitable for Russia. But it
is a long way from such general wishes to the acts
of State-policy. For whole decades the great
majority of French statesmen, without distinction
of party, have given a lip-adherence to the Russian
alliance; even Lamartine, the enthusiast for
freedom, spoke of this alliance as a geographical
necessity and the "cry of nature. " And yet the
course of the world's history went another way.
Then came the Polish rising of 1863. The
Court of St. Petersburg learned to know thor-
oughly the secret intrigues of Bonapartism, and
in Prussia's watchful aid found a proof of the
value of German friendship. Since then, for a
whole decade, its attitude has remained favourable
to our interests, whatever fault the Baltic anony-
mous author may find in details. Certainly it
was only the will of one man, which gave this
direction to Russian policy. The Russo- Prussian
alliance has never denied its origin; it has never
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