No More Learning

Therefore it does not belong to the essence of backbiting that it
should be done by secret words.

Objection 2: Further, the notion of a good name implies something known
to the public. If, therefore, a person's good name is blackened by
backbiting, this cannot be done by secret words, but by words uttered
openly.

Objection 3: Further, to detract is to subtract, or to diminish
something already existing. But sometimes a man's good name is
blackened, even without subtracting from the truth: for instance, when
one reveals the crimes which a man has in truth committed. Therefore
not every blackening of a good name is backbiting.

On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 10:11): "If a serpent bite in
silence, he is nothing better that backbiteth. "

I answer that, Just as one man injures another by deed in two
ways---openly, as by robbery or by doing him any kind of violence---and
secretly, as by theft, or by a crafty blow, so again one man injures
another by words in two ways---in one way, openly, and this is done by
reviling him, as stated above ([2949]Q[72], A[1])---and in another way
secretly, and this is done by backbiting. Now from the fact that one
man openly utters words against another man, he would appear to think
little of him, so that for this reason he dishonors him, so that
reviling is detrimental to the honor of the person reviled. On the
other hand, he that speaks against another secretly, seems to respect
rather than slight him, so that he injures directly, not his honor but
his good name, in so far as by uttering such words secretly, he, for
his own part, causes his hearers to have a bad opinion of the person
against whom he speaks. For the backbiter apparently intends and aims
at being believed. It is therefore evident that backbiting differs from
reviling in two points: first, in the way in which the words are
uttered, the reviler speaking openly against someone, and the backbiter
secretly; secondly, as to the end in view, i. e. as regards the injury
inflicted, the reviler injuring a man's honor, the backbiter injuring
his good name.

Reply to Objection 1: In involuntary commutations, to which are reduced
all injuries inflicted on our neighbor, whether by word or by deed, the
kind of sin is differentiated by the circumstances "secretly" and
"openly," because involuntariness itself is diversified by violence and
by ignorance, as stated above (Q[65], A[4]; [2950]FS, Q[6], AA[5],8).

Reply to Objection 2: The words of a backbiter are said to be secret,
not altogether, but in relation to the person of whom they are said,
because they are uttered in his absence and without his knowledge. On
the other hand, the reviler speaks against a man to his face. Wherefore
if a man speaks ill of another in the presence of several, it is a case
of backbiting if he be absent, but of reviling if he alone be present:
although if a man speak ill of an absent person to one man alone, he
destroys his good name not altogether but partly.

Reply to Objection 3: A man is said to backbite [detrehere] another,
not because he detracts from the truth, but because he lessens his good
name. This is done sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly. Directly,
in four ways: first, by saying that which is false about him; secondly,
by stating his sin to be greater than it is; thirdly, by revealing
something unknown about him; fourthly, by ascribing his good deeds to a
bad intention. Indirectly, this is done either by gainsaying his good,
or by maliciously concealing it, or by diminishing it.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether backbiting is a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is not a mortal sin. For no
act of virtue is a mortal sin. Now, to reveal an unknown sin, which
pertains to backbiting, as stated above (A[1], ad 3), is an act of the
virtue of charity, whereby a man denounces his brother's sin in order
that he may amend: or else it is an act of justice, whereby a man
accuses his brother. Therefore backbiting is not a mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Prov. 24:21, "Have nothing to do with
detractors," says: "The whole human race is in peril from this vice. "
But no mortal sin is to be found in the whole of mankind, since many
refrain from mortal sin: whereas they are venial sins that are found in
all. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine in a homily On the Fire of Purgatory
[*Serm. civ in the appendix to St. Augustine's work] reckons it a
slight sin "to speak ill without hesitation or forethought. " But this
pertains to backbiting. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 1:30): "Backbiters, hateful to
God," which epithet, according to a gloss, is inserted, "lest it be
deemed a slight sin because it consists in words. "

I answer that, As stated above ([2951]Q[72], A[2]), sins of word should
be judged chiefly from the intention of the speaker. Now backbiting by
its very nature aims at blackening a man's good name. Wherefore,
properly speaking, to backbite is to speak ill of an absent person in
order to blacken his good name. Now it is a very grave matter to
blacken a man's good name, because of all temporal things a man's good
name seems the most precious, since for lack of it he is hindered from
doing many things well. For this reason it is written (Ecclus. 41:15):
"Take care of a good name, for this shall continue with thee, more than
a thousand treasures precious and great. " Therefore backbiting,
properly speaking, is a mortal sin. Nevertheless it happens sometimes
that a man utters words, whereby someone's good name is tarnished, and
yet he does not intend this, but something else. This is not backbiting
strictly and formally speaking, but only materially and accidentally as
it were. And if such defamatory words be uttered for the sake of some
necessary good, and with attention to the due circumstances, it is not
a sin and cannot be called backbiting. But if they be uttered out of
lightness of heart or for some unnecessary motive, it is not a mortal
sin, unless perchance the spoken word be of such a grave nature, as to
cause a notable injury to a man's good name, especially in matters
pertaining to his moral character, because from the very nature of the
words this would be a mortal sin. And one is bound to restore a man his
good name, no less than any other thing one has taken from him, in the
manner stated above ([2952]Q[62], A[2]) when we were treating of
restitution.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, it is not backbiting to reveal a
man's hidden sin in order that he may mend, whether one denounce it, or
accuse him for the good of public justice.

Reply to Objection 2: This gloss does not assert that backbiting is to
be found throughout the whole of mankind, but "almost," both because
"the number of fools is infinite," [*Eccles. 1:15] and few are they
that walk in the way of salvation, [*Cf. Mat. 7:14] and because there
are few or none at all who do not at times speak from lightness of
heart, so as to injure someone's good name at least slightly, for it is
written (James 3:2): "If any man offend not in word, the same is a
perfect man. "

Reply to Objection 3: Augustine is referring to the case when a man
utters a slight evil about someone, not intending to injure him, but
through lightness of heart or a slip of the tongue.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether backbiting is the gravest of all sins committed against one's
neighbor?

Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is the gravest of all sins
committed against one's neighbor. Because a gloss on Ps. 108:4,
"Instead of making me a return of love they detracted me," a gloss
says: "Those who detract Christ in His members and slay the souls of
future believers are more guilty than those who killed the flesh that
was soon to rise again. " From this it seems to follow that backbiting
is by so much a graver sin than murder, as it is a graver matter to
kill the soul than to kill the body. Now murder is the gravest of the
other sins that are committed against one's neighbor. Therefore
backbiting is absolutely the gravest of all.

Objection 2: Further, backbiting is apparently a graver sin than
reviling, because a man can withstand reviling, but not a secret
backbiting. Now backbiting is seemingly a graver sin than adultery,
because adultery unites two persons in one flesh, whereas reviling
severs utterly those who were united. Therefore backbiting is more
grievous than adultery: and yet of all other sins a man commits against
his neighbor, adultery is most grave.

Objection 3: Further, reviling arises from anger, while backbiting
arises from envy, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). But envy is a
graver sin than anger. Therefore backbiting is a graver sin than
reviling; and so the same conclusion follows as before.

Objection 4: Further, the gravity of a sin is measured by the gravity
of the defect that it causes. Now backbiting causes a most grievous
defect, viz. blindness of mind. For Gregory says (Regist. xi, Ep. 2):
"What else do backbiters but blow on the dust and stir up the dirt into
their eyes, so that the more they breathe of detraction, the less they
see of the truth? " Therefore backbiting is the most grievous sin
committed against one's neighbor.

On the contrary, It is more grievous to sin by deed than by word. But
backbiting is a sin of word, while adultery, murder, and theft are sins
of deed. Therefore backbiting is not graver than the other sins
committed against one's neighbor.

I answer that, The essential gravity of sins committed against one's
neighbor must be weighed by the injury they inflict on him, since it is
thence that they derive their sinful nature. Now the greater the good
taken away, the greater the injury. And while man's good is threefold,
namely the good of his soul, the good of his body, and the good of
external things; the good of the soul, which is the greatest of all,
cannot be taken from him by another save as an occasional cause, for
instance by an evil persuasion, which does not induce necessity. On the
other hand the two latter goods, viz. of the body and of external
things, can be taken away by violence. Since, however, the goods of the
body excel the goods of external things, those sins which injure a
man's body are more grievous than those which injure his external
things. Consequently, among other sins committed against one's
neighbor, murder is the most grievous, since it deprives man of the
life which he already possesses: after this comes adultery, which is
contrary to the right order of human generation, whereby man enters
upon life. In the last place come external goods, among which a man's
good name takes precedence of wealth because it is more akin to
spiritual goods, wherefore it is written (Prov. 22:1): "A good name is
better than great riches. " Therefore backbiting according to its genus
is a more grievous sin than theft, but is less grievous than murder or
adultery. Nevertheless the order may differ by reason of aggravating or
extenuating circumstances.

The accidental gravity of a sin is to be considered in relation to the
sinner, who sins more grievously, if he sins deliberately than if he
sins through weakness or carelessness. In this respect sins of word
have a certain levity, in so far as they are apt to occur through a
slip of the tongue, and without much forethought.

Reply to Objection 1: Those who detract Christ by hindering the faith
of His members, disparage His Godhead, which is the foundation of our
faith. Wherefore this is not simple backbiting but blasphemy.

Reply to Objection 2: Reviling is a more grievous sin than backbiting,
in as much as it implies greater contempt of one's neighbor: even as
robbery is a graver sin than theft, as stated above ([2953]Q[66],
A[9]). Yet reviling is not a more grievous sin than adultery. For the
gravity of adultery is measured, not from its being a union of bodies,
but from being a disorder in human generation. Moreover the reviler is
not the sufficient cause of unfriendliness in another man, but is only
the occasional cause of division among those who were united, in so
far, to wit, as by declaring the evils of another, he for his own part
severs that man from the friendship of other men, though they are not
forced by his words to do so. Accordingly a backbiter is a murderer
"occasionally," since by his words he gives another man an occasion for
hating or despising his neighbor. For this reason it is stated in the
Epistle of Clement [*Ad Jacob. Ep. i], that "backbiters are murderers,"
i. e. occasionally; because "he that hateth his brother is a murderer"
(1 Jn. 3:15).

Reply to Objection 3: Anger seeks openly to be avenged, as the
Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2): wherefore backbiting which takes
place in secret, is not the daughter of anger, as reviling is, but
rather of envy, which strives by any means to lessen one's neighbor's
glory. Nor does it follow from this that backbiting is more grievous
than reviling: since a lesser vice can give rise to a greater sin, just
as anger gives birth to murder and blasphemy. For the origin of a sin
depends on its inclination to an end, i. e. on the thing to which the
sin turns, whereas the gravity of a sin depends on what it turns away
from.

Reply to Objection 4: Since "a man rejoiceth in the sentence of his
mouth" (Prov. 15:23), it follows that a backbiter more and more loves
and believes what he says, and consequently more and more hates his
neighbor, and thus his knowledge of the truth becomes less and less.
This effect however may also result from other sins pertaining to hate
of one's neighbor.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether it is a grave sin for the listener to suffer the backbiter?

Objection 1: It would seem that the listener who suffers a backbiter
does not sin grievously. For a man is not under greater obligations to
others than to himself. But it is praiseworthy for a man to suffer his
own backbiters: for Gregory says (Hom. ix, super Ezech): "Just as we
ought not to incite the tongue of backbiters, lest they perish, so
ought we to suffer them with equanimity when they have been incited by
their own wickedness, in order that our merit may be the greater. "
Therefore a man does not sin if he does not withstand those who
backbite others.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 4:30): "In no wise speak
against the truth. " Now sometimes a person tells the truth while
backbiting, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Therefore it seems that one
is not always bound to withstand a backbiter.

Objection 3: Further, no man should hinder what is profitable to
others. Now backbiting is often profitable to those who are backbitten:
for Pope Pius [*St. Pius I] says [*Append. Grat. ad can. Oves, caus.
vi, qu. 1]: "Not unfrequently backbiting is directed against good
persons, with the result that those who have been unduly exalted
through the flattery of their kindred, or the favor of others, are
humbled by backbiting. " Therefore one ought not to withstand
backbiters.

On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot. lii): "Take care not to
have an itching tongue, nor tingling ears, that is, neither detract
others nor listen to backbiters. "

I answer that, According to the Apostle (Rom. 1:32), they "are worthy
of death . . . not only they that" commit sins, "but they also that
consent to them that do them. " Now this happens in two ways. First,
directly, when, to wit, one man induces another to sin, or when the sin
is pleasing to him: secondly, indirectly, that is, if he does not
withstand him when he might do so, and this happens sometimes, not
because the sin is pleasing to him, but on account of some human fear.

Accordingly we must say that if a man list ens to backbiting without
resisting it, he seems to consent to the backbiter, so that he becomes
a participator in his sin. And if he induces him to backbite, or at
least if the detraction be pleasing to him on account of his hatred of
the person detracted, he sins no less than the detractor, and sometimes
more. Wherefore Bernard says (De Consid. ii, 13): "It is difficult to
say which is the more to be condemned the backbiter or he that listens
to backbiting. " If however the sin is not pleasing to him, and he fails
to withstand the backbiter, through fear negligence, or even shame, he
sins indeed, but much less than the backbiter, and, as a rule venially.
Sometimes too this may be a mortal sin, either because it is his
official duty to cor. rect the backbiter, or by reason of some
consequent danger; or on account of the radical reason for which human
fear may sometimes be a mortal sin, as stated above ([2954]Q[19],
A[3]).

Reply to Objection 1: No man hears himself backbitten, because when a
man is spoken evil of in his hearing, it is not backbiting, properly
speaking, but reviling, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Yet it is
possible for the detractions uttered against a person to come to his
knowledge through others telling him, and then it is left to his
discretion whether he will suffer their detriment to his good name,
unless this endanger the good of others, as stated above ([2955]Q[72],
A[3]). Wherefore his patience may deserve commendation for as much as
he suffers patiently being detracted himself. But it is not left to his
discretion to permit an injury to be done to another's good name, hence
he is accounted guilty if he fails to resist when he can, for the same
reason whereby a man is bound to raise another man's ass lying
"underneath his burden," as commanded in Dt. 21:4 [*Ex. 23:5].

Reply to Objection 2: One ought not always to withstand a backbiter by
endeavoring to convince him of falsehood, especially if one knows that
he is speaking the truth: rather ought one to reprove him with words,
for that he sins in backbiting his brother, or at least by our pained
demeanor show him that we are displeased with his backbiting, because
according to Prov. 25:23, "the north wind driveth away rain, as doth a
sad countenance a backbiting tongue. "

Reply to Objection 3: The profit one derives from being backbitten is
due, not to the intention of the backbiter, but to the ordinance of God
Who produces good out of every evil. Hence we should none the less
withstand backbiters, just as those who rob or oppress others, even
though the oppressed and the robbed may gain merit by patience.
__________________________________________________________________

OF TALE-BEARING [*'Susurratio,' i. e. whispering] (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider tale-bearing: under which head there are two
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether tale-bearing is a sin distinct from backbiting?

(2) Which of the two is the more grievous?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether tale-bearing is a sin distinct from backbiting?

Objection 1: It would seem that tale-bearing is not a distinct sin from
backbiting. Isidore says (Etym. x): "The susurro [tale-bearer] takes
his name from the sound of his speech, for he speaks disparagingly not
to the face but into the ear. " But to speak of another disparagingly
belongs to backbiting. Therefore tale-bearing is not a distinct sin
from backbiting.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Lev. 19:16): "Thou shalt not be an
informer [Douay: 'a detractor'] nor a tale-bearer [Douay: 'whisperer']
among the people. " But an informer is apparently the same as a
backbiter. Therefore neither does tale-bearing differ from backbiting.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 28:15): "The tale-bearer
[Douay: 'whisperer'] and the double-tongued is accursed. " But a
double-tongued man is apparently the same as a backbiter, because a
backbiter speaks with a double tongue, with one in your absence, with
another in your presence. Therefore a tale-bearer is the same as a
backbiter.

On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. 1:29,30, "Tale-bearers, backbiters
[Douay: 'whisperers, detractors']" says: "Tale-bearers sow discord
among friends; backbiters deny or disparage others' good points. "

I answer that, The tale-bearer and the backbiter agree in matter, and
also in form or mode of speaking, since they both speak evil secretly
of their neighbor: and for this reason these terms are sometimes used
one for the other. Hence a gloss on Ecclus. 5:16, "Be not called a
tale-bearer [Douay: 'whisperer']" says: "i. e. a backbiter. " They differ
however in end, because the backbiter intends to blacken his neighbor's
good name, wherefore he brings forward those evils especially about his
neighbor which are likely to defame him, or at least to depreciate his
good name: whereas a tale-bearer intends to sever friendship, as
appears from the gloss quoted above and from the saying of Prov. 26:20,
"Where the tale-bearer is taken away, contentions shall cease. " Hence
it is that a tale-bearer speaks such ill about his neighbors as may
stir his hearer's mind against them, according to Ecclus. 28:11, "A
sinful man will trouble his friends, and bring in debate in the midst
of them that are at peace. "

Reply to Objection 1: A tale-bearer is called a backbiter in so far as
he speaks ill of another; yet he differs from a backbiter since he
intends not to speak ill as such, but to say anything that may stir one
man against another, though it be good simply, and yet has a semblance
of evil through being unpleasant to the hearer.

Reply to Objection 2: An informer differs from a tale-bearer and a
backbiter, for an informer is one who charges others publicly with
crimes, either by accusing or by railing them, which does not apply to
a backbiter or tale-bearer.

Reply to Objection 3: A double-tongued person is properly speaking a
tale-bearer. For since friendship is between two, the tale-bearer
strives to sever friendship on both sides. Hence he employs a double
tongue towards two persons, by speaking ill of one to the other:
wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 28:15): "The tale-bearer [Douay:
'whisperer'] and the double-tongued is accursed," and then it is added,
"for he hath troubled many that were peace. "
__________________________________________________________________

Whether backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing?

Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is a graver sin than
tale-bearing. For sins of word consist in speaking evil.
Now a
backbiter speaks of his neighbor things that are evil simply, for such
things lead to the loss or depreciation of his good name: whereas a
tale-bearer is only intent on saying what is apparently evil, because
to wit they are unpleasant to the hearer. Therefore backbiting is a
graver sin than tale-bearing.

Objection 2: Further, he that deprives. a man of his good name,
deprives him not merely of one friend, but of many, because everyone is
minded to scorn the friendship of a person with a bad name. Hence it is
reproached against a certain individual [*King Josaphat] (2 Paralip
19:2): "Thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the Lord. "
But tale-bearing deprives one of only one friend. Therefore backbiting
is a graver sin than tale-bearing.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (James 4:11): "He that backbiteth
[Douay:,'detracteth'] his brother . . . detracteth the law," and
consequently God the giver of the law. Wherefore the sin of backbiting
seems to be a sin against God, which is most grievous, as stated above
(Q[20], A[3]; [2956]FS, Q[73], A[3]). On the other hand the sin of
tale-bearing is against one's neighbor. Therefore the sin of backbiting
is graver than the sin of tale-bearing.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 5:17): "An evil mark of
disgrace is upon the double-tongued; but to the tale-bearer [Douay:
'whisperer'] hatred, and enmity, and reproach. "

I answer that, As stated above (Q[73], A[3]; [2957]FS, Q[73], A[8]),
sins against one's neighbor are the more grievous, according as they
inflict a greater injury on him: and an injury is so much the greater,
according to the greatness of the good which it takes away. Now of all
one's external goods a friend takes the first place, since "no man can
live without friends," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 1).
Hence it is written (Ecclus. 6:15): "Nothing can be compared to a
faithful friend. " Again, a man's good name whereof backbiting deprives
him, is most necessary to him that he may be fitted for friendship.
Therefore tale-bearing is a greater sin than backbiting or even
reviling, because a friend is better than honor, and to be loved is
better than to be honored, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii).

Reply to Objection 1: The species and gravity of a sin depend on the
end rather than on the material object, wherefore, by reason of its
end, tale-bearing is worse than backbiting, although sometimes the
backbiter says worse things.

Reply to Objection 2: A good name is a disposition for friendship, and
a bad name is a disposition for enmity. But a disposition falls short
of the thing for which it disposes. Hence to do anything that leads to
a disposition for enmity is a less grievous sin than to do what
conduces directly to enmity.

Reply to Objection 3: He that backbites his brother, seems to detract
the law, in so far as he despises the precept of love for one's
neighbor: while he that strives to sever friendship seems to act more
directly against this precept. Hence the latter sin is more specially
against God, because "God is charity" (1 Jn. 4:16), and for this reason
it is written (Prov. 6:16): "Six things there are, which the Lord
hateth, and the seventh His soul detesteth," and the seventh is "he
(Prov. 6:19) that soweth discord among brethren. "
__________________________________________________________________

OF DERISION [*Or mockery] (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now speak of derision, under which head there are two points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether derision is a special sin distinct from the other sins
whereby one's neighbor is injured by words?

(2) Whether derision is a mortal sin?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether derision is a special sin distinct from those already mentioned?

Objection 1: It would seem that derision is not a special sin distinct
from those mentioned above. For laughing to scorn is apparently the
same as derision. But laughing to scorn pertains to reviling. Therefore
derision would seem not to differ from reviling.

Objection 2: Further, no man is derided except for something
reprehensible which puts him to shame. Now such are sins; and if they
be imputed to a person publicly, it is a case of reviling, if
privately, it amounts to backbiting or tale-bearing. Therefore derision
is not distinct from the foregoing vices.

Objection 3: Further, sins of this kind are distinguished by the injury
they inflict on one's neighbor. Now the injury inflicted on a man by
derision affects either his honor, or his good name, or is detrimental
to his friendship. Therefore derision is not a sin distinct from the
foregoing.

On the contrary, Derision is done in jest, wherefore it is described as
"making fun. " Now all the foregoing are done seriously and not in jest.
Therefore derision differs from all of them.

I answer that, As stated above ([2958]Q[72], A[2]), sins of word should
be weighed chiefly by the intention of the speaker, wherefore these
sins are differentiated according to the various intentions of those
who speak against another. Now just as the railer intends to injure the
honor of the person he rails, the backbiter to depreciate a good name,
and the tale-bearer to destroy friendship, so too the derider intends
to shame the person he derides. And since this end is distinct from the
others, it follows that the sin of derision is distinct from the
foregoing sins.

Reply to Objection 1: Laughing to scorn and derision agree as to the
end but differ in mode, because derision is done with the "mouth," i. e.
by words and laughter, while laughing to scorn is done by wrinkling the
nose, as a gloss says on Ps. 2:4, "He that dwelleth in heaven shall
laugh at them": and such a distinction does not differentiate the
species. Yet they both differ from reviling, as being shamed differs
from being dishonored: for to be ashamed is "to fear dishonor," as
Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 15).

Reply to Objection 2: For doing a virtuous deed a man deserves both
respect and a good name in the eyes of others, and in his own eyes the
glory of a good conscience, according to 2 Cor. 1:12, "Our glory is
this, the testimony of our conscience. " Hence, on the other hand, for
doing a reprehensible, i. e. a vicious action, a man forfeits his honor
and good name in the eyes of others---and for this purpose the reviler
and the backbiter speak of another person---while in his own eyes, he
loses the glory of his conscience through being confused and ashamed at
reprehensible deeds being imputed to him---and for this purpose the
derider speaks ill of him. It is accordingly evident that derision
agrees with the foregoing vices as to the matter but differs as to the
end.

Reply to Objection 3: A secure and calm conscience is a great good,
according to Prov. 15:15, "A secure mind is like a continual feast. "
Wherefore he that disturbs another's conscience by confounding him
inflicts a special injury on him: hence derision is a special kind of
sin.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether derision can be a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that derision cannot be a mortal sin. Every
mortal sin is contrary to charity. But derision does not seem contrary
to charity, for sometimes it takes place in jest among friends,
wherefore it is known as "making fun. " Therefore derision cannot be a
mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, the greatest derision would appear to be that
which is done as an injury to God. But derision is not always a mortal
sin when it tends to the injury of God: else it would be a mortal sin
to relapse into a venial sin of which one has repented. For Isidore
says (De Sum. Bon. ii, 16) that "he who continues to do what he has
repented of, is a derider and not a penitent. " It would likewise follow
that all hypocrisy is a mortal sin, because, according to Gregory
(Moral. xxxi, 15) "the ostrich signifies the hypocrite, who derides the
horse, i. e. the just man, and his rider, i. e. God. " Therefore derision
is not a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, reviling and backbiting seem to be graver sins
than derision, because it is more to do a thing seriously than in jest.
But not all backbiting or reviling is a mortal sin. Much less therefore
is derision a mortal sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 3:34): "He derideth [Vulg. :
'shall scorn'] the scorners. " But God's derision is eternal punishment
for mortal sin, as appears from the words of Ps. 2:4, "He that dwelleth
in heaven shall laugh at them. " Therefore derision is a mortal sin.

I answer that, The object of derision is always some evil or defect.
Now when an evil is great, it is taken, not in jest, but seriously:
consequently if it is taken in jest or turned to ridicule (whence the
terms 'derision' and 'jesting'), this is because it is considered to be
slight. Now an evil may be considered to be slight in two ways: first,
in itself, secondly, in relation to the person. When anyone makes game
or fun of another's evil or defect, because it is a slight evil in
itself, this is a venial sin by reason of its genus. on the other hand
this defect may be considered as a slight evil in relation to the
person, just as we are wont to think little of the defects of children
and imbeciles: and then to make game or fun of a person, is to scorn
him altogether, and to think him so despicable that his misfortune
troubles us not one whit, but is held as an object of derision. In this
way derision is a mortal sin, and more grievous than reviling, which is
also done openly: because the reviler would seem to take another's evil
seriously; whereas the derider does so in fun, and so would seem the
more to despise and dishonor the other man. Wherefore, in this sense,
derision is a grievous sin, and all the more grievous according as a
greater respect is due to the person derided.

Consequently it is an exceedingly grievous sin to deride God and the
things of God, according to Is. 37:23, "Whom hast thou reproached, and
whom hast thou blasphemed, and against whom hast thou exalted thy
voice? " and he replies: "Against the Holy One of Israel. " In the second
place comes derision of one's parents, wherefore it is written (Prov.
30:17): "The eye that mocketh at his father, and that despiseth the
labor of his mother in bearing him, let the ravens of the brooks pick
it out, and the young eagles eat it. " Further, the derision of good
persons is grievous, because honor is the reward of virtue, and against
this it is written (Job 12:4): "The simplicity of the just man is
laughed to scorn. " Such like derision does very much harm: because it
turns men away from good deeds, according to Gregory (Moral. xx, 14),
"Who when they perceive any good points appearing in the acts of
others, directly pluck them up with the hand of a mischievous
reviling. "

Reply to Objection 1: Jesting implies nothing contrary to charity in
relation to the person with whom one jests, but it may imply something
against charity in relation to the person who is the object of the
jest, on account of contempt, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Neither he that relapses into a sin of which he
has repented, nor a hypocrite, derides God explicitly, but implicitly,
in so far as either's behavior is like a derider's. Nor is it true that
to commit a venial sin is to relapse or dissimulate altogether, but
only dispositively and imperfectly.

Reply to Objection 3: Derision considered in itself is less grievous
than backbiting or reviling, because it does not imply contempt, but
jest. Sometimes however it includes greater contempt than reviling
does, as stated above, and then it is a grave sin.
__________________________________________________________________

OF CURSING (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider cursing. Under this head there are four points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether one may lawfully curse another?

(2) Whether one may lawfully curse an irrational creature?

(3) Whether cursing is a mortal sin?

(4) Of its comparison with other sins.
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Whether it is lawful to curse anyone?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to curse anyone. For it is unlawful
to disregard the command of the Apostle in whom Christ spoke, according
to 2 Cor. 13:3. Now he commanded (Rom. 12:14), "Bless and curse not. "
Therefore it is not lawful to curse anyone.

Objection 2: Further, all are bound to bless God, according to Dan.
3:82, "O ye sons of men, bless the Lord. " Now the same mouth cannot
both bless God and curse man, as proved in the third chapter of James.
Therefore no man may lawfully curse another man.

Objection 3: Further, he that curses another would seem to wish him
some evil either of fault or of punishment, since a curse appears to be
a kind of imprecation. But it is not lawful to wish ill to anyone,
indeed we are bound to pray that all may be delivered from evil.
Therefore it is unlawful for any man to curse.

Objection 4: Further, the devil exceeds all in malice on account of his
obstinacy. But it is not lawful to curse the devil, as neither is it
lawful to curse oneself; for it is written (Ecclus. 21:30): "While the
ungodly curseth the devil, he curseth his own soul. " Much less
therefore is it lawful to curse a man.

Objection 5: Further, a gloss on Num. 23:8, "How shall I curse whom God
hath not cursed? " says: "There cannot be a just cause for cursing a
sinner if one be ignorant of his sentiments. " Now one man cannot know
another man's sentiments, nor whether he is cursed by God. Therefore no
man may lawfully curse another.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 27:26): "Cursed be he that abideth
not in the words of this law. " Moreover Eliseus cursed the little boys
who mocked him (4 Kings 2:24).

I answer that, To curse [maledicere] is the same as to speak ill [malum
dicere]. Now "speaking" has a threefold relation to the thing spoken.
First, by way of assertion, as when a thing is expressed in the
indicative mood: in this way "maledicere" signifies simply to tell
someone of another's evil, and this pertains to backbiting, wherefore
tellers of evil [maledici] are sometimes called backbiters. Secondly,
speaking is related to the thing spoken, by way of cause, and this
belongs to God first and foremost, since He made all things by His
word, according to Ps. 32:9, "He spoke and they were made"; while
secondarily it belongs to man, who, by his word, commands others and
thus moves them to do something: it is for this purpose that we employ
verbs in the imperative mood. Thirdly, "speaking" is related to the
thing spoken by expressing the sentiments of one who desires that which
is expressed in words; and for this purpose we employ the verb in the
optative mood.

Accordingly we may omit the first kind of evil speaking which is by way
of simple assertion of evil, and consider the other two kinds. And here
we must observe that to do something and to will it are consequent on
one another in the matter of goodness and wickedness, as shown above
([2959]FS, Q[20], A[3]). Hence in these two ways of evil speaking, by
way of command and by way of desire, there is the same aspect of
lawfulness and unlawfulness, for if a man commands or desires another's
evil, as evil, being intent on the evil itself, then evil speaking will
be unlawful in both ways, and this is what is meant by cursing. On the
other hand if a man commands or desires another's evil under the aspect
of good, it is lawful; and it may be called cursing, not strictly
speaking, but accidentally, because the chief intention of the speaker
is directed not to evil but to good.

Now evil may be spoken, by commanding or desiring it, under the aspect
of a twofold good. Sometimes under the aspect of just, and thus a judge
lawfully curses a man whom he condemns to a just penalty: thus too the
Church curses by pronouncing anathema. In the same way the prophets in
the Scriptures sometimes call down evils on sinners, as though
conforming their will to Divine justice, although such like imprecation
may be taken by way of foretelling. Sometimes evil is spoken under the
aspect of useful, as when one wishes a sinner to suffer sickness or
hindrance of some kind, either that he may himself reform, or at least
that he may cease from harming others.

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle forbids cursing strictly so called
with an evil intent: and the same answer applies to the Second
Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: To wish another man evil under the aspect of
good, is not opposed to the sentiment whereby one wishes him good
simply, in fact rather is it in conformity therewith.

Reply to Objection 4: In the devil both nature and guilt must be
considered. His nature indeed is good and is from God nor is it lawful
to curse it. On the other hand his guilt is deserving of being cursed,
according to Job 3:8, "Let them curse it who curse the day. " Yet when a
sinner curses the devil on account of his guilt, for the same reason he
judges himself worthy of being cursed; and in this sense he is said to
curse his own soul.

Reply to Objection 5: Although the sinner's sentiments cannot be
perceived in themselves, they can be perceived through some manifest
sin, which has to be punished. Likewise although it is not possible to
know whom God curses in respect of final reprobation, it is possible to
know who is accursed of God in respect of being guilty of present sin.
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Whether it is lawful to curse an irrational creature?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful to curse an irrational
creature. Cursing would seem to be lawful chiefly in its relation to
punishment. Now irrational creatures are not competent subjects either
of guilt or of punishment. Therefore it is unlawful to curse them.

Objection 2: Further, in an irrational creature there is nothing but
the nature which God made. But it is unlawful to curse this even in the
devil, as stated above [2960](A[1]). Therefore it is nowise lawful to
curse an irrational creature.

Objection 3: Further, irrational creatures are either stable, as
bodies, or transient, as the seasons. Now, according to Gregory (Moral.
iv, 2), "it is useless to curse what does not exist, and wicked to
curse what exists. " Therefore it is nowise lawful to curse an
irrational creature.

On the contrary, our Lord cursed the fig tree, as related in Mat.
21:19; and Job cursed his day, according to Job 3:1.

I answer that, Benediction and malediction, properly speaking, regard
things to which good or evil may happen, viz. rational creatures: while
good and evil are said to happen to irrational creatures in relation to
the rational creature for whose sake they are. Now they are related to
the rational creature in several ways. First by way of ministration, in
so far as irrational creatures minister to the needs of man. In this
sense the Lord said to man (Gn. 3:17): "Cursed is the earth in thy
work," so that its barrenness would be a punishment to man. Thus also
David cursed the mountains of Gelboe, according to Gregory's expounding
(Moral. iv, 3). Again the irrational creature is related to the
rational creature by way of signification: and thus our Lord cursed the
fig tree in signification of Judea. Thirdly, the irrational creature is
related to rational creatures as something containing them, namely by
way of time or place: and thus Job cursed the day of his birth, on
account of the original sin which he contracted in birth, and on
account of the consequent penalties. In this sense also we may
understand David to have cursed the mountains of Gelboe, as we read in
2 Kings 1:21, namely on account of the people slaughtered there.

But to curse irrational beings, considered as creatures of God, is a
sin of blasphemy; while to curse them considered in themselves is idle
and vain and consequently unlawful.

From this the Replies to the objections may easily be gathered.
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Whether cursing is a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that cursing is not a mortal sin. For
Augustine in a homily On the Fire of Purgatory [*Serm. civ in the
appendix of St. Augustine's works] reckons cursing among slight sins.
But such sins are venial. Therefore cursing is not a mortal but a
venial Sin.

Objection 2: Further, that which proceeds from a slight movement of the
mind does not seem to be generically a mortal sin.