“These lines of Count Verri's (Sull
indole del piacere e del dolore; 1781) I confirm
with absolute certainty: 'Il solo principio motore
dell'uomo è il dolore.
indole del piacere e del dolore; 1781) I confirm
with absolute certainty: 'Il solo principio motore
dell'uomo è il dolore.
Nietzsche - v15 - Will to Power - b
For the time
being, we stand firmly as we did before ; up to
the present no results save very superficial
modification or degeneration have been shown
to follow upon domestication. And everything
that escapes from the hand and discipline of man,
returns almost immediately to its original natural
condition. The type remains constant, man can-
not “ dénaturer la nature. "
Biologists reckon upon the struggle for existence,
the death of the weaker creature and the survival
of the most robust, most gifted combatant; on
that account they imagine a continuous increase in
the perfection of all creatures. We, on the con-
trary, have convinced ourselves of the fact, that in
the struggle for existence, accident serves the
cause of the weak quite as much as that of
the strong; that craftiness often supplements
strength with advantage; that the prolificness
of a species is related in a remarkable manner
to that species' chances of destruction. .
Natural Selection is also credited with the
power of slowly effecting unlimited metamor-
phoses : it is believed that every advantage is
## p. 156 (#186) ############################################
156
THE WILL TO POWER.
transmitted by heredity, and strengthened in the
course of generations (when heredity is known to
be so capricious that . . . ); the happy adaptations
of certain creatures to very special conditions of life,
are regarded as the result of surrounding influences.
Nowhere, however, are examples of unconscious
selection to be found absolutely nowhere). The
most different individuals associate one with the
other; the extremes become lost in the mass. Each
vies with the other to maintain his kind; those
creatures whose appearance shields them from
certain dangers, do not alter this appearance
when they are in an environment quite devoid
of danger. . . . If they live in places where
their coats or their hides do not conceal them,
they do not adapt themselves to their surroundings
in any way
The selection of the most beautiful has been so
exaggerated, that it greatly exceeds the instincts
for beauty in our own race! As a matter of fact,
the most beautiful creature often couples with the
most debased, and the largest with the smallest.
We almost always see males and females taking
advantage of their first chance meeting, and
manifesting no taste or selectiveness at all.
Modification through climate and nourishment-
but as a matter of fact unimportant.
There are no intermediate forms. -
The growing evolution of creatures is assumed.
All grounds for this assumption are entirely
lacking. Every type has its limitations : beyond
these evolution cannot carry it.
## p. 157 (#187) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
157
My general point of view. --First proposition :
Man as a species is not progressing. Higher
specimens are indeed attained; but they do not
survive. The general level of the species is not
raised.
Second proposition : Man as a species does not
represent any sort of progress compared with any
other animal. The whole of the animal and
plant world does not develop from the lower to
the higher. . . . but all simultaneously, haphazardly,
confusedly, and at variance. The richest and
most complex forms and the term “higher
type” means no more than this—perish more
easily : only the lowest succeed in maintaining
their apparent imperishableness. The former
are seldom attained, and maintain their superior
position with difficulty; the latter are compensated
by great fruitfulness. --In the human race, also,
the superior specimens, the happy cases of evolution,
are the first to perish amid the fluctuations of
chances for and against them. They are exposed
to every form of decadence: they are extreme,
and, on that account alone, already decadents. . .
The short duration of beauty, of genius, of the
Cæsar, is sui generis : such things are not heredi-
tary. The type is inherited, there is nothing
extreme or particularly “happy" about a type. . . .
It is not a case of a particular fate, or of the “evil
will ” of Nature, but merely of the concept" superior
type": the higher type is an example of an incom-
parably greater degree of complexity—a greater
sum of co-ordinated elements : but on this account
disintegration becomes a thousand times more
C
:
## p. 158 (#188) ############################################
158
THE WILL TO POWER.
threatening “ Genius " is the sublimest machine
in existence-hence it is the most fragile.
Third proposition : The domestication (culture)
of man does not sink very deep. When it does
sink far below the skin it immediately becomes
degeneration (type : the Christian). The “wild”
man (or, in moral terminology, the evil man)
is a reversion to Nature—and, in a certain sense,
he represents a recovery, a cure from the effects of
“ culture. ”
685.
Anti-Darwin. - What surprises me most on
making a general survey of the great destinies
of man, is that I invariably see the reverse of
what to-day Darwin and his school sees or will
persist in seeing : selection in favour of the
stronger, the better-constituted, and the progress
of the species. Precisely the reverse of this
stares one in the face : the suppression of the
lucky cases, the uselessness of the more highly
constituted types, the inevitable mastery of the
mediocre, and even of those who are below
inediocrity. Unless we are shown some reason
why man is an exception among living creatures,
I incline to the belief that Darwin's school is
everywhere at fault. That will to power, in
which I perceive the ultimate reason and character
of all change, explains why it is that selection is
never in favour of the exceptions and of the lucky
cases : the strongest and happiest natures are
weak when they are confronted with a majority
ruled by organised gregarious instincts and the
## p. 159 (#189) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
159
fear which possesses the weak. My general
view of the world of values shows that in the
highest values which now sway the destiny of
man, the happy cases among men, the select
specimens do not prevail : but rather the decadent
specimens,—perhaps there is nothing more in-
teresting in the world than this unpleasant
spectacle. . .
Strange as it may seem, the strong always have
to be upheld against the weak; and the well-
constituted against the ill-constituted, the healthy
against the sick and physiologically botched. If
we drew our morals from reality, they would read
thus: the mediocre are more valuable than the
exceptional creatures, and the decadent than the
mediocre ; the will to nonentity prevails over the
will to life—and the general aim now is, in
Christian, Buddhistic, Schopenhauerian phrase-
ology: “ It is better not to be than to be. "
I protest against this formulating of reality into
a moral: and I loathe Christianity with a deadly
loathing, because it created sublime words and at-
titudes in order to deck a revolting truth with all
the tawdriness of justice, virtue, and godliness.
I see all philosophers and the whole of science
on their knees before a reality which is the reverse
of “the struggle for life," as Darwin and his school
understood it—that is to say, wherever I look,
I see those prevailing and surviving, who throw
doubt and suspicion upon life and the value of
life. The error of the Darwinian school became
a problem to me: how can one be so blind as to
make this mistake ?
## p. 160 (#190) ############################################
160
THE WILL TO POWER.
That species show an ascending tendency, is the
most nonsensical assertion that has ever been made:
until now they have only manifested a dead level.
There is nothing whatever to prove that the higher
organisms have developed from the lower. I see
that the lower, owing to their numerical strength,
their craft, and ruse, now preponderate,—and I fail
to see an instance in which an accidental change
produces an advantage, at least not for a very long
period : for it would be necessary to find some
reason why an accidental change should become
so very strong.
I do indeed find the “cruelty of Nature” which
is so often referred to; but in a different place:
Nature is cruel, but against her lucky and well-
constituted children; she protects and shelters and
loves the lowly.
In short, the increase of a species' power, as
the result of the preponderance of its particularly
well-constituted and strong specimens, is perhaps
less of a certainty than that it is the result of the
preponderance of its mediocre and lower specimens
. . in the case of the latter, we find great fruit-
fulness and permanence: in the case of the former,
the besetting dangers are greater, waste is more
rapid, and decimation is more speedy.
686.
Man as he has appeared up to the present is
the embryo of the man of the future; all the
formative powers which are to produce the latter,
already lie in the former : and owing to the fact that
## p. 161 (#191) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
161
they are enormous, the more promising for the
future the modern individual happens to be, the
more suffering falls to his lot.
This is the pro-
foundest concept of suffering. The formative
powers clash. —The isolation of the individual
need not deceive one- as a matter of fact, some
uninterrupted current does actually flow through
all individuals, and does thus unite them. The
fact that they feel themselves isolated, is the most
powerful spur in the process of setting themselves
the loftiest of aims: their search for happiness is the
means which keeps together and moderates the for-
mative powers, and keeps them from being mutually
destructive.
687.
Excessive intellectual strength sets itself new
goals; it is not in the least satisfied by the com-
mand and the leadership of the inferior world, or
by the preservation of the organism, of the “in-
dividual. "
We are more than the individual: we are the
whole chain itself, with the tasks of all the possible
futures of that chain in us.
3. THEORY OF THE WILL TO POWER AND OF
VALUATIONS.
688.
. The unitary view of psychology. -We are accus-
tomed to regard the development of a vast number
of forms as compatible with one single origin.
My theory would be: that the will to power
L
VOL. II.
## p. 162 (#192) ############################################
162
THE WILL TO POWER.
is the primitive motive force out of which all other
motives have been derived ;
That it is exceedingly illuminating to sub-
stitute power for individual "happiness” (after
“
which every living organism is said to strive): “It
strives after power, after more power”;-happiness
is only a symptom of the feeling of power attained,
a consciousness of difference (it does not strive
after happiness: but happiness steps in when the
object is attained, after which the organism has
striven: happiness is an accompanying, not an
actuating factor);
That all motive force is the will to power; that
there is no other force, either physical, dynamic, or
psychic.
In our science, where the concept cause and
effect is reduced to a relationship of complete
equilibrium, and in which it seems desirable for
the same quantum of force to be found on either
side, all idea of a motive power is absent: we only
apprehend results, and we call these equal from
the point of view of their content of force. . .
It is a matter of mere experience that change
never ceases: at bottom we have not the smallest
grounds for assuming that any one particular
change must follow upon any other.
On the con-
trary, any state which has been attained would
seem almost forced to maintain itself intact if it
had not within itself a capacity for not desiring to
maintain itself. . . . Spinoza's proposition concern-
ing “self-preservation " ought as a matter of fact to
put a stop to change. But the proposition is false;
the contrary is true. In all living organisms it can
(
## p. 163 (#193) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
163
be clearly shown that they do everything not to
remain as they are, but to become greater.
«
689.
" Will to power” and causality. -From a psycho-
logical point of view the idea of “cause " is our feel-
ing of power in the act which is called willing-our
concept "effect" is the superstition that this feeling
of power is itself the force which moves things. . . .
. A state which accompanies an event and is
already an effect of that event is deemed "suffi-
cient cause ” of the latter; the tense relationship
of our feeling of power (pleasure as the feeling of
power) and of an obstacle being overcome—are
these things illusions ?
If we translate the notion cause back into
the only sphere which is known to us, and out of
which we have taken it, we cannot imagine any
change in which the will to power is not inherent.
We do not know how to account for any change
which is not a trespassing of one power on another.
- Mechanics only show us the results, and then
only in images (movement is a figure of speech);
gravitation itself has no mechanical cause, because
it is itself the first cause of mechanical results.
The will to accumulate force is confined to the
phenomenon of life, to nourishment, to procreation,
to inheritance, to society, states, customs, authority.
Should we not be allowed to assume that this will
is the motive power also of chemistry ? -and of
the cosmic order ?
Not only conservation of energy, but the mini-
mum amount of waste; so that the only reality is
## p. 164 (#194) ############################################
164
THE WILL TO POWER.
this: the will of every centre of power to become
stronger-not self-preservation, but the desire to
appropriate, to become master, to become more,
to become stronger.
Is the fact that science is possible a proof of the
principle of causation—"From like causes, like
effects”—“A permanent law of things "-" In-
variable order"? Because something is calculable,
is it therefore on that account necessary?
If something happens thus, and thus only, it is
not the manifestation of a “principle,” of a “law,"
of “order. " What happens is that certain quanta
of power begin to operate, and their essence is
to exercise their power over all other quanta of
power. Can we assume the existence of a striving
after power without a feeling of pleasure and pain,
i. e. without the sensation of an increase or a de-
crease of power? Is mechanism only a language
of signs for the concealed fact of a world of fight-
ing and conquering quanta of will-power ? All
mechanical first-principles, matter, atoms, weight,
pressure, and repulsion, are not facts in themselves,
but interpretations arrived at with the help of
psychical fictions.
Life, which is our best known form of being, is
altogether" will to the accumulation of strength
all the processes of life hinge on this: everything
aims, not at preservation, but at accretion and
accumulation. Life as an individual case (a
hypothesis which may be applied to existence in
general) strives after the maximum feeling of
power; life is essentially a striving after more power;
striving itself is only a straining after more power ;
"
## p. 165 (#195) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
165
the most fundamental and innermost thing of all is
this will. (Mechanism is merely the semeiotics of
the results. )
690.
The thing which is the cause of the existence
of development cannot in the course of investiga-
tion be found above development; it should neither
be regarded as "evolving” nor as evolved .
the “ will to power" cannot have been evolved.
691.
What is the relation of the whole of the organic
process towards the rest of nature ? —Here the
fundamental will reveals itself.
692.
Is the “will to power” a kind of will, or is it
identical with the concept will ? Is it equivalent
to desiring or commanding; is it the will which
Schopenhauer says is the essence of things?
My proposition is that the will of psychologists
hitherto has been an unjustifiable generalisation,
and that there is no such thing as this sort of will,
that instead of the development of one will into
several forms being taken as a fact, the character
of will has been cancelled owing to the fact that
its content, its “whither," was subtracted from it:
in Schopenhauer this is so in the highest degree;
what he calls “ will ” is merely an empty word.
There is even less plausibility in the will to live :
for life is simply one of the manifestations of the
will to power; it is quite arbitrary and ridiculous
## p. 166 (#196) ############################################
166
THE WILL TO POWER.
to suggest that everything is striving to enter into
this particular form of the will to power.
693
If the innermost essence of existence is the will
to power; if happiness is every increase of power,
and unhappiness the feeling of not being able to
resist, of not being able to become master : may
we not then postulate happiness and pain as
cardinal facts ? Is will possible without these two
oscillations of yea and nay?
But who feels
happiness? . . . Who will have power? . . .
Nonsensical question. If the essence of all things
is itself will to power, and consequently the
ability to feel pleasure and pain! Albeit: con-
trasts and obstacles are necessary, therefore also,
relatively, units which trespass on one another.
694.
According to the obstacles which a force seeks
with a view of overcoming them, the measure of
the failure and the fatality thus provoked must
increase: and in so far as every force can only
manifest itself against some thing that opposes it,
an element of unhappiness is necessarily inherent
in every action.
But this pain acts as a greater
incitement to life, and increases the will to power.
695.
If pleasure and pain are related to the feeling
of power, life would have to represent such an
increase in power that the difference, the “plus,"
## p. 167 (#197) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
167
.
.
would have to enter consciousness. A dead
level of power, if maintained, would have to
measure its happiness in relation to depreciations
of that level, i. e. in relation to states of unhappi-
ness and not of happiness. . . . The will to an
increase lies in the essence of happiness: that
power is enhanced, and that this difference becomes
conscious.
In a state of decadence after a certain time the
opposite difference becomes conscious, that is
decrease: the memory of former strong moments
depresses the present feelings of happiness—in
this state comparison reduces happiness.
696.
It is not the satisfaction of the will which is
the cause of happiness (to this superficial theory
I am more particularly opposed—this absurd
psychological forgery in regard to the most simple
things), but it is that the will is always striving to
overcome that which stands in its way. The feel-
ing of happiness lies precisely in the discontented-
ness of the will, in the fact that without opponents
and obstacles it is never satisfied.
“ The happy
man": a gregarious ideal.
697.
The normal discontent of our instincts for
instance, of the instinct of hunger, of sex, of move-
ment-contains nothing which is in itself depress-
ing; it rather provokes the feeling of life, and,
whatever the pessimists may say to us, like all
## p. 168 (#198) ############################################
168
THE WILL TO POWER.
the rhythms of small and irritating stimuli, it
strengthens. Instead of this discontent making us
sick of life, it is rather the great stimulus to life.
(Pleasure might even perhaps be characterised
as the rhythm of small and painful stimuli. )
Kant says:
698.
“These lines of Count Verri's (Sull
indole del piacere e del dolore; 1781) I confirm
with absolute certainty: 'Il solo principio motore
dell'uomo è il dolore. Il dolore precede ogni
piacere. Il piacere non è un essere positivo. '"*
699.
Pain is something different from pleasure-I
mean it is not the latter's opposite.
If the essence of pleasure has been aptly char-
acterised as the feeling of increased power (that is
to say, as a feeling of difference which presupposes
comparison), that does not define the nature of
pain. The false contrasts which the people, and
consequently the language, believes in, are always
dangerous fetters which impede the march of truth.
There are even cases where a kind of pleasure is
conditioned by a certain rhythmic sequence of
small, painful stimuli: in this way a very rapid
growth of the feeling of power and of the feeling
* On the Nature of Pleasure and Pain. “The only motive
force of man is pain. Pain precedes every pleasure.
Pleasure is not a positive thing. "—TR.
>
## p. 169 (#199) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
169
a
of pleasure is attained. This is the case, for
instance, in tickling, also in the sexual tickling
which accompanies the coitus: here we see pain
acting as the ingredient of happiness. It seems
to be a small hindrance which is overcome, followed
immediately by another small hindrance which
once again is overcome-this play of resistance
and resistance overcome is the greatest excitant
of that complete feeling of overflowing and surplus
power which constitutes the essence of happiness.
The converse, which would be an increase in
the feeling of pain through small intercalated
pleasurable stimuli, does not exist : pleasure and
pain are not opposites,
Pain is undoubtedly an intellectual process in
which a judgment is inherent-the judgment
“harmful,” in which long experience is epitomised.
There is no such thing as pain in itself. It is not
the wound that hurts, it is the experience of the
harmful results a wound may have for the whole
organism, which here speaks in this deeply moving
way, and is called pain. (In the case of deleterious
influences which were unknown to ancient man,
as, for instance, those residing in the new combina-
tion of poisonous chemicals, the hint from pain is
lacking, and we are lost. )
That which is quite peculiar in pain is the pro-
longed disturbance, the quivering subsequent to a
terrible shock in the ganglia of the nervous system.
As a matter of fact, nobody suffers from the cause
of pain (from any sort of injury, for instance),
but from the protracted disturbance of his equi-
librium which follows upon the shock. Pain is a
1.
## p. 170 (#200) ############################################
170
THE WILL TO POWER.
disease of the cerebral centres-pleasure is no
disease at all.
The fact that pain may be the cause of reflex
actions has appearances and even philosophical
prejudice in its favour. But in very sudden
accidents, if we observe closely, we find that the
reflex action occurs appreciably earlier than the
feeling of pain. I should be in a bad way when
I stumbled if I had to wait until the fact had
struck the bell of my consciousness, and until a
hint of what I had to do had been telegraphed
back to me.
On the contrary, what I notice as
clearly as possible is, that first, in order to avoid
a fall, reflex action on the part of my foot takes
place, and then, after a certain measurable space of
time, there follows quite suddenly a kind of painful
wave in my forehead. Nobody, then, reacts to
pain. Pain is subsequently projected into the
wounded quarter-but the essence of this local
pain is nevertheless not the expression of a kind
of local wound: it is merely a local sign, the
strength and nature of which is in keeping with
the severity of the wound, and of which the nerve
centres have taken note. The fact that as the
result of this shock the muscular power of the
organism is materially reduced, does not prove in
any way that the essence of pain is to be sought
in the lowering of the feeling of power.
Once more let me repeat: nobody reacts to
pain: pain is no “cause" of action, . Pain itself
is a reaction; the reflex movement is another
and earlier process—both originate at different
points.
## p. 171 (#201) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
171
700.
The message of pain : in itself pain does not
announce that
that which has been momentarily
damaged, but the significance of this damage for
the individual as a whole.
Are we to suppose that there are any pains
which “the species " feel, and which the individual
does not?
701.
“ The sum of unhappiness outweighs the sum
of happiness: consequently it were better that the
world did not exist "-" The world is something
which from a rational standpoint it were better
did not exist, because it occasions more pain than
pleasure to the feeling subject "—this futile gossip
now calls itself pessimism!
Pleasure and pain are accompanying factors, not
causes; they are second-rate valuations derived
from a dominating value,—they are one with the
feeling “ useful," "harmful," and therefore they are
absolutely fugitive and relative. For in regard to
all utility and harmfulness there are a hundred
different ways of asking “what for? ”
I despise this pessimism of sensitiveness : it is
in itself a sign of profoundly impoverished life.
702.
Man does not seek happiness and does not avoid
unhappiness. Everybody knows the famous pre-
judices I here contradict. Pleasure and pain are
mere results, mere accompanying phenomena—that
which every man, which every tiny particle of a
## p. 172 (#202) ############################################
172
THE WILL TO POWER.
living organism will have, is an increase of power.
In striving after this, pleasure and pain are en-
countered; it is owing to that will that the organism
seeks opposition and requires that which stands in
its way. . . . Pain as the hindrance of its will to
power is therefore a normal feature, a natural in-
gredient of every organic phenomenon; man does
not avoid it, on the contrary, he is constantly in
need of it: every triumph, every feeling of pleasure,
every event presupposes an obstacle overcome.
Let us take the simplest case, that of primitive
nourishment; the protoplasm extends its pseudo-
podia in order to seek for that which resists it,
it does not do so out of hunger, but owing to its
Then it makes the attempt to over-
come, to appropriate, and to incorporate that with
which it comes into contact—what people call
“nourishment” is merely a derivative, a utilitarian
application, of the primordial will to become
stronger.
Pain is so far from acting as a diminution of
our feeling of power, that it actually forms in the
majority of cases a spur to this feeling, the
obstacle is the stimulus of the will to power.
will to power.
703
Pain has been confounded with one of its
subdivisions, which is exhaustion: the latter does
indeed represent a profound reduction and lowering
of the will to power, a material loss of strength
-that is to say, there is (a) pain as the stimulus
to an increase or power, and (6) pain following
## p. 173 (#203) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
173
upon an expenditure of power; in the first case it
is a spur, in the second it is the outcome of ex-
cessive spurring. . . . The inability to resist is
proper to the latter form of pain : the provocation
of that which resists is proper to the former. . .
The only happiness which is to be felt in the state
of exhaustion is that of going to sleep; in the other
case, happiness means triumph. . . . The great
confusion of psychologists consisted in the fact
that they did not keep these two kinds of happi-
ness—that of falling asleep, and that of triumph
-sufficiently apart. Exhausted people will have
repose, slackened limbs, peace and quiet and these
things constitute the bliss of Nihilistic religions and
philosophies; the wealthy in vital strength, the
active, want triumph, defeated opponents, and the
extension of their feeling of power over ever wider
regions. Every healthy function of the organism
has this need,—and the whole organism constitutes
an intricate complexity of systems struggling for
the increase of the feeling of power. . . .
704.
How is it that the fundamental article of faith
in all psychologies is a piece of most outrageous con-
tortion and fabrication? “Man strives after happi-
ness," for instance-how much of this is true ? In
order to understand what life is, and what kind of
striving and tenseness life contains, the formula
should hold good not only of trees and plants, but
of animals also. "What does the plant strive
after ? "-But here we have already invented a
## p. 174 (#204) ############################################
174
THE WILL TO POWER.
false entity which does not exist,-concealing and
denying the fact of an infinitely variegated growth,
with individual and semi-individual starting-points,
if we give it the clumsy title “plant” as if it were
a unit.
It is very obvious that the ultimate and
smallest individuals ” cannot be understood in the
sense of metaphysical individuals or atoms; their
sphere of power is continually shifting its ground:
but with all these changes, can it be said that any
of them strives after happiness -All this expand-
ing, this incorporation and growth, is a search for
resistance; movement is essentially related to
states of pain: the driving power here must
represent some other desire if it leads to such
continual willing and seeking of pain. -- To what
end do the trees of a virgin forest contend with
each other? “For happiness"? -For power ! . . .
Man is now master of the forces of nature, and
master too of his own wild and unbridled feelings
(the passions have followed suit, and have learned
to become useful)—in comparison with primeva/
man, the man of to-day represents an enormous
quantum of power, but not an increase in happi-
ness! How can one maintain, then, that he has
striven after happiness ? . .
.
.
705.
But while I say this I see above me, and below
the stars, the glittering rat's-tail of errors which
hitherto has represented the greatest inspiration of
man: "All happiness is the result of virtue, all
virtue is the result of free will”!
## p. 175 (#205) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
175
Let us transvalue the values: all capacity is the
outcome of a happy organisation, all freedom is the
outcome of capacity (freedom understood here as
facility in self-direction. Every artist will under-
stand me)
706.
“The value of life. ”—Every life stands by itself;
all existence must be justified, and not only life,
—the justifying principle must be one through
which life itself speaks.
Life is only a means to something : it is the
expression of the forms of growth in power.
»
707.
The “conscious world” cannot be a starting-
point for valuing: an “objective" valuation is
necessary.
In comparison with the enormous and compli-
cated antagonistic processes which the collective life
of every organism represents, its conscious world
of feelings, intentions, and valuations, is only a small
slice. We have absolutely no right to postulate
this particle of consciousness as the object, the
wherefore, of the collective phenomena of life: the.
attainment of conseiousness. is obviously only an
additional means to the unfolding of life, and to. .
the extension of its power. That is why it is a
piece of childish simplicity to set up happiness, or
intellectuality, or morality, or any other individual
sphere of consciousness, as the highest value: and
maybe to justify " the world” with it.
## p. 176 (#206) ############################################
176
THE WILL TO POWER.
This is my fundamental objection to all philo-
sophical and moral cosmologies and theologies, to
allwherefores and highest values that have appeared
in philosophies and philosophic religions hitherto.
A kind of means is misunderstood as the object
itself: conversely life and its growth of power were
debased to a means.
If we wished to postulate an adequate object of
life it would not necessarily be related in any way
with the category of conscious life; it would
require rather to explain conscious life as a mere
means to itself. . .
The “denial of life” regarded as the object of
life, the object of evolution ! Existence—a piece of
tremendous stupidity! Any such mad interpreta-
tion is only the outcome of life's being measured
by the factors of consciousness (pleasure and pain,
good and evil). Here the means are made to stand
against the end-the" unholy,” absurd, and, above
all, disagreeable means: how can the end be any
use when it requires such means ? But where the
fault lies is here instead of looking for the end
which would explain the necessity of such means,
we posited an end from the start which actually
excludes such means, i. e. we made a desideratum
in regard to certain means (especially pleasurable,
rational, and virtuous) into a rule, and then only
did we decide what end would be desirable. .
Where the fundamental fault lies is in the fact
that, instead of regarding consciousness · as an
instrument and an isolated phenomenon of life in
general, we made it a standard, the highest value
in life: it is the faulty standpoint of a parte ad
.
## p. 177 (#207) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
177
totum,—and that is why all philosophers are
instinctively seeking at the present day for a col-
lective consciousness, a thing that lives and wills
consciously with all that happens, a “Spirit,” a
“God. ” But they must be told that it is precisely
thus that life is converted into a monster; that a
“God” and a general sensorium would necessarily
be something on whose account the whole of
existence would have to be condemned.
Our greatest relief came when we eliminated the
general consciousness which postulates ends and
means—in this way we ceased from being neces-
sarily pessimists. . . . Our greatest indictment
of life was the existence of God.
.
708.
Concerning the value of “Becoming. ”—If the
movement of the world really tended to reach a
final state, that state would already have been
reached. The only fundamental fact, however, is
that it does not tend to reach a final state: and
every philosophy and scientific hypothesis (e. g.
materialism) according to which such a final state
is necessary, is refuted by this fundamental fact.
I should like to have a concept of the world
which does justice to this fact. Becoming ought
to be explained without having recourse to such
final designs. Becoming must appear justified at
every instant (or it must defy all valuation : which
has unity as its end); the present must not under
any circumstances be justified by a future, nor
must the past be justified for the sake of the
M
VOL. II.
## p. 178 (#208) ############################################
178
THE WILL TO POWER.
present. Necessity” must not be interpreted
in the form of a prevailing and ruling collective
force or as a prime motor; and still less as the
necessary cause of some valuable result. But to
this end it is necessary to deny a collective
consciousness for Becoming,—a “God,” in order
that life may not be veiled under the shadow of a
being who feels and knows as we do and yet wills
nothing: “God” is useless if he wants nothing;
and if he do want something, this presupposes a
general sum of suffering and irrationality which
lowers the general value of Becoming. Fortun-
ately any such general power is lacking (a suffering
God overlooking everything, a general sensorium
and ubiquitous Spirit, would be the greatest indict-
ment of existence).
Strictly speaking nothing of the nature of
Being must be allowed to remain, because in
that case Becoming loses its value and gets to be
sheer and superfluous nonsense.
The next question, then, is: how did the
illusion Being originate (why was it obliged to
originate);
Likewise: how was it that all valuations based
upon the hypothesis that there was such a thing
as Being came to be depreciated.
But in this way we have recognised that this
hypothesis concerning Being is the source of all
the calumny that has been directed against the
world (the “Better world,” the “True world” the
“World Beyond," the “ Thing-in-itself").
(1) Becoming has no final state, it does not
tend towards stability.
## p. 179 (#209) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
179
(2) Becoming is not a state of appearance;
the world of Being is probably only
appearance.
(3) Becoming is of precisely the same value
at every instant; the sum of its value
always remains equal: expressed other-
wise, it has no value; for that according
to which it might be measured, and in
regard to which the word value might
have some sense, is
is entirely lacking.
The collective value of the world defies
valuation ; for this reason philosophical
pessimism belongs to the order of farces.
709.
We should not make our little desiderata the
judges of existence ! Neither should we make
culminating evolutionary forms (eg. mind) the
"absolute " which stands behind evolution !
710.
Our knowledge has become scientific to the
extent in which it has been able to make use of
number and measure. It might be worth while
to try and see whether a scientific order of values
might not be constructed according to a scale of
numbers and measures representing energy. . .
All other values are matters of prejudice, simplicity,
and misunderstanding. They may all be reduced
to that scale of numbers and measures represent-
ing energy.
The ascent in this scale would
## p. 180 (#210) ############################################
180
THE WILL TO POWER.
represent an increase of value, the descent a
diminution.
But here appearance and prejudice are against
one (moral values are only apparent values com-
pared with those which are physiological).
711.
Why the standpoint of “value” lapses :-
Because in the " whole process of the universe”
the work of mankind does not come under considera-
tion; because a general process (viewed in the
light of a system) does not exist.
Because there is no such thing as a whole ;
because no depreciation of human existence or
human aims can be made in regard to something
that does not exist.
Because “necessity," causality,” “ design,” are
merely useful semblances.
Because the aim is not “the increase of the
sphere of consciousness," but the increase of power;
in which increase the utility of consciousness is
also contained; and the same holds good of
pleasure and pain.
Because a mere means must not be elevated to
the highest criterion of value (such as states of
consciousness like pleasure and pain, if con-
sciousness is in itself only a means).
Because the world is not an organism at all,
but a thing of chaos; because the development of
“intellectuality” is only a means tending relatively
to extend the duration of an organisation.
Because all desirability” has no
sense in
regard to the general character of existence.
## p. 181 (#211) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
181
712.
“God” is the culminating moment: life is an
eternal process of deifying and undeifying. But
withal there is no zenith of values, but only a
zenith of power.
Absolute exclusion of mechanical and material-
istic interpretations: they are both only expres-
sions of inferior states, of emotions deprived of all
spirit (of the “will to power ').
The retrograde movement from the zenith of
development (the intellectualisation of power on
some slave-infected soil) may be shown to be the
result of the highest degree of energy turning
against itself, once it no longer has anything to
organise, and utilising its power in order to
disorganise.
(a) The ever-increasing suppression of societies,
and the latter's subjection by a smaller number of
stronger individuals.
(6) The ever-increasing suppression of the
privileged and the strong, hence the rise of
democracy, and ultimately of anarchy, in the
elements,
713.
being, we stand firmly as we did before ; up to
the present no results save very superficial
modification or degeneration have been shown
to follow upon domestication. And everything
that escapes from the hand and discipline of man,
returns almost immediately to its original natural
condition. The type remains constant, man can-
not “ dénaturer la nature. "
Biologists reckon upon the struggle for existence,
the death of the weaker creature and the survival
of the most robust, most gifted combatant; on
that account they imagine a continuous increase in
the perfection of all creatures. We, on the con-
trary, have convinced ourselves of the fact, that in
the struggle for existence, accident serves the
cause of the weak quite as much as that of
the strong; that craftiness often supplements
strength with advantage; that the prolificness
of a species is related in a remarkable manner
to that species' chances of destruction. .
Natural Selection is also credited with the
power of slowly effecting unlimited metamor-
phoses : it is believed that every advantage is
## p. 156 (#186) ############################################
156
THE WILL TO POWER.
transmitted by heredity, and strengthened in the
course of generations (when heredity is known to
be so capricious that . . . ); the happy adaptations
of certain creatures to very special conditions of life,
are regarded as the result of surrounding influences.
Nowhere, however, are examples of unconscious
selection to be found absolutely nowhere). The
most different individuals associate one with the
other; the extremes become lost in the mass. Each
vies with the other to maintain his kind; those
creatures whose appearance shields them from
certain dangers, do not alter this appearance
when they are in an environment quite devoid
of danger. . . . If they live in places where
their coats or their hides do not conceal them,
they do not adapt themselves to their surroundings
in any way
The selection of the most beautiful has been so
exaggerated, that it greatly exceeds the instincts
for beauty in our own race! As a matter of fact,
the most beautiful creature often couples with the
most debased, and the largest with the smallest.
We almost always see males and females taking
advantage of their first chance meeting, and
manifesting no taste or selectiveness at all.
Modification through climate and nourishment-
but as a matter of fact unimportant.
There are no intermediate forms. -
The growing evolution of creatures is assumed.
All grounds for this assumption are entirely
lacking. Every type has its limitations : beyond
these evolution cannot carry it.
## p. 157 (#187) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
157
My general point of view. --First proposition :
Man as a species is not progressing. Higher
specimens are indeed attained; but they do not
survive. The general level of the species is not
raised.
Second proposition : Man as a species does not
represent any sort of progress compared with any
other animal. The whole of the animal and
plant world does not develop from the lower to
the higher. . . . but all simultaneously, haphazardly,
confusedly, and at variance. The richest and
most complex forms and the term “higher
type” means no more than this—perish more
easily : only the lowest succeed in maintaining
their apparent imperishableness. The former
are seldom attained, and maintain their superior
position with difficulty; the latter are compensated
by great fruitfulness. --In the human race, also,
the superior specimens, the happy cases of evolution,
are the first to perish amid the fluctuations of
chances for and against them. They are exposed
to every form of decadence: they are extreme,
and, on that account alone, already decadents. . .
The short duration of beauty, of genius, of the
Cæsar, is sui generis : such things are not heredi-
tary. The type is inherited, there is nothing
extreme or particularly “happy" about a type. . . .
It is not a case of a particular fate, or of the “evil
will ” of Nature, but merely of the concept" superior
type": the higher type is an example of an incom-
parably greater degree of complexity—a greater
sum of co-ordinated elements : but on this account
disintegration becomes a thousand times more
C
:
## p. 158 (#188) ############################################
158
THE WILL TO POWER.
threatening “ Genius " is the sublimest machine
in existence-hence it is the most fragile.
Third proposition : The domestication (culture)
of man does not sink very deep. When it does
sink far below the skin it immediately becomes
degeneration (type : the Christian). The “wild”
man (or, in moral terminology, the evil man)
is a reversion to Nature—and, in a certain sense,
he represents a recovery, a cure from the effects of
“ culture. ”
685.
Anti-Darwin. - What surprises me most on
making a general survey of the great destinies
of man, is that I invariably see the reverse of
what to-day Darwin and his school sees or will
persist in seeing : selection in favour of the
stronger, the better-constituted, and the progress
of the species. Precisely the reverse of this
stares one in the face : the suppression of the
lucky cases, the uselessness of the more highly
constituted types, the inevitable mastery of the
mediocre, and even of those who are below
inediocrity. Unless we are shown some reason
why man is an exception among living creatures,
I incline to the belief that Darwin's school is
everywhere at fault. That will to power, in
which I perceive the ultimate reason and character
of all change, explains why it is that selection is
never in favour of the exceptions and of the lucky
cases : the strongest and happiest natures are
weak when they are confronted with a majority
ruled by organised gregarious instincts and the
## p. 159 (#189) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
159
fear which possesses the weak. My general
view of the world of values shows that in the
highest values which now sway the destiny of
man, the happy cases among men, the select
specimens do not prevail : but rather the decadent
specimens,—perhaps there is nothing more in-
teresting in the world than this unpleasant
spectacle. . .
Strange as it may seem, the strong always have
to be upheld against the weak; and the well-
constituted against the ill-constituted, the healthy
against the sick and physiologically botched. If
we drew our morals from reality, they would read
thus: the mediocre are more valuable than the
exceptional creatures, and the decadent than the
mediocre ; the will to nonentity prevails over the
will to life—and the general aim now is, in
Christian, Buddhistic, Schopenhauerian phrase-
ology: “ It is better not to be than to be. "
I protest against this formulating of reality into
a moral: and I loathe Christianity with a deadly
loathing, because it created sublime words and at-
titudes in order to deck a revolting truth with all
the tawdriness of justice, virtue, and godliness.
I see all philosophers and the whole of science
on their knees before a reality which is the reverse
of “the struggle for life," as Darwin and his school
understood it—that is to say, wherever I look,
I see those prevailing and surviving, who throw
doubt and suspicion upon life and the value of
life. The error of the Darwinian school became
a problem to me: how can one be so blind as to
make this mistake ?
## p. 160 (#190) ############################################
160
THE WILL TO POWER.
That species show an ascending tendency, is the
most nonsensical assertion that has ever been made:
until now they have only manifested a dead level.
There is nothing whatever to prove that the higher
organisms have developed from the lower. I see
that the lower, owing to their numerical strength,
their craft, and ruse, now preponderate,—and I fail
to see an instance in which an accidental change
produces an advantage, at least not for a very long
period : for it would be necessary to find some
reason why an accidental change should become
so very strong.
I do indeed find the “cruelty of Nature” which
is so often referred to; but in a different place:
Nature is cruel, but against her lucky and well-
constituted children; she protects and shelters and
loves the lowly.
In short, the increase of a species' power, as
the result of the preponderance of its particularly
well-constituted and strong specimens, is perhaps
less of a certainty than that it is the result of the
preponderance of its mediocre and lower specimens
. . in the case of the latter, we find great fruit-
fulness and permanence: in the case of the former,
the besetting dangers are greater, waste is more
rapid, and decimation is more speedy.
686.
Man as he has appeared up to the present is
the embryo of the man of the future; all the
formative powers which are to produce the latter,
already lie in the former : and owing to the fact that
## p. 161 (#191) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
161
they are enormous, the more promising for the
future the modern individual happens to be, the
more suffering falls to his lot.
This is the pro-
foundest concept of suffering. The formative
powers clash. —The isolation of the individual
need not deceive one- as a matter of fact, some
uninterrupted current does actually flow through
all individuals, and does thus unite them. The
fact that they feel themselves isolated, is the most
powerful spur in the process of setting themselves
the loftiest of aims: their search for happiness is the
means which keeps together and moderates the for-
mative powers, and keeps them from being mutually
destructive.
687.
Excessive intellectual strength sets itself new
goals; it is not in the least satisfied by the com-
mand and the leadership of the inferior world, or
by the preservation of the organism, of the “in-
dividual. "
We are more than the individual: we are the
whole chain itself, with the tasks of all the possible
futures of that chain in us.
3. THEORY OF THE WILL TO POWER AND OF
VALUATIONS.
688.
. The unitary view of psychology. -We are accus-
tomed to regard the development of a vast number
of forms as compatible with one single origin.
My theory would be: that the will to power
L
VOL. II.
## p. 162 (#192) ############################################
162
THE WILL TO POWER.
is the primitive motive force out of which all other
motives have been derived ;
That it is exceedingly illuminating to sub-
stitute power for individual "happiness” (after
“
which every living organism is said to strive): “It
strives after power, after more power”;-happiness
is only a symptom of the feeling of power attained,
a consciousness of difference (it does not strive
after happiness: but happiness steps in when the
object is attained, after which the organism has
striven: happiness is an accompanying, not an
actuating factor);
That all motive force is the will to power; that
there is no other force, either physical, dynamic, or
psychic.
In our science, where the concept cause and
effect is reduced to a relationship of complete
equilibrium, and in which it seems desirable for
the same quantum of force to be found on either
side, all idea of a motive power is absent: we only
apprehend results, and we call these equal from
the point of view of their content of force. . .
It is a matter of mere experience that change
never ceases: at bottom we have not the smallest
grounds for assuming that any one particular
change must follow upon any other.
On the con-
trary, any state which has been attained would
seem almost forced to maintain itself intact if it
had not within itself a capacity for not desiring to
maintain itself. . . . Spinoza's proposition concern-
ing “self-preservation " ought as a matter of fact to
put a stop to change. But the proposition is false;
the contrary is true. In all living organisms it can
(
## p. 163 (#193) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
163
be clearly shown that they do everything not to
remain as they are, but to become greater.
«
689.
" Will to power” and causality. -From a psycho-
logical point of view the idea of “cause " is our feel-
ing of power in the act which is called willing-our
concept "effect" is the superstition that this feeling
of power is itself the force which moves things. . . .
. A state which accompanies an event and is
already an effect of that event is deemed "suffi-
cient cause ” of the latter; the tense relationship
of our feeling of power (pleasure as the feeling of
power) and of an obstacle being overcome—are
these things illusions ?
If we translate the notion cause back into
the only sphere which is known to us, and out of
which we have taken it, we cannot imagine any
change in which the will to power is not inherent.
We do not know how to account for any change
which is not a trespassing of one power on another.
- Mechanics only show us the results, and then
only in images (movement is a figure of speech);
gravitation itself has no mechanical cause, because
it is itself the first cause of mechanical results.
The will to accumulate force is confined to the
phenomenon of life, to nourishment, to procreation,
to inheritance, to society, states, customs, authority.
Should we not be allowed to assume that this will
is the motive power also of chemistry ? -and of
the cosmic order ?
Not only conservation of energy, but the mini-
mum amount of waste; so that the only reality is
## p. 164 (#194) ############################################
164
THE WILL TO POWER.
this: the will of every centre of power to become
stronger-not self-preservation, but the desire to
appropriate, to become master, to become more,
to become stronger.
Is the fact that science is possible a proof of the
principle of causation—"From like causes, like
effects”—“A permanent law of things "-" In-
variable order"? Because something is calculable,
is it therefore on that account necessary?
If something happens thus, and thus only, it is
not the manifestation of a “principle,” of a “law,"
of “order. " What happens is that certain quanta
of power begin to operate, and their essence is
to exercise their power over all other quanta of
power. Can we assume the existence of a striving
after power without a feeling of pleasure and pain,
i. e. without the sensation of an increase or a de-
crease of power? Is mechanism only a language
of signs for the concealed fact of a world of fight-
ing and conquering quanta of will-power ? All
mechanical first-principles, matter, atoms, weight,
pressure, and repulsion, are not facts in themselves,
but interpretations arrived at with the help of
psychical fictions.
Life, which is our best known form of being, is
altogether" will to the accumulation of strength
all the processes of life hinge on this: everything
aims, not at preservation, but at accretion and
accumulation. Life as an individual case (a
hypothesis which may be applied to existence in
general) strives after the maximum feeling of
power; life is essentially a striving after more power;
striving itself is only a straining after more power ;
"
## p. 165 (#195) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
165
the most fundamental and innermost thing of all is
this will. (Mechanism is merely the semeiotics of
the results. )
690.
The thing which is the cause of the existence
of development cannot in the course of investiga-
tion be found above development; it should neither
be regarded as "evolving” nor as evolved .
the “ will to power" cannot have been evolved.
691.
What is the relation of the whole of the organic
process towards the rest of nature ? —Here the
fundamental will reveals itself.
692.
Is the “will to power” a kind of will, or is it
identical with the concept will ? Is it equivalent
to desiring or commanding; is it the will which
Schopenhauer says is the essence of things?
My proposition is that the will of psychologists
hitherto has been an unjustifiable generalisation,
and that there is no such thing as this sort of will,
that instead of the development of one will into
several forms being taken as a fact, the character
of will has been cancelled owing to the fact that
its content, its “whither," was subtracted from it:
in Schopenhauer this is so in the highest degree;
what he calls “ will ” is merely an empty word.
There is even less plausibility in the will to live :
for life is simply one of the manifestations of the
will to power; it is quite arbitrary and ridiculous
## p. 166 (#196) ############################################
166
THE WILL TO POWER.
to suggest that everything is striving to enter into
this particular form of the will to power.
693
If the innermost essence of existence is the will
to power; if happiness is every increase of power,
and unhappiness the feeling of not being able to
resist, of not being able to become master : may
we not then postulate happiness and pain as
cardinal facts ? Is will possible without these two
oscillations of yea and nay?
But who feels
happiness? . . . Who will have power? . . .
Nonsensical question. If the essence of all things
is itself will to power, and consequently the
ability to feel pleasure and pain! Albeit: con-
trasts and obstacles are necessary, therefore also,
relatively, units which trespass on one another.
694.
According to the obstacles which a force seeks
with a view of overcoming them, the measure of
the failure and the fatality thus provoked must
increase: and in so far as every force can only
manifest itself against some thing that opposes it,
an element of unhappiness is necessarily inherent
in every action.
But this pain acts as a greater
incitement to life, and increases the will to power.
695.
If pleasure and pain are related to the feeling
of power, life would have to represent such an
increase in power that the difference, the “plus,"
## p. 167 (#197) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
167
.
.
would have to enter consciousness. A dead
level of power, if maintained, would have to
measure its happiness in relation to depreciations
of that level, i. e. in relation to states of unhappi-
ness and not of happiness. . . . The will to an
increase lies in the essence of happiness: that
power is enhanced, and that this difference becomes
conscious.
In a state of decadence after a certain time the
opposite difference becomes conscious, that is
decrease: the memory of former strong moments
depresses the present feelings of happiness—in
this state comparison reduces happiness.
696.
It is not the satisfaction of the will which is
the cause of happiness (to this superficial theory
I am more particularly opposed—this absurd
psychological forgery in regard to the most simple
things), but it is that the will is always striving to
overcome that which stands in its way. The feel-
ing of happiness lies precisely in the discontented-
ness of the will, in the fact that without opponents
and obstacles it is never satisfied.
“ The happy
man": a gregarious ideal.
697.
The normal discontent of our instincts for
instance, of the instinct of hunger, of sex, of move-
ment-contains nothing which is in itself depress-
ing; it rather provokes the feeling of life, and,
whatever the pessimists may say to us, like all
## p. 168 (#198) ############################################
168
THE WILL TO POWER.
the rhythms of small and irritating stimuli, it
strengthens. Instead of this discontent making us
sick of life, it is rather the great stimulus to life.
(Pleasure might even perhaps be characterised
as the rhythm of small and painful stimuli. )
Kant says:
698.
“These lines of Count Verri's (Sull
indole del piacere e del dolore; 1781) I confirm
with absolute certainty: 'Il solo principio motore
dell'uomo è il dolore. Il dolore precede ogni
piacere. Il piacere non è un essere positivo. '"*
699.
Pain is something different from pleasure-I
mean it is not the latter's opposite.
If the essence of pleasure has been aptly char-
acterised as the feeling of increased power (that is
to say, as a feeling of difference which presupposes
comparison), that does not define the nature of
pain. The false contrasts which the people, and
consequently the language, believes in, are always
dangerous fetters which impede the march of truth.
There are even cases where a kind of pleasure is
conditioned by a certain rhythmic sequence of
small, painful stimuli: in this way a very rapid
growth of the feeling of power and of the feeling
* On the Nature of Pleasure and Pain. “The only motive
force of man is pain. Pain precedes every pleasure.
Pleasure is not a positive thing. "—TR.
>
## p. 169 (#199) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
169
a
of pleasure is attained. This is the case, for
instance, in tickling, also in the sexual tickling
which accompanies the coitus: here we see pain
acting as the ingredient of happiness. It seems
to be a small hindrance which is overcome, followed
immediately by another small hindrance which
once again is overcome-this play of resistance
and resistance overcome is the greatest excitant
of that complete feeling of overflowing and surplus
power which constitutes the essence of happiness.
The converse, which would be an increase in
the feeling of pain through small intercalated
pleasurable stimuli, does not exist : pleasure and
pain are not opposites,
Pain is undoubtedly an intellectual process in
which a judgment is inherent-the judgment
“harmful,” in which long experience is epitomised.
There is no such thing as pain in itself. It is not
the wound that hurts, it is the experience of the
harmful results a wound may have for the whole
organism, which here speaks in this deeply moving
way, and is called pain. (In the case of deleterious
influences which were unknown to ancient man,
as, for instance, those residing in the new combina-
tion of poisonous chemicals, the hint from pain is
lacking, and we are lost. )
That which is quite peculiar in pain is the pro-
longed disturbance, the quivering subsequent to a
terrible shock in the ganglia of the nervous system.
As a matter of fact, nobody suffers from the cause
of pain (from any sort of injury, for instance),
but from the protracted disturbance of his equi-
librium which follows upon the shock. Pain is a
1.
## p. 170 (#200) ############################################
170
THE WILL TO POWER.
disease of the cerebral centres-pleasure is no
disease at all.
The fact that pain may be the cause of reflex
actions has appearances and even philosophical
prejudice in its favour. But in very sudden
accidents, if we observe closely, we find that the
reflex action occurs appreciably earlier than the
feeling of pain. I should be in a bad way when
I stumbled if I had to wait until the fact had
struck the bell of my consciousness, and until a
hint of what I had to do had been telegraphed
back to me.
On the contrary, what I notice as
clearly as possible is, that first, in order to avoid
a fall, reflex action on the part of my foot takes
place, and then, after a certain measurable space of
time, there follows quite suddenly a kind of painful
wave in my forehead. Nobody, then, reacts to
pain. Pain is subsequently projected into the
wounded quarter-but the essence of this local
pain is nevertheless not the expression of a kind
of local wound: it is merely a local sign, the
strength and nature of which is in keeping with
the severity of the wound, and of which the nerve
centres have taken note. The fact that as the
result of this shock the muscular power of the
organism is materially reduced, does not prove in
any way that the essence of pain is to be sought
in the lowering of the feeling of power.
Once more let me repeat: nobody reacts to
pain: pain is no “cause" of action, . Pain itself
is a reaction; the reflex movement is another
and earlier process—both originate at different
points.
## p. 171 (#201) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
171
700.
The message of pain : in itself pain does not
announce that
that which has been momentarily
damaged, but the significance of this damage for
the individual as a whole.
Are we to suppose that there are any pains
which “the species " feel, and which the individual
does not?
701.
“ The sum of unhappiness outweighs the sum
of happiness: consequently it were better that the
world did not exist "-" The world is something
which from a rational standpoint it were better
did not exist, because it occasions more pain than
pleasure to the feeling subject "—this futile gossip
now calls itself pessimism!
Pleasure and pain are accompanying factors, not
causes; they are second-rate valuations derived
from a dominating value,—they are one with the
feeling “ useful," "harmful," and therefore they are
absolutely fugitive and relative. For in regard to
all utility and harmfulness there are a hundred
different ways of asking “what for? ”
I despise this pessimism of sensitiveness : it is
in itself a sign of profoundly impoverished life.
702.
Man does not seek happiness and does not avoid
unhappiness. Everybody knows the famous pre-
judices I here contradict. Pleasure and pain are
mere results, mere accompanying phenomena—that
which every man, which every tiny particle of a
## p. 172 (#202) ############################################
172
THE WILL TO POWER.
living organism will have, is an increase of power.
In striving after this, pleasure and pain are en-
countered; it is owing to that will that the organism
seeks opposition and requires that which stands in
its way. . . . Pain as the hindrance of its will to
power is therefore a normal feature, a natural in-
gredient of every organic phenomenon; man does
not avoid it, on the contrary, he is constantly in
need of it: every triumph, every feeling of pleasure,
every event presupposes an obstacle overcome.
Let us take the simplest case, that of primitive
nourishment; the protoplasm extends its pseudo-
podia in order to seek for that which resists it,
it does not do so out of hunger, but owing to its
Then it makes the attempt to over-
come, to appropriate, and to incorporate that with
which it comes into contact—what people call
“nourishment” is merely a derivative, a utilitarian
application, of the primordial will to become
stronger.
Pain is so far from acting as a diminution of
our feeling of power, that it actually forms in the
majority of cases a spur to this feeling, the
obstacle is the stimulus of the will to power.
will to power.
703
Pain has been confounded with one of its
subdivisions, which is exhaustion: the latter does
indeed represent a profound reduction and lowering
of the will to power, a material loss of strength
-that is to say, there is (a) pain as the stimulus
to an increase or power, and (6) pain following
## p. 173 (#203) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
173
upon an expenditure of power; in the first case it
is a spur, in the second it is the outcome of ex-
cessive spurring. . . . The inability to resist is
proper to the latter form of pain : the provocation
of that which resists is proper to the former. . .
The only happiness which is to be felt in the state
of exhaustion is that of going to sleep; in the other
case, happiness means triumph. . . . The great
confusion of psychologists consisted in the fact
that they did not keep these two kinds of happi-
ness—that of falling asleep, and that of triumph
-sufficiently apart. Exhausted people will have
repose, slackened limbs, peace and quiet and these
things constitute the bliss of Nihilistic religions and
philosophies; the wealthy in vital strength, the
active, want triumph, defeated opponents, and the
extension of their feeling of power over ever wider
regions. Every healthy function of the organism
has this need,—and the whole organism constitutes
an intricate complexity of systems struggling for
the increase of the feeling of power. . . .
704.
How is it that the fundamental article of faith
in all psychologies is a piece of most outrageous con-
tortion and fabrication? “Man strives after happi-
ness," for instance-how much of this is true ? In
order to understand what life is, and what kind of
striving and tenseness life contains, the formula
should hold good not only of trees and plants, but
of animals also. "What does the plant strive
after ? "-But here we have already invented a
## p. 174 (#204) ############################################
174
THE WILL TO POWER.
false entity which does not exist,-concealing and
denying the fact of an infinitely variegated growth,
with individual and semi-individual starting-points,
if we give it the clumsy title “plant” as if it were
a unit.
It is very obvious that the ultimate and
smallest individuals ” cannot be understood in the
sense of metaphysical individuals or atoms; their
sphere of power is continually shifting its ground:
but with all these changes, can it be said that any
of them strives after happiness -All this expand-
ing, this incorporation and growth, is a search for
resistance; movement is essentially related to
states of pain: the driving power here must
represent some other desire if it leads to such
continual willing and seeking of pain. -- To what
end do the trees of a virgin forest contend with
each other? “For happiness"? -For power ! . . .
Man is now master of the forces of nature, and
master too of his own wild and unbridled feelings
(the passions have followed suit, and have learned
to become useful)—in comparison with primeva/
man, the man of to-day represents an enormous
quantum of power, but not an increase in happi-
ness! How can one maintain, then, that he has
striven after happiness ? . .
.
.
705.
But while I say this I see above me, and below
the stars, the glittering rat's-tail of errors which
hitherto has represented the greatest inspiration of
man: "All happiness is the result of virtue, all
virtue is the result of free will”!
## p. 175 (#205) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
175
Let us transvalue the values: all capacity is the
outcome of a happy organisation, all freedom is the
outcome of capacity (freedom understood here as
facility in self-direction. Every artist will under-
stand me)
706.
“The value of life. ”—Every life stands by itself;
all existence must be justified, and not only life,
—the justifying principle must be one through
which life itself speaks.
Life is only a means to something : it is the
expression of the forms of growth in power.
»
707.
The “conscious world” cannot be a starting-
point for valuing: an “objective" valuation is
necessary.
In comparison with the enormous and compli-
cated antagonistic processes which the collective life
of every organism represents, its conscious world
of feelings, intentions, and valuations, is only a small
slice. We have absolutely no right to postulate
this particle of consciousness as the object, the
wherefore, of the collective phenomena of life: the.
attainment of conseiousness. is obviously only an
additional means to the unfolding of life, and to. .
the extension of its power. That is why it is a
piece of childish simplicity to set up happiness, or
intellectuality, or morality, or any other individual
sphere of consciousness, as the highest value: and
maybe to justify " the world” with it.
## p. 176 (#206) ############################################
176
THE WILL TO POWER.
This is my fundamental objection to all philo-
sophical and moral cosmologies and theologies, to
allwherefores and highest values that have appeared
in philosophies and philosophic religions hitherto.
A kind of means is misunderstood as the object
itself: conversely life and its growth of power were
debased to a means.
If we wished to postulate an adequate object of
life it would not necessarily be related in any way
with the category of conscious life; it would
require rather to explain conscious life as a mere
means to itself. . .
The “denial of life” regarded as the object of
life, the object of evolution ! Existence—a piece of
tremendous stupidity! Any such mad interpreta-
tion is only the outcome of life's being measured
by the factors of consciousness (pleasure and pain,
good and evil). Here the means are made to stand
against the end-the" unholy,” absurd, and, above
all, disagreeable means: how can the end be any
use when it requires such means ? But where the
fault lies is here instead of looking for the end
which would explain the necessity of such means,
we posited an end from the start which actually
excludes such means, i. e. we made a desideratum
in regard to certain means (especially pleasurable,
rational, and virtuous) into a rule, and then only
did we decide what end would be desirable. .
Where the fundamental fault lies is in the fact
that, instead of regarding consciousness · as an
instrument and an isolated phenomenon of life in
general, we made it a standard, the highest value
in life: it is the faulty standpoint of a parte ad
.
## p. 177 (#207) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
177
totum,—and that is why all philosophers are
instinctively seeking at the present day for a col-
lective consciousness, a thing that lives and wills
consciously with all that happens, a “Spirit,” a
“God. ” But they must be told that it is precisely
thus that life is converted into a monster; that a
“God” and a general sensorium would necessarily
be something on whose account the whole of
existence would have to be condemned.
Our greatest relief came when we eliminated the
general consciousness which postulates ends and
means—in this way we ceased from being neces-
sarily pessimists. . . . Our greatest indictment
of life was the existence of God.
.
708.
Concerning the value of “Becoming. ”—If the
movement of the world really tended to reach a
final state, that state would already have been
reached. The only fundamental fact, however, is
that it does not tend to reach a final state: and
every philosophy and scientific hypothesis (e. g.
materialism) according to which such a final state
is necessary, is refuted by this fundamental fact.
I should like to have a concept of the world
which does justice to this fact. Becoming ought
to be explained without having recourse to such
final designs. Becoming must appear justified at
every instant (or it must defy all valuation : which
has unity as its end); the present must not under
any circumstances be justified by a future, nor
must the past be justified for the sake of the
M
VOL. II.
## p. 178 (#208) ############################################
178
THE WILL TO POWER.
present. Necessity” must not be interpreted
in the form of a prevailing and ruling collective
force or as a prime motor; and still less as the
necessary cause of some valuable result. But to
this end it is necessary to deny a collective
consciousness for Becoming,—a “God,” in order
that life may not be veiled under the shadow of a
being who feels and knows as we do and yet wills
nothing: “God” is useless if he wants nothing;
and if he do want something, this presupposes a
general sum of suffering and irrationality which
lowers the general value of Becoming. Fortun-
ately any such general power is lacking (a suffering
God overlooking everything, a general sensorium
and ubiquitous Spirit, would be the greatest indict-
ment of existence).
Strictly speaking nothing of the nature of
Being must be allowed to remain, because in
that case Becoming loses its value and gets to be
sheer and superfluous nonsense.
The next question, then, is: how did the
illusion Being originate (why was it obliged to
originate);
Likewise: how was it that all valuations based
upon the hypothesis that there was such a thing
as Being came to be depreciated.
But in this way we have recognised that this
hypothesis concerning Being is the source of all
the calumny that has been directed against the
world (the “Better world,” the “True world” the
“World Beyond," the “ Thing-in-itself").
(1) Becoming has no final state, it does not
tend towards stability.
## p. 179 (#209) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
179
(2) Becoming is not a state of appearance;
the world of Being is probably only
appearance.
(3) Becoming is of precisely the same value
at every instant; the sum of its value
always remains equal: expressed other-
wise, it has no value; for that according
to which it might be measured, and in
regard to which the word value might
have some sense, is
is entirely lacking.
The collective value of the world defies
valuation ; for this reason philosophical
pessimism belongs to the order of farces.
709.
We should not make our little desiderata the
judges of existence ! Neither should we make
culminating evolutionary forms (eg. mind) the
"absolute " which stands behind evolution !
710.
Our knowledge has become scientific to the
extent in which it has been able to make use of
number and measure. It might be worth while
to try and see whether a scientific order of values
might not be constructed according to a scale of
numbers and measures representing energy. . .
All other values are matters of prejudice, simplicity,
and misunderstanding. They may all be reduced
to that scale of numbers and measures represent-
ing energy.
The ascent in this scale would
## p. 180 (#210) ############################################
180
THE WILL TO POWER.
represent an increase of value, the descent a
diminution.
But here appearance and prejudice are against
one (moral values are only apparent values com-
pared with those which are physiological).
711.
Why the standpoint of “value” lapses :-
Because in the " whole process of the universe”
the work of mankind does not come under considera-
tion; because a general process (viewed in the
light of a system) does not exist.
Because there is no such thing as a whole ;
because no depreciation of human existence or
human aims can be made in regard to something
that does not exist.
Because “necessity," causality,” “ design,” are
merely useful semblances.
Because the aim is not “the increase of the
sphere of consciousness," but the increase of power;
in which increase the utility of consciousness is
also contained; and the same holds good of
pleasure and pain.
Because a mere means must not be elevated to
the highest criterion of value (such as states of
consciousness like pleasure and pain, if con-
sciousness is in itself only a means).
Because the world is not an organism at all,
but a thing of chaos; because the development of
“intellectuality” is only a means tending relatively
to extend the duration of an organisation.
Because all desirability” has no
sense in
regard to the general character of existence.
## p. 181 (#211) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
181
712.
“God” is the culminating moment: life is an
eternal process of deifying and undeifying. But
withal there is no zenith of values, but only a
zenith of power.
Absolute exclusion of mechanical and material-
istic interpretations: they are both only expres-
sions of inferior states, of emotions deprived of all
spirit (of the “will to power ').
The retrograde movement from the zenith of
development (the intellectualisation of power on
some slave-infected soil) may be shown to be the
result of the highest degree of energy turning
against itself, once it no longer has anything to
organise, and utilising its power in order to
disorganise.
(a) The ever-increasing suppression of societies,
and the latter's subjection by a smaller number of
stronger individuals.
(6) The ever-increasing suppression of the
privileged and the strong, hence the rise of
democracy, and ultimately of anarchy, in the
elements,
713.
