No More Learning

P^*" party in
approach to the obtaining of what he asked, could only be forgotten by those who were willing to forget; and if Rome should now renew from Lilybaeum the enterprise which she had undertaken with so great success from Italy, Carthage would undoubtedly fall, unless the perversity of the enemy or some special piece of good fortune should intervene to save it No doubt they had peace for the present ; but the ratification of that peace had hung on a thread, and they knew what public opinion in Rome thought of the terms on which it was concluded. It might be that Rome was not yet meditating the conquest of
Africa and was as yet content with Italy; but if the existence of the Carthaginian state depended on that con tentment, the prospect was but a sorry one ; and where was the security that the Romans might not find it even con venient for their Italian policy to extirpate rather than reduce to subjection their African neighbour ?
In short, Carthage could only regard the peace of 513 in the light of a truce, and could not but employ it in preparations for the inevitable renewal of the war ; not for
232
HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL book iil
art^t the purpose of avenging the defeat which she had suffered, nor even with the primary view of recovering what she had lost, but in order to secure for herself an existence that should not be dependent on the good-will of the enemy. But when a war of annihilation is surely, though in point of time indefinitely, impending over a weaker state, the wiser, more resolute, and more devoted men — who would immediately prepare for the unavoidable struggle, accept it at a favourable moment, and thus cover their defensive policy by a strategy of offence — always find themselves hampered by the indolent and cowardly mass of the money- worshippers, of the aged and feeble, and of the thoughtless who are minded merely to gain time, to live and die in peace, and to postpone at any price the final struggle. So there was in Carthage a party for peace and a party for
chap, iv HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL
833
war, both, as was natural, associating themselves with the political distinction which already existed between the conservatives and the reformers. The former found its support in the governing boards, the council of the Ancients and that of the Hundred, led by Hanno the Great, as he was called ; the latter found its support in the leaders of the multitude, particularly the much-respected Hasdrubal, and in the officers of the Sicilian army, whose great successes under the leadership of Hamilcar, although they had been otherwise fruitless, had at least shown to the patriots a method which seemed to promise deliverance from the great danger that beset them. Vehement feud had probably long subsisted between these parties, when the Libyan war intervened to suspend the strife. We have already related how that war arose. After the governing party had instigated the mutiny by their incapable adminis
tration which frustrated all the precautionary measures of the Sicilian officers, had converted that mutiny into a revolution by the operation of their inhuman system of government, and had at length brought the country to the verge of ruin by their military incapacity —and particularly that of their leader Hanno, who ruined the army — Hamilcar Barcas, the hero of Ercte, was in the perilous emergency solicited by the government itself to save it from the effects of its blunders and crimes. He accepted the command, and had the magnanimity not to resign it even when they appointed Hanno as his colleague. Indeed, when the indignant army sent the latter home, Hamilcar had the self-control a second time to concede to him, at the urgent request of the government, a share in the command ; and, in spite of his enemies and in spite of such a colleague, he was able by his influence with the insurgents, by his dexterous treatment of the Numidian sheiks, and by his unrivalled genius for organization and generalship, in a
singularly short time to put down the revolt
entirely
S34
HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL BOOK ill
and to recall rebellious Africa to its allegiance M7. of si
During this war the patriot party had kept silence now spoke out the louder. On the one hand this catastrophe
had brought to light the utterly corrupt and pernicious character of the ruling oligarchy, their incapacity, their coterie-policy, their leanings towards the Romans. On the other hand the seizure of Sardinia, and the threatening attitude which Rome on that occasion assumed, showed plainly even to the humblest that declaration of war by Rome was constantly hanging like the sword of Damocles over Carthage, and that, Carthage in her present circumstances went to war with Rome, the consequence must necessarily be the downfall of the Phoenician dominion in Libya. Probably there were in Carthage not
few who, despairing of the future of their country, counselled emigration to the islands of the Atlantic who could blame them But minds of the nobler order disdain to save themselves apart from their nation, and great natures enjoy the privilege of deriving enthusiasm from circumstances in which the multitude of good men despair. They accepted the new conditions just as Rome dictated them no course was left but to submit and, adding fresh bitterness to their former hatred, carefully to cherish and husband resentment — that last resource of an injured nation. They then took steps towards political reform. 1 They had become sufficiently convinced of the incorrigible- ness of the party in power: the fact that the governing lords had even in the last war neither forgotten their spite
Our accounts as to these events are not only imperfect but one-sided, for of course was the version of the Carthaginian peace party which was adopted by the Roman annalists. Even, however, in our fragmentary and confused accounts (the most important are those of Fabius, in Polyb. iii. Appian. Hisp. and Diodorus, xxv. p. 567) the relations of the parties appear clearly enough. Of the vulgar gossip by " which its opponents sought to blacken the " revolutionary combination (trcupela rur TomjporiTwv ivOptlnruv) specimens may be had in Nepos (Ham. 3), to which will be difficult perhaps to find a parallel.
(end
it
8 ;
1
it
4; ?
a
;
a
it
7).
if
a
;;
chap, IV HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL
335
nor learned greater wisdom, was shown by the effrontery bordering on simplicity with which they now instituted pro ceedings against Hamilcar as the originator of the mercenary war, because he had without full powers from the government made promises of money to his Sicilian soldiers. Had the club of officers and popular leaders desired to overthrow this rotten and wretched government, it would hardly have encountered much difficulty in Carthage itself; but it would have met with more formidable obstacles in Rome, with which the chiefs of the government in Carthage already maintained relations that bordered on treason. To all the other difficulties of the position there fell to be added the circumstance, that the means of saving their country had to be created without allowing either the Romans, or their own government with its Roman leanings, to become rightly aware of what was doing.
So they left the constitution untouched, and the chiefs Hamilcar of the government in full enjoyment of their exclusive privi- com' leges and of the public property. It was merely proposed chief, and carried, that of the two commanders-in-chief, who at
the end of the Libyan war were at the head of the Cartha ginian troops, Hanno and Hamilcar, the former should be recalled, and the latter should be nominated commander- in-chief for all Africa during an indefinite period. It was arranged that he should hold a position independent of the governing corporations —his antagonists called it an uncon stitutional monarchical power, Cato calls it a dictatorship — and that he could only be recalled and placed upon his trial by the popular assembly. 1 Even the choice of a successor was to be vested not in the authorities fo the capital, but in the army, that in the Carthaginians
The Barca family conclude the most important state treaties, and the ratification of the governing board a formality (Pol. iii. 21). Rome enters her protest before them and before the senate (Pol. iii. 15). The position of the Barca family towards Carthage in many points resembles that of the Princes of Orange towards the States-General.
1
is
is,
Hamnc«r'» project*.
The army.
*36
HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL book til
in the army as gerusiasts or officers, who were named in treaties also along with the general ; of course the right of confirmation was reserved to the popular assembly at home. Whether this may or may not have been a usurpation, it clearly indicates that the war party regarded and treated the army as its special domain.
The commission which Hamilcar thus received sounded but little liable to exception. Wars with the Numidian tribes on the borders never ceased; only a short time
serving
the "city of a hundred gates," Theveste (Tebessa), in the interior had been occupied by the Cartha
The task of continuing this border warfare, which was allotted to the new commander-in-chief of Africa, was not in itself of such importance as to prevent the Cartha ginian government, which was allowed to do as it liked in its own immediate sphere, from tacitly conniving at the decrees passed in reference to the matter by the popular assembly ; and the Romans did not perhaps recognize its significance at all.
Thus there stood at the head of the army the one man, who had given proof in the Sicilian and in the Libyan wars that fate had destined him, if any one, to be the saviour of his country. Never perhaps was the noble struggle of man with fate waged more nobly than by him. The army was expected to save the state ; but what sort of army ? The Carthaginian civic militia had fought not badly under Hamilcar's leadership in the Libyan war; but he knew well, that it is one thing to lead out the merchants and artisans of a city, which is in the extremity of peril, for once to battle, and another to form them into soldiers. The patriotic party in Carthage furnished him with excellent officers, but it was of course almost exclusively the culti vated class that was represented in He had no citizen- militia, at most few squadrons of Libyphoenician cavalry. The task was to form an army out of Libyan forced recruits
previously
ginians.
a
it.
crtAP. iv HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL
*37
and mercenaries ; a task possible in the hands of a general like Hamilcar, but possible even for him only on condition that he should be able to pay his men punctually and
But he had learned, by experience in Sicily, that
the state revenues of Carthage were expended in Carthage itself on matters much more needful than the payment of
the armies that fought against the enemy. The warfare which he waged, accordingly, had to support itself, and he
had to carry out on a great scale what he had already attempted on a smaller scale at Monte Pellegrino. But The further, Hamilcar was not only a military chief, he was
also a party leader. In opposition to the implacable governing party, which eagerly but patiently waited for an opportunity of overthrowing him, he had to seek support among the citizens ; and although their leaders might be ever so pure and noble, the multitude was deeply corrupt
and accustomed by the unhappy system of corruption to give nothing without being paid for it In particular emergencies, indeed, necessity or enthusiasm might for the moment prevail, as everywhere happens even with the most venal corporations ; but, if Hamilcar wished to secure the permanent support of the Carthaginian community for his plan, which at the best could only be carried out after a series of years, he had to supply his friends at home with regular consignments of money as the means of keeping
the mob in good humour. Thus compelled to beg or to
buy from the lukewarm and venal multitude the permission
to save it ; compelled to bargain with the arrogance of men whom he hated and whom he had constantly conquered,
at the price of humiliation and of silence, for the respite indispensable for his ends ; compelled to conceal from those despised traitors to their country, who called themselves
the lords of his native city, his plans and his contempt —
the noble hero stood with few like-minded friends between tnemies without and enemies within, building upon the
amply.
338
HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL
irresolution of the one and of the other, at once deceiving both and defying both, if only he might gain means, money, and men for the contest with a land which, even were the army ready to strike the blow, it seemed difficult to reach and scarce possible to vanquish. He was still a young man, little beyond thirty, but he had apparently, when he was preparing for his expedition, a foreboding that he would not be permitted to attain the end of his labours, or to see otherwise than afar off the promised land. When he left Carthage he enjoined his son Hannibal, nine years of age, to swear at the altar of the supreme God eternal hatred to the Roman name, and reared him and his younger sons Hasdrubal and Mago—the "lion's brood," as he called them — in the camp as the inheritors of his projects, of his
genius, and of his hatred.
The new commander-in-chief of Libya departed from
Hamflcar
proceeds to Carthage immediately after the termination of the mercenary
Spanish kingdom of the Barcides.
meditated an expedition against the free Libyans in the west His army, which was especially strong in elephants, marched along the coast ; by its side sailed the fleet, led by his faithful associate Hasdrubal. Suddenly tidings came that he had crossed the sea at the Pillars of Hercules and had landed in Spain, where he was waging war with the
natives — with people who had done him no harm, and without orders from his government, as the Carthaginian authorities complained. They could not complain at any rate that he neglected the affairs of Africa; when the Numidians once more rebelled, his lieutenant Hasdrubal so effectually routed them that for a long period there was tranquillity on the frontier, and several tribes hitherto independent submitted to pay tribute. What he personally did in Spain, we are no longer able to trace in detail. His achievements compelled Cato the elder, who, a generation
after Hamilcar's death, beheld in Spain the still fresh traces
236. war (perhaps in the spring of 518). He apparently 286.
chap, IV HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL
239
of bis working, to exclaim, notwithstanding all his hatred of
the Carthaginians, that no king was worthy to be named by
the side of Hamilcar Barcas. The results still show to us,
at least in a general way, what was accomplished by Hamil
car as a soldier and a statesman in the last nine years of his
life (518—526) —till in the flower of his age, fighting 286-228, bravely in the field of battle, he met his death like Scharn-
horst just as his plans were beginning to reach maturity —
and what during the next eight years (527—534) the heir of 227-220. his office and of his plans, his son-in-law Hasdrubal, did to prosecute, in the spirit of the master, the work which Hamil
car had begun. Instead of the small entrepot for trade,
which, along with the protectorate over Gades, was all that Carthage had hitherto possessed on the Spanish coast, and
which she had treated as a dependency of Libya, a Carthaginian kingdom was founded in Spain by the
of Hamilcar, and confirmed by the adroit statesmanship of Hasdrubal. The fairest regions of Spain, the southern and eastern coasts, became Phoenician pro vinces. Towns were founded; above all, "Spanish Carthage" (Cartagena) was established by Hasdrubal on the only good harbour along the south coast, containing the splendid " royal castle " of its founder. Agriculture flourished, and, still more, mining in consequence of the fortunate discovery of the silver-mines of Cartagena, which a century afterwards had a yearly produce of more than ,£360,000 (36,000,000 sesterces). Most of the commu nities as far as the Ebro became dependent on Carthage and paid tribute to it Hasdrubal skilfully by every means, even by intermarriages, attached the chiefs to the interests of Carthage. Thus Carthage acquired in Spain a rich market for its commerce and manufactures ; and not only did the revenues of the province sustain the army, but there remained a balance to be remitted to Carthage and reserved for future use. The province formed and at the same time
generalship
240
HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL BOOK in
trained the army ; regular levies took place in the territory subject to Carthage ; the prisoners of war were introduced into the Carthaginian corps. Contingents and mercenaries, as many as were desired, were supplied by the dependent communities. During his long life of warfare the soldier found in the camp a second home, and found a substitute for patriotism in fidelity to his standard and enthusiastic attachment to his great leaders. Constant conflicts with the brave Iberians and Celts created a serviceable infantry, to co-operate with the excellent Numidian cavalry.
So far as Carthage was concerned, the Barcides were allowed to go on. Since the citizens were not asked for
The Car
thaginian
govern
ment and regular contributions, but on the contrary some benefit the
Barcides.
accrued to them and commerce recovered in Spain what it had lost in Sicily and Sardinia, the Spanish war and the Spanish army with its brilliant victories and important suc cesses soon became so popular that it was even possible in particular emergencies, such as after Hamilcar's fall, to
effect the despatch of considerable reinforcements of African troops to Spain ; and the governing party, whether well or ill affected, had to maintain silence, or at any rate to con tent themselves with complaining to each other or to their friends in Rome regarding the demagogic officers and the mob.
On the part of Rome too nothing took place calculated seriously to alter the course of Spanish affairs. The first and chief cause of the inactivity of the Romans was un doubtedly their very want of acquaintance with the circum stances of the remote peninsula —which was certainly also Hamilcar's main reason for selecting Spain and not, as
might otherwise have been possible, Africa itself for the execution of his plan. The explanations with which the Carthaginian generals met the Roman commissioners sent to Spain to procure information on the spot, and their assurances that all this was done only to provide the means
The Roman govern ment and the Barcides.
chap, IV HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL
341
of promptly paying the war-contributions to Rome, could not possibly find belief in the senate. But they probably dis cerned only the immediate object of Hamilcar's plans, viz. to procure compensation in Spain for the tribute and the traffic of the islands which Carthage had lost ; and they deemed an aggressive war on the part of the Carthaginians, and in particular an invasion of Italy from Spain — as is evident both from express statements to that effect and from the whole state of the case —as absolutely impossible. Many, of course, among the peace party in Carthage saw further; but, whatever they might think, they could hardly be much inclined to enlighten their Roman friends as to the impend ing storm, which the Carthaginian authorities had long been unable to prevent, for that step would accelerate, instead of averting, the crisis ; and even if they did so, such denuncia tions proceeding from partisans would justly be received with great caution at Rome. By degrees, certainly, the inconceivably rapid and mighty extension of the Carthaginian power in Spain could not but excite the observation and awaken the apprehensions of the Romans. In fact, in the course of the later years before the outbreak of war, they
did attempt to set bounds to it About the year 528, 221 mindful of their new-born Hellenism, they concluded an alliance with the two Greek or semi-Greek towns on the
east coast of Spain, Zacynthus or Saguntum (Murviedro, not
far from Valencia), and Emporiae (Ampurias) ; and when they acquainted the Carthaginian general Hasdrubal that they had done so, they at the same time warned him not to push his conquests over the Ebro, with which he promised compliance. This was not done by any means to prevent an invasion of Italy by the land-route — no treaty could fetter the general who undertook such an enterprise—but partly to set a limit to the material power of the Spanish Carthaginians which began to be dangerous, partly to recurs ! d the free communities between the Ebro and the
vol. 11
48
342
HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL book iii
Pyrenees whom Rome thus took under her protection, a Dasis of operations in case of its being necessary to land and make war in Spain. In reference to the impending war with Carthage, which the senate did not fail to see was inevitable, they hardly apprehended any greater inconveni ence from the events that had occurred in Spain than that they might be compelled to send some legions thither, and that the enemy would be somewhat better provided with money and soldiers than, without Spain, he would have been ; they were at any rate firmly resolved, as the plan of
218. the campaign of 536 shows and as indeed could not but be the case, to begin and terminate the next war in Africa, — a course which would at the same time decide the fate of Spain. Further grounds for delay were suggested during the first years by the instalments from Carthage, which a declaration of war would have cut off, and then by the death of Hamilcar, which probably induced friends and foes to think that his projects must have died with him. Lastly, during the latter years when the senate certainly began to apprehend that it was not prudent long to delay the renewal of the war, there was the very intelligible wish to dispose of the Gauls in the valley of the Po in the first instance, foi these, threatened with extirpation, might be expected to avail themselves of any serious war undertaken by Rome to allure the Transalpine tribes once more to Italy, and to renew those Celtic migrations which were still fraught with very great peril. That it was not regard either for the Carthaginian peace party or for existing treaties which with held the Romans from action, is self-evident ; moreover, if they desired war, the Spanish feuds furnished at any moment a ready pretext. The conduct of Rome in this view is by no means unintelligible ; but as little can it be denied that the Roman senate in dealing with this matter displayed shortsightedness and slackness — faults which were still more inexcusably manifested in their mode of
chap, iv HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL
343
dealing at the same epoch with Gallic affairs. The policy of the Romans was always more remarkable for tenacity, cunning, and consistency, than for grandeur of conception or power of rapid organization —qualities in which the enemies of Rome from Pyrrhus down to Mithradates often surpassed her.
Thus the smiles of fortune inaugurated the brilliantly Hannibal conceived project of Hamilcar. The means of war were
acquired —a numerous army accustomed to combat and to
conquer, and a constantly replenished exchequer ; but, in
order that the right moment might be discovered for the struggle and that the right direction might be given to there was wanted leader. The man, whose head and heart had desperate emergency and amidst despairing people paved the way for their deliverance, was no more, when became possible to carry out his design. Whether his successor Hasdrubal forbore to make the attack because the proper moment seemed to him to have not yet come, or whether, more statesman than general, he believed him self unequal to the conduct of the enterprise, we are unable to determine. When, at the beginning of 534, he fell
220. the hand of an assassin, the Carthaginian officers of the Spanish army summoned to fill his place Hannibal, the
eldest son of Hamilcar. He was still young man—born
in 505, and now, therefore, in his twenty-ninth year but 249. his had already been life of manifold experience. His
first recollections pictured to him his father fighting in distant land and conquering on Ercte; he had keenly shared that unconquered father's feelings on the peace of Catulus, on the bitter return home, and throughout the horrors of the Libyan war. While yet boy, he had followed his father to the camp and he soon distinguished himself. His light and firmly-knit frame made him an excellent runner and fencer, and fearless rider at full speed the privation of sleep did not affect him, and he
;
it
; a
a
a
a
a
;
a by it,
a
in a
a
a
144
HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL book iii
knew like a soldier how to enjoy or to dispense with food. Although his youth had been spent in the camp, he
such culture as belonged to the Phoenicians of rank in his day ; in Greek, apparently after he had become a general, he made such progress under the guidance of his confidant Sosilus of Sparta as to be able to compose state papers in that language. As he grew up, he entered the army of his father, to perform his first feats of arms under the paternal eye and to see him fall in battle by his side. Thereafter he had commanded the cavalry under his sister's husband, Hasdrubal, and distinguished himself by brilliant personal bravery as well as by his talents as a leader. The voice of his comrades now summoned him — the tried, although youthful general — to the chief command, and he could now execute the designs for which his father and his brother-in-law had lived and died. He took up the inheritance, and he was worthy of His contem poraries tried to cast stains of various sorts on his character the Romans charged him with cruelty, the Carthaginians with covetousness and true that he hated as only Oriental natures know how to hate, and that general who never fell short of money and stores can hardly have been other than covetous. But though anger and envy and meanness have written his history, they have not been able to mar the pure and noble image which presents. Laying aside wretched inventions which furnish their own refuta tion, and some things which his lieutenants, particularly Hannibal Monomachus and Mago the Samnite, were guilty of doing in his name, nothing occurs in the accounts regarding him which may not be justified under the circumstances, and according to the international law, of the times and all agree in this, that he combined in rare perfection discretion and enthusiasm, caution and energy. He was peculiarly marked by that inventive craftiness, which forms one of the leading traits of the Phoenician
possessed
;
it
a
it.
;
it is
;
chap, IV HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL
345
character ; he was fond of taking singular and unexpected routes ; ambushes and stratagems of all sorts were familiar to him; and he studied the character of his antagonists with unprecedented care. By an unrivalled system of espionage—he had regular spies even in Rome—he kept himself informed of the projects of the enemy ; he himself was frequently seen wearing disguises and false hair, in order to procure information on some point or other. Every page of the history of this period attests his genius in strategy ; and his gifts as a statesman were, after the peace with Rome, no less conspicuously displayed in his reform of the Carthaginian constitution, and in the unparalleled influence which as a foreign exile he exercised in the cabinets of the eastern powers. The power which he wielded over men is shown by his incomparable control over an army of various nations and many tongues—an army which never in the worst times mutinied against him. He was a great man; wherever he went, he riveted the
eyes of all.
Hannibal resolved immediately after his nomination (in Rupture
the spring of 534) to commence the war. The land of the RomeTMO.
Celts was still in a ferment, and a war seemed imminent and between Rome and Macedonia : he had good reason now
to throw off the mask without delay and to carry the war whithersoever he pleased, before the Romans began it at their own convenience with a descent on Africa. His army
was soon ready to take the field, and his exchequer was filled by some razzias on a great scale; but the Cartha ginian government showed itself far from desirous of despatching the declaration of war to Rome. The place of Hasdrubal, the patriotic national leader, was even more difficult to fill in Carthage than that of Hasdrubal the general in Spain ; the peace party had now the ascendency
at home, and persecuted the leaders of the war party with
political indictments. The rulers who had
already cut
^*8,
219.
down and mutilated the plans of Hamilcar were by no means inclined to allow the unknown young man, who now commanded in Spain, to vent his youthful patriotism at the expense of the state ; and Hannibal hesitated personally to declare war in open opposition to the legitimate authorities. He tried to provoke the Saguntines
to break the peace; but they contented themselves with making a complaint to Rome. Then, when a commission from Rome appeared, he tried to drive it to a declaration of war by treating it rudely ; but the commissioners saw how matters stood : they kept silence in Spain, with a view to lodge complaints at Carthage and to report at home that Hannibal was ready to strike and that war was
imminent Thus the time passed away ; accounts had already come of the death of Antigonus Doson, who had suddenly died nearly at the same time with Hasdrubal ; in Cisalpine Gaul the establishment of fortresses was carried on by the Romans with redoubled rapidity and energy ; preparations were made in Rome for putting a speedy end in the course of the next spring to the insurrection in Illyria. Every day was precious ; Hannibal formed his resolution. He sent summary intimation to Carthage that the Saguntines were making aggressions on the Torboletes, subjects of Carthage, and he must therefore attack them ; and without waiting for a reply he began in the spring of 535 the siege of a town which was in alliance with Rome, or, in other words, war against Rome. We may form some idea of the views and counsels that would prevail in Carthage from the impression produced in certain circles by York's capitulation. All "respectable men," it was said, disapproved an attack made "without orders"; there was talk of disavowal, of surrendering the daring officer. But whether it was that dread of the army and of the multitude nearer home outweighed in the Carthaginian council the fear of Rome; or that they perceived the
246
HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL book ni
chap, iv HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL
247
impossibility of retracing such a step once taken ; or that
the mere vis inertiae prevented any definite action, they resolved at length to resolve on nothing and, if not to wage
war, to let it nevertheless be waged. Saguntum defended itself, as only Spanish towns know how to conduct defence :
had the Romans showed but a tithe of the energy of their clients, and not trifled away their time during the eight months' siege of Saguntum in the paltry warfare with Illyrian brigands, they might, masters as they were of the
sea and of places suitable for landing, have spared them selves the disgrace of failing to grant the protection which they had promised, and might perhaps have given a different turn to the war. But they delayed, and the town
was at length taken by storm. When Hannibal sent the spoil for distribution to Carthage, patriotism and zeal for
war were roused in the hearts of many who had hitherto
felt nothing of the kind, and the distribution cut off all prospect of coming to terms with Rome. Accordingly, when after the destruction of Saguntum a Roman embassy appeared at Carthage and demanded the surrender of the general and of the gerusiasts present in the camp, and when the Roman spokesman, interrupting an attempt at justification, broke off the discussion and, gathering up his robe, declared that he held in it peace and war and that
the gerusia might choose between them, the gerusiasts mustered courage to reply that they left it to the choice of
the Roman ; and when he offered war, they accepted it (in
the spring of 536). 218.
Hannibal, who had lost a whole year through the Prepai»- obstinate resistance of the Saguntines, had as usual retired "? ",? for the winter of 535-6 to Cartagena, to make all his Italy, preparations on the one hand for the attack of Italy, on 219"218, the other for the defence of Spain and Africa ; for, as he,
like his father and his brother-in-law, held the supreme command in both countries, it devolved upon him to take
248
HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL book in
measures also for the protection of his native land The whole mass of his forces amounted to about 120,000 infantry and 16,000 cavalry; he had also 58 elephants, 32 quinqueremes manned, and 18 not manned, besides the elephants and vessels remaining at the capital. Excepting a few Ligurians among the light troops, there were no mercenaries in this Carthaginian army ; the troops, with the exception of some Phoenician squadrons, consisted mainly of the Carthaginian subjects called out for service —Libyans and Spaniards. To insure the fidelity of the latter the general, who knew the men with whom he had to deal, gave them as a proof of his confidence a general leave of absence for the whole winter; while, not sharing the narrow-minded exclusiveness of Phoenician patriotism, he promised to the Libyans on his oath the citizenship of Carthage, should they return to Africa victorious. This mass of troops however was only destined in part for the
to Italy. Some 20,000 men were sent to Africa, the smaller portion of them proceeding to the capital and the Phoenician territory proper, the majority to the western point of Africa. For the protection of Spain
13,000 infantry, 2500 cavalry, and nearly the half of the elephants were left behind, in addition to the fleet stationed there; the chief command and the government of Spain were entrusted to Hannibal's younger brother Hasdrubal. The immediate territory of Carthage was comparatively weakly garrisoned, because the capital afforded in case of need sufficient resources; in like manner a moderate number of infantry sufficed for the present in Spain, where new levies could be procured with ease, whereas a compara tively large proportion of the arms specially African— horses and elephants—was retained there. The chief care was bestowed in securing the communications between
expedition
and Africa: with that view the fleet remained in Spain, and western Africa was guarded by a very strong
Spain
chap, iv HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL
349
body of troops. The fidelity of the troops was secured not only by hostages collected from the Spanish communities and detained in the stronghold of Saguntum, but by the removal of the soldiers from the districts where they were raised to other quarters : the east African militia were moved chiefly to Spain, the Spanish to Western Africa, the West African to Carthage. Adequate provision was thus made for defence. As to offensive measures, a squadron of 20 quinqueremes with 1000 soldiers on board was to sail from Carthage for the west coast of Italy and to pillage and second of 25 sail was, possible, to re-establish itself at Lilybaeum; Hannibal believed that he might count upon the government making this moderate amount of exertion. With the main army he determined person to invade Italy; as was beyond doubt part of the original plan of Hamilcar. decisive attack on Rome was only possible in Italy, as similar attack on Carthage was only possible kn Libya; as certainly as Rome meant to begin her next campaign with the latter, so certainly ought Carthage not to confine herself at the outset either to any secondary object of operations, such as Sicily, or to mere defence — defeat would in any case involve equal destruction, but victory would not yield equal fruit.
But how could Italy be attacked He might succeed Nethod of in reaching the peninsula sea or by land; but the altac project was to be no mere desperate adventure, but
military expedition with strategic aim, nearer basis for
its operations was requisite than Spain or Africa. Hannibal could not rely for support on fleet and fortified harbour, for Rome was now mistress of the sea. As little did the territory of the Italian confederacy present any tenable basis. If in very different times, and in spite of Hellenic sympathies, had withstood the shock of Pyrrhus, was not to be expected that would now fall to pieces on the appearance of the Phoenician general; an invading army
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HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL book lit
would without doubt be crushed between the network of
Roman fortresses and the firmly-consolidated confederacy. The land of the Ligurians and Celts alone could be to Hannibal, what Poland was to Napoleon in his very similar Russian campaigns. These tribes still smarting under their scarcely ended struggle for independence, alien in race from the Italians, and feeling their very existence endangered by the chain of Roman fortresses and highways whose first coils were even now being fastened around them, could not but recognize their deliverers in the Phoe nician army (which numbered in its ranks numerous Spanish Celts), and would serve as a first support for it to fall back upon—a source whence it might draw supplies and recruits. Already formal treaties were concluded with
the Boii and the Insubres, by which they bound themselves to send guides to meet the Carthaginian army, to procure for it a good reception from the cognate tribes and supplies along its route, and to rise against the Romans as soon as it should set foot on Italian ground. In fine, the relations of Rome with the east led the Carthaginians to this same quarter. Macedonia, which by the victory of Sellasia had re-established its sovereignty in the Peloponnesus, was in strained relations with Rome; Demetrius of Pharos, who had exchanged the Roman alliance for that of Macedonia and had been dispossessed by the Romans, lived as an exile at the Macedonian court, and the latter had refused the demand which the Romans made for his surrender. If it was possible to combine the armies from the Guadal
quivir and the Karasu anywhere against the common foe, it could only be done on the Po. Thus everything directed Hannibal to Northern Italy ; and that the eyes of his father had already been turned to that quarter, is shown by the reconnoitring party of Carthaginians, whom the Romans to their great surprise encountered in Liguria
SSO. in 524.
chap, IV HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL
251
The reason for Hannibal's preference of the land route to that by sea is less obvious ; for that neither the mari time supremacy of the Romans nor their league with Massilia could have prevented a landing at Genoa, is evident, and was shown by the sequel. Our authorities fail to furnish us with several of the elements, on which a satisfactory answer to this question would depend, and which cannot be supplied by conjecture. Hannibal had to choose between two evils. Instead of exposing himself to the unknown and less calculable contingencies of a sea voyage and of naval war, it must have seemed to him the better course to accept the assurances, which beyond doubt were seriously meant, of the Boii and Insubres, and the more so that, even if the army should land at Genoa, it would still have mountains to cross ; he could hardly know exactly, how much smaller are the difficulties presented by the Apennines at Genoa than by the main chain of the Alps. At any rate the route which he took was the primitive Celtic route, by which many much larger hordes had crossed the Alps : the ally and deliverer of the Celtic nation might without temerity venture to traverse it
So Hannibal collected the troops, destined for the Departure grand army, in Cartagena at the beginning of the favour- Hannibal able season; there were 90,000 infantry and 12,000
cavalry, of whom about two-thirds were Africans and a
third Spaniards. The 37 elephants which they took with
them were probably destined rather to make an impression
on the Gauls than for serious warfare. Hannibal's infantry
no longer needed, like that led by Xanthippus, to shelter
itself behind a screen of elephants, and the general had too
much sagacity to employ otherwise than sparingly and with
caution that two-edged weapon, which had as often occasioned the defeat of its own as of the enemy's army.
With this force the general set out in the spring of 536 218. from Cartagena towards the Ebro. He so far informed
252
HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL book hi
Position of Rome.
his soldiers as to the measures which he had taken, particu larly as to the connections he had entered into with the Celts and the resources and object of the expedition, that even the common soldier, whose military instincts length ened war had developed, felt the clear perception and the steady hand of his leader, and followed him with implicit confidence to the unknown and distant land; and the fervid address, in which he laid before them the position of their country and the demands of the Romans, the slavery certainly reserved for their dear native land, and the disgrace of the imputation that they could surrender their beloved general and his staff, kindled a soldierly and patriotic ardour in the hearts of all.
The Roman state was in a plight, such as may occur even in firmly-established and sagacious aristocracies. The Romans knew doubtless what they wished to accomplish, and they took various steps ; but nothing was done rightly or at the right time. They might long ago have been masters of the gates of the Alps and have settled matters with the Celts ; the latter were still formidable, and the former were open. They might either have had friendship
C41. with Carthage, had they honourably kept the peace of 513, or, had they not been disposed for peace, they might long ago have conquered Carthage : the peace was practically broken by the seizure of Sardinia, and they allowed the power of Carthage to recover itself undisturbed for twenty
There was no great difficulty in maintaining peace with Macedonia ; but they had forfeited her friendship for a trifling gain. There must have been a lack of some leading statesman to take a connected and commanding view of the position of affairs ; on all hands either too little was done, or too much. Now the war began at a time and at a place which they had allowed the enemy to determine ; and, with all their well-founded conviction of military superiority, they were perplexed as to the object to be
years.
chat. IT HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL
253
aimed at and the course to be followed in their first opera- Their tions. They had at their disposal more than half a million j^ for of serviceable soldiers ; the Roman cavalry alone was less the war. good, and relatively less numerous, than the Carthaginian,
the former constituting about a tenth, the latter an eighth,
of the whole number of troops taking the field.
None of
the states affected by the war had any fleet corresponding
to the Roman fleet of 220 quinqueremes, which had just returned from the Adriatic to the western sea. The
natural and proper application of this crushing superiority
of force was self-evident. It had been long settled that
the war ought to be opened with a landing in Africa. The subsequent turn taken by events had compelled the
Romans to embrace in their scheme of the war a simultane
ous landing in Spain, chiefly to prevent the Spanish army
from appearing before the walls of Carthage. In accord
ance with this plan they ought above all, when the war had
been practically opened by Hannibal's attack on Saguntum
in the beginning of 535, to have thrown a Roman army 219. into Spain before the town fell; but they neglected the
dictates of interest no less than of honour. For eight
months Saguntum held out in vain : when the town passed
into other hands, Rome had not even equipped her arma
ment for landing in Spain. The country, however, between
the Ebro and the Pyrenees was still free, and its tribes were
not only the natural allies of the Romans, but had also, like
the Saguntines, received from Roman emissaries promises
of speedy assistance. Catalonia may be reached by sea
from Italy in not much longer time than from Cartagena by
and : had the Romans started, like the Phoenicians, in April, after the formal declaration of war that had taken place in the interval, Hannibal might have encountered the Roman legions on the line of the Ebro.
At length, certainly, the greater part of the army and of the fleet was got ready for the expedition to Africa, and
Hannibal Ebro
the second consul Publius Cornelius Scipio was ordered to tne Ebro; but he took time, and when an insurrection broke out on the Po, he allowed the army that was ready for embarkation to be employed there, and formed new legions for the Spanish expedition. So although Hannibal encountered on the Ebro very vehement resistance, it pro ceeded only from the natives ; and, as under circumstances time was still more precious to him than the blood of his men, he surmounted the opposition after some months with the loss of a fourth part of his army, and reached the line of the Pyrenees. That the Spanish allies of Rome would be sacrificed a second time by that delay might have been as certainly foreseen, as the delay itself might have been easily avoided; but probably even the
254
HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL book iii
existing
Hannibal
Arrived at the Pyrenees, Hannibal sent home a portion of bis troops ; a measure which he had resolved on from the first with the view of showing to the soldiers how confident their general was of success, and of checking the
818. expedition to Italy itself, which in the spring of 536 must not have been anticipated in Rome, would have been averted by the timely appearance of the Romans in Spain. Hannibal had by no means the intention of sacrificing his Spanish " kingdom," and throwing himself like a desperado on Italy. The time which he had spent in the siege of Saguntum and in the reduction of Catalonia, and the con siderable corps which he left behind for the occupation of the newly-won territory between the Ebro and the Pyrenees, sufficiently show that, had a Roman army disputed the posses sion of Spain with him, he would not have been content to withdraw from it ; and —which was the main point —had the Romans been able to delay his departure from Spain for but a few weeks, winter would have closed the passes of the Alps before Hannibal reached them, and the African expedition would have departed without hindrance for its destination.
chap, IV HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL
355
feeling that his enterprise was one of those from which there is no return home. With an army of 50,000 infantry and 9000 cavalry, entirely veteran soldiers, he crossed the Pyrenees without difficulty, and then took the coast route by Narbonne and Nimes through the Celtic territory, which was opened to the army partly by the connections previously formed, partly by Carthaginian gold, partly by arms. It was not till it arrived in the end of July at the Rhone opposite Avignon, that a serious resistance appeared to await it The consul Scipio, who on his voyage to Spain had landed at Massilia (about the end of June), had there been informed that he had come too late and that Hannibal had crossed not only the Ebro but the Pyrenees. On receiving these accounts, which appear to have first opened the eyes of the Romans to the course and the object of
Hannibal, the consul had temporarily given up his expedition to Spain, and had resolved in connection with
the Celtic tribes of that region, who were under the influence of the Massiliots and thereby under that of Rome,
to receive the Phoenicians on the Rhone, and to obstruct Passage their passage of the river and their march into Italy, Fortunately for Hannibal, opposite to the point at which he
meant to cross, there lay at the moment only the general levy of the Celts, while the consul himself with his army of 22,000 infantry and 2000 horse was still in Massilia, four days' march farther down the stream. The messengers of the Gallic levy hastened to inform him. It was the
object of Hannibal to convey his army with its numerous cavalry and elephants across the rapid stream under the eyes of the enemy, and before the arrival of Scipio ; and he possessed not a single boat Immediately by his directions all the boats belonging to the numerous navigators of the Rhone in the neighbourhood were bought up at any price, and the deficiency of boats was supplied by rafts made from felled trees; and in fact the whole numerous army
Sdpto at
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HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL book III
could be conveyed over in one day. While this was being done, a strong division under Hanno, son of Bomilcar, pro ceeded by forced marches up the stream till they reached a suitable point for crossing, which they found undefended, situated two short days' march above Avignon. Here they crossed the river on hastily constructed rafts, with the view
of then moving down on the left bank and taking the Gauls, who were barring the passage of the main army, in the rear. On the morning of the fifth day after they had reached the Rhone, and of the third after Hanno's departure, the smoke-signals of the division that had been detached rose up on the opposite bank and gave to Hannibal the anxiously awaited summons for the crossing. Just as the Gauls, seeing that the enemy's fleet of boats began to move, were hastening to occupy the bank, their camp behind them suddenly burst into flames. Surprised and divided, they were unable either to withstand the attack or to resist the passage, and they dispersed in hasty flight
Scipio meanwhile held councils of war in Massilia as to the proper mode of occupying the ferries of the Rhone, and was not induced to move even by the urgent messages that came from the leaders of the Celts. He distrusted their accounts, and he contented himself with detaching a weak Roman cavalry division to reconnoitre on the left bank of the Rhone. This detachment found the whole enemy's army already transported to that bank, and occupied in bringing over the elephants which alone remained on the right bank of the stream; and, after it had warmly engaged some Carthaginian squadrons in the district of Avignon, merely for the purpose of enabling it to complete its reconnaissance —the first encounter of the Romans and Phoenicians in this war—it hastily returned to report at
head-quarters. Scipio now started in the utmost haste with all his troops for Avignon; but, when he arrived
chap, iv HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL
257
there, even the Carthaginian cavalry that had been left behind to cover the passage of the elephants had already taken its departure three days ago, and nothing remained for the consul but to return with weary troops and little credit to Massilia, and to revile the " cowardly flight " of the Punic leader. Thus the Romans had for the third time through pure negligence abandoned their allies and an important line of defence ; and not only so, but by passing after this first blunder from mistaken slackness to mistaken haste, and by still attempting without any prospect of success to do what might have been done with so much certainty a few days before, they let the real means of repairing their error pass out of their hands. When once Hannibal was in the Celtic territory on the Roman side of the Rhone, he could no longer be prevented from reaching the Alps ; but if Scipio had at the first accounts proceeded with his whole army to Italy—the Po might have been reached by way of Genoa in seven days —and had united with his corps the weak divisions in the valley of the Po, he might have at least prepared a formidable reception for the
But not only did he lose precious time in the march to Avignon, but, capable as otherwise he was, he wanted either the political courage or the military sagacity to change the destination of his corps as the change of circumstances required. He sent the main body under his brother Gnaeus to Spain, and returned himself with a few men to Pisae.
Hannibal, who after the passage of the Rhone had Hannibal's in a great assembly of the army explained to his troops the Ef5". ? 6 of object of his expedition, and had brought forward the
Celtic chief Magilus himself, who had arrived from the
valley of the Po, to address the army through an inter
preter, meanwhile continued his march to the passes
of the Alps without obstruction. Which of these passes
he should choose, could not be at once determined either
by the shortness of the route or by the disposition of the
enemy.
vol. 11
49
258
HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL book iii
inhabitants, although he had no time to lose either in circuitous routes or in combat He had necessarily to select a route which should be practicable for his baggage, his numerous cavalry, and his elephants, and in which an army could procure sufficient means of subsistence either by friendship or by force; for, although Hannibal had made preparations to convey provisions after him on beasts of burden, these could only meet for a few days the wants of an army which still, notwithstanding its great losses, amounted to nearly 50,000 men. Leaving out of view the coast route, which Hannibal abstained from taking not because the Romans barred but because would have led him away from his destination, there were only two routes of note leading across the Alps from Gaul to Italy in ancient times the pass of the Cottian Alps (Mont Genevre) leading into the territory of the Taurini (by Susa or Fenestrelles to Turin), and that of the Graian Alps (the Little St Bernard) leading into the territory of the Salassi (to Aosta and Ivrea). The former route the shorter but, after leaving the valley of the Rhone, passes by the impracticable and unfruitful river-valleys of the Drac, the Romanche, and the upper Durance, through difficult and poor mountain country, and requires at least a seven or eight days' mountain march. A military road was first constructed there by Pompeius, to furnish shorter communication between the provinces of Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul.
The route the Little St Bernard somewhat longer but after crossing the first Alpine wall that forms the eastern boundary of the Rhone valley, keeps by the valley of the upper Isere, which stretches from Grenoble way of
was not till the middle ages that the route by Mont Cenis became military road. The eastern passes, such as that over the Poenine Alps or the Great St Bernard —which, moreover, was only converted into a military road by Caesar and Augustus —are, of course, in this case out of
the question.
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chap, iv HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL
859
Chambe"ry up to the very foot of the Little St Bernard or, in other words, of the chain of the higher Alps, and is the broadest, most fertile and most populous of all the Alpine valleys. Moreover, the pass of the Little St. Bernard, while not the lowest of all the natural passes of the Alps, is by far the easiest ; although no artificial road was constructed there, an Austrian corps with artillery crossed the Alps by that route in 181 5. And lastly this route, which only leads over two mountain ridges, has been from the earliest times the great military route from the Celtic to the Italian terri tory. The Carthaginian army had thus in fact no choice. It was a fortunate coincidence, but not a motive influencing the decision of Hannibal, that the Celtic tribes allied with him in Italy inhabited the country up to the Little St Bernard, while the route by Mont Genevre would have brought him at first into the territory of the Taurini, who were from ancient times at feud with the Insubres.
So the Carthaginian army marched in the first instance up the Rhone towards the valley of the upper Isere, not, as might be presumed, by the nearest route up the left bank of the lower Isere from Valence to Grenoble, but through the "island" of the Allobroges, the rich, and even then thickly peopled, low ground, which is enclosed on the north and west by the Rhone, on the south by the Isere, and on the east by the Alps. The reason of this movement was, that the nearest route would have led them through an impracticable and poor mountain -country, while the
" island " was level and extremely fertile, and was separated by but a single mountain-wall from the valley of the upper Isere. The march along the Rhone into, and across, the u island " to the foot of the Alpine wall was accomplished in sixteen days : it presented little difficulty, and in the " island " itself Hannibal dexterously availed himself of a feud that had broken out between two chieftains of the
Allobroges
to attach to his interests one of the most im
s6o HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL book iii
portant of the chiefs, who not only escorted the Cartha ginians through the whole plain, but also supplied them with provisions, and furnished the soldiers with arms, clothing, and shoes. But the expedition narrowly escaped destruction at the crossing of the first Alpine chain, which rises precipitously like a wall, and over which only a single available path leads (over the Mont du Chat, near the hamlet Chevelu). The population of the Allobroges had strongly occupied the pass. Hannibal learned the state of matters early enough to avoid a surprise, and encamped at the foot, until after sunset the Celts dispersed to the houses of the nearest town ; he then seized the pass in the night Thus the summit was gained ; but on the extremely steep path, which leads down from the summit to the lake of Bourget, the mules and horses slipped and fell. The assaults, which at suitable points were made by the Celts upon the army in march, were very annoying, not so much of themselves as byreason of the turmoil which they occasioned;
and when Hannibal with his light troops threw himself from above on the Allobroges, these were chased doubtless without difficulty and with heavy loss down the mountain, but the confusion, in the train especially, was further increased by the noise of the combat So, when after much loss he arrived in the plain, Hannibal immediately attacked the nearest town, to chastise and terrify the bar barians, and at the same time to repair as far as possible
his loss in sumpter animals and horses. After a day's repose in the pleasant valley of Chambe'ry the army con tinued its march up the Isere, without being detained either by want of supplies or by attacks so long as the valley continued broad and fertile. It was only when on the fourth day they entered the territory of the Ceutrones (the modern Tarantaise) where the valley gradually contracts, that they had again greater occasion to be on their guard. The Ceutrones received the army at the boundary of their
chap, iv HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL 361
(somewhere about Conflans) with branches and garlands, furnished cattle for slaughter, guides, and hostages; and the Carthaginians marched through their territory as through a friendly land. When, however, the troops had reached the very foot of the Alps, at the point where the path leaves the Isere, and winds by a narrow and difficult defile along the brook Reclus up to the summit of the St Bernard, all at once the militia of the Ceutrones appeared partly in the rear of the army, partly on the crests of the rocks enclosing the pass on the right and left, in the hope of cutting off the train and baggage. But Hannibal, whose unerring tact had seen in all those advances made by the Ceutrones nothing but the design of procuring at once immunity for their territory and a rich spoil, had in expect ation of such an attack sent forward the baggage and cavalry, and covered the march with all his infantry. By this means he frustrated the design of the enemy, although
he could not prevent them from moving along the mountain slopes parallel to the march of the infantry, and inflicting very considerable loss by hurling or rolling down stones. At the " white stone " (still called la roche blanche), a high isolated chalk cliff standing at the foot of the St. Bernard and commanding the ascent to Hannibal encamped with his infantry, to cover the march of the horses and sumpter animals laboriously climbing upward throughout the whole night and amidst continual and very bloody conflicts he at length on the following day reached the summit of the pass.
There, on the sheltered table-land which spreads to the extent of two and half miles round little lake, the source of the Doria, he allowed the army to rest Despondency had begun to seize the minds of the soldiers. The paths that were becoming ever more difficult, the provisions fail ing, the marching through defiles exposed to the constant attacks of foes whom they could not reach, the sorely
thinned ranks, the hopeless situation of the stragglers and
country
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the wounded, the object which appeared chimerical to all save the enthusiastic leader and his immediate staff — all these things began to tell even on the African and Spanish veterans. But the confidence of the general remained ever the same; numerous stragglers rejoined the ranks; the friendly Gauls were near ; the watershed was reached, and the view of the descending path, so gladdening to the mountain-pilgrim, opened up : after a brief repose they prepared with renewed courage for the last and most difficult undertaking, —the downward march. In it the army was not materially annoyed by the enemy ; but the advanced season —it was already the beginning of September —occasioned troubles in the descent, equal to those which had been occasioned in the ascent by the attacks of the adjoining tribes. On the steep and slippery mountain- slope along the Doria, where the recently -fallen snow had concealed and obliterated the paths, men and animals went astray and slipped, and were precipitated into the chasms. In fact, towards the end of the first day's march they reached a portion of the path about 200 paces in length, on which avalanches are constantly descending from the precipices of the Cramont that overhang and where in cold summers snow lies throughout the year. The infantry passed over; but the horses and elephants were unable to cross the smooth masses of ice, on which there lay but thin covering of freshly-fallen snow, and the general encamped above the difficult spot with the baggage, the cavalry, and the elephants. On the following day the horsemen, by zealous exertion in entrenching, prepared a path for horses and beasts of burden but was not until after further labour of three days with constant reliefs, that the half-famished elephants could at length be con ducted over. In this way the whole army was after delay of four days once more united and after further three days' march through the valley of the Doria, which was ever
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chap, iv HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL
363
widening and displaying greater fertility, and whose inhabit ants the Salassi, clients of the Insubres, hailed in the Car thaginians their allies and deliverers, the army arrived about the middle of September in the plain of Ivrea, where the exhausted troops were quartered in the villages, that by good nourishment and a fortnight's repose they might recruit from their unparalleled hardships. Had the Romans placed a corps, as they might have done, of 30,000 men thoroughly fresh and ready for action somewhere near Turin, and immediately forced on a battle, the prospects of Hannibal's great plan would have been very dubious ; fortunately for him, once more, they were not where they should have been, and they did not disturb the troops of the enemy in the repose which was so greatly needed. 1
1 The much-discussed questions of topography, connected with this celebrated expedition, may be regarded as cleared up and substantially solved by the masterly investigations of Messrs. Wickham and Cramer. Respecting the chronological questions, which likewise present difficulties, a few remarks may be exceptionally allowed to have a place here.
When Hannibal reached the summit of the St. Bernard, "the peaks were already beginning to be thickly covered with snow" (Pol. iii. 54) , snow lay on the route (Pol. iii. 55), perhaps for the most part snow not freshly fallen, but proceeding from the fall of avalanches. At the St. Bernard winter begins about Michaelmas, and the falling of snow in September ; when the Englishmen already mentioned crossed the mountain at the end of August, they found almost no snow on their road, but the slopes on both sides were covered with it. Hannibal thus appears to have arrived at the pass in the beginning of September ; which is quite com patible with the statement that he arrived there "when the winter was already approaching" — for awdirretv -rip Tijs irXtidoos Sijir (Pol. iii. 54) does not mean anything more than this, least of all, the day of the heliacal setting of the Pleiades (about 26th October) ; comp. Ideler,
Chronol. i. 241.
IfHannibal reached Italy nine days later, and therefore about the
middle of September, there is room for the events that occurred from that time up to the battle of the Trebia towards the end of December (wepi X«/<ep<v&; rpoirAj, PoL iii. 72), and in particular for the transporting of the army destined for Africa from Lilybaeum to Placentia. This hypo thesis further suits the statement that the day of departure was announced at an assembly of the army inrb TV iapirty Upav (Pol. iii. 34), and there fore towards the end of March, and that the march lasted five (or, accord ing to App. vii. 4, six) months. If Hannibal was thus at the St. Bernard in the beginning of September, he must have reached the Rhone at the beginning of August — for he spent thirty days in making his way from the Rhone thither — and in that case it is evident that Scipio, who embarked at
Results.
The object was attained, but at a heavy cost Of the 50,000 veteran infantry and the 9000 cavalry, which the army had numbered at the crossing of the Pyrenees, more than half had been sacrificed in the conflicts, the marches, and the passages of the rivers. Hannibal now, according
to his own statement, numbered not more than 20,000 infantry—of whom three-fifths were Libyans and two-fifths Spaniards — and 6000 cavalry, part of them doubtless dismounted: the comparatively small loss of the latter proclaimed the excellence of the Numidian cavalry no less than the consideration of the general in making a sparing use of troops so select. A march of 526 miles or about 33 moderate days' marching —the continuance and termina tion of which were disturbed by no special misfortunes on a great scale that could not be anticipated, but were, on the other hand, rendered possible only by incalculable pieces of good fortune and still more incalculable blunders of the enemy, and which yet not only cost such sacrifices, but so fatigued and demoralized the army, that it needed a pro longed rest in order to be again ready for action — is a military operation of doubtful value, and it may be ques tioned whether Hannibal himself regarded it as successful. Only in so speaking we may not pronounce an absolute censure on the general : we see well the defects of the plan of operations pursued by him, but we cannot determine whether he was in a position to foresee them — his route lay through an unknown land of barbarians —or whether any other plan, such as that of taking the coast road or of embarking at Cartagena or at Carthage, would have exposed him to fewer dangers. The cautious and masterly execution of the plan in its details at any rate deserves our admiration, and to whatever causes the result may have
the beginning of summer (Pol. iii. 41) and so at latest by the commence ment of June, must have spent much time on the voyage or remained for a considerable period in singular inaction at Massilia.
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HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL book in
CHAP. IV HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL
265
been due—whether it was due mainly to the favour of fortune, or mainly to the skill of the general — the grand idea of Hamilcar, that of taking up the conflict with Rome in Italy, was now realized. It was his genius that projected this expedition ; and as the task of Stein and Scharnhorst was more difficult and nobler than that of York and Blucher, so the unerring tact of historical tradition has always dwelt on the last link in the great chain of pre paratory steps, the passage of the Alps, with a greater admiration than on the battles of the Trasimene lake and of the plain of Cannae.
a66 THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOK. Ill
CHAPTER V
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE
Hannibal The appearance of the Carthaginian army on the Roman
and the
Italian
Celts. and disconcerted the Roman plan of war. Of the two
side of the Alps changed all at once the situation of affairs,
principal armies of the Romans, one had landed in Spain and was already engaged with the enemy there : it was no longer possible to recall it The second, which was destined for Africa under the command of the consul Tiberius Sempronius, was fortunately still in Sicily : in this instance Roman delay for once proved useful. Of the two Carthaginian squadrons destined for Italy and Sicily, the first was dispersed by a storm, and some of its vessels were captured by the Syracusans near Messana; the second had endeavoured in vain to surprise Lilybaeum, and had thereafter been defeated in a naval engagement off that port. But the continuance of the enemy's squadrons in the Italian waters was so inconvenient, that the consul determined, before crossing to Africa, to occupy the small islands around Sicily, and to drive away the Carthaginian fleet operating against Italy. The summer
passed away in the conquest of Melita, in the chase after the enemy's squadron, which he expected to find at the Lipari islands while it had made a descent near Vibo
and pillaged the Bruttian coast, and, lastly, in gaining information as to a suitable spot for landing on
(Monteleone)
chap, v TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE
267
the coast of Africa ; so that the army and fleet were still at Lilybaeum, when orders arrived from the senate that they should return with all possible speed for the defence of their homes.
In this way, while the two great Roman armies, each in itself equal in numbers to that of Hannibal, remained at
a great distance from the valley of the Po, the Romans
were quite unprepared for an attack in that quarter. No doubt a Roman army was there, in consequence of an insurrection that had broken out among the Celts even before the arrival of the Carthaginian army. The founding
of the two Roman strongholds of Placentia and Cremona,
each of which received 6000 colonists, and more especially
the preparations for the founding of Mutina in the territory
of the Boii, had already in the spring of 536 driven the 218. Boii to revolt before the time concerted with Hannibal ;
and the Insubres had immediately joined them. The colonists already settled in the territory of Mutina, sud denly attacked, took refuge in the town. The praetor Lucius Manlius, who held the chief command at Ariminum, hastened with his single legion to relieve the blockaded colonists; but he was surprised in the woods, and no course was left to him after sustaining great loss but to establish himself upon a hill and to submit to a siege there
on the part of the Boii, till a second legion sent from Rome under the praetor Lucius Atilius succeeded in re lieving army and town, and in suppressing for the moment
the Gaulish insurrection. This premature rising of the
Boii on the one hand, by delaying the departure of Scipio
for Spain, essentially promoted the plans of Hannibal; on
the other hand, but for its occurrence he would have found
the valley of the Po entirely unoccupied, except the fortresses. But the Roman corps, whose two severely thinned legions did not number 20,000 soldiers, had enough to do to keep the Celts in check, and did not
Sdplo in tke valley ofthe Po.
Conflict on the Ticmo.
a68 THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL book III
think of occupying the passes of the Alps. The Romans only learned that the passes were threatened, when in August the consul Publius Scipio returned without his army from Massilia to Italy, and perhaps even then they gave little heed to the matter, because, forsooth, the foolhardy attempt would be frustrated by the Alps alone. Thus at the decisive hour and on the decisive spot there was not even a Roman outpost Hannibal had full time to rest his army, to capture after a three days' siege the capital of the Taurini which closed its gates against him, and to induce or terrify into alliance with him all the Ligurian and Celtic communi ties in the upper basin of the Po, before Scipio, who had taken the command in the Po valley, encountered him.
Scipio, who, with an army considerably smaller and very
weak in cavalry, had the difficult task of preventing the -
advance of the superior force of the enemy and of repress ing the movements of insurrection which everywhere were spreading among the Celts, had crossed the Po presumably at Placentia, and marched up the river to meet the enemy, while Hannibal after the capture of Turin marched down- wards to relieve the Insubres and Boil In the plain between the Ticino and the Sesia, not far from Vercelli, the Roman cavalry, which had advanced with the light infantry to make a reconnaissance in force, encountered the Punic cavalry sent out for the like purpose, both led by the generals in person. Scipio accepted battle when offered, notwithstanding the superiority of the enemy ; but his light infantry, which was placed in front of the cavalry, dispersed before the charge of the heavy cavalry of the enemy, and while the latter engaged the masses of the Roman horsemen in front, the light Numidian cavalry,
after having pushed aside the broken ranks of the enemy's infantry, took the Roman horsemen in flank and rear. This decided the combat The loss of the Romans was very considerable. The consul himself, who made up as a
chap, v TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE
369
soldier for his deficiencies as a general, received a danger ous wound, and owed his safety entirely to the devotion of his son of seventeen, who, courageously dashing into the ranks of the enemy, compelled his squadron to follow him and rescued his father. Scipio, enlightened by this combat as to the strength of the enemy, saw the error which he had committed in posting himself, with a weaker army, in the plain with his back to the river, and resolved to return *o the right bank of the Po under the eyes of his antagonist As the operations became contracted into a narrower space and his illusions regarding Roman invincibility departed, he recovered the use of his considerable military talents, which the adventurous boldness of his youthful opponent's plans had for a moment paralyzed. While Hannibal was preparing for a pitched battle, Scipio by a rapidly
and steadily executed march succeeded in reaching the right bank of the river which in an evil hour
he had abandoned, and broke down the bridge over the
Po behind his army ; the Roman detachment of 600 men
charged to cover the process of destruction were, however, intercepted and made prisoners. But as the upper course
of the river was in the hands of Hannibal, he could not be prevented from marching up the stream, crossing on a
bridge of boats, and in a few days confronting the Roman
army on the right bank. The latter had taken a position The
in the plain in front of Placentia; but the mutiny of a piac^^
Celtic division in the Roman camp, and the Gallic insur rection breaking out afresh all around, compelled the consul to evacuate the plain and to post himself on the hills behind the Trebia. This was accomplished without notable loss, because the Numidian horsemen sent in pursuit lost their time in plundering, and setting fire to, the abandoned camp. In this strong position, with his left wing resting on the Apennines, his right on the Po and the fortress of Placentia, and covered in front by the
projected
370
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL book iii
Trebia —no inconsiderable stream at that season — Scipio was unable to save the rich stores of Clastidium (Casteggio) from which in this position he was cut off by the army of the enemy ; nor was he able to avert the insurrectionary movement on the part of almost all the Gallic cantons, excepting the Cenomani who were friendly to Rome ; but he completely checked the progress of Hannibal, and compelled him to pitch his camp opposite to that of the Romans. Moreover, the position taken up by Scipio, and the circumstance of the Cenomani threatening the borders of the Insubres, hindered the main body of the Gallic insurgents from directly joining the enemy, and gave to the second Roman army, which meanwhile had arrived at Ariminum from Lilybaeum, the opportunity of reaching Placentia through the midst of the insurgent country without material hindrance, and of uniting itself with the army of the Po.
Scipio had thus solved his difficult task completely and
Battle on
the Trebia, brilliantly. The Roman army, now close on 40,000 strong,
and though not a match for its antagonist in cavalry, at least equal in infantry, had simply to remain in its existing posi tion, in order to compel the enemy either to attempt in the winter season the passage of the river and an attack upon the camp, or to suspend his advance and to test the fickle temper of the Gauls by the burden of winter quarters. Clear, however, as this was, it was no less clear that it was now December, and that under the course proposed the victory might perhaps be gained by Rome, but would not be gained by the consul Tiberius Sempronius, who held the sole command in consequence of Scipio's wound, and whose year of office expired in a few months. Hannibal knew the man, and neglected no means of alluring him to
The Celtic villages that had remained faithful to the Romans were cruelly laid waste, and, when this brought on a conflict between the cavalry, Hannibal allowed his
fight.
«ap, v TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE
271
opponents to boast of the victory. Soon thereafter on a raw rainy day a general engagement came on, unlooked for by the Romans. From the earliest hour of the morning the Roman light troops had been skirmishing with the light cavalry of the enemy ; the latter slowly retreated, and the Romans eagerly pursued it through the deeply swollen Trebia to follow up the advantage which they had gained. Suddenly the cavalry halted ; the Roman vanguard found itself face to face with the army of Hannibal drawn up for battle on a field chosen by himself; it was lost, unless the main body should cross the stream with all speed to its support. Hungry, weary, and wet, the Romans came on and hastened to form in order of battle, the cavalry, as
usual, on the wings, the infantry in the centre. The light troops, who formed the vanguard on both sides, began the combat : but the Romans had already almost exhausted their missiles against the cavalry, and immediately
gave way. In like manner the cavalry gave way on the wings, hard pressed by the elephants in front, and outflanked right and left by the far more numerous Carthaginian horse.
But the Roman infantry proved itself worthy of its name : at the beginning of the battle it fought with very decided superiority against the infantry of the enemy, and even when the repulse of the Roman horse allowed the enemy's cavalry and light-armed troops to turn their attacks against the Roman infantry, the latter, although ceasing to advance, obstinately maintained its ground. At this stage a select Carthaginian band of 1000 infantry, and as many horsemen, under the leadership of Mago, Hannibal's youngest brother, suddenly emerged from an ambush in the rear of the Roman army, and fell upon the densely entangled masses. The wings of the army and the rear ranks of the Roman centre were broken up and scattered by this attack, while the first division, 10,000 men strong, in compact array broke through the Carthaginian line, and made a passage for
*7a
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL book ill
itself obliquely through the midst of the enemy, inflicting great loss on the opposing infantry and more especially on the Gallic insurgents. This brave body, pursued but feebly, thus reached Placentia. The remaining mass was for the most part slaughtered by the elephants and light troops of the enemy in attempting to cross the river : only part of the cavalry and some divisions of infantry were able, by wading through the river, to gain the camp whither the Carthaginians did not follow them, and thus they too reached Placentia. 1 Few battles confer more honour on the Roman soldier than this on the Trebia, and few at the same time furnish graver impeachment of the general in command ; although the candid judge will not forget that a commandership-in-chief expiring on a definite day was an unmilitary institution, and that figs cannot be reaped from thistles. The victory came to be costly even to the victors. Although the loss in the battle fell chiefly on the Celtic
1 Polybius's account of the battle on the Trebia is quite clear. If Placentia lay on the right bank of the Trebia where it falls into the Po, and if the battle was fought on the left bank, while the Roman encamp ment was pitched upon the right —both of which points have been dis puted, but are nevertheless indisputable —the Roman soldiers must certainly have passed the Trebia in order to gain Placentia as well as to gain the camp. But those who crossed to the camp must have made their way through the disorganized portions of their own army and through the corps of the enemy that had gone round to their rear, and must then have crossed the river almost in hand-to-hand combat with the enemy. On the other hand the passage near Placentia was accomplished after the pursuit had slackened ; the corps was several miles distant from the field of battle, and had arrived within reach of a Roman fortress ; it may even have been the case, although it cannot be proved, that a bridge led over the Trebia at that point, and that the tile de pont on the other bank was occupied by the garrison of Placentia. It is evident that the first passage
was just as difficult as the second was easy, and therefore with good reason Polybius, military judge as he was, merely says of the corps of 10,000, that in close columns it cut its way to Placentia (iii. 74, 6), without mentioning the passage of the river which in this case was unattended with difficulty.
The erroneousness of the view of Livy , which transfers the Phoenician camp to the right, the Roman to the left bank of the Trebia, has lately been repeatedly pointed out. We may only further mention, that the site of Clastidium, near the modern Casteggio, has now been established by inscriptions (Orclli-Henzen, 5117).
chap, v TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE
aj3
insurgents, yet a multitude of the veteran soldiers of
Hannibal died afterwards from diseases
that raw and wet winter day, and all the elephants perished except one.
The effect of this first victory of the invading army was, Hannibal that the national insurrection now spread and assumed ^J^^ shape without hindrance throughout the Celtic territory. Italy. The remains of the Roman army of the Po threw themselves
into the fortresses of Placentia and Cremona : completely
cut off from home, they were obliged to procure their
supplies by way of the river. The consul Tiberius Sempronius only escaped, as if by miracle, from being
taken prisoner, when with a weak escort of cavalry he went
to Rome on account of the elections. Hannibal, who
would not hazard the health of his troops by further
marches at that inclement season, bivouacked for the winter
where he was; and, as a serious attempt on the larger fortresses would have led to no result, contented himself
with annoying the enemy by attacks on the river-port of Placentia and other minor Roman positions. He employed
himself mainly in organizing the Gallic insurrection : more
than 60,000 foot soldiers and 4000 horsemen from the
Celts are said to have joined his army.
Military campaign of 537. The senate thought, and not unreason- ^ P[ai7.
-l
•*
1 t. 11
position of Hannibal,
e1
means fraught with serious danger. Besides the coast-
garrsons, which were despatched to Sardinia, Sicily, and Tarentum, and the reinforcements which were sent to Spain, the two new consuls Gaius Flaminius and Gnaeus Servilius obtained only as many men as were necessary to restore the four legions to their full complement ; additions were made to the strength of the cavalry alone. The consuls had to protect the northern frontier, and stationed themselves accordingly on the two highways which led
VOL. II
50
engendered by
No extraordinary exertions were made in Rome for the ably, that, despite the lost battle, their position was by no
274
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL book in
from Rome to the north, the western of which at that time terminated at Arretium, and the eastern at Ariminum ; Gaius Flaminius occupied the former, Gnaeus Servilius the latter. There they ordered the troops from the fortresses on the Po to join them, probably by water, and awaited the commencement of the favourable season, when they proposed to occupy in the defensive the passes of the Apennines, and then, taking up the offensive, to descend into the valley of the Po and effect a junction somewhere near Placentia. But Hannibal by no means intended to defend the valley of the Po. He knew Rome better per haps than the Romans knew it themselves, and was very well aware how decidedly he was the weaker and continued to be so notwithstanding the brilliant battle on the Trebia; he knew too that his ultimate object, the humiliation of Rome, was not to be wrung from the unbending Roman pride either by terror or by surprise, but could only be
gained by the actual subjugation of the haughty city. It was clearly apparent that the Italian federation was in political solidity and in military resources infinitely superior to an adversary, who received only precarious and irregular support from home, and who in Italy was dependent for primary aid solely on the vacillating and capricious nation of the Celts; and that the Phoenician foot soldier was, notwithstanding all the pains taken by Hannibal, far in ferior in point of tactics to the legionary, had been completely proved by the defensive movements of Scipio and the brilliant retreat of the defeated infantry on the Trebia. From this conviction flowed the two fundamental principles which determined Hannibal's whole method of operations in Italy — viz. , that the war should be carried on, in somewhat adventurous fashion, with constant changes in the plan and in the theatre of operations ; and that its favourable issue could only be looked for as the result of political and not of military successes —of the
chap, v TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE
and final breaking up of the Italian federation. That mode of carrying on the war was neces
sary, because the single element which Hannibal had to throw into the scale against so many disadvantages — his military genius — only told with its full weight, when he constantly foiled his opponents by unexpected combina tions ; he was undone, if the war became stationary. That aim was the aim dictated to him by right policy, because, mighty conqueror though he was in battle, he saw very clearly that on each occasion he vanquished the generals and not the city, and that after each new battle the Romans remained just as superior to the Carthaginians as he was personally superior to the Roman commanders. That Hannibal even at the height of his fortune never deceived himself on this point, is worthier of admiration than his most admired battles.
It was these motives, and not the entreaties of the Hannibal Gauls that he should spare their country —which would ^pen** not have influenced him — that induced Hannibal now to nine*, forsake, as it were, his newly acquired basis of operations
against Italy, and to transfer the scene of war to Italy itself. Before doing so he gave orders that all the prisoners should be brought before him. He ordered the Romans to be separated and loaded with chains as slaves —the statement that Hannibal put to death all the Romans capable of bearing arms, who here and elsewhere fell into his hands, is beyond doubt at least strongly exaggerated. On the other hand, all the Italian allies were released without ransom, and charged to report at home that Hannibal waged war not against Italy, but against Rome ; that he promised to every Italian community the restora tion of its ancient independence and its ancient boundaries ; and that the deliverer was about to follow those whom he had set free, bringing release and revenge. In fact, when the winter ended, he started from the valley of the Po to
gradual loosening
275
Flaminius.
search for a route through the difficult defiles of the Apennines. Gaius Flaminius, with the Etruscan army, was still for the moment at Arezzo, intending to move from that point towards Lucca in order to protect the vale of the Arno and the passes of the Apennines, so soon as the season should allow. But Hannibal anticipated him. The passage of the Apennines was accomplished without much difficulty, at a point as far west as possible or, in other words, as distant as possible from the enemy; but the marshy low grounds between the Serchio and the Arno were so flooded by the melting of the snow and the spring rains, that the army had to march four days in water, without finding any other dry spot for resting by night than was supplied by piling the baggage or by the sumpter animals that had fallen. The troops underwent unutterable sufferings, particularly the Gallic infantry, which marched behind the Carthaginians along tracks already rendered impassable : they murmured loudly and would undoubtedly have dispersed to a man, had not the Carthaginian cavalry under Mago, which brought up the rear, rendered flight impossible. The horses, assailed by a distemper in their hoofs, fell in heaps ; various diseases decimated the soldiers ; Hannibal himself lost an eye in consequence of ophthalmia.