I answer that, We must draw a distinction between the damned before the
judgment day and after.
judgment day and after.
Summa Theologica
The
fire there will be of the very greatest heat, because its heat will be
all gathered together from all parts, through being surrounded on all
sides by the cold of the earth.
Reply to Objection 3: Hell will never lack sufficient room to admit the
bodies of the damned: since hell is accounted one of the three things
that "never are satisfied" (Prov. 30:15,16). Nor is it unreasonable
that God's power should maintain within the bowels of the earth a
hollow great enough to contain all the bodies of the damned.
Reply to Objection 4: It does not follow of necessity that "by what
things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented," except as
regards the principal instruments of sin: for as much as man having
sinned in soul and body will be punished in both. But it does not
follow that a man will be punished in the very place where he sinned,
because the place due to the damned is other from that due to
wayfarers. We may also reply that these words refer to the punishments
inflicted on man on the way: according as each sin has its
corresponding punishment, since "inordinate love is its own
punishment," as Augustine states (Confess. i, 12).
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OF THE WILL AND INTELLECT OF THE DAMNED (NINE ARTICLES)
We must next consider matters pertaining to the will and intellect of
the damned. Under this head there are nine points of inquiry:
(1) Whether every act of will in the damned is evil?
(2) Whether they ever repent of the evil they have done?
(3) Whether they would rather not be than be?
(4) Whether they would wish others to be damned?
(5) Whether the wicked hate God?
(6) Whether they can demerit?
(7) Whether they can make use of the knowledge acquired in this life?
(8) Whether they ever think of God?
(9) Whether they see the glory of the blessed?
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Whether every act of will in the damned is evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that not every act of will in the damned is
evil. For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "the demons desire the
good and the best, namely to be, to live, to understand. " Since, then,
men who are damned are not worse off than the demons, it would seem
that they also can have a good will.
Objection 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "evil is
altogether involuntary. " Therefore if the damned will anything, they
will it as something good or apparently good. Now a will that is
directly ordered to good is itself good. Therefore the damned can have
a good will.
Objection 3: Further, some will be damned who, while in this world,
acquired certain habits of virtue, for instance heathens who had civic
virtues. Now a will elicits praiseworthy acts by reason of virtuous
habits. Therefore there may be praiseworthy acts of the will in some of
the damned.
On the contrary, An obstinate will can never be inclined except to
evil. Now men who are damned will be obstinate even as the demons [*Cf.
[5159]FP, Q[64], A[2]]. Further, as the will of the damned is in
relation to evil, so is the will of the blessed in regard to good. But
the blessed never have an evil will. Neither therefore have the damned
any good will.
I answer that, A twofold will may be considered in the damned, namely
the deliberate will and the natural will. Their natural will is theirs
not of themselves but of the Author of nature, Who gave nature this
inclination which we call the natural will. Wherefore since nature
remains in them, it follows that the natural will in them can be good.
But their deliberate will is theirs of themselves, inasmuch as it is in
their power to be inclined by their affections to this or that. This
will is in them always evil: and this because they are completely
turned away from the last end of a right will, nor can a will be good
except it be directed to that same end. Hence even though they will
some good, they do not will it well so that one be able to call their
will good on that account.
Reply to Objection 1: The words of Dionysius must be understood of the
natural will, which is nature's inclination to some particular good.
And yet this natural inclination is corrupted by their wickedness, in
so far as this good which they desire naturally is desired by them
under certain evil circumstances [*Cf. [5160]FP, Q[64], A[2], ad 5].
Reply to Objection 2: Evil, as evil, does not move the will, but in so
far as it is thought to be good. Yet it comes of their wickedness that
they esteem that which is evil as though it were good. Hence their will
is evil.
Reply to Objection 3: The habits of civic virtue do not remain in the
separated soul, because those virtues perfect us only in the civic life
which will not remain after this life. Even though they remained, they
would never come into action, being enchained, as it were, by the
obstinacy of the mind.
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Whether the damned repent of the evil they have done?
Objection 1: It would seem that the damned never repent of the evil
they have done. For Bernard says on the Canticle [*Cf. De
Consideratione v, 12; De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio ix] that "the damned
ever consent to the evil they have done. " Therefore they never repent
of the sins they have committed.
Objection 2: Further, to wish one had not sinned is a good will. But
the damned will never have a good will. Therefore the damned will never
wish they had not sinned: and thus the same conclusion follows as
above.
Objection 3: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii), "death
is to man what their fall was to the angels. " But the angel's will is
irrevocable after his fall, so that he cannot withdraw from the choice
whereby he previously sinned [*Cf. [5161]FP, Q[64], A[2]]. Therefore
the damned also cannot repent of the sins committed by them.
Objection 4: Further, the wickedness of the damned in hell will be
greater than that of sinners in the world. Now in this world some
sinners repent not of the sins they have committed, either through
blindness of mind, as heretics, or through obstinacy, as those "who are
glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things"
(Prov. 2:14). Therefore, etc.
On the contrary, It is said of the damned (Wis. 5:3): "Repenting within
themselves [Vulg. : 'Saying within themselves, repenting']. "
Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4) that "the wicked are full
of repentance; for afterwards they are sorry for that in which
previously they took pleasure. " Therefore the damned, being most
wicked, repent all the more.
I answer that, A person may repent of sin in two ways: in one way
directly, in another way indirectly. He repents of a sin directly who
hates sin as such: and he repents indirectly who hates it on account of
something connected with it, for instance punishment or something of
that kind. Accordingly the wicked will not repent of their sins
directly, because consent in the malice of sin will remain in them; but
they will repent indirectly, inasmuch as they will suffer from the
punishment inflicted on them for sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The damned will wickedness, but shun punishment:
and thus indirectly they repent of wickedness committed.
Reply to Objection 2: To wish one had not sinned on account of the
shamefulness of vice is a good will: but this will not be in the
wicked.
Reply to Objection 3: It will be possible for the damned to repent of
their sins without turning their will away from sin, because in their
sins they will shun, not what they heretofore desired, but something
else, namely the punishment.
Reply to Objection 4: However obstinate men may be in this world, they
repent of the sins indirectly, if they be punished for them. Thus
Augustine says (QQ[83], qu. 36): "We see the most savage beasts are
deterred from the greatest pleasures by fear of pain. "
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Whether the damned by right and deliberate reason would wish not to be?
Objection 1: It would seem impossible for the damned, by right and
deliberate reason, to wish not to be. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb.
iii, 7): "Consider how great a good it is to be; since both the happy
and the unhappy will it; for to be and yet to be unhappy is a greater
thing than not to be at all. "
Objection 2: Further, Augustine argues thus (De Lib. Arb. iii, 8):
"Preference supposes election. " But "not to be" is not eligible; since
it has not the appearance of good, for it is nothing. Therefore not to
be cannot be more desirable to the damned than "to be. "
Objection 3: Further, the greater evil is the more to be shunned. Now
"not to be" is the greatest evil, since it removes good altogether, so
as to leave nothing. Therefore "not to be" is more to be shunned than
to be unhappy: and thus the same conclusion follows as above.
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 9:6): "In those days men . . .
shall desire to die, and death shall fly from them. "
Further, the unhappiness of the damned surpasses all unhappiness of
this world. Now in order to escape the unhappiness of this world, it is
desirable to some to die, wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 41:3,4): "O
death, thy sentence is welcome to the man that is in need and to him
whose strength faileth; who is in a decrepit age, and that is in care
about all things, and to the distrustful that loseth wisdom [Vulg. :
'patience']. " Much more, therefore, is "not to be" desirable to the
damned according to their deliberate reason.
I answer that, Not to be may be considered in two ways. First, in
itself, and thus it can nowise be desirable, since it has no aspect of
good, but is pure privation of good. Secondly, it may be considered as
a relief from a painful life or from some unhappiness: and thus "not to
be" takes on the aspect of good, since "to lack an evil is a kind of
good" as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1). In this way it is better
for the damned not to be than to be unhappy. Hence it is said (Mat.
26:24): "It were better for him, if that man had not been born," and
(Jer. 20:14): "Cursed be the day wherein I was born," where a gloss of
Jerome observes: "It is better not to be than to be evilly. " In this
sense the damned can prefer "not to be" according to their deliberate
reason [*Cf. [5162]FP, Q[5], A[2], ad 3].
Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Augustine is to be understood in
the sense that "not to be" is eligible, not in itself but accidentally,
as putting an end to unhappiness. For when it is stated that "to be"
and "to live" are desired by all naturally, we are not to take this as
referable to an evil and corrupt life, and a life of unhappiness, as
the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4), but absolutely.
Reply to Objection 2: Non-existence is eligible, not in itself, but
only accidentally, as stated already.
Reply to Objection 3: Although "not to be" is very evil, in so far as
it removes being, it is very good, in so far as it removes unhappiness,
which is the greatest of evils, and thus it is preferred "not to be. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in hell the damned would wish others were damned who are not damned?
Objection 1: It would seem that in hell the damned would not wish
others were damned who are not damned. For it is said (Lk. 16:27, 28)
of the rich man that he prayed for his brethren, lest they should come
"into the place of torments. " Therefore in like manner the other damned
would not wish, at least their friends in the flesh to be damned in
hell.
Objection 2: Further, the damned are not deprived of their inordinate
affections. Now some of the damned loved inordinately some who are not
damned. Therefore they would not desire their evil, i. e. that they
should be damned.
Objection 3: Further, the damned do not desire the increase of their
punishment. Now if more were damned, their punishment would be greater,
even as the joy of the blessed is increased by an increase in their
number. Therefore the damned desire not the damnation of those who are
saved.
On the contrary, A gloss on Is. 14:9, "are risen up from their
thrones," says: "The wicked are comforted by having many companions in
their punishment. "
Further, envy reigns supreme in the damned. Therefore they grieve for
the happiness of the blessed, and desire their damnation.
I answer that Even as in the blessed in heaven there will be most
perfect charity, so in the damned there will be the most perfect hate.
Wherefore as the saints will rejoice in all goods, so will the damned
grieve for all goods. Consequently the sight of the happiness of the
saints will give them very great pain; hence it is written (Is. 26:11):
"Let the envious people see and be confounded, and let fire devour Thy
enemies. " Therefore they will wish all the good were damned.
Reply to Objection 1: So great will be the envy of the damned that they
will envy the glory even of their kindred, since they themselves are
supremely unhappy, for this happens even in this life, when envy
increases. Nevertheless they will envy their kindred less than others,
and their punishment would be greater if all their kindred were damned,
and others saved, than if some of their kindred were saved. For this
reason the rich man prayed that his brethren might be warded from
damnation: for he knew that some are guarded therefrom. Yet he would
rather that his brethren were damned as well as all the rest.
Reply to Objection 2: Love that is not based on virtue is easily
voided, especially in evil men as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4).
Hence the damned will not preserve their friendship for those whom they
loved inordinately. Yet the will of them will remain perverse, because
they will continue to love the cause of their inordinate loving.
Reply to Objection 3: Although an increase in the number of the damned
results in an increase of each one's punishment, so much the more will
their hatred and envy increase that they will prefer to be more
tormented with many rather than less tormented alone.
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Whether the damned hate God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the damned do not hate God. For,
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "the beautiful and good that is
the cause of all goodness and beauty is beloved of all. " But this is
God. Therefore God cannot be the object of anyone's hate.
Objection 2: Further, no one can hate goodness itself, as neither can
one will badness itself since "evil is altogether involuntary," as
Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now God is goodness itself. Therefore
no one can hate Him.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 73:23): "The pride of them that
hate Thee ascendeth continually. "
I answer that, The appetite is moved by good or evil apprehended. Now
God is apprehended in two ways, namely in Himself, as by the blessed,
who see Him in His essence; and in His effects, as by us and by the
damned. Since, then, He is goodness by His essence, He cannot in
Himself be displeasing to any will; wherefore whoever sees Him in His
essence cannot hate Him. On the other hand, some of His effects are
displeasing to the will in so far as they are opposed to any one: and
accordingly a person may hate God not in Himself, but by reason of His
effects. Therefore the damned, perceiving God in His punishment, which
is the effect of His justice, hate Him, even as they hate the
punishment inflicted on them [*Cf. Q[90], A[3], ad 2; [5163]SS, Q[34],
A[1]].
Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Dionysius refers to the natural
appetite. and even this is rendered perverse in the damned, by that
which is added thereto by their deliberate will, as stated above
[5164](A[1]) [*Cf. [5165]SS, Q[34], A[1], ad 1 where St. Thomas gives
another answer].
Reply to Objection 2: This argument would prove if the damned saw God
in Himself, as being in His essence.
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Whether the damned demerit?
Objection 1: It would seem that the damned demerit. For the damned have
an evil will, as stated in the last Distinction of Sentent. iv. But
they demerited by the evil will that they had here. Therefore if they
demerit not there, their damnation is to their advantage.
Objection 2: Further, the damned are on the same footing as the demons.
Now the demons demerit after their fall, wherefore God inflicted a
punishment on the serpent, who induced man to sin (Gn. 3:14,15).
Therefore the damned also demerit.
Objection 3: Further, an inordinate act that proceeds from a deliberate
will is not excused from demerit, even though there be necessity of
which one is oneself the cause: for the "drunken man deserves a double
punishment" if he commit a crime through being drunk (Ethic. iii). Now
the damned were themselves the cause of their own obstinacy, owing to
which they are under a kind of necessity of sinning. Therefore since
their act proceeds from their free will, they are not excused from
demerit.
On the contrary, Punishment is contradistinguished from fault [*Cf.
[5166]FP, Q[48], A[5]]. Now the perverse will of the damned proceeds
from their obstinacy which is their punishment. Therefore the perverse
will of the damned is not a fault whereby they may demerit.
Further, after reaching the last term there is no further movement, or
advancement in good or evil. Now the damned, especially after the
judgment day, will have reached the last term of their damnation, since
then there "will cease to be two cities," according to Augustine
(Enchiridion cxi). Therefore after the judgment day the damned will not
demerit by their perverse will, for if they did their damnation would
be augmented.
I answer that, We must draw a distinction between the damned before the
judgment day and after. For all are agreed that after the judgment day
there will be neither merit nor demerit. The reason for this is because
merit or demerit is directed to the attainment of some further good or
evil: and after the day of judgment good and evil will have reached
their ultimate consummation, so that there will be no further addition
to good or evil. Consequently, good will in the blessed will not be a
merit but a reward, and evil will in the damned will be not a demerit
but a punishment only. For works of virtue belong especially to the
state of happiness and their contraries to the state of unhappiness
(Ethic. i, 9,10).
On the other hand, some say that, before the judgment day, both the
good merit and the damned demerit. But this cannot apply to the
essential reward or to the principal punishment, since in this respect
both have reached the term. Possibly, however, this may apply to the
accidental reward, or secondary punishment, which are subject to
increase until the day of judgment. Especially may this apply to the
demons, or to the good angels, by whose activities some are drawn to
salvation, whereby the joy of the blessed angels is increased, and some
to damnation, whereby the punishment of the demons is augmented [*Cf.
[5167]FP, Q[62], A[9], ad 3; [5168]SS, Q[13], A[4], ad 2; where St.
Thomas tacitly retracts the opinion expressed here as to merit or
demerit. ].
Reply to Objection 1: It is in the highest degree unprofitable to have
reached the highest degree of evil, the result being that the damned
are incapable of demerit. Hence it is clear that they gain no advantage
from their sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Men who are damned are not occupied in drawing
others to damnation, as the demons are, for which reason the latter
demerit as regards their secondary punishment [*Cf. [5169]FP, Q[62],
A[9], ad 3; [5170]SS, Q[13] , A[4], ad 2; where St. Thomas tacitly
retracts the opinion expressed here as to merit or demerit].
Reply to Objection 3: The reason why they are not excused from demerit
is not because they are under the necessity of sinning, but because
they have reached the highest of evils.
However, the necessity of sinning whereof we are ourselves the cause,
in so far as it is a necessity, excuses from sin, because every sin
needs to be voluntary: but it does not excuse, in so far as it proceeds
from a previous act of the will: and consequently the whole demerit of
the subsequent sin would seem to belong to the previous sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the damned can make use of the knowledge they had in this world?
[*Cf. FP, Q[89]]
Objection 1: It would seem that the damned are unable to make use of
the knowledge they had in this world. For there is very great pleasure
in the consideration of knowledge. But we must not admit that they have
any pleasure. Therefore they cannot make use of the knowledge they had
heretofore, by applying their consideration thereto.
Objection 2: Further, the damned suffer greater pains than any pains of
this world. Now in this world, when one is in very great pain, it is
impossible to consider any intelligible conclusions, through being
distracted by the pains that one suffers. Much less therefore can one
do so in hell.
Objection 3: Further, the damned are subject to time. But "length of
time is the cause of forgetfulness" (Phys. lib. iv, 13). Therefore the
damned will forget what they knew here.
On the contrary, It is said to the rich man who was damned (Lk. 16:25):
"Remember that thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime," etc.
Therefore they will consider about the things they knew here.
Further, the intelligible species remain in the separated soul, as
stated above (Q[70], A[2], ad 3; [5171]FP, Q[89], AA[5],6). Therefore,
if they could not use them, these would remain in them to no purpose.
I answer that, Even as in the saints on account of the perfection of
their glory, there will be nothing but what is a matter of joy so there
will be nothing in the damned but what is a matter and cause of sorrow;
nor will anything that can pertain to sorrow be lacking, so that their
unhappiness is consummate. Now the consideration of certain things
known brings us joy, in some respect, either on the part of the things
known, because we love them, or on the part of the knowledge, because
it is fitting and perfect. There may also be a reason for sorrow both
on the part of the things known, because they are of a grievous nature,
and on the part of the knowledge, if we consider its imperfection; for
instance a person may consider his defective knowledge about a certain
thing, which he would desire to know perfectly. Accordingly, in the
damned there will be actual consideration of the things they knew
heretofore as matters of sorrow, but not as a cause of pleasure. For
they will consider both the evil they have done, and for which they
were damned, and the delightful goods they have lost, and on both
counts they will suffer torments. Likewise they will be tormented with
the thought that the knowledge they had of speculative matters was
imperfect, and that they missed its highest degree of perfection which
they might have acquired.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the consideration of knowledge is
delightful in itself, it may accidentally be the cause of sorrow, as
explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: In this world the soul is united to a corruptible
body, wherefore the soul's consideration is hindered by the suffering
of the body. On the other hand, in the future life the soul will not be
so drawn by the body, but however much the body may suffer, the soul
will have a most clear view of those things that can be a cause of
anguish to it.
Reply to Objection 3: Time causes forgetfulness accidentally, in so far
as the movement whereof it is the measure is the cause of change. But
after the judgment day there will be no movement of the heavens;
wherefore neither will it be possible for forgetfulness to result from
any lapse of time however long. Before the judgment day, however, the
separated soul is not changed from its disposition by the heavenly
movement.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the damned will ever think of God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the damned will sometimes think of God.
For one cannot hate a thing actually, except one think about it. Now
the damned will hate God, as stated in the text of Sentent. iv, in the
last Distinction. Therefore they will think of God sometimes.
Objection 2: Further, the damned will have remorse of conscience. But
the conscience suffers remorse for deeds done against God. Therefore
they will sometimes think of God.
On the contrary, Man's most perfect thoughts are those which are about
God: whereas the damned will be in a state of the greatest
imperfection. Therefore they will not think of God.
I answer that, one may think of God in two ways. First, in Himself and
according to that which is proper to Him, namely that He is the fount
of all goodness: and thus it is altogether impossible to think of Him
without delight, so that the damned will by no means think of Him in
this way. Secondly, according to something accidental as it were to Him
in His effects, such as His punishments, and so forth, and in this
respect the thought of God can bring sorrow, so that in this way the
damned will think of God.
Reply to Objection 1: The damned do not hate God except because He
punishes and forbids what is agreeable to their evil will: and
consequently they will think of Him only as punishing and forbidding.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection, since conscience
will not have remorse for sin except as forbidden by the Divine
commandment.
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Whether the damned see the glory of the blessed?
Objection 1: It would seem that the damned do not see the glory of the
blessed. For they are more distant from the glory of the blessed than
from the happenings of this world. But they do not see what happens in
regard to us: hence Gregory commenting on Job 14:21, "Whether his
children come to honor," etc. says (Moral. xii): "Even as those who
still live know not in what place are the souls of the dead; so the
dead who have lived in the body know not the things which regard the
life of those who are in the flesh. " Much less, therefore, can they see
the glory of the blessed.
Objection 2: Further, that which is granted as a great favor to the
saints in this life is never granted to the damned. Now it was granted
as a great favor to Paul to see the life in which the saints live for
ever with God (2 Cor. 12). Therefore the damned will not see the glory
of the saints.
On the contrary, It is stated (Lk. 16:23) that the rich man in the
midst of his torments "saw Abraham . . . and Lazarus in his bosom. "
I answer that, The damned, before the judgment day, will see the
blessed in glory, in such a way as to know, not what that glory is
like, but only that they are in a state of glory that surpasses all
thought. This will trouble them, both because they will, through envy,
grieve for their happiness, and because they have forfeited that glory.
Hence it is written (Wis. 5:2) concerning the wicked: "Seeing it" they
"shall be troubled with terrible fear. " After the judgment day,
however, they will be altogether deprived of seeing the blessed: nor
will this lessen their punishment, but will increase it; because they
will bear in remembrance the glory of the blessed which they saw at or
before the judgment: and this will torment them. Moreover they will be
tormented by finding themselves deemed unworthy even to see the glory
which the saints merit to have.
Reply to Objection 1: The happenings of this life would not, if seen,
torment the damned in hell as the sight of the glory of the saints;
wherefore the things which happen here are not shown to the damned in
the same way as the saints' glory; although also of the things that
happen here those are shown to them which are capable of causing them
sorrow.
Reply to Objection 2: Paul looked upon that life wherein the saints
live with God [*Cf. [5172]SS, Q[185], A[3], ad 2], by actual experience
thereof and by hoping to have it more perfectly in the life to come.
Not so the damned; wherefore the comparison fails.
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OF GOD'S MERCY AND JUSTICE TOWARDS THE DAMNED (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must next consider God's justice and mercy towards the damned: under
which head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether by Divine justice an eternal punishment is inflicted on
sinners?
(2) Whether by God's mercy all punishment both of men and of demons
comes to an end?
(3) Whether at least the punishment of men comes to an end?
(4) Whether at least the punishment of Christians has an end?
(5) Whether there is an end to the punishment of those who have
performed works of mercy?
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Whether by Divine justice an eternal punishment is inflicted on sinners?
[*Cf. FS, Q[87], AA[3],4]
Objection 1: It would seem that an eternal punishment is not inflicted
on sinners by Divine justice. For the punishment should not exceed the
fault: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of
the stripes be" (Dt. 25:2). Now fault is temporal. Therefore the
punishment should not be eternal.
Objection 2: Further, of two mortal sins one is greater than the other.
and therefore one should receive a greater punishment than the other.
But no punishment is greater than eternal punishment, since it is
infinite. Therefore eternal punishment is not due to every sin; and if
it is not due to one, it is due to none, since they are not infinitely
distant from one another.
Objection 3: Further, a just judge does not punish except in order to
correct, wherefore it is stated (Ethic. ii, 3) that "punishments are a
kind of medicine. " Now, to punish the wicked eternally does not lead to
their correction, nor to that of others, since then there will be no
one in future who can be corrected thereby. Therefore eternal
punishment is not inflicted for sins according to Divine justice.
Objection 4: Further, no one wishes that which is not desirable for its
own sake, except on account of some advantage. Now God does not wish
punishment for its own sake, for He delights not in punishments [*The
allusion is to Wis. 1:13: "Neither hath He pleasure in the destruction
of the living," as may be gathered from [5173]FS, Q[87], A[3], OBJ[3]].
Since then no advantage can result from the perpetuity of punishment,
it would seem that He ought not to inflict such a punishment for sin.
Objection 5: Further, "nothing accidental lasts for ever" (De Coelo et
Mundo i). But punishment is one of those things that happen
accidentally, since it is contrary to nature. Therefore it cannot be
everlasting.
Objection 6: Further, the justice of God would seem to require that
sinners should be brought to naught: because on account of ingratitude
a person deserves to lose all benefits. and among other benefits of God
there is "being" itself. Therefore it would seem just that the sinner
who has been ungrateful to God should lose his being. But if sinners be
brought to naught, their punishment cannot be everlasting. Therefore it
would seem out of keeping with Divine justice that sinners should be
punished for ever.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 25:46): "These," namely the
wicked, "shall go into everlasting punishment. "
Further, as reward is to merit, so is punishment to guilt. Now,
according to Divine justice, an eternal reward is due to temporal
merit: "Every one who seeth the Son and believeth in Him hath [Vulg. :
'that everyone . . . may have'] life everlasting. " Therefore according
to Divine justice an everlasting punishment is due to temporal guilt.
Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5), punishment is
meted according to the dignity of the person sinned against, so that a
person who strikes one in authority receives a greater punishment than
one who strikes anyone else. Now whoever sins mortally sins against
God, Whose commandments he breaks, and Whose honor he gives another, by
placing his end in some one other than God. But God's majesty is
infinite. Therefore whoever sins mortally deserves infinite punishment;
and consequently it seems just that for a mortal sin a man should be
punished for ever.
I answer that, Since punishment is measured in two ways, namely
according to the degree of its severity, and according to its length of
time, the measure of punishment corresponds to the measure of fault, as
regards the degree of severity, so that the more grievously a person
sins the more grievously is he punished: "As much as she hath glorified
herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to
her" (Apoc. 18:7). The duration of the punishment does not, however,
correspond with the duration of the fault, as Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xxi, 11), for adultery which is committed in a short space of time
is not punished with a momentary penalty even according to human laws
[*Cf. [5174]FS, Q[87], A[3], ad 1]. But the duration of punishment
regards the disposition of the sinner: for sometimes a person who
commits an offense in a city is rendered by his very offense worthy of
being cut off entirely from the fellowship of the citizens, either by
perpetual exile or even by death: whereas sometimes he is not rendered
worthy of being cut off entirely from the fellowship of the citizens.
wherefore in order that he may become a fitting member of the State,
his punishment is prolonged or curtailed, according as is expedient for
his amendment, so that he may live in the city in a becoming and
peaceful manner. So too, according to Divine justice, sin renders a
person worthy to be altogether cut off from the fellowship of God's
city, and this is the effect of every sin committed against charity,
which is the bond uniting this same city together. Consequently, for
mortal sin which is contrary to charity a person is expelled for ever
from the fellowship of the saints and condemned to everlasting
punishment, because as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11), "as men
are cut off from this perishable city by the penalty of the first
death, so are they excluded from that imperishable city by the
punishment of the second death. " That the punishment inflicted by the
earthly state is not deemed everlasting is accidental, either because
man endures not for ever, or because the state itself comes to an end.
Wherefore if man lived for ever, the punishment of exile or slavery,
which is pronounced by human law, would remain in him for ever. On the
other hand, as regards those who sin in such a way as not to deserve to
be entirely cut off from the fellowship of the saints, such as those
who sin venially, their punishment will be so much the shorter or
longer according as they are more or less fit to be cleansed, through
sin clinging to them more or less: this is observed in the punishments
of this world and of purgatory according to Divine justice.
We find also other reasons given by the saints why some are justly
condemned to everlasting punishment for a temporal sin. One is because
they sinned against an eternal good by despising eternal life. This is
mentioned by Augustine (De Civ. Dei. xii, 12): "He is become worthy of
eternal evil, who destroyed in himself a good which could be eternal. "
Another reason is because man sinned in his own eternity [*Cf.
[5175]FS, Q[87], A[3], ad 1]; wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv), it
belongs to the great justice of the judge that those should never cease
to be punished, who in this life never ceased to desire sin. And if it
be objected that some who sin mortally propose to amend their life at
some time, and that these accordingly are seemingly not deserving of
eternal punishment, it must be replied according to some that Gregory
speaks of the will that is made manifest by the deed. For he who falls
into mortal sin of his own will puts himself in a state whence he
cannot be rescued, except God help him: wherefore from the very fact
that he is willing to sin, he is willing to remain in sin for ever. For
man is "a wind that goeth," namely to sin, "and returneth not by his
own power" (Ps. 77:39). Thus if a man were to throw himself into a pit
whence he could not get out without help, one might say that he wished
to remain there for ever, whatever else he may have thought himself.
Another and a better answer is that from the very fact that he commits
a mortal sin, he places his end in a creature; and since the whole of
life is directed to its end, it follows that for this very reason he
directs the whole of his life to that sin, and is willing to remain in
sin forever, if he could do so with impunity. This is what Gregory says
on Job 41:23, "He shall esteem the deep as growing old" (Moral. xxxiv):
"The wicked only put an end to sinning because their life came to an
end: they would indeed have wished to live for ever, that they might
continue in sin for ever for they desire rather to sin than to live. "
Still another reason may be given why the punishment of mortal sin is
eternal: because thereby one offends God Who is infinite. Wherefore
since punishment cannot be infinite in intensity, because the creature
is incapable of an infinite quality, it must needs be infinite at least
in duration. And again there is a fourth reason for the same: because
guilt remains for ever, since it cannot be remitted without grace, and
men cannot receive grace after death; nor should punishment cease so
long as guilt remains.
Reply to Objection 1: Punishment has not to be equal to fault as to the
amount of duration as is seen to be the case also with human laws. We
may also reply with Gregory (Dial. xliv) that although sin is temporal
in act, it is eternal in will.
Reply to Objection 2: The degree of intensity in the punishment
corresponds to the degree of gravity in the sin; wherefore mortal sins
unequal in gravity will receive a punishment unequal in intensity but
equal in duration.
Reply to Objection 3: The punishments inflicted on those who are not
altogether expelled from the society of their fellow-citizens are
intended for their correction: whereas those punishments, whereby
certain persons are wholly banished from the society of their
fellow-citizens, are not intended for their correction; although they
may be intended for the correction and tranquillity of the others who
remain in the state. Accordingly the damnation of the wicked is for the
correction of those who are now in the Church; for punishments are
intended for correction, not only when they are being inflicted, but
also when they are decreed.
Reply to Objection 4: The everlasting punishment of the wicked will not
be altogether useless. For they are useful for two purposes. First,
because thereby the Divine justice is safeguarded which is acceptable
to God for its own sake. Hence Gregory says (Dial. iv): "Almighty God
on account of His loving kindness delights not in the torments of the
unhappy, but on account of His justice. He is for ever unappeased by
the punishment of the wicked. " Secondly, they are useful, because the
elect rejoice therein, when they see God's justice in them, and realize
that they have escaped them. Hence it is written (Ps. 57:12): "The just
shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge," etc. , and (Is. 66:24):
"They," namely the wicked, "shall be a loathsome sight* to all flesh,"
namely to the saints, as a gloss says. [*"Ad satietatem visionis,"
which St. Thomas takes to signify being satiated with joy; Cf. [5176]
Q[94], A[3]]. Gregory expresses himself in the same sense (Dial. iv):
"The wicked are all condemned to eternal punishment, and are punished
for their own wickedness. Yet they will burn to some purpose, namely
that the just may all both see in God the joys they receive, and
perceive in them the torments they have escaped: for which reason they
will acknowledge themselves for ever the debtors of Divine grace the
more that they will see how the evils which they overcame by its
assistance are punished eternally. "
Reply to Objection 5: Although the punishment relates to the soul
accidentally, it relates essentially to the soul infected with guilt.
And since guilt will remain in the soul for ever, its punishment also
will be everlasting.
Reply to Objection 6: Punishment corresponds to fault, properly
speaking, in respect of the inordinateness in the fault, and not of the
dignity in the person offended: for if the latter were the case, a
punishment of infinite intensity would correspond to every sin.
Accordingly, although a man deserves to lose his being from the fact
that he has sinned against God the author of his being, yet, in view of
the inordinateness of the act itself, loss of being is not due to him,
since being is presupposed to merit and demerit, nor is being lost or
corrupted by the inordinateness of sin [*Cf. [5177]FS, Q[85], A[1]]:
and consequently privation of being cannot be the punishment due to any
sin.
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Whether by God's mercy all punishment of the damned, both men and demons,
comes to an end?
Objection 1: It would seem that by God's mercy all punishment of the
damned, both men and demons, comes to an end.
fire there will be of the very greatest heat, because its heat will be
all gathered together from all parts, through being surrounded on all
sides by the cold of the earth.
Reply to Objection 3: Hell will never lack sufficient room to admit the
bodies of the damned: since hell is accounted one of the three things
that "never are satisfied" (Prov. 30:15,16). Nor is it unreasonable
that God's power should maintain within the bowels of the earth a
hollow great enough to contain all the bodies of the damned.
Reply to Objection 4: It does not follow of necessity that "by what
things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented," except as
regards the principal instruments of sin: for as much as man having
sinned in soul and body will be punished in both. But it does not
follow that a man will be punished in the very place where he sinned,
because the place due to the damned is other from that due to
wayfarers. We may also reply that these words refer to the punishments
inflicted on man on the way: according as each sin has its
corresponding punishment, since "inordinate love is its own
punishment," as Augustine states (Confess. i, 12).
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OF THE WILL AND INTELLECT OF THE DAMNED (NINE ARTICLES)
We must next consider matters pertaining to the will and intellect of
the damned. Under this head there are nine points of inquiry:
(1) Whether every act of will in the damned is evil?
(2) Whether they ever repent of the evil they have done?
(3) Whether they would rather not be than be?
(4) Whether they would wish others to be damned?
(5) Whether the wicked hate God?
(6) Whether they can demerit?
(7) Whether they can make use of the knowledge acquired in this life?
(8) Whether they ever think of God?
(9) Whether they see the glory of the blessed?
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Whether every act of will in the damned is evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that not every act of will in the damned is
evil. For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "the demons desire the
good and the best, namely to be, to live, to understand. " Since, then,
men who are damned are not worse off than the demons, it would seem
that they also can have a good will.
Objection 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "evil is
altogether involuntary. " Therefore if the damned will anything, they
will it as something good or apparently good. Now a will that is
directly ordered to good is itself good. Therefore the damned can have
a good will.
Objection 3: Further, some will be damned who, while in this world,
acquired certain habits of virtue, for instance heathens who had civic
virtues. Now a will elicits praiseworthy acts by reason of virtuous
habits. Therefore there may be praiseworthy acts of the will in some of
the damned.
On the contrary, An obstinate will can never be inclined except to
evil. Now men who are damned will be obstinate even as the demons [*Cf.
[5159]FP, Q[64], A[2]]. Further, as the will of the damned is in
relation to evil, so is the will of the blessed in regard to good. But
the blessed never have an evil will. Neither therefore have the damned
any good will.
I answer that, A twofold will may be considered in the damned, namely
the deliberate will and the natural will. Their natural will is theirs
not of themselves but of the Author of nature, Who gave nature this
inclination which we call the natural will. Wherefore since nature
remains in them, it follows that the natural will in them can be good.
But their deliberate will is theirs of themselves, inasmuch as it is in
their power to be inclined by their affections to this or that. This
will is in them always evil: and this because they are completely
turned away from the last end of a right will, nor can a will be good
except it be directed to that same end. Hence even though they will
some good, they do not will it well so that one be able to call their
will good on that account.
Reply to Objection 1: The words of Dionysius must be understood of the
natural will, which is nature's inclination to some particular good.
And yet this natural inclination is corrupted by their wickedness, in
so far as this good which they desire naturally is desired by them
under certain evil circumstances [*Cf. [5160]FP, Q[64], A[2], ad 5].
Reply to Objection 2: Evil, as evil, does not move the will, but in so
far as it is thought to be good. Yet it comes of their wickedness that
they esteem that which is evil as though it were good. Hence their will
is evil.
Reply to Objection 3: The habits of civic virtue do not remain in the
separated soul, because those virtues perfect us only in the civic life
which will not remain after this life. Even though they remained, they
would never come into action, being enchained, as it were, by the
obstinacy of the mind.
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Whether the damned repent of the evil they have done?
Objection 1: It would seem that the damned never repent of the evil
they have done. For Bernard says on the Canticle [*Cf. De
Consideratione v, 12; De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio ix] that "the damned
ever consent to the evil they have done. " Therefore they never repent
of the sins they have committed.
Objection 2: Further, to wish one had not sinned is a good will. But
the damned will never have a good will. Therefore the damned will never
wish they had not sinned: and thus the same conclusion follows as
above.
Objection 3: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii), "death
is to man what their fall was to the angels. " But the angel's will is
irrevocable after his fall, so that he cannot withdraw from the choice
whereby he previously sinned [*Cf. [5161]FP, Q[64], A[2]]. Therefore
the damned also cannot repent of the sins committed by them.
Objection 4: Further, the wickedness of the damned in hell will be
greater than that of sinners in the world. Now in this world some
sinners repent not of the sins they have committed, either through
blindness of mind, as heretics, or through obstinacy, as those "who are
glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things"
(Prov. 2:14). Therefore, etc.
On the contrary, It is said of the damned (Wis. 5:3): "Repenting within
themselves [Vulg. : 'Saying within themselves, repenting']. "
Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4) that "the wicked are full
of repentance; for afterwards they are sorry for that in which
previously they took pleasure. " Therefore the damned, being most
wicked, repent all the more.
I answer that, A person may repent of sin in two ways: in one way
directly, in another way indirectly. He repents of a sin directly who
hates sin as such: and he repents indirectly who hates it on account of
something connected with it, for instance punishment or something of
that kind. Accordingly the wicked will not repent of their sins
directly, because consent in the malice of sin will remain in them; but
they will repent indirectly, inasmuch as they will suffer from the
punishment inflicted on them for sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The damned will wickedness, but shun punishment:
and thus indirectly they repent of wickedness committed.
Reply to Objection 2: To wish one had not sinned on account of the
shamefulness of vice is a good will: but this will not be in the
wicked.
Reply to Objection 3: It will be possible for the damned to repent of
their sins without turning their will away from sin, because in their
sins they will shun, not what they heretofore desired, but something
else, namely the punishment.
Reply to Objection 4: However obstinate men may be in this world, they
repent of the sins indirectly, if they be punished for them. Thus
Augustine says (QQ[83], qu. 36): "We see the most savage beasts are
deterred from the greatest pleasures by fear of pain. "
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Whether the damned by right and deliberate reason would wish not to be?
Objection 1: It would seem impossible for the damned, by right and
deliberate reason, to wish not to be. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb.
iii, 7): "Consider how great a good it is to be; since both the happy
and the unhappy will it; for to be and yet to be unhappy is a greater
thing than not to be at all. "
Objection 2: Further, Augustine argues thus (De Lib. Arb. iii, 8):
"Preference supposes election. " But "not to be" is not eligible; since
it has not the appearance of good, for it is nothing. Therefore not to
be cannot be more desirable to the damned than "to be. "
Objection 3: Further, the greater evil is the more to be shunned. Now
"not to be" is the greatest evil, since it removes good altogether, so
as to leave nothing. Therefore "not to be" is more to be shunned than
to be unhappy: and thus the same conclusion follows as above.
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 9:6): "In those days men . . .
shall desire to die, and death shall fly from them. "
Further, the unhappiness of the damned surpasses all unhappiness of
this world. Now in order to escape the unhappiness of this world, it is
desirable to some to die, wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 41:3,4): "O
death, thy sentence is welcome to the man that is in need and to him
whose strength faileth; who is in a decrepit age, and that is in care
about all things, and to the distrustful that loseth wisdom [Vulg. :
'patience']. " Much more, therefore, is "not to be" desirable to the
damned according to their deliberate reason.
I answer that, Not to be may be considered in two ways. First, in
itself, and thus it can nowise be desirable, since it has no aspect of
good, but is pure privation of good. Secondly, it may be considered as
a relief from a painful life or from some unhappiness: and thus "not to
be" takes on the aspect of good, since "to lack an evil is a kind of
good" as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1). In this way it is better
for the damned not to be than to be unhappy. Hence it is said (Mat.
26:24): "It were better for him, if that man had not been born," and
(Jer. 20:14): "Cursed be the day wherein I was born," where a gloss of
Jerome observes: "It is better not to be than to be evilly. " In this
sense the damned can prefer "not to be" according to their deliberate
reason [*Cf. [5162]FP, Q[5], A[2], ad 3].
Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Augustine is to be understood in
the sense that "not to be" is eligible, not in itself but accidentally,
as putting an end to unhappiness. For when it is stated that "to be"
and "to live" are desired by all naturally, we are not to take this as
referable to an evil and corrupt life, and a life of unhappiness, as
the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4), but absolutely.
Reply to Objection 2: Non-existence is eligible, not in itself, but
only accidentally, as stated already.
Reply to Objection 3: Although "not to be" is very evil, in so far as
it removes being, it is very good, in so far as it removes unhappiness,
which is the greatest of evils, and thus it is preferred "not to be. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in hell the damned would wish others were damned who are not damned?
Objection 1: It would seem that in hell the damned would not wish
others were damned who are not damned. For it is said (Lk. 16:27, 28)
of the rich man that he prayed for his brethren, lest they should come
"into the place of torments. " Therefore in like manner the other damned
would not wish, at least their friends in the flesh to be damned in
hell.
Objection 2: Further, the damned are not deprived of their inordinate
affections. Now some of the damned loved inordinately some who are not
damned. Therefore they would not desire their evil, i. e. that they
should be damned.
Objection 3: Further, the damned do not desire the increase of their
punishment. Now if more were damned, their punishment would be greater,
even as the joy of the blessed is increased by an increase in their
number. Therefore the damned desire not the damnation of those who are
saved.
On the contrary, A gloss on Is. 14:9, "are risen up from their
thrones," says: "The wicked are comforted by having many companions in
their punishment. "
Further, envy reigns supreme in the damned. Therefore they grieve for
the happiness of the blessed, and desire their damnation.
I answer that Even as in the blessed in heaven there will be most
perfect charity, so in the damned there will be the most perfect hate.
Wherefore as the saints will rejoice in all goods, so will the damned
grieve for all goods. Consequently the sight of the happiness of the
saints will give them very great pain; hence it is written (Is. 26:11):
"Let the envious people see and be confounded, and let fire devour Thy
enemies. " Therefore they will wish all the good were damned.
Reply to Objection 1: So great will be the envy of the damned that they
will envy the glory even of their kindred, since they themselves are
supremely unhappy, for this happens even in this life, when envy
increases. Nevertheless they will envy their kindred less than others,
and their punishment would be greater if all their kindred were damned,
and others saved, than if some of their kindred were saved. For this
reason the rich man prayed that his brethren might be warded from
damnation: for he knew that some are guarded therefrom. Yet he would
rather that his brethren were damned as well as all the rest.
Reply to Objection 2: Love that is not based on virtue is easily
voided, especially in evil men as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4).
Hence the damned will not preserve their friendship for those whom they
loved inordinately. Yet the will of them will remain perverse, because
they will continue to love the cause of their inordinate loving.
Reply to Objection 3: Although an increase in the number of the damned
results in an increase of each one's punishment, so much the more will
their hatred and envy increase that they will prefer to be more
tormented with many rather than less tormented alone.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the damned hate God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the damned do not hate God. For,
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "the beautiful and good that is
the cause of all goodness and beauty is beloved of all. " But this is
God. Therefore God cannot be the object of anyone's hate.
Objection 2: Further, no one can hate goodness itself, as neither can
one will badness itself since "evil is altogether involuntary," as
Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now God is goodness itself. Therefore
no one can hate Him.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 73:23): "The pride of them that
hate Thee ascendeth continually. "
I answer that, The appetite is moved by good or evil apprehended. Now
God is apprehended in two ways, namely in Himself, as by the blessed,
who see Him in His essence; and in His effects, as by us and by the
damned. Since, then, He is goodness by His essence, He cannot in
Himself be displeasing to any will; wherefore whoever sees Him in His
essence cannot hate Him. On the other hand, some of His effects are
displeasing to the will in so far as they are opposed to any one: and
accordingly a person may hate God not in Himself, but by reason of His
effects. Therefore the damned, perceiving God in His punishment, which
is the effect of His justice, hate Him, even as they hate the
punishment inflicted on them [*Cf. Q[90], A[3], ad 2; [5163]SS, Q[34],
A[1]].
Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Dionysius refers to the natural
appetite. and even this is rendered perverse in the damned, by that
which is added thereto by their deliberate will, as stated above
[5164](A[1]) [*Cf. [5165]SS, Q[34], A[1], ad 1 where St. Thomas gives
another answer].
Reply to Objection 2: This argument would prove if the damned saw God
in Himself, as being in His essence.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the damned demerit?
Objection 1: It would seem that the damned demerit. For the damned have
an evil will, as stated in the last Distinction of Sentent. iv. But
they demerited by the evil will that they had here. Therefore if they
demerit not there, their damnation is to their advantage.
Objection 2: Further, the damned are on the same footing as the demons.
Now the demons demerit after their fall, wherefore God inflicted a
punishment on the serpent, who induced man to sin (Gn. 3:14,15).
Therefore the damned also demerit.
Objection 3: Further, an inordinate act that proceeds from a deliberate
will is not excused from demerit, even though there be necessity of
which one is oneself the cause: for the "drunken man deserves a double
punishment" if he commit a crime through being drunk (Ethic. iii). Now
the damned were themselves the cause of their own obstinacy, owing to
which they are under a kind of necessity of sinning. Therefore since
their act proceeds from their free will, they are not excused from
demerit.
On the contrary, Punishment is contradistinguished from fault [*Cf.
[5166]FP, Q[48], A[5]]. Now the perverse will of the damned proceeds
from their obstinacy which is their punishment. Therefore the perverse
will of the damned is not a fault whereby they may demerit.
Further, after reaching the last term there is no further movement, or
advancement in good or evil. Now the damned, especially after the
judgment day, will have reached the last term of their damnation, since
then there "will cease to be two cities," according to Augustine
(Enchiridion cxi). Therefore after the judgment day the damned will not
demerit by their perverse will, for if they did their damnation would
be augmented.
I answer that, We must draw a distinction between the damned before the
judgment day and after. For all are agreed that after the judgment day
there will be neither merit nor demerit. The reason for this is because
merit or demerit is directed to the attainment of some further good or
evil: and after the day of judgment good and evil will have reached
their ultimate consummation, so that there will be no further addition
to good or evil. Consequently, good will in the blessed will not be a
merit but a reward, and evil will in the damned will be not a demerit
but a punishment only. For works of virtue belong especially to the
state of happiness and their contraries to the state of unhappiness
(Ethic. i, 9,10).
On the other hand, some say that, before the judgment day, both the
good merit and the damned demerit. But this cannot apply to the
essential reward or to the principal punishment, since in this respect
both have reached the term. Possibly, however, this may apply to the
accidental reward, or secondary punishment, which are subject to
increase until the day of judgment. Especially may this apply to the
demons, or to the good angels, by whose activities some are drawn to
salvation, whereby the joy of the blessed angels is increased, and some
to damnation, whereby the punishment of the demons is augmented [*Cf.
[5167]FP, Q[62], A[9], ad 3; [5168]SS, Q[13], A[4], ad 2; where St.
Thomas tacitly retracts the opinion expressed here as to merit or
demerit. ].
Reply to Objection 1: It is in the highest degree unprofitable to have
reached the highest degree of evil, the result being that the damned
are incapable of demerit. Hence it is clear that they gain no advantage
from their sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Men who are damned are not occupied in drawing
others to damnation, as the demons are, for which reason the latter
demerit as regards their secondary punishment [*Cf. [5169]FP, Q[62],
A[9], ad 3; [5170]SS, Q[13] , A[4], ad 2; where St. Thomas tacitly
retracts the opinion expressed here as to merit or demerit].
Reply to Objection 3: The reason why they are not excused from demerit
is not because they are under the necessity of sinning, but because
they have reached the highest of evils.
However, the necessity of sinning whereof we are ourselves the cause,
in so far as it is a necessity, excuses from sin, because every sin
needs to be voluntary: but it does not excuse, in so far as it proceeds
from a previous act of the will: and consequently the whole demerit of
the subsequent sin would seem to belong to the previous sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the damned can make use of the knowledge they had in this world?
[*Cf. FP, Q[89]]
Objection 1: It would seem that the damned are unable to make use of
the knowledge they had in this world. For there is very great pleasure
in the consideration of knowledge. But we must not admit that they have
any pleasure. Therefore they cannot make use of the knowledge they had
heretofore, by applying their consideration thereto.
Objection 2: Further, the damned suffer greater pains than any pains of
this world. Now in this world, when one is in very great pain, it is
impossible to consider any intelligible conclusions, through being
distracted by the pains that one suffers. Much less therefore can one
do so in hell.
Objection 3: Further, the damned are subject to time. But "length of
time is the cause of forgetfulness" (Phys. lib. iv, 13). Therefore the
damned will forget what they knew here.
On the contrary, It is said to the rich man who was damned (Lk. 16:25):
"Remember that thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime," etc.
Therefore they will consider about the things they knew here.
Further, the intelligible species remain in the separated soul, as
stated above (Q[70], A[2], ad 3; [5171]FP, Q[89], AA[5],6). Therefore,
if they could not use them, these would remain in them to no purpose.
I answer that, Even as in the saints on account of the perfection of
their glory, there will be nothing but what is a matter of joy so there
will be nothing in the damned but what is a matter and cause of sorrow;
nor will anything that can pertain to sorrow be lacking, so that their
unhappiness is consummate. Now the consideration of certain things
known brings us joy, in some respect, either on the part of the things
known, because we love them, or on the part of the knowledge, because
it is fitting and perfect. There may also be a reason for sorrow both
on the part of the things known, because they are of a grievous nature,
and on the part of the knowledge, if we consider its imperfection; for
instance a person may consider his defective knowledge about a certain
thing, which he would desire to know perfectly. Accordingly, in the
damned there will be actual consideration of the things they knew
heretofore as matters of sorrow, but not as a cause of pleasure. For
they will consider both the evil they have done, and for which they
were damned, and the delightful goods they have lost, and on both
counts they will suffer torments. Likewise they will be tormented with
the thought that the knowledge they had of speculative matters was
imperfect, and that they missed its highest degree of perfection which
they might have acquired.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the consideration of knowledge is
delightful in itself, it may accidentally be the cause of sorrow, as
explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: In this world the soul is united to a corruptible
body, wherefore the soul's consideration is hindered by the suffering
of the body. On the other hand, in the future life the soul will not be
so drawn by the body, but however much the body may suffer, the soul
will have a most clear view of those things that can be a cause of
anguish to it.
Reply to Objection 3: Time causes forgetfulness accidentally, in so far
as the movement whereof it is the measure is the cause of change. But
after the judgment day there will be no movement of the heavens;
wherefore neither will it be possible for forgetfulness to result from
any lapse of time however long. Before the judgment day, however, the
separated soul is not changed from its disposition by the heavenly
movement.
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Whether the damned will ever think of God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the damned will sometimes think of God.
For one cannot hate a thing actually, except one think about it. Now
the damned will hate God, as stated in the text of Sentent. iv, in the
last Distinction. Therefore they will think of God sometimes.
Objection 2: Further, the damned will have remorse of conscience. But
the conscience suffers remorse for deeds done against God. Therefore
they will sometimes think of God.
On the contrary, Man's most perfect thoughts are those which are about
God: whereas the damned will be in a state of the greatest
imperfection. Therefore they will not think of God.
I answer that, one may think of God in two ways. First, in Himself and
according to that which is proper to Him, namely that He is the fount
of all goodness: and thus it is altogether impossible to think of Him
without delight, so that the damned will by no means think of Him in
this way. Secondly, according to something accidental as it were to Him
in His effects, such as His punishments, and so forth, and in this
respect the thought of God can bring sorrow, so that in this way the
damned will think of God.
Reply to Objection 1: The damned do not hate God except because He
punishes and forbids what is agreeable to their evil will: and
consequently they will think of Him only as punishing and forbidding.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection, since conscience
will not have remorse for sin except as forbidden by the Divine
commandment.
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Whether the damned see the glory of the blessed?
Objection 1: It would seem that the damned do not see the glory of the
blessed. For they are more distant from the glory of the blessed than
from the happenings of this world. But they do not see what happens in
regard to us: hence Gregory commenting on Job 14:21, "Whether his
children come to honor," etc. says (Moral. xii): "Even as those who
still live know not in what place are the souls of the dead; so the
dead who have lived in the body know not the things which regard the
life of those who are in the flesh. " Much less, therefore, can they see
the glory of the blessed.
Objection 2: Further, that which is granted as a great favor to the
saints in this life is never granted to the damned. Now it was granted
as a great favor to Paul to see the life in which the saints live for
ever with God (2 Cor. 12). Therefore the damned will not see the glory
of the saints.
On the contrary, It is stated (Lk. 16:23) that the rich man in the
midst of his torments "saw Abraham . . . and Lazarus in his bosom. "
I answer that, The damned, before the judgment day, will see the
blessed in glory, in such a way as to know, not what that glory is
like, but only that they are in a state of glory that surpasses all
thought. This will trouble them, both because they will, through envy,
grieve for their happiness, and because they have forfeited that glory.
Hence it is written (Wis. 5:2) concerning the wicked: "Seeing it" they
"shall be troubled with terrible fear. " After the judgment day,
however, they will be altogether deprived of seeing the blessed: nor
will this lessen their punishment, but will increase it; because they
will bear in remembrance the glory of the blessed which they saw at or
before the judgment: and this will torment them. Moreover they will be
tormented by finding themselves deemed unworthy even to see the glory
which the saints merit to have.
Reply to Objection 1: The happenings of this life would not, if seen,
torment the damned in hell as the sight of the glory of the saints;
wherefore the things which happen here are not shown to the damned in
the same way as the saints' glory; although also of the things that
happen here those are shown to them which are capable of causing them
sorrow.
Reply to Objection 2: Paul looked upon that life wherein the saints
live with God [*Cf. [5172]SS, Q[185], A[3], ad 2], by actual experience
thereof and by hoping to have it more perfectly in the life to come.
Not so the damned; wherefore the comparison fails.
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OF GOD'S MERCY AND JUSTICE TOWARDS THE DAMNED (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must next consider God's justice and mercy towards the damned: under
which head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether by Divine justice an eternal punishment is inflicted on
sinners?
(2) Whether by God's mercy all punishment both of men and of demons
comes to an end?
(3) Whether at least the punishment of men comes to an end?
(4) Whether at least the punishment of Christians has an end?
(5) Whether there is an end to the punishment of those who have
performed works of mercy?
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Whether by Divine justice an eternal punishment is inflicted on sinners?
[*Cf. FS, Q[87], AA[3],4]
Objection 1: It would seem that an eternal punishment is not inflicted
on sinners by Divine justice. For the punishment should not exceed the
fault: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of
the stripes be" (Dt. 25:2). Now fault is temporal. Therefore the
punishment should not be eternal.
Objection 2: Further, of two mortal sins one is greater than the other.
and therefore one should receive a greater punishment than the other.
But no punishment is greater than eternal punishment, since it is
infinite. Therefore eternal punishment is not due to every sin; and if
it is not due to one, it is due to none, since they are not infinitely
distant from one another.
Objection 3: Further, a just judge does not punish except in order to
correct, wherefore it is stated (Ethic. ii, 3) that "punishments are a
kind of medicine. " Now, to punish the wicked eternally does not lead to
their correction, nor to that of others, since then there will be no
one in future who can be corrected thereby. Therefore eternal
punishment is not inflicted for sins according to Divine justice.
Objection 4: Further, no one wishes that which is not desirable for its
own sake, except on account of some advantage. Now God does not wish
punishment for its own sake, for He delights not in punishments [*The
allusion is to Wis. 1:13: "Neither hath He pleasure in the destruction
of the living," as may be gathered from [5173]FS, Q[87], A[3], OBJ[3]].
Since then no advantage can result from the perpetuity of punishment,
it would seem that He ought not to inflict such a punishment for sin.
Objection 5: Further, "nothing accidental lasts for ever" (De Coelo et
Mundo i). But punishment is one of those things that happen
accidentally, since it is contrary to nature. Therefore it cannot be
everlasting.
Objection 6: Further, the justice of God would seem to require that
sinners should be brought to naught: because on account of ingratitude
a person deserves to lose all benefits. and among other benefits of God
there is "being" itself. Therefore it would seem just that the sinner
who has been ungrateful to God should lose his being. But if sinners be
brought to naught, their punishment cannot be everlasting. Therefore it
would seem out of keeping with Divine justice that sinners should be
punished for ever.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 25:46): "These," namely the
wicked, "shall go into everlasting punishment. "
Further, as reward is to merit, so is punishment to guilt. Now,
according to Divine justice, an eternal reward is due to temporal
merit: "Every one who seeth the Son and believeth in Him hath [Vulg. :
'that everyone . . . may have'] life everlasting. " Therefore according
to Divine justice an everlasting punishment is due to temporal guilt.
Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5), punishment is
meted according to the dignity of the person sinned against, so that a
person who strikes one in authority receives a greater punishment than
one who strikes anyone else. Now whoever sins mortally sins against
God, Whose commandments he breaks, and Whose honor he gives another, by
placing his end in some one other than God. But God's majesty is
infinite. Therefore whoever sins mortally deserves infinite punishment;
and consequently it seems just that for a mortal sin a man should be
punished for ever.
I answer that, Since punishment is measured in two ways, namely
according to the degree of its severity, and according to its length of
time, the measure of punishment corresponds to the measure of fault, as
regards the degree of severity, so that the more grievously a person
sins the more grievously is he punished: "As much as she hath glorified
herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to
her" (Apoc. 18:7). The duration of the punishment does not, however,
correspond with the duration of the fault, as Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xxi, 11), for adultery which is committed in a short space of time
is not punished with a momentary penalty even according to human laws
[*Cf. [5174]FS, Q[87], A[3], ad 1]. But the duration of punishment
regards the disposition of the sinner: for sometimes a person who
commits an offense in a city is rendered by his very offense worthy of
being cut off entirely from the fellowship of the citizens, either by
perpetual exile or even by death: whereas sometimes he is not rendered
worthy of being cut off entirely from the fellowship of the citizens.
wherefore in order that he may become a fitting member of the State,
his punishment is prolonged or curtailed, according as is expedient for
his amendment, so that he may live in the city in a becoming and
peaceful manner. So too, according to Divine justice, sin renders a
person worthy to be altogether cut off from the fellowship of God's
city, and this is the effect of every sin committed against charity,
which is the bond uniting this same city together. Consequently, for
mortal sin which is contrary to charity a person is expelled for ever
from the fellowship of the saints and condemned to everlasting
punishment, because as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11), "as men
are cut off from this perishable city by the penalty of the first
death, so are they excluded from that imperishable city by the
punishment of the second death. " That the punishment inflicted by the
earthly state is not deemed everlasting is accidental, either because
man endures not for ever, or because the state itself comes to an end.
Wherefore if man lived for ever, the punishment of exile or slavery,
which is pronounced by human law, would remain in him for ever. On the
other hand, as regards those who sin in such a way as not to deserve to
be entirely cut off from the fellowship of the saints, such as those
who sin venially, their punishment will be so much the shorter or
longer according as they are more or less fit to be cleansed, through
sin clinging to them more or less: this is observed in the punishments
of this world and of purgatory according to Divine justice.
We find also other reasons given by the saints why some are justly
condemned to everlasting punishment for a temporal sin. One is because
they sinned against an eternal good by despising eternal life. This is
mentioned by Augustine (De Civ. Dei. xii, 12): "He is become worthy of
eternal evil, who destroyed in himself a good which could be eternal. "
Another reason is because man sinned in his own eternity [*Cf.
[5175]FS, Q[87], A[3], ad 1]; wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv), it
belongs to the great justice of the judge that those should never cease
to be punished, who in this life never ceased to desire sin. And if it
be objected that some who sin mortally propose to amend their life at
some time, and that these accordingly are seemingly not deserving of
eternal punishment, it must be replied according to some that Gregory
speaks of the will that is made manifest by the deed. For he who falls
into mortal sin of his own will puts himself in a state whence he
cannot be rescued, except God help him: wherefore from the very fact
that he is willing to sin, he is willing to remain in sin for ever. For
man is "a wind that goeth," namely to sin, "and returneth not by his
own power" (Ps. 77:39). Thus if a man were to throw himself into a pit
whence he could not get out without help, one might say that he wished
to remain there for ever, whatever else he may have thought himself.
Another and a better answer is that from the very fact that he commits
a mortal sin, he places his end in a creature; and since the whole of
life is directed to its end, it follows that for this very reason he
directs the whole of his life to that sin, and is willing to remain in
sin forever, if he could do so with impunity. This is what Gregory says
on Job 41:23, "He shall esteem the deep as growing old" (Moral. xxxiv):
"The wicked only put an end to sinning because their life came to an
end: they would indeed have wished to live for ever, that they might
continue in sin for ever for they desire rather to sin than to live. "
Still another reason may be given why the punishment of mortal sin is
eternal: because thereby one offends God Who is infinite. Wherefore
since punishment cannot be infinite in intensity, because the creature
is incapable of an infinite quality, it must needs be infinite at least
in duration. And again there is a fourth reason for the same: because
guilt remains for ever, since it cannot be remitted without grace, and
men cannot receive grace after death; nor should punishment cease so
long as guilt remains.
Reply to Objection 1: Punishment has not to be equal to fault as to the
amount of duration as is seen to be the case also with human laws. We
may also reply with Gregory (Dial. xliv) that although sin is temporal
in act, it is eternal in will.
Reply to Objection 2: The degree of intensity in the punishment
corresponds to the degree of gravity in the sin; wherefore mortal sins
unequal in gravity will receive a punishment unequal in intensity but
equal in duration.
Reply to Objection 3: The punishments inflicted on those who are not
altogether expelled from the society of their fellow-citizens are
intended for their correction: whereas those punishments, whereby
certain persons are wholly banished from the society of their
fellow-citizens, are not intended for their correction; although they
may be intended for the correction and tranquillity of the others who
remain in the state. Accordingly the damnation of the wicked is for the
correction of those who are now in the Church; for punishments are
intended for correction, not only when they are being inflicted, but
also when they are decreed.
Reply to Objection 4: The everlasting punishment of the wicked will not
be altogether useless. For they are useful for two purposes. First,
because thereby the Divine justice is safeguarded which is acceptable
to God for its own sake. Hence Gregory says (Dial. iv): "Almighty God
on account of His loving kindness delights not in the torments of the
unhappy, but on account of His justice. He is for ever unappeased by
the punishment of the wicked. " Secondly, they are useful, because the
elect rejoice therein, when they see God's justice in them, and realize
that they have escaped them. Hence it is written (Ps. 57:12): "The just
shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge," etc. , and (Is. 66:24):
"They," namely the wicked, "shall be a loathsome sight* to all flesh,"
namely to the saints, as a gloss says. [*"Ad satietatem visionis,"
which St. Thomas takes to signify being satiated with joy; Cf. [5176]
Q[94], A[3]]. Gregory expresses himself in the same sense (Dial. iv):
"The wicked are all condemned to eternal punishment, and are punished
for their own wickedness. Yet they will burn to some purpose, namely
that the just may all both see in God the joys they receive, and
perceive in them the torments they have escaped: for which reason they
will acknowledge themselves for ever the debtors of Divine grace the
more that they will see how the evils which they overcame by its
assistance are punished eternally. "
Reply to Objection 5: Although the punishment relates to the soul
accidentally, it relates essentially to the soul infected with guilt.
And since guilt will remain in the soul for ever, its punishment also
will be everlasting.
Reply to Objection 6: Punishment corresponds to fault, properly
speaking, in respect of the inordinateness in the fault, and not of the
dignity in the person offended: for if the latter were the case, a
punishment of infinite intensity would correspond to every sin.
Accordingly, although a man deserves to lose his being from the fact
that he has sinned against God the author of his being, yet, in view of
the inordinateness of the act itself, loss of being is not due to him,
since being is presupposed to merit and demerit, nor is being lost or
corrupted by the inordinateness of sin [*Cf. [5177]FS, Q[85], A[1]]:
and consequently privation of being cannot be the punishment due to any
sin.
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Whether by God's mercy all punishment of the damned, both men and demons,
comes to an end?
Objection 1: It would seem that by God's mercy all punishment of the
damned, both men and demons, comes to an end.
