82 An
Historian
of Culture
?
?
Foucault-Live
We had to struggle for a long time against these two models.
It was the Communist Party which suggested and im- posed the Russian one, and the struggle against the Party's conservative influence brought a somewhat systematic refusal of the Soviet model; on the other hand, a certain liberal bour- geoisie tied up with American interests never stopped putting
? Rituals of Exclusion 71
? forward the American model, against which it was also neces- sary to struggle. At that moment, I think, the mechanisms of chauvinism appeared inside the French Left. These are mecha- nisms that are not always conscious; they manifest themselves by a game of exclusion, of refusal and oversight. American literature, for instance, is very httle read in France. One does not read American philosophy, history and criticism at all; American books are translated after an enormous delay. One must not allow the struggle against American economic influ- ence and relations to affect relations with American intellectu- als. We must have a selective nationalism. I believe that a small country like France is necessarily bound to be somewhat nationalistic in its politics and economy if it wants to preserve some degree of independence; on the other hand, we must understand that a struggle which today is ideological but will become some day openly revolutionary is tuming up in every comer of the world. Cultural chauvinism must be abandoned.
? Q: This has been your first trip to America, your first teaching assignment in an American university. In relation to the cultural change which you just spoke about, how will these two months affect you?
? MF: My problem is essentially the definition of the implicit systems in which we find ourselves prisoners; what I would like to grasp is the system of limits and exclusion which we practice without knowing it; I would like to make the cultural unconscious apparent. Therefore, the more I travel, the more I remove myself from my natural and hibitual centers of gravity, the greater my chance of grasping the foundations I am obviously standing on. To that extent any trip--not of course in the sense of a sightseeing trip nor even a survey-- any movement away from my original frame of reference, is fiiiitful. It is always good for me to change language and
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? country. A simple example; in New York I was struck, as any foreigner would be, by the immediate contrast between the "good sections" and the poverty, even the misery, that sur- round them on the right and the left. North and South. I well know that one finds that same contrast in Europe, and that you too, when in Europe, are certainly shocked by the great misery in the poor sections of Paris, Hamburg or London, it doesn't matter where. Having lived in Europe for years, I had lost a sense of this contrast and had ended up believing that there had been a general rise in the standard of living of the whole population; I wasn't far from imagining that the proletariat was becoming middle class, that there were really no more poor people, that the social struggle, the struggle between classes, consequently, was coming to an end. Well, seeing New York, perceiving again suddenly this vivid contrast that exists everywhere but which was blotted out of my eyes by familiar forms of it, that was for me a kind of second revela- tion; the class struggle still exists, it exists more intensely. A
? Notes
? ' Peter Weiss, The Persecution and Assassination of Jean- Paul Marat, as Performed by the Inmates of the Asylum of Charenton, under the Direction of the Marquis de Sade, Translated by Geoffrey Skelton and Adrian Mitchell, (New York; Atheneum, 1966).
? 2 The C. G. T. (General Confederation of Workers) is a power- ful trade-union very close to the French Communist Party. Cf. A. Beiden Fields, Trotskyism and Maoism: Theory and Practice in France and the United States (New York; Au- tonomedia, 1988).
? 7
An Historian of Culture
? ? Q: Professor Foucault, you have said that philoso- phy, as a discourse, is above all a diagnostic enterprise. I would like to ask you a question about this. Doesn't perform- ing a diagnosis perhaps involve placing oneself outside, ele- vating oneself to a different level of reflection, a level superior to the level of the objective field to which the diagnosis is applied?
? MF; I would like to add that there exist various means of knowing diagnostically. By diagnostic knowledge I mean, in general, a form of knowledge that defines and deter- mines differences. For example, when a doctor makes a diag- nosis of tuberculosis, he does it by determining the differences that distinguish someone sick with tuberculosis from someone sick with pneumonia or anyother disease. In this sense diag- nostic knowledge operates within a certain objective field de- fined by the sickness, the symptoms, etc.
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Q: Yet it is outside the sickness: the doctor speaks of the sickness but doesn't live it; and his discourse is not in fact a symptom of this or that sickness.
? MF: Yes, within an objective field yet outside of the sickness. However, there are forms of diagnostic knowledge that are not located within an objective field but which, on the contrary, permit a new objective field to appear. For example, when Saussure defined what langue was with respect to parole or what synchronic was with respect to diachronic, he opened up a new sector of potential studies, a new objective field which did not exist before. ' And this too is knowledge through diagnosis, though much different from the first type.
? Q: At any rate, it is necessary to resort to a metalan- guage, a language to describe a language.
MF: Not always. It depends on the science with which one is dealing. I do not believe that one can call a medical diagnosis a metalanguage.
Q: If we consider the symptoms of a sickness as
signs, the doctor's discourse is metalinguistic with respect to these signs.
? MF: If you give to metalanguage the very general meaning of a discourse about a system of signs, it is true that one is dealing with a metalanguage. But only if one accepts this very general definition.
Q; Metalanguage is a discourse about a discourse.
MF: Yes, but now I am a little worried because today the term metalanguage is employed in a very wide and
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? general sense which lacks rigor. One speaks of metalanguage in dealing with literary criticism, the history of science, the history of philosophy, etc. Naturally, one can talk about it in dealing with medicine as well. I wonder whether it might not be preferable to return to the more rigorous definition of meta- language, one which says that it is the discourse through which the elements and the rules of construction of a language are defined.
Q: In fact, in mathematics, metalanguage is the lan- guage through which mathematics is formalized. But beyond the definition, the most important aspect of the question is something else: that is, that the structure of the metalanguage can be different from that of the language.
MF: Possibly.
Q: But I am constructing my discourse within the
episteme of my civilization, or outside it?
MF: What meaning are you giving to the term epis-
teme?
Q: The same one you gave to it.
MF: Yes, and I'd like to know what that meaning is.
? Q: For my part, as a good neo-Kantian, I intend to refer to the categories.
MF: Now we're at the crux. What I called episteme in The Order of Things has nothing to do with historical cate- gories, that is with those categories created in a particular historical moment. When I speak of episteme, I mean all those
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? relationships which existed between the various sectors of sci- ence during a given epoch. For example, I am thinking of the fact that at a certain point mathematics was used for research in physics, while linguistics or, if you will, semiology, the science of signs, was used by biology (to deal with genetic messages). Likewise the theory of evolution was used by, or served as a model for historians, psychologists, and sociolo- gists of the 19th century. All these phenomena of relationship between the sciences or between the various scientific sectors constitute what I call the episteme of an epoch. Thus for me episteme has nothing to do with the Kantian categories.
? Q: Yet when you speak of the concept of "order" in the 17th century, aren't you dealing with a category?
? MF: I simply noted that the problem of order (the problem, not the category), or rather the need to introduce an order among series of numbers, human beings, or values, ap- pears simultaneously in many different disciplines in the 17th century. This involves a communication between the diverse disciplines, and so it was that someone who proposed, for example, the creation of a universal language in the 17th cen- tury was quite close in terms of procedure to somoeone who dealt with the problem of how one could catalog human beings. It's a question of relationships and communication among the various sciences. This is what I call episteme, and it has nothing to do with the Kantian categories.
? Q: I call these categories, because they are formal, universal, and empty.
MF: Do you consider historicity, for example, to be a category?
? An Historian of Culture 77
? Q: Yes, it's a category of 19th century culture.
MF: But this isn't Kant's meaning of "category. "
Q: It depends on how one reads Kant.
MF: Then I recognize that even my own are catego- ries in this sense.
Q: Let's go on now to another topic. I would like to ask you a question concerning your interest in Nietzsche. What is the Nietzsche that you like?
MF: Clearly, it is not that of Zarathustra. It is that of The Birth of Tragedy, of The Genealogy of Morals.
Q: The Nietzsche of origins, then?
? MF: I would say that in Nietzsche I find a question- ing of the historical type which does not refer in any way to the "original" as do many of the analyses of Western thought. Husserl and Heidegger bring up for discussion again all of our knowledge and its foundations, but they do this by beginning from that which is original. This analysis takes place, how- ever, at the expense of any articulated historical content. In- stead, what I liked in Nietzsche is the attempt to bring up for discussion again the fundamental concepts of knowledge, of morals, and of metaphysics by appealing to a historical analy- sis of the positivistic type, without going back to origins. But clearly this is not the only thing that interests me in Nietzsche.
In your writings, I find another more important as- pect; the retum to the discussion of the primacy, or, if you prefer, of the privilege of the subject in the Cartesian or Kan- tian sense, of the subject as consciousness.
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Q: It's precisely on that point that I wanted to ask you another question. I have the impression that for you, as for the majority of French philosophers, the subject coincides with consciousness.
? MF: For me this isn't true; but it is true that the over- whelming majority of philosphers from the 17th to the 19th century has equated subject and consciousness. I would say, rather, that this holds true also for the French philosophers of the 20th century, including Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. I think that this equation of subject-consciousness at the transcenden- tal level is a characteristic of Western philosophy from Des- cartes to our own time. Nietzsche launched one of the first, or at least one of the most vigorous, attacks against this equation.
? Q: It's a question of consciousness as the subject of "I think. " But what I don't understand is the position of con- sciousnenss as object of an episteme. The consciousness, if anything, is "epistemizing," not "epistemizable. "
MF: Are you speaking of the transcendental con- sciousness?
Q: Yes.
? MF: Well, I am not Kantian or Cartesian, precisely because I refuse an equation on the transcendental level be- tween subject and thinking "I. " I am convinced that there ex- ist, if not exactly structures, then at least rules for the function- ing of knowledge which have arisen in the course of history and within which can be located the various subjects.
? Q: I am afraid that all this may be a trap in which we are prisoners. What you are saying is undoubtedly true, but on
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? the other hand, it is exactly this transcendental consciousness which conditions the formation of our knowledge. It is true that transcendental consciousness arises in a particular phase of our history and civilization, in a particular situation; but it is also true that, once arisen, it manifests itself as a constituting and not a constituted thing.
MF: I understand your position, but it is exacty on this point that our views diverge. You seem to me Kantian or Husserlian. In all of my work I strive instead to avoid any reference to this transcendental as a condition of possibility for any knowledge. When I say that I strive to avoid it, I don't mean that I am sure of succeeding. My procedure at this mo- ment is of a regressive sort, I would say; I try to assume a greater and greater detachment in order to define the historical conditions and transformations of our knowledge. I try to his- toricize to the utmost in order to leave as litu? e space as pos- sible to the transcendental. I cannot exclude the possibility that one day I will have to confront an irreducible residuum which will be, in fact, the transcendental.
? Q: Let's try to look at the question fi-om another point of view. Since it is said that you are a structuralist (for- give me for saying this), I would like to know whether you think that some kind of relationship exists between the concept of "structure" and the Freudian notion of the "unconscious. "
? MF: I'll answer you in an offhand way, though I will begin by making a statement of principles: I am absolutely not a structuralist.
Q: I know that, but public opinion has linked you to the structuralists.
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? MF: I am obliged to repeat it continually. I have never used any of the concepts which can be considered char- acteristic of structuralism. I have mentioned the concept of structure several times, but I have never used it. Unfortunately critics and journalists are not like philosophers; they do not recognize the difference between "mention" and "use. " Thus if I now speak of struchire and the unconscious I do so from a completely external standpoint; nor do I consider myself bound by the answer that I give. Anyway I am quite incompe- tent in this field. I will say that it seems to me that in recent years (I am speaking as a historian of culture) an unexpected discovery has occurred: I mean the discovery of the existence of formal relationships, which can indeed be called structures, exactly in areas that appear in all respects under the control of consciousness, for example in language and formal thought. It has also been observed that these relationships existed and operated even when the subject was not truly conscious of them--conscious first in the psychological sense of the word, but also in the Kantian or Cartesian sense. Thus through lin- guistics, logic and ethnology one arrives at the discovery of a sector which stands outside consciousness in the usually ac- cepted meaning of that word. Is it necessary to fit this sector into the realm of the? unconscious, understood in the Freudian sense? Students of psychoanalysis have found themselves with two choices. The first involves asserting that this "structural" unconscious, if we want to term it that, is subordinate to the Freudian unconscious. Fortunately many investigators have avoided this error, or should I say ingenuousness, and have put the problem in different terms.
The problem is to find out whether the Freudian un- conscious is not itself a locus in which this system of formal relationships operates. These relationships are operative in language, in formal thought, and even in certain social struc- tures. Perhaps the Freudian unconscious as well is, shall we
? An Historian of Culture 81
? say, "touched" by this structural unconscious. This is the point at which many psychoanalytic investigations have arrived.
Q: But doesn't this "structural" unconscious perhaps coincide with the unconscious as defined by Jung?
? MF: Certainly not. One can say with confidence that we are not speaking of an individual unconscious, in the sense that psychoanalysis generally understands that notion. Yet nei- ther is it a collective unconscious, which would be a kind of collection or reservoir of archetypes at the disposition of eve- ryone. The "structural" unconscious is neither of these things.
? Q: Please explain to me your interest in a writer like Sade. Does it have to do with the dissolution of the "ego" in his work, or perhaps with his eroticism, with that kind of alge- braic combination which eroticism undergoes in him?
? MF: Sade's great experiment, even with all that might be considered pathetic in it, lies in the fact that he seeks to introduce the disorder of desire into a world dominated by order and classification. This is precisely the meaning of what he calls "libertinism. " The libertine is a man gifted with a desire stroong enough and a mind cold enough to allow him to succeed in fitting all the potentialities of his desire into an absolutely exhaustive combination of events.
? Q: But according to you, doesn't one perhaps arrive at the death of desire in Sade? These combinations which know neither time nor the dynamics of desire, but only some abstract sexual acts--don't these combinations of all possible modes of behavior lead us perhaps to a situation in which Eros no longer exists, in which Eros becomes only a pretext?
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82 An Historian of Culture
? MF: I'll say only a few things in reference to this. It is evident that if I want to make love (or rather, when I want to make love) I do not resort to Sade's prescribed methods, to his combinations; not so much because I wouldn't like to try, but because I've never had the opportunity. Thus I agree with you that in these perfect successive combinations it is not possible that desire should be multiplied or divided as it is in Sade's works. But in Sade I don't seek a formula for making love or a stimulus leading to it. For me Sade is a symptom of a curious movement which becomes evident within our culture at that moment when a thought, which was basically dominated by representation, calculation, order and classification, gives way, simultaneously with the French Revolution, to an element which up to then had never been conceived in this way, that is desire or voluptuousness. . .
Q: Thus, according to you, Sade is the last defender of the esprit de geometrie?
MF: Exactly. I see in Sade the last representative of the 18th century (the milieu from which he came also testifies to this), rather than a prophet of the future. Perhaps the real qustion is why we today should be so passionately interested in him. At any rate, I don't make Sade out to be a god, and I don't make him the prophet of our age; my interest in him has been constant principally because of the historical position he occupies, which is at a point of transition between two forms of thought.
Q: Why is our era so interested in Sade?
? MF: The reason probably is that Sade sought to in- sert into the combinations of representations the infinite power of desire, and when he did so he was obliged, almost as an
? An Historian of Culture 83
? afterthought, to take away the ego's privileged position. The ego became just one element within a combination. In the philosophy of the 17th and 18th centuries, the ego was king. Later, in the 19th century, with the philosophy of will, the ego remains king, though in a different way. Yet at the moment at which these two currents are joined, the ego is dissociated and dispersed among the various combinations. I believe that one of the most noteworthy characteristics of our era is that the sovereignty of the ego has been put in doubt. The dissociation which characterizes our own time was already present in Sade.
? Q; But don't you think that the popularity of Sade is due rather to the pansexuality which reigns in our day, the op- position to all order and all morality? I feel that for many people Sade represents above all the liberation of Eros, a spirit that mocks virtuousness, or the victory of the anarchistic Juli- ette ("Vice") over the timid and conformist Justine ("Virtue").
? MF: That's true. However, I maintain that the desire to liberate oneself from sexual taboos has always existed, in all epochs. People have always been famished, from the sexual point of view; there are no societies which do not regulate sex, and thus all societies create the hope of escaping from such regulations. The point is to decipher what form that hope takes today. It's true, today we set Juliette against Justine. But when we do that, aren't we perhaps admitting, or agreeing to, a kind of sexuality which goes beyond the subject, which stands be- hind the ego, so to speak, or which supersedes it? Thus the kind of sexuality that we recognize today in practice contrib- utes to the dissociation of the ego, at least in the form in which that term is understood from Descartes onward. So we see that in fact the basic theme of Sade's Juliette is this: "I will do with you anythiing that my desire wants, though it is agreed that you will do the same with me. No part of you will escape my
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? desire, but the same goes for me. " Thus neither of the two controls his or her own body anymore, and the loss of one communicates with the loss of the other even if the subject itself does not exercise any real control. It is exactiy this orgi- astic quality of contemporary sexuality that has raised the question of the subject's position.
Q: But many, for example Marcuse, speak of the lib- eration of Eros as an affirmation of the ego.
MF: I think that Marcuse is trying to use the ancient themes inherited from the 19th century to salvage the ego, understood in the traditional sense.
Q: Again, for me things appear differemly. Pansexu- ality is a phenomenon analogous to protest; it is a refusal of authority, of morality. The struggle is not so much against the subject as against constituted society, the "establishment. "
? MF: When I speak of the particular forms which ero- tocism assumes today, I don't mean to say that it is the only factor leading to a dissolution of the individual. I believe that we ? ue passing through a profound crisis of our civihzation, in the course of which the ego, the individual person as under- stood in traditional terms, has come to be questioned.
? Q: You have written that moral problems today are entirely reducible to political and sexual problems. Why?
MF: It often happens that I say something just so that I won't have to think about it anymore; then, for this reason, I have some trouble in justifying it. Nevertheless, I made this statement because I was thinking about it and also in order to continue thinking about it.
? An Historian of Culture 85
? Q: But you went further; you said that sexuality could ultimately be connected to politics.
? MF: This I stated simply as hypothesis. But here is what I meant. Today, in our time (and I speak to you as a historian, even if my goal is to be a historian of the present), moral problems concern sex and politics exclusively. I'll give you an example. For a very long time, in the 17th and 18th centuries, the problem of work, or the lack of work, was or seemed to be a moral problem by nature. Those who did not work were not considered unfortunates who could not find work, but lazy evil creatures who did not want to work. In short, there existed a work ethic but it's hardly necessary for me to say this, because Max Weber said it all, and much better than I could. Today we know quite well that whoever is not working cannot find work, is unemployed. Work has left the domain of morality and entered into that of politics.
? Q: It's clear that you are not Italian.
MF; Be that as it may, to me it seems difficult to deny that today work is no longer a moral problem. In short, I would like you to give me an example of a moral problem recognized as such by everyone or by many people, and one which is not connnected to sex or politics. Do you think that my reduction is a bit too radical?
Q: I'm from another school. For me, morality is a hi- erarchy of values, of all values; every time we are forced to choose between values we find ourselves in the midst of a moral problem.
MF: But don't you believe that in the present world sex and politics define these values?
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? Q: They define the most visible and most discussed part of moral problems. I would say that they define rather the ethicality (Hegel's Sittlichkeit). You're right as far as Sittlich- keit is concemed, but not for the case of morality (Hegel's Moralita? t). The two things are not identical. Ethicality is cus- tom: habitual behavior, or at least the behavior expected from a person within a social group, in his relations with the mem- bers and the institutions of that group, in his dealings with them. Custom has its duties and its prohibitions, its idols and its taboos, which vary through history, from epoch to epoch, from place to place (a customs barrier suffices to mark a change in ethics). Morality is much wider, and includes ethics as one of its particular, determined aspects. But it actually sigiti? fies a general respect for values as such (for "all" values) inasmuch as they are objects of the will ("ends"); moreover, it is a respect for the hierarchy of values, and whenever the realization of some of these values appears impossible, there will be a conflict (the necessity of choosing). Robinson Crusoe, on his desert island, doesn't have ethical problems; but he continues to have a morality, and eventually moral problems as well. Morality is a category of the objective spirit, while ethicality is only a particular value (and perhaps it is merely an instrumental thing, if it is true, as I happen to think, that the individual represents a higher value than the group).
? MF: Here we find ourselves dealing with the same problem as before; you believe in the transcendental and I don't.
Q: But how, in your view, can sexuality be reduced to politics?
? MF: This is a question that I have asked myself, but I am not really sure. Perhaps one could say that, if certain as-
? An Historian of Culture 87
? pects of our sexual lives (marriage, the family, the corruption of minors, etc. ) raise moral problems, that happens as a func- tion of the particular political situation.
Q: But everything we do has a relationship to the po- litical situation. We are no longer in the midst of Rousseau's forest; in all aspects of our lives we are confronted with laws and institutions.
MF: I wasn't speaking of that. I was wondering how sexuality could raise moral problems; I'm not talking about problems of repression, but exclusively of moral problems. In what sense can leaving a woman or not leaving her constitute a moral problem? I'm not thinking of laws, which vary from one country to another. I think that such things can be because certain acts have connections with the political relationships that define our societies.
Q: According to you, what is the difference between political and social relationships?
MF: I label political everything that has to do with class struggle, and social everything that derives from and is a consequence of the class struggle, expressed in human rela- tionships and in institutions.
Q: For me politics is everything connected to the struggle for power and therefore constitutes perhaps only one aspect of class struggle. The social refers to everything con- nected to relationships between people in general.
? MF: If we give to the term "political" the meaning that you attribute to it--^and yours is the more precise defini- tion, I must admit--^then my definition cannot stand. I also
? 88 An Historian of Culture
want to give politics the meaning of a struggle for power; but it's not power understood only as government or state, but economic power as well. A
Translated by Jared Becker and James Cascaito.
? Note
? 1 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin (New York: McGraw Hill, 1966). Langue (language) is the system of language; parole (speech) is the individual utterance.
? ? fj
8
? Film and Popular Memory
? ? Q: Let's start from the journalistic phenomenon of the "retro" style, the current fad for the recent past. Basically, we can put the question like this: how is it that films like Louis Malle's Lacombe Lucien or The Night Porter^ can be made today? Why do they meet with such a fantastic response? We think the answer has to be sought on three levels:
? (1. ) Giscard d'Estaing has been elected. A new kind of approach to politics, to history, to the political apparatus is coming into existence, indicating very clearly--in such a way that everyone can see it--that Gaullism is dead. So it's neces- sary, insofar as GauUism remains very closely linked to the period of the Resistance, to look at how this is translated in the films which are being made.
? (2. ) How is it possible for bourgeois ideology to at- tack the weak points of orthodox Marxism (rigid, economistic, mechanical--the terms don't matter much) which has for so long provided the only framework for interpreting social phe- nomena?
(3. ) Lastly, what does all this mean for pohtical mili- tants? Given that militants are consumers and sometimes also makers of films.
? 88 An Historian of Culture
want to give politics the meaning of a struggle for power; but it's not power understood only as government or state, but economic power as well. A
Translated by Jared Becker and James Cascaito. Note
? 1 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin (New York: McGraw Hill, 1966). Langue (language) is the system of language; parole (speech) is the individual utterance.
? 8
Film and Popular Memory
? ? Q: Let's start from the journalistic phenomenon of the "retro" style, the current fad for the recent past. Basically, we can put the question like this: how is it that films like Louis Malle's Lacombe Lucien or The Night Porter^ can be made today? Why do they meet with such a fantastic response? We think the answer has to be sought on three levels:
? (1. ) Giscard d'Estaing has been elected. A new kind of approach to politics, to history, to the political apparatus is coming into existence, indicating very clearly--^in such a way that everyone can see it--that Gaullism is dead. So it's neces- sary, insofar as Gaullism remains very closely linked to the period of the Resistance, to look at how this is translated in the films which are being made.
? (2. ) How is it possible for bourgeois ideology to at- tack the weak points of orthodox Marxism (rigid, economistic, mechanical--the terms don't matter much) which has for so long provided the only framework for interpreting social phe- nomena?
(3. ) Lastly, what does all this mean for political mili- tants? Given that militants are consumers and sometimes also makers of films.
? 90 Film and Popular Memory
The thing is, that after Marcel Ophuls' film The Sor- row and the Pity, the floodgates have been open. Something hitherto completely repressed or forbidden has flooded out. Why?
? MF: I think this comes from the fact that the history of the war, and what took place around it, has never really been written except in completely official accounts. These of- ficial histories are to all intents and purposes centered on Gaullism, which, on the one hand, was the only way of writing history in terms of an honorable nationalism; and, on the other, the only way of introducing the Great Man, the man of the right, the man of the old 19th-century nationalisms, as an historical figure.
? It boils down to the fact that France was exonerated by de Gaulle, while the right (and we know how it behaved at the time of the war) was purified and sanctified by him.
What has never been described is what was going on in the very heart of the country from 1936, and even fi'om the end of the 1914 war, up until Liberation.
Q; So what has come about since The Sorrow and the Pity is some kind of retum to tmth in history. The point is really whether it is the truth.
MF: This has to be hnked to the fact that the end of Gaullism means an end to this exoneration of the right by de Gaulle and by this brief period. The old right of Petain and Maurras, the old reactionary and collaborating right, which disguised itself behind de Gaulle as best it could, now feels entitled to write its own history. This old right which, since Tardieu, had been upstaged both historically and politically, is now coming back into the limelight.
? It openly supported Giscard. There's no longer any
? Film and Popular Memory 91
? need for it to rely on disguises, it can write its own history. And among the factors which account for the present accep- tance of Giscard by half of France (a majority of 200,000), we mustn't forget to include films like those we're discussing-- whatever their makers' intentions. The fact that it's been pos- sible to show everything has enabled the right to carry out a certain regrouping. In the same way that, conversely, it's re- ally the healing of the breach between the national right and the collaborating right which has made these films possible. The two are inextricably linked.
Q: This history, then, is being rewritten both in the cinema and on television. It seems this rewriting of history is being carried out by film-makers who are thought of as more or less left-wing. This is a problem we should look at more closely.
MF: I don't think it's that simple. What I've just said is very schematic. Let's go over it again.
? There's a real fight going on. Over what? Over what we can roughly describe as popular memory. It's an actual fact that people--I'm talking about those who are barred from writing, from producing their books themselves, fi'om drawing up their own historical accounts--^that these people neverthe- less do have a way of recording history, or remembering it, of keeping it fresh and using it. This popular history was, to a certain extent, even more alive, more clearly formulated in the 19th century, where, for instance, there was a whole tradition of struggles which were transmitted orally, or in writing or songs, etc.
? Now, a whole number of apparatuses have been set up ("popular literature," cheap books and the stuff that's taught in school as well) to obstruct the flow of this popular memory.
? Rituals of Exclusion 71
? forward the American model, against which it was also neces- sary to struggle. At that moment, I think, the mechanisms of chauvinism appeared inside the French Left. These are mecha- nisms that are not always conscious; they manifest themselves by a game of exclusion, of refusal and oversight. American literature, for instance, is very httle read in France. One does not read American philosophy, history and criticism at all; American books are translated after an enormous delay. One must not allow the struggle against American economic influ- ence and relations to affect relations with American intellectu- als. We must have a selective nationalism. I believe that a small country like France is necessarily bound to be somewhat nationalistic in its politics and economy if it wants to preserve some degree of independence; on the other hand, we must understand that a struggle which today is ideological but will become some day openly revolutionary is tuming up in every comer of the world. Cultural chauvinism must be abandoned.
? Q: This has been your first trip to America, your first teaching assignment in an American university. In relation to the cultural change which you just spoke about, how will these two months affect you?
? MF: My problem is essentially the definition of the implicit systems in which we find ourselves prisoners; what I would like to grasp is the system of limits and exclusion which we practice without knowing it; I would like to make the cultural unconscious apparent. Therefore, the more I travel, the more I remove myself from my natural and hibitual centers of gravity, the greater my chance of grasping the foundations I am obviously standing on. To that extent any trip--not of course in the sense of a sightseeing trip nor even a survey-- any movement away from my original frame of reference, is fiiiitful. It is always good for me to change language and
? 72 Rituals of Exclusion
? country. A simple example; in New York I was struck, as any foreigner would be, by the immediate contrast between the "good sections" and the poverty, even the misery, that sur- round them on the right and the left. North and South. I well know that one finds that same contrast in Europe, and that you too, when in Europe, are certainly shocked by the great misery in the poor sections of Paris, Hamburg or London, it doesn't matter where. Having lived in Europe for years, I had lost a sense of this contrast and had ended up believing that there had been a general rise in the standard of living of the whole population; I wasn't far from imagining that the proletariat was becoming middle class, that there were really no more poor people, that the social struggle, the struggle between classes, consequently, was coming to an end. Well, seeing New York, perceiving again suddenly this vivid contrast that exists everywhere but which was blotted out of my eyes by familiar forms of it, that was for me a kind of second revela- tion; the class struggle still exists, it exists more intensely. A
? Notes
? ' Peter Weiss, The Persecution and Assassination of Jean- Paul Marat, as Performed by the Inmates of the Asylum of Charenton, under the Direction of the Marquis de Sade, Translated by Geoffrey Skelton and Adrian Mitchell, (New York; Atheneum, 1966).
? 2 The C. G. T. (General Confederation of Workers) is a power- ful trade-union very close to the French Communist Party. Cf. A. Beiden Fields, Trotskyism and Maoism: Theory and Practice in France and the United States (New York; Au- tonomedia, 1988).
? 7
An Historian of Culture
? ? Q: Professor Foucault, you have said that philoso- phy, as a discourse, is above all a diagnostic enterprise. I would like to ask you a question about this. Doesn't perform- ing a diagnosis perhaps involve placing oneself outside, ele- vating oneself to a different level of reflection, a level superior to the level of the objective field to which the diagnosis is applied?
? MF; I would like to add that there exist various means of knowing diagnostically. By diagnostic knowledge I mean, in general, a form of knowledge that defines and deter- mines differences. For example, when a doctor makes a diag- nosis of tuberculosis, he does it by determining the differences that distinguish someone sick with tuberculosis from someone sick with pneumonia or anyother disease. In this sense diag- nostic knowledge operates within a certain objective field de- fined by the sickness, the symptoms, etc.
? 74 An Historian of Culture
Q: Yet it is outside the sickness: the doctor speaks of the sickness but doesn't live it; and his discourse is not in fact a symptom of this or that sickness.
? MF: Yes, within an objective field yet outside of the sickness. However, there are forms of diagnostic knowledge that are not located within an objective field but which, on the contrary, permit a new objective field to appear. For example, when Saussure defined what langue was with respect to parole or what synchronic was with respect to diachronic, he opened up a new sector of potential studies, a new objective field which did not exist before. ' And this too is knowledge through diagnosis, though much different from the first type.
? Q: At any rate, it is necessary to resort to a metalan- guage, a language to describe a language.
MF: Not always. It depends on the science with which one is dealing. I do not believe that one can call a medical diagnosis a metalanguage.
Q: If we consider the symptoms of a sickness as
signs, the doctor's discourse is metalinguistic with respect to these signs.
? MF: If you give to metalanguage the very general meaning of a discourse about a system of signs, it is true that one is dealing with a metalanguage. But only if one accepts this very general definition.
Q; Metalanguage is a discourse about a discourse.
MF: Yes, but now I am a little worried because today the term metalanguage is employed in a very wide and
? ? An Historian of Culture 75
? general sense which lacks rigor. One speaks of metalanguage in dealing with literary criticism, the history of science, the history of philosophy, etc. Naturally, one can talk about it in dealing with medicine as well. I wonder whether it might not be preferable to return to the more rigorous definition of meta- language, one which says that it is the discourse through which the elements and the rules of construction of a language are defined.
Q: In fact, in mathematics, metalanguage is the lan- guage through which mathematics is formalized. But beyond the definition, the most important aspect of the question is something else: that is, that the structure of the metalanguage can be different from that of the language.
MF: Possibly.
Q: But I am constructing my discourse within the
episteme of my civilization, or outside it?
MF: What meaning are you giving to the term epis-
teme?
Q: The same one you gave to it.
MF: Yes, and I'd like to know what that meaning is.
? Q: For my part, as a good neo-Kantian, I intend to refer to the categories.
MF: Now we're at the crux. What I called episteme in The Order of Things has nothing to do with historical cate- gories, that is with those categories created in a particular historical moment. When I speak of episteme, I mean all those
? ? 76 An Historian of Culture
? relationships which existed between the various sectors of sci- ence during a given epoch. For example, I am thinking of the fact that at a certain point mathematics was used for research in physics, while linguistics or, if you will, semiology, the science of signs, was used by biology (to deal with genetic messages). Likewise the theory of evolution was used by, or served as a model for historians, psychologists, and sociolo- gists of the 19th century. All these phenomena of relationship between the sciences or between the various scientific sectors constitute what I call the episteme of an epoch. Thus for me episteme has nothing to do with the Kantian categories.
? Q: Yet when you speak of the concept of "order" in the 17th century, aren't you dealing with a category?
? MF: I simply noted that the problem of order (the problem, not the category), or rather the need to introduce an order among series of numbers, human beings, or values, ap- pears simultaneously in many different disciplines in the 17th century. This involves a communication between the diverse disciplines, and so it was that someone who proposed, for example, the creation of a universal language in the 17th cen- tury was quite close in terms of procedure to somoeone who dealt with the problem of how one could catalog human beings. It's a question of relationships and communication among the various sciences. This is what I call episteme, and it has nothing to do with the Kantian categories.
? Q: I call these categories, because they are formal, universal, and empty.
MF: Do you consider historicity, for example, to be a category?
? An Historian of Culture 77
? Q: Yes, it's a category of 19th century culture.
MF: But this isn't Kant's meaning of "category. "
Q: It depends on how one reads Kant.
MF: Then I recognize that even my own are catego- ries in this sense.
Q: Let's go on now to another topic. I would like to ask you a question concerning your interest in Nietzsche. What is the Nietzsche that you like?
MF: Clearly, it is not that of Zarathustra. It is that of The Birth of Tragedy, of The Genealogy of Morals.
Q: The Nietzsche of origins, then?
? MF: I would say that in Nietzsche I find a question- ing of the historical type which does not refer in any way to the "original" as do many of the analyses of Western thought. Husserl and Heidegger bring up for discussion again all of our knowledge and its foundations, but they do this by beginning from that which is original. This analysis takes place, how- ever, at the expense of any articulated historical content. In- stead, what I liked in Nietzsche is the attempt to bring up for discussion again the fundamental concepts of knowledge, of morals, and of metaphysics by appealing to a historical analy- sis of the positivistic type, without going back to origins. But clearly this is not the only thing that interests me in Nietzsche.
In your writings, I find another more important as- pect; the retum to the discussion of the primacy, or, if you prefer, of the privilege of the subject in the Cartesian or Kan- tian sense, of the subject as consciousness.
? ? 78 An Historian of Culture
Q: It's precisely on that point that I wanted to ask you another question. I have the impression that for you, as for the majority of French philosophers, the subject coincides with consciousness.
? MF: For me this isn't true; but it is true that the over- whelming majority of philosphers from the 17th to the 19th century has equated subject and consciousness. I would say, rather, that this holds true also for the French philosophers of the 20th century, including Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. I think that this equation of subject-consciousness at the transcenden- tal level is a characteristic of Western philosophy from Des- cartes to our own time. Nietzsche launched one of the first, or at least one of the most vigorous, attacks against this equation.
? Q: It's a question of consciousness as the subject of "I think. " But what I don't understand is the position of con- sciousnenss as object of an episteme. The consciousness, if anything, is "epistemizing," not "epistemizable. "
MF: Are you speaking of the transcendental con- sciousness?
Q: Yes.
? MF: Well, I am not Kantian or Cartesian, precisely because I refuse an equation on the transcendental level be- tween subject and thinking "I. " I am convinced that there ex- ist, if not exactly structures, then at least rules for the function- ing of knowledge which have arisen in the course of history and within which can be located the various subjects.
? Q: I am afraid that all this may be a trap in which we are prisoners. What you are saying is undoubtedly true, but on
? ? An Historian of Culture 79
? the other hand, it is exactly this transcendental consciousness which conditions the formation of our knowledge. It is true that transcendental consciousness arises in a particular phase of our history and civilization, in a particular situation; but it is also true that, once arisen, it manifests itself as a constituting and not a constituted thing.
MF: I understand your position, but it is exacty on this point that our views diverge. You seem to me Kantian or Husserlian. In all of my work I strive instead to avoid any reference to this transcendental as a condition of possibility for any knowledge. When I say that I strive to avoid it, I don't mean that I am sure of succeeding. My procedure at this mo- ment is of a regressive sort, I would say; I try to assume a greater and greater detachment in order to define the historical conditions and transformations of our knowledge. I try to his- toricize to the utmost in order to leave as litu? e space as pos- sible to the transcendental. I cannot exclude the possibility that one day I will have to confront an irreducible residuum which will be, in fact, the transcendental.
? Q: Let's try to look at the question fi-om another point of view. Since it is said that you are a structuralist (for- give me for saying this), I would like to know whether you think that some kind of relationship exists between the concept of "structure" and the Freudian notion of the "unconscious. "
? MF: I'll answer you in an offhand way, though I will begin by making a statement of principles: I am absolutely not a structuralist.
Q: I know that, but public opinion has linked you to the structuralists.
? ? 80 An Historian of Culture
? MF: I am obliged to repeat it continually. I have never used any of the concepts which can be considered char- acteristic of structuralism. I have mentioned the concept of structure several times, but I have never used it. Unfortunately critics and journalists are not like philosophers; they do not recognize the difference between "mention" and "use. " Thus if I now speak of struchire and the unconscious I do so from a completely external standpoint; nor do I consider myself bound by the answer that I give. Anyway I am quite incompe- tent in this field. I will say that it seems to me that in recent years (I am speaking as a historian of culture) an unexpected discovery has occurred: I mean the discovery of the existence of formal relationships, which can indeed be called structures, exactly in areas that appear in all respects under the control of consciousness, for example in language and formal thought. It has also been observed that these relationships existed and operated even when the subject was not truly conscious of them--conscious first in the psychological sense of the word, but also in the Kantian or Cartesian sense. Thus through lin- guistics, logic and ethnology one arrives at the discovery of a sector which stands outside consciousness in the usually ac- cepted meaning of that word. Is it necessary to fit this sector into the realm of the? unconscious, understood in the Freudian sense? Students of psychoanalysis have found themselves with two choices. The first involves asserting that this "structural" unconscious, if we want to term it that, is subordinate to the Freudian unconscious. Fortunately many investigators have avoided this error, or should I say ingenuousness, and have put the problem in different terms.
The problem is to find out whether the Freudian un- conscious is not itself a locus in which this system of formal relationships operates. These relationships are operative in language, in formal thought, and even in certain social struc- tures. Perhaps the Freudian unconscious as well is, shall we
? An Historian of Culture 81
? say, "touched" by this structural unconscious. This is the point at which many psychoanalytic investigations have arrived.
Q: But doesn't this "structural" unconscious perhaps coincide with the unconscious as defined by Jung?
? MF: Certainly not. One can say with confidence that we are not speaking of an individual unconscious, in the sense that psychoanalysis generally understands that notion. Yet nei- ther is it a collective unconscious, which would be a kind of collection or reservoir of archetypes at the disposition of eve- ryone. The "structural" unconscious is neither of these things.
? Q: Please explain to me your interest in a writer like Sade. Does it have to do with the dissolution of the "ego" in his work, or perhaps with his eroticism, with that kind of alge- braic combination which eroticism undergoes in him?
? MF: Sade's great experiment, even with all that might be considered pathetic in it, lies in the fact that he seeks to introduce the disorder of desire into a world dominated by order and classification. This is precisely the meaning of what he calls "libertinism. " The libertine is a man gifted with a desire stroong enough and a mind cold enough to allow him to succeed in fitting all the potentialities of his desire into an absolutely exhaustive combination of events.
? Q: But according to you, doesn't one perhaps arrive at the death of desire in Sade? These combinations which know neither time nor the dynamics of desire, but only some abstract sexual acts--don't these combinations of all possible modes of behavior lead us perhaps to a situation in which Eros no longer exists, in which Eros becomes only a pretext?
?
82 An Historian of Culture
? MF: I'll say only a few things in reference to this. It is evident that if I want to make love (or rather, when I want to make love) I do not resort to Sade's prescribed methods, to his combinations; not so much because I wouldn't like to try, but because I've never had the opportunity. Thus I agree with you that in these perfect successive combinations it is not possible that desire should be multiplied or divided as it is in Sade's works. But in Sade I don't seek a formula for making love or a stimulus leading to it. For me Sade is a symptom of a curious movement which becomes evident within our culture at that moment when a thought, which was basically dominated by representation, calculation, order and classification, gives way, simultaneously with the French Revolution, to an element which up to then had never been conceived in this way, that is desire or voluptuousness. . .
Q: Thus, according to you, Sade is the last defender of the esprit de geometrie?
MF: Exactly. I see in Sade the last representative of the 18th century (the milieu from which he came also testifies to this), rather than a prophet of the future. Perhaps the real qustion is why we today should be so passionately interested in him. At any rate, I don't make Sade out to be a god, and I don't make him the prophet of our age; my interest in him has been constant principally because of the historical position he occupies, which is at a point of transition between two forms of thought.
Q: Why is our era so interested in Sade?
? MF: The reason probably is that Sade sought to in- sert into the combinations of representations the infinite power of desire, and when he did so he was obliged, almost as an
? An Historian of Culture 83
? afterthought, to take away the ego's privileged position. The ego became just one element within a combination. In the philosophy of the 17th and 18th centuries, the ego was king. Later, in the 19th century, with the philosophy of will, the ego remains king, though in a different way. Yet at the moment at which these two currents are joined, the ego is dissociated and dispersed among the various combinations. I believe that one of the most noteworthy characteristics of our era is that the sovereignty of the ego has been put in doubt. The dissociation which characterizes our own time was already present in Sade.
? Q; But don't you think that the popularity of Sade is due rather to the pansexuality which reigns in our day, the op- position to all order and all morality? I feel that for many people Sade represents above all the liberation of Eros, a spirit that mocks virtuousness, or the victory of the anarchistic Juli- ette ("Vice") over the timid and conformist Justine ("Virtue").
? MF: That's true. However, I maintain that the desire to liberate oneself from sexual taboos has always existed, in all epochs. People have always been famished, from the sexual point of view; there are no societies which do not regulate sex, and thus all societies create the hope of escaping from such regulations. The point is to decipher what form that hope takes today. It's true, today we set Juliette against Justine. But when we do that, aren't we perhaps admitting, or agreeing to, a kind of sexuality which goes beyond the subject, which stands be- hind the ego, so to speak, or which supersedes it? Thus the kind of sexuality that we recognize today in practice contrib- utes to the dissociation of the ego, at least in the form in which that term is understood from Descartes onward. So we see that in fact the basic theme of Sade's Juliette is this: "I will do with you anythiing that my desire wants, though it is agreed that you will do the same with me. No part of you will escape my
? 84 An Historian of Culture
? desire, but the same goes for me. " Thus neither of the two controls his or her own body anymore, and the loss of one communicates with the loss of the other even if the subject itself does not exercise any real control. It is exactiy this orgi- astic quality of contemporary sexuality that has raised the question of the subject's position.
Q: But many, for example Marcuse, speak of the lib- eration of Eros as an affirmation of the ego.
MF: I think that Marcuse is trying to use the ancient themes inherited from the 19th century to salvage the ego, understood in the traditional sense.
Q: Again, for me things appear differemly. Pansexu- ality is a phenomenon analogous to protest; it is a refusal of authority, of morality. The struggle is not so much against the subject as against constituted society, the "establishment. "
? MF: When I speak of the particular forms which ero- tocism assumes today, I don't mean to say that it is the only factor leading to a dissolution of the individual. I believe that we ? ue passing through a profound crisis of our civihzation, in the course of which the ego, the individual person as under- stood in traditional terms, has come to be questioned.
? Q: You have written that moral problems today are entirely reducible to political and sexual problems. Why?
MF: It often happens that I say something just so that I won't have to think about it anymore; then, for this reason, I have some trouble in justifying it. Nevertheless, I made this statement because I was thinking about it and also in order to continue thinking about it.
? An Historian of Culture 85
? Q: But you went further; you said that sexuality could ultimately be connected to politics.
? MF: This I stated simply as hypothesis. But here is what I meant. Today, in our time (and I speak to you as a historian, even if my goal is to be a historian of the present), moral problems concern sex and politics exclusively. I'll give you an example. For a very long time, in the 17th and 18th centuries, the problem of work, or the lack of work, was or seemed to be a moral problem by nature. Those who did not work were not considered unfortunates who could not find work, but lazy evil creatures who did not want to work. In short, there existed a work ethic but it's hardly necessary for me to say this, because Max Weber said it all, and much better than I could. Today we know quite well that whoever is not working cannot find work, is unemployed. Work has left the domain of morality and entered into that of politics.
? Q: It's clear that you are not Italian.
MF; Be that as it may, to me it seems difficult to deny that today work is no longer a moral problem. In short, I would like you to give me an example of a moral problem recognized as such by everyone or by many people, and one which is not connnected to sex or politics. Do you think that my reduction is a bit too radical?
Q: I'm from another school. For me, morality is a hi- erarchy of values, of all values; every time we are forced to choose between values we find ourselves in the midst of a moral problem.
MF: But don't you believe that in the present world sex and politics define these values?
? 86 An Historian of Culture
? Q: They define the most visible and most discussed part of moral problems. I would say that they define rather the ethicality (Hegel's Sittlichkeit). You're right as far as Sittlich- keit is concemed, but not for the case of morality (Hegel's Moralita? t). The two things are not identical. Ethicality is cus- tom: habitual behavior, or at least the behavior expected from a person within a social group, in his relations with the mem- bers and the institutions of that group, in his dealings with them. Custom has its duties and its prohibitions, its idols and its taboos, which vary through history, from epoch to epoch, from place to place (a customs barrier suffices to mark a change in ethics). Morality is much wider, and includes ethics as one of its particular, determined aspects. But it actually sigiti? fies a general respect for values as such (for "all" values) inasmuch as they are objects of the will ("ends"); moreover, it is a respect for the hierarchy of values, and whenever the realization of some of these values appears impossible, there will be a conflict (the necessity of choosing). Robinson Crusoe, on his desert island, doesn't have ethical problems; but he continues to have a morality, and eventually moral problems as well. Morality is a category of the objective spirit, while ethicality is only a particular value (and perhaps it is merely an instrumental thing, if it is true, as I happen to think, that the individual represents a higher value than the group).
? MF: Here we find ourselves dealing with the same problem as before; you believe in the transcendental and I don't.
Q: But how, in your view, can sexuality be reduced to politics?
? MF: This is a question that I have asked myself, but I am not really sure. Perhaps one could say that, if certain as-
? An Historian of Culture 87
? pects of our sexual lives (marriage, the family, the corruption of minors, etc. ) raise moral problems, that happens as a func- tion of the particular political situation.
Q: But everything we do has a relationship to the po- litical situation. We are no longer in the midst of Rousseau's forest; in all aspects of our lives we are confronted with laws and institutions.
MF: I wasn't speaking of that. I was wondering how sexuality could raise moral problems; I'm not talking about problems of repression, but exclusively of moral problems. In what sense can leaving a woman or not leaving her constitute a moral problem? I'm not thinking of laws, which vary from one country to another. I think that such things can be because certain acts have connections with the political relationships that define our societies.
Q: According to you, what is the difference between political and social relationships?
MF: I label political everything that has to do with class struggle, and social everything that derives from and is a consequence of the class struggle, expressed in human rela- tionships and in institutions.
Q: For me politics is everything connected to the struggle for power and therefore constitutes perhaps only one aspect of class struggle. The social refers to everything con- nected to relationships between people in general.
? MF: If we give to the term "political" the meaning that you attribute to it--^and yours is the more precise defini- tion, I must admit--^then my definition cannot stand. I also
? 88 An Historian of Culture
want to give politics the meaning of a struggle for power; but it's not power understood only as government or state, but economic power as well. A
Translated by Jared Becker and James Cascaito.
? Note
? 1 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin (New York: McGraw Hill, 1966). Langue (language) is the system of language; parole (speech) is the individual utterance.
? ? fj
8
? Film and Popular Memory
? ? Q: Let's start from the journalistic phenomenon of the "retro" style, the current fad for the recent past. Basically, we can put the question like this: how is it that films like Louis Malle's Lacombe Lucien or The Night Porter^ can be made today? Why do they meet with such a fantastic response? We think the answer has to be sought on three levels:
? (1. ) Giscard d'Estaing has been elected. A new kind of approach to politics, to history, to the political apparatus is coming into existence, indicating very clearly--in such a way that everyone can see it--that Gaullism is dead. So it's neces- sary, insofar as GauUism remains very closely linked to the period of the Resistance, to look at how this is translated in the films which are being made.
? (2. ) How is it possible for bourgeois ideology to at- tack the weak points of orthodox Marxism (rigid, economistic, mechanical--the terms don't matter much) which has for so long provided the only framework for interpreting social phe- nomena?
(3. ) Lastly, what does all this mean for pohtical mili- tants? Given that militants are consumers and sometimes also makers of films.
? 88 An Historian of Culture
want to give politics the meaning of a struggle for power; but it's not power understood only as government or state, but economic power as well. A
Translated by Jared Becker and James Cascaito. Note
? 1 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin (New York: McGraw Hill, 1966). Langue (language) is the system of language; parole (speech) is the individual utterance.
? 8
Film and Popular Memory
? ? Q: Let's start from the journalistic phenomenon of the "retro" style, the current fad for the recent past. Basically, we can put the question like this: how is it that films like Louis Malle's Lacombe Lucien or The Night Porter^ can be made today? Why do they meet with such a fantastic response? We think the answer has to be sought on three levels:
? (1. ) Giscard d'Estaing has been elected. A new kind of approach to politics, to history, to the political apparatus is coming into existence, indicating very clearly--^in such a way that everyone can see it--that Gaullism is dead. So it's neces- sary, insofar as Gaullism remains very closely linked to the period of the Resistance, to look at how this is translated in the films which are being made.
? (2. ) How is it possible for bourgeois ideology to at- tack the weak points of orthodox Marxism (rigid, economistic, mechanical--the terms don't matter much) which has for so long provided the only framework for interpreting social phe- nomena?
(3. ) Lastly, what does all this mean for political mili- tants? Given that militants are consumers and sometimes also makers of films.
? 90 Film and Popular Memory
The thing is, that after Marcel Ophuls' film The Sor- row and the Pity, the floodgates have been open. Something hitherto completely repressed or forbidden has flooded out. Why?
? MF: I think this comes from the fact that the history of the war, and what took place around it, has never really been written except in completely official accounts. These of- ficial histories are to all intents and purposes centered on Gaullism, which, on the one hand, was the only way of writing history in terms of an honorable nationalism; and, on the other, the only way of introducing the Great Man, the man of the right, the man of the old 19th-century nationalisms, as an historical figure.
? It boils down to the fact that France was exonerated by de Gaulle, while the right (and we know how it behaved at the time of the war) was purified and sanctified by him.
What has never been described is what was going on in the very heart of the country from 1936, and even fi'om the end of the 1914 war, up until Liberation.
Q; So what has come about since The Sorrow and the Pity is some kind of retum to tmth in history. The point is really whether it is the truth.
MF: This has to be hnked to the fact that the end of Gaullism means an end to this exoneration of the right by de Gaulle and by this brief period. The old right of Petain and Maurras, the old reactionary and collaborating right, which disguised itself behind de Gaulle as best it could, now feels entitled to write its own history. This old right which, since Tardieu, had been upstaged both historically and politically, is now coming back into the limelight.
? It openly supported Giscard. There's no longer any
? Film and Popular Memory 91
? need for it to rely on disguises, it can write its own history. And among the factors which account for the present accep- tance of Giscard by half of France (a majority of 200,000), we mustn't forget to include films like those we're discussing-- whatever their makers' intentions. The fact that it's been pos- sible to show everything has enabled the right to carry out a certain regrouping. In the same way that, conversely, it's re- ally the healing of the breach between the national right and the collaborating right which has made these films possible. The two are inextricably linked.
Q: This history, then, is being rewritten both in the cinema and on television. It seems this rewriting of history is being carried out by film-makers who are thought of as more or less left-wing. This is a problem we should look at more closely.
MF: I don't think it's that simple. What I've just said is very schematic. Let's go over it again.
? There's a real fight going on. Over what? Over what we can roughly describe as popular memory. It's an actual fact that people--I'm talking about those who are barred from writing, from producing their books themselves, fi'om drawing up their own historical accounts--^that these people neverthe- less do have a way of recording history, or remembering it, of keeping it fresh and using it. This popular history was, to a certain extent, even more alive, more clearly formulated in the 19th century, where, for instance, there was a whole tradition of struggles which were transmitted orally, or in writing or songs, etc.
? Now, a whole number of apparatuses have been set up ("popular literature," cheap books and the stuff that's taught in school as well) to obstruct the flow of this popular memory.
