Wherefore heresy and sect are the same thing,
and each belongs to the works of the flesh, not indeed by reason of the
act itself of unbelief in respect of its proximate object, but by
reason of its cause, which is either the desire of an undue end in
which way it arises from pride or covetousness, as stated in the second
objection, or some illusion of the imagination (which gives rise to
error, as the Philosopher states in Metaph.
and each belongs to the works of the flesh, not indeed by reason of the
act itself of unbelief in respect of its proximate object, but by
reason of its cause, which is either the desire of an undue end in
which way it arises from pride or covetousness, as stated in the second
objection, or some illusion of the imagination (which gives rise to
error, as the Philosopher states in Metaph.
Summa Theologica
5:6).
For after he had
pronounced sentence of excommunication, he adds as his reason: "Know
you not that a little leaven corrupts the whole lump? " and afterwards
he adds the reason on the part of the punishment inflicted by the
sentence of the Church when he says (1 Cor. 5:12): "Do not you judge
them that are within? "
Accordingly, in the first way the Church does not forbid the faithful
to communicate with unbelievers, who have not in any way received the
Christian faith, viz. with pagans and Jews, because she has not the
right to exercise spiritual judgment over them, but only temporal
judgment, in the case when, while dwelling among Christians they are
guilty of some misdemeanor, and are condemned by the faithful to some
temporal punishment. On the other hand, in this way, i. e. as a
punishment, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with those
unbelievers who have forsaken the faith they once received, either by
corrupting the faith, as heretics, or by entirely renouncing the faith,
as apostates, because the Church pronounces sentence of excommunication
on both.
With regard to the second way, it seems that one ought to distinguish
according to the various conditions of persons, circumstances and time.
For some are firm in the faith; and so it is to be hoped that their
communicating with unbelievers will lead to the conversion of the
latter rather than to the aversion of the faithful from the faith.
These are not to be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers who have
not received the faith, such as pagans or Jews, especially if there be
some urgent necessity for so doing. But in the case of simple people
and those who are weak in the faith, whose perversion is to be feared
as a probable result, they should be forbidden to communicate with
unbelievers, and especially to be on very familiar terms with them, or
to communicate with them without necessity.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: The Church does not exercise judgment against
unbelievers in the point of inflicting spiritual punishment on them:
but she does exercise judgment over some of them in the matter of
temporal punishment. It is under this head that sometimes the Church,
for certain special sins, withdraws the faithful from communication
with certain unbelievers.
Reply to Objection 3: There is more probability that a servant who is
ruled by his master's commands, will be converted to the faith of his
master who is a believer, than if the case were the reverse: and so the
faithful are not forbidden to have unbelieving servants. If, however,
the master were in danger, through communicating with such a servant,
he should send him away, according to Our Lord's command (Mat. 18:8):
"If . . . thy foot scandalize thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee. "
With regard to the argument in the contrary [*The Leonine Edition gives
this solution before the Reply OBJ 2] sense the reply is that the Lord
gave this command in reference to those nations into whose territory
the Jews were about to enter. For the latter were inclined to idolatry,
so that it was to be feared lest, through frequent dealings with those
nations, they should be estranged from the faith: hence the text goes
on (Dt. 7:4): "For she will turn away thy son from following Me. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether unbelievers may have authority or dominion over the faithful?
Objection 1: It would seem that unbelievers may have authority or
dominion over the faithful. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:1):
"Whosoever are servants under the yoke, let them count their masters
worthy of all honor": and it is clear that he is speaking of
unbelievers, since he adds (1 Tim. 6:2): "But they that have believing
masters, let them not despise them. " Moreover it is written (1 Pet.
2:18): "Servants be subject to your masters with all fear, not only to
the good and gentle, but also to the froward. " Now this command would
not be contained in the apostolic teaching unless unbelievers could
have authority over the faithful. Therefore it seems that unbelievers
can have authority over the faithful.
Objection 2: Further, all the members of a prince's household are his
subjects. Now some of the faithful were members of unbelieving princes'
households, for we read in the Epistle to the Philippians (4:22): "All
the saints salute you, especially they that are of Caesar's household,"
referring to Nero, who was an unbeliever. Therefore unbelievers can
have authority over the faithful.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2) a
slave is his master's instrument in matters concerning everyday life,
even as a craftsman's laborer is his instrument in matters concerning
the working of his art. Now, in such matters, a believer can be subject
to an unbeliever, for he may work on an unbeliever's farm. Therefore
unbelievers may have authority over the faithful even as to dominion.
On the contrary, Those who are in authority can pronounce judgment on
those over whom they are placed. But unbelievers cannot pronounce
judgment on the faithful, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:1): "Dare any
of you, having a matter against another, go to be judged before the
unjust," i. e. unbelievers, "and not before the saints? " Therefore it
seems that unbelievers cannot have authority over the faithful.
I answer that, That this question may be considered in two ways. First,
we may speak of dominion or authority of unbelievers over the faithful
as of a thing to be established for the first time. This ought by no
means to be allowed, since it would provoke scandal and endanger the
faith, for subjects are easily influenced by their superiors to comply
with their commands, unless the subjects are of great virtue: moreover
unbelievers hold the faith in contempt, if they see the faithful fall
away. Hence the Apostle forbade the faithful to go to law before an
unbelieving judge. And so the Church altogether forbids unbelievers to
acquire dominion over believers, or to have authority over them in any
capacity whatever.
Secondly, we may speak of dominion or authority, as already in force:
and here we must observe that dominion and authority are institutions
of human law, while the distinction between faithful and unbelievers
arises from the Divine law. Now the Divine law which is the law of
grace, does not do away with human law which is the law of natural
reason. Wherefore the distinction between faithful and unbelievers,
considered in itself, does not do away with dominion and authority of
unbelievers over the faithful.
Nevertheless this right of dominion or authority can be justly done
away with by the sentence or ordination of the Church who has the
authority of God: since unbelievers in virtue of their unbelief deserve
to forfeit their power over the faithful who are converted into
children of God.
This the Church does sometimes, and sometimes not. For among those
unbelievers who are subject, even in temporal matters, to the Church
and her members, the Church made the law that if the slave of a Jew
became a Christian, he should forthwith receive his freedom, without
paying any price, if he should be a "vernaculus," i. e. born in slavery;
and likewise if, when yet an unbeliever, he had been bought for his
service: if, however, he had been bought for sale, then he should be
offered for sale within three months. Nor does the Church harm them in
this, because since those Jews themselves are subject to the Church,
she can dispose of their possessions, even as secular princes have
enacted many laws to be observed by their subjects, in favor of
liberty. On the other hand, the Church has not applied the above law to
those unbelievers who are not subject to her or her members, in
temporal matters, although she has the right to do so: and this, in
order to avoid scandal, for as Our Lord showed (Mat. 17:25,26) that He
could be excused from paying the tribute, because "the children are
free," yet He ordered the tribute to be paid in order to avoid giving
scandal. Thus Paul too, after saying that servants should honor their
masters, adds, "lest the name of the Lord and His doctrine be
blasphemed. "
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: The authority of Caesar preceded the distinction
of faithful from unbelievers. Hence it was not cancelled by the
conversion of some to the faith. Moreover it was a good thing that
there should be a few of the faithful in the emperor's household, that
they might defend the rest of the faithful. Thus the Blessed Sebastian
encouraged those whom he saw faltering under torture, and, the while,
remained hidden under the military cloak in the palace of Diocletian.
Reply to Objection 3: Slaves are subject to their masters for their
whole lifetime, and are subject to their overseers in everything:
whereas the craftsman's laborer is subject to him for certain special
works. Hence it would be more dangerous for unbelievers to have
dominion or authority over the faithful, than that they should be
allowed to employ them in some craft. Wherefore the Church permits
Christians to work on the land of Jews, because this does not entail
their living together with them. Thus Solomon besought the King of Tyre
to send master workmen to hew the trees, as related in 3 Kings 5:6.
Yet, if there be reason to fear that the faithful will be perverted by
such communications and dealings, they should be absolutely forbidden.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the rites of unbelievers ought to be tolerated?
Objection 1: It would seem that rites of unbelievers ought not to be
tolerated. For it is evident that unbelievers sin in observing their
rites: and not to prevent a sin, when one can, seems to imply consent
therein, as a gloss observes on Rom. 1:32: "Not only they that do them,
but they also that consent to them that do them. " Therefore it is a sin
to tolerate their rites.
Objection 2: Further, the rites of the Jews are compared to idolatry,
because a gloss on Gal. 5:1, "Be not held again under the yoke of
bondage," says: "The bondage of that law was not lighter than that of
idolatry. " But it would not be allowable for anyone to observe the
rites of idolatry, in fact Christian princes at first caused the
temples of idols to be closed, and afterwards, to be destroyed, as
Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei xviii, 54). Therefore it follows that
even the rites of Jews ought not to be tolerated.
Objection 3: Further, unbelief is the greatest of sins, as stated above
(A[3] ). Now other sins such as adultery, theft and the like, are not
tolerated, but are punishable by law. Therefore neither ought the rites
of unbelievers to be tolerated.
On the contrary, Gregory [*Regist. xi, Ep. 15: cf. Decret. , dist. xlv,
can. , Qui sincera] says, speaking of the Jews: "They should be allowed
to observe all their feasts, just as hitherto they and their fathers
have for ages observed them. "
I answer that, Human government is derived from the Divine government,
and should imitate it. Now although God is all-powerful and supremely
good, nevertheless He allows certain evils to take place in the
universe, which He might prevent, lest, without them, greater goods
might be forfeited, or greater evils ensue. Accordingly in human
government also, those who are in authority, rightly tolerate certain
evils, lest certain goods be lost, or certain greater evils be
incurred: thus Augustine says (De Ordine ii, 4): "If you do away with
harlots, the world will be convulsed with lust. " Hence, though
unbelievers sin in their rites, they may be tolerated, either on
account of some good that ensues therefrom, or because of some evil
avoided. Thus from the fact that the Jews observe their rites, which,
of old, foreshadowed the truth of the faith which we hold, there
follows this good---that our very enemies bear witness to our faith,
and that our faith is represented in a figure, so to speak. For this
reason they are tolerated in the observance of their rites.
On the other hand, the rites of other unbelievers, which are neither
truthful nor profitable are by no means to be tolerated, except
perchance in order to avoid an evil, e. g. the scandal or disturbance
that might ensue, or some hindrance to the salvation of those who if
they were unmolested might gradually be converted to the faith. For
this reason the Church, at times, has tolerated the rites even of
heretics and pagans, when unbelievers were very numerous.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the children of Jews and other unbelievers ought to be baptized
against their parents' will?
Objection 1: It would seem that the children of Jews and of other
unbelievers ought to be baptized against their parents' will. For the
bond of marriage is stronger than the right of parental authority over
children, since the right of parental authority can be made to cease,
when a son is set at liberty; whereas the marriage bond cannot be
severed by man, according to Mat. 19:6: "What . . . God hath joined
together let no man put asunder. " And yet the marriage bond is broken
on account of unbelief: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:15): "If the
unbeliever depart, let him depart. For a brother or sister is not under
servitude in such cases": and a canon [*Can. Uxor legitima, and
Idololatria, qu. i] says that "if the unbelieving partner is unwilling
to abide with the other, without insult to their Creator, then the
other partner is not bound to cohabitation. " Much more, therefore, does
unbelief abrogate the right of unbelieving parents' authority over
their children: and consequently their children may be baptized against
their parents' will.
Objection 2: Further, one is more bound to succor a man who is in
danger of everlasting death, than one who is in danger of temporal
death. Now it would be a sin, if one saw a man in danger of temporal
death and failed to go to his aid. Since, then, the children of Jews
and other unbelievers are in danger of everlasting death, should they
be left to their parents who would imbue them with their unbelief, it
seems that they ought to be taken away from them and baptized, and
instructed in the faith.
Objection 3: Further, the children of a bondsman are themselves
bondsmen, and under the power of his master. Now the Jews are bondsmen
of kings and princes: therefore their children are also. Consequently
kings and princes have the power to do what they will with Jewish
children. Therefore no injustice is committed if they baptize them
against their parents' wishes.
Objection 4: Further, every man belongs more to God, from Whom he has
his soul, than to his carnal father, from whom he has his body.
Therefore it is not unjust if Jewish children be taken away from their
parents, and consecrated to God in Baptism.
Objection 5: Further, Baptism avails for salvation more than preaching
does, since Baptism removes forthwith the stain of sin and the debt of
punishment, and opens the gate of heaven. Now if danger ensue through
not preaching, it is imputed to him who omitted to preach, according to
the words of Ezech. 33:6 about the man who "sees the sword coming and
sounds not the trumpet. " Much more therefore, if Jewish children are
lost through not being baptized are they accounted guilty of sin, who
could have baptized them and did not.
On the contrary, Injustice should be done to no man. Now it would be an
injustice to Jews if their children were to be baptized against their
will, since they would lose the rights of parental authority over their
children as soon as these were Christians. Therefore these should not
be baptized against their parents' will.
I answer that, The custom of the Church has very great authority and
ought to be jealously observed in all things, since the very doctrine
of catholic doctors derives its authority from the Church. Hence we
ought to abide by the authority of the Church rather than by that of an
Augustine or a Jerome or of any doctor whatever. Now it was never the
custom of the Church to baptize the children of the Jews against the
will of their parents, although at times past there have been many very
powerful catholic princes like Constantine and Theodosius, with whom
most holy bishops have been on most friendly terms, as Sylvester with
Constantine, and Ambrose with Theodosius, who would certainly not have
failed to obtain this favor from them if it had been at all reasonable.
It seems therefore hazardous to repeat this assertion, that the
children of Jews should be baptized against their parents' wishes, in
contradiction to the Church's custom observed hitherto.
There are two reasons for this custom. One is on account of the danger
to the faith. For children baptized before coming to the use of reason,
afterwards when they come to perfect age, might easily be persuaded by
their parents to renounce what they had unknowingly embraced; and this
would be detrimental to the faith.
The other reason is that it is against natural justice. For a child is
by nature part of its father: thus, at first, it is not distinct from
its parents as to its body, so long as it is enfolded within its
mother's womb; and later on after birth, and before it has the use of
its free-will, it is enfolded in the care of its parents, which is like
a spiritual womb, for so long as man has not the use of reason, he
differs not from an irrational animal; so that even as an ox or a horse
belongs to someone who, according to the civil law, can use them when
he likes, as his own instrument, so, according to the natural law, a
son, before coming to the use of reason, is under his father's care.
Hence it would be contrary to natural justice, if a child, before
coming to the use of reason, were to be taken away from its parents'
custody, or anything done to it against its parents' wish. As soon,
however, as it begins to have the use of its free-will, it begins to
belong to itself, and is able to look after itself, in matters
concerning the Divine or the natural law, and then it should be
induced, not by compulsion but by persuasion, to embrace the faith: it
can then consent to the faith, and be baptized, even against its
parents' wish; but not before it comes to the use of reason. Hence it
is said of the children of the fathers of old that they were saved in
the faith of their parents; whereby we are given to understand that it
is the parents' duty to look after the salvation of their children,
especially before they come to the use of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: In the marriage bond, both husband and wife have
the use of the free-will, and each can assent to the faith without the
other's consent. But this does not apply to a child before it comes to
the use of reason: yet the comparison holds good after the child has
come to the use of reason, if it is willing to be converted.
Reply to Objection 2: No one should be snatched from natural death
against the order of civil law: for instance, if a man were condemned
by the judge to temporal death, nobody ought to rescue him by violence:
hence no one ought to break the order of the natural law, whereby a
child is in the custody of its father, in order to rescue it from the
danger of everlasting death.
Reply to Objection 3: Jews are bondsmen of princes by civil bondage,
which does not exclude the order of natural or Divine law.
Reply to Objection 4: Man is directed to God by his reason, whereby he
can know Him. Hence a child before coming to the use of reason, in the
natural order of things, is directed to God by its parents' reason,
under whose care it lies by nature: and it is for them to dispose of
the child in all matters relating to God.
Reply to Objection 5: The peril that ensues from the omission of
preaching, threatens only those who are entrusted with the duty of
preaching. Hence it had already been said (Ezech. 3:17): "I have made
thee a watchman to the children [Vulg. : 'house'] of Israel. " On the
other hand, to provide the sacraments of salvation for the children of
unbelievers is the duty of their parents. Hence it is they whom the
danger threatens, if through being deprived of the sacraments their
children fail to obtain salvation.
__________________________________________________________________
OF HERESY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider heresy: under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether heresy is a kind of unbelief?
(2) Of the matter about which it is;
(3) Whether heretics should be tolerated?
(4) Whether converts should be received?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether heresy is a species of unbelief?
Objection 1: It would seem that heresy is not a species of unbelief.
For unbelief is in the understanding, as stated above (Q[10], A[2]).
Now heresy would seem not to pertain to the understanding, but rather
to the appetitive power; for Jerome says on Gal. 5:19: [*Cf. Decretals
xxiv, qu. iii, cap. 27] "The works of the flesh are manifest: Heresy is
derived from a Greek word meaning choice, whereby a man makes choice of
that school which he deems best. " But choice is an act of the
appetitive power, as stated above ([2398]FS, Q[13], A[1]). Therefore
heresy is not a species of unbelief.
Objection 2: Further, vice takes its species chiefly from its end;
hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he who commits adultery
that he may steal, is a thief rather than an adulterer. " Now the end of
heresy is temporal profit, especially lordship and glory, which belong
to the vice of pride or covetousness: for Augustine says (De Util.
Credendi i) that "a heretic is one who either devises or follows false
and new opinions, for the sake of some temporal profit, especially that
he may lord and be honored above others. " Therefore heresy is a species
of pride rather than of unbelief.
Objection 3: Further, since unbelief is in the understanding, it would
seem not to pertain to the flesh. Now heresy belongs to the works of
the flesh, for the Apostle says (Gal. 5:19): "The works of the flesh
are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness," and among the
others, he adds, "dissensions, sects," which are the same as heresies.
Therefore heresy is not a species of unbelief.
On the contrary, Falsehood is contrary to truth. Now a heretic is one
who devises or follows false or new opinions. Therefore heresy is
opposed to the truth, on which faith is founded; and consequently it is
a species of unbelief.
I answer that, The word heresy as stated in the first objection denotes
a choosing. Now choice as stated above ([2399]FS, Q[13], A[3]) is about
things directed to the end, the end being presupposed. Now, in matters
of faith, the will assents to some truth, as to its proper good, as was
shown above (Q[4], A[3]): wherefore that which is the chief truth, has
the character of last end, while those which are secondary truths, have
the character of being directed to the end.
Now, whoever believes, assents to someone's words; so that, in every
form of unbelief, the person to whose words assent is given seems to
hold the chief place and to be the end as it were; while the things by
holding which one assents to that person hold a secondary place.
Consequently he that holds the Christian faith aright, assents, by his
will, to Christ, in those things which truly belong to His doctrine.
Accordingly there are two ways in which a man may deviate from the
rectitude of the Christian faith. First, because he is unwilling to
assent to Christ: and such a man has an evil will, so to say, in
respect of the very end. This belongs to the species of unbelief in
pagans and Jews. Secondly, because, though he intends to assent to
Christ, yet he fails in his choice of those things wherein he assents
to Christ, because he chooses not what Christ really taught, but the
suggestions of his own mind.
Therefore heresy is a species of unbelief, belonging to those who
profess the Christian faith, but corrupt its dogmas.
Reply to Objection 1: Choice regards unbelief in the same way as the
will regards faith, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Vices take their species from their proximate
end, while, from their remote end, they take their genus and cause.
Thus in the case of adultery committed for the sake of theft, there is
the species of adultery taken from its proper end and object; but the
ultimate end shows that the act of adultery is both the result of the
theft, and is included under it, as an effect under its cause, or a
species under its genus, as appears from what we have said about acts
in general ([2400]FS, Q[18], A[7]). Wherefore, as to the case in point
also, the proximate end of heresy is adherence to one's own false
opinion, and from this it derives its species, while its remote end
reveals its cause, viz. that it arises from pride or covetousness.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as heresy is so called from its being a
choosing [*From the Greek {airein} [hairein], to cut off], so does sect
derive its name from its being a cutting off [secando], as Isidore
states (Etym. viii, 3).
Wherefore heresy and sect are the same thing,
and each belongs to the works of the flesh, not indeed by reason of the
act itself of unbelief in respect of its proximate object, but by
reason of its cause, which is either the desire of an undue end in
which way it arises from pride or covetousness, as stated in the second
objection, or some illusion of the imagination (which gives rise to
error, as the Philosopher states in Metaph. iv; Ed. Did. iii, 5), for
this faculty has a certain connection with the flesh, in as much as its
act is independent on a bodily organ.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether heresy is properly about matters of faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that heresy is not properly about matters of
faith. For just as there are heresies and sects among Christians, so
were there among the Jews, and Pharisees, as Isidore observes (Etym.
viii, 3,4,5). Now their dissensions were not about matters of faith.
Therefore heresy is not about matters of faith, as though they were its
proper matter.
Objection 2: Further, the matter of faith is the thing believed. Now
heresy is not only about things, but also about works, and about
interpretations of Holy Writ. For Jerome says on Gal. 5:20 that
"whoever expounds the Scriptures in any sense but that of the Holy
Ghost by Whom they were written, may be called a heretic, though he may
not have left the Church": and elsewhere he says that "heresies spring
up from words spoken amiss. " [*St. Thomas quotes this saying elsewhere,
in Sent. iv, D, 13, and [2401]TP, Q[16], A[8], but it is not to be
found in St. Jerome's works. ] Therefore heresy is not properly about
the matter of faith.
Objection 3: Further, we find the holy doctors differing even about
matters pertaining to the faith, for example Augustine and Jerome, on
the question about the cessation of the legal observances: and yet this
was without any heresy on their part. Therefore heresy is not properly
about the matter of faith.
On the contrary, Augustine says against the Manichees [*Cf. De Civ. Dei
xviii, 51]: "In Christ's Church, those are heretics, who hold
mischievous and erroneous opinions, and when rebuked that they may
think soundly and rightly, offer a stubborn resistance, and, refusing
to mend their pernicious and deadly doctrines, persist in defending
them. " Now pernicious and deadly doctrines are none but those which are
contrary to the dogmas of faith, whereby "the just man liveth" (Rom.
1:17). Therefore heresy is about matters of faith, as about its proper
matter.
I answer that, We are speaking of heresy now as denoting a corruption
of the Christian faith. Now it does not imply a corruption of the
Christian faith, if a man has a false opinion in matters that are not
of faith, for instance, in questions of geometry and so forth, which
cannot belong to the faith by any means; but only when a person has a
false opinion about things belonging to the faith.
Now a thing may be of the faith in two ways, as stated above ([2402]FP,
Q[32], A[4]; [2403]FS, Q[1], A[6], ad 1; [2404]FS, Q[2], A[5]), in one
way, directly and principally, e. g. the articles of faith; in another
way, indirectly and secondarily, e. g. those matters, the denial of
which leads to the corruption of some article of faith; and there may
be heresy in either way, even as there can be faith.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as the heresies of the Jews and Pharisees
were about opinions relating to Judaism or Pharisaism, so also heresies
among Christians are about matter touching the Christian faith.
Reply to Objection 2: A man is said to expound Holy Writ in another
sense than that required by the Holy Ghost, when he so distorts the
meaning of Holy Writ, that it is contrary to what the Holy Ghost has
revealed. Hence it is written (Ezech. 13:6) about the false prophets:
"They have persisted to confirm what they have said," viz. by false
interpretations of Scripture. Moreover a man professes his faith by the
words that he utters, since confession is an act of faith, as stated
above ([2405]Q[3], A[1] ). Wherefore inordinate words about matters of
faith may lead to corruption of the faith; and hence it is that Pope
Leo says in a letter to Proterius, Bishop of Alexandria: "The enemies
of Christ's cross lie in wait for our every deed and word, so that, if
we but give them the slightest pretext, they may accuse us mendaciously
of agreeing with Nestorius. "
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Ep. xliii) and we find it
stated in the Decretals (xxiv, qu. 3, can. Dixit Apostolus): "By no
means should we accuse of heresy those who, however false and perverse
their opinion may be, defend it without obstinate fervor, and seek the
truth with careful anxiety, ready to mend their opinion, when they have
found the truth," because, to wit, they do not make a choice in
contradiction to the doctrine of the Church. Accordingly, certain
doctors seem to have differed either in matters the holding of which in
this or that way is of no consequence, so far as faith is concerned, or
even in matters of faith, which were not as yet defined by the Church;
although if anyone were obstinately to deny them after they had been
defined by the authority of the universal Church, he would be deemed a
heretic. This authority resides chiefly in the Sovereign Pontiff. For
we read [*Decret. xxiv, qu. 1, can. Quoties]: "Whenever a question of
faith is in dispute, I think, that all our brethren and fellow bishops
ought to refer the matter to none other than Peter, as being the source
of their name and honor, against whose authority neither Jerome nor
Augustine nor any of the holy doctors defended their opinion. " Hence
Jerome says (Exposit. Symbol [*Among the supposititious works of St.
Jerome]): "This, most blessed Pope, is the faith that we have been
taught in the Catholic Church. If anything therein has been incorrectly
or carelessly expressed, we beg that it may be set aright by you who
hold the faith and see of Peter. If however this, our profession, be
approved by the judgment of your apostleship, whoever may blame me,
will prove that he himself is ignorant, or malicious, or even not a
catholic but a heretic. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether heretics ought to be tolerated?
Objection 1: It seems that heretics ought to be tolerated. For the
Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:24,25): "The servant of the Lord must not
wrangle . . . with modesty admonishing them that resist the truth, if
peradventure God may give them repentance to know the truth, and they
may recover themselves from the snares of the devil. " Now if heretics
are not tolerated but put to death, they lose the opportunity of
repentance. Therefore it seems contrary to the Apostle's command.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is necessary in the Church should be
tolerated. Now heresies are necessary in the Church, since the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 11:19): "There must be . . . heresies, that they . . . who
are reproved, may be manifest among you. " Therefore it seems that
heretics should be tolerated.
Objection 3: Further, the Master commanded his servants (Mat. 13:30) to
suffer the cockle "to grow until the harvest," i. e. the end of the
world, as a gloss explains it. Now holy men explain that the cockle
denotes heretics. Therefore heretics should be tolerated.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Titus 3:10,11): "A man that is a
heretic, after the first and second admonition, avoid: knowing that he,
that is such an one, is subverted. "
I answer that, With regard to heretics two points must be observed:
one, on their own side; the other, on the side of the Church. On their
own side there is the sin, whereby they deserve not only to be
separated from the Church by excommunication, but also to be severed
from the world by death. For it is a much graver matter to corrupt the
faith which quickens the soul, than to forge money, which supports
temporal life. Wherefore if forgers of money and other evil-doers are
forthwith condemned to death by the secular authority, much more reason
is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be
not only excommunicated but even put to death.
On the part of the Church, however, there is mercy which looks to the
conversion of the wanderer, wherefore she condemns not at once, but
"after the first and second admonition," as the Apostle directs: after
that, if he is yet stubborn, the Church no longer hoping for his
conversion, looks to the salvation of others, by excommunicating him
and separating him from the Church, and furthermore delivers him to the
secular tribunal to be exterminated thereby from the world by death.
For Jerome commenting on Gal. 5:9, "A little leaven," says: "Cut off
the decayed flesh, expel the mangy sheep from the fold, lest the whole
house, the whole paste, the whole body, the whole flock, burn, perish,
rot, die. Arius was but one spark in Alexandria, but as that spark was
not at once put out, the whole earth was laid waste by its flame. "
Reply to Objection 1: This very modesty demands that the heretic should
be admonished a first and second time: and if he be unwilling to
retract, he must be reckoned as already "subverted," as we may gather
from the words of the Apostle quoted above.
Reply to Objection 2: The profit that ensues from heresy is beside the
intention of heretics, for it consists in the constancy of the faithful
being put to the test, and "makes us shake off our sluggishness, and
search the Scriptures more carefully," as Augustine states (De Gen.
cont. Manich. i, 1). What they really intend is the corruption of the
faith, which is to inflict very great harm indeed. Consequently we
should consider what they directly intend, and expel them, rather than
what is beside their intention, and so, tolerate them.
Reply to Objection 3: According to Decret. (xxiv, qu. iii, can.
Notandum), "to be excommunicated is not to be uprooted. " A man is
excommunicated, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:5) that his "spirit may
be saved in the day of Our Lord. " Yet if heretics be altogether
uprooted by death, this is not contrary to Our Lord's command, which is
to be understood as referring to the case when the cockle cannot be
plucked up without plucking up the wheat, as we explained above
([2406]Q[10], A[8], ad 1), when treating of unbelievers in general.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Church should receive those who return from heresy?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Church ought in all cases to
receive those who return from heresy. For it is written (Jer. 3:1) in
the person of the Lord: "Thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers;
nevertheless return to Me saith the Lord. " Now the sentence of the
Church is God's sentence, according to Dt. 1:17: "You shall hear the
little as well as the great: neither shall you respect any man's
person, because it is the judgment of God. " Therefore even those who
are guilty of the prostitution of unbelief which is spiritual
prostitution, should be received all the same.
Objection 2: Further, Our Lord commanded Peter (Mat. 18:22) to forgive
his offending brother "not" only "till seven times, but till seventy
times seven times," which Jerome expounds as meaning that "a man should
be forgiven, as often as he has sinned. " Therefore he ought to be
received by the Church as often as he has sinned by falling back into
heresy.
Objection 3: Further, heresy is a kind of unbelief. Now other
unbelievers who wish to be converted are received by the Church.
Therefore heretics also should be received.
On the contrary, The Decretal Ad abolendam (De Haereticis, cap. ix)
says that "those who are found to have relapsed into the error which
they had already abjured, must be left to the secular tribunal. "
Therefore they should not be received by the Church.
I answer that, In obedience to Our Lord's institution, the Church
extends her charity to all, not only to friends, but also to foes who
persecute her, according to Mat. 5:44: "Love your enemies; do good to
them that hate you. " Now it is part of charity that we should both wish
and work our neighbor's good. Again, good is twofold: one is spiritual,
namely the health of the soul, which good is chiefly the object of
charity, since it is this chiefly that we should wish for one another.
Consequently, from this point of view, heretics who return after
falling no matter how often, are admitted by the Church to Penance
whereby the way of salvation is opened to them.
The other good is that which charity considers secondarily, viz.
temporal good, such as life of the body, worldly possessions, good
repute, ecclesiastical or secular dignity, for we are not bound by
charity to wish others this good, except in relation to the eternal
salvation of them and of others. Hence if the presence of one of these
goods in one individual might be an obstacle to eternal salvation in
many, we are not bound out of charity to wish such a good to that
person, rather should we desire him to be without it, both because
eternal salvation takes precedence of temporal good, and because the
good of the many is to be preferred to the good of one. Now if heretics
were always received on their return, in order to save their lives and
other temporal goods, this might be prejudicial to the salvation of
others, both because they would infect others if they relapsed again,
and because, if they escaped without punishment, others would feel more
assured in lapsing into heresy. For it is written (Eccles. 8:11): "For
because sentence is not speedily pronounced against the evil, the
children of men commit evils without any fear. "
For this reason the Church not only admits to Penance those who return
from heresy for the first time, but also safeguards their lives, and
sometimes by dispensation, restores them to the ecclesiastical
dignities which they may have had before, should their conversion
appear to be sincere: we read of this as having frequently been done
for the good of peace. But when they fall again, after having been
received, this seems to prove them to be inconstant in faith, wherefore
when they return again, they are admitted to Penance, but are not
delivered from the pain of death.
Reply to Objection 1: In God's tribunal, those who return are always
received, because God is a searcher of hearts, and knows those who
return in sincerity. But the Church cannot imitate God in this, for she
presumes that those who relapse after being once received, are not
sincere in their return; hence she does not debar them from the way of
salvation, but neither does she protect them from the sentence of
death.
Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord was speaking to Peter of sins committed
against oneself, for one should always forgive such offenses and spare
our brother when he repents. These words are not to be applied to sins
committed against one's neighbor or against God, for it is not left to
our discretion to forgive such offenses, as Jerome says on Mat. 18:15,
"If thy brother shall offend against thee. " Yet even in this matter the
law prescribes limits according as God's honor or our neighbor's good
demands.
Reply to Objection 3: When other unbelievers, who have never received
the faith are converted, they do not as yet show signs of inconstancy
in faith, as relapsed heretics do; hence the comparison fails.
__________________________________________________________________
OF APOSTASY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider apostasy: about which there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether apostasy pertains to unbelief?
(2) Whether, on account of apostasy from the faith, subjects are
absolved from allegiance to an apostate prince?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether apostasy pertains to unbelief?
Objection 1: It would seem that apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.
For that which is the origin of all sins, does not, seemingly, pertain
to unbelief, since many sins there are without unbelief. Now apostasy
seems to be the origin of every sin, for it is written (Ecclus. 10:14):
"The beginning of the pride of man is apostasy [Douay: 'to fall off']
from God," and further on, (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the beginning of
all sin. " Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.
Objection 2: Further, unbelief is an act of the understanding: whereas
apostasy seems rather to consist in some outward deed or utterance, or
even in some inward act of the will, for it is written (Prov. 6:12-14):
"A man that is an apostate, an unprofitable man walketh with a perverse
mouth. He winketh with the eyes, presseth with the foot, speaketh with
the finger. With a wicked heart he deviseth evil, and at all times he
soweth discord. " Moreover if anyone were to have himself circumcised,
or to worship at the tomb of Mahomet, he would be deemed an apostate.
Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.
Objection 3: Further, heresy, since it pertains to unbelief, is a
determinate species of unbelief. If then, apostasy pertained to
unbelief, it would follow that it is a determinate species of unbelief,
which does not seem to agree with what has been said ([2407]Q[10],
A[5]). Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 6:67): "Many of his disciples went
back," i. e. apostatized, of whom Our Lord had said previously (Jn.
6:65): "There are some of you that believe not. " Therefore apostasy
pertains to unbelief.
I answer that, Apostasy denotes a backsliding from God. This may happen
in various ways according to the different kinds of union between man
and God. For, in the first place, man is united to God by faith;
secondly, by having his will duly submissive in obeying His
commandments; thirdly, by certain special things pertaining to
supererogation such as the religious life, the clerical state, or Holy
Orders. Now if that which follows be removed, that which precedes,
remains, but the converse does not hold. Accordingly a man may
apostatize from God, by withdrawing from the religious life to which he
was bound by profession, or from the Holy Order which he had received:
and this is called "apostasy from religious life" or "Orders. " A man
may also apostatize from God, by rebelling in his mind against the
Divine commandments: and though man may apostatize in both the above
ways, he may still remain united to God by faith.
But if he give up the faith, then he seems to turn away from God
altogether: and consequently, apostasy simply and absolutely is that
whereby a man withdraws from the faith, and is called "apostasy of
perfidy. " In this way apostasy, simply so called, pertains to unbelief.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection refers to the second kind of
apostasy, which denotes an act of the will in rebellion against God's
commandments, an act that is to be found in every mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to faith not only that the heart
should believe, but also that external words and deeds should bear
witness to the inward faith, for confession is an act of faith. In this
way too, certain external words or deeds pertain to unbelief, in so far
as they are signs of unbelief, even as a sign of health is said itself
to be healthy. Now although the authority quoted may be understood as
referring to every kind of apostate, yet it applies most truly to an
apostate from the faith. For since faith is the first foundation of
things to be hoped for, and since, without faith it is "impossible to
please God"; when once faith is removed, man retains nothing that may
be useful for the obtaining of eternal salvation, for which reason it
is written (Prov. 6:12): "A man that is an apostate, an unprofitable
man": because faith is the life of the soul, according to Rom. 1:17:
"The just man liveth by faith. " Therefore, just as when the life of the
body is taken away, man's every member and part loses its due
disposition, so when the life of justice, which is by faith, is done
away, disorder appears in all his members. First, in his mouth, whereby
chiefly his mind stands revealed; secondly, in his eyes; thirdly, in
the instrument of movement; fourthly, in his will, which tends to evil.
The result is that "he sows discord," endeavoring to sever others from
the faith even as he severed himself.
Reply to Objection 3: The species of a quality or form are not
diversified by the fact of its being the term "wherefrom" or "whereto"
of movement: on the contrary, it is the movement that takes its species
from the terms. Now apostasy regards unbelief as the term "whereto" of
the movement of withdrawal from the faith; wherefore apostasy does not
imply a special kind of unbelief, but an aggravating circumstance
thereof, according to 2 Pet. 2:21: "It had been better for them not to
know the truth [Vulg. : 'the way of justice'], than after they had known
it, to turn back. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a prince forfeits his dominion over his subjects, on account of
apostasy from the faith, so that they no longer owe him allegiance?
Objection 1: It would seem that a prince does not so forfeit his
dominion over his subjects, on account of apostasy from the faith, that
they no longer owe him allegiance. For Ambrose [*St. Augustine, Super
Ps. 124:3] says that the Emperor Julian, though an apostate,
nevertheless had under him Christian soldiers, who when he said to
them, "Fall into line for the defense of the republic," were bound to
obey. Therefore subjects are not absolved from their allegiance to
their prince on account of his apostasy.
Objection 2: Further, an apostate from the faith is an unbeliever. Now
we find that certain holy men served unbelieving masters; thus Joseph
served Pharaoh, Daniel served Nabuchodonosor, and Mardochai served
Assuerus. Therefore apostasy from the faith does not release subjects
from allegiance to their sovereign.
Objection 3: Further, just as by apostasy from the faith, a man turns
away from God, so does every sin. Consequently if, on account of
apostasy from the faith, princes were to lose their right to command
those of their subjects who are believers, they would equally lose it
on account of other sins: which is evidently not the case. Therefore we
ought not to refuse allegiance to a sovereign on account of his
apostatizing from the faith.
On the contrary, Gregory VII says (Council, Roman V): "Holding to the
institutions of our holy predecessors, we, by our apostolic authority,
absolve from their oath those who through loyalty or through the sacred
bond of an oath owe allegiance to excommunicated persons: and we
absolutely forbid them to continue their allegiance to such persons,
until these shall have made amends. " Now apostates from the faith, like
heretics, are excommunicated, according to the Decretal [*Extra, De
Haereticis, cap. Ad abolendam].
pronounced sentence of excommunication, he adds as his reason: "Know
you not that a little leaven corrupts the whole lump? " and afterwards
he adds the reason on the part of the punishment inflicted by the
sentence of the Church when he says (1 Cor. 5:12): "Do not you judge
them that are within? "
Accordingly, in the first way the Church does not forbid the faithful
to communicate with unbelievers, who have not in any way received the
Christian faith, viz. with pagans and Jews, because she has not the
right to exercise spiritual judgment over them, but only temporal
judgment, in the case when, while dwelling among Christians they are
guilty of some misdemeanor, and are condemned by the faithful to some
temporal punishment. On the other hand, in this way, i. e. as a
punishment, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with those
unbelievers who have forsaken the faith they once received, either by
corrupting the faith, as heretics, or by entirely renouncing the faith,
as apostates, because the Church pronounces sentence of excommunication
on both.
With regard to the second way, it seems that one ought to distinguish
according to the various conditions of persons, circumstances and time.
For some are firm in the faith; and so it is to be hoped that their
communicating with unbelievers will lead to the conversion of the
latter rather than to the aversion of the faithful from the faith.
These are not to be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers who have
not received the faith, such as pagans or Jews, especially if there be
some urgent necessity for so doing. But in the case of simple people
and those who are weak in the faith, whose perversion is to be feared
as a probable result, they should be forbidden to communicate with
unbelievers, and especially to be on very familiar terms with them, or
to communicate with them without necessity.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: The Church does not exercise judgment against
unbelievers in the point of inflicting spiritual punishment on them:
but she does exercise judgment over some of them in the matter of
temporal punishment. It is under this head that sometimes the Church,
for certain special sins, withdraws the faithful from communication
with certain unbelievers.
Reply to Objection 3: There is more probability that a servant who is
ruled by his master's commands, will be converted to the faith of his
master who is a believer, than if the case were the reverse: and so the
faithful are not forbidden to have unbelieving servants. If, however,
the master were in danger, through communicating with such a servant,
he should send him away, according to Our Lord's command (Mat. 18:8):
"If . . . thy foot scandalize thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee. "
With regard to the argument in the contrary [*The Leonine Edition gives
this solution before the Reply OBJ 2] sense the reply is that the Lord
gave this command in reference to those nations into whose territory
the Jews were about to enter. For the latter were inclined to idolatry,
so that it was to be feared lest, through frequent dealings with those
nations, they should be estranged from the faith: hence the text goes
on (Dt. 7:4): "For she will turn away thy son from following Me. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether unbelievers may have authority or dominion over the faithful?
Objection 1: It would seem that unbelievers may have authority or
dominion over the faithful. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:1):
"Whosoever are servants under the yoke, let them count their masters
worthy of all honor": and it is clear that he is speaking of
unbelievers, since he adds (1 Tim. 6:2): "But they that have believing
masters, let them not despise them. " Moreover it is written (1 Pet.
2:18): "Servants be subject to your masters with all fear, not only to
the good and gentle, but also to the froward. " Now this command would
not be contained in the apostolic teaching unless unbelievers could
have authority over the faithful. Therefore it seems that unbelievers
can have authority over the faithful.
Objection 2: Further, all the members of a prince's household are his
subjects. Now some of the faithful were members of unbelieving princes'
households, for we read in the Epistle to the Philippians (4:22): "All
the saints salute you, especially they that are of Caesar's household,"
referring to Nero, who was an unbeliever. Therefore unbelievers can
have authority over the faithful.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2) a
slave is his master's instrument in matters concerning everyday life,
even as a craftsman's laborer is his instrument in matters concerning
the working of his art. Now, in such matters, a believer can be subject
to an unbeliever, for he may work on an unbeliever's farm. Therefore
unbelievers may have authority over the faithful even as to dominion.
On the contrary, Those who are in authority can pronounce judgment on
those over whom they are placed. But unbelievers cannot pronounce
judgment on the faithful, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:1): "Dare any
of you, having a matter against another, go to be judged before the
unjust," i. e. unbelievers, "and not before the saints? " Therefore it
seems that unbelievers cannot have authority over the faithful.
I answer that, That this question may be considered in two ways. First,
we may speak of dominion or authority of unbelievers over the faithful
as of a thing to be established for the first time. This ought by no
means to be allowed, since it would provoke scandal and endanger the
faith, for subjects are easily influenced by their superiors to comply
with their commands, unless the subjects are of great virtue: moreover
unbelievers hold the faith in contempt, if they see the faithful fall
away. Hence the Apostle forbade the faithful to go to law before an
unbelieving judge. And so the Church altogether forbids unbelievers to
acquire dominion over believers, or to have authority over them in any
capacity whatever.
Secondly, we may speak of dominion or authority, as already in force:
and here we must observe that dominion and authority are institutions
of human law, while the distinction between faithful and unbelievers
arises from the Divine law. Now the Divine law which is the law of
grace, does not do away with human law which is the law of natural
reason. Wherefore the distinction between faithful and unbelievers,
considered in itself, does not do away with dominion and authority of
unbelievers over the faithful.
Nevertheless this right of dominion or authority can be justly done
away with by the sentence or ordination of the Church who has the
authority of God: since unbelievers in virtue of their unbelief deserve
to forfeit their power over the faithful who are converted into
children of God.
This the Church does sometimes, and sometimes not. For among those
unbelievers who are subject, even in temporal matters, to the Church
and her members, the Church made the law that if the slave of a Jew
became a Christian, he should forthwith receive his freedom, without
paying any price, if he should be a "vernaculus," i. e. born in slavery;
and likewise if, when yet an unbeliever, he had been bought for his
service: if, however, he had been bought for sale, then he should be
offered for sale within three months. Nor does the Church harm them in
this, because since those Jews themselves are subject to the Church,
she can dispose of their possessions, even as secular princes have
enacted many laws to be observed by their subjects, in favor of
liberty. On the other hand, the Church has not applied the above law to
those unbelievers who are not subject to her or her members, in
temporal matters, although she has the right to do so: and this, in
order to avoid scandal, for as Our Lord showed (Mat. 17:25,26) that He
could be excused from paying the tribute, because "the children are
free," yet He ordered the tribute to be paid in order to avoid giving
scandal. Thus Paul too, after saying that servants should honor their
masters, adds, "lest the name of the Lord and His doctrine be
blasphemed. "
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: The authority of Caesar preceded the distinction
of faithful from unbelievers. Hence it was not cancelled by the
conversion of some to the faith. Moreover it was a good thing that
there should be a few of the faithful in the emperor's household, that
they might defend the rest of the faithful. Thus the Blessed Sebastian
encouraged those whom he saw faltering under torture, and, the while,
remained hidden under the military cloak in the palace of Diocletian.
Reply to Objection 3: Slaves are subject to their masters for their
whole lifetime, and are subject to their overseers in everything:
whereas the craftsman's laborer is subject to him for certain special
works. Hence it would be more dangerous for unbelievers to have
dominion or authority over the faithful, than that they should be
allowed to employ them in some craft. Wherefore the Church permits
Christians to work on the land of Jews, because this does not entail
their living together with them. Thus Solomon besought the King of Tyre
to send master workmen to hew the trees, as related in 3 Kings 5:6.
Yet, if there be reason to fear that the faithful will be perverted by
such communications and dealings, they should be absolutely forbidden.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the rites of unbelievers ought to be tolerated?
Objection 1: It would seem that rites of unbelievers ought not to be
tolerated. For it is evident that unbelievers sin in observing their
rites: and not to prevent a sin, when one can, seems to imply consent
therein, as a gloss observes on Rom. 1:32: "Not only they that do them,
but they also that consent to them that do them. " Therefore it is a sin
to tolerate their rites.
Objection 2: Further, the rites of the Jews are compared to idolatry,
because a gloss on Gal. 5:1, "Be not held again under the yoke of
bondage," says: "The bondage of that law was not lighter than that of
idolatry. " But it would not be allowable for anyone to observe the
rites of idolatry, in fact Christian princes at first caused the
temples of idols to be closed, and afterwards, to be destroyed, as
Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei xviii, 54). Therefore it follows that
even the rites of Jews ought not to be tolerated.
Objection 3: Further, unbelief is the greatest of sins, as stated above
(A[3] ). Now other sins such as adultery, theft and the like, are not
tolerated, but are punishable by law. Therefore neither ought the rites
of unbelievers to be tolerated.
On the contrary, Gregory [*Regist. xi, Ep. 15: cf. Decret. , dist. xlv,
can. , Qui sincera] says, speaking of the Jews: "They should be allowed
to observe all their feasts, just as hitherto they and their fathers
have for ages observed them. "
I answer that, Human government is derived from the Divine government,
and should imitate it. Now although God is all-powerful and supremely
good, nevertheless He allows certain evils to take place in the
universe, which He might prevent, lest, without them, greater goods
might be forfeited, or greater evils ensue. Accordingly in human
government also, those who are in authority, rightly tolerate certain
evils, lest certain goods be lost, or certain greater evils be
incurred: thus Augustine says (De Ordine ii, 4): "If you do away with
harlots, the world will be convulsed with lust. " Hence, though
unbelievers sin in their rites, they may be tolerated, either on
account of some good that ensues therefrom, or because of some evil
avoided. Thus from the fact that the Jews observe their rites, which,
of old, foreshadowed the truth of the faith which we hold, there
follows this good---that our very enemies bear witness to our faith,
and that our faith is represented in a figure, so to speak. For this
reason they are tolerated in the observance of their rites.
On the other hand, the rites of other unbelievers, which are neither
truthful nor profitable are by no means to be tolerated, except
perchance in order to avoid an evil, e. g. the scandal or disturbance
that might ensue, or some hindrance to the salvation of those who if
they were unmolested might gradually be converted to the faith. For
this reason the Church, at times, has tolerated the rites even of
heretics and pagans, when unbelievers were very numerous.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the children of Jews and other unbelievers ought to be baptized
against their parents' will?
Objection 1: It would seem that the children of Jews and of other
unbelievers ought to be baptized against their parents' will. For the
bond of marriage is stronger than the right of parental authority over
children, since the right of parental authority can be made to cease,
when a son is set at liberty; whereas the marriage bond cannot be
severed by man, according to Mat. 19:6: "What . . . God hath joined
together let no man put asunder. " And yet the marriage bond is broken
on account of unbelief: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:15): "If the
unbeliever depart, let him depart. For a brother or sister is not under
servitude in such cases": and a canon [*Can. Uxor legitima, and
Idololatria, qu. i] says that "if the unbelieving partner is unwilling
to abide with the other, without insult to their Creator, then the
other partner is not bound to cohabitation. " Much more, therefore, does
unbelief abrogate the right of unbelieving parents' authority over
their children: and consequently their children may be baptized against
their parents' will.
Objection 2: Further, one is more bound to succor a man who is in
danger of everlasting death, than one who is in danger of temporal
death. Now it would be a sin, if one saw a man in danger of temporal
death and failed to go to his aid. Since, then, the children of Jews
and other unbelievers are in danger of everlasting death, should they
be left to their parents who would imbue them with their unbelief, it
seems that they ought to be taken away from them and baptized, and
instructed in the faith.
Objection 3: Further, the children of a bondsman are themselves
bondsmen, and under the power of his master. Now the Jews are bondsmen
of kings and princes: therefore their children are also. Consequently
kings and princes have the power to do what they will with Jewish
children. Therefore no injustice is committed if they baptize them
against their parents' wishes.
Objection 4: Further, every man belongs more to God, from Whom he has
his soul, than to his carnal father, from whom he has his body.
Therefore it is not unjust if Jewish children be taken away from their
parents, and consecrated to God in Baptism.
Objection 5: Further, Baptism avails for salvation more than preaching
does, since Baptism removes forthwith the stain of sin and the debt of
punishment, and opens the gate of heaven. Now if danger ensue through
not preaching, it is imputed to him who omitted to preach, according to
the words of Ezech. 33:6 about the man who "sees the sword coming and
sounds not the trumpet. " Much more therefore, if Jewish children are
lost through not being baptized are they accounted guilty of sin, who
could have baptized them and did not.
On the contrary, Injustice should be done to no man. Now it would be an
injustice to Jews if their children were to be baptized against their
will, since they would lose the rights of parental authority over their
children as soon as these were Christians. Therefore these should not
be baptized against their parents' will.
I answer that, The custom of the Church has very great authority and
ought to be jealously observed in all things, since the very doctrine
of catholic doctors derives its authority from the Church. Hence we
ought to abide by the authority of the Church rather than by that of an
Augustine or a Jerome or of any doctor whatever. Now it was never the
custom of the Church to baptize the children of the Jews against the
will of their parents, although at times past there have been many very
powerful catholic princes like Constantine and Theodosius, with whom
most holy bishops have been on most friendly terms, as Sylvester with
Constantine, and Ambrose with Theodosius, who would certainly not have
failed to obtain this favor from them if it had been at all reasonable.
It seems therefore hazardous to repeat this assertion, that the
children of Jews should be baptized against their parents' wishes, in
contradiction to the Church's custom observed hitherto.
There are two reasons for this custom. One is on account of the danger
to the faith. For children baptized before coming to the use of reason,
afterwards when they come to perfect age, might easily be persuaded by
their parents to renounce what they had unknowingly embraced; and this
would be detrimental to the faith.
The other reason is that it is against natural justice. For a child is
by nature part of its father: thus, at first, it is not distinct from
its parents as to its body, so long as it is enfolded within its
mother's womb; and later on after birth, and before it has the use of
its free-will, it is enfolded in the care of its parents, which is like
a spiritual womb, for so long as man has not the use of reason, he
differs not from an irrational animal; so that even as an ox or a horse
belongs to someone who, according to the civil law, can use them when
he likes, as his own instrument, so, according to the natural law, a
son, before coming to the use of reason, is under his father's care.
Hence it would be contrary to natural justice, if a child, before
coming to the use of reason, were to be taken away from its parents'
custody, or anything done to it against its parents' wish. As soon,
however, as it begins to have the use of its free-will, it begins to
belong to itself, and is able to look after itself, in matters
concerning the Divine or the natural law, and then it should be
induced, not by compulsion but by persuasion, to embrace the faith: it
can then consent to the faith, and be baptized, even against its
parents' wish; but not before it comes to the use of reason. Hence it
is said of the children of the fathers of old that they were saved in
the faith of their parents; whereby we are given to understand that it
is the parents' duty to look after the salvation of their children,
especially before they come to the use of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: In the marriage bond, both husband and wife have
the use of the free-will, and each can assent to the faith without the
other's consent. But this does not apply to a child before it comes to
the use of reason: yet the comparison holds good after the child has
come to the use of reason, if it is willing to be converted.
Reply to Objection 2: No one should be snatched from natural death
against the order of civil law: for instance, if a man were condemned
by the judge to temporal death, nobody ought to rescue him by violence:
hence no one ought to break the order of the natural law, whereby a
child is in the custody of its father, in order to rescue it from the
danger of everlasting death.
Reply to Objection 3: Jews are bondsmen of princes by civil bondage,
which does not exclude the order of natural or Divine law.
Reply to Objection 4: Man is directed to God by his reason, whereby he
can know Him. Hence a child before coming to the use of reason, in the
natural order of things, is directed to God by its parents' reason,
under whose care it lies by nature: and it is for them to dispose of
the child in all matters relating to God.
Reply to Objection 5: The peril that ensues from the omission of
preaching, threatens only those who are entrusted with the duty of
preaching. Hence it had already been said (Ezech. 3:17): "I have made
thee a watchman to the children [Vulg. : 'house'] of Israel. " On the
other hand, to provide the sacraments of salvation for the children of
unbelievers is the duty of their parents. Hence it is they whom the
danger threatens, if through being deprived of the sacraments their
children fail to obtain salvation.
__________________________________________________________________
OF HERESY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider heresy: under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether heresy is a kind of unbelief?
(2) Of the matter about which it is;
(3) Whether heretics should be tolerated?
(4) Whether converts should be received?
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Whether heresy is a species of unbelief?
Objection 1: It would seem that heresy is not a species of unbelief.
For unbelief is in the understanding, as stated above (Q[10], A[2]).
Now heresy would seem not to pertain to the understanding, but rather
to the appetitive power; for Jerome says on Gal. 5:19: [*Cf. Decretals
xxiv, qu. iii, cap. 27] "The works of the flesh are manifest: Heresy is
derived from a Greek word meaning choice, whereby a man makes choice of
that school which he deems best. " But choice is an act of the
appetitive power, as stated above ([2398]FS, Q[13], A[1]). Therefore
heresy is not a species of unbelief.
Objection 2: Further, vice takes its species chiefly from its end;
hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he who commits adultery
that he may steal, is a thief rather than an adulterer. " Now the end of
heresy is temporal profit, especially lordship and glory, which belong
to the vice of pride or covetousness: for Augustine says (De Util.
Credendi i) that "a heretic is one who either devises or follows false
and new opinions, for the sake of some temporal profit, especially that
he may lord and be honored above others. " Therefore heresy is a species
of pride rather than of unbelief.
Objection 3: Further, since unbelief is in the understanding, it would
seem not to pertain to the flesh. Now heresy belongs to the works of
the flesh, for the Apostle says (Gal. 5:19): "The works of the flesh
are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness," and among the
others, he adds, "dissensions, sects," which are the same as heresies.
Therefore heresy is not a species of unbelief.
On the contrary, Falsehood is contrary to truth. Now a heretic is one
who devises or follows false or new opinions. Therefore heresy is
opposed to the truth, on which faith is founded; and consequently it is
a species of unbelief.
I answer that, The word heresy as stated in the first objection denotes
a choosing. Now choice as stated above ([2399]FS, Q[13], A[3]) is about
things directed to the end, the end being presupposed. Now, in matters
of faith, the will assents to some truth, as to its proper good, as was
shown above (Q[4], A[3]): wherefore that which is the chief truth, has
the character of last end, while those which are secondary truths, have
the character of being directed to the end.
Now, whoever believes, assents to someone's words; so that, in every
form of unbelief, the person to whose words assent is given seems to
hold the chief place and to be the end as it were; while the things by
holding which one assents to that person hold a secondary place.
Consequently he that holds the Christian faith aright, assents, by his
will, to Christ, in those things which truly belong to His doctrine.
Accordingly there are two ways in which a man may deviate from the
rectitude of the Christian faith. First, because he is unwilling to
assent to Christ: and such a man has an evil will, so to say, in
respect of the very end. This belongs to the species of unbelief in
pagans and Jews. Secondly, because, though he intends to assent to
Christ, yet he fails in his choice of those things wherein he assents
to Christ, because he chooses not what Christ really taught, but the
suggestions of his own mind.
Therefore heresy is a species of unbelief, belonging to those who
profess the Christian faith, but corrupt its dogmas.
Reply to Objection 1: Choice regards unbelief in the same way as the
will regards faith, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Vices take their species from their proximate
end, while, from their remote end, they take their genus and cause.
Thus in the case of adultery committed for the sake of theft, there is
the species of adultery taken from its proper end and object; but the
ultimate end shows that the act of adultery is both the result of the
theft, and is included under it, as an effect under its cause, or a
species under its genus, as appears from what we have said about acts
in general ([2400]FS, Q[18], A[7]). Wherefore, as to the case in point
also, the proximate end of heresy is adherence to one's own false
opinion, and from this it derives its species, while its remote end
reveals its cause, viz. that it arises from pride or covetousness.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as heresy is so called from its being a
choosing [*From the Greek {airein} [hairein], to cut off], so does sect
derive its name from its being a cutting off [secando], as Isidore
states (Etym. viii, 3).
Wherefore heresy and sect are the same thing,
and each belongs to the works of the flesh, not indeed by reason of the
act itself of unbelief in respect of its proximate object, but by
reason of its cause, which is either the desire of an undue end in
which way it arises from pride or covetousness, as stated in the second
objection, or some illusion of the imagination (which gives rise to
error, as the Philosopher states in Metaph. iv; Ed. Did. iii, 5), for
this faculty has a certain connection with the flesh, in as much as its
act is independent on a bodily organ.
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Whether heresy is properly about matters of faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that heresy is not properly about matters of
faith. For just as there are heresies and sects among Christians, so
were there among the Jews, and Pharisees, as Isidore observes (Etym.
viii, 3,4,5). Now their dissensions were not about matters of faith.
Therefore heresy is not about matters of faith, as though they were its
proper matter.
Objection 2: Further, the matter of faith is the thing believed. Now
heresy is not only about things, but also about works, and about
interpretations of Holy Writ. For Jerome says on Gal. 5:20 that
"whoever expounds the Scriptures in any sense but that of the Holy
Ghost by Whom they were written, may be called a heretic, though he may
not have left the Church": and elsewhere he says that "heresies spring
up from words spoken amiss. " [*St. Thomas quotes this saying elsewhere,
in Sent. iv, D, 13, and [2401]TP, Q[16], A[8], but it is not to be
found in St. Jerome's works. ] Therefore heresy is not properly about
the matter of faith.
Objection 3: Further, we find the holy doctors differing even about
matters pertaining to the faith, for example Augustine and Jerome, on
the question about the cessation of the legal observances: and yet this
was without any heresy on their part. Therefore heresy is not properly
about the matter of faith.
On the contrary, Augustine says against the Manichees [*Cf. De Civ. Dei
xviii, 51]: "In Christ's Church, those are heretics, who hold
mischievous and erroneous opinions, and when rebuked that they may
think soundly and rightly, offer a stubborn resistance, and, refusing
to mend their pernicious and deadly doctrines, persist in defending
them. " Now pernicious and deadly doctrines are none but those which are
contrary to the dogmas of faith, whereby "the just man liveth" (Rom.
1:17). Therefore heresy is about matters of faith, as about its proper
matter.
I answer that, We are speaking of heresy now as denoting a corruption
of the Christian faith. Now it does not imply a corruption of the
Christian faith, if a man has a false opinion in matters that are not
of faith, for instance, in questions of geometry and so forth, which
cannot belong to the faith by any means; but only when a person has a
false opinion about things belonging to the faith.
Now a thing may be of the faith in two ways, as stated above ([2402]FP,
Q[32], A[4]; [2403]FS, Q[1], A[6], ad 1; [2404]FS, Q[2], A[5]), in one
way, directly and principally, e. g. the articles of faith; in another
way, indirectly and secondarily, e. g. those matters, the denial of
which leads to the corruption of some article of faith; and there may
be heresy in either way, even as there can be faith.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as the heresies of the Jews and Pharisees
were about opinions relating to Judaism or Pharisaism, so also heresies
among Christians are about matter touching the Christian faith.
Reply to Objection 2: A man is said to expound Holy Writ in another
sense than that required by the Holy Ghost, when he so distorts the
meaning of Holy Writ, that it is contrary to what the Holy Ghost has
revealed. Hence it is written (Ezech. 13:6) about the false prophets:
"They have persisted to confirm what they have said," viz. by false
interpretations of Scripture. Moreover a man professes his faith by the
words that he utters, since confession is an act of faith, as stated
above ([2405]Q[3], A[1] ). Wherefore inordinate words about matters of
faith may lead to corruption of the faith; and hence it is that Pope
Leo says in a letter to Proterius, Bishop of Alexandria: "The enemies
of Christ's cross lie in wait for our every deed and word, so that, if
we but give them the slightest pretext, they may accuse us mendaciously
of agreeing with Nestorius. "
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Ep. xliii) and we find it
stated in the Decretals (xxiv, qu. 3, can. Dixit Apostolus): "By no
means should we accuse of heresy those who, however false and perverse
their opinion may be, defend it without obstinate fervor, and seek the
truth with careful anxiety, ready to mend their opinion, when they have
found the truth," because, to wit, they do not make a choice in
contradiction to the doctrine of the Church. Accordingly, certain
doctors seem to have differed either in matters the holding of which in
this or that way is of no consequence, so far as faith is concerned, or
even in matters of faith, which were not as yet defined by the Church;
although if anyone were obstinately to deny them after they had been
defined by the authority of the universal Church, he would be deemed a
heretic. This authority resides chiefly in the Sovereign Pontiff. For
we read [*Decret. xxiv, qu. 1, can. Quoties]: "Whenever a question of
faith is in dispute, I think, that all our brethren and fellow bishops
ought to refer the matter to none other than Peter, as being the source
of their name and honor, against whose authority neither Jerome nor
Augustine nor any of the holy doctors defended their opinion. " Hence
Jerome says (Exposit. Symbol [*Among the supposititious works of St.
Jerome]): "This, most blessed Pope, is the faith that we have been
taught in the Catholic Church. If anything therein has been incorrectly
or carelessly expressed, we beg that it may be set aright by you who
hold the faith and see of Peter. If however this, our profession, be
approved by the judgment of your apostleship, whoever may blame me,
will prove that he himself is ignorant, or malicious, or even not a
catholic but a heretic. "
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Whether heretics ought to be tolerated?
Objection 1: It seems that heretics ought to be tolerated. For the
Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:24,25): "The servant of the Lord must not
wrangle . . . with modesty admonishing them that resist the truth, if
peradventure God may give them repentance to know the truth, and they
may recover themselves from the snares of the devil. " Now if heretics
are not tolerated but put to death, they lose the opportunity of
repentance. Therefore it seems contrary to the Apostle's command.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is necessary in the Church should be
tolerated. Now heresies are necessary in the Church, since the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 11:19): "There must be . . . heresies, that they . . . who
are reproved, may be manifest among you. " Therefore it seems that
heretics should be tolerated.
Objection 3: Further, the Master commanded his servants (Mat. 13:30) to
suffer the cockle "to grow until the harvest," i. e. the end of the
world, as a gloss explains it. Now holy men explain that the cockle
denotes heretics. Therefore heretics should be tolerated.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Titus 3:10,11): "A man that is a
heretic, after the first and second admonition, avoid: knowing that he,
that is such an one, is subverted. "
I answer that, With regard to heretics two points must be observed:
one, on their own side; the other, on the side of the Church. On their
own side there is the sin, whereby they deserve not only to be
separated from the Church by excommunication, but also to be severed
from the world by death. For it is a much graver matter to corrupt the
faith which quickens the soul, than to forge money, which supports
temporal life. Wherefore if forgers of money and other evil-doers are
forthwith condemned to death by the secular authority, much more reason
is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be
not only excommunicated but even put to death.
On the part of the Church, however, there is mercy which looks to the
conversion of the wanderer, wherefore she condemns not at once, but
"after the first and second admonition," as the Apostle directs: after
that, if he is yet stubborn, the Church no longer hoping for his
conversion, looks to the salvation of others, by excommunicating him
and separating him from the Church, and furthermore delivers him to the
secular tribunal to be exterminated thereby from the world by death.
For Jerome commenting on Gal. 5:9, "A little leaven," says: "Cut off
the decayed flesh, expel the mangy sheep from the fold, lest the whole
house, the whole paste, the whole body, the whole flock, burn, perish,
rot, die. Arius was but one spark in Alexandria, but as that spark was
not at once put out, the whole earth was laid waste by its flame. "
Reply to Objection 1: This very modesty demands that the heretic should
be admonished a first and second time: and if he be unwilling to
retract, he must be reckoned as already "subverted," as we may gather
from the words of the Apostle quoted above.
Reply to Objection 2: The profit that ensues from heresy is beside the
intention of heretics, for it consists in the constancy of the faithful
being put to the test, and "makes us shake off our sluggishness, and
search the Scriptures more carefully," as Augustine states (De Gen.
cont. Manich. i, 1). What they really intend is the corruption of the
faith, which is to inflict very great harm indeed. Consequently we
should consider what they directly intend, and expel them, rather than
what is beside their intention, and so, tolerate them.
Reply to Objection 3: According to Decret. (xxiv, qu. iii, can.
Notandum), "to be excommunicated is not to be uprooted. " A man is
excommunicated, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:5) that his "spirit may
be saved in the day of Our Lord. " Yet if heretics be altogether
uprooted by death, this is not contrary to Our Lord's command, which is
to be understood as referring to the case when the cockle cannot be
plucked up without plucking up the wheat, as we explained above
([2406]Q[10], A[8], ad 1), when treating of unbelievers in general.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Church should receive those who return from heresy?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Church ought in all cases to
receive those who return from heresy. For it is written (Jer. 3:1) in
the person of the Lord: "Thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers;
nevertheless return to Me saith the Lord. " Now the sentence of the
Church is God's sentence, according to Dt. 1:17: "You shall hear the
little as well as the great: neither shall you respect any man's
person, because it is the judgment of God. " Therefore even those who
are guilty of the prostitution of unbelief which is spiritual
prostitution, should be received all the same.
Objection 2: Further, Our Lord commanded Peter (Mat. 18:22) to forgive
his offending brother "not" only "till seven times, but till seventy
times seven times," which Jerome expounds as meaning that "a man should
be forgiven, as often as he has sinned. " Therefore he ought to be
received by the Church as often as he has sinned by falling back into
heresy.
Objection 3: Further, heresy is a kind of unbelief. Now other
unbelievers who wish to be converted are received by the Church.
Therefore heretics also should be received.
On the contrary, The Decretal Ad abolendam (De Haereticis, cap. ix)
says that "those who are found to have relapsed into the error which
they had already abjured, must be left to the secular tribunal. "
Therefore they should not be received by the Church.
I answer that, In obedience to Our Lord's institution, the Church
extends her charity to all, not only to friends, but also to foes who
persecute her, according to Mat. 5:44: "Love your enemies; do good to
them that hate you. " Now it is part of charity that we should both wish
and work our neighbor's good. Again, good is twofold: one is spiritual,
namely the health of the soul, which good is chiefly the object of
charity, since it is this chiefly that we should wish for one another.
Consequently, from this point of view, heretics who return after
falling no matter how often, are admitted by the Church to Penance
whereby the way of salvation is opened to them.
The other good is that which charity considers secondarily, viz.
temporal good, such as life of the body, worldly possessions, good
repute, ecclesiastical or secular dignity, for we are not bound by
charity to wish others this good, except in relation to the eternal
salvation of them and of others. Hence if the presence of one of these
goods in one individual might be an obstacle to eternal salvation in
many, we are not bound out of charity to wish such a good to that
person, rather should we desire him to be without it, both because
eternal salvation takes precedence of temporal good, and because the
good of the many is to be preferred to the good of one. Now if heretics
were always received on their return, in order to save their lives and
other temporal goods, this might be prejudicial to the salvation of
others, both because they would infect others if they relapsed again,
and because, if they escaped without punishment, others would feel more
assured in lapsing into heresy. For it is written (Eccles. 8:11): "For
because sentence is not speedily pronounced against the evil, the
children of men commit evils without any fear. "
For this reason the Church not only admits to Penance those who return
from heresy for the first time, but also safeguards their lives, and
sometimes by dispensation, restores them to the ecclesiastical
dignities which they may have had before, should their conversion
appear to be sincere: we read of this as having frequently been done
for the good of peace. But when they fall again, after having been
received, this seems to prove them to be inconstant in faith, wherefore
when they return again, they are admitted to Penance, but are not
delivered from the pain of death.
Reply to Objection 1: In God's tribunal, those who return are always
received, because God is a searcher of hearts, and knows those who
return in sincerity. But the Church cannot imitate God in this, for she
presumes that those who relapse after being once received, are not
sincere in their return; hence she does not debar them from the way of
salvation, but neither does she protect them from the sentence of
death.
Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord was speaking to Peter of sins committed
against oneself, for one should always forgive such offenses and spare
our brother when he repents. These words are not to be applied to sins
committed against one's neighbor or against God, for it is not left to
our discretion to forgive such offenses, as Jerome says on Mat. 18:15,
"If thy brother shall offend against thee. " Yet even in this matter the
law prescribes limits according as God's honor or our neighbor's good
demands.
Reply to Objection 3: When other unbelievers, who have never received
the faith are converted, they do not as yet show signs of inconstancy
in faith, as relapsed heretics do; hence the comparison fails.
__________________________________________________________________
OF APOSTASY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider apostasy: about which there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether apostasy pertains to unbelief?
(2) Whether, on account of apostasy from the faith, subjects are
absolved from allegiance to an apostate prince?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether apostasy pertains to unbelief?
Objection 1: It would seem that apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.
For that which is the origin of all sins, does not, seemingly, pertain
to unbelief, since many sins there are without unbelief. Now apostasy
seems to be the origin of every sin, for it is written (Ecclus. 10:14):
"The beginning of the pride of man is apostasy [Douay: 'to fall off']
from God," and further on, (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the beginning of
all sin. " Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.
Objection 2: Further, unbelief is an act of the understanding: whereas
apostasy seems rather to consist in some outward deed or utterance, or
even in some inward act of the will, for it is written (Prov. 6:12-14):
"A man that is an apostate, an unprofitable man walketh with a perverse
mouth. He winketh with the eyes, presseth with the foot, speaketh with
the finger. With a wicked heart he deviseth evil, and at all times he
soweth discord. " Moreover if anyone were to have himself circumcised,
or to worship at the tomb of Mahomet, he would be deemed an apostate.
Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.
Objection 3: Further, heresy, since it pertains to unbelief, is a
determinate species of unbelief. If then, apostasy pertained to
unbelief, it would follow that it is a determinate species of unbelief,
which does not seem to agree with what has been said ([2407]Q[10],
A[5]). Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 6:67): "Many of his disciples went
back," i. e. apostatized, of whom Our Lord had said previously (Jn.
6:65): "There are some of you that believe not. " Therefore apostasy
pertains to unbelief.
I answer that, Apostasy denotes a backsliding from God. This may happen
in various ways according to the different kinds of union between man
and God. For, in the first place, man is united to God by faith;
secondly, by having his will duly submissive in obeying His
commandments; thirdly, by certain special things pertaining to
supererogation such as the religious life, the clerical state, or Holy
Orders. Now if that which follows be removed, that which precedes,
remains, but the converse does not hold. Accordingly a man may
apostatize from God, by withdrawing from the religious life to which he
was bound by profession, or from the Holy Order which he had received:
and this is called "apostasy from religious life" or "Orders. " A man
may also apostatize from God, by rebelling in his mind against the
Divine commandments: and though man may apostatize in both the above
ways, he may still remain united to God by faith.
But if he give up the faith, then he seems to turn away from God
altogether: and consequently, apostasy simply and absolutely is that
whereby a man withdraws from the faith, and is called "apostasy of
perfidy. " In this way apostasy, simply so called, pertains to unbelief.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection refers to the second kind of
apostasy, which denotes an act of the will in rebellion against God's
commandments, an act that is to be found in every mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to faith not only that the heart
should believe, but also that external words and deeds should bear
witness to the inward faith, for confession is an act of faith. In this
way too, certain external words or deeds pertain to unbelief, in so far
as they are signs of unbelief, even as a sign of health is said itself
to be healthy. Now although the authority quoted may be understood as
referring to every kind of apostate, yet it applies most truly to an
apostate from the faith. For since faith is the first foundation of
things to be hoped for, and since, without faith it is "impossible to
please God"; when once faith is removed, man retains nothing that may
be useful for the obtaining of eternal salvation, for which reason it
is written (Prov. 6:12): "A man that is an apostate, an unprofitable
man": because faith is the life of the soul, according to Rom. 1:17:
"The just man liveth by faith. " Therefore, just as when the life of the
body is taken away, man's every member and part loses its due
disposition, so when the life of justice, which is by faith, is done
away, disorder appears in all his members. First, in his mouth, whereby
chiefly his mind stands revealed; secondly, in his eyes; thirdly, in
the instrument of movement; fourthly, in his will, which tends to evil.
The result is that "he sows discord," endeavoring to sever others from
the faith even as he severed himself.
Reply to Objection 3: The species of a quality or form are not
diversified by the fact of its being the term "wherefrom" or "whereto"
of movement: on the contrary, it is the movement that takes its species
from the terms. Now apostasy regards unbelief as the term "whereto" of
the movement of withdrawal from the faith; wherefore apostasy does not
imply a special kind of unbelief, but an aggravating circumstance
thereof, according to 2 Pet. 2:21: "It had been better for them not to
know the truth [Vulg. : 'the way of justice'], than after they had known
it, to turn back. "
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Whether a prince forfeits his dominion over his subjects, on account of
apostasy from the faith, so that they no longer owe him allegiance?
Objection 1: It would seem that a prince does not so forfeit his
dominion over his subjects, on account of apostasy from the faith, that
they no longer owe him allegiance. For Ambrose [*St. Augustine, Super
Ps. 124:3] says that the Emperor Julian, though an apostate,
nevertheless had under him Christian soldiers, who when he said to
them, "Fall into line for the defense of the republic," were bound to
obey. Therefore subjects are not absolved from their allegiance to
their prince on account of his apostasy.
Objection 2: Further, an apostate from the faith is an unbeliever. Now
we find that certain holy men served unbelieving masters; thus Joseph
served Pharaoh, Daniel served Nabuchodonosor, and Mardochai served
Assuerus. Therefore apostasy from the faith does not release subjects
from allegiance to their sovereign.
Objection 3: Further, just as by apostasy from the faith, a man turns
away from God, so does every sin. Consequently if, on account of
apostasy from the faith, princes were to lose their right to command
those of their subjects who are believers, they would equally lose it
on account of other sins: which is evidently not the case. Therefore we
ought not to refuse allegiance to a sovereign on account of his
apostatizing from the faith.
On the contrary, Gregory VII says (Council, Roman V): "Holding to the
institutions of our holy predecessors, we, by our apostolic authority,
absolve from their oath those who through loyalty or through the sacred
bond of an oath owe allegiance to excommunicated persons: and we
absolutely forbid them to continue their allegiance to such persons,
until these shall have made amends. " Now apostates from the faith, like
heretics, are excommunicated, according to the Decretal [*Extra, De
Haereticis, cap. Ad abolendam].
