The reason (voûs) and the
ceptions
of the senses.
William Smith - 1844 - Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities - a
The beginning of his The composition of Aristotle's writings stands
philosophical investigations is external. But the in close connexion with the method of his philoso-
end in view manifests itself in the course of them. phizing. Here the object of investigation is always
For, while in this way he begins with the external, first laid down and distinctly defined, in order to
he steadily endeavours to bring into prominent obviate any misunderstanding. Thereupon he
and distinct relief the intrinsic nature of each sepa- gives an historical review of the way in which the
rate thing according to the internal formative subject has been hitherto treated by earlier philo-
principles which are inherent in it, and essentially sophers (Phys. i. 2, &c. , de Anima, i. 2, Metaph.
belong to it.
i. 3, &c. , Eth. Nic. i. 3, Magn. Mor. i. 1, Polit. ii. );
Next to this starting-point, an essential part of and indeed it may be remarked generally, that
his method is the exhibition and removal of the Aristotle is the father of the history of philosophy.
difficulties which come in the way in the course of the The investigation itself then begins with the exhi-
investigation (droplai, duoxépeian, Comp. Metaph. bition of the difficulties, doubts, and contradictions
iii. 1, p. 40, 20). “For," says Aristotle, " those which present themselves (atropiai, dropruara).
who investigate without removing the difficulties. These are sifted, and discussed and explained on
are like persons who do not know whither they all sides (daropeiv), and the solution and recon.
ought to go, and at the same time never perceive ciliation of them (arois, europeîv, in opposition to
whether they have found what they were seeking atopeiv) is given in the course of the investigation.
For the end in view is not clear to such a (Metaph. i. init
. p. 40, Brandis, Phys. iv. 4, p. 211,
person, but is clear to one who has previously ac- 1. 7, ed. Berol. ) In this enumeration of the various
quired a consciousness of the difficulties. Lastly, views and apories, Aristotle is not unfrequently
that person must necessarily be in a better condi- explicit to a degree which wearies the reader, as it
tion for judging, who has, as it were, heard all the is continued without any internal necessity.
opposing doctrines as though they were antagonist
parties pleading before a tribunal. ” Hence he v. RELATION OF THE ARISTOTELIN Pulila
everywhere has regard to his predecessors, and
SOPHY TO THE PLATONIC.
endeavours carefully to develop the foundation In the Platonic philosophy the opposition be-
and relative truth of their doctrines. (Metaph. l. 3, tween the real and the ideal had completely de
Top. i. 2. ) In this manner Aristotle proceeds with veloped itself. For while the opposition and con-
an impartiality which reminds one of the epic re- tradiction in the ideal--in the world of thought-
pose in Homer, and which may easily give him a was conquered by Plato's dialectics, the external
tinge of scepticisin and indefiniteness, where the and sensible world was looked upon as a world of
solution does not immediately follow the aporia, appearance, in which the ideas cannot attain to
but occurs in the progress of the development. true and proper reality. Between these two, the
Intimately connected with his endeavour to set world of ideas and the visible world of appenr-
out with that which is empirically known, is his ances, there exists, according to Plato, only a
practice of everywhere making conceptions of the passing relation of participation (mébefus) and
ordinary understanding of men, manners, and cus- imitation, in so far namely as the ideas, as the
toms, proverbs, religious conceptions (comp. Metaph. prototypes, can only to a certain extent rule the
xii. 8, xiv. 8, de Caelo, ii. 1, de Generat. Anim. i. 2), formless and resisting matter, and fashion it into a
and above all, language, the points on which to visible existence. Plato accordingly made the ex-
hang his speculative investigations. The Ethics in ternal world the region of the incomplete and bad,
particular give abundant proofs of the last. Thus, of the contradictory and false, and recognized ab-
advancing from the lower to the higher, from the solute truth only in the eternal immutable ideas.
more imperfect to the more perfect, he constantly Now this opposition, which set fixed limits to cog-
brings into notice the entelecheia (éYTENÉXeba), or nition, was surmounted by Aristotle. He laid
that to which everything, according to its pecu- down the proposition, that the idea, which cannot
liarity, is capable of attaining ; whereupon, again of itself fashion itself into reality, is powerless, and
he also points out in this entelecheia the higher has only a potential existence, and that it becomes
principle through which the entelecheia itself be a living reality only by realizing itself in a crealive
comes a potentiality (Súvayıs). In this manner he manner by means of its own energy. (Metaph.
exhibits the different steps of development in na- xii. 6, p. 246. 8. , Brandis. ) The transition
tural existence in their internal relation to each of the ideal into the real, however, Aristotle ex-
other, and so at last arrives at the highest unity, plains by means of the pure idea of negation
consisting in the purpose and cause, which, in its (otépnois). That is to say, ideality and reality
creative, organizing activity, makes of the manifold are not opposed to each other, as existence and
and different forms of the universe one internally non-existence, according to Plato's view; but the
connected whole.
material itself contains in itself the opposition, the
With all this, however, we must bear in mind, negation, through which it comes to have a kind of
that this method did not lead Aristotle to a perfect feeling of want, and strives after the ideal forn, as
and compact system. The philosophy of Aristotle the ugly strives after the beautiful. The giving it
is not such. in every single science he always, so a definite form does awav not with the matter,
to say, starts afresh from the commencement. The but with the negation which is inherent in the
individual parts of his philosophy, therefore, sub- matter, and by that means the material is fashioned
sist independently side by side, and are not com. so as to assume a definite existence. Thus matter
## p. 335 (#355) ############################################
ARISTOTELES.
335
ARISTOTELES.
is that which is eternal, fundamental, whilst the After substance (ovo ía) Aristotle first treats
single object, fashioned so as to assume an indivi- of quantity, which with that which is relative
dual existence is produced, and perishes. The ma- attaches to the material of the substance, then
terial in which the negation is inherent, is the passes to what is qualitative, which has reference
potentiality (súvauis), out of which the formative especially to the determination of the form of the
principle, as an entelecheia, fashions itself into ex object. (In the Metaphysics on the other hand
istence. This, as the full reality (évépzena), is the (v. 15), where the categories are defined more in
higher step in opposition to the mere potentiality. accordance with our conceptions of them, the in-
According to these definitions, the Aristotelian vestigation on the qualitative precedes that on the
philosophy progresses genetically from the lower to relative. ) The six remaining categories are treated
the higher, from the dúvapıs to the evTché xela of of only in short outlines.
that, of which the potential, according to its pecu- The object of the categories is, to render possi-
liarity, is capable. Thus by nieans of the cron* ble the cognition of the enormous multiplicity of
the universe becomes a whole consisting of mu- phaenomena ; since by means of them those modes of
tually connected members, in which these eron viewing things which constantly recur in connexion
attain to full existence. In inorganic nature the with existence arc fixed, and thus the necessity for
purpose is still identical with the necessity of the advancing step by step ad infinitum is removed.
maiter ; but in organic nature it comes into exist- But in Aristotle's view they are not the ultimatum
ence as the soul of the enlivened object (yuxý). for cognition. They rather denote only the differ-
The energy (évépyela) of the soul is, as an entele- ent modes in which anything is inherent in the
cheia, thought, both voûs mantikos, since, as the substance, and are truly and properly determined
temporary activity of the mind, it is necessarily only by means of that which is substantial. This
dependent on the co-operation of the senses, and again is determined by the eldos, which is what is
volls TointiKÓS, i. e. cognoscent, self-acting reason, essential in the material, and owes its existence to
in so far as, in the pure element of thought freed the purpose of the thing. This purpose, and
from what is sensuous, it elevates the finite world nothing short of this, is an ultimatum for cognition.
into cognoscible truth. From this exalted point of The highest opposition in which the purpose
view Aristotle regarded and subjected to inquiry realises itself is that of dúvauis and {vtené Xela.
the entire empire of reality and life, as it had (Arist. de Anima, ii. c. 1. )
developed itself up to his time in science, arts, and The categories are single words (τα άνευ συμ-
politics.
alorñs deyóueva). As such, they are in them-
VI. ARISTOTELIAN Logic.
selves neither true nor false. They become both
Aristotle is the creator of the science of logic. only in the union of ideas by means of mutual
The two deepest thinkers of Germany, Kant and reference in a proposition (td kard ouut horriv
Hegel, acknowledge that from the time of Aris. Aeyoueva). A proposition is the expression
totle to their own age logic had made no progress. (dpuúvera) of reflecting thonght, which separates
Aristotle has described the pure forms and opera- and combines (dialpeois, ouundunh). This opera-
tions of abstract reason, of finite thought, with the tion of thought manifests itself first of all in judg-
accuracy of an investigator of nature, and his logic ment. In this way Aristotle succeeds in advan-
is, as it were, a natural history of this “finite cing from the categories to the doctrine of the ex-
thought. "
pression of thought (éputvera). Here he treats
Aristotle obtains the categories, the fundamen- first of all of the component elements of the pro-
tal conceptions of thought, from language, in which position, then of simple propositions, together with
these universal forms of thought appear as parts of the mode of their opposition with reference to the
speech. These categories (κατηγορίαι, also κατηγ-
true and the false; lastly, of compound propositions
ορήματα, τα κατηγορούμενα) give all the possible | (αι συμπλεκόμενοι αποφάνσεις), or modal forms of
definitions for the different modes in which every- judgment (ai atopávo eis uetá pórov), out of
thing that exists may be viewed; they are the which the category of modality was afterwards
most universal expressions for the relations which formed.
constantly recur in things ; fundamental definitions, In the second part of the treatise nepi épunveias
which cannot be comprehended under any higher the different modes of opposition of both kinds of
generic conception, and are, therefore, called wévn. propositions are discussed. The essence of judg-
Yet they are not themselves generic conceptions, ment, which presents itself in a visible form in the
which gire what is essential in an object, but the proposition, consists in this, that the idea, which
most universal modes of expressing it. An inde in itself is neither true nor false, separates itself
pendent existence belongs to ovolan substance, into the momenta peculiar to it, the universal, the
alone of all the categories ; the rest denote particular, the individual, and that the relation be-
only the different modes of what is inherent. The tween these momenta is either established by
categories themselves, therefore, are not an ultima means of affirmation, or abolished by means of
tum, by means of which the true cognition of an negation.
object can be attained. The most important pro- Judgment, however, stands in essential relation
position in Aristotle's doctrine of substances + is, to conclusion. In judgment, Universal and Parti-
that “the universal attains to reality only in the cular are referred to each other; these two mo-
individual” (uni ovow oùy twv apurwv ovoiwv menta of our conceptions separate themselves, with
αδύνατον των άλλων τι είναι).
reference to the conclusion, into two premises
(a por does), of which the one asserts the universal,
eldos is the internal formative principle; ubpon the other the particular. (Anal. pr. i. 25; to mer
is the external form itself.
ως όλον, το δε ως μέρος. ) The conclusion itself,
+ The apuéto ouoia expresses the essential qua- however, is that expression, in which, from certain
lities only, the dettepai ovolai are substances, in- premises, something else beyond the premises is
cluding both essential and accidental qualities. necessarily deduced. But the conclusion is still
## p. 336 (#356) ############################################
336
ARISTOTELES.
ARISTOTELES.
considered apart from its particular contents; it is means of induction. (Anal. post. ii. 7. ) We find
treated quite as a form, and the remark is at the out the essence of a thing only when we know the
same time made, that for that very reason it as yet essential attributes of the thing, and its existence
supplies us with no knowledge (étuotuun). But itself. Aristotle analyses the different kinds of
because this abstract universal possesses greater definition (Anal. post. ii. 10), then treats of the
facilities for subjective cognition, Aristotle makes individual causes (for the definition declares the
the doctrine of the syllogism precede that of why of a thing with reference to its essence), and
proof, for according to him, proof is a particular Instly lays down the method of finding a correct
kind of conclusion. (Anal. pr. i. 4. ) Accordingly, definition. (Anal. post. ii. 11, &c. ii. 13. ) The ob-
together with the mode of its formation, he treats ject of definition is to comprehend the whole ac-
of the figures of the syllogism, and the different cording to its essential differences, and to refer
forms of conclusion in them. (cc. 1-27. ) Then he these again to the genus, in order by these means
gives directions for finding with ease the syllogistic to bring under contemplation the whole as a unity
figures for each problem that is proposed (Europe), consisting of mutually connected and dependent
and lastly shews how to refer given conclusions to members. One aid in definition is suiniivision
their principles, and to arrange them according to (olalpecus). The definition must be clear and dis-
preinises. Thereupon, in the second book of the rinct. This distinctness is attained by endeavour-
Analytics, he treats of the complete conclusion ing first to define the particular, in order to become
according to its peculiar determining principles acquainted with the import of it in every species.
(Anal. ii
. 1—15), points out errors and deficiencies The use of definition is especially important in
in concluding (cc. 16–21), and teaches how to proposing problenis. (Anal. post. ii. 14. )
refer to the syllogistic figures incomplete argu- Aristotle, however, does not, either in his Meta-
ments, which have for their object subjective con- physics, or in the particular sciences, proceed ac-
viction only. (cc. 22–27. )
cording to the abstract forms of conclusion, as he
We do not arrive at that conclusion which is develops them in the Organon; but the definition
the foundation of knowledge til we arrive at (ógiouós) forms the central point in the further
proof, i. e, a conclusion conveying a distinct prosecution of his philosophical investigations. He
meaning (συλλογισμός επιστημονικός, απόδειξις), forms his conception of the idea of a thing (το τι
which proceeds from the essential definitions of tv elva) in the identity of its existence and essence,
the matter in question. Proof, in order to lead and so continually points out the universal in the
to objective truth, necessarily presupposes prin particular.
ciples. Without an acquaintance with princi-
VII. METAPHYSICS.
ples. we cannot attain to knowledge by means of
proof. Aristotle, therefore, treats first of the na- The first philosophy (for such is the name Aris-
ture of principles. They are the Universal, which totle gives to what we call Metaphysics) is the
serves as a medium through which alone we can science of the first principles and causes of things.
attain to knowledge; they have their certainty in (Meh. ii. 3, 4. ) li' is theoretic science, and the
themselves, and are not susceptible of any additional most excellent, but at the same time the most
separate proof. In this point of view Aristotle difficult of all sciences, because its object, the uni-
compares them with the immediate certainty of versal, is removed as far as possible from the per-
sensuous perceptions.
The reason (voûs) and the ceptions of the senses. (Met. i. 2. ) It is, however,
exertion of the reason (vonois), which is itself the at the same time the most accurate science, because
Universal, develops these principles (apxás) out of its subject matter is most knowable; and the most
itself.
free, because it is sought solely for the sake of
In proof we may distinguish three things : knowledge.
1. That which is proved (Anal. post. i. 7), i. e. There are four first causes or principles of things:
that which is to pertain to some definite object a. The substance and the idea (ni ovoia kai 70 tí
(yével Tivi) considered in itself. 2. The principles v elval); 6. The subject and the matter (ý in
from which this is deduced. 3. The object, the Kal TÒ ÚTokeluevov); C. The principle of motion
attributes of which are to be exhibited. According (80ev apxo) Tas Kuhoews); d. The purpose and
to their subject-matter, proofs come into closer the good (TÒ éveka kal tò ayabów). The earlier
relation to the particular sciences. Here the im- philosophers (this Aristotle shews in the first book
portant point is, to know what science is more
of the Metaphysics) recognized indeed all these
accurate, and may be presupposed as the ground classes singly, but neither distinctly nor in connex-
work of another (Trpotépa &oti). The knowledge ion. With full consciousness he declares, after
to which proof conducts by means of principles having developed the history of metaphysics froin
(ÉMIOTÝMT) has for its object necessary existence; the Ionian philosophers to Plato in bold and mas-
conception (86ļa), on the other hand, bas for its terly outlines, that this science of the first philoso-
object that which may be otherwise constituted: phy had up to his time resembled a lisping child
After Aristotle, in the first book of the second(vernicovévm, Met. i. 10, p. 993, Bekk. ).
Analytics, has shewn how by means of proof we The consciousness of the opposition between
may receive a knowledge that something is, and truth existing in and for itself, and the cognition
why it is so, he considers that which we cannot get of it, must necessarily be presupposed in all philo-
at by means of proof, but which is necessary for the sophizing. This consciousness, which has come out
complete development of our ideas, viz. the defini- in all its distinctness only in the philosophy of the
tion of that which is substantial, by means of which most recent times, Aristotle also possesses. But
we have stated what an object is. This is effected he has it in the form of doubts (åtopiai), which
by definition (ópiouós). The definition states what rise against science itself and its definitions. These
the essence of a thing is, and is therefore always doubts and questions, then, Aristotle considers on
universal and affirmative. It cannot be proved by all sides, and therefrom arrives at the following
any conclusion, nor even be demonstrated by result:-
i
## p. 337 (#357) ############################################
ARISTOTELES.
337
ARISTOTELES.
We
Ced
The
de a
des:
be
136
Ans
1. There is a science which considers existence 3. The third kind of substance is that in which
as such, and the definitions pertaining to it as dúvapus, évépzela, and évtedexeca are united ; the
such. 2. It is not the same with any one of the absolute substance; the eternal, unmoved; but which
particular sciences, for all these consider only a is at the same time motive, is pure activity (actus
part of what exists and its attributes. 3. The purus, Met. xii. 6, ix. 8, xii. 7), is God himself.
principies and highest causes of things must have a
This substance is without matter, and so also is
nature appropriate only to them.
not a magnitude.
Existence is indeed defined in various ways, and The chief momentum in the Aristotelian philo-
denotes at one time the What and the idea, at sophy is, that thought and the subject of thought
another time the condition or constitution, magni- are one; that what is objective and thought (the
tude, &c. , of a thing ; of all the definitions, how- évépyera) are one and the sune. God himself is
ever, the What, which denotes the substance, is eternal thought, and his thought is operation, life,
the first. (Met. vii. 1. p. 1028, Bekk. ) All other action,-it is the thought of thought. Objects
definitions only state attributes or qualities of this exist in their truth only in so far as they are the
first definition, and are not in their nature inde subjects of thought, are thoughts. That is their
pendent, or capable of being separated from the essence (ovola). In nature, indeed, the idea
substance. On the other hand, the idea of sub- exists not as a thought, but as a body; it has,
stance (ovola) lies at the foundation of our ideas of however, a soul, and this is its idea. In saying
everything, and we do not arrive at the cognition this, Aristotle stands upon the highest point of
of anything when we know how great, or where, speculation : God, as a living God, is the universe.
&c. , it is, but when we know what it The In the course of the investigation, Aristotle, with
question, therefore, is, What is the substance ? careful regard to, and examination of, the views of
(ris o ovola ;) which has ever been the object earlier philosophers, points out that neither ab-
of philosophical investigation. (Met. vii. 1. p. stractly universal, nor particular, sensuously per-
1028. ) Aristotle distinguishes three kinds of ceptible essences can be looked upon as principles
substances: 1. Substance perceptible by the senses of existence. Neither the universal apart from the
(Met. xii. 1, 2, vii. 7), which is finite and pe particular, nor the particular by itself, can be a
rishable, like single sensible objects. The mo principle of the natural and spiritual world; but
menta of this sensible substance are, - a. the the absolute principle is God, -the highest reason,
matter, that which is fundamental, constant; b. the object of whose thought is himself. Thus the
particular things, the negative in relation to each dominion of the Anaxagorean vous was declared in
other ; c. the motive principle, the pure form or a profounder manner by Aristotle. In the divine
cidos. 2. The second higher kind of substance is thought, existence is at the same time implied.
that which may be perceived by the senses, but is Thought is the sum and substance of the universe,
imperishable, such as the heavenly bodies. Here and realizes itself in the eternal immutable furni-
the active principle (évépyela, actus) steps in, ative principles which, as the essences indwelling
which, in so far as it contains that which is to be (immanent) in the material, fashion themselves so
produced, is understanding (vous). That which it as to assume an individual existence. In man, the
contains is the purpose, which is realized by means thought of the divine reason completes itself so as
of the evėpyera. The two extremes are here po- to become the self-conscious activity of thinking
tentiality and agency (matter and thought), the reason. By it he recognizes in the objective world
passive universal and the active universal. These his own nature again, and so attains to the cogni-
iwo are not subject to change. That which is tion of truth. With these slight intimations, we
changed is the particular thing, and passes from must here leave the subject.
one into the other by means of something else by VIII. THE PARTICULAR SCIENCES.
which it is moved. The purpose, in so far as it Respecting the Essence of the Particular Sciences,
is the motive principle, is called the cause ( ápxý), and the division of them into Theoretical and Prac-
but, in so far as it is the purpose, it is the reason, tical Sciences. The science of the particular can
aitla. (Mel. v. 1, 2. ) The active principle gives
reality to that wbich it contains in itself: this re thing, the potentiality must pass into actuality.
mains the same: it is still, however, matter, which the principle of the transition from the potential
is different from the active principle, though both to the actual in a thing Aristotle calls entelecheia
are combined. That which combines them is the ! (Td erteles é xov), because it unites both the
form, the union of both. The relation of the potentiality and the actuality. Every union of
newly coined idea of évteléxeia, or the purpose potentiality and actuality is a motion, and accord-
realized by the formative principle, to the idea of ingly the entelecheia is the principle of motion (o
ενέργεια, is this : εντελέχεια signifies in the dif-του δυνάμει όντος εντελέχεια, ή τοιούτον, κίνησις
ferent grades of existence the completion which is doti). The potentiality (Súvauis) can never be-
in conformity with each single existing thing ; come actuality (évéoyela) without entelecheia ; but
and évépyeta denotes the actuality which is in the entelecheia also cannot dispense with the poten-
conformity with this completion. (Metaph. ix. 3, tiality. If the entelecheia does not manifest itself
p. 179. 8, Brand. ) Thus the soul is essentially in a thing, it is merely a thing kata duvapiv ;
εντελέχεια. *
if it does manifest itself, it becomes a thing kat'
évéprerav. The same thing is often both together,
The actuality of each thing presupposes an the former in reference to qualities which it has
original internal potentiality, which is in itself not yet, but can obtain; the latter in reference to
only conceivable, not perceptible. The potenti attributes already actually present in it. (Buhle,
ality of a thing is followed by its actuality in in Ersch and Gruber's Encyclopädie. )
reference either to mere existence or to action. • Met. xii. p. 1074, Bekk. , autóv åpa voci ennep
This actuality is ενέργεια, αctus, and is perceptible. έστι το κράτιστον και έστιν η νύησις, νοήσεως
Lut, that the potential thing may become a real vómois.
ke at
294
a
a. net
21
2
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338
ARISTOTELES.
ARISTOTELES.
1
1
1
exist only when the essence of the particular, the vows fa&ntikus the sensible, finite world is a ne
vontov, i, e. the conceivable, the reasonable, is cessary production of cognition. It attains to the
perceived. (Met. vii. 6. ) It presupposes the cognition of nothing without sensuous perception.
principles of the intellectual and real, and has But it is only the vous #OINTIKOS which attains to
reference to that which is demonstrable from them. the cognition of the complete truth of the sensible
The individual sciences deduce from principles the world, and here rice versá the proposition holds
truth of the particular by means of proof, which is good: nihil est in sensu, quod non fuerit in in-
the foundation of knowledge. Their limit consists tellectu.
in this : that the individual science sets out from Reason is either theoretical or practical reason
something presupposed, which is recognized, and (de Anim. iii. 10). The object of the first is the
deduces the rest from this by means of conclusion cognition of truth (of the universal, the unchange
(syllogism). That operation of the mind which able); the object of the other is the realisation, by
refers the particular to the universal, is the reflect- means of action, of the truth, the cognition of
ing understanding (Orávoia), which is opposed as which has been attained. (Metaph. ii. 1. ) Prac-
well to sensuous perception as to the higher opera- tical reason, therefore, is directed to the particular
tion of the reason. With it the difference between and individual, which is determined and regulated
existence and thought, between truth and false by the universal. (Eth. Nic. vi. 12. ) The scientific
hood, becomes a matter of consciousness.
treatment of the moral (ethics and politics) has,
Every single science has reference to a definite ob- therefore, to investigate not so much what virtue
ject (γένος, Αnal. post. 1. 28, Met. xi. 7), and seeks is ( ου γαρ ίν' είδωμεν τι εστιν η αρετή σκεπτομεθα,
certain principles and causes of it. The particular Eth. Nic. ii. 2), as rather how we may becomie vir-
object therefore determines the science, and every tuous (axx' iv dyatol yevuueda). Without this last
science deduces the proof out of the principles pecu- object it would be of no use. The difference be-
liar to it, i. e. out of the essential definitions of the tween action and the exercise of the creative power
particular object. Three things are presupposed (apátter and foreiv) in the province of practical
for every particular science : a. That its object, reason, is the foundation of the difference between
and the essential definitions of that object (i. e, the morality and art. What is common to both is,
principles peculiar to it), exist. 1. The common that the commencing point of the activity lies
principles (axioms), and c. The signification of the here in the subject (Met. xi. 7), and that the ob-
essential attributes of the object. According to ject of the activity has reference to that which
their common principles, all sciences are mutually admits of different modes of existence. (Eth. Nic.
connected. Such common principles are, for ex- vi. 4. ) The difference, thererefore, between the
ample, the law of contradiction.
two is this: that in action (Tpártev) the pur-
The accuracy (dxpibera) of the single sciences pose lies in the activity itself in the mpaktov),
depends on the nature of their objects. The less whereby the will of the actor manifests itself, while
this is an object of sense, the more accurate is the in the exercise of the creative power (Foreiv) it
science of it. (Met. xiii. 3; Anal. post. i. 27; lies in the work produced. (Metaph. vi. l;
Met.
philosophical investigations is external. But the in close connexion with the method of his philoso-
end in view manifests itself in the course of them. phizing. Here the object of investigation is always
For, while in this way he begins with the external, first laid down and distinctly defined, in order to
he steadily endeavours to bring into prominent obviate any misunderstanding. Thereupon he
and distinct relief the intrinsic nature of each sepa- gives an historical review of the way in which the
rate thing according to the internal formative subject has been hitherto treated by earlier philo-
principles which are inherent in it, and essentially sophers (Phys. i. 2, &c. , de Anima, i. 2, Metaph.
belong to it.
i. 3, &c. , Eth. Nic. i. 3, Magn. Mor. i. 1, Polit. ii. );
Next to this starting-point, an essential part of and indeed it may be remarked generally, that
his method is the exhibition and removal of the Aristotle is the father of the history of philosophy.
difficulties which come in the way in the course of the The investigation itself then begins with the exhi-
investigation (droplai, duoxépeian, Comp. Metaph. bition of the difficulties, doubts, and contradictions
iii. 1, p. 40, 20). “For," says Aristotle, " those which present themselves (atropiai, dropruara).
who investigate without removing the difficulties. These are sifted, and discussed and explained on
are like persons who do not know whither they all sides (daropeiv), and the solution and recon.
ought to go, and at the same time never perceive ciliation of them (arois, europeîv, in opposition to
whether they have found what they were seeking atopeiv) is given in the course of the investigation.
For the end in view is not clear to such a (Metaph. i. init
. p. 40, Brandis, Phys. iv. 4, p. 211,
person, but is clear to one who has previously ac- 1. 7, ed. Berol. ) In this enumeration of the various
quired a consciousness of the difficulties. Lastly, views and apories, Aristotle is not unfrequently
that person must necessarily be in a better condi- explicit to a degree which wearies the reader, as it
tion for judging, who has, as it were, heard all the is continued without any internal necessity.
opposing doctrines as though they were antagonist
parties pleading before a tribunal. ” Hence he v. RELATION OF THE ARISTOTELIN Pulila
everywhere has regard to his predecessors, and
SOPHY TO THE PLATONIC.
endeavours carefully to develop the foundation In the Platonic philosophy the opposition be-
and relative truth of their doctrines. (Metaph. l. 3, tween the real and the ideal had completely de
Top. i. 2. ) In this manner Aristotle proceeds with veloped itself. For while the opposition and con-
an impartiality which reminds one of the epic re- tradiction in the ideal--in the world of thought-
pose in Homer, and which may easily give him a was conquered by Plato's dialectics, the external
tinge of scepticisin and indefiniteness, where the and sensible world was looked upon as a world of
solution does not immediately follow the aporia, appearance, in which the ideas cannot attain to
but occurs in the progress of the development. true and proper reality. Between these two, the
Intimately connected with his endeavour to set world of ideas and the visible world of appenr-
out with that which is empirically known, is his ances, there exists, according to Plato, only a
practice of everywhere making conceptions of the passing relation of participation (mébefus) and
ordinary understanding of men, manners, and cus- imitation, in so far namely as the ideas, as the
toms, proverbs, religious conceptions (comp. Metaph. prototypes, can only to a certain extent rule the
xii. 8, xiv. 8, de Caelo, ii. 1, de Generat. Anim. i. 2), formless and resisting matter, and fashion it into a
and above all, language, the points on which to visible existence. Plato accordingly made the ex-
hang his speculative investigations. The Ethics in ternal world the region of the incomplete and bad,
particular give abundant proofs of the last. Thus, of the contradictory and false, and recognized ab-
advancing from the lower to the higher, from the solute truth only in the eternal immutable ideas.
more imperfect to the more perfect, he constantly Now this opposition, which set fixed limits to cog-
brings into notice the entelecheia (éYTENÉXeba), or nition, was surmounted by Aristotle. He laid
that to which everything, according to its pecu- down the proposition, that the idea, which cannot
liarity, is capable of attaining ; whereupon, again of itself fashion itself into reality, is powerless, and
he also points out in this entelecheia the higher has only a potential existence, and that it becomes
principle through which the entelecheia itself be a living reality only by realizing itself in a crealive
comes a potentiality (Súvayıs). In this manner he manner by means of its own energy. (Metaph.
exhibits the different steps of development in na- xii. 6, p. 246. 8. , Brandis. ) The transition
tural existence in their internal relation to each of the ideal into the real, however, Aristotle ex-
other, and so at last arrives at the highest unity, plains by means of the pure idea of negation
consisting in the purpose and cause, which, in its (otépnois). That is to say, ideality and reality
creative, organizing activity, makes of the manifold are not opposed to each other, as existence and
and different forms of the universe one internally non-existence, according to Plato's view; but the
connected whole.
material itself contains in itself the opposition, the
With all this, however, we must bear in mind, negation, through which it comes to have a kind of
that this method did not lead Aristotle to a perfect feeling of want, and strives after the ideal forn, as
and compact system. The philosophy of Aristotle the ugly strives after the beautiful. The giving it
is not such. in every single science he always, so a definite form does awav not with the matter,
to say, starts afresh from the commencement. The but with the negation which is inherent in the
individual parts of his philosophy, therefore, sub- matter, and by that means the material is fashioned
sist independently side by side, and are not com. so as to assume a definite existence. Thus matter
## p. 335 (#355) ############################################
ARISTOTELES.
335
ARISTOTELES.
is that which is eternal, fundamental, whilst the After substance (ovo ía) Aristotle first treats
single object, fashioned so as to assume an indivi- of quantity, which with that which is relative
dual existence is produced, and perishes. The ma- attaches to the material of the substance, then
terial in which the negation is inherent, is the passes to what is qualitative, which has reference
potentiality (súvauis), out of which the formative especially to the determination of the form of the
principle, as an entelecheia, fashions itself into ex object. (In the Metaphysics on the other hand
istence. This, as the full reality (évépzena), is the (v. 15), where the categories are defined more in
higher step in opposition to the mere potentiality. accordance with our conceptions of them, the in-
According to these definitions, the Aristotelian vestigation on the qualitative precedes that on the
philosophy progresses genetically from the lower to relative. ) The six remaining categories are treated
the higher, from the dúvapıs to the evTché xela of of only in short outlines.
that, of which the potential, according to its pecu- The object of the categories is, to render possi-
liarity, is capable. Thus by nieans of the cron* ble the cognition of the enormous multiplicity of
the universe becomes a whole consisting of mu- phaenomena ; since by means of them those modes of
tually connected members, in which these eron viewing things which constantly recur in connexion
attain to full existence. In inorganic nature the with existence arc fixed, and thus the necessity for
purpose is still identical with the necessity of the advancing step by step ad infinitum is removed.
maiter ; but in organic nature it comes into exist- But in Aristotle's view they are not the ultimatum
ence as the soul of the enlivened object (yuxý). for cognition. They rather denote only the differ-
The energy (évépyela) of the soul is, as an entele- ent modes in which anything is inherent in the
cheia, thought, both voûs mantikos, since, as the substance, and are truly and properly determined
temporary activity of the mind, it is necessarily only by means of that which is substantial. This
dependent on the co-operation of the senses, and again is determined by the eldos, which is what is
volls TointiKÓS, i. e. cognoscent, self-acting reason, essential in the material, and owes its existence to
in so far as, in the pure element of thought freed the purpose of the thing. This purpose, and
from what is sensuous, it elevates the finite world nothing short of this, is an ultimatum for cognition.
into cognoscible truth. From this exalted point of The highest opposition in which the purpose
view Aristotle regarded and subjected to inquiry realises itself is that of dúvauis and {vtené Xela.
the entire empire of reality and life, as it had (Arist. de Anima, ii. c. 1. )
developed itself up to his time in science, arts, and The categories are single words (τα άνευ συμ-
politics.
alorñs deyóueva). As such, they are in them-
VI. ARISTOTELIAN Logic.
selves neither true nor false. They become both
Aristotle is the creator of the science of logic. only in the union of ideas by means of mutual
The two deepest thinkers of Germany, Kant and reference in a proposition (td kard ouut horriv
Hegel, acknowledge that from the time of Aris. Aeyoueva). A proposition is the expression
totle to their own age logic had made no progress. (dpuúvera) of reflecting thonght, which separates
Aristotle has described the pure forms and opera- and combines (dialpeois, ouundunh). This opera-
tions of abstract reason, of finite thought, with the tion of thought manifests itself first of all in judg-
accuracy of an investigator of nature, and his logic ment. In this way Aristotle succeeds in advan-
is, as it were, a natural history of this “finite cing from the categories to the doctrine of the ex-
thought. "
pression of thought (éputvera). Here he treats
Aristotle obtains the categories, the fundamen- first of all of the component elements of the pro-
tal conceptions of thought, from language, in which position, then of simple propositions, together with
these universal forms of thought appear as parts of the mode of their opposition with reference to the
speech. These categories (κατηγορίαι, also κατηγ-
true and the false; lastly, of compound propositions
ορήματα, τα κατηγορούμενα) give all the possible | (αι συμπλεκόμενοι αποφάνσεις), or modal forms of
definitions for the different modes in which every- judgment (ai atopávo eis uetá pórov), out of
thing that exists may be viewed; they are the which the category of modality was afterwards
most universal expressions for the relations which formed.
constantly recur in things ; fundamental definitions, In the second part of the treatise nepi épunveias
which cannot be comprehended under any higher the different modes of opposition of both kinds of
generic conception, and are, therefore, called wévn. propositions are discussed. The essence of judg-
Yet they are not themselves generic conceptions, ment, which presents itself in a visible form in the
which gire what is essential in an object, but the proposition, consists in this, that the idea, which
most universal modes of expressing it. An inde in itself is neither true nor false, separates itself
pendent existence belongs to ovolan substance, into the momenta peculiar to it, the universal, the
alone of all the categories ; the rest denote particular, the individual, and that the relation be-
only the different modes of what is inherent. The tween these momenta is either established by
categories themselves, therefore, are not an ultima means of affirmation, or abolished by means of
tum, by means of which the true cognition of an negation.
object can be attained. The most important pro- Judgment, however, stands in essential relation
position in Aristotle's doctrine of substances + is, to conclusion. In judgment, Universal and Parti-
that “the universal attains to reality only in the cular are referred to each other; these two mo-
individual” (uni ovow oùy twv apurwv ovoiwv menta of our conceptions separate themselves, with
αδύνατον των άλλων τι είναι).
reference to the conclusion, into two premises
(a por does), of which the one asserts the universal,
eldos is the internal formative principle; ubpon the other the particular. (Anal. pr. i. 25; to mer
is the external form itself.
ως όλον, το δε ως μέρος. ) The conclusion itself,
+ The apuéto ouoia expresses the essential qua- however, is that expression, in which, from certain
lities only, the dettepai ovolai are substances, in- premises, something else beyond the premises is
cluding both essential and accidental qualities. necessarily deduced. But the conclusion is still
## p. 336 (#356) ############################################
336
ARISTOTELES.
ARISTOTELES.
considered apart from its particular contents; it is means of induction. (Anal. post. ii. 7. ) We find
treated quite as a form, and the remark is at the out the essence of a thing only when we know the
same time made, that for that very reason it as yet essential attributes of the thing, and its existence
supplies us with no knowledge (étuotuun). But itself. Aristotle analyses the different kinds of
because this abstract universal possesses greater definition (Anal. post. ii. 10), then treats of the
facilities for subjective cognition, Aristotle makes individual causes (for the definition declares the
the doctrine of the syllogism precede that of why of a thing with reference to its essence), and
proof, for according to him, proof is a particular Instly lays down the method of finding a correct
kind of conclusion. (Anal. pr. i. 4. ) Accordingly, definition. (Anal. post. ii. 11, &c. ii. 13. ) The ob-
together with the mode of its formation, he treats ject of definition is to comprehend the whole ac-
of the figures of the syllogism, and the different cording to its essential differences, and to refer
forms of conclusion in them. (cc. 1-27. ) Then he these again to the genus, in order by these means
gives directions for finding with ease the syllogistic to bring under contemplation the whole as a unity
figures for each problem that is proposed (Europe), consisting of mutually connected and dependent
and lastly shews how to refer given conclusions to members. One aid in definition is suiniivision
their principles, and to arrange them according to (olalpecus). The definition must be clear and dis-
preinises. Thereupon, in the second book of the rinct. This distinctness is attained by endeavour-
Analytics, he treats of the complete conclusion ing first to define the particular, in order to become
according to its peculiar determining principles acquainted with the import of it in every species.
(Anal. ii
. 1—15), points out errors and deficiencies The use of definition is especially important in
in concluding (cc. 16–21), and teaches how to proposing problenis. (Anal. post. ii. 14. )
refer to the syllogistic figures incomplete argu- Aristotle, however, does not, either in his Meta-
ments, which have for their object subjective con- physics, or in the particular sciences, proceed ac-
viction only. (cc. 22–27. )
cording to the abstract forms of conclusion, as he
We do not arrive at that conclusion which is develops them in the Organon; but the definition
the foundation of knowledge til we arrive at (ógiouós) forms the central point in the further
proof, i. e, a conclusion conveying a distinct prosecution of his philosophical investigations. He
meaning (συλλογισμός επιστημονικός, απόδειξις), forms his conception of the idea of a thing (το τι
which proceeds from the essential definitions of tv elva) in the identity of its existence and essence,
the matter in question. Proof, in order to lead and so continually points out the universal in the
to objective truth, necessarily presupposes prin particular.
ciples. Without an acquaintance with princi-
VII. METAPHYSICS.
ples. we cannot attain to knowledge by means of
proof. Aristotle, therefore, treats first of the na- The first philosophy (for such is the name Aris-
ture of principles. They are the Universal, which totle gives to what we call Metaphysics) is the
serves as a medium through which alone we can science of the first principles and causes of things.
attain to knowledge; they have their certainty in (Meh. ii. 3, 4. ) li' is theoretic science, and the
themselves, and are not susceptible of any additional most excellent, but at the same time the most
separate proof. In this point of view Aristotle difficult of all sciences, because its object, the uni-
compares them with the immediate certainty of versal, is removed as far as possible from the per-
sensuous perceptions.
The reason (voûs) and the ceptions of the senses. (Met. i. 2. ) It is, however,
exertion of the reason (vonois), which is itself the at the same time the most accurate science, because
Universal, develops these principles (apxás) out of its subject matter is most knowable; and the most
itself.
free, because it is sought solely for the sake of
In proof we may distinguish three things : knowledge.
1. That which is proved (Anal. post. i. 7), i. e. There are four first causes or principles of things:
that which is to pertain to some definite object a. The substance and the idea (ni ovoia kai 70 tí
(yével Tivi) considered in itself. 2. The principles v elval); 6. The subject and the matter (ý in
from which this is deduced. 3. The object, the Kal TÒ ÚTokeluevov); C. The principle of motion
attributes of which are to be exhibited. According (80ev apxo) Tas Kuhoews); d. The purpose and
to their subject-matter, proofs come into closer the good (TÒ éveka kal tò ayabów). The earlier
relation to the particular sciences. Here the im- philosophers (this Aristotle shews in the first book
portant point is, to know what science is more
of the Metaphysics) recognized indeed all these
accurate, and may be presupposed as the ground classes singly, but neither distinctly nor in connex-
work of another (Trpotépa &oti). The knowledge ion. With full consciousness he declares, after
to which proof conducts by means of principles having developed the history of metaphysics froin
(ÉMIOTÝMT) has for its object necessary existence; the Ionian philosophers to Plato in bold and mas-
conception (86ļa), on the other hand, bas for its terly outlines, that this science of the first philoso-
object that which may be otherwise constituted: phy had up to his time resembled a lisping child
After Aristotle, in the first book of the second(vernicovévm, Met. i. 10, p. 993, Bekk. ).
Analytics, has shewn how by means of proof we The consciousness of the opposition between
may receive a knowledge that something is, and truth existing in and for itself, and the cognition
why it is so, he considers that which we cannot get of it, must necessarily be presupposed in all philo-
at by means of proof, but which is necessary for the sophizing. This consciousness, which has come out
complete development of our ideas, viz. the defini- in all its distinctness only in the philosophy of the
tion of that which is substantial, by means of which most recent times, Aristotle also possesses. But
we have stated what an object is. This is effected he has it in the form of doubts (åtopiai), which
by definition (ópiouós). The definition states what rise against science itself and its definitions. These
the essence of a thing is, and is therefore always doubts and questions, then, Aristotle considers on
universal and affirmative. It cannot be proved by all sides, and therefrom arrives at the following
any conclusion, nor even be demonstrated by result:-
i
## p. 337 (#357) ############################################
ARISTOTELES.
337
ARISTOTELES.
We
Ced
The
de a
des:
be
136
Ans
1. There is a science which considers existence 3. The third kind of substance is that in which
as such, and the definitions pertaining to it as dúvapus, évépzela, and évtedexeca are united ; the
such. 2. It is not the same with any one of the absolute substance; the eternal, unmoved; but which
particular sciences, for all these consider only a is at the same time motive, is pure activity (actus
part of what exists and its attributes. 3. The purus, Met. xii. 6, ix. 8, xii. 7), is God himself.
principies and highest causes of things must have a
This substance is without matter, and so also is
nature appropriate only to them.
not a magnitude.
Existence is indeed defined in various ways, and The chief momentum in the Aristotelian philo-
denotes at one time the What and the idea, at sophy is, that thought and the subject of thought
another time the condition or constitution, magni- are one; that what is objective and thought (the
tude, &c. , of a thing ; of all the definitions, how- évépyera) are one and the sune. God himself is
ever, the What, which denotes the substance, is eternal thought, and his thought is operation, life,
the first. (Met. vii. 1. p. 1028, Bekk. ) All other action,-it is the thought of thought. Objects
definitions only state attributes or qualities of this exist in their truth only in so far as they are the
first definition, and are not in their nature inde subjects of thought, are thoughts. That is their
pendent, or capable of being separated from the essence (ovola). In nature, indeed, the idea
substance. On the other hand, the idea of sub- exists not as a thought, but as a body; it has,
stance (ovola) lies at the foundation of our ideas of however, a soul, and this is its idea. In saying
everything, and we do not arrive at the cognition this, Aristotle stands upon the highest point of
of anything when we know how great, or where, speculation : God, as a living God, is the universe.
&c. , it is, but when we know what it The In the course of the investigation, Aristotle, with
question, therefore, is, What is the substance ? careful regard to, and examination of, the views of
(ris o ovola ;) which has ever been the object earlier philosophers, points out that neither ab-
of philosophical investigation. (Met. vii. 1. p. stractly universal, nor particular, sensuously per-
1028. ) Aristotle distinguishes three kinds of ceptible essences can be looked upon as principles
substances: 1. Substance perceptible by the senses of existence. Neither the universal apart from the
(Met. xii. 1, 2, vii. 7), which is finite and pe particular, nor the particular by itself, can be a
rishable, like single sensible objects. The mo principle of the natural and spiritual world; but
menta of this sensible substance are, - a. the the absolute principle is God, -the highest reason,
matter, that which is fundamental, constant; b. the object of whose thought is himself. Thus the
particular things, the negative in relation to each dominion of the Anaxagorean vous was declared in
other ; c. the motive principle, the pure form or a profounder manner by Aristotle. In the divine
cidos. 2. The second higher kind of substance is thought, existence is at the same time implied.
that which may be perceived by the senses, but is Thought is the sum and substance of the universe,
imperishable, such as the heavenly bodies. Here and realizes itself in the eternal immutable furni-
the active principle (évépyela, actus) steps in, ative principles which, as the essences indwelling
which, in so far as it contains that which is to be (immanent) in the material, fashion themselves so
produced, is understanding (vous). That which it as to assume an individual existence. In man, the
contains is the purpose, which is realized by means thought of the divine reason completes itself so as
of the evėpyera. The two extremes are here po- to become the self-conscious activity of thinking
tentiality and agency (matter and thought), the reason. By it he recognizes in the objective world
passive universal and the active universal. These his own nature again, and so attains to the cogni-
iwo are not subject to change. That which is tion of truth. With these slight intimations, we
changed is the particular thing, and passes from must here leave the subject.
one into the other by means of something else by VIII. THE PARTICULAR SCIENCES.
which it is moved. The purpose, in so far as it Respecting the Essence of the Particular Sciences,
is the motive principle, is called the cause ( ápxý), and the division of them into Theoretical and Prac-
but, in so far as it is the purpose, it is the reason, tical Sciences. The science of the particular can
aitla. (Mel. v. 1, 2. ) The active principle gives
reality to that wbich it contains in itself: this re thing, the potentiality must pass into actuality.
mains the same: it is still, however, matter, which the principle of the transition from the potential
is different from the active principle, though both to the actual in a thing Aristotle calls entelecheia
are combined. That which combines them is the ! (Td erteles é xov), because it unites both the
form, the union of both. The relation of the potentiality and the actuality. Every union of
newly coined idea of évteléxeia, or the purpose potentiality and actuality is a motion, and accord-
realized by the formative principle, to the idea of ingly the entelecheia is the principle of motion (o
ενέργεια, is this : εντελέχεια signifies in the dif-του δυνάμει όντος εντελέχεια, ή τοιούτον, κίνησις
ferent grades of existence the completion which is doti). The potentiality (Súvauis) can never be-
in conformity with each single existing thing ; come actuality (évéoyela) without entelecheia ; but
and évépyeta denotes the actuality which is in the entelecheia also cannot dispense with the poten-
conformity with this completion. (Metaph. ix. 3, tiality. If the entelecheia does not manifest itself
p. 179. 8, Brand. ) Thus the soul is essentially in a thing, it is merely a thing kata duvapiv ;
εντελέχεια. *
if it does manifest itself, it becomes a thing kat'
évéprerav. The same thing is often both together,
The actuality of each thing presupposes an the former in reference to qualities which it has
original internal potentiality, which is in itself not yet, but can obtain; the latter in reference to
only conceivable, not perceptible. The potenti attributes already actually present in it. (Buhle,
ality of a thing is followed by its actuality in in Ersch and Gruber's Encyclopädie. )
reference either to mere existence or to action. • Met. xii. p. 1074, Bekk. , autóv åpa voci ennep
This actuality is ενέργεια, αctus, and is perceptible. έστι το κράτιστον και έστιν η νύησις, νοήσεως
Lut, that the potential thing may become a real vómois.
ke at
294
a
a. net
21
2
## p. 338 (#358) ############################################
338
ARISTOTELES.
ARISTOTELES.
1
1
1
exist only when the essence of the particular, the vows fa&ntikus the sensible, finite world is a ne
vontov, i, e. the conceivable, the reasonable, is cessary production of cognition. It attains to the
perceived. (Met. vii. 6. ) It presupposes the cognition of nothing without sensuous perception.
principles of the intellectual and real, and has But it is only the vous #OINTIKOS which attains to
reference to that which is demonstrable from them. the cognition of the complete truth of the sensible
The individual sciences deduce from principles the world, and here rice versá the proposition holds
truth of the particular by means of proof, which is good: nihil est in sensu, quod non fuerit in in-
the foundation of knowledge. Their limit consists tellectu.
in this : that the individual science sets out from Reason is either theoretical or practical reason
something presupposed, which is recognized, and (de Anim. iii. 10). The object of the first is the
deduces the rest from this by means of conclusion cognition of truth (of the universal, the unchange
(syllogism). That operation of the mind which able); the object of the other is the realisation, by
refers the particular to the universal, is the reflect- means of action, of the truth, the cognition of
ing understanding (Orávoia), which is opposed as which has been attained. (Metaph. ii. 1. ) Prac-
well to sensuous perception as to the higher opera- tical reason, therefore, is directed to the particular
tion of the reason. With it the difference between and individual, which is determined and regulated
existence and thought, between truth and false by the universal. (Eth. Nic. vi. 12. ) The scientific
hood, becomes a matter of consciousness.
treatment of the moral (ethics and politics) has,
Every single science has reference to a definite ob- therefore, to investigate not so much what virtue
ject (γένος, Αnal. post. 1. 28, Met. xi. 7), and seeks is ( ου γαρ ίν' είδωμεν τι εστιν η αρετή σκεπτομεθα,
certain principles and causes of it. The particular Eth. Nic. ii. 2), as rather how we may becomie vir-
object therefore determines the science, and every tuous (axx' iv dyatol yevuueda). Without this last
science deduces the proof out of the principles pecu- object it would be of no use. The difference be-
liar to it, i. e. out of the essential definitions of the tween action and the exercise of the creative power
particular object. Three things are presupposed (apátter and foreiv) in the province of practical
for every particular science : a. That its object, reason, is the foundation of the difference between
and the essential definitions of that object (i. e, the morality and art. What is common to both is,
principles peculiar to it), exist. 1. The common that the commencing point of the activity lies
principles (axioms), and c. The signification of the here in the subject (Met. xi. 7), and that the ob-
essential attributes of the object. According to ject of the activity has reference to that which
their common principles, all sciences are mutually admits of different modes of existence. (Eth. Nic.
connected. Such common principles are, for ex- vi. 4. ) The difference, thererefore, between the
ample, the law of contradiction.
two is this: that in action (Tpártev) the pur-
The accuracy (dxpibera) of the single sciences pose lies in the activity itself in the mpaktov),
depends on the nature of their objects. The less whereby the will of the actor manifests itself, while
this is an object of sense, the more accurate is the in the exercise of the creative power (Foreiv) it
science of it. (Met. xiii. 3; Anal. post. i. 27; lies in the work produced. (Metaph. vi. l;
Met.
