Hence
there was a greater effort in the higher angels, both for good in those
who persevered, and for evil in those who fell, and consequently those
of the higher angels who remained steadfast became better than the
others, and those who fell became worse.
there was a greater effort in the higher angels, both for good in those
who persevered, and for evil in those who fell, and consequently those
of the higher angels who remained steadfast became better than the
others, and those who fell became worse.
Summa Theologica
5:6.
Therefore faith is more excellent than charity.
Objection 3: Further, that which is by way of addition to another seems
to be the more perfect of the two. Now hope seems to be something
additional to charity: for the object of charity is good, whereas the
object of hope is an arduous good. Therefore hope is more excellent
than charity.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 13:13): "The greater of these is
charity. "
I answer that, Since good, in human acts, depends on their being
regulated by the due rule, it must needs be that human virtue, which is
a principle of good acts, consists in attaining the rule of human acts.
Now the rule of human acts is twofold, as stated above [2507](A[3]),
namely, human reason and God: yet God is the first rule, whereby, even
human reason must be regulated. Consequently the theological virtues,
which consist in attaining this first rule, since their object is God,
are more excellent than the moral, or the intellectual virtues, which
consist in attaining human reason: and it follows that among the
theological virtues themselves, the first place belongs to that which
attains God most.
Now that which is of itself always ranks before that which is by
another. But faith and hope attain God indeed in so far as we derive
from Him the knowledge of truth or the acquisition of good, whereas
charity attains God Himself that it may rest in Him, but not that
something may accrue to us from Him. Hence charity is more excellent
than faith or hope, and, consequently, than all the other virtues, just
as prudence, which by itself attains reason, is more excellent than the
other moral virtues, which attain reason in so far as it appoints the
mean in human operations or passions.
Reply to Objection 1: The operation of the intellect is completed by
the thing understood being in the intellectual subject, so that the
excellence of the intellectual operation is assessed according to the
measure of the intellect. On the other hand, the operation of the will
and of every appetitive power is completed in the tendency of the
appetite towards a thing as its term, wherefore the excellence of the
appetitive operation is gauged according to the thing which is the
object of the operation. Now those things which are beneath the soul
are more excellent in the soul than they are in themselves, because a
thing is contained according to the mode of the container (De Causis
xii). On the other hand, things that are above the soul, are more
excellent in themselves than they are in the soul. Consequently it is
better to know than to love the things that are beneath us; for which
reason the Philosopher gave the preference to the intellectual virtues
over the moral virtues (Ethic. x, 7,8): whereas the love of the things
that are above us, especially of God, ranks before the knowledge of
such things. Therefore charity is more excellent than faith.
Reply to Objection 2: Faith works by love, not instrumentally, as a
master by his servant, but as by its proper form: hence the argument
does not prove.
Reply to Objection 3: The same good is the object of charity and of
hope: but charity implies union with that good, whereas hope implies
distance therefrom. Hence charity does not regard that good as being
arduous, as hope does, since what is already united has not the
character of arduous: and this shows that charity is more perfect than
hope.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether any true virtue is possible without charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that there can be true virtue without
charity. For it is proper to virtue to produce a good act. Now those
who have not charity, do some good actions, as when they clothe the
naked, or feed the hungry and so forth. Therefore true virtue is
possible without charity.
Objection 2: Further, charity is not possible without faith, since it
comes of "an unfeigned faith," as the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5). Now,
in unbelievers, there can be true chastity, if they curb their
concupiscences, and true justice, if they judge rightly. Therefore true
virtue is possible without charity.
Objection 3: Further, science and art are virtues, according to Ethic.
vi. But they are to be found in sinners who lack charity. Therefore
true virtue can be without charity.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:3): "If I should
distribute all my goods to the poor, and if I should deliver my body to
be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. " And yet true
virtue is very profitable, according to Wis. 8:7: "She teacheth
temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such
things as men can have nothing more profitable in life. " Therefore no
true virtue is possible without charity.
I answer that, Virtue is ordered to the good, as stated above
([2508]FS, Q[55] , A[4]). Now the good is chiefly an end, for things
directed to the end are not said to be good except in relation to the
end. Accordingly, just as the end is twofold, the last end, and the
proximate end, so also, is good twofold, one, the ultimate and
universal good, the other proximate and particular. The ultimate and
principal good of man is the enjoyment of God, according to Ps. 72:28:
"It is good for me to adhere to God," and to this good man is ordered
by charity. Man's secondary and, as it were, particular good may be
twofold: one is truly good, because, considered in itself, it can be
directed to the principal good, which is the last end; while the other
is good apparently and not truly, because it leads us away from the
final good. Accordingly it is evident that simply true virtue is that
which is directed to man's principal good; thus also the Philosopher
says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that "virtue is the disposition of a perfect
thing to that which is best": and in this way no true virtue is
possible without charity.
If, however, we take virtue as being ordered to some particular end,
then we speak of virtue being where there is no charity, in so far as
it is directed to some particular good. But if this particular good is
not a true, but an apparent good, it is not a true virtue that is
ordered to such a good, but a counterfeit virtue. Even so, as Augustine
says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "the prudence of the miser, whereby he
devises various roads to gain, is no true virtue; nor the miser's
justice, whereby he scorns the property of another through fear of
severe punishment; nor the miser's temperance, whereby he curbs his
desire for expensive pleasures; nor the miser's fortitude, whereby as
Horace, says, 'he braves the sea, he crosses mountains, he goes through
fire, in order to avoid poverty'" (Epis. lib, 1; Ep. i, 45). If, on the
other hand, this particular good be a true good, for instance the
welfare of the state, or the like, it will indeed be a true virtue,
imperfect, however, unless it be referred to the final and perfect
good. Accordingly no strictly true virtue is possible without charity.
Reply to Objection 1: The act of one lacking charity may be of two
kinds; one is in accordance with his lack of charity, as when he does
something that is referred to that whereby he lacks charity. Such an
act is always evil: thus Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3) that the
actions which an unbeliever performs as an unbeliever, are always
sinful, even when he clothes the naked, or does any like thing, and
directs it to his unbelief as end.
There is, however, another act of one lacking charity, not in
accordance with his lack of charity, but in accordance with his
possession of some other gift of God, whether faith, or hope, or even
his natural good, which is not completely taken away by sin, as stated
above (Q[10], A[4]; [2509]FS, Q[85], A[2]). In this way it is possible
for an act, without charity, to be generically good, but not perfectly
good, because it lacks its due order to the last end.
Reply to Objection 2: Since the end is in practical matters, what the
principle is in speculative matters, just as there can be no strictly
true science, if a right estimate of the first indemonstrable principle
be lacking, so, there can be no strictly true justice, or chastity,
without that due ordering to the end, which is effected by charity,
however rightly a man may be affected about other matters.
Reply to Objection 3: Science and art of their very nature imply a
relation to some particular good, and not to the ultimate good of human
life, as do the moral virtues, which make man good simply, as stated
above ([2510]FS, Q[56] , A[3]). Hence the comparison fails.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether charity is the form of the virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the true form of the
virtues. Because the form of a thing is either exemplar or essential.
Now charity is not the exemplar form of the other virtues, since it
would follow that the other virtues are of the same species as charity:
nor is it the essential form of the other virtues, since then it would
not be distinct from them. Therefore it is in no way the form of the
virtues.
Objection 2: Further, charity is compared to the other virtues as their
root and foundation, according to Eph. 3:17: "Rooted and founded in
charity. " Now a root or foundation is not the form, but rather the
matter of a thing, since it is the first part in the making. Therefore
charity is not the form of the virtues.
Objection 3: Further, formal, final, and efficient causes do not
coincide with one another (Phys. ii, 7). Now charity is called the end
and the mother of the virtues. Therefore it should not be called their
form.
On the contrary, Ambrose [*Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 23] says that charity
is the form of the virtues.
I answer that, In morals the form of an act is taken chiefly from the
end. The reason of this is that the principal of moral acts is the
will, whose object and form, so to speak, are the end. Now the form of
an act always follows from a form of the agent. Consequently, in
morals, that which gives an act its order to the end, must needs give
the act its form. Now it is evident, in accordance with what has been
said [2511](A[7]), that it is charity which directs the acts of all
other virtues to the last end, and which, consequently, also gives the
form to all other acts of virtue: and it is precisely in this sense
that charity is called the form of the virtues, for these are called
virtues in relation to "informed" acts.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity is called the form of the other virtues
not as being their exemplar or their essential form, but rather by way
of efficient cause, in so far as it sets the form on all, in the
aforesaid manner.
Reply to Objection 2: Charity is compared to the foundation or root in
so far as all other virtues draw their sustenance and nourishment
therefrom, and not in the sense that the foundation and root have the
character of a material cause.
Reply to Objection 3: Charity is said to be the end of other virtues,
because it directs all other virtues to its own end. And since a mother
is one who conceives within herself and by another, charity is called
the mother of the other virtues, because, by commanding them, it
conceives the acts of the other virtues, by the desire of the last end.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE SUBJECT OF CHARITY (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider charity in relation to its subject, under which
head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether charity is in the will as its subject?
(2) Whether charity is caused in man by preceding acts or by a Divine
infusion?
(3) Whether it is infused according to the capacity of our natural
gifts?
(4) Whether it increases in the person who has it?
(5) Whether it increases by addition?
(6) Whether it increases by every act?
(7) Whether it increases indefinitely?
(8) Whether the charity of a wayfarer can be perfect?
(9) Of the various degrees of charity;
(10) Whether charity can diminish?
(11) Whether charity can be lost after it has been possessed?
(12) Whether it is lost through one mortal sin?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the will is the subject of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not the subject of charity.
For charity is a kind of love. Now, according to the Philosopher
(Topic. ii, 3) love is in the concupiscible part. Therefore charity is
also in the concupiscible and not in the will.
Objection 2: Further, charity is the foremost of the virtues, as stated
above ([2512]Q[23], A[6]). But the reason is the subject of virtue.
Therefore it seems that charity is in the reason and not in the will.
Objection 3: Further, charity extends to all human acts, according to 1
Cor. 16:14: "Let all your things be done in charity. " Now the principle
of human acts is the free-will. Therefore it seems that charity is
chiefly in the free-will as its subject and not in the will.
On the contrary, The object of charity is the good, which is also the
object of the will. Therefore charity is in the will as its subject.
I answer that, Since, as stated in the [2513]FP, Q[80], A[2], the
appetite is twofold, namely the sensitive, and the intellective which
is called the will, the object of each is the good, but in different
ways: for the object of the sensitive appetite is a good apprehended by
sense, whereas the object of the intellective appetite or will is good
under the universal aspect of good, according as it can be apprehended
by the intellect. Now the object of charity is not a sensible good, but
the Divine good which is known by the intellect alone. Therefore the
subject of charity is not the sensitive, but the intellective appetite,
i. e. the will.
Reply to Objection 1: The concupiscible is a part of the sensitive, not
of the intellective appetite, as proved in the [2514]FP, Q[81], A[2]:
wherefore the love which is in the concupiscible, is the love of
sensible good: nor can the concupiscible reach to the Divine good which
is an intelligible good; the will alone can. Consequently the
concupiscible cannot be the subject of charity.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9),
the will also is in the reason: wherefore charity is not excluded from
the reason through being in the will. Yet charity is regulated, not by
the reason, as human virtues are, but by God's wisdom, and transcends
the rule of human reason, according to Eph. 3:19: "The charity of
Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge. " Hence it is not in the reason,
either as its subject, like prudence is, or as its rule, like justice
and temperance are, but only by a certain kinship of the will to the
reason.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in the [2515]FP, Q[83], A[4], the
free-will is not a distinct power from the will. Yet charity is not in
the will considered as free-will, the act of which is to choose. For
choice is of things directed to the end, whereas the will is of the end
itself (Ethic. iii, 2). Hence charity, whose object is the last end,
should be described as residing in the will rather than in the
free-will.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether charity is caused in us by infusion?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not caused in us by
infusion. For that which is common to all creatures, is in man
naturally. Now, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), the "Divine
good", which is the object of charity, "is for all an object of
dilection and love. " Therefore charity is in us naturally, and not by
infusion.
Objection 2: Further, the more lovable a thing is the easier it is to
love it. Now God is supremely lovable, since He is supremely good.
Therefore it is easier to love Him than other things. But we need no
infused habit in order to love other things. Neither, therefore, do we
need one in order to love God.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): "The end of the
commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an
unfeigned faith. " Now these three have reference to human acts.
Therefore charity is caused in us from preceding acts, and not from
infusion.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:5): "The charity of God is
poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us. "
I answer that, As stated above ([2516]Q[23], A[1]), charity is a
friendship of man for God, founded upon the fellowship of everlasting
happiness. Now this fellowship is in respect, not of natural, but of
gratuitous gifts, for, according to Rom. 6:23, "the grace of God is
life everlasting": wherefore charity itself surpasses our natural
facilities. Now that which surpasses the faculty of nature, cannot be
natural or acquired by the natural powers, since a natural effect does
not transcend its cause.
Therefore charity can be in us neither naturally, nor through
acquisition by the natural powers, but by the infusion of the Holy
Ghost, Who is the love of the Father and the Son, and the participation
of Whom in us is created charity, as stated above ([2517]Q[23], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius is speaking of the love of God, which
is founded on the fellowship of natural goods, wherefore it is in all
naturally. On the other hand, charity is founded on a supernatural
fellowship, so the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as God is supremely knowable in Himself yet
not to us, on account of a defect in our knowledge which depends on
sensible things, so too, God is supremely lovable in Himself, in as
much as He is the object of happiness. But He is not supremely lovable
to us in this way, on account of the inclination of our appetite
towards visible goods. Hence it is evident that for us to love God
above all things in this way, it is necessary that charity be infused
into our hearts.
Reply to Objection 3: When it is said that in us charity proceeds from
"a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith," this
must be referred to the act of charity which is aroused by these
things. Or again, this is said because the aforesaid acts dispose man
to receive the infusion of charity. The same remark applies to the
saying of Augustine (Tract. ix in prim. canon. Joan. ): "Fear leads to
charity," and of a gloss on Mat. 1:2: "Faith begets hope, and hope
charity. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether charity is infused according to the capacity of our natural gifts?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is infused according to the
capacity of our natural gifts. For it is written (Mat. 25:15) that "He
gave to every one according to his own virtue [Douay: 'proper
ability']. " Now, in man, none but natural virtue precedes charity,
since there is no virtue without charity, as stated above ([2518]Q[23],
A[7]). Therefore God infuses charity into man according to the measure
of his natural virtue.
Objection 2: Further, among things ordained towards one another, the
second is proportionate to the first: thus we find in natural things
that the form is proportionate to the matter, and in gratuitous gifts,
that glory is proportionate to grace. Now, since charity is a
perfection of nature, it is compared to the capacity of nature as
second to first. Therefore it seems that charity is infused according
to the capacity of nature.
Objection 3: Further, men and angels partake of happiness according to
the same measure, since happiness is alike in both, according to Mat.
22:30 and Lk. 20:36. Now charity and other gratuitous gifts are
bestowed on the angels, according to their natural capacity, as the
Master teaches (Sent. ii, D, 3). Therefore the same apparently applies
to man.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 3:8): "The Spirit breatheth where
He will," and (1 Cor. 12:11): "All these things one and the same Spirit
worketh, dividing to every one according as He will. " Therefore charity
is given, not according to our natural capacity, but according as the
Spirit wills to distribute His gifts.
I answer that, The quantity of a thing depends on the proper cause of
that thing, since the more universal cause produces a greater effect.
Now, since charity surpasses the proportion of human nature, as stated
above [2519](A[2]) it depends, not on any natural virtue, but on the
sole grace of the Holy Ghost Who infuses charity. Wherefore the
quantity of charity depends neither on the condition of nature nor on
the capacity of natural virtue, but only on the will of the Holy Ghost
Who "divides" His gifts "according as He will. " Hence the Apostle says
(Eph. 4:7): "To every one of us is given grace according to the measure
of the giving of Christ. "
Reply to Objection 1: The virtue in accordance with which God gives His
gifts to each one, is a disposition or previous preparation or effort
of the one who receives grace. But the Holy Ghost forestalls even this
disposition or effort, by moving man's mind either more or less,
according as He will. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col. 1:12): "Who hath
made us worthy to be partakers of the lot of the saints in light. "
Reply to Objection 2: The form does not surpass the proportion of the
matter. In like manner grace and glory are referred to the same genus,
for grace is nothing else than a beginning of glory in us. But charity
and nature do not belong to the same genus, so that the comparison
fails.
Reply to Objection 3: The angel's is an intellectual nature, and it is
consistent with his condition that he should be borne wholly
whithersoever he is borne, as stated in the FP, Q[61], A[6].
Hence
there was a greater effort in the higher angels, both for good in those
who persevered, and for evil in those who fell, and consequently those
of the higher angels who remained steadfast became better than the
others, and those who fell became worse. But man's is a rational
nature, with which it is consistent to be sometimes in potentiality and
sometimes in act: so that it is not necessarily borne wholly
whithersoever it is borne, and where there are greater natural gifts
there may be less effort, and vice versa. Thus the comparison fails.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether charity can increase?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity cannot increase. For nothing
increases save what has quantity. Now quantity is twofold, namely
dimensive and virtual. The former does not befit charity which is a
spiritual perfection, while virtual quantity regards the objects in
respect of which charity does not increase, since the slightest charity
loves all that is to be loved out of charity. Therefore charity does
not increase.
Objection 2: Further, that which consists in something extreme receives
no increase. But charity consists in something extreme, being the
greatest of the virtues, and the supreme love of the greatest good.
Therefore charity cannot increase.
Objection 3: Further, increase is a kind of movement. Therefore
wherever there is increase there is movement, and if there be increase
of essence there is movement of essence. Now there is no movement of
essence save either by corruption or generation. Therefore charity
cannot increase essentially, unless it happen to be generated anew or
corrupted, which is unreasonable.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. lxxiv in Joan. ) [*Cf. Ep.
clxxxv. ] that "charity merits increase that by increase it may merit
perfection. "
I answer that, The charity of a wayfarer can increase. For we are
called wayfarers by reason of our being on the way to God, Who is the
last end of our happiness. In this way we advance as we get nigh to
God, Who is approached, "not by steps of the body but by the affections
of the soul" [*St. Augustine, Tract. in Joan. xxxii]: and this approach
is the result of charity, since it unites man's mind to God.
Consequently it is essential to the charity of a wayfarer that it can
increase, for if it could not, all further advance along the way would
cease. Hence the Apostle calls charity the way, when he says (1 Cor.
12:31): "I show unto you yet a more excellent way. "
Reply to Objection 1: Charity is not subject to dimensive, but only to
virtual quantity: and the latter depends not only on the number of
objects, namely whether they be in greater number or of greater
excellence, but also on the intensity of the act, namely whether a
thing is loved more, or less; it is in this way that the virtual
quantity of charity increases.
Reply to Objection 2: Charity consists in an extreme with regard to its
object, in so far as its object is the Supreme Good, and from this it
follows that charity is the most excellent of the virtues. Yet not
every charity consists in an extreme, as regards the intensity of the
act.
Reply to Objection 3: Some have said that charity does not increase in
its essence, but only as to its radication in its subject, or according
to its fervor.
But these people did not know what they were talking about. For since
charity is an accident, its being is to be in something. So that an
essential increase of charity means nothing else but that it is yet
more in its subject, which implies a greater radication in its subject.
Furthermore, charity is essentially a virtue ordained to act, so that
an essential increase of charity implies ability to produce an act of
more fervent love. Hence charity increases essentially, not by
beginning anew, or ceasing to be in its subject, as the objection
imagines, but by beginning to be more and more in its subject.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether charity increases by addition?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity increases by addition. For just
as increase may be in respect of bodily quantity, so may it be
according to virtual quantity. Now increase in bodily quantity results
from addition; for the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5) that "increase
is addition to pre-existing magnitude. " Therefore the increase of
charity which is according to virtual quantity is by addition.
Objection 2: Further, charity is a kind of spiritual light in the soul,
according to 1 Jn. 2:10: "He that loveth his brother abideth in the
light. " Now light increases in the air by addition; thus the light in a
house increases when another candle is lit. Therefore charity also
increases in the soul by addition.
Objection 3: Further, the increase of charity is God's work, even as
the causing of it, according to 2 Cor. 9:10: "He will increase the
growth of the fruits of your justice. " Now when God first infuses
charity, He puts something in the soul that was not there before.
Therefore also, when He increases charity, He puts something there
which was not there before. Therefore charity increases by addition.
On the contrary, Charity is a simple form. Now nothing greater results
from the addition of one simple thing to another, as proved in Phys.
iii, text. 59, and Metaph. ii, 4. Therefore charity does not increase
by addition.
I answer that, Every addition is of something to something else: so
that in every addition we must at least presuppose that the things
added together are distinct before the addition. Consequently if
charity be added to charity, the added charity must be presupposed as
distinct from charity to which it is added, not necessarily by a
distinction of reality, but at least by a distinction of thought. For
God is able to increase a bodily quantity by adding a magnitude which
did not exist before, but was created at that very moment; which
magnitude, though not pre-existent in reality, is nevertheless capable
of being distinguished from the quantity to which it is added.
Wherefore if charity be added to charity we must presuppose the
distinction, at least logical, of the one charity from the other.
Now distinction among forms is twofold: specific and numeric. Specific
distinction of habits follows diversity of objects, while numeric
distinction follows distinction of subjects. Consequently a habit may
receive increase through extending to objects to which it did not
extend before: thus the science of geometry increases in one who
acquires knowledge of geometrical matters which he ignored hitherto.
But this cannot be said of charity, for even the slightest charity
extends to all that we have to love by charity. Hence the addition
which causes an increase of charity cannot be understood, as though the
added charity were presupposed to be distinct specifically from that to
which it is added.
It follows therefore that if charity be added to charity, we must
presuppose a numerical distinction between them, which follows a
distinction of subjects: thus whiteness receives an increase when one
white thing is added to another, although such an increase does not
make a thing whiter. This, however, does not apply to the case in
point, since the subject of charity is none other than the rational
mind, so that such like an increase of charity could only take place by
one rational mind being added to another; which is impossible.
Moreover, even if it were possible, the result would be a greater
lover, but not a more loving one. It follows, therefore, that charity
can by no means increase by addition of charity to charity, as some
have held to be the case.
Accordingly charity increases only by its subject partaking of charity
more and more subject thereto. For this is the proper mode of increase
in a form that is intensified, since the being of such a form consists
wholly in its adhering to its subject. Consequently, since the
magnitude of a thing follows on its being, to say that a form is
greater is the same as to say that it is more in its subject, and not
that another form is added to it: for this would be the case if the
form, of itself, had any quantity, and not in comparison with its
subject. Therefore charity increases by being intensified in its
subject, and this is for charity to increase in its essence; and not by
charity being added to charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Bodily quantity has something as quantity, and
something else, in so far as it is an accidental form. As quantity, it
is distinguishable in respect of position or number, and in this way we
have the increase of magnitude by addition, as may be seen in animals.
But in so far as it is an accidental form, it is distinguishable only
in respect of its subject, and in this way it has its proper increase,
like other accidental forms, by way of intensity in its subject, for
instance in things subject to rarefaction, as is proved in Phys. iv, 9.
In like manner science, as a habit, has its quantity from its objects,
and accordingly it increases by addition, when a man knows more things;
and again, as an accidental form, it has a certain quantity through
being in its subject, and in this way it increase in a man who knows
the same scientific truths with greater certainty now than before. In
the same way charity has a twofold quantity; but with regard to that
which it has from its object, it does not increase, as stated above:
hence it follows that it increases solely by being intensified.
Reply to Objection 2: The addition of light to light can be understood
through the light being intensified in the air on account of there
being several luminaries giving light: but this distinction does not
apply to the case in point, since there is but one luminary shedding
forth the light of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: The infusion of charity denotes a change to the
state of "having" charity from the state of "not having it," so that
something must needs come which was not there before. On the other
hand, the increase of charity denotes a change to "more having" from
"less having," so that there is need, not for anything to be there that
was not there before, but for something to be more there that
previously was less there. This is what God does when He increases
charity, that is He makes it to have a greater hold on the soul, and
the likeness of the Holy Ghost to be more perfectly participated by the
soul.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether charity increases through every act of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity increases through every act of
charity. For that which can do what is more, can do what is less. But
every act of charity can merit everlasting life; and this is more than
a simple addition of charity, since it includes the perfection of
charity. Much more, therefore, does every act of charity increase
charity.
Objection 2: Further, just as the habits of acquired virtue are
engendered by acts, so too an increase of charity is caused by an act
of charity. Now each virtuous act conduces to the engendering of
virtue. Therefore also each virtuous act of charity conduces to the
increase of charity.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory [*St. Bernard, Serm. ii in Festo Purif. ]
says that "to stand still in the way to God is to go back. " Now no man
goes back when he is moved by an act of charity. Therefore whoever is
moved by an act of charity goes forward in the way to God. Therefore
charity increases through every act of charity.
On the contrary, The effect does not surpass the power of its cause.
But an act of charity is sometimes done with tepidity or slackness.
Therefore it does not conduce to a more excellent charity, rather does
it dispose one to a lower degree.
I answer that, The spiritual increase of charity is somewhat like the
increase of a body. Now bodily increase in animals and plants is not a
continuous movement, so that, to wit, if a thing increase so much in so
much time, it need to increase proportionally in each part of that
time, as happens in local movement; but for a certain space of time
nature works by disposing for the increase, without causing any actual
increase, and afterwards brings into effect that to which it had
disposed, by giving the animal or plant an actual increase. In like
manner charity does not actually increase through every act of charity,
but each act of charity disposes to an increase of charity, in so far
as one act of charity makes man more ready to act again according to
charity, and this readiness increasing, man breaks out into an act of
more fervent love, and strives to advance in charity, and then his
charity increases actually.
Reply to Objection 1: Every act of charity merits everlasting life,
which, however, is not to be bestowed then and there, but at its proper
time. In like manner every act of charity merits an increase of
charity; yet this increase does not take place at once, but when we
strive for that increase.
Reply to Objection 2: Even when an acquired virtue is being engendered,
each act does not complete the formation of the virtue, but conduces
towards that effect by disposing to it, while the last act, which is
the most perfect, and acts in virtue of all those that preceded it,
reduces the virtue into act, just as when many drops hollow out a
stone.
Reply to Objection 3: Man advances in the way to God, not merely by
actual increase of charity, but also by being disposed to that
increase.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether charity increases indefinitely?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity does not increase indefinitely.
For every movement is towards some end and term, as stated in Metaph.
ii, text. 8,9. But the increase of charity is a movement. Therefore it
tends to an end and term. Therefore charity does not increase
indefinitely.
Objection 2: Further, no form surpasses the capacity of its subject.
But the capacity of the rational creature who is the subject of charity
is finite. Therefore charity cannot increase indefinitely.
Objection 3: Further, every finite thing can, by continual increase,
attain to the quantity of another finite thing however much greater,
unless the amount of its increase be ever less and less. Thus the
Philosopher states (Phys. iii, 6) that if we divide a line into an
indefinite number of parts, and take these parts away and add them
indefinitely to another line, we shall never arrive at any definite
quantity resulting from those two lines, viz. the one from which we
subtracted and the one to which we added what was subtracted. But this
does not occur in the case in point: because there is no need for the
second increase of charity to be less than the first, since rather is
it probable that it would be equal or greater. As, therefore, the
charity of the blessed is something finite, if the charity of the
wayfarer can increase indefinitely, it would follow that the charity of
the way can equal the charity of heaven; which is absurd. Therefore the
wayfarer's charity cannot increase indefinitely.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): "Not as though I had
already attained, or were already perfect; but I follow after, if I
may, by any means apprehend," on which words a gloss says: "Even if he
has made great progress, let none of the faithful say: 'Enough. ' For
whosoever says this, leaves the road before coming to his destination. "
Therefore the wayfarer's charity can ever increase more and more.
I answer that, A term to the increase of a form may be fixed in three
ways: first by reason of the form itself having a fixed measure, and
when this has been reached it is no longer possible to go any further
in that form, but if any further advance is made, another form is
attained. And example of this is paleness, the bounds of which may, by
continual alteration, be passed, either so that whiteness ensues, or so
that blackness results. Secondly, on the part of the agent, whose power
does not extend to a further increase of the form in its subject.
Thirdly, on the part of the subject, which is not capable of ulterior
perfection.
Now, in none of these ways, is a limit imposed to the increase of man's
charity, while he is in the state of the wayfarer. For charity itself
considered as such has no limit to its increase, since it is a
participation of the infinite charity which is the Holy Ghost. In like
manner the cause of the increase of charity, viz. God, is possessed of
infinite power. Furthermore, on the part of its subject, no limit to
this increase can be determined, because whenever charity increases,
there is a corresponding increased ability to receive a further
increase. It is therefore evident that it is not possible to fix any
limits to the increase of charity in this life.
Reply to Objection 1: The increase of charity is directed to an end,
which is not in this, but in a future life.
Reply to Objection 2: The capacity of the rational creature is
increased by charity, because the heart is enlarged thereby, according
to 2 Cor. 6:11: "Our heart is enlarged"; so that it still remains
capable of receiving a further increase.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument holds good in those things which
have the same kind of quantity, but not in those which have different
kinds: thus however much a line may increase it does not reach the
quantity of a superficies. Now the quantity of a wayfarer's charity
which follows the knowledge of faith is not of the same kind as the
quantity of the charity of the blessed, which follows open vision.
Hence the argument does not prove.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether charity can be perfect in this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity cannot be perfect in this life.
For this would have been the case with the apostles before all others.
Yet it was not so, since the Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): "Not as though
I had already attained, or were already perfect. " Therefore charity
cannot be perfect in this life.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that
"whatever kindles charity quenches cupidity, but where charity is
perfect, cupidity is done away altogether. " But this cannot be in this
world, wherein it is impossible to live without sin, according to 1 Jn.
1:8: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves. " Now all sin
arises from some inordinate cupidity. Therefore charity cannot be
perfect in this life.
Objection 3: Further, what is already perfect cannot be perfected any
more. But in this life charity can always increase, as stated above
[2520](A[7]). Therefore charity cannot be perfect in this life.
On the contrary, Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. v)
"Charity is perfected by being strengthened; and when it has been
brought to perfection, it exclaims, 'I desire to be dissolved and to be
with Christ. '" Now this is possible in this life, as in the case of
Paul. Therefore charity can be perfect in this life.
I answer that, The perfection of charity may be understood in two ways:
first with regard to the object loved, secondly with regard to the
person who loves. With regard to the object loved, charity is perfect,
if the object be loved as much as it is lovable. Now God is as lovable
as He is good, and His goodness is infinite, wherefore He is infinitely
lovable. But no creature can love Him infinitely since all created
power is finite. Consequently no creature's charity can be perfect in
this way; the charity of God alone can, whereby He loves Himself.
On the part of the person who loves, charity is perfect, when he loves
as much as he can. This happens in three ways. First, so that a man's
whole heart is always actually borne towards God: this is the
perfection of the charity of heaven, and is not possible in this life,
wherein, by reason of the weakness of human life, it is impossible to
think always actually of God, and to be moved by love towards Him.
Secondly, so that man makes an earnest endeavor to give his time to God
and Divine things, while scorning other things except in so far as the
needs of the present life demand. This is the perfection of charity
that is possible to a wayfarer; but is not common to all who have
charity. Thirdly, so that a man gives his whole heart to God
habitually, viz. by neither thinking nor desiring anything contrary to
the love of God; and this perfection is common to all who have charity.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle denies that he has the perfection of
heaven, wherefore a gloss on the same passage says that "he was a
perfect wayfarer, but had not yet achieved the perfection to which the
way leads. "
Reply to Objection 2: This is said on account of venial sins, which are
contrary, not to the habit, but to the act of charity: hence they are
incompatible, not with the perfection of the way, but with that of
heaven.
Reply to Objection 3: The perfection of the way is not perfection
simply, wherefore it can always increase.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether charity is rightly distinguished into three degrees, beginning,
progress, and perfection?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting to distinguish three degrees of
charity, beginning, progress, and perfection. For there are many
degrees between the beginning of charity and its ultimate perfection.
Therefore it is not right to put only one.
Objection 2: Further, charity begins to progress as soon as it begins
to be. Therefore we ought not to distinguish between charity as
progressing and as beginning.
Objection 3: Further, in this world, however perfect a man's charity
may be, it can increase, as stated above [2521](A[7]). Now for charity
to increase is to progress. Therefore perfect charity ought not to be
distinguished from progressing charity: and so the aforesaid degrees
are unsuitably assigned to charity.
On the contrary, Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan.
Objection 3: Further, that which is by way of addition to another seems
to be the more perfect of the two. Now hope seems to be something
additional to charity: for the object of charity is good, whereas the
object of hope is an arduous good. Therefore hope is more excellent
than charity.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 13:13): "The greater of these is
charity. "
I answer that, Since good, in human acts, depends on their being
regulated by the due rule, it must needs be that human virtue, which is
a principle of good acts, consists in attaining the rule of human acts.
Now the rule of human acts is twofold, as stated above [2507](A[3]),
namely, human reason and God: yet God is the first rule, whereby, even
human reason must be regulated. Consequently the theological virtues,
which consist in attaining this first rule, since their object is God,
are more excellent than the moral, or the intellectual virtues, which
consist in attaining human reason: and it follows that among the
theological virtues themselves, the first place belongs to that which
attains God most.
Now that which is of itself always ranks before that which is by
another. But faith and hope attain God indeed in so far as we derive
from Him the knowledge of truth or the acquisition of good, whereas
charity attains God Himself that it may rest in Him, but not that
something may accrue to us from Him. Hence charity is more excellent
than faith or hope, and, consequently, than all the other virtues, just
as prudence, which by itself attains reason, is more excellent than the
other moral virtues, which attain reason in so far as it appoints the
mean in human operations or passions.
Reply to Objection 1: The operation of the intellect is completed by
the thing understood being in the intellectual subject, so that the
excellence of the intellectual operation is assessed according to the
measure of the intellect. On the other hand, the operation of the will
and of every appetitive power is completed in the tendency of the
appetite towards a thing as its term, wherefore the excellence of the
appetitive operation is gauged according to the thing which is the
object of the operation. Now those things which are beneath the soul
are more excellent in the soul than they are in themselves, because a
thing is contained according to the mode of the container (De Causis
xii). On the other hand, things that are above the soul, are more
excellent in themselves than they are in the soul. Consequently it is
better to know than to love the things that are beneath us; for which
reason the Philosopher gave the preference to the intellectual virtues
over the moral virtues (Ethic. x, 7,8): whereas the love of the things
that are above us, especially of God, ranks before the knowledge of
such things. Therefore charity is more excellent than faith.
Reply to Objection 2: Faith works by love, not instrumentally, as a
master by his servant, but as by its proper form: hence the argument
does not prove.
Reply to Objection 3: The same good is the object of charity and of
hope: but charity implies union with that good, whereas hope implies
distance therefrom. Hence charity does not regard that good as being
arduous, as hope does, since what is already united has not the
character of arduous: and this shows that charity is more perfect than
hope.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether any true virtue is possible without charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that there can be true virtue without
charity. For it is proper to virtue to produce a good act. Now those
who have not charity, do some good actions, as when they clothe the
naked, or feed the hungry and so forth. Therefore true virtue is
possible without charity.
Objection 2: Further, charity is not possible without faith, since it
comes of "an unfeigned faith," as the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5). Now,
in unbelievers, there can be true chastity, if they curb their
concupiscences, and true justice, if they judge rightly. Therefore true
virtue is possible without charity.
Objection 3: Further, science and art are virtues, according to Ethic.
vi. But they are to be found in sinners who lack charity. Therefore
true virtue can be without charity.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:3): "If I should
distribute all my goods to the poor, and if I should deliver my body to
be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. " And yet true
virtue is very profitable, according to Wis. 8:7: "She teacheth
temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such
things as men can have nothing more profitable in life. " Therefore no
true virtue is possible without charity.
I answer that, Virtue is ordered to the good, as stated above
([2508]FS, Q[55] , A[4]). Now the good is chiefly an end, for things
directed to the end are not said to be good except in relation to the
end. Accordingly, just as the end is twofold, the last end, and the
proximate end, so also, is good twofold, one, the ultimate and
universal good, the other proximate and particular. The ultimate and
principal good of man is the enjoyment of God, according to Ps. 72:28:
"It is good for me to adhere to God," and to this good man is ordered
by charity. Man's secondary and, as it were, particular good may be
twofold: one is truly good, because, considered in itself, it can be
directed to the principal good, which is the last end; while the other
is good apparently and not truly, because it leads us away from the
final good. Accordingly it is evident that simply true virtue is that
which is directed to man's principal good; thus also the Philosopher
says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that "virtue is the disposition of a perfect
thing to that which is best": and in this way no true virtue is
possible without charity.
If, however, we take virtue as being ordered to some particular end,
then we speak of virtue being where there is no charity, in so far as
it is directed to some particular good. But if this particular good is
not a true, but an apparent good, it is not a true virtue that is
ordered to such a good, but a counterfeit virtue. Even so, as Augustine
says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "the prudence of the miser, whereby he
devises various roads to gain, is no true virtue; nor the miser's
justice, whereby he scorns the property of another through fear of
severe punishment; nor the miser's temperance, whereby he curbs his
desire for expensive pleasures; nor the miser's fortitude, whereby as
Horace, says, 'he braves the sea, he crosses mountains, he goes through
fire, in order to avoid poverty'" (Epis. lib, 1; Ep. i, 45). If, on the
other hand, this particular good be a true good, for instance the
welfare of the state, or the like, it will indeed be a true virtue,
imperfect, however, unless it be referred to the final and perfect
good. Accordingly no strictly true virtue is possible without charity.
Reply to Objection 1: The act of one lacking charity may be of two
kinds; one is in accordance with his lack of charity, as when he does
something that is referred to that whereby he lacks charity. Such an
act is always evil: thus Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3) that the
actions which an unbeliever performs as an unbeliever, are always
sinful, even when he clothes the naked, or does any like thing, and
directs it to his unbelief as end.
There is, however, another act of one lacking charity, not in
accordance with his lack of charity, but in accordance with his
possession of some other gift of God, whether faith, or hope, or even
his natural good, which is not completely taken away by sin, as stated
above (Q[10], A[4]; [2509]FS, Q[85], A[2]). In this way it is possible
for an act, without charity, to be generically good, but not perfectly
good, because it lacks its due order to the last end.
Reply to Objection 2: Since the end is in practical matters, what the
principle is in speculative matters, just as there can be no strictly
true science, if a right estimate of the first indemonstrable principle
be lacking, so, there can be no strictly true justice, or chastity,
without that due ordering to the end, which is effected by charity,
however rightly a man may be affected about other matters.
Reply to Objection 3: Science and art of their very nature imply a
relation to some particular good, and not to the ultimate good of human
life, as do the moral virtues, which make man good simply, as stated
above ([2510]FS, Q[56] , A[3]). Hence the comparison fails.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether charity is the form of the virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the true form of the
virtues. Because the form of a thing is either exemplar or essential.
Now charity is not the exemplar form of the other virtues, since it
would follow that the other virtues are of the same species as charity:
nor is it the essential form of the other virtues, since then it would
not be distinct from them. Therefore it is in no way the form of the
virtues.
Objection 2: Further, charity is compared to the other virtues as their
root and foundation, according to Eph. 3:17: "Rooted and founded in
charity. " Now a root or foundation is not the form, but rather the
matter of a thing, since it is the first part in the making. Therefore
charity is not the form of the virtues.
Objection 3: Further, formal, final, and efficient causes do not
coincide with one another (Phys. ii, 7). Now charity is called the end
and the mother of the virtues. Therefore it should not be called their
form.
On the contrary, Ambrose [*Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 23] says that charity
is the form of the virtues.
I answer that, In morals the form of an act is taken chiefly from the
end. The reason of this is that the principal of moral acts is the
will, whose object and form, so to speak, are the end. Now the form of
an act always follows from a form of the agent. Consequently, in
morals, that which gives an act its order to the end, must needs give
the act its form. Now it is evident, in accordance with what has been
said [2511](A[7]), that it is charity which directs the acts of all
other virtues to the last end, and which, consequently, also gives the
form to all other acts of virtue: and it is precisely in this sense
that charity is called the form of the virtues, for these are called
virtues in relation to "informed" acts.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity is called the form of the other virtues
not as being their exemplar or their essential form, but rather by way
of efficient cause, in so far as it sets the form on all, in the
aforesaid manner.
Reply to Objection 2: Charity is compared to the foundation or root in
so far as all other virtues draw their sustenance and nourishment
therefrom, and not in the sense that the foundation and root have the
character of a material cause.
Reply to Objection 3: Charity is said to be the end of other virtues,
because it directs all other virtues to its own end. And since a mother
is one who conceives within herself and by another, charity is called
the mother of the other virtues, because, by commanding them, it
conceives the acts of the other virtues, by the desire of the last end.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE SUBJECT OF CHARITY (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider charity in relation to its subject, under which
head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether charity is in the will as its subject?
(2) Whether charity is caused in man by preceding acts or by a Divine
infusion?
(3) Whether it is infused according to the capacity of our natural
gifts?
(4) Whether it increases in the person who has it?
(5) Whether it increases by addition?
(6) Whether it increases by every act?
(7) Whether it increases indefinitely?
(8) Whether the charity of a wayfarer can be perfect?
(9) Of the various degrees of charity;
(10) Whether charity can diminish?
(11) Whether charity can be lost after it has been possessed?
(12) Whether it is lost through one mortal sin?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the will is the subject of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not the subject of charity.
For charity is a kind of love. Now, according to the Philosopher
(Topic. ii, 3) love is in the concupiscible part. Therefore charity is
also in the concupiscible and not in the will.
Objection 2: Further, charity is the foremost of the virtues, as stated
above ([2512]Q[23], A[6]). But the reason is the subject of virtue.
Therefore it seems that charity is in the reason and not in the will.
Objection 3: Further, charity extends to all human acts, according to 1
Cor. 16:14: "Let all your things be done in charity. " Now the principle
of human acts is the free-will. Therefore it seems that charity is
chiefly in the free-will as its subject and not in the will.
On the contrary, The object of charity is the good, which is also the
object of the will. Therefore charity is in the will as its subject.
I answer that, Since, as stated in the [2513]FP, Q[80], A[2], the
appetite is twofold, namely the sensitive, and the intellective which
is called the will, the object of each is the good, but in different
ways: for the object of the sensitive appetite is a good apprehended by
sense, whereas the object of the intellective appetite or will is good
under the universal aspect of good, according as it can be apprehended
by the intellect. Now the object of charity is not a sensible good, but
the Divine good which is known by the intellect alone. Therefore the
subject of charity is not the sensitive, but the intellective appetite,
i. e. the will.
Reply to Objection 1: The concupiscible is a part of the sensitive, not
of the intellective appetite, as proved in the [2514]FP, Q[81], A[2]:
wherefore the love which is in the concupiscible, is the love of
sensible good: nor can the concupiscible reach to the Divine good which
is an intelligible good; the will alone can. Consequently the
concupiscible cannot be the subject of charity.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9),
the will also is in the reason: wherefore charity is not excluded from
the reason through being in the will. Yet charity is regulated, not by
the reason, as human virtues are, but by God's wisdom, and transcends
the rule of human reason, according to Eph. 3:19: "The charity of
Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge. " Hence it is not in the reason,
either as its subject, like prudence is, or as its rule, like justice
and temperance are, but only by a certain kinship of the will to the
reason.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in the [2515]FP, Q[83], A[4], the
free-will is not a distinct power from the will. Yet charity is not in
the will considered as free-will, the act of which is to choose. For
choice is of things directed to the end, whereas the will is of the end
itself (Ethic. iii, 2). Hence charity, whose object is the last end,
should be described as residing in the will rather than in the
free-will.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether charity is caused in us by infusion?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not caused in us by
infusion. For that which is common to all creatures, is in man
naturally. Now, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), the "Divine
good", which is the object of charity, "is for all an object of
dilection and love. " Therefore charity is in us naturally, and not by
infusion.
Objection 2: Further, the more lovable a thing is the easier it is to
love it. Now God is supremely lovable, since He is supremely good.
Therefore it is easier to love Him than other things. But we need no
infused habit in order to love other things. Neither, therefore, do we
need one in order to love God.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): "The end of the
commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an
unfeigned faith. " Now these three have reference to human acts.
Therefore charity is caused in us from preceding acts, and not from
infusion.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:5): "The charity of God is
poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us. "
I answer that, As stated above ([2516]Q[23], A[1]), charity is a
friendship of man for God, founded upon the fellowship of everlasting
happiness. Now this fellowship is in respect, not of natural, but of
gratuitous gifts, for, according to Rom. 6:23, "the grace of God is
life everlasting": wherefore charity itself surpasses our natural
facilities. Now that which surpasses the faculty of nature, cannot be
natural or acquired by the natural powers, since a natural effect does
not transcend its cause.
Therefore charity can be in us neither naturally, nor through
acquisition by the natural powers, but by the infusion of the Holy
Ghost, Who is the love of the Father and the Son, and the participation
of Whom in us is created charity, as stated above ([2517]Q[23], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius is speaking of the love of God, which
is founded on the fellowship of natural goods, wherefore it is in all
naturally. On the other hand, charity is founded on a supernatural
fellowship, so the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as God is supremely knowable in Himself yet
not to us, on account of a defect in our knowledge which depends on
sensible things, so too, God is supremely lovable in Himself, in as
much as He is the object of happiness. But He is not supremely lovable
to us in this way, on account of the inclination of our appetite
towards visible goods. Hence it is evident that for us to love God
above all things in this way, it is necessary that charity be infused
into our hearts.
Reply to Objection 3: When it is said that in us charity proceeds from
"a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith," this
must be referred to the act of charity which is aroused by these
things. Or again, this is said because the aforesaid acts dispose man
to receive the infusion of charity. The same remark applies to the
saying of Augustine (Tract. ix in prim. canon. Joan. ): "Fear leads to
charity," and of a gloss on Mat. 1:2: "Faith begets hope, and hope
charity. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether charity is infused according to the capacity of our natural gifts?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is infused according to the
capacity of our natural gifts. For it is written (Mat. 25:15) that "He
gave to every one according to his own virtue [Douay: 'proper
ability']. " Now, in man, none but natural virtue precedes charity,
since there is no virtue without charity, as stated above ([2518]Q[23],
A[7]). Therefore God infuses charity into man according to the measure
of his natural virtue.
Objection 2: Further, among things ordained towards one another, the
second is proportionate to the first: thus we find in natural things
that the form is proportionate to the matter, and in gratuitous gifts,
that glory is proportionate to grace. Now, since charity is a
perfection of nature, it is compared to the capacity of nature as
second to first. Therefore it seems that charity is infused according
to the capacity of nature.
Objection 3: Further, men and angels partake of happiness according to
the same measure, since happiness is alike in both, according to Mat.
22:30 and Lk. 20:36. Now charity and other gratuitous gifts are
bestowed on the angels, according to their natural capacity, as the
Master teaches (Sent. ii, D, 3). Therefore the same apparently applies
to man.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 3:8): "The Spirit breatheth where
He will," and (1 Cor. 12:11): "All these things one and the same Spirit
worketh, dividing to every one according as He will. " Therefore charity
is given, not according to our natural capacity, but according as the
Spirit wills to distribute His gifts.
I answer that, The quantity of a thing depends on the proper cause of
that thing, since the more universal cause produces a greater effect.
Now, since charity surpasses the proportion of human nature, as stated
above [2519](A[2]) it depends, not on any natural virtue, but on the
sole grace of the Holy Ghost Who infuses charity. Wherefore the
quantity of charity depends neither on the condition of nature nor on
the capacity of natural virtue, but only on the will of the Holy Ghost
Who "divides" His gifts "according as He will. " Hence the Apostle says
(Eph. 4:7): "To every one of us is given grace according to the measure
of the giving of Christ. "
Reply to Objection 1: The virtue in accordance with which God gives His
gifts to each one, is a disposition or previous preparation or effort
of the one who receives grace. But the Holy Ghost forestalls even this
disposition or effort, by moving man's mind either more or less,
according as He will. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col. 1:12): "Who hath
made us worthy to be partakers of the lot of the saints in light. "
Reply to Objection 2: The form does not surpass the proportion of the
matter. In like manner grace and glory are referred to the same genus,
for grace is nothing else than a beginning of glory in us. But charity
and nature do not belong to the same genus, so that the comparison
fails.
Reply to Objection 3: The angel's is an intellectual nature, and it is
consistent with his condition that he should be borne wholly
whithersoever he is borne, as stated in the FP, Q[61], A[6].
Hence
there was a greater effort in the higher angels, both for good in those
who persevered, and for evil in those who fell, and consequently those
of the higher angels who remained steadfast became better than the
others, and those who fell became worse. But man's is a rational
nature, with which it is consistent to be sometimes in potentiality and
sometimes in act: so that it is not necessarily borne wholly
whithersoever it is borne, and where there are greater natural gifts
there may be less effort, and vice versa. Thus the comparison fails.
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Whether charity can increase?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity cannot increase. For nothing
increases save what has quantity. Now quantity is twofold, namely
dimensive and virtual. The former does not befit charity which is a
spiritual perfection, while virtual quantity regards the objects in
respect of which charity does not increase, since the slightest charity
loves all that is to be loved out of charity. Therefore charity does
not increase.
Objection 2: Further, that which consists in something extreme receives
no increase. But charity consists in something extreme, being the
greatest of the virtues, and the supreme love of the greatest good.
Therefore charity cannot increase.
Objection 3: Further, increase is a kind of movement. Therefore
wherever there is increase there is movement, and if there be increase
of essence there is movement of essence. Now there is no movement of
essence save either by corruption or generation. Therefore charity
cannot increase essentially, unless it happen to be generated anew or
corrupted, which is unreasonable.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. lxxiv in Joan. ) [*Cf. Ep.
clxxxv. ] that "charity merits increase that by increase it may merit
perfection. "
I answer that, The charity of a wayfarer can increase. For we are
called wayfarers by reason of our being on the way to God, Who is the
last end of our happiness. In this way we advance as we get nigh to
God, Who is approached, "not by steps of the body but by the affections
of the soul" [*St. Augustine, Tract. in Joan. xxxii]: and this approach
is the result of charity, since it unites man's mind to God.
Consequently it is essential to the charity of a wayfarer that it can
increase, for if it could not, all further advance along the way would
cease. Hence the Apostle calls charity the way, when he says (1 Cor.
12:31): "I show unto you yet a more excellent way. "
Reply to Objection 1: Charity is not subject to dimensive, but only to
virtual quantity: and the latter depends not only on the number of
objects, namely whether they be in greater number or of greater
excellence, but also on the intensity of the act, namely whether a
thing is loved more, or less; it is in this way that the virtual
quantity of charity increases.
Reply to Objection 2: Charity consists in an extreme with regard to its
object, in so far as its object is the Supreme Good, and from this it
follows that charity is the most excellent of the virtues. Yet not
every charity consists in an extreme, as regards the intensity of the
act.
Reply to Objection 3: Some have said that charity does not increase in
its essence, but only as to its radication in its subject, or according
to its fervor.
But these people did not know what they were talking about. For since
charity is an accident, its being is to be in something. So that an
essential increase of charity means nothing else but that it is yet
more in its subject, which implies a greater radication in its subject.
Furthermore, charity is essentially a virtue ordained to act, so that
an essential increase of charity implies ability to produce an act of
more fervent love. Hence charity increases essentially, not by
beginning anew, or ceasing to be in its subject, as the objection
imagines, but by beginning to be more and more in its subject.
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Whether charity increases by addition?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity increases by addition. For just
as increase may be in respect of bodily quantity, so may it be
according to virtual quantity. Now increase in bodily quantity results
from addition; for the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5) that "increase
is addition to pre-existing magnitude. " Therefore the increase of
charity which is according to virtual quantity is by addition.
Objection 2: Further, charity is a kind of spiritual light in the soul,
according to 1 Jn. 2:10: "He that loveth his brother abideth in the
light. " Now light increases in the air by addition; thus the light in a
house increases when another candle is lit. Therefore charity also
increases in the soul by addition.
Objection 3: Further, the increase of charity is God's work, even as
the causing of it, according to 2 Cor. 9:10: "He will increase the
growth of the fruits of your justice. " Now when God first infuses
charity, He puts something in the soul that was not there before.
Therefore also, when He increases charity, He puts something there
which was not there before. Therefore charity increases by addition.
On the contrary, Charity is a simple form. Now nothing greater results
from the addition of one simple thing to another, as proved in Phys.
iii, text. 59, and Metaph. ii, 4. Therefore charity does not increase
by addition.
I answer that, Every addition is of something to something else: so
that in every addition we must at least presuppose that the things
added together are distinct before the addition. Consequently if
charity be added to charity, the added charity must be presupposed as
distinct from charity to which it is added, not necessarily by a
distinction of reality, but at least by a distinction of thought. For
God is able to increase a bodily quantity by adding a magnitude which
did not exist before, but was created at that very moment; which
magnitude, though not pre-existent in reality, is nevertheless capable
of being distinguished from the quantity to which it is added.
Wherefore if charity be added to charity we must presuppose the
distinction, at least logical, of the one charity from the other.
Now distinction among forms is twofold: specific and numeric. Specific
distinction of habits follows diversity of objects, while numeric
distinction follows distinction of subjects. Consequently a habit may
receive increase through extending to objects to which it did not
extend before: thus the science of geometry increases in one who
acquires knowledge of geometrical matters which he ignored hitherto.
But this cannot be said of charity, for even the slightest charity
extends to all that we have to love by charity. Hence the addition
which causes an increase of charity cannot be understood, as though the
added charity were presupposed to be distinct specifically from that to
which it is added.
It follows therefore that if charity be added to charity, we must
presuppose a numerical distinction between them, which follows a
distinction of subjects: thus whiteness receives an increase when one
white thing is added to another, although such an increase does not
make a thing whiter. This, however, does not apply to the case in
point, since the subject of charity is none other than the rational
mind, so that such like an increase of charity could only take place by
one rational mind being added to another; which is impossible.
Moreover, even if it were possible, the result would be a greater
lover, but not a more loving one. It follows, therefore, that charity
can by no means increase by addition of charity to charity, as some
have held to be the case.
Accordingly charity increases only by its subject partaking of charity
more and more subject thereto. For this is the proper mode of increase
in a form that is intensified, since the being of such a form consists
wholly in its adhering to its subject. Consequently, since the
magnitude of a thing follows on its being, to say that a form is
greater is the same as to say that it is more in its subject, and not
that another form is added to it: for this would be the case if the
form, of itself, had any quantity, and not in comparison with its
subject. Therefore charity increases by being intensified in its
subject, and this is for charity to increase in its essence; and not by
charity being added to charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Bodily quantity has something as quantity, and
something else, in so far as it is an accidental form. As quantity, it
is distinguishable in respect of position or number, and in this way we
have the increase of magnitude by addition, as may be seen in animals.
But in so far as it is an accidental form, it is distinguishable only
in respect of its subject, and in this way it has its proper increase,
like other accidental forms, by way of intensity in its subject, for
instance in things subject to rarefaction, as is proved in Phys. iv, 9.
In like manner science, as a habit, has its quantity from its objects,
and accordingly it increases by addition, when a man knows more things;
and again, as an accidental form, it has a certain quantity through
being in its subject, and in this way it increase in a man who knows
the same scientific truths with greater certainty now than before. In
the same way charity has a twofold quantity; but with regard to that
which it has from its object, it does not increase, as stated above:
hence it follows that it increases solely by being intensified.
Reply to Objection 2: The addition of light to light can be understood
through the light being intensified in the air on account of there
being several luminaries giving light: but this distinction does not
apply to the case in point, since there is but one luminary shedding
forth the light of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: The infusion of charity denotes a change to the
state of "having" charity from the state of "not having it," so that
something must needs come which was not there before. On the other
hand, the increase of charity denotes a change to "more having" from
"less having," so that there is need, not for anything to be there that
was not there before, but for something to be more there that
previously was less there. This is what God does when He increases
charity, that is He makes it to have a greater hold on the soul, and
the likeness of the Holy Ghost to be more perfectly participated by the
soul.
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Whether charity increases through every act of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity increases through every act of
charity. For that which can do what is more, can do what is less. But
every act of charity can merit everlasting life; and this is more than
a simple addition of charity, since it includes the perfection of
charity. Much more, therefore, does every act of charity increase
charity.
Objection 2: Further, just as the habits of acquired virtue are
engendered by acts, so too an increase of charity is caused by an act
of charity. Now each virtuous act conduces to the engendering of
virtue. Therefore also each virtuous act of charity conduces to the
increase of charity.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory [*St. Bernard, Serm. ii in Festo Purif. ]
says that "to stand still in the way to God is to go back. " Now no man
goes back when he is moved by an act of charity. Therefore whoever is
moved by an act of charity goes forward in the way to God. Therefore
charity increases through every act of charity.
On the contrary, The effect does not surpass the power of its cause.
But an act of charity is sometimes done with tepidity or slackness.
Therefore it does not conduce to a more excellent charity, rather does
it dispose one to a lower degree.
I answer that, The spiritual increase of charity is somewhat like the
increase of a body. Now bodily increase in animals and plants is not a
continuous movement, so that, to wit, if a thing increase so much in so
much time, it need to increase proportionally in each part of that
time, as happens in local movement; but for a certain space of time
nature works by disposing for the increase, without causing any actual
increase, and afterwards brings into effect that to which it had
disposed, by giving the animal or plant an actual increase. In like
manner charity does not actually increase through every act of charity,
but each act of charity disposes to an increase of charity, in so far
as one act of charity makes man more ready to act again according to
charity, and this readiness increasing, man breaks out into an act of
more fervent love, and strives to advance in charity, and then his
charity increases actually.
Reply to Objection 1: Every act of charity merits everlasting life,
which, however, is not to be bestowed then and there, but at its proper
time. In like manner every act of charity merits an increase of
charity; yet this increase does not take place at once, but when we
strive for that increase.
Reply to Objection 2: Even when an acquired virtue is being engendered,
each act does not complete the formation of the virtue, but conduces
towards that effect by disposing to it, while the last act, which is
the most perfect, and acts in virtue of all those that preceded it,
reduces the virtue into act, just as when many drops hollow out a
stone.
Reply to Objection 3: Man advances in the way to God, not merely by
actual increase of charity, but also by being disposed to that
increase.
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Whether charity increases indefinitely?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity does not increase indefinitely.
For every movement is towards some end and term, as stated in Metaph.
ii, text. 8,9. But the increase of charity is a movement. Therefore it
tends to an end and term. Therefore charity does not increase
indefinitely.
Objection 2: Further, no form surpasses the capacity of its subject.
But the capacity of the rational creature who is the subject of charity
is finite. Therefore charity cannot increase indefinitely.
Objection 3: Further, every finite thing can, by continual increase,
attain to the quantity of another finite thing however much greater,
unless the amount of its increase be ever less and less. Thus the
Philosopher states (Phys. iii, 6) that if we divide a line into an
indefinite number of parts, and take these parts away and add them
indefinitely to another line, we shall never arrive at any definite
quantity resulting from those two lines, viz. the one from which we
subtracted and the one to which we added what was subtracted. But this
does not occur in the case in point: because there is no need for the
second increase of charity to be less than the first, since rather is
it probable that it would be equal or greater. As, therefore, the
charity of the blessed is something finite, if the charity of the
wayfarer can increase indefinitely, it would follow that the charity of
the way can equal the charity of heaven; which is absurd. Therefore the
wayfarer's charity cannot increase indefinitely.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): "Not as though I had
already attained, or were already perfect; but I follow after, if I
may, by any means apprehend," on which words a gloss says: "Even if he
has made great progress, let none of the faithful say: 'Enough. ' For
whosoever says this, leaves the road before coming to his destination. "
Therefore the wayfarer's charity can ever increase more and more.
I answer that, A term to the increase of a form may be fixed in three
ways: first by reason of the form itself having a fixed measure, and
when this has been reached it is no longer possible to go any further
in that form, but if any further advance is made, another form is
attained. And example of this is paleness, the bounds of which may, by
continual alteration, be passed, either so that whiteness ensues, or so
that blackness results. Secondly, on the part of the agent, whose power
does not extend to a further increase of the form in its subject.
Thirdly, on the part of the subject, which is not capable of ulterior
perfection.
Now, in none of these ways, is a limit imposed to the increase of man's
charity, while he is in the state of the wayfarer. For charity itself
considered as such has no limit to its increase, since it is a
participation of the infinite charity which is the Holy Ghost. In like
manner the cause of the increase of charity, viz. God, is possessed of
infinite power. Furthermore, on the part of its subject, no limit to
this increase can be determined, because whenever charity increases,
there is a corresponding increased ability to receive a further
increase. It is therefore evident that it is not possible to fix any
limits to the increase of charity in this life.
Reply to Objection 1: The increase of charity is directed to an end,
which is not in this, but in a future life.
Reply to Objection 2: The capacity of the rational creature is
increased by charity, because the heart is enlarged thereby, according
to 2 Cor. 6:11: "Our heart is enlarged"; so that it still remains
capable of receiving a further increase.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument holds good in those things which
have the same kind of quantity, but not in those which have different
kinds: thus however much a line may increase it does not reach the
quantity of a superficies. Now the quantity of a wayfarer's charity
which follows the knowledge of faith is not of the same kind as the
quantity of the charity of the blessed, which follows open vision.
Hence the argument does not prove.
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Whether charity can be perfect in this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity cannot be perfect in this life.
For this would have been the case with the apostles before all others.
Yet it was not so, since the Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): "Not as though
I had already attained, or were already perfect. " Therefore charity
cannot be perfect in this life.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that
"whatever kindles charity quenches cupidity, but where charity is
perfect, cupidity is done away altogether. " But this cannot be in this
world, wherein it is impossible to live without sin, according to 1 Jn.
1:8: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves. " Now all sin
arises from some inordinate cupidity. Therefore charity cannot be
perfect in this life.
Objection 3: Further, what is already perfect cannot be perfected any
more. But in this life charity can always increase, as stated above
[2520](A[7]). Therefore charity cannot be perfect in this life.
On the contrary, Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. v)
"Charity is perfected by being strengthened; and when it has been
brought to perfection, it exclaims, 'I desire to be dissolved and to be
with Christ. '" Now this is possible in this life, as in the case of
Paul. Therefore charity can be perfect in this life.
I answer that, The perfection of charity may be understood in two ways:
first with regard to the object loved, secondly with regard to the
person who loves. With regard to the object loved, charity is perfect,
if the object be loved as much as it is lovable. Now God is as lovable
as He is good, and His goodness is infinite, wherefore He is infinitely
lovable. But no creature can love Him infinitely since all created
power is finite. Consequently no creature's charity can be perfect in
this way; the charity of God alone can, whereby He loves Himself.
On the part of the person who loves, charity is perfect, when he loves
as much as he can. This happens in three ways. First, so that a man's
whole heart is always actually borne towards God: this is the
perfection of the charity of heaven, and is not possible in this life,
wherein, by reason of the weakness of human life, it is impossible to
think always actually of God, and to be moved by love towards Him.
Secondly, so that man makes an earnest endeavor to give his time to God
and Divine things, while scorning other things except in so far as the
needs of the present life demand. This is the perfection of charity
that is possible to a wayfarer; but is not common to all who have
charity. Thirdly, so that a man gives his whole heart to God
habitually, viz. by neither thinking nor desiring anything contrary to
the love of God; and this perfection is common to all who have charity.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle denies that he has the perfection of
heaven, wherefore a gloss on the same passage says that "he was a
perfect wayfarer, but had not yet achieved the perfection to which the
way leads. "
Reply to Objection 2: This is said on account of venial sins, which are
contrary, not to the habit, but to the act of charity: hence they are
incompatible, not with the perfection of the way, but with that of
heaven.
Reply to Objection 3: The perfection of the way is not perfection
simply, wherefore it can always increase.
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Whether charity is rightly distinguished into three degrees, beginning,
progress, and perfection?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting to distinguish three degrees of
charity, beginning, progress, and perfection. For there are many
degrees between the beginning of charity and its ultimate perfection.
Therefore it is not right to put only one.
Objection 2: Further, charity begins to progress as soon as it begins
to be. Therefore we ought not to distinguish between charity as
progressing and as beginning.
Objection 3: Further, in this world, however perfect a man's charity
may be, it can increase, as stated above [2521](A[7]). Now for charity
to increase is to progress. Therefore perfect charity ought not to be
distinguished from progressing charity: and so the aforesaid degrees
are unsuitably assigned to charity.
On the contrary, Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan.
