These hills are steep, rocky
and covered with such enormous boulders that they are almost un-
climbable.
and covered with such enormous boulders that they are almost un-
climbable.
Cambridge History of India - v4 - Mugul Period
In fact, the emperor's spirit was now up;
as the Karwar factors wrote: "He is so inveterate against the Raja
that he hath thrown off his pagri and sworn never to put it on again,
till he hath either killed, taken, or routed him out of his country. ”
Khan Jahan gave the Marathas a long and hot chase from Nander
and Bidar to Chanda and the Qutb Shahi frontier. A'zam campaigned
for one year in the north Bijapur territory, capturing Dharur. In his
absence his camp was attacked by the Marathas, but, inspired by his
heroic wife Jahanzib Banu, the Hara Rajput guards repulsed the
enemy, though losing 900 of their own men.
But nothing decisive was achieved by the Mughuls in 1682, and all
their detachments were recalled to the emperor's side in April, 1683.
His distrust of his sons and generals led him to follow a barren
policy of waiting and vacillation. “The king's mind. . . is continually
wavering and he is extraordinarily peevish and uneasy because of
Sultan Akbar. Sultan A'zam, (his) Begam, and Dilir Khan degraded
for even nothing but only suspected, without any grounds, of being
kind to Akbar" (Surat Factory letter).
But just at this time came a happy diversion for the Mughuls. In
April, 1683, Shambhuji began an invasion of Portuguese territory
which occupied all his forces till the next January, when he was glad
to make peace by the mutual restitution of conquests. In the mean-
time prince Akbar had realised that the Maratha king would do
nothing for him; his heart grew sick of hope deferred, and he decided
## p. 283 (#317) ############################################
CAMPAIGNS AGAINST SHAMBHUJI
283
to leave Maharashtra, go to Portuguese territory and there charter
a ship for conveying him to Persia for refuge. In January, 1683,
he left Pali and took up his residence at Banda, and then (in Septem-
ber) at Bicholim, very close to Goa. In November he bought a ship
and embarked at Vingurla, but Durga Das and Kavi-Kalash arrived
there with fresh promises of armed support from Shambhuji and
induced him to give up this attempt to sail to Persia. Throughout
1684 Akbar lived in the Ratnagiri district as Shambhuji's unwilling
guest, but unable to make any successful dash into his father's terri-
tory. In fact, Shambhuji was now too deeply sunk in vice and his
government was too disturbed by the jealousy of the local nobles
against the raja's all-powerful “foreign” favourite Kavi-Kalash (a
Kanaujiya Brahman) and the frequent rebellions among his vassals
and court conspiracies against his life, so that the Maratha power
ceased to count in Indian politics. There were many desertions of
Maratha officers and nobles to the Mughul side, and the whole west
coast was up in arms against Shambhuji.
A fresh Mughul offensive was launched at the end of September,
1683; Aurangzib himself advanced from Aurangabad to Ahmadnagar,
while strong divisions were posted at Poona, Nasik and Akalkot, and
the Sidi cruised off Vingurla to watch Akbar's movements. But the
main attack was entrusted to a grand army led by Shah 'Alam into
the south Konkan by the Ramghat pass (between Goa and Belgaum).
After conquering many places in the Belgaum district, this prince
crossed the pass and descended into Savantvadi. At Bicholim (15
January, 1684) he destroyed the mansions and gardens of Shambhuji
and Akbar and then moved to the neighbourhood of Goa, the invasion
of which was immediately abandoned by the Marathas. But the
prince, coming as a deliverer, plotted to seize Goa by treachery; this
fatal policy set the Portuguese against him and they stopped his
grain supply by sea. The prince next marched northwards, sacking
and burning Malyan, Kudal, Banda and Vingurla in this region, and
then returned to the river bank north of Goa. Famine stopped his
further progress. No corn could be procured locally and none was
allowed to come to him by sea from Surat. So, the baffled prince
returned to the Ramghat pass on 1 March. Here a pestilence of such
virulence spread that in one week a third of his men died, besides
an even larger proportion of transport animals. This failure of trans-
port led to a second famine, and more men perished of heat and thirst.
The miserable remnant of the army crossed the pass and reached
Ahmadnagar (28 May) without having done anything except burning
a few villages and robbing a few towns, at the expense of half its
strength.
The Mughul campaign in the first half of 1684 was highly successful
in other quarters; many Maratha forts were taken, their field armies
repeatedly defeated, and much of their territory annexed, while
## p. 284 (#318) ############################################
284
AURANGZIB (1681-1707)
a
many of their captains came over to the imperial side. The sieges of
Bijapur and Golconda, however, relieved the pressure on the
Marathas during 1685-87. Prince Akbar, thoroughly despairing of
any success or even safety in India, sailed from Rajapur in February,
1637, and reached the Persian court in January, 1688, after some
months' detention by the Sultan of Muscat, who tried to sell him to
Aurangzib.
While Shambhuji was absorbed in drinking and merry-making with
a small escort and in utter carelessness at Sangameshwar, twenty-two
miles from Ratnagiri, he was surprised and captured by an energetic
Mughul officer named Muqarrab Khan, who had made a forced march
from Kolhapur. With him were captured his minister Kavi-Kalash
and twenty-five of his chief followers (11 February, 1689). At Baha-
durgarh, the two chief captives were brought to the imperial camp
and publicly paraded dressed as buffoons with drum and trumpet.
Shambhujj was offered his life if he would give up his forts and
divulge the hiding-places of his treasures; but he loosened his tongue
in scurrilous abuse of the emperor and his Prophet and asked for one
of his daughters to be given to him. After being tortured and
mutilated for twenty-four days, Shambhuji and Kavi-Kalash were
hacked to pieces limb by limb on 21 March.
After the capture of Shambhuji his younger brother Raja Ram was
crowned by the ministers at Raigarh (18 February). But, soon after-
wards, an imperial army under I'tiqad Khan (afterwards Zu-'l-Fiqar
Khan, Nusrat Jang) laid siege to this Maratha capital, and Raja Ram
slipped out of it disguised as a religious mendicant (15 April), and
finally, after many adventures, made his way to Gingee (11 Novem-
ber). In the meantime Raigarh capitulated on 29 October, and the
Mughuls seized there the surviving ladies of the Maratha royal family
and Shambhuji's children, including Shahu, a boy of seven. These
were detained in Aurangzib's camp with every respect and privacy.
Thus by the end of 1689 Aurangzib became the unrivalled lord para-
mount of northern India and the Deccan alike; but it was the
beginning of his end.
For four years after Dilir Khan's failure (February, 1680) nothing
decisive was done by the Mughuls against Bijapur, as they were busy
opposing Shambhuji and Akbar. Prince A'zam's campaign (1682-83)
was languidly conducted in the region north of the Nira river;
thereafter even these desultory attacks ceased. In the meantime the
conditions of the Adil Shahi government grew hopeless. Mas'ud
resigned his post as minister in despair and disgust early in 1684, and
his successor Aqa Khusrav died after six months of office (21 October).
The leadership of the state then fell to Sharza Khan (a Mahdavi
Sayyid) and 'Abdur-Rauf (Afghan). The Mughuls then resumed the
appropriation of bits of the 'Adil Shahi kingdom and established
their own outposts in these; Mangalvide and Sangola. were gained:
## p. 285 (#319) ############################################
LAST SIEGE OF BIJAPUR
285
in May, 1684. Although a rupture between the two powers now seemed
imminent and some acrimonious letters were exchanged, war did not
actually break out until some months afterwards, and Aurangzib
continued to send friendly letters and robes of honour to the 'Adil
Shahi court. But both sides used the interval in preparing for war,
and on 11 April, 1685, the last Mughul siege of Bijapur began. Ruh-
ullah Khan and Qasim Khan opened their trenches on the Shahpur
or north-western side, half a mile from the fort wall, while Khan
Jahan ran his approaches from the Rasulpur or western suburb.
Prince A'zam arrived on 24 June and took over the supreme con-
mand, encamping at the Begam Hauz, south of the city.
The Mughuls were slow and clumsy in conducting regular sieges;
the soil round Bijapur is extremely hard, and therefore the besiegers
made no real progress even after fifteen months of labour. The fort
was not fully invested; the soldiers sallied out and returned whenever
they liked; and allies flocked to 'Adil Shah, from Mas'ud (now semi-
independent chief of Adoni), Qutb Shah and Shambhuji. A'zam had
to fight three severe battles in less than a month; his grain supply
was totally stopped and a famine raged in his camp. But as he refused
to retire, even when commanded by Aurangzib, the emperor sent
him provisions, reinforcements and money under the escort of Ghazi-
ud-din (Firuz Jang), who ably fought his way to the famished army
and “turned the scarcity into plenty” (end of October). Firuz Jang
next intercepted and cut off a force of 6000 Berad infantry, each with
a
a bag of provisions on his head, whom Pam Nayak tried to smuggle
into the fort. At this time the Mughul capture of Hyderabad and
the flight of its king to Golconda cut off all hope of aid to Bijapur
being received from that side.
· But discord and mutual jealousy among the Mughul commanders
thwarted their efforts. So the emperor himself went to Bijapur
(13 July, 1686) and pressed the siege vigorously. The fort was com-
pletely invested and the friends of the garrison in his camp were
crushed. The sufferings of the Bijapuris were aggravated by a famine
which was then raging in the Deccan on account of the failure of
the annual rains. Countless men and horses died within the fort,
and from the lack of horses the Deccanis could not follow their
favourite tactics of hovering round the invaders and cutting off their
stragglers and transport. But even then the Mughuls could neither
make any practicable breach in the walls nor fill up the broad and
deepmoat. On 14 September Aurangzib advanced his tent from
two miles in the rear to a place immediately behind the siege trenches,
and next day rode to the edge of the moat to inspect his raised
battery.
And now the garrison lost heart; the future looked absolutely
dark to them, and their ranks had been thinned to 2000 men, while
no help was to be expected from outside. Their two leading nobles
## p. 286 (#320) ############################################
286
AURANGZIB (1681-1707)
1
arranged the terms of surrender, which Aurangzib readily granted.
On 22 September, 1686, Sikandar, the last of the 'Adil Shahs, left
the capital of his ancestors and waited on Aurangzib in his camp at
Rasulpur. He was very kindly received and enrolled among the
Mughul peers with the lesser title of Khan (instead of Shah), and an
annual pension of 100,000 rupees was settled upon him. All the Bija-
puri officers were taken over into Mughul service. On the 29th,
Aurangzib entered the fallen city through the southern or Mangali
gate (henceforth to be called the "Gate of Victory”, Fath Darwaza).
In the 'Adil Shahi palace and the “Relic Shrine” (Asar-i-sharif) he
erased all pictures drawn in violation of the Quranic law and all
Shiah inscriptions. The Kingdom was ordered to be styled Dar-uz-
Zafar. Complete desolation settled upon the city of Bijapur after the
fall of its independent dynasty; from a proud capital it became merely
the headquarters city of one of the numerous provinces of the Mughul
empire; its nobility decayed and disappeared, and the multitude of
artisans and labourers, poets and scholars, lost their bread. Two years
after its conquest, a terrible bubonic plague swept away more than
half its population, and even the abundant water supply in the city
wells suddenly grew scanty. The city and its once populous suburbs
were deserted and fell into ruin.
After being at first lodged in the state prison of Daulatabad and
then carried about with Aurangzib's camp, Sikandar died outside
Satara fort on 13 April, 1700, not yet thirty-two years of age.
For nearly thirty years after Aurangzib's accession the kingdom of
Golconda enjoyed respite from Mughul attack, because of the pre-
occupation of the Mughuls with the Marathas and 'Adil Shah and
also because Qutb Shah paid his tribute regularly. Abu-'l Hasan
(accession 1672), the last Sultan of this line, resigned his royal func-
tions to his Brahman minister Madanna and shut himself up in his
palace with a host of concubines and dancing-girls. All power in
the state was monopolized by Madanna, his brother Akkanna and
their nephew surnamed Rustam Rao; the administration grew more
and more inefficient and corrupt, and the Muslims complained of
Hindu predominance and their own humiliation in the state. Above
all, Madanna was a staunch supporter of the defensive alliance with
the Marathas for an annual subsidy.
Soon after the Mughul siege of Bijapur had commenced, a letter
from Qutb Shah to his agent in the emperor's camp was intercepted,
in which he called Aurangzib a mean-minded coward for attacking
a helpless young orphan like Sikandar 'Adil Shah, and promised to
send a large army in support of Bijapur. At this Aurangzib sent
Shah Alam with a strong force to seize Hyderabad (July, 1685);
but this division was effectively checked at Malkhed and practically
besieged by a Golconda army for more than two months. There were
frequent fights, in which the Mughuls could make no advance, as
## p. 287 (#321) ############################################
MUGHUL ATTACKS ON QUTB SHAH
287
the enemy greatly outnumbered them; their heavy losses took the
heart out of the imperialists and the rains added to their hardships.
But early in October, the Golconda commander-in-chief, Mir Muham-
mad Ibrahim, was bribed to come over to the Mughuls, and his
disheartened soldiers fled back to their capital.
The defection of the commander-in-chief paralysed the defence
of Hyderabad. Qutb Shah fled precipitately to the fort of Golconda,
leaving all his property behind in Hyderabad. Before Shah Alam
could arrive and restore order in the city (c. 18 October), it presented
the spectacle of a sack after assault by an enemy; indiscriminate
looting and confusion raged in it, and many women and children
were kidnapped and outraged. Qutb Shah then submitted, and at
Shah 'Alam's recommendation the emperor granted him pardon on
the following conditions: (i) the payment of twelve million rupees
in settlement of all past dues and in addition a tribute of two hundred
thousand huns every year, (ii) the dismissal of Madanna and Akkanna,
and (iii) the cession of Malkhed and Seram to the emperor.
Shah Alam halted at Kuhir for some months for the collection of
the war indemnity. Abu-'l Hasan put off the dismissal of Madanna
as long as he could. At this his Muslim nobles and the two dowager
Sultanas formed a plot and caused Madanna and Akkanna to be
murdered in the streets of Golconda (March, 1686). The ministers'
residences were plundered and their families ruined by the Muslim
mob, who next made a general attack on the Hindu quarter, killing
and plundering the Brahmans. Golconda territory was then com-
pletely evacuated by the Mughuls.
But the fall of Bijapur (September, 1686) set the imperialists free
to deal finally with the Qutb Shahi government. On 7 February,
1687, the emperor arrived before Golconda, to which Abu-'l Hasan
had again fled. The Mughuls occupied Hyderabad for the third and
last time. On the first day the Mughuls charged and drove in the
Qutb Shahi soldiers who were assembled in the dry ditch under
shelter of the fort walls. Qilich Khan (the grandfather of the first
Nizam), in trying to enter Golconda pell-mell with these fugitives,
was fatally wounded, and regular siege operations began (17 Febru-
ary). Aurangzib himself encamped north-west of the fort along
the Sholapur road; trenches were opened against the south-eastern
and southern faces of the fort, the Mughul soldiers with the city
behind them moving along both banks of the Musi river.
But the emperor's aims were paralysed by bitter personal jealousies
in his camp. Shah 'Alam was soft-hearted and wished to save Abu-'l
Hasan from destruction. He welcomed Qutb Shah's agents, who
visited him secretly and bribed him to use his influence with the
emperor to get Abu-'l Hasan pardoned and thus rob his brother
A'zam of the credit of capturing Golconda. The emperor, on learning
of these secret negotiations with the enemy, at once put Shah 'Alam
## p. 288 (#322) ############################################
288
AURANGZIB (1681-1707)
and his entire family in prison (3 March), confiscated his property,
and even punished his servants. Every hardship and humiliation
was inflicted upon the prince in his captivity and it was seven years
before he could recover his liberty.
Another cause of discord in the imperial camp was that the many
Shiahs in the imperial service heartily disliked the prospect of the
extinction of the last Shiah kingdom in India and even many orthodox
Sunnis, like the chief Qazis Shaikh-ul-Islam and 'Abdullah, con-
demned the attacks on Bijapur and Golconda as "wars between
Muslims" and therefore sinful. Firuz Jang, a Turk and Sunni, was
at first the leading officer at the siege, and therefore Saf Shikan Khan,
the chief of artillery and a Persian Shiah, after working strenuously
for some time, resigned "in order to spite Firuz Jang”. The next two
chiefs of artillery were utter failures, and then this post, the most
important in a siege, went begging, till at last Saf Shikan Khan was
reinstated (2 July); but by that time the field-works had been de-
molished by the enemy and the investment had to be begun anew.
The fort had an inexhaustible supply of munitions and its walls
bristled with guns of large calibre. Its incessant fire caused heavy
losses to the Mughuls, but they carried the trenches to the edge of
the ditch in six weeks. The ditch however could not be filled up.
At midnight, 26 May, Firuz Jang made an attempt to surprise the
fort by scaling the wall with ladders. But a carrion dog of the fort,
on seeing strangers, set up a loud bark which alarmed the garţison
and the Mughul party had to return without success.
While the siege operations languished, the Mughul army fell into
the grip of famine, as the enemy infested the roads and effectually
stopped the transport of provisions. In June the rain descended in
torrents, turning the roads into quagmires and the camp into a lake,
and completely washing out the trenches and raised batteries. The
enemy seized the opportunity. In the night of 15 June, amidst a
deluge of rain, they raided the Mughul advanced batteries and
trenches, slew the careless gunners, damaged the guns, destroved the
materials and munition, and carried off the chief of artillery (Ghairat
Khan) and thirteen other high officers as prisoners. It was only after
three days of struggle that the Mughuls were able to reoccupy the
lost battery. Meantime, three mines had been carried under the
bastions of the fort and each loaded with heavy charges of gunpowder.
On 30 June, under the emperor's own eyes, the first of them was fired,
but the force of the explosion was directed outwards and the scattered
rock killed 1100 of the densely crowded imperialists. After this the
garrison made a sortie, seized the Mughul trenches and outposts
opposite, and were driven out only after a long contest and heavy
slaughter. Then the second mine was fired with the same disastrous
.
consequences, the Mughuls losing another thousand men. The
enemy immediately made another sortie and took possession of the
## p. 289 (#323) ############################################
CAPTURE OF GOLCONDA FORT
289
field-works and outposts. The Mughuls fought desperately to recover
them, Firuz Jang and two other generals being wounded and large
numbers of their men slain. Aurangzib himself advanced into the
field to aid his troops; cannon-balls began to fall near him, but he
coolly kept his position and cheered his soldiers by his example.
While this battle was raging a tempest burst on the plain with the
tropical fury of wind, rain and thunder. The rising water forced the
Mughuls back, and then the enemy made another charge, seizing the
trenches further off and carrying away or damaging all their guns.
At sunset the defeated Mughuls fell back on their rear lines. Next
morning the third mine was fired, but having been discovered and
flooded with water by the enemy, it did not explode. Thus the
Mughuls failed with all their efforts and the siege dragged on.
The morale of the imperial army was utterly gone; the famine
grew worse than before; and a pestilence broke out which nearly
depopulated Hyderabad and caused havoc in the camp. "At night
heaps of dead bodies used to accumulate. After some months, when
the rains ceased, the white piles of skeletons looked from a distance
like hillocks of snow. " But Aurangzib held on with grim tenacity and
called up reinforcements. Golconda was completely enclosed by him
with a wall of wood and earth and ingress and egress from the fort
stopped. At the same time he annexed the Qutb Shahi kingdoom by
proclamation and set up his own officers in all places in it, so as to
stop supplies and succour from coming to the fort.
On 2 October, 1687, Golconda was captured, bụt by bribery. An
Afghan soldier of fortune named 'Abdullah Pani (surnamed Sardar
Khan), who had deserted from Bijapur service and then from the
Mughul to join Qutb Shah, now sold his master. He left the postern
gate of the fort open, and at his invitation Ruh-ullah Khan with a
small force entered by this gate unchallenged at 3 o'clock in the
morning, and opened the main gate, by which the Mughul pporting
columns poured into the fort like a flood. No resistance could be
made to a surprise in such force; only one faithful captain, 'Abdur-
Razzaq Lari, opposed the assailants single-handed, but he was borne
down covered with seventy wounds. The Mughuls nursed him back
to recovery and the emperor gave him high rank.
Abu-'l-Hasan, the last of the Qutb Shahs, left his throne with
calmness and dignity. When Ruh-ullah Khan entered his palace to
seize him, he bade his captors to breakfast with him, consoled his
women and servants, and left for the Mughul camp. In the evening
he was presented by A'zam to the emperor, who read him a long
lecture on his corrupt government, wherein he had been very
unfaithful in the charge he had committed to him, in encouraging
the Brahmans and discouraging the Moors, to the dishonour of their
religion and country, whereby he had justly brought these troubles
.
19
## p. 290 (#324) ############################################
290
AURANGZIB (1881-1707)
upon himself”. After a time he was sent off to the prison-fortress of
Daulatabad with an allowance of 50,000 rupees a year.
The spoils taken at Golconda amounted to nearly seventy million
rupees in cash, besides gold and silver plate, jewels and jewelled ware.
The revenue of the kingdom was, on paper, nearly thirty million
rupees.
The emperor set himself to take possession of the forts and districts
of the fallen kingdoms of Bijapur and Golkonda. Sagar (the Berad
capital), Adoni (the seat of Sidi Mas'ud), Karnul, Raichur, Sera and
Bangalore in Mysore, and Bankapur and Belgaum in Kanara, as well
as Wandiwash and Conjeveram in the eastern or Madras Carnatic,
were gained by his armies, in the course of a year from the fall
of Golconda. After his return to Bijapur, a deadly bubonic plague
broke out in the city and camp (November, 1688), which killed about
a hundred thousand people, including the emperor's wife Aurangabadi
Mahall, Jasvant's alleged son Muhammadi Raj, and many grandees.
Firuz Jang escaped with the loss of his eyes.
After the fall of Shambhuji, Aurangzib mostly encamped in Bijapur
and at different places south of that city (especially Galgala) for
many years, and finally settled at Brahmapuri (on the Bhima river)
to which he gave the name of Islampuri. After four years and a half
(June, 1695-October, 1699) passed here, he set out on the campaign
against Maratha forts from which he returned a broken down old
man to Ahmadnagar (31 January, 1706), only to die there (3 March,
1707). The flight of the new Maratha king Raja Ram to Gingee (end
of 1689) made that fort a centre of Maratha enterprise on the east
coast, while his ministers left at home organised resistance in the
west and thus doubled the task of the Mughuls. The difficulties of
Aurangzib were multiplied by this disappearance of a common head
and a central government among the Marathas, because every petty
Maratha captain now fought and plundered in a different quarter
on his own account. The Marathas were no longer a tribe of banditti
or local rebels, but the one dominating factor of Deccan politics,
and an enemy all-pervasive throughout the Indian peninsula, elusive
as the wind, the ally and rallying point of all the enemies of the Delhi
empire and all disturbers of public peace and regular administration
throughout the Deccan and even in Malwa, Gondwana and Bundel.
khand. The imperialists could not be present everywhere in full
strength; hence, they suffered reverses in places.
In 1689 the Marathas had been cowed by the fall of Shambhuji,
the siege of their capital and the perilous flight of their new king.
Many of their forts easily fell into Aurangzib's hands. Throughout
1690 and 1691 the emperor's chief concern was to take possession of
the rich and boundless dominions of the fallen 'Adil Shahi and
Qutb Shahi kingdoms in the south and the east. At this stage, he
underrated the Maratha danger, being satisfied with the annihilation
.
## p. 291 (#325) ############################################
MARATHA PARTISAN WAR
291
of their state. He was soon afterwards confronted by a people's war,
and about the middle of 1690 the first signs of the Maratha recovery
appeared, which became triumphant in 1692. The leaders in the
west or homeland were the Amatya (Ramchandra N. Bavdekar);
the Sachiv (Shankaraji Malhar), and Parashuram Trimbak (who
became Pratinidhi or regent in 1701), while in the eastern Carnatic
the king's supreme director was Prahlad Niraji (created Pratinidhi),
who stood above the nominal prime minister or Peshwa. Two extra-
ordinarily able and active generals, Dhana Jadav and Santaji Ghor-
pare (rivals for the post of commander-in-chief), frequently passed
from one theatre of war to the other across the peninsula, and caused
the greatest loss and confusion to the Mughuls. The Maratha plan
of operations was for Raja Ram to take refuge in the far-off impreg-
nable fort of Gingee (in the South Arcot district) and make a stand
there, while in the homeland independent commandos would be
crganised and guided against the Mughuls by Ramchandra Bavdekar,
on whom was conferred the new office of dictator (Hukumatpanah)
with full regal authority over all the officials and captains in Maha-
rashtra. He had an inborn genius for command and organisation,
chose the ablest lieutenants, and managed to make the mutually
jealous Maratha guerrilla leaders act in concert.
We shall deal with the eastern front first. The eastern Carnatic
extended from Chicacole to the mouth of the Cauvery on the sea-
board and over all the inland country including the Mysore plateau
and the modern Madras districts north of it. As the result of Muslim
conquests effected about the middle of the seventeenth century, this
vast country was divided into two parts, the Hyderabadi and the
Bijapuri, by an imaginary line from Vellore to Sadras, and each of
these parts was further subdivided into uplands and lowlands. But
the new rulers had not consolidated their conquests; much of the
country was still in the hands of unsubdued poligars (local chiefs),
or held by nobles who were independent of Bijapur and Hyderabad
in all but name. The situation was further complicated by Shivaji's
invasion of 1677 and establishment of a new Maratha government at
Gingee. After his death, his son-in-law Harji Mahadik became the
local viceroy, but practically assumed independence of his distant
master Shambhuji. After the fall of Bijapur and Golconda, Mughul
sovereignty was proclaimed over all the Carnatic once belonging to
them, but without any adequate force to make it effective.
During this eclipse of royalty, Harji invaded the Hyderabad
Carnatic north of the Palar river and took easy possession of several
forts (including Arcot) and a hundred towns. The Marathas plund-
ered the country and even the sacred city of Conjeveram (January,
1688). On the arrival of Aurangzib's officers, the raiders retreated, but
took post a day's march south of the Mughul camp at Wandiwash
(March). For a year the two armies remained there watching each
## p. 292 (#326) ############################################
292
AURANGZIB (1681-1707)
other, but daily sending out detachments which plundered the coun-
try indiscriminately. The trade and industry of the district were
ruined, food stuffs became very scarce, and all who could fled to the
fortified European settlements on the coast for shelter.
Harji died about 29 September, 1689; Raja Ram arrived at Gingee
on 11 November, took peaceful possession of it and established his
court there. Zu-'l-Fiqar Khan, as the supreme Mughul commander,
reached the environs of Gingee about the middle of September, 1690,
with the object of besieging the fort, but the task was too great for
his means. The rock-fortress of Gingee consists of three fortified
hillocks connected together by strong walls and forming a rough
triangle nearly 3 miles in circumference.
These hills are steep, rocky
and covered with such enormous boulders that they are almost un-
climbable. Zu-'l-Fiqar could neither bombard it nor cut off the garri-
son's communication with the outside. The activity of the Maratha
roving bands stopped his grain supply, he abandoned the siege, and at
his request reinforcements under the vazir Asad Khan and the young
prince Kam Bakhsh reached him at the end of December, 1691. He
renewed the siege in 1692, ran trenches and bombarded two points
without doing any damage. His object was only to make a show,
prolong the siege and thereby escape from being sent on campaign
elsewhere. Thus, he effected nothing during 1691 and 1692. At the
end of 1692 two disasters befell the Mughuls. Two large Maratha
armies raised in western India arrived in the Carnatic under the
famous generals Santa and Dhana. The first of these captured 'Ali
Mardan Khan, the imperial commandant of Conjeveram, with all
the horses, elephants and other property of his army, near Kaveripak
(23 December). The Khan ransomed himself for 100,000 huns. The
other Maratha division attacked the siege camp round Gingee, and
compelled Zu-'l-Fiqar Khan to draw his outposts in for safety, in
which operation Isma'il Khan Maka was captured with 500 horses and
carried off to Gingee.
The Maratha light horse now dominated the country and stopped
the coming of provisions and letters to the Mughul camp, which
lived in a state of siege. Alarming rumours spread that Aurangzib
was already dead and that Shah 'Alam had gained the throne. Kam
Bakhsh in fear and despair opened a secret correspondence with Raja
Ram, and planned to escape to Gingee with his family and then make
an attempt on the throne of Delhi with Maratha aid. This foolish
plot was betrayed to Zu-'l-Fiqar and Asad Khan. They consulted
the leading officers, who urged that the safety of the army required
that the prince should be kept under guard, the siege trenches
abandoned and all the troops concentrated in the rear lines after
bursting the big guns. The retreat was effected only after a severe
fight with the surrounding enemy and heavy losses. The prince, who
had conspired to arrest the two generals, was himself detained a
## p. 293 (#327) ############################################
ZU-'L-FIQAR KHAN BESIEGES GINGEE
293
prisoner in Asad Khan's tent and was later sent back to his father
under escort.
One great danger was thus averted, but the difficulties of the
Mughuls only thickened. Santa and Dhana by daily attacks wore
down the outnumbered imperialists and reduced them to famine.
Asad Khan then bribed Raja Ram to let him retreat to Wandiwash
unmolested, but his soldiers had lost all spirit through famine and
the death of transport animals; the retreat became a rout in which
the Mughul army was plundered of its property and stores (2 Febru-
ary, 1693). Supplies and reinforcements under Qasim Khan soon
arrived at Wandiwash, where the Mughuls halted for some months.
In February, 1694, Zu-'l-Fiqar Khan set out southwards along the
coast, conquering many forts in the South Arcot district and threaten-
ing Tanjore, the raja of which, Shahji II, had to sign a treaty (1 June)
promising to obey the emperor, give up Raja Ram's cause, and pay
an annual tribute of three million rupees. Then, after storming
Palamcottah, the Mughul general returned to Wandiwash, and near
the end of the year made a show of renewing the siege of Gingee. But
he had come to a secret understanding with Raja Ram, in expectation
of the death of the old emperor and civil wars among his sons, so that
nothing was achieved by the Mughuls during 1695. The arrival of
Dhana and Santa early in 1695 forced Zu-'l-Fiqar to raise the siege
and confine himself to the defensive in Arcot fort throughout 1696;
he was hopelessly outnumbered and without money or food.
Early in 1697 he collected tribute from Tanjore and other places
in the south and then returned to Wandiwash for the rainy season.
A bitter quarrel between Santa and Dhana weakened the Marathas,
and Zu-'l-Fiqar renewed the siege of Gingee in earnest, in November.
Daud Khan Pani, his lieutenant, captured Chikkali-drug (the de-
tached southern fort) by assault in one day and then entrenched
opposite the south face of Gingee itself, but his further efforts were
thwarted by Zu-'l-Fiqar, who gave the Marathas secret intelligence of
his intended attacks. At last Zu-'l-Fiqar had to take Gingee in order
to save his credit with the emperor. He sent timely warning to Raja
Ram, who escaped first to Vellore with his chief officers but left his
family behind. The three forts within Gingee were successfully
stormed in gallant style by the Rajputs and Afghans (18 January,
1698). A vast amount of booty was captured, and among the prisoners
were four wives and five children of Raja Ram. But the raja succeeded
in arriving at Vishalgarh; the work of the long siege of Gingee was
undone; the war was merely transferred to the western theatre.
We shall now turn to the affairs of western India after Raja Ram's
accession. The first flush of Mughul success was over in a year and
a half, the Marathas recovered from the crushing blows of Sham-
bhuji's capture and Raja Ram's flight to Madras, and they gained
their first signal victory over the Mughuls on 4 June, 1690, when they
## p. 294 (#328) ############################################
294
AURANGZIB (1681-1707)
captured Sharza Khan near Satara with his family, 4000 horses and
the entire camp and baggage of his army, after slaying 1500 of his
men. Then they recovered several forts from the imperialists, Partab-
garh, Rohira, Rajgarh and Torna. In 1692 there was a renewal of
Maratha activity and their success was conspicuous in many quarters,
such as the recovery of Panhala. The siege of this fort, urged by
Aurangzib, failed after many years of desultory attack under Mu'izz-
ud-din Bidar Bakht and Firuz Jang. The disaster to Sharza Khan
in 1690 compelled the emperor to occupy the north Satara district
in force, which led to frequent but indecisive conflicts with Santa
Ghorpare, who had made the Mahadev hill his base, and used to
raid far to the south and the east. The Belgaum and Dharwar districts
were harried by Santa and Dhana, which necessitated the strengthen-
ing of the Mughul forces there; but when these generals went off
to the eastern Carnatic (end of 1692), the Mughuls on the western
front enjoyed a short respite. Late in 1693 they returned home and
renewed their attacks. Dhana destroyed the siege-works before
Panhala, while Santa sent off Amrit Rao Nimbalkar to raid Berar,
and he himself levied chauth in the Malkhed region. Throughout
1694 and 1695 the Maratha bands were active and the Berads trouble-
some all over the western Deccan, but nothing decisive or noteworthy
was done on either side but desultory fighting and futile marches,
which wore the Mughuls down,
Then came two terrible disasters. In November, 1695, the emperor,
learning that Santa was conveying his rich store of plunder to his
own home in north-western Mysore, ordered Qasim Khan to intercept
him, and sent a picked force of his personal retinue and the contin-
gents of the nobles, under some of his highest officers, to reinforce
Qasim Khan. The two divisions united near Chitaldroog, and Qasim
Khan entertained his noble guests with all the pomp and luxury
of a Mughul grandee, discarding military precaution. Santa came
up from a distance by swift and secret marches and formed his men
in three divisions which were very ably handled and co-ordinated.
The first surprised and plundered the advanced tents of Qasim Khan
and his heavy baggage, the second intercepted and enveloped the
Khan, who was advancing to the rescue, while the third Maratha
division looted the camp and baggage left behind by Qasim Khan
in his advance. The Carnatic musketeers and Maratha light horse
completely overpowered the Mughuls and drove them in headlong
rout to the small fort of Dodderi, which had neither space nor food
sufficient for them. Fully one-third of the Mughul army fell in the
battle and the retreat; the rest capitulated through hunger; Qasim
Khan committed suicide. The remnant of his army, after promising
a ransom of two million rupees and giving up all its cash, horses and
other property, was set free (December, 1695).
Another great Mughul general, Himmat Khan, was in Basayapatan
## p. 295 (#329) ############################################
RAJA RAM'S LAST EFFORTS
295
(forty miles west of Dodderi). Santa appeared before it on 30 January,
1696, and lured Himmat Khan out of his refuge, and shot him dead
as he was leading a charge. His baggage was plundered, and his men
fell back into the fort. Here they were relieved after more than a
month. The emperor took prompt measures to strengthen the defence
of this district. Prince Bidar Bakht chastised Barmappa Nayak of
Chitaldroog, who had disloyally sided with Santa. Prince A'zam was
posted at Pedgaon.
But now a civil war weakened the Maratha strength. Santaji
Ghorpare was mortally jealous of Dhana-Jadav, his favoured rival
for the post of commander-in-chief (Senapati). His vanity, imperious
temper and insubordinate spirit gave great offence at Raja Ram's
court; Santa was attacked by Raja Ram and Dhana near Conjeveram
(May, 1696), but he defeated them. When he returned to Maharashtra
in March, 1697, a civil war broke out between him and Dhana, all
the Maratha captains being ranged on the two sides. In another
battle most of Santa's followers, disgusted with his severity and
insolence, went over to Dhana. Santa, defeated and despoiled of all,
fled from the field, but near the Mahadev hill he was murdered by
order of Radhika Bai Mane, whose brother he had slain (June, 1697).
In force of genius he was the greatest Maratha soldier after Shivaji,
but his temper was unbearable.
Nothing remarkable happened in the second half of 1697, nor for
some time after Raja Ram's return from Gingee to Vishalgarh
(February, 1698). Next year, after forming plans for an extensive
raid through Khandesh and Berar, he issued from Satara (5 Novem-
ber, 1699) and took the road with a large force. But he was intercepted
near Parenda by Bidar Bakht, broken and driven towards Ahmad.
nagar; his raid into Berar was nipped in the bud; but one division
under Krishna Savant crossed the Narbada for the first time and
plundered some places near Dhamoni. Battles, however, were fought
with Dhana and other generals in the Satara district with various
results (January, 1700).
On 12 March, 1700, Raja Ram died at Sinhgarh. His senior widow
Tara Bai placed her son. Shivaji III on the throne, while another wife
Rajas Bai crowned her son as Shambhuji II, and the Maratha
ministers and generals were again divided into two rival factions.
But Tara Bai's ability and energy, seconded by the genius of Para-
shuram Trimbak (the new regent), gave her supreme power in the
state.
. During the past decade, the Mughul cause had achieved remarkable
and unbroken success in the northern Konkan through the ability
and enterprise of a local commandant named Muat'bar Khan, a
Sayyid of the Navait clan. He first distinguished himself by cap-
turing or buying many hill-forts in the Nasik district, and then
descended into the Konkan, where he took Kalyan (April, 1689)
.
## p. 296 (#330) ############################################
296
AURANGZIB (1681-1707)
and several other places, occupying the country southwards to the
latitude of Bombay, and even forced the Portuguese of “the North"
(Bassein and Daman) to make peace by promising not to support
the Marathas. At Kalyan he lived for many years, adorning the
city with his many buildings and gardens, and restoring peace and
prosperity to the district.
By April, 1695, Aurangzib came to realise that his work in the
Deccan was not finished with the conquest of Bijapur, Golconda and
the Maratha capital; it was only beginning; for him there was no
going back to Delhi, as he could see no end to the people's war in
which he was entangled. Therefore, in May, 1695, he sent his eldest
surviving son Shah 'Alam to govern the Punjab, Sind and afterwards
Afghanistan and guard the north-western gateway of India, while
he himself took post at Brahmapuri for the next four and a half years
in the very heart of the enemy country. During this period (1695-99),
the Maratha danger came nearer home and drove the Mughuls into
the defensive in Maharashtra and Kanara. The movements of their
roving bands were bewilderingly rapid and unexpected, and the
Mughul pursung columns toiled in vain after them. Local represen-
tatives of the emperor were often driven to make unauthorised terms
with the Marathas by agreeing to pay chauth. Worse than that, some
imperialists made a concert with the enemy for sharing the plunder
of the emperor's own subjects. The Mughul administration had really
dissolved and only the presence of the emperor held it together, but
merely as a phantom rule.
The fall of Gingee enabled Aurangzib to concentrate all his re-
sources in the western theatre of war, and now began the last stage
of his career, the siege of successive Maratha forts by the emperor in
person. The rest of his life is a repetition of the same sickening tale:
a hill-fort captured by him in person after a vast expenditure of time,
men and money, the fort recovered by the Marathas from the weak
Mughul garrison after a few months, and its siege begun again a year
or two later. His soldiers and camp-followers suffered unspeakable
hardship in marching over flooded rivers, muddy roads and broken
hilly tracks; porters disappeared, transport beasts died of hunger and
overwork, scarcity of grain was ever present in the camp and the
Maratha and Berad “thieves" (as he officially called them) not far off.
The mutual jealousies of his generals ruined his cause or delayed
his success. The siege of eight forts, Satara, Parli, Panhala, Khelna
(=Vishalgarh), Kondhana (Sinhgarh), Rajgarh, Torna and Wagin-
gera, besides five places of lesser note, occupied him for five years
and a half (1699-1705), after which the broken down old man of
eighty-eight retired to die.
Leaving his family, surplus baggage and unnecessary officials in
the fortified camp of Brahmapuri in charge of the vazir, and giving
Zu-l-Fiqar, surnamed Nusrat Jang, a roving commission to fight the
## p. 297 (#331) ############################################
CAPTURE OF SATARA AND PARLI
297
Maratha field-armies that hovered round the emperor or threatened
this base camp, Aurangzib started from Brahmapuri on 29 October,
1699. Capturing Basantgarh on the way without a blow, he arrived
before Satara on 18 December and took up his quarters at Karanja,
a mile and a half to the north of the fort. The entire siege-camp, five
miles round, was enclosed with a wall to keep the Maratha raiders
out. The rocky soil made sapping a very slow and difficult work, and
the fort was never completely invested. The garrison made frequent
sorties, which were repulsed with more or less loss, while the Maratha
field-forces reduced the besiegers to the condition of a beleaguered
city, cutting off outposts and closing the road to grain dealers.
On 23 April the Mughuls fired two mines. The first killed many
of the garrison, but the commandant Pragji Prabhu was dug out -
alive from under the debris. The second exploded outwards, killing
two thousand of the Mughul soldiers, but making a 20 yards breach
in the wall. Baji Chavan Daphle, a Maratha vassal, mounted the
breach shouting to the Mughul soldiers to follow him and enter, but
they were too dazed by the catastrophe to advance, and he was
killed. But after the death of Raja Ram, the Maratha commandant
Subhanji lost heart and yielded the fort to the imperialists (1 May,
1700).
Aurangzib next laid siege to Parli, a fort six miles west of Satara
and the headquarters of the Maratha government. It resisted for
some time, and the invaders suffered terribly from excessive rain and
the scarcity of grain and fodder. But the emperor held grimly on
and at last the commandant evacuated the fort for a bribe (19 June).
These two sieges caused an enormous waste of men and animals;
the Mughul treasury was empty and the soldiers were starving as
their pay for three years was in arrears. Excessive rain aggravated
their sufferings. On the return march from Parli to Bhushangarh,
transport utterly broke down, much property had to be abandoned,
even nobles had to walk on foot through the mud, and only forty-five
miles were covered in thirty-five days. While the emperor was
encamped at Khavasspur (on the Man river), the river suddenly
rose in flood at midnight (11 October) and swept through the camp,
destroying many men and animals, and ruining the tents and baggage.
The emperor himself stumbled and dislocated his knee in trying to
escape. This left him a little lame for the rest of his life, which the
court flatterers used to say was the heritage of his ancestor, the
world-conqueror Timur-Lang! But reinforcements were summoned
from northern India and many thousands of fresh horses purchased
to mount the army again. The Marathas and Berads plundered
and levied chauth far and wide during this eclipse of the Mughul
power.
Panhala was the next fort attacked (19 March, 1701). The emperor
formed a complete circle of investment, fourteen miles in length,
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298
AURANGZIB (1681-1707)
around it and its sister-height Pavangarh. A mobile force under
Nusrat Jang was sent out to chastise the Marathas wherever heard of.
But in that stony region the progress of mining was very slow, while
the mutual jealousies of his generals led them to thwart each other
and thus prolonged the siege. The siege dragged on for two months,
without success seeming any nearer. Then a heavy bribe was paid
to the commandant Trimbak and he delivered the fort on 7 June.
Wardhangarh, Chandan, Nandgir and Wandan were next captured
with little or no opposition.
Aurangzib marched against Khelna next winter. This fort stands
on the crest of the western Ghats, 3350 feet above the sea and over-
looking the Konkan plain, with dense forests and thick underwood
below it. With great labour a road was made through the Ambaghat
pass by Fath-ullah Khan, but even then the emperor's followers
suffered terrible hardship and loss in crossing it and bringing his
camp and equipage to the foot of the fort. The siege dragged on for
five months; the Mughul artillery beat in vain against the solid rock
of the walls, while the missiles of the garrison did terrible havoc
among the imperialists crowded below. Some success was gained
at the western gate by Bidar Bakht's follower Raja Jay Singh (Sawai,
of Amber) and his Rajputs, who stormed the fausse braye of the gate
(7 May, 1702). But the terrible monsoon of the Bombay coast now
burst on the heads of the Mughul army. They then bribed the
commandant Parashuram to evacuate it (17 June). The imperialists
underwent unspeakable hardship in their return from Khelna, in
crossing the Ambaghat and the swollen streams on the way which
raged like torrents. Grain sold at a rupee a seer, "fodder and fire-
wood appeared in the isolated camp only by mistake”; no tent was
available. In this condition, traversing 30 miles in thirty-eight days,
the miserable army reached Panhala on 27 July.
On 12 December, the indomitable old man set out to conquer
Kondhana (Sinhgarh). But there was no life in the work of the
besiegers, and after wasting three months they secured the fort by
profuse bribery (18 April, 1703). After spending seven months near
Poona, the emperor besieged Rajgarh, and captured its first gate
by assault after two months of bombardment. Then the garrison
made terms but fled away from the fort at night (26 February, 1704).
Torna was next taken (20 March), the only fort that Aurangzib
captured by force without resort to bribery.
Next, after a six months' halt at Khed (7 miles north of Chakan),
the emperor marched to attack Wagingera, the capital of the Berads, a
an aboriginal people expert in musketry, night attack and robbery,
who lived in the fork between the Krishna and the Bhima, east of
Bijapur. The siege began on 19 February, 1705, but for many weeks
afterwards the Mughuls could make no progress; every day the
1 Fifteen pence a pound. 2 Beydurs in Meadows Taylor's 'Story of my life. '
## p. 299 (#333) ############################################
>
AURANGZIB'S LAST CAMPAIGN
299
enemy sallied out and attacked them, the bombardment from the
numerous well-supplied guns in the fort made the advance of the
siege-trenches or even their maintenance within range impossible.
One morning the imperialists captured by surprise the hillock of
Lal Tikri, which commands a portion of Wagingera, but the Berads
soon drove them out with heavy loss, as mutual jealousy among the
Mughul generals prevented the timely reinforcement of the captors
of this position.
On 6 April, a Maratha force under Dhana Jadav and Hindu Rao
(brother of Santa Ghorpare) arrived to support the Berads, because
the families of many Maratha generals were sheltered in Wagingera.
These were cleverly removed by the newcomers through the back-
door, while they kept the Mughuls in play by a noisy feint in front.
The Marathas halted in the neighbourhood in consideration of a
daily subsidy from Pidia the Berad chief, and made frequent attacks
on the Mughuls, who were now thrown into a state of siege and all
their activity ceased, while famine raged in their camp. Then Pidia
gained some time by delusive peace negotiations.
Nusrat Jang, who had arrived to aid the emperor, made steady
progress by capturing some of the outlying hillocks and the village
of Talwargera, in the plain south of the fort gate, after days of gallant
fight and heavy loss among his Bundela soldiers, till Pidia found
further struggle hopeless and evacuated the fort secretly at night
(8 May, 1705) with his Maratha allies. The Mughul camp-followers
who first entered it in search of plunder set fire to the grass huts
which caused terrible gunpowder explosions. The bare fort was
captured, but its chieftain and his clansmen remained free to give.
more trouble to the emperor.
After the fall of the fort, Aurangzib encamped at Devapur, a quiet
village on the bank of the Krishna, eight miles south of it. Here he
fell very ill on account of his extreme old age (ninety lunar years)
and incessant toil. His entire army was seized with consternation;
if he died who would lead them safely out of that enemy country?
His courageous struggling with disease and insistence on transacting
business in spite of fever made him very weak and at times uncon-
scious. But after ten or twelve days he began to rally, though slowly.
On his complete recovery, he broke up his camp on 2 November
and marched slowly to Ahmadnagar, which was reached on 31
January, 1706. This was destined to be his "journey's end”, for here
he died a year later.
When Aurangzib set out on his retreat to Ahmadnagar, he left
desolation and anarchy behind him. His march was molested by the
exultant Marathas under all their great generals, who followed his
army a few miles in the rear, cutting off its grain supplies and
stragglers and threatening to break into its camp. When attacked by
the Mughuls in force, they would fall back a little, but like water
## p. 300 (#334) ############################################
300
AURANGZIB (1681-1707)
parted by the oar would close again as soon as the attackers retired
on their main body. As the eyewitness Bhimsen wrote:
The Marathas became completely dominant over the whole kingdom and
closed the roads. By means of robbery they escaped from poverty and rose to
great wealth. I have heard that every week they distributed alms and sweet-
meats in charity, praying for the long life of the emperor, who had proved (for
them) the Feeder of the Universe! The price of grain grew higher and higher;
in the imperial camp in particular vast numbers perished of hunger and many
kinds of illegal exactions and practices appeared.
The Marathas reduced spoliation to a system :
Wherever these raiders arrived they engaged in collecting the revenue of the
place and passed months and years there with their wives and children in
composure of mind. They divided the parganas among themselves, and in
imitation of the imperial government they appointed their own subahdars (gov-
ernors), kamavish-dars (chauth-collectors) and rahdars (road-patrol). When
a kamavishdar was opposed by a strong zamindar or imperial faujdar, the
Maratha subahdat came to his aid (with his troops). . . . In each subah the
Marathas built one or two small forts, from which they issued to raid the
country around (Khafi Khan).
When the Marathas invade a province, they take from every pargana as much
money as they desire and make their horses eat the standing crops or tread them
down. The imperial army that comes in pursuit can subsist there only after
the fields have been cultivated (anew). All administration has disappeared. . . .
The peasants have given up cultivation; the jagirdars do not get a penny from
their fiefs. . . . The servants of the Maratha state support themselves by plund-
ering on all sides, and pay a small part of their booty to their king, getting no
salary from him. The coming of rent from the Mughul officers' jagirs ceased
. . . . The condition of the imperial army grew worse from the high price of
grain and the devastation of the jagirs, while the resources of the Marathas
increased through robbery. Thus, vicious circle was formed which aggra-
vated the evil. The mansabdars, on account of the scanty forces under them,
. cannot gain control over their jagirs. The local zamindars, growing stronger,
have joined the Marathas, raised troops and stretched the hand of oppression
over the realm. As the imperial dominions have been given out in fief to the
jagirdars, so too the Marathas have made a distribution of the whole empire
among their generals, and thus une kingdom has to support two sets of agir-
dars. . . . .
as the Karwar factors wrote: "He is so inveterate against the Raja
that he hath thrown off his pagri and sworn never to put it on again,
till he hath either killed, taken, or routed him out of his country. ”
Khan Jahan gave the Marathas a long and hot chase from Nander
and Bidar to Chanda and the Qutb Shahi frontier. A'zam campaigned
for one year in the north Bijapur territory, capturing Dharur. In his
absence his camp was attacked by the Marathas, but, inspired by his
heroic wife Jahanzib Banu, the Hara Rajput guards repulsed the
enemy, though losing 900 of their own men.
But nothing decisive was achieved by the Mughuls in 1682, and all
their detachments were recalled to the emperor's side in April, 1683.
His distrust of his sons and generals led him to follow a barren
policy of waiting and vacillation. “The king's mind. . . is continually
wavering and he is extraordinarily peevish and uneasy because of
Sultan Akbar. Sultan A'zam, (his) Begam, and Dilir Khan degraded
for even nothing but only suspected, without any grounds, of being
kind to Akbar" (Surat Factory letter).
But just at this time came a happy diversion for the Mughuls. In
April, 1683, Shambhuji began an invasion of Portuguese territory
which occupied all his forces till the next January, when he was glad
to make peace by the mutual restitution of conquests. In the mean-
time prince Akbar had realised that the Maratha king would do
nothing for him; his heart grew sick of hope deferred, and he decided
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CAMPAIGNS AGAINST SHAMBHUJI
283
to leave Maharashtra, go to Portuguese territory and there charter
a ship for conveying him to Persia for refuge. In January, 1683,
he left Pali and took up his residence at Banda, and then (in Septem-
ber) at Bicholim, very close to Goa. In November he bought a ship
and embarked at Vingurla, but Durga Das and Kavi-Kalash arrived
there with fresh promises of armed support from Shambhuji and
induced him to give up this attempt to sail to Persia. Throughout
1684 Akbar lived in the Ratnagiri district as Shambhuji's unwilling
guest, but unable to make any successful dash into his father's terri-
tory. In fact, Shambhuji was now too deeply sunk in vice and his
government was too disturbed by the jealousy of the local nobles
against the raja's all-powerful “foreign” favourite Kavi-Kalash (a
Kanaujiya Brahman) and the frequent rebellions among his vassals
and court conspiracies against his life, so that the Maratha power
ceased to count in Indian politics. There were many desertions of
Maratha officers and nobles to the Mughul side, and the whole west
coast was up in arms against Shambhuji.
A fresh Mughul offensive was launched at the end of September,
1683; Aurangzib himself advanced from Aurangabad to Ahmadnagar,
while strong divisions were posted at Poona, Nasik and Akalkot, and
the Sidi cruised off Vingurla to watch Akbar's movements. But the
main attack was entrusted to a grand army led by Shah 'Alam into
the south Konkan by the Ramghat pass (between Goa and Belgaum).
After conquering many places in the Belgaum district, this prince
crossed the pass and descended into Savantvadi. At Bicholim (15
January, 1684) he destroyed the mansions and gardens of Shambhuji
and Akbar and then moved to the neighbourhood of Goa, the invasion
of which was immediately abandoned by the Marathas. But the
prince, coming as a deliverer, plotted to seize Goa by treachery; this
fatal policy set the Portuguese against him and they stopped his
grain supply by sea. The prince next marched northwards, sacking
and burning Malyan, Kudal, Banda and Vingurla in this region, and
then returned to the river bank north of Goa. Famine stopped his
further progress. No corn could be procured locally and none was
allowed to come to him by sea from Surat. So, the baffled prince
returned to the Ramghat pass on 1 March. Here a pestilence of such
virulence spread that in one week a third of his men died, besides
an even larger proportion of transport animals. This failure of trans-
port led to a second famine, and more men perished of heat and thirst.
The miserable remnant of the army crossed the pass and reached
Ahmadnagar (28 May) without having done anything except burning
a few villages and robbing a few towns, at the expense of half its
strength.
The Mughul campaign in the first half of 1684 was highly successful
in other quarters; many Maratha forts were taken, their field armies
repeatedly defeated, and much of their territory annexed, while
## p. 284 (#318) ############################################
284
AURANGZIB (1681-1707)
a
many of their captains came over to the imperial side. The sieges of
Bijapur and Golconda, however, relieved the pressure on the
Marathas during 1685-87. Prince Akbar, thoroughly despairing of
any success or even safety in India, sailed from Rajapur in February,
1637, and reached the Persian court in January, 1688, after some
months' detention by the Sultan of Muscat, who tried to sell him to
Aurangzib.
While Shambhuji was absorbed in drinking and merry-making with
a small escort and in utter carelessness at Sangameshwar, twenty-two
miles from Ratnagiri, he was surprised and captured by an energetic
Mughul officer named Muqarrab Khan, who had made a forced march
from Kolhapur. With him were captured his minister Kavi-Kalash
and twenty-five of his chief followers (11 February, 1689). At Baha-
durgarh, the two chief captives were brought to the imperial camp
and publicly paraded dressed as buffoons with drum and trumpet.
Shambhujj was offered his life if he would give up his forts and
divulge the hiding-places of his treasures; but he loosened his tongue
in scurrilous abuse of the emperor and his Prophet and asked for one
of his daughters to be given to him. After being tortured and
mutilated for twenty-four days, Shambhuji and Kavi-Kalash were
hacked to pieces limb by limb on 21 March.
After the capture of Shambhuji his younger brother Raja Ram was
crowned by the ministers at Raigarh (18 February). But, soon after-
wards, an imperial army under I'tiqad Khan (afterwards Zu-'l-Fiqar
Khan, Nusrat Jang) laid siege to this Maratha capital, and Raja Ram
slipped out of it disguised as a religious mendicant (15 April), and
finally, after many adventures, made his way to Gingee (11 Novem-
ber). In the meantime Raigarh capitulated on 29 October, and the
Mughuls seized there the surviving ladies of the Maratha royal family
and Shambhuji's children, including Shahu, a boy of seven. These
were detained in Aurangzib's camp with every respect and privacy.
Thus by the end of 1689 Aurangzib became the unrivalled lord para-
mount of northern India and the Deccan alike; but it was the
beginning of his end.
For four years after Dilir Khan's failure (February, 1680) nothing
decisive was done by the Mughuls against Bijapur, as they were busy
opposing Shambhuji and Akbar. Prince A'zam's campaign (1682-83)
was languidly conducted in the region north of the Nira river;
thereafter even these desultory attacks ceased. In the meantime the
conditions of the Adil Shahi government grew hopeless. Mas'ud
resigned his post as minister in despair and disgust early in 1684, and
his successor Aqa Khusrav died after six months of office (21 October).
The leadership of the state then fell to Sharza Khan (a Mahdavi
Sayyid) and 'Abdur-Rauf (Afghan). The Mughuls then resumed the
appropriation of bits of the 'Adil Shahi kingdom and established
their own outposts in these; Mangalvide and Sangola. were gained:
## p. 285 (#319) ############################################
LAST SIEGE OF BIJAPUR
285
in May, 1684. Although a rupture between the two powers now seemed
imminent and some acrimonious letters were exchanged, war did not
actually break out until some months afterwards, and Aurangzib
continued to send friendly letters and robes of honour to the 'Adil
Shahi court. But both sides used the interval in preparing for war,
and on 11 April, 1685, the last Mughul siege of Bijapur began. Ruh-
ullah Khan and Qasim Khan opened their trenches on the Shahpur
or north-western side, half a mile from the fort wall, while Khan
Jahan ran his approaches from the Rasulpur or western suburb.
Prince A'zam arrived on 24 June and took over the supreme con-
mand, encamping at the Begam Hauz, south of the city.
The Mughuls were slow and clumsy in conducting regular sieges;
the soil round Bijapur is extremely hard, and therefore the besiegers
made no real progress even after fifteen months of labour. The fort
was not fully invested; the soldiers sallied out and returned whenever
they liked; and allies flocked to 'Adil Shah, from Mas'ud (now semi-
independent chief of Adoni), Qutb Shah and Shambhuji. A'zam had
to fight three severe battles in less than a month; his grain supply
was totally stopped and a famine raged in his camp. But as he refused
to retire, even when commanded by Aurangzib, the emperor sent
him provisions, reinforcements and money under the escort of Ghazi-
ud-din (Firuz Jang), who ably fought his way to the famished army
and “turned the scarcity into plenty” (end of October). Firuz Jang
next intercepted and cut off a force of 6000 Berad infantry, each with
a
a bag of provisions on his head, whom Pam Nayak tried to smuggle
into the fort. At this time the Mughul capture of Hyderabad and
the flight of its king to Golconda cut off all hope of aid to Bijapur
being received from that side.
· But discord and mutual jealousy among the Mughul commanders
thwarted their efforts. So the emperor himself went to Bijapur
(13 July, 1686) and pressed the siege vigorously. The fort was com-
pletely invested and the friends of the garrison in his camp were
crushed. The sufferings of the Bijapuris were aggravated by a famine
which was then raging in the Deccan on account of the failure of
the annual rains. Countless men and horses died within the fort,
and from the lack of horses the Deccanis could not follow their
favourite tactics of hovering round the invaders and cutting off their
stragglers and transport. But even then the Mughuls could neither
make any practicable breach in the walls nor fill up the broad and
deepmoat. On 14 September Aurangzib advanced his tent from
two miles in the rear to a place immediately behind the siege trenches,
and next day rode to the edge of the moat to inspect his raised
battery.
And now the garrison lost heart; the future looked absolutely
dark to them, and their ranks had been thinned to 2000 men, while
no help was to be expected from outside. Their two leading nobles
## p. 286 (#320) ############################################
286
AURANGZIB (1681-1707)
1
arranged the terms of surrender, which Aurangzib readily granted.
On 22 September, 1686, Sikandar, the last of the 'Adil Shahs, left
the capital of his ancestors and waited on Aurangzib in his camp at
Rasulpur. He was very kindly received and enrolled among the
Mughul peers with the lesser title of Khan (instead of Shah), and an
annual pension of 100,000 rupees was settled upon him. All the Bija-
puri officers were taken over into Mughul service. On the 29th,
Aurangzib entered the fallen city through the southern or Mangali
gate (henceforth to be called the "Gate of Victory”, Fath Darwaza).
In the 'Adil Shahi palace and the “Relic Shrine” (Asar-i-sharif) he
erased all pictures drawn in violation of the Quranic law and all
Shiah inscriptions. The Kingdom was ordered to be styled Dar-uz-
Zafar. Complete desolation settled upon the city of Bijapur after the
fall of its independent dynasty; from a proud capital it became merely
the headquarters city of one of the numerous provinces of the Mughul
empire; its nobility decayed and disappeared, and the multitude of
artisans and labourers, poets and scholars, lost their bread. Two years
after its conquest, a terrible bubonic plague swept away more than
half its population, and even the abundant water supply in the city
wells suddenly grew scanty. The city and its once populous suburbs
were deserted and fell into ruin.
After being at first lodged in the state prison of Daulatabad and
then carried about with Aurangzib's camp, Sikandar died outside
Satara fort on 13 April, 1700, not yet thirty-two years of age.
For nearly thirty years after Aurangzib's accession the kingdom of
Golconda enjoyed respite from Mughul attack, because of the pre-
occupation of the Mughuls with the Marathas and 'Adil Shah and
also because Qutb Shah paid his tribute regularly. Abu-'l Hasan
(accession 1672), the last Sultan of this line, resigned his royal func-
tions to his Brahman minister Madanna and shut himself up in his
palace with a host of concubines and dancing-girls. All power in
the state was monopolized by Madanna, his brother Akkanna and
their nephew surnamed Rustam Rao; the administration grew more
and more inefficient and corrupt, and the Muslims complained of
Hindu predominance and their own humiliation in the state. Above
all, Madanna was a staunch supporter of the defensive alliance with
the Marathas for an annual subsidy.
Soon after the Mughul siege of Bijapur had commenced, a letter
from Qutb Shah to his agent in the emperor's camp was intercepted,
in which he called Aurangzib a mean-minded coward for attacking
a helpless young orphan like Sikandar 'Adil Shah, and promised to
send a large army in support of Bijapur. At this Aurangzib sent
Shah Alam with a strong force to seize Hyderabad (July, 1685);
but this division was effectively checked at Malkhed and practically
besieged by a Golconda army for more than two months. There were
frequent fights, in which the Mughuls could make no advance, as
## p. 287 (#321) ############################################
MUGHUL ATTACKS ON QUTB SHAH
287
the enemy greatly outnumbered them; their heavy losses took the
heart out of the imperialists and the rains added to their hardships.
But early in October, the Golconda commander-in-chief, Mir Muham-
mad Ibrahim, was bribed to come over to the Mughuls, and his
disheartened soldiers fled back to their capital.
The defection of the commander-in-chief paralysed the defence
of Hyderabad. Qutb Shah fled precipitately to the fort of Golconda,
leaving all his property behind in Hyderabad. Before Shah Alam
could arrive and restore order in the city (c. 18 October), it presented
the spectacle of a sack after assault by an enemy; indiscriminate
looting and confusion raged in it, and many women and children
were kidnapped and outraged. Qutb Shah then submitted, and at
Shah 'Alam's recommendation the emperor granted him pardon on
the following conditions: (i) the payment of twelve million rupees
in settlement of all past dues and in addition a tribute of two hundred
thousand huns every year, (ii) the dismissal of Madanna and Akkanna,
and (iii) the cession of Malkhed and Seram to the emperor.
Shah Alam halted at Kuhir for some months for the collection of
the war indemnity. Abu-'l Hasan put off the dismissal of Madanna
as long as he could. At this his Muslim nobles and the two dowager
Sultanas formed a plot and caused Madanna and Akkanna to be
murdered in the streets of Golconda (March, 1686). The ministers'
residences were plundered and their families ruined by the Muslim
mob, who next made a general attack on the Hindu quarter, killing
and plundering the Brahmans. Golconda territory was then com-
pletely evacuated by the Mughuls.
But the fall of Bijapur (September, 1686) set the imperialists free
to deal finally with the Qutb Shahi government. On 7 February,
1687, the emperor arrived before Golconda, to which Abu-'l Hasan
had again fled. The Mughuls occupied Hyderabad for the third and
last time. On the first day the Mughuls charged and drove in the
Qutb Shahi soldiers who were assembled in the dry ditch under
shelter of the fort walls. Qilich Khan (the grandfather of the first
Nizam), in trying to enter Golconda pell-mell with these fugitives,
was fatally wounded, and regular siege operations began (17 Febru-
ary). Aurangzib himself encamped north-west of the fort along
the Sholapur road; trenches were opened against the south-eastern
and southern faces of the fort, the Mughul soldiers with the city
behind them moving along both banks of the Musi river.
But the emperor's aims were paralysed by bitter personal jealousies
in his camp. Shah 'Alam was soft-hearted and wished to save Abu-'l
Hasan from destruction. He welcomed Qutb Shah's agents, who
visited him secretly and bribed him to use his influence with the
emperor to get Abu-'l Hasan pardoned and thus rob his brother
A'zam of the credit of capturing Golconda. The emperor, on learning
of these secret negotiations with the enemy, at once put Shah 'Alam
## p. 288 (#322) ############################################
288
AURANGZIB (1681-1707)
and his entire family in prison (3 March), confiscated his property,
and even punished his servants. Every hardship and humiliation
was inflicted upon the prince in his captivity and it was seven years
before he could recover his liberty.
Another cause of discord in the imperial camp was that the many
Shiahs in the imperial service heartily disliked the prospect of the
extinction of the last Shiah kingdom in India and even many orthodox
Sunnis, like the chief Qazis Shaikh-ul-Islam and 'Abdullah, con-
demned the attacks on Bijapur and Golconda as "wars between
Muslims" and therefore sinful. Firuz Jang, a Turk and Sunni, was
at first the leading officer at the siege, and therefore Saf Shikan Khan,
the chief of artillery and a Persian Shiah, after working strenuously
for some time, resigned "in order to spite Firuz Jang”. The next two
chiefs of artillery were utter failures, and then this post, the most
important in a siege, went begging, till at last Saf Shikan Khan was
reinstated (2 July); but by that time the field-works had been de-
molished by the enemy and the investment had to be begun anew.
The fort had an inexhaustible supply of munitions and its walls
bristled with guns of large calibre. Its incessant fire caused heavy
losses to the Mughuls, but they carried the trenches to the edge of
the ditch in six weeks. The ditch however could not be filled up.
At midnight, 26 May, Firuz Jang made an attempt to surprise the
fort by scaling the wall with ladders. But a carrion dog of the fort,
on seeing strangers, set up a loud bark which alarmed the garţison
and the Mughul party had to return without success.
While the siege operations languished, the Mughul army fell into
the grip of famine, as the enemy infested the roads and effectually
stopped the transport of provisions. In June the rain descended in
torrents, turning the roads into quagmires and the camp into a lake,
and completely washing out the trenches and raised batteries. The
enemy seized the opportunity. In the night of 15 June, amidst a
deluge of rain, they raided the Mughul advanced batteries and
trenches, slew the careless gunners, damaged the guns, destroved the
materials and munition, and carried off the chief of artillery (Ghairat
Khan) and thirteen other high officers as prisoners. It was only after
three days of struggle that the Mughuls were able to reoccupy the
lost battery. Meantime, three mines had been carried under the
bastions of the fort and each loaded with heavy charges of gunpowder.
On 30 June, under the emperor's own eyes, the first of them was fired,
but the force of the explosion was directed outwards and the scattered
rock killed 1100 of the densely crowded imperialists. After this the
garrison made a sortie, seized the Mughul trenches and outposts
opposite, and were driven out only after a long contest and heavy
slaughter. Then the second mine was fired with the same disastrous
.
consequences, the Mughuls losing another thousand men. The
enemy immediately made another sortie and took possession of the
## p. 289 (#323) ############################################
CAPTURE OF GOLCONDA FORT
289
field-works and outposts. The Mughuls fought desperately to recover
them, Firuz Jang and two other generals being wounded and large
numbers of their men slain. Aurangzib himself advanced into the
field to aid his troops; cannon-balls began to fall near him, but he
coolly kept his position and cheered his soldiers by his example.
While this battle was raging a tempest burst on the plain with the
tropical fury of wind, rain and thunder. The rising water forced the
Mughuls back, and then the enemy made another charge, seizing the
trenches further off and carrying away or damaging all their guns.
At sunset the defeated Mughuls fell back on their rear lines. Next
morning the third mine was fired, but having been discovered and
flooded with water by the enemy, it did not explode. Thus the
Mughuls failed with all their efforts and the siege dragged on.
The morale of the imperial army was utterly gone; the famine
grew worse than before; and a pestilence broke out which nearly
depopulated Hyderabad and caused havoc in the camp. "At night
heaps of dead bodies used to accumulate. After some months, when
the rains ceased, the white piles of skeletons looked from a distance
like hillocks of snow. " But Aurangzib held on with grim tenacity and
called up reinforcements. Golconda was completely enclosed by him
with a wall of wood and earth and ingress and egress from the fort
stopped. At the same time he annexed the Qutb Shahi kingdoom by
proclamation and set up his own officers in all places in it, so as to
stop supplies and succour from coming to the fort.
On 2 October, 1687, Golconda was captured, bụt by bribery. An
Afghan soldier of fortune named 'Abdullah Pani (surnamed Sardar
Khan), who had deserted from Bijapur service and then from the
Mughul to join Qutb Shah, now sold his master. He left the postern
gate of the fort open, and at his invitation Ruh-ullah Khan with a
small force entered by this gate unchallenged at 3 o'clock in the
morning, and opened the main gate, by which the Mughul pporting
columns poured into the fort like a flood. No resistance could be
made to a surprise in such force; only one faithful captain, 'Abdur-
Razzaq Lari, opposed the assailants single-handed, but he was borne
down covered with seventy wounds. The Mughuls nursed him back
to recovery and the emperor gave him high rank.
Abu-'l-Hasan, the last of the Qutb Shahs, left his throne with
calmness and dignity. When Ruh-ullah Khan entered his palace to
seize him, he bade his captors to breakfast with him, consoled his
women and servants, and left for the Mughul camp. In the evening
he was presented by A'zam to the emperor, who read him a long
lecture on his corrupt government, wherein he had been very
unfaithful in the charge he had committed to him, in encouraging
the Brahmans and discouraging the Moors, to the dishonour of their
religion and country, whereby he had justly brought these troubles
.
19
## p. 290 (#324) ############################################
290
AURANGZIB (1881-1707)
upon himself”. After a time he was sent off to the prison-fortress of
Daulatabad with an allowance of 50,000 rupees a year.
The spoils taken at Golconda amounted to nearly seventy million
rupees in cash, besides gold and silver plate, jewels and jewelled ware.
The revenue of the kingdom was, on paper, nearly thirty million
rupees.
The emperor set himself to take possession of the forts and districts
of the fallen kingdoms of Bijapur and Golkonda. Sagar (the Berad
capital), Adoni (the seat of Sidi Mas'ud), Karnul, Raichur, Sera and
Bangalore in Mysore, and Bankapur and Belgaum in Kanara, as well
as Wandiwash and Conjeveram in the eastern or Madras Carnatic,
were gained by his armies, in the course of a year from the fall
of Golconda. After his return to Bijapur, a deadly bubonic plague
broke out in the city and camp (November, 1688), which killed about
a hundred thousand people, including the emperor's wife Aurangabadi
Mahall, Jasvant's alleged son Muhammadi Raj, and many grandees.
Firuz Jang escaped with the loss of his eyes.
After the fall of Shambhuji, Aurangzib mostly encamped in Bijapur
and at different places south of that city (especially Galgala) for
many years, and finally settled at Brahmapuri (on the Bhima river)
to which he gave the name of Islampuri. After four years and a half
(June, 1695-October, 1699) passed here, he set out on the campaign
against Maratha forts from which he returned a broken down old
man to Ahmadnagar (31 January, 1706), only to die there (3 March,
1707). The flight of the new Maratha king Raja Ram to Gingee (end
of 1689) made that fort a centre of Maratha enterprise on the east
coast, while his ministers left at home organised resistance in the
west and thus doubled the task of the Mughuls. The difficulties of
Aurangzib were multiplied by this disappearance of a common head
and a central government among the Marathas, because every petty
Maratha captain now fought and plundered in a different quarter
on his own account. The Marathas were no longer a tribe of banditti
or local rebels, but the one dominating factor of Deccan politics,
and an enemy all-pervasive throughout the Indian peninsula, elusive
as the wind, the ally and rallying point of all the enemies of the Delhi
empire and all disturbers of public peace and regular administration
throughout the Deccan and even in Malwa, Gondwana and Bundel.
khand. The imperialists could not be present everywhere in full
strength; hence, they suffered reverses in places.
In 1689 the Marathas had been cowed by the fall of Shambhuji,
the siege of their capital and the perilous flight of their new king.
Many of their forts easily fell into Aurangzib's hands. Throughout
1690 and 1691 the emperor's chief concern was to take possession of
the rich and boundless dominions of the fallen 'Adil Shahi and
Qutb Shahi kingdoms in the south and the east. At this stage, he
underrated the Maratha danger, being satisfied with the annihilation
.
## p. 291 (#325) ############################################
MARATHA PARTISAN WAR
291
of their state. He was soon afterwards confronted by a people's war,
and about the middle of 1690 the first signs of the Maratha recovery
appeared, which became triumphant in 1692. The leaders in the
west or homeland were the Amatya (Ramchandra N. Bavdekar);
the Sachiv (Shankaraji Malhar), and Parashuram Trimbak (who
became Pratinidhi or regent in 1701), while in the eastern Carnatic
the king's supreme director was Prahlad Niraji (created Pratinidhi),
who stood above the nominal prime minister or Peshwa. Two extra-
ordinarily able and active generals, Dhana Jadav and Santaji Ghor-
pare (rivals for the post of commander-in-chief), frequently passed
from one theatre of war to the other across the peninsula, and caused
the greatest loss and confusion to the Mughuls. The Maratha plan
of operations was for Raja Ram to take refuge in the far-off impreg-
nable fort of Gingee (in the South Arcot district) and make a stand
there, while in the homeland independent commandos would be
crganised and guided against the Mughuls by Ramchandra Bavdekar,
on whom was conferred the new office of dictator (Hukumatpanah)
with full regal authority over all the officials and captains in Maha-
rashtra. He had an inborn genius for command and organisation,
chose the ablest lieutenants, and managed to make the mutually
jealous Maratha guerrilla leaders act in concert.
We shall deal with the eastern front first. The eastern Carnatic
extended from Chicacole to the mouth of the Cauvery on the sea-
board and over all the inland country including the Mysore plateau
and the modern Madras districts north of it. As the result of Muslim
conquests effected about the middle of the seventeenth century, this
vast country was divided into two parts, the Hyderabadi and the
Bijapuri, by an imaginary line from Vellore to Sadras, and each of
these parts was further subdivided into uplands and lowlands. But
the new rulers had not consolidated their conquests; much of the
country was still in the hands of unsubdued poligars (local chiefs),
or held by nobles who were independent of Bijapur and Hyderabad
in all but name. The situation was further complicated by Shivaji's
invasion of 1677 and establishment of a new Maratha government at
Gingee. After his death, his son-in-law Harji Mahadik became the
local viceroy, but practically assumed independence of his distant
master Shambhuji. After the fall of Bijapur and Golconda, Mughul
sovereignty was proclaimed over all the Carnatic once belonging to
them, but without any adequate force to make it effective.
During this eclipse of royalty, Harji invaded the Hyderabad
Carnatic north of the Palar river and took easy possession of several
forts (including Arcot) and a hundred towns. The Marathas plund-
ered the country and even the sacred city of Conjeveram (January,
1688). On the arrival of Aurangzib's officers, the raiders retreated, but
took post a day's march south of the Mughul camp at Wandiwash
(March). For a year the two armies remained there watching each
## p. 292 (#326) ############################################
292
AURANGZIB (1681-1707)
other, but daily sending out detachments which plundered the coun-
try indiscriminately. The trade and industry of the district were
ruined, food stuffs became very scarce, and all who could fled to the
fortified European settlements on the coast for shelter.
Harji died about 29 September, 1689; Raja Ram arrived at Gingee
on 11 November, took peaceful possession of it and established his
court there. Zu-'l-Fiqar Khan, as the supreme Mughul commander,
reached the environs of Gingee about the middle of September, 1690,
with the object of besieging the fort, but the task was too great for
his means. The rock-fortress of Gingee consists of three fortified
hillocks connected together by strong walls and forming a rough
triangle nearly 3 miles in circumference.
These hills are steep, rocky
and covered with such enormous boulders that they are almost un-
climbable. Zu-'l-Fiqar could neither bombard it nor cut off the garri-
son's communication with the outside. The activity of the Maratha
roving bands stopped his grain supply, he abandoned the siege, and at
his request reinforcements under the vazir Asad Khan and the young
prince Kam Bakhsh reached him at the end of December, 1691. He
renewed the siege in 1692, ran trenches and bombarded two points
without doing any damage. His object was only to make a show,
prolong the siege and thereby escape from being sent on campaign
elsewhere. Thus, he effected nothing during 1691 and 1692. At the
end of 1692 two disasters befell the Mughuls. Two large Maratha
armies raised in western India arrived in the Carnatic under the
famous generals Santa and Dhana. The first of these captured 'Ali
Mardan Khan, the imperial commandant of Conjeveram, with all
the horses, elephants and other property of his army, near Kaveripak
(23 December). The Khan ransomed himself for 100,000 huns. The
other Maratha division attacked the siege camp round Gingee, and
compelled Zu-'l-Fiqar Khan to draw his outposts in for safety, in
which operation Isma'il Khan Maka was captured with 500 horses and
carried off to Gingee.
The Maratha light horse now dominated the country and stopped
the coming of provisions and letters to the Mughul camp, which
lived in a state of siege. Alarming rumours spread that Aurangzib
was already dead and that Shah 'Alam had gained the throne. Kam
Bakhsh in fear and despair opened a secret correspondence with Raja
Ram, and planned to escape to Gingee with his family and then make
an attempt on the throne of Delhi with Maratha aid. This foolish
plot was betrayed to Zu-'l-Fiqar and Asad Khan. They consulted
the leading officers, who urged that the safety of the army required
that the prince should be kept under guard, the siege trenches
abandoned and all the troops concentrated in the rear lines after
bursting the big guns. The retreat was effected only after a severe
fight with the surrounding enemy and heavy losses. The prince, who
had conspired to arrest the two generals, was himself detained a
## p. 293 (#327) ############################################
ZU-'L-FIQAR KHAN BESIEGES GINGEE
293
prisoner in Asad Khan's tent and was later sent back to his father
under escort.
One great danger was thus averted, but the difficulties of the
Mughuls only thickened. Santa and Dhana by daily attacks wore
down the outnumbered imperialists and reduced them to famine.
Asad Khan then bribed Raja Ram to let him retreat to Wandiwash
unmolested, but his soldiers had lost all spirit through famine and
the death of transport animals; the retreat became a rout in which
the Mughul army was plundered of its property and stores (2 Febru-
ary, 1693). Supplies and reinforcements under Qasim Khan soon
arrived at Wandiwash, where the Mughuls halted for some months.
In February, 1694, Zu-'l-Fiqar Khan set out southwards along the
coast, conquering many forts in the South Arcot district and threaten-
ing Tanjore, the raja of which, Shahji II, had to sign a treaty (1 June)
promising to obey the emperor, give up Raja Ram's cause, and pay
an annual tribute of three million rupees. Then, after storming
Palamcottah, the Mughul general returned to Wandiwash, and near
the end of the year made a show of renewing the siege of Gingee. But
he had come to a secret understanding with Raja Ram, in expectation
of the death of the old emperor and civil wars among his sons, so that
nothing was achieved by the Mughuls during 1695. The arrival of
Dhana and Santa early in 1695 forced Zu-'l-Fiqar to raise the siege
and confine himself to the defensive in Arcot fort throughout 1696;
he was hopelessly outnumbered and without money or food.
Early in 1697 he collected tribute from Tanjore and other places
in the south and then returned to Wandiwash for the rainy season.
A bitter quarrel between Santa and Dhana weakened the Marathas,
and Zu-'l-Fiqar renewed the siege of Gingee in earnest, in November.
Daud Khan Pani, his lieutenant, captured Chikkali-drug (the de-
tached southern fort) by assault in one day and then entrenched
opposite the south face of Gingee itself, but his further efforts were
thwarted by Zu-'l-Fiqar, who gave the Marathas secret intelligence of
his intended attacks. At last Zu-'l-Fiqar had to take Gingee in order
to save his credit with the emperor. He sent timely warning to Raja
Ram, who escaped first to Vellore with his chief officers but left his
family behind. The three forts within Gingee were successfully
stormed in gallant style by the Rajputs and Afghans (18 January,
1698). A vast amount of booty was captured, and among the prisoners
were four wives and five children of Raja Ram. But the raja succeeded
in arriving at Vishalgarh; the work of the long siege of Gingee was
undone; the war was merely transferred to the western theatre.
We shall now turn to the affairs of western India after Raja Ram's
accession. The first flush of Mughul success was over in a year and
a half, the Marathas recovered from the crushing blows of Sham-
bhuji's capture and Raja Ram's flight to Madras, and they gained
their first signal victory over the Mughuls on 4 June, 1690, when they
## p. 294 (#328) ############################################
294
AURANGZIB (1681-1707)
captured Sharza Khan near Satara with his family, 4000 horses and
the entire camp and baggage of his army, after slaying 1500 of his
men. Then they recovered several forts from the imperialists, Partab-
garh, Rohira, Rajgarh and Torna. In 1692 there was a renewal of
Maratha activity and their success was conspicuous in many quarters,
such as the recovery of Panhala. The siege of this fort, urged by
Aurangzib, failed after many years of desultory attack under Mu'izz-
ud-din Bidar Bakht and Firuz Jang. The disaster to Sharza Khan
in 1690 compelled the emperor to occupy the north Satara district
in force, which led to frequent but indecisive conflicts with Santa
Ghorpare, who had made the Mahadev hill his base, and used to
raid far to the south and the east. The Belgaum and Dharwar districts
were harried by Santa and Dhana, which necessitated the strengthen-
ing of the Mughul forces there; but when these generals went off
to the eastern Carnatic (end of 1692), the Mughuls on the western
front enjoyed a short respite. Late in 1693 they returned home and
renewed their attacks. Dhana destroyed the siege-works before
Panhala, while Santa sent off Amrit Rao Nimbalkar to raid Berar,
and he himself levied chauth in the Malkhed region. Throughout
1694 and 1695 the Maratha bands were active and the Berads trouble-
some all over the western Deccan, but nothing decisive or noteworthy
was done on either side but desultory fighting and futile marches,
which wore the Mughuls down,
Then came two terrible disasters. In November, 1695, the emperor,
learning that Santa was conveying his rich store of plunder to his
own home in north-western Mysore, ordered Qasim Khan to intercept
him, and sent a picked force of his personal retinue and the contin-
gents of the nobles, under some of his highest officers, to reinforce
Qasim Khan. The two divisions united near Chitaldroog, and Qasim
Khan entertained his noble guests with all the pomp and luxury
of a Mughul grandee, discarding military precaution. Santa came
up from a distance by swift and secret marches and formed his men
in three divisions which were very ably handled and co-ordinated.
The first surprised and plundered the advanced tents of Qasim Khan
and his heavy baggage, the second intercepted and enveloped the
Khan, who was advancing to the rescue, while the third Maratha
division looted the camp and baggage left behind by Qasim Khan
in his advance. The Carnatic musketeers and Maratha light horse
completely overpowered the Mughuls and drove them in headlong
rout to the small fort of Dodderi, which had neither space nor food
sufficient for them. Fully one-third of the Mughul army fell in the
battle and the retreat; the rest capitulated through hunger; Qasim
Khan committed suicide. The remnant of his army, after promising
a ransom of two million rupees and giving up all its cash, horses and
other property, was set free (December, 1695).
Another great Mughul general, Himmat Khan, was in Basayapatan
## p. 295 (#329) ############################################
RAJA RAM'S LAST EFFORTS
295
(forty miles west of Dodderi). Santa appeared before it on 30 January,
1696, and lured Himmat Khan out of his refuge, and shot him dead
as he was leading a charge. His baggage was plundered, and his men
fell back into the fort. Here they were relieved after more than a
month. The emperor took prompt measures to strengthen the defence
of this district. Prince Bidar Bakht chastised Barmappa Nayak of
Chitaldroog, who had disloyally sided with Santa. Prince A'zam was
posted at Pedgaon.
But now a civil war weakened the Maratha strength. Santaji
Ghorpare was mortally jealous of Dhana-Jadav, his favoured rival
for the post of commander-in-chief (Senapati). His vanity, imperious
temper and insubordinate spirit gave great offence at Raja Ram's
court; Santa was attacked by Raja Ram and Dhana near Conjeveram
(May, 1696), but he defeated them. When he returned to Maharashtra
in March, 1697, a civil war broke out between him and Dhana, all
the Maratha captains being ranged on the two sides. In another
battle most of Santa's followers, disgusted with his severity and
insolence, went over to Dhana. Santa, defeated and despoiled of all,
fled from the field, but near the Mahadev hill he was murdered by
order of Radhika Bai Mane, whose brother he had slain (June, 1697).
In force of genius he was the greatest Maratha soldier after Shivaji,
but his temper was unbearable.
Nothing remarkable happened in the second half of 1697, nor for
some time after Raja Ram's return from Gingee to Vishalgarh
(February, 1698). Next year, after forming plans for an extensive
raid through Khandesh and Berar, he issued from Satara (5 Novem-
ber, 1699) and took the road with a large force. But he was intercepted
near Parenda by Bidar Bakht, broken and driven towards Ahmad.
nagar; his raid into Berar was nipped in the bud; but one division
under Krishna Savant crossed the Narbada for the first time and
plundered some places near Dhamoni. Battles, however, were fought
with Dhana and other generals in the Satara district with various
results (January, 1700).
On 12 March, 1700, Raja Ram died at Sinhgarh. His senior widow
Tara Bai placed her son. Shivaji III on the throne, while another wife
Rajas Bai crowned her son as Shambhuji II, and the Maratha
ministers and generals were again divided into two rival factions.
But Tara Bai's ability and energy, seconded by the genius of Para-
shuram Trimbak (the new regent), gave her supreme power in the
state.
. During the past decade, the Mughul cause had achieved remarkable
and unbroken success in the northern Konkan through the ability
and enterprise of a local commandant named Muat'bar Khan, a
Sayyid of the Navait clan. He first distinguished himself by cap-
turing or buying many hill-forts in the Nasik district, and then
descended into the Konkan, where he took Kalyan (April, 1689)
.
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296
AURANGZIB (1681-1707)
and several other places, occupying the country southwards to the
latitude of Bombay, and even forced the Portuguese of “the North"
(Bassein and Daman) to make peace by promising not to support
the Marathas. At Kalyan he lived for many years, adorning the
city with his many buildings and gardens, and restoring peace and
prosperity to the district.
By April, 1695, Aurangzib came to realise that his work in the
Deccan was not finished with the conquest of Bijapur, Golconda and
the Maratha capital; it was only beginning; for him there was no
going back to Delhi, as he could see no end to the people's war in
which he was entangled. Therefore, in May, 1695, he sent his eldest
surviving son Shah 'Alam to govern the Punjab, Sind and afterwards
Afghanistan and guard the north-western gateway of India, while
he himself took post at Brahmapuri for the next four and a half years
in the very heart of the enemy country. During this period (1695-99),
the Maratha danger came nearer home and drove the Mughuls into
the defensive in Maharashtra and Kanara. The movements of their
roving bands were bewilderingly rapid and unexpected, and the
Mughul pursung columns toiled in vain after them. Local represen-
tatives of the emperor were often driven to make unauthorised terms
with the Marathas by agreeing to pay chauth. Worse than that, some
imperialists made a concert with the enemy for sharing the plunder
of the emperor's own subjects. The Mughul administration had really
dissolved and only the presence of the emperor held it together, but
merely as a phantom rule.
The fall of Gingee enabled Aurangzib to concentrate all his re-
sources in the western theatre of war, and now began the last stage
of his career, the siege of successive Maratha forts by the emperor in
person. The rest of his life is a repetition of the same sickening tale:
a hill-fort captured by him in person after a vast expenditure of time,
men and money, the fort recovered by the Marathas from the weak
Mughul garrison after a few months, and its siege begun again a year
or two later. His soldiers and camp-followers suffered unspeakable
hardship in marching over flooded rivers, muddy roads and broken
hilly tracks; porters disappeared, transport beasts died of hunger and
overwork, scarcity of grain was ever present in the camp and the
Maratha and Berad “thieves" (as he officially called them) not far off.
The mutual jealousies of his generals ruined his cause or delayed
his success. The siege of eight forts, Satara, Parli, Panhala, Khelna
(=Vishalgarh), Kondhana (Sinhgarh), Rajgarh, Torna and Wagin-
gera, besides five places of lesser note, occupied him for five years
and a half (1699-1705), after which the broken down old man of
eighty-eight retired to die.
Leaving his family, surplus baggage and unnecessary officials in
the fortified camp of Brahmapuri in charge of the vazir, and giving
Zu-l-Fiqar, surnamed Nusrat Jang, a roving commission to fight the
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CAPTURE OF SATARA AND PARLI
297
Maratha field-armies that hovered round the emperor or threatened
this base camp, Aurangzib started from Brahmapuri on 29 October,
1699. Capturing Basantgarh on the way without a blow, he arrived
before Satara on 18 December and took up his quarters at Karanja,
a mile and a half to the north of the fort. The entire siege-camp, five
miles round, was enclosed with a wall to keep the Maratha raiders
out. The rocky soil made sapping a very slow and difficult work, and
the fort was never completely invested. The garrison made frequent
sorties, which were repulsed with more or less loss, while the Maratha
field-forces reduced the besiegers to the condition of a beleaguered
city, cutting off outposts and closing the road to grain dealers.
On 23 April the Mughuls fired two mines. The first killed many
of the garrison, but the commandant Pragji Prabhu was dug out -
alive from under the debris. The second exploded outwards, killing
two thousand of the Mughul soldiers, but making a 20 yards breach
in the wall. Baji Chavan Daphle, a Maratha vassal, mounted the
breach shouting to the Mughul soldiers to follow him and enter, but
they were too dazed by the catastrophe to advance, and he was
killed. But after the death of Raja Ram, the Maratha commandant
Subhanji lost heart and yielded the fort to the imperialists (1 May,
1700).
Aurangzib next laid siege to Parli, a fort six miles west of Satara
and the headquarters of the Maratha government. It resisted for
some time, and the invaders suffered terribly from excessive rain and
the scarcity of grain and fodder. But the emperor held grimly on
and at last the commandant evacuated the fort for a bribe (19 June).
These two sieges caused an enormous waste of men and animals;
the Mughul treasury was empty and the soldiers were starving as
their pay for three years was in arrears. Excessive rain aggravated
their sufferings. On the return march from Parli to Bhushangarh,
transport utterly broke down, much property had to be abandoned,
even nobles had to walk on foot through the mud, and only forty-five
miles were covered in thirty-five days. While the emperor was
encamped at Khavasspur (on the Man river), the river suddenly
rose in flood at midnight (11 October) and swept through the camp,
destroying many men and animals, and ruining the tents and baggage.
The emperor himself stumbled and dislocated his knee in trying to
escape. This left him a little lame for the rest of his life, which the
court flatterers used to say was the heritage of his ancestor, the
world-conqueror Timur-Lang! But reinforcements were summoned
from northern India and many thousands of fresh horses purchased
to mount the army again. The Marathas and Berads plundered
and levied chauth far and wide during this eclipse of the Mughul
power.
Panhala was the next fort attacked (19 March, 1701). The emperor
formed a complete circle of investment, fourteen miles in length,
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AURANGZIB (1681-1707)
around it and its sister-height Pavangarh. A mobile force under
Nusrat Jang was sent out to chastise the Marathas wherever heard of.
But in that stony region the progress of mining was very slow, while
the mutual jealousies of his generals led them to thwart each other
and thus prolonged the siege. The siege dragged on for two months,
without success seeming any nearer. Then a heavy bribe was paid
to the commandant Trimbak and he delivered the fort on 7 June.
Wardhangarh, Chandan, Nandgir and Wandan were next captured
with little or no opposition.
Aurangzib marched against Khelna next winter. This fort stands
on the crest of the western Ghats, 3350 feet above the sea and over-
looking the Konkan plain, with dense forests and thick underwood
below it. With great labour a road was made through the Ambaghat
pass by Fath-ullah Khan, but even then the emperor's followers
suffered terrible hardship and loss in crossing it and bringing his
camp and equipage to the foot of the fort. The siege dragged on for
five months; the Mughul artillery beat in vain against the solid rock
of the walls, while the missiles of the garrison did terrible havoc
among the imperialists crowded below. Some success was gained
at the western gate by Bidar Bakht's follower Raja Jay Singh (Sawai,
of Amber) and his Rajputs, who stormed the fausse braye of the gate
(7 May, 1702). But the terrible monsoon of the Bombay coast now
burst on the heads of the Mughul army. They then bribed the
commandant Parashuram to evacuate it (17 June). The imperialists
underwent unspeakable hardship in their return from Khelna, in
crossing the Ambaghat and the swollen streams on the way which
raged like torrents. Grain sold at a rupee a seer, "fodder and fire-
wood appeared in the isolated camp only by mistake”; no tent was
available. In this condition, traversing 30 miles in thirty-eight days,
the miserable army reached Panhala on 27 July.
On 12 December, the indomitable old man set out to conquer
Kondhana (Sinhgarh). But there was no life in the work of the
besiegers, and after wasting three months they secured the fort by
profuse bribery (18 April, 1703). After spending seven months near
Poona, the emperor besieged Rajgarh, and captured its first gate
by assault after two months of bombardment. Then the garrison
made terms but fled away from the fort at night (26 February, 1704).
Torna was next taken (20 March), the only fort that Aurangzib
captured by force without resort to bribery.
Next, after a six months' halt at Khed (7 miles north of Chakan),
the emperor marched to attack Wagingera, the capital of the Berads, a
an aboriginal people expert in musketry, night attack and robbery,
who lived in the fork between the Krishna and the Bhima, east of
Bijapur. The siege began on 19 February, 1705, but for many weeks
afterwards the Mughuls could make no progress; every day the
1 Fifteen pence a pound. 2 Beydurs in Meadows Taylor's 'Story of my life. '
## p. 299 (#333) ############################################
>
AURANGZIB'S LAST CAMPAIGN
299
enemy sallied out and attacked them, the bombardment from the
numerous well-supplied guns in the fort made the advance of the
siege-trenches or even their maintenance within range impossible.
One morning the imperialists captured by surprise the hillock of
Lal Tikri, which commands a portion of Wagingera, but the Berads
soon drove them out with heavy loss, as mutual jealousy among the
Mughul generals prevented the timely reinforcement of the captors
of this position.
On 6 April, a Maratha force under Dhana Jadav and Hindu Rao
(brother of Santa Ghorpare) arrived to support the Berads, because
the families of many Maratha generals were sheltered in Wagingera.
These were cleverly removed by the newcomers through the back-
door, while they kept the Mughuls in play by a noisy feint in front.
The Marathas halted in the neighbourhood in consideration of a
daily subsidy from Pidia the Berad chief, and made frequent attacks
on the Mughuls, who were now thrown into a state of siege and all
their activity ceased, while famine raged in their camp. Then Pidia
gained some time by delusive peace negotiations.
Nusrat Jang, who had arrived to aid the emperor, made steady
progress by capturing some of the outlying hillocks and the village
of Talwargera, in the plain south of the fort gate, after days of gallant
fight and heavy loss among his Bundela soldiers, till Pidia found
further struggle hopeless and evacuated the fort secretly at night
(8 May, 1705) with his Maratha allies. The Mughul camp-followers
who first entered it in search of plunder set fire to the grass huts
which caused terrible gunpowder explosions. The bare fort was
captured, but its chieftain and his clansmen remained free to give.
more trouble to the emperor.
After the fall of the fort, Aurangzib encamped at Devapur, a quiet
village on the bank of the Krishna, eight miles south of it. Here he
fell very ill on account of his extreme old age (ninety lunar years)
and incessant toil. His entire army was seized with consternation;
if he died who would lead them safely out of that enemy country?
His courageous struggling with disease and insistence on transacting
business in spite of fever made him very weak and at times uncon-
scious. But after ten or twelve days he began to rally, though slowly.
On his complete recovery, he broke up his camp on 2 November
and marched slowly to Ahmadnagar, which was reached on 31
January, 1706. This was destined to be his "journey's end”, for here
he died a year later.
When Aurangzib set out on his retreat to Ahmadnagar, he left
desolation and anarchy behind him. His march was molested by the
exultant Marathas under all their great generals, who followed his
army a few miles in the rear, cutting off its grain supplies and
stragglers and threatening to break into its camp. When attacked by
the Mughuls in force, they would fall back a little, but like water
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AURANGZIB (1681-1707)
parted by the oar would close again as soon as the attackers retired
on their main body. As the eyewitness Bhimsen wrote:
The Marathas became completely dominant over the whole kingdom and
closed the roads. By means of robbery they escaped from poverty and rose to
great wealth. I have heard that every week they distributed alms and sweet-
meats in charity, praying for the long life of the emperor, who had proved (for
them) the Feeder of the Universe! The price of grain grew higher and higher;
in the imperial camp in particular vast numbers perished of hunger and many
kinds of illegal exactions and practices appeared.
The Marathas reduced spoliation to a system :
Wherever these raiders arrived they engaged in collecting the revenue of the
place and passed months and years there with their wives and children in
composure of mind. They divided the parganas among themselves, and in
imitation of the imperial government they appointed their own subahdars (gov-
ernors), kamavish-dars (chauth-collectors) and rahdars (road-patrol). When
a kamavishdar was opposed by a strong zamindar or imperial faujdar, the
Maratha subahdat came to his aid (with his troops). . . . In each subah the
Marathas built one or two small forts, from which they issued to raid the
country around (Khafi Khan).
When the Marathas invade a province, they take from every pargana as much
money as they desire and make their horses eat the standing crops or tread them
down. The imperial army that comes in pursuit can subsist there only after
the fields have been cultivated (anew). All administration has disappeared. . . .
The peasants have given up cultivation; the jagirdars do not get a penny from
their fiefs. . . . The servants of the Maratha state support themselves by plund-
ering on all sides, and pay a small part of their booty to their king, getting no
salary from him. The coming of rent from the Mughul officers' jagirs ceased
. . . . The condition of the imperial army grew worse from the high price of
grain and the devastation of the jagirs, while the resources of the Marathas
increased through robbery. Thus, vicious circle was formed which aggra-
vated the evil. The mansabdars, on account of the scanty forces under them,
. cannot gain control over their jagirs. The local zamindars, growing stronger,
have joined the Marathas, raised troops and stretched the hand of oppression
over the realm. As the imperial dominions have been given out in fief to the
jagirdars, so too the Marathas have made a distribution of the whole empire
among their generals, and thus une kingdom has to support two sets of agir-
dars. . . . .
