No More Learning

The prac tical forms a clue to the answer of the theoretical, and--in its highest form --speculative question. For all hoping has happiness for its object, and stands in precisely the same re lation to the practical and the law of morality, as knowing to the theoretical cognition of things and the law of nature. 'I he former arrives finally at the conclusion that something is (which determines the ultimate end), because something ought
to take place ; the latter, that something is (which operates as the highest cause), because something does take place.
Happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires ; extensive, in regard to their multiplicity ; intensive, in regard to their degree ; and protensive, in regard to their duration. The practical law based on the motive of happiness, I term a prag matical law (or prudential rule) ; but that law, assuming such to exist, which has no other motive than the worthiness qf
? ? ? ? TBI CANON OF MTU HUM*. 4S<<I
iein^ hapyf, I term a moral or ethical law. The first telis ua what ws have to do, if we wish to become possessed of happiness ; the second dictates how we ought to act, in order to deserve happiness. The first is based upon empirical principles ; for it is only by experience that I can learn either what incli nations exist which desire satisfaction, or what are the natural means of satisfying them. The second takes no account of our desires or the means of satisfying them, and regards only the freedom of a rational being, and the necessary conditions under which alone this freedom can harmonize with the dis tribution of happiness according to principles. This second law may therefore rest upon mere ideas of pure reason, and may be cognized a priori.
? I assume tha* there are pure moral laws which determine, entirely a priori (without regard to empirical motives, that is, to happiness), the conduct of a rational being, or in other words, the use which it makes of ita freedom, and that these
laws are absolutely imperative (not merely hypothetically, on the supposition of other empirical ends), and therefore in all respects necessary. I am warranted in assuming this, not only by the arguments of the most enlightened moralists, but by the moral judgment of every man who will make the at
tempt to form a distinct conception of such a law.
Pure reason, then, contains, not indeed in its speculative, but in its practical, or, more strictly, its moral use, principles of the possibility of experience, of such actions, namely, as, in accordance with ethical precepts, might be met with in the
history of man. For since reason commands that such actions should take place, it must be possible for them to take place ; and hence a particular kind of systematic unity -- the moral, must be possible. We have found, it is true, that the syste matic unity of nature could not be established according to speculative principles of reason, because, while reason possesses a causal power in relation to freedom, it has none in relation
to the whole sphere of nature ; and, while moral principles of reason can produce free actions, they cannot produce natural laws. It is, then, in its practical, but especially iu its moral use, that the principles of pure reason possess objective reality.
I call the world a moral world, in so far as it may be in accordance with all the ethical law* --which, by virtue of the
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TUANSCENDEKTAX DOCTRISE OF METHOJ!
freedom of reasonable beings, it can be, and according to the necessary laws of morality it ought to be. But tbis world must be conceived only as an intelligible world, inasmuch as abstraction is therein made of all conditions (ends), and even of all impediments to morality (the weakness or pravity of human nature). --So far, then, it is a mere idea, -- though still a practical idea, which may have, and ought to have, an in fluence on the world of sense, so as to bring it as far as pos sible into conformity with itself. The idea of a moral world has, therefore, objective reality, not as referring to an ODject of intelligible intuition, -- for of such an object we can form no conception whatever, --but to the world of sense, --conceived, however, as an object of pure reason in ift practical use, ? and to a corpus mysticum of rational beings in in so far as the liberum arbitrium of the individual placed, under and virtue of mornl laws, in complete systematic unity both with itself, and with the freedom of all others.
That the answer to the first of the two questions of pure reason which relate to its practical interest :--Do that which will render thee worthy of happiness. The second question this If conduct myself so as not to be unworthy of hsppi ness, may hope thereby to obtain happiness In order to arrive at the solution of this question, we must inquire whether the principles of pare reason, which prescribe a priori the law, necessarily also connect this hope with it.
? say, then, that just as the moral principles are necessary according to reason in its practical use, so equally neces sary according to reason in its theoretical use, to assume that every one has ground to hope for happiness in the measure which he has made himself worthy of his conduct, and that therefore the system of morality
only in the idea of pure reason) connected with that of hap
piness.
Now in an intelligible, that in the moral world, in the
conception of which we make abstraction of all the impedi ments to morality (sensuous desires), such system of happi ness, connected with and proportioned to morality, may be conceived as necessary, because freedom of volition--partly incited, and partly restrained moral laws --would be itself the cause of general happiness and thus rational beings, under the guidance of such principles, would be themselves the autbon
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ooth of their own enduring welfare and that of others. But Mich a system of self-rewarding morality is only an idea, the carrying out of which depends upon the condition that every one acta as he ought ; in other words, that all' actions of reasonable beings be such as they would be if they sprung from a Supreme Will, comprehending in, or under, itself all particular wills. But since the moral law is binding on each individual in the use of his freedom of volition, even if others should not act in conformity with this law, neither the nature of things, nor the causality of actions and their relation to morality, determine how the consequences of these actions will be related to happiness ; and the necessary connection of the hope of happiness with the unceasing endeavour to become worthy of happiness, cannot be cognized by reason, if we take nature alone for our guide. This connection can be hoped for only on the assumption that the cause of nature is a supreme reason, which governs according to moral laws.
I term the idea of an intelligence in which the morally most perfect will, united with supreme blessedness, is the cause of all happiness in the world, so far as happiness stands in strict relation to morality (as the worthiness of being happy), the Ideal of the Supreme Good. It is only, then, in the ideal of the supreme original good, that pure reason can find the ground of the practically necessary connection of both elements of the highest derivative good, and accordingly of an intelligible, that moral world. Now since we are necessitated by reason to conceive ourselves as belonging to such world, while the senses present to us nothing but world of phenomena, we must assume the former as consequence of our conduct in the world of sense (since the world of sense gives us no hint of it), and therefore as future in relation to us. Thus God and future life are two hypotheses which, according to the principles of pure reason, are inseparable from the obligation which this reason imposes upon us.
Morality per te constitutes system. But we can form no system of happiness, except in so far as dispensed in strict proportion to morality. But this only possible in the in telligible world, under wise author and ruler. Such ruler, together with life in such world, which we must look upon m future, reason finds itself compelled to assume or must
regard the moral laws as idle dreams, since the necessary con.
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sequence which this same reason connects with them, must, without this hypothesis, fall to the ground. Hence also the moral laws are universally regarded as commands, which they could not be, did they not connect a priori adequate conse quences with their dictates, and thus carry with them promise* and threats. But this, again, they could not do, did they not reside in a necessary being, as the Supreme Good, which alone can render such a teleological unity possible.
Leibnitz termed the world, when viewed in relation to the rational beings which it contains, and the moral relations in which they stand to each other, under the government of the Supreme Good, the kingdom of Grace, and distinguished it from the kingdom ofNature, in which these rational beings live, under moral laws, indeed, but expect no other conse quences from their actions than such as follow according to the course of nature in the world of sense. To view ourselves, therefore, as in the kingdom of grace, in which all happiness awaits us, except in so far as we ourselves limit our partici pation in it by actions which render us unworthy of happiness, is a practically necessary idea of reason.
Practical laws, in so far as they are subjective grounds of actions, that subjective principles, are termed maxims. The judgments of morality, in its purity and ultimate results, are framed according to ideas the observance of its laws, accord ing to maxims.
The whole course of our life must be subject to moral maxims but this impossible, unless with the moral law, which mere idea, reason connects an efficient cause which ordains to all conduct which in conformity with the moral law an issue either in this or in another life, which exact conformity with our highest aims. Thus, without God and without world, invisible to us now, but hoped for, the glorious ideas of morality are, indeed, objects of approbation and of admiration, but cannot be the springs of purpose and action. For they do not satisfy all the aims which are natural to every rational being, and which are determined priori pure reason itself, and necessary.
Happiness alone is, in the view of reason, far from being
? the complete good. Reason does not approve of
much inclination may desire it), except as united with desert. On the other hand, morality "lone, and with mere desert.
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u likewise i'ar from being the complete good. To make it
complete, lie who conducts himself in n manner not unworthy
of happiness, must be able to hope for the possession of hap
piness. Even reason, unbiassed by private ends, or interested
considerations, cannot judge otherwise, if it puts itself in the
place of a being whose business it is to dispense all happiness to others. For in the practical idea both points are essen
tially combined, though in such a way that participation in happiness is rendered possible by the moral disposition, as its condition, and not conversely, the moral disposition by the prospect of happiness. For a disposition which should re quire the prospect of happiness as its necessary condition, would not be moral, and hence also would not he worthy of complete happiness --a happiness which, iuthe view of reason, recognizes no limitation but such as arises from our own im moral conduct.
Happiness, therefore, in exact proportion with the morality of rational beings (whereby they are made worthy of happi ness), constitutes alone the supreme good of a world into which we absolutely must transport ourselves according to the com mands of pure but practical reason. This world is, it is true, only an intelligible world ; for of such a systematic unity of ends as it requires, the world of sense gives us no hint. Its reality can be based on nothing else but the hypothesis of a supreme original good. In it independent reason, equipped with all the sufficiency of a supreme cause, founds, maintains, and fulfils the universal order of things, with the most perfect teleological harmony, however much this order may be hidden from us in the world of sense.
This moral theology has the peculiar advantage, in contrast with speculative theology, of leading inevitably to the concep tion of a sole, perfect, and rational First Cause, whereof specu lative theology does not give us any indication on objective grounds, far less any convincing evidence. For we find neither in transcendental nor in natural theology, however far reason may lead us in these, any ground to warrant us in assuming the existence of one only Being, which stands at the head of all natural causes, and on which these are entirely dependent. On the other hand, if we take our stand on moral ui. ity as a necessary law of the universe, and from this point of view consider what is necessary to give this law adequate elfioiency
? ? ? ? 494 TRAICSCKTDENTAI, DOCTHHTX OT METHOD.
and, for us, obligatory force, we must come to the conclude* that there is one only supreme will, which comprehends ai these laws in itself. For how, under different wills, should we find complete unity of ends? This will must be omni potent, that all nature and its relation to morality in the world may be subject to it ; omniscient, that it may have knowledge of the most secret feelings and their moral worth ; omni present, that it may be at band to supply every necessity to which the highest weal of the world may give rise ; eternal, that this harmony of nature and liberty may never fail ; and bo on.
But this systematic unity of ends in this world of intelli gences -- which, as mere nature, is only a world of sense, but as a system of freedom of volition, may be termed an in telligible, that moral world (regnum gratia) -- leads in evitably also to the teleologicnl unity of all things which con stitute this great whole, according to universal natural laws, -- just as the unity of the former according to universal and necessary moral laws, -- and unites the practical with the specu lative reason. The world must be represented as having originated from an idea, to harmonize with that use of reason without which we cannot even consider ourselves as worthy of reason, --namely, the moral use, which rests entirely on the idea of the supreme good. Hence the investigation of nature receives teleological direction, and becomes, in its widest extension, physico-theology. But this, taking its rise in moral order as unity founded on the essence of freedom, and not accidentally instituted by external commands, estab lishes the teleological view of nature on grounds which must be inseparably connected with the internal possibility of things. This gives rise to transcendental theology, which takes the ideal of the highest ontological perfection as principle of systematic unity and this principle connects all things ac cording to universal and necessary natural laws, because all things have their origin in the absolute necessity of the one only Primal Being.
What use can we make of our understanding, even re spect of experience, we do not propose ends to ourselves
But the highest ends are those of morality, and
pure reason that can give us the knowledge of these. Though supplied with these, and putting ourselves under their gui-l
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Mice, we un make no teleological use of the knowledge at nature, as regards cognition, unless nature itself has estali- lished teleological unity. For without this unity we shouM not even possess reason, because we should have no school for reason, and no cultivation through objects which afford the materials for its conceptions. But teleological unity is a necessary unity, and founded on the essence of the indi vidual will itself. Hence this will, which is the condition of the application of this unity in concreto, must be so likewise. In this way the transcendental enlargement of our rational
cognition would be, not the cause, but merely the effect of the practical teleology, which pure reason imposes upon us.
Hence, also, we find in the history of human reason that, before the moral conceptions were sufficiently purified and determined, and before men had attained to a perception of
the systematic unity of ends according to these conceptions and from necessary principles, the knowledge of nature, and even a considerable amount of intellectual culture in many other sciences, could produce only rude and vague concep tions of the Deity, sometimes even admitting of an astonish ing indifference with regard to this question altogether. But the more enlarged treatment of moral ideas, which was ren dered necessary by the extremely pure moral lawof our religion, awakened the interest, and thereby quickened the perceptions
of reason in relation to this object. In this way, and without the help either of an extended acquaintance with nature, or of a reliable transcendental insight, (for these have been wanting in all ages), a conception of the Divine Being was arrived at, which we now hold to be the correct one, not because specu lative reason convinces us of its correctness, but because it accords with the moral principles of reason. Thus it is to pure reason, but only in its practical use, that we must ascribe the merit of having connected with our highest interest ?
cognition, of which mere speculation was able only to form a conjecture, but the validity of which it was unable to estab lish, -- and of having thereby rendered not indeed demon strated dogma, but a hypothesis absolutely necessary to the essential ends of reason.
But practical reason haa reached this elevation, and has attained to the conception of sole Primal Being, as the supreme good, must not, therefore, imagine that haa
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? 496 TRANSCEKDEJTTAL DOCTBEN1 OF METHOD.
transcended the empirical conditions of its application, anil risen to the immediate cognition of new objects ; it must not presume to start from the conception which it has gained, and to deduce from it the moral laws themselves. For it was these very laws, the internal practical necessity of which led us to the hypothesis of an independent cause, or of a wise ruler of the universe, who should give them effect. Hence we are not entitled to regard them as accidental and derived from the mere will of the ruler, especially as we have no con ception of such a will, except as formed in accordance with
these laws. So far, then, as practical reason has the right to conduct us, we shall not look upon actions as binding on us, because they are the commands of God, butwe shall regard them as divine commands, because we are internally bound them. We shall study freedom under the teleologies] unity which accords with principles of reason ; we shall look upon ourselves as acting in conformity with the divine will only in so far as we hold sacred the moral law which reason teaches us from the nature of actions themselves, and we shall believe that we can obey that will only by promoting the weal of the universe in ourselves and in others. Moral theology therefore, only of immanent use. teaches us to fulfil our destiny here in the world, by placing ourselves
in harmony with the general system of ends, and warns against the fanaticism, nay, the crime of depriving reason of its legislative authority in the moral conduct of life, for the purpose of directly connecting this authority with the idea of the Supreme Being. For this would be, not an imma nent, but transcendent use of moral theology, and, like the transcendent use of mere speculation, would inevitably per vert and frustrate the ultimate ends of reason.
THE CANON OF PURE REASON. Section III.
Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief.
The holding of thing to be true, phenomenon in out understanding which may rest on objective grounds, but re quires, also, subjective causes in the mind of the person judging. If judgment valid for every rational being, then its ground objectively sufficient, and termed
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action. on the other hand, has its ground in the particular character of the subject, termed persuasion.
Persuasion mere illusion, the ground of the judgment, which lies solely in the subject, being regarded as objective.
Hence judgment of this kind has only private validity-- only valid for the individual who judges, and the holding of a thing to be true in this way cannot be communicated. But truth depends upon agreement with the object, and consequently the judgments of all understandings, true, must be in agreement with each other (consentienlia uni tertio consentiunt inter se). Conviction may, therefore, be distinguished, from an external point of view, from persua sion, by the possibility of communicating and showing its validity for the reason of every man for in this case the presumption, at least, arises, that the agreement of all judg ments with each other, in spite of the different characters of individuals, rests upon the common ground of the agreement of each with the object, and thus the correctness of the judg ment established.
? Persuasion, accordingly, cannot be subjectively distin guished from conviction, that so long as the subject views its judgment simply as phenomenon of its own mind. But we inquire whether the grounds of our judgment, which are valid for us, produce the same effect on the reason of others as on our own, we hav<< then the means, though only subjective means, not, indeed, of producing conviction, but of detecting the merely private validity of the judgment in other words, of discovering that there in the element of mere persuasion.
If we can, in addition to this, develope the subjective causes of the judgment, which we have taken for its objective grounds, and thus explain the deceptive judgment as phe- nomeuon in our mind, apart altogether from the objective character of the object, we can then expose the illusion and need be no longer deceived by although, its subjective cause lies in our nature, we cannot hope altogether to escape its influence.
can only maintain, that affirm as necessarily valid for every one, that which produces conviction. Persuasion may keep for myself, agreeable to me but cannot, ana
ought not, to attempt to impose as binding upon inert. KK
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Holding for true, or the subjective validity of a jidgment in relation to conviction (which is, at the same time, objec tively valid), hahjie three following degrees : Opinion, Belief, and Knowledge. Opinion is a consciously insufficient judg ment, subjectively as well as objectively. Belief is subjec tively sufficient, but is recognized as being objectively in sufficient. Knowledge is both subjectively and objectively sufficient. Subjective sufficiency is termed conviction (for myself) ; objective sufficiency is termed certainty (for all). I need not dwell longer on the explanation of such simple
conceptions.
I must never venture to be of opinion, without knowing
something, at least, by which my judgment, in itself merely
is brought into connection with the truth, -- which connection, although not perfect, is still something more than an arbitrary fiction. Moreover, the law of such a connection must be certain. For in relation to this law, have nothing more than opinion, my judgment but play of the imagination, without the least relation to truth. --In the judgments of pure reason, opinion lias no place. For as they do not rest on empirical grounds, and as the sphere of pure reason that of necessary truth and a priori cognition, the principle of connection in requires universality and ne cessity, and consequently perfect certainty, --otherwise we should have no guide to the truth at all. Hence absurd to have an opinion in pure mathematics we must know, or abstain from forming judgment altogether. The case the same with the maxims of morality. For we must not hazard an action on the mere opinion that allowed, but we must know to be so.
In the transcendental sphere of reason, on the other hand, the term opinion too weak, while the word knowledge too strong. From the merely speculative point of view, therefore, we cannot form judgment at all. For the subjective grounds of judgment, such as produce belief, cannot be admitted in speculative enquiries, inasmuch as they cannot stand without empirical support, and are incapable of being communicated to others in equal measure.
But only from the practical point of view that theo retically insufficient judgment can be termed belief. Now tci practical reference either to tkiil or to morality; 10 ih<
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former, when the end proposed is arbitrary and accidental, to the latter, when it is absolutely necessary.
If we propose to ourselves any end whatever, the conditions of its attainment are hypothetically necessary. The necessity is subjectively, but still only comparatively, sufficient, if I am acquainted with no other conditions under which the end can be attained. On the other hand, it is sufficient, absolutely, and for every one, if I know for certain that no one can be acquainted with any other conditions, under which the attain ment of the proposed end would be possible. In the former case my supposition -- my judgment with regard to certain conditions, is a merely accidental belief; in the latter it is a necessary belief. The physician must pursue some course in the case of a patient who is in danger, but is ignorant of the nature of the disease. He observes the symptoms, and con eludes, according to the best of his judgment, that it is a case of phthisis. His belief even in his own judgment, only contingent another man might, perhaps, come nearer the truth. Such belief, contingent indeed, but still forming the ground of the actual use of means for the attainment of certain ends, term praymatical belief.
? The usual test, whether that which any one maintains merely his persuasion, or his subjective conviction at least, that his firm belief, bet. It frequently happens that man delivers his opinions with so much boldness and assurance, that he appears to be under no apprehension as to the possibility of his being in error. The offer of bet startles him, and makes him pause. Sometimes turns out that his persuasion may
be valued at ducat, but not at ten. For he does not hesi tate, perhaps, to venture ducat, but proposed to stake ten, he immediately becomes aware of the possibility of his being mistaken -- possibility which has hitherto escaped his observation. If we imagine to ourselves that we have to stake the happiness of our whole life on the truth of any proposi tion, our judgment drops its air of triumph, we take the alarm, and discover the actual strength of our belief. Thus prag matical belief has degrees, varying in proportion to the inter ests at stake.
Now, in cases where we cannot enter upon any course of action in reference to some object, and where, accordingly, oui judgment purely theoretical, we can utill represent to our
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? elves, in thought, the possibility of a course of action, foi which we suppose that we have sufficient grounds, if any meapa existed of ascertaining; the truth of the matter. Thus we find in purely theoretical judgments an analogon of practical judg ments, to which the word belief may properly be applied, and which we may term doctrinal belief.
I should not hesitate to stake my all on the truth of the proposition, -- if there were any possibility of bringing it to the test of experience, --that, at least, some one of the planets, which we see, is inhabited. Hence I say that I have not merely the opinion, but the strong belief, on the correctness of which I would stake even many of the advantages of life, that there are inhabitants in other worlds.
Now we must admit that the doctrine of the existence of God belongs to doctrinal belief. For, although in respect to the theoretical cognition of the universe I do not require to form any theory which necessarily involves this idea, as the condition of my explanation of the phenomena which the universe presents, but, on the contrary, am rather bound so to use my reason as if everything were mere nature, still teleological unity is so important a conditiou of the application of my reason to nature, that it is impossible for me to ignore it -- especially since, in addition to these considerations, abundant examples of it are supplied by experience. But the sole condition, so far as my knowledge extends, under which this unity cau be my guide in the investigation of nature, is the assumption that a supreme intelligence has ordered all things according to the wisest ends. Consequently the hypothesis of a wise author of the universe is necessary for my guidance in the investigation of nature --is the condition under which alone I can fulfil an end which is contingent indeed, but by no means unimportant. Moreover, since the result of my at tempts so frequently confirms the utility of this assumption, and since nothing decisive can be adduced against follows that would be saying far too little to term my judgment, this case, mere opinion, and that, even in this theoretical con nection, may assert that firmly believe God. Still, we use words strictly, this must not be called practical, but
doctrinal belief, which the theology of nature (physico- tlieoln;:r) must also produce my mind. In the wisdom
Supreme lieing, and the shortness of life, so inadequate
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to the development of the glorious powers of human nature, we may find equally sufficient grounds for a doctrinal belie! in the future life of the human bouI.
The expression of belief in such cases, an expression of modesty from the objective point of view, but, at the same time, of firm confidence, from the subjective. If should venture to term this merely theoretical judgment even so much as hypothesis which am entitled to assume more complete conception, with regard to another world find to the cause of the world, might then be justly required of me than am, in reality, able to give. For, assume anything, even as mere hypothesis, must, at least, know so much ot the properties of suoh being as will enable me, not to form the conception, but to imagine the existence of it. But the word belief refers only to the guidance which an idea gives me, and to its subjective influence on the conduct of my reason, which forces roe to hold fast, though may net be in
position to give speculative account of it.
But mere doctrinal belief to some extent, wanting sta
bility. We often quit our hold of consequence of the difficulties which occur in speculation, though in the end we
inevitably return to again.
quite otherwise with moral belie/. For in this sphere
action absolutely necessary, that must act obedience to the moral law in all points. The end here incontrover- tibly established, and there only one condition possible, according to the best of my perception, under which this end can harmonize with all other ends, and so have practical validity -- namely, the existence of God and of future world.
know also, to certainty, that no one can be acquainted with any other conditions which conduct to the same unity of ends under the moral law. But since the moral precept is, at the same time, my maxim (as reason requires that should be). am irresistibly constrained to believe in the existence of God and future life and am sure that nothing can make me
waver in this belief, since should thereby overthrow my morn) maxims, the renunciation of which would render me hateful in my own eyes.
Ihus, while all the ambitious attempts of reason to pene trate beyond the limits of experience end in disappointment, there still enough left to satisfy us practical point
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view. No one, it is true, will be able to boast that he Vnowi that there in a God and a future life; for, if he knows thia, hi in just ihe man whom 1 have long wished to find. All know ledge, regarding an object of mere reason, can be communi cated ; and I should thus be enabled to hope that my own knowledge would receive this wonderful extension, through the instrumentality of his instruction. No, my conviction is not logical, but moral certainty ; and since it rests on subjective
It it morally certain that there is a God, &c. , but : 1 am morally
grounds (of the moral sentiment), I must not even say :
? certain, that my belief in God and in another world sc interwoven with my moral nature, that am under as little apprehension of having the former torn from me as of losing the latter.
The only point in this argument that may appear open to suspicion, that this rational belief presupposes the existence of moral sentiments. If we give up this assumption, and take
man who entirely indifferent with regard to moral laws, the question which reason proposes, becomes then merely problem for speculation, and may, indeed, be supported strong grounds from analogy, but not such as will compel the most obstinate scepticism to give way. But these ques tions no man free from all interest. For though the want of good sentiments may place htm beyond the influence of moral interests, still even in this case enough may be left to make him fear the existence of God and future life. For he cannot pretend to any certainty of the non-existence of God and of future life, unless --since could only be proved
mere reason, and therefore apodeictically -- he
to establish the impossibility of both, which certainly no reasonable man would undertake to do. This would be negative belief, which could not, indeed, produce morality and good sentiments, but still could produce an analogon of these, by operating as powerful restraint on the outbreak of evil dispositions.
But, will be said, this all that pure reason can effect,
? The human mind (as, believe, every rational being must of necessity do,) takes natural interest in morality, although this interest not un divided, and may not be practically in preponderance. If you strengthen and increase you will find the reason become docile, more enlightened, and more capable of uniting the speculative interest with the practical. Hut
you do not take care at the outset, or at least mid-way, to make racr good, you will never force them into au honest belie*"-
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? THE ARCHITECTOWIC OF PUKE KEA8OK. 503
is opening up prospects beyond the limits of experience ? Nothing more than two articles of belief? Common tense could have done as much as this, without taking the philoso phers to counsel in the matter !
I shall not here eulogize philosophy for the benefits which the laborious efforts of its criticism have conferred on human reason, -- even granting that its merit should turn out in the end to be only negative, --for on this point something more will be said in the next section. But I ask, do you require that that knowledge which concerns all men, should transcend the common understanding, and should only be revealed to you by philosophers ? The very circumstance which has called forth your censure, is the best confirmation of the correctness of our previous assertions, since it discloses, what could not have been foreseen, that Nature is not chargeable with any partial distribution of her gifts in those matters which concern all men without distinction, and that in respect to the essential ends of human nature, we cannot advance further with the help of the highest philosophy, than under the guidance which nature has vouchsafed to the meanest understanding.
TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. CHAPTER THIRD.
The Ahohitectonio of Puhe Reasow.
By the term Architectonic I mean the art of constructing a
? Without systematic unity, our knowledge cannot be come science ; it will be an aggregate, and not a system. Thus Architectonic is the doctrine of the scientific in cognition, and therefore necessarily forms part of our Methodology.
Reason cannot permit our knowledge to remain in an uncon nected and rhapsodistic state, but requires that the sum of our cognitions should constitute a system. It. is thus alone that they can advance the ends of reason. By a system I mean the unity of various cognitions under one idea. This idea is the conception --given by reason--of the form of a whole, in so far as the conception determines a priori not
only the limits of its content, but the place which each of its parts w. to occupy. The scientific idea contains, there* fore, the end, and the form of the whole which is in accord*
system.
? ? ? 504 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRtNE OF METHOD.
? nee with that end. The unity of the end, to which all the parts of the system relate, and through which all have a re lation to each other, communicates unity to the whole system, ? o that the absence of any part can be immediately detected from our knowledge of the rest ; and it determines a priori the limits of the system, thus excluding all contingent or arbitrary additions. The whole is thus an organism (articulatio), and not an aggregate (coacervatio) ; it may grow from within (per intutsutceplionem), but it cannot increase by external additions (per appositionem). It is thus like an animal body, the growth of which does not add any limb, but, without changing their proportions, makes each in its sphere stronger and more active.
We require, for the execution of the idea of a system, a
? content and an arrangement of parts deter the principle which the aim of the system schema which not projected in accordance with an idea, that from the stand-point of the highest aim
of reason, but merely empirically, in accordance with acciden tal aims and purposes (the number of which cannot be pre determined), can give us nothing more than technical unity. But the schema which originated from an idea (in which case reason presents us with aims priori, and does not look for them to experience), forms the basis of architeetonical unity. science, in the proper acceptation of that term, cannot be formed technically, that front observation of the similarity existing between different objects, and the purely contingent use we make of our knowledge in eoncreto with reference to all kinds of arbitrary external aims its consti tution must be framed on architeetonical principles, that
its parts must be shown to possess au essential affinity, and he capable of being deduced from one supreme and internal aim or end, which forms the condition of the possibility of the scientific whole. The schema of science must give a priori the plan of (monogramma), and the division of the whole into parts, in conformity with the idea of the science and must also distinguish this whole from all others, according to certain understood principles.
No one will attempt to construct science, unless he havo some idea to rest on as proper basis. But, in the elaboration of the science he fipds that the schema, nay, even the defi
schema, that mined priori
prescribes.
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? THE ABCJUTECTONIO OF PtTRE REASOI. 505
nition which he at first gave of the science, rarely corresponds
with his idea ; for this idea lies, like a germ, in our reason,
its parts undeveloped and hid even from microscopical obser vation. For this reason, we ought to explain and define
sciences, not according to the description which the originator gives of them, but according to the idea which we find base,d in reason itself, and which is suggested by the natural unity of the parts of the science already accumulated. For it will often be found, that the originator of a science, and even his latest successors, remain attached to an erroneous idea, which they cannot render clear to themselves, and that they thus fail in determining the true content, the articulation or systematic unity, and the limits of their science.
It is unfortunate that, only after having occupied ourselvei for a long time in the collection of materials, under the guid ance of an idea which lies undeveloped in the mind, but not according to any definite plan of arrangement, --nay, only after we have spent much time and labour in the technical dispo sition of our materials, does it become possible to view the idea of a science in a clear light, and to project, according to
architectonical principles, a plan of the whole, in accordance with the aims of reason. Systems seem, like certain worms, to be formed by a kind of generatio aquivoca --by the mere confluence of conceptions, and to gain completeness only with the progress of time. But the schema or germ of all lies in reason ; and thus is not only every system organized accord-, ing to its own idea, but all are united into one grand system of human knowledge, of which they form members. For this reason, it is possible to frame an architectonic of all hu man cognition, the formation of which, at the present time, considering the immense materials collected or to be found in the ruins of old systems, would not indeed be very difficult. Our purpose at present is merely to sketch the plan of the
? Architectonic of all cognition given by pure reason ; and we begin from the point where the main root of human know ledge divides into two, one of which is reason. By reason I understand here the whole higher faculty of cognition, the rational being placed in contradistinction to the empirical.
If I make complete abstraction of the content of cognition, objectively considered, all cognition fr>m subjective point of view, either historical or rational. Historical cogni
? ? is,
a
? B06 THAWsCENDEirTAI/ DOCTRISE OF METHOD.
tion is cognitio ex datis, rational, ingnitio ex principiiz. What ever may be the original source of a cognition, it in relation to the person who possesses merely historical,
be knows only what has been given him from another quarter, whether that knowledge was communicated direct experience or instruction. Thus the person who has learned system of philosophy, -- say the Wolfian, -- although he has perfect knowledge of all the principles, definitions and arguments in that philosophy, as well as of the divisions that have been made of the system, he possesses really no more than historical knowledge of the Wolfian system he knows only what has been told him, his judgments are only those which he has received from his teachers. Dispute the validity of definition, and he at completely loss to find another. He has formed his mind on another's but the imitative faculty not the productive. His knowledge has not been drawn from reason and, although, objectively consi dered, rational knowledge, subjectively, merely histo rical. He has learned this or that philosophy, and
? merely plaster-cast of living man. Rational cognitions which are
philosophical,
the latter mathematical. have already shewn
which have their source in reason, can be
objective, that
so termed from
have been drawn
of reason, that
that criticism, or even the rejection of what has been already learned, can spring up in the mind.
All rational cognition again, based either on conceptions, or on the construction of conceptions. The former termed
subjective point of view, only when they the individual himself from the sources from principles and in this way alone
the essential difference of these two methods of cognition in
cal and subjectively historical, --as the case with the majority of scholars and those who cannot look beyond the limits of their system, and who remain in state of pupillage all their lives. But remarkable that mathematical knowledge, when committed to memory, valid, from the subjective point of view, as rational knowledge also, and that the same distinction cannot be drawn here as in the case of philosophi cal cognition. The reason that the only way of arriving at this knowledge through the essential principles of reason, *nd thus always certain and indisputable because reason
the first chapter. cognition may be objectively philosophi
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? top: aucittteotontc of tuhe beasok. 507 Is employed in concrete -- but at the same time a prion--
tha;
Philosophy the system of all philosophical cognition We must use this term in an objective sense, we understand
the archetype of all attempts at philosophizing, and the standard by which all subjective philosophies are to be judged. In this sense, philosophy merely the idea of possible science, which does not exist in concreto, but to which we endeavour in various ways to approximate, until we have disco vered the right path to pursue -- path overgrown the errors and illusions of sense, -- and the image we have hitherto tried to shape in vain, has become perfect copy of the great proto type. Until that time, we cannot learn philosophy-- does not exist does, where who possesses and how shall we know it? We cm only learn to philosophize in other words, we can only exercise our powers of reasoning in accordance with general principles, retaining at the same time, the right of investigating the sources of these principles, of testing, and even of rejecting them.
Until then, our conception of philosophy only a scho lastic conception-- conception, that of a system of cogni tion which we are trying to elaborate into science all that we at present know, being the systematic unity of this cogni tion, and consequently the logical completeness of the cogni tion for the desired end. But there also cosmical concep
pure, and therefore, infallible intuition and thai all causes of illusion and error are excluded. Of all the priori sciences of reason, therefore, mathematics alone can be learned. Philosophy -- unless be an historical manner -- cannot be le. 'irned we can at most learn to philosophize.
? tion (conceptus cosmicus) of philosophy, which has always formed the true basis of this term, especially when philosophy was personified and presented to us in the ideal of philoso pher. In this view, philosophy the science of the relation of all cognition to the ultimate and essential aims of human reason (teleologia rationis humante), and the philosopher not merely an artist --who occupies himself with conceptions, but
law-giver --legislating for human reason. In this sense of the word, would be in the highest degree arrogant to as sume the title of philosopher, and to pretend that we had reached the perfection of the prototype which lies the idea alone
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? 508 TH4KSCJS5DEKTAL DOOTHllTE OF METHOD.
The mathematician, the natural philosopher, and the logi cian, --how far soever the first may hare advanced in rational, and the two latter in philosophical knowledge, --are merely k rti-ts, engaged in the arrangement and formation of concep tions ; they cannot be termed philosophers. Above them all, there is the ideal teacher, who employs them aa instruments for the advancement of the essential aims of human reason. Him alone can we call philosopher ; but he nowhere exists. But the idea of his legislative power resides in the mind of every man, and it alone teaches us what kind of systematic unity philosophy demands in view of the ultimate aims of rea
son. This idea therefore, cosmical conception. *
In view of the complete systematic unity of reason, there can only be one ultimate end of all the operations of the mind. To this all other aims are subordinate, and nothing more than
means for its attainment. This ultimate end the destina tion of roan, and the philosophy which relates to termed Moral Philosophy. The superior position occupied moral
philosophy, above all other spheres for the operations of reason, sufficiently indicates the reason why the ancients always iucluded the idea -- and in an especial manner -- of Moralist in that of Philosopher. Even at the present day, we call man who appears to have the power of self-govern ment, even although his knowledge may be very limited,
? the name of philosopher.
The legislation of human reason, or philosophy, has two
objects -- Nature and Freedom, and thus contains not only the laws of nature, but also those of ethics, at first in two separate systems, which, finally, merge into one grand philosophical
system of cognition. The philosophy of Nature relates to that which is, that of Ethics to that which ought to be.
But nll philosophy either cognition on the basis of pnre reason, or the cognition of reason on the basis of empirical principles. The former termed pure, the latter empirical philosophy.
The philosophy of pure reason either propcedeutie, that is, an inquiry into the powers of reason in regard to pure priori
By comical conception, mean one in which all men necessarily take an interest the aim of science must accordingly be determined ac cording 10 scholastic [or partial] conceptions, regarded merely at amcaaa to certain arbitrarily proposed ends.
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? THE ARCHITECTONIC Of SOBE EEAsOJT. SOil
cognition, aud is termed Critical Philosophy ; or it secondly, the system of pure reason-- science containing the syste matic presentation of the whole body of philosophical know ledge, true as well as illusory, given pure reason, and called Metaphysic. This name may, however, be also given to the whole system of pure philosophy, critical philosophy included, and may designate the investigation into the sources or possibility of priori cognition, as well as the presentation of the a priori cognitions which form system of pure philo sophy --excluding, at the same time, all empirical and mathe
matical elements.
divided into that of the speculative and that of the practical use of pure reason, and accordingly, either the Metaphysic Nature, or the Metaphysic 0/ Ethics. The former contains all the pure rational principles -- based upon
conceptions alone (and thus excluding mathematics) --of all
? Metaphysic
the latter, the principles which deter priori all action. Now moral philo
theoretical cognition
mine and necessitate
sophy alone contains
actions --which are deduced from principles entirely a priori. Hence the Metaphysic of Ethics the only pure moral philo sophy, as not based upon anthropological or other empi rical considerations. The metaphysic of speculative reason what commonly called Metaphysic in the more limited sense. But as pure Moral Philosophy properly forms part of this system of cognition, we must allow to retain the name of Metaphysic, although not requisite that we should insist on so terming in our present discussion.
of the highest importance to separate those cognitions which differ from others both in kind and in origin, and to take great care that they are not confounded with those, with which they are generally found connected. What the chemist does in the analysis of substances, what the mathematician in pure mathematics, in still higher degree, the duty of the philosopher, that the value of each different kind of cognition, and the part takes in the operations of the mind, may be clearly defined. Human reason has never wanted Metaphysic of some kind, since attained the power of thought, or rather of reflection but has never been able to keep this sphere of thought and cognition pure from all admixture of foreign
elements. The idea of science of this kind az old as
code of laws -- for the regulation of our
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? 510 TRANSCENDENTAL BOCTRINE OF ltWUOD.
speculation itself ; and what mind does not apeculute --eithei in the scholastic or in the popular fashion ? At the same time, it must be admitted that even thinkers by profession have been unable clearly to explain the distinction between the two elements of our cognition -- the one completely a priori, the other a posteriori; and hence the proper definition of a peculiar kind of cognition, and with it the just idea of a science which has so long and bo deeply engaged the attention of the human mind, has never been established. When it was said--Metaphysic is the science of the first principles of human cognition, this definition did not signalise a peculiarity in kind, but only a difference in degree ; these first principles were thus declared to be more general than others, but no criterion ot distinction from empirical principles was given. Of these some are more general, and therefore higher, than others ; and -- as we cannot distinguish what is completely a priori, from that which is known to be a posteriori -- where shall we draw the line which is to separate the higher and so-called first principles, from the lower and subordinate principles of cognition ? What would be said if we were asked to be satis fied with a division of the epochs of the world into the earlier centuries and those following them ? Does the fifth, or the tenth century belong to the earlier centuries? it would be asked. In the same way I ask : Does the conception of ex tension belong to metaphysics ? You answer, yes. Well, that of body too? Yes. And that of a fluid body? You stop, you are unprepared to admit this ; for if you do, everything will belong to metaphysics. From this it is evident that the mere degree of subordination -- of the particular to the general --cannot determine the limits of a science ; and that, in the present case, we must expect to find a difference in the con ceptions of metaphysics both in kind and in origin. The fun
damental idea of metaphysics was obscured on another side, by the fact that this kind of & priori cognition showed a certain similarity in character with the science of mathematics. Both have the property in common of possessing an a priori origin ; but, in the one, our knowledge is based upon conceptions, in the other, on the construction of conceptions. Thus a de cided dissimilarity between philosophical and mathematical cognition comes out -- a dissimilarity which was always felt,
but which could not be made distinct for want of an insight
? ? ? ? THE AHCHITECTONIC OF PtfRE BEASOIT
511
into the criteria of the difference. And thus it happened that, as philosopher* themselves failed in the proper development ot the idea of their science, the elaboration of the science could not proceed with a definite aim, or under trustworthy guid ance. Thus, too, philosophers, ignorant of the path they ought to pursue, and always disputing with each other re garding the discoveries which each asserted he had made, brought their science into disrepute with the rest of the world, and finally, even among themselves.
All pure a priori cognition forms, therefore, in view of the peculiar faculty which originates peculiar and distinct unity and metaphysic the term applied to the philo sophy which attempts to represent that cognition this syste matic unity.