By definition, every
magnitude
is a limit, so to talk about a magnitude without limit equals to speak about a limit without limit.
Hegel Was Right_nodrm
As a definition of infinite Cantor's great construction is circular: it presupposes that we under- stand the meaning of the word 'all', which can only be understood in function of the infinite.
Of course, he does not ever say a word about the non-existence of the series: it does not exist either in reality, imagina- tion, paper or blackboards.
Once again, we are dealing with the indefi- nite process, which we could define as the search of a meaning with the condition of never finding it --in other words, with the condition of never reaching the concept.
The reason of not calling the last element
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 144 Hegel was right
of the series infinite is that the last element does not exist. And the same thing goes to the entire series: it does not exist.
Further, all these attempts work with numbers. But a number is not a sensible data. It is an invention of the understanding. Animals do not know how to count; Thomas Aquinas and Kant already said this: sensibility does not perceive the number. Hegel said that too: "Number is a non-sensuous object" (WL I 212).
In order to be convinced of this, we must bear into account that we are able to count the most heterogeneous things, without them having any sensible relation whatsoever between them. A flower, an emotion, a tempest, a flavor, a soul, a bull and a thought sum up seven. Perhaps one could say that the common denominator is that all of them are beings. Now, this would be enough to demonstrate that the number is not an empirical data, for we have exposed (II 7) that empirical data do not apprehend the being. However, we could add nothingness as another numeral and then we would have eight. Whenever we have the whim of counting stuff, we do not depend at all on the empiri- cal: numbers have nothing to do with sensibility. The example we just mentioned teaches us that --even when the countable elements are ob- jects that can be perceived empirically-- the idea of number does not enter through the senses but is rather an initiative on account of the intellect. Besides, in order to constitute a number, the elements need to be summed up between them; otherwise, each element would exist independently and we would not have the total number. But empirical impressions --as they originally come to us-- do not come this way: each of them is what it is and knows nothing about sums. The idea of summing them up must come from someplace else. Not even the fact that five empirical impressions could come simultaneously to our minds would make us count them; let alone the case of successive impressions, for the best thing that mechanical memory could do is to present them at the same time.
In a word, the efforts to give meaning to the word 'infinite' which are not based on self-consciousness employ the number, but for this very reason they fail since the number is not a sensible data. Furthermore, what they build up is neither the infinite nor anything that resembles it. Naturally, they can always employ the arbitrary recourse: we under- stand this by infinite. But we already said that whoever speaks like that remains only with this and renounces thus to the infinite; he prefers this and quits thereby the search for the infinite. Not even he knows
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why he takes this and not that, for he renounces to look up for the meaning of infinite. He could say I understand 'abracadabra' or 'X' by this, but whoever hears him does not know what he is talking about: he does not even know it himself.
We would now have to proceed positively and disentangle the true meaning of the infinite, but since it is also the meaning of the universal, it would be more convenient to dissipate the common illusion of those who believe that the universal has a meaning which is not intersubjec- tivity as such.
2. pSeudouniverSaL
First and foremost, one should notice how inadmissible it would be to build up the universal as the negation of the particular and the indi- vidual. First, because negation does not provide any content at all and thus the only positive content would be singularity, which is precisely what we cannot employ in order to construct the universal. Second, because the individual would be defined through the negation of the universal, the process would be circular and nothing would have been defined.
What we have just said refers to the alleged singular that we sup- posedly perceive by means of sensation. In fact, the empirical data says nothing about individuality or universality, the same way it says noth- ing with regard to finitude or infinitude. All these considerations are provided by the mind: they are not contributions of the sensibility. On the level of individuality, the fact that the individual must be mentioned in the definition of the universal and vice versa is very illustrative; this demonstrates that, if we leave aside the fixed and unintelligible abstrac- tions of the abstract intellect, the concrete and real individual is univer- sal in itself, and it would be the more universal the more individual it is. But let us not rush too much.
It is important to remind (II, 6) the reader how frivolous the theory of abstraction is. According to this theory, the origin of the universal is empirical data through a mysterious process of generalization. Before making a generalization in order to get a concrete universal, the mind needs to know which are the pertinent data, among the innumerable ones we have in the world, because just from them, not from all the existent ones, could the mind abstract the universal in question. Now,
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 146 Hegel was right
in order to know which objects we need and which aspects of these ob- jects are relevant, the mind needs the universal in question as a previous guide; otherwise, it would be trapped by a total despair, it would not know where to begin or where to draw its attention. Far from being the product of empirical impressions and the result of the said process of generalization, the universal is the condition of possibility of the for- mer and precedes the latter.
The aforementioned theory of abstraction is an unforgivable mis- placing, because Plato had already showed --in the decisive way we just evoked-- that the universal necessarily preexists.
Some people asked: where is it?
The key point is what we have to say. The question is imagining the universal (what is imaginary is spatial), not understanding it, because only in regard to a spatial object can one say things like location, posi- tion, etcetera. And so the same happens as in the case of the infinite: the infinite of imagination is not the infinite, and a universal of imagination is not universal. Neither the infinite nor the universal are imaginable.
By definition, the universal is what is fulfilled in many, in the belong- ing particulars. But an imagined and spatialized universal falls beyond the singulars; it is distinct and distant from them; it is not in them, it is not fulfilled in them and hence it is not universal; it is in the imagination and the particulars remain outside. The abstract intellect --whose mo- dus operandi is to follow imagination quietly-- believes that the fulfill- ment of the universal in the particulars consist in its mere considering that the universals are fulfilled in the particulars. But that would be a fiction of universality, not true universality. Nothing can be legitimate- ly called if it is not effectively fulfilled in the singulars. All the farce would be reduced to say that intellect has the whim of calling universal something that is not universal; but a whim does not legitimize the use of the term in the opposite sense contained in its definition.
Of course, it is useless to reply that one can define universal as that which is predicated of many. To predicate is to affirm that something is fulfilled in the thing that is being predicated. This is the only meaning of the operation called predicating. All the attempts to define predication by empirical means are doomed to failure. For instance, to say that one predicates something when one has the verb 'to be' is entirely misguid- ed, for all propositions predicates something about something, and the immense majority of propositions are built up without that verb. To sustain that there is predication when the attribute 'goes along' the
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subject in question is also completely mistaken, because the hyper- baton or other grammatical device can separate them to the opposite extremes of a sentence and yet the predication remains. No empirical data corresponds to the meaning of the predication. Its meaning is to affirm that something is fulfilled in that which is being predicted. And here we are, exactly where we were before this way out came to light.
One should notice that despite the pretensions of the abstract intellect of considering the universal within the particulars, the fact is that this does not happen as tall. What he is considering universal is either an imaginary confusing representation as indeterminate as pos- sible (for all determination would wipe out its alleged universality) or a word that supposedly consists in a set of sounds in a blob of ink. Any of these alleged universals is an entity on its own, which is completely different and distant from the singulars being referred. It is false that the intellect considers or even imagines it fulfilled in the singulars, for it considers or imagines it separately from the objects. It is not even a fictitious universal; it is not universal even for the deceiving intellect that calls it universal.
3. infinite and univerSaL
Infinite is the spirit. Every spirit, "since there cannot be two classes of reason or two classes of spirit" (PR I 43).
This is a necessary consequence of what we have said: since the con- cept of infinite cannot be empirical or imaginary, its origin cannot be sensibility or imagination; therefore, its origin is self-consciousness. But what we know by self-consciousness is the spirit. It follows that the meaning of the said concept is the spirit.
When it comes to the spirit, the point of departure has to be --as Hegel affirms emphatically-- the immensely meritorious contribution of Spinoza: every determination is negation; every peculiarity is limi- tation. Nevertheless, Spinoza did not understand that, if the limit is negation, the infinite is negation of negation.
When I published my previous work I had not yet realized that fini- tum and determinatum are passive past participles. If we say that some- one is infinite, what we are actually doing is denying that this person has been determined, for he is giving himself determinations, that is to say, he is self-determining himself. Infinitude is self-determination.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 148 Hegel was right
"The spirit is not natural; it is only that which he makes of itself" (GP II 494).
Infinite is what is not determined by nature but what gives itself its own determinations which he can wipe out and replace with other ones. "Freedom consists precisely in the indetermination of the will, that is to say, the will does have in itself any natural determination. This is why it is in itself a universal will" (NH 224). "This absolute unity of individuality and universality called the self" (JLMN 163).
"The infinitude is the self-determination which refers to itself, the posing of an immanent and own determination, which is truly some- thing indifferent for he who poses it" (NH 87s).
"The practical spirit (moral) is first and foremost free will in the sense in which the self can abstract from any determination in which he is, and in any determination he remains undetermined and identical with himself" (NH 57).
We showed (III 7) that self-determination consists precisely in moral; the appearances are only natural determinations; self-determination consists precisely in not letting them to determine the self; this task is only for the self to do.
"The awareness of freedom contains the understanding that the sub- ject has of himself as a person, that means to say, as a universal in his individuality, as something which is capable of making abstraction of everything particular and of laying it down as an infinite" (VG 175).
The last thing we said should not be understood as if we were talking as potential infinitude, that is to say, as if infinitude consisted in the spirit's capacity of having all the determinations. It is the other way around: Determination is limit, negation. The infinitude is negation of that negation. The spirit is infinite because it does not have determi- nations "he is only what he makes himself being" (GP II 494).
In itself, the spirit does not have limits, and that is the definition of infinite: that which has no limits. As Hegel says, the limits and the de- terminations that he gives to himself are indifferent to it. In fact, they do not limit him, because he can do without them whenever he wants. Even in the act of giving itself certain determination or peculiarity, the spirit manifests its infinite and universal nature, for he could give itself this one instead of that one; these determinations do not deter- mine the spirit; it holds the dominion over his own acts. "By virtue of this original unity it follows, in the first place, that the first negative, or the determination, is not a limitation for the universal which, on the
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contrary, maintains itself therein and is positively identical with itself. " (WL II 241)
It is useless to object that such thing is not what is commonly under- stood by infinite. By infinite one can only understand that which has no limits. The only sense in which the definiendum can be real is the one we have been referring to. We have showed that people commonly imagine something that is not infinite, despite the fact that mathematicians and physics have the whim of calling it like that. The concept of infinite that we have showed can only be rejected by someone who has anoth- er concept of infinite, but neither philosophers nor physics have such concept or can have it. In particular, we said (IV, 1) that one should not confuse the infinite with a big magnitude. Further, one should not be tempted to say that the infinite is a 'magnitude without limits'!
By definition, every magnitude is a limit, so to talk about a magnitude without limit equals to speak about a limit without limit. "What has all determinations" is (implicitly) contradictory, because there are de- terminations that are contradictory between themselves. Besides, if all determination is limitation, this statement would be useless to define what is unlimited and infinite.
Let us do without the resistance of those who are not willing to admit that the human spirit is infinite. Evidently, they think that the human spirit is 'here' or 'there', in a given place and not in the an- tipodes; therefore, they conclude that it is not infinite. The ship of this objection is so feeble that one big wave will be enough to sink it. On the one hand, they suppose that the spirit is something material and spa- tial, for that would be the only way they could speak of location and place. On the other hand, they believe that infinitude is spatial; some- thing so big that is everywhere. We have said enough in this regard. Another recourse the objectors could employ is to say that the infinite is that which has all determinations, denying thereby that the human spirit is not in that case. But we pointed out that this could not be the definition of infinite:
In a word, finitude consists in having a limit, which means to say, that it puts its not-being in that point; in other words, in that point this thing ceases to be and makes reference to some other thing. On the other hand, the infinite reflection consists in that I do not refer to anything else but my- self and I am an object to myself. This pure reference to myself is the self, the root of the infinite Being itself. The leave aside completely, everything
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 150 Hegel was right
that is finite. The self as such does not have any content given by nature (immediate), but rather he has only himself as content. This pure form is at the same time his content. Any content given by nature is, in the first place, limited, while the content of the self is unlimited. In the second place, the content of nature is immediate, while the pure self does not have immedi- ate content since it only exists by means of doing without everything else. (NH 221).
"For the characteristic feature of the spiritual is not being abstract, but rather something vital, a universal individual, subjective, which determines and chooses itself" (PR III 47).
It is true that we sometimes express ourselves like that: my will was de- termined by such motives, circumstances, stimuli, impulses. At first, this expression implies that I behaved myself passively. But in fact I did not behave myself passively, but essentially in an active way, namely, my will admitted these circumstances as motives; it made them be regarded as motives [. . . ] By means of reflection, I can go beyond any determination given by the circumstances [. . . ] Circumstances and motives exert so much influence upon man as he lets them have. (NH 222s).
This self, which is essentially universal, is the one that specifies itself with these particular determinations, retaining its universality thereby since it gets hold of them freely and they do not set barriers to his self because the spirit could easily do without them and obtain other deter- minations. The really interesting thing about this is that in exercising its freedom the self truly becomes a self, in other words, it becomes more individual. The more universal and free it is, the more individual it becomes; and this comes about in the act in which it particularizes itself; if the spirit would let itself to be determined by natural im- pulses, it would not be something individual but only another part of nature. It follows that universality, particularity and individuality are identified with what is concrete, subjective and vital, despite the fixational intellect that only deals with abstractions and keeps these three things separated and without understanding them, for the abstract universal is not universal and the abstract individual is not individual. We have seen already (IV, 2) that the abstract intellect does not know what to do with them and does not understand them, for the abstract universal is not universal and the abstract individual is not individual. We saw that this abstract intellect did not know what to do with the
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universal, which by definition is fulfilled in the individual and identi- fies itself with it. This mediocre way out consists in declaring that the universal is not real; but that getaway is blocked by the evident fact that if it is not real it is not universal, because we cannot say that something unreal is realized in the individual.
There is nothing weird about the fact that the spirit is the meaning of the universal. If no empirical or imaginary data is universal, it follows that neither sensibility nor imagination could be the origin of the con- cept of 'universal', and hence the origin of it lies in self-consciousness. But what we know in self-consciousness is the spirit! That is the content of such concept.
By the way, it follows also that the universal and the particular identify themselves, for when the spirit knows itself by means of self- consciousness it knows himself as a self, that is, as individual. This clari- fies the explosive Hegelian thesis according to which judgments can only be true in regard to the spirit; the only thing that the judgment affirms is that the individual is universal:
It must be considered a complete lack of observation the fact that one does not points out in logics that any judgment emitted contains this assessment: "the individual is the universal" [. . . ] It is true that the determinations of individuality and universality, of subject and predicate, are distinguished, but this does not deny the general fact that any judgment declares them identical (EPW, 166A).
The contemporary logicist efforts miss the target completely when they say that the judgment only affirms that the subject is an element of a given set. We pointed out (IV, 1) that a set is not an empirical data and that it does not exist in reality. The only thing the spirit has is concepts, and only in the level of concepts one can give a meaning to every judg- ment. One has to do without the peculiar and the incidental character that the subject or the predicate of the judgment might have. Now, the common meaning to all these judgments is the one that Hegel stresses: the individual is the universal. That is the true form of the judgment: Hegel is right when he says that common logic is not formal enough in spite of its pretensions of being formal.
But let us go back to the infinite, which is our central subject. We have seen that the meaning of infinite is self-consciousness (the self), which is first and foremost self-determination since it is not determined by
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 152 Hegel was right
nature. But we said (III, 7) that self-consciousness and the conscious- ness I have of others feed each other, they make the other exist, and one can truly say that one is the being of the other: "without a thou the self is impossible"(JS 378). The most elemental analysis shows us that the meaning of infinite is self-consciousness, and if self-consciousness is essentially intersubjectivity, the very concept of infinite includes distinc- tion, that is to say, it is not a monistic and/or a pantheistic reality, as rightist and leftist superficial critics naively affirmed.
On this point, one cannot be too radical. As we have seen, one can- not give any other meaning to the word 'distinction' or 'distinct' than that which consists in intersubjectivity. It follows from this that not only the imputations of monism lack meaning completely, but also that this contribution of Hegel is one of the most revolutionary and im- portant ones ever made in the history of philosophy and in science in general (including physics, of course).
4. imputationS
If the leftist counterfeiters would have wanted to respect the rigor that science imposes, they would have put more attention to texts like the following one: "The Enlightment came from France to Germany, but with the difference that nobody dealt so openly with the dogma of such knowledge; they were twisted and turned in order to maintain the apparent respect towards religion, something that is still done now" (WG 916s).
It is clear in this text how genuine is the contempt that Hegel has against the hypocrisies that cover up and dissimulate the true ex- tent and meaning of a philosophical doctrine with the purpose of not offending certain religious instances. Besides, it is a text of Hegel's last intellectual period; it is absurd to suppose that they could impute him with the same charge he holds against them. I do not see how Findlay could possibly hold the following posture: "Though Hegel has veiled his treatment of Religion in much orthodox-sounding language, its out- come is quite clear. Theism in all its form is an imaginative distortion of final truth" (1958, 151). What we have here is this: the prestige and the huge intelligence of Hegel are so imposing that the atheists do not give up their wishes of having him on their side. One can read similar forced co-options in Kaufmann, Luka? cs, Althusser, Marx, Feuerbach, Adorno,
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Infinite and Distinction 153
Koje`ve, Marcuse, Garaudy, etcetera. One does not need to make a big fuzz about this: one only has to distinguish between the publicist and the scientific genre, for the form really has to be subjected to objectivity and to the accuracy of the texts.
Since we mentioned Enlightment, it is worthwhile to read this other passage from Hegel: "Enlightment --that conceit of the abstract in- tellect-- is the fiercest enemy of Philosophy; it hinders that one makes reason patent in the Christian religion; it hinders that Philosophy demonstrates that the testimony of the spirit of truth is placed within religion" (PR III 225).
I do not believe that a careful exegesis could question the sincerity of this declaration of war against Enlightment and in favor of Christianity. If Findlay et al would have said that theism is false and that Hegel was dumb --or, in either case, that he did not see the consequences of his principles-- we would be facing a whole different problem, but to say that Hegel is only pretending is something that cannot be done if one examine texts so aggressive and militant as the last one we quoted.
This other passage says clarifying things in regard of the illuminist pandemic:
That was in the rationalistic, enlightened, and apparently rational religion, but it was nothing else than renouncing to the fundamental teachings of religion, so that everything remained in general and superficial doctrines, such as that there is a God, that a man appeared, Christ, in order to teach de divine commandments and in that sense he appeared as a divine man, et- cetera [. . . ]. A religion that is satisfied with such contents is as insipid as the belonging philosophy [. . . ]. An agreement in which everything is so squat and flattened does not satisfy the depth of religiosity or the depth of the reason that thinks (EGP 292s).
This passage does not need to be commented. Findlay and his fol- lowers lacked the scientific seriousness of the hermeneutic: that is all. There is a point which is closely linked to the subject of our present chapter in which the aforementioned gentlemen would like Hegel to change his mind: Findlay expresses it thus: "Hegel further says that, in his True Infinite, the element of Infinity will absorb and overcome the Finite, but he might equally well have put it the other way round. "
(1958, 164)
We will later see that the divine does not absorb the human; on the
contrary, the former affirms the latter and makes it exist. But Findlay
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 154 Hegel was right
and his henchmen would want Hegel to think that man was the only thing real, and that all the non-sense about the infinite and the divin- ity were absorbed by the human. They probably missed the Hegelian mockery about the Greek religion in their reading of the Phenomenology: "both gods and men did one and the same thing. The earnestness of those divine powers is a ridiculous superfluity, since they are in fact the power or strength of the individuality performing the action. " (PG 508). In contrast to the God of Christianity, Hegel mocks the Greek divinities for not having personality and real individuality: "They are, in true, endowed with the form of individuality, but this is only in imagination and does not really and truly belong to them; the actual self does not have such an abstract moment for its substance and content" (PG 517s). Let us keep into account that these two texts are in the Phenomenology, which insistently isolated unscientifically from the rest of the Hegelian work, by those who forcefully want to suck the divine into the human.
Hegel denounces that the Indian divinities also lack real subjectivity and autonomy in front of the human subject:
In his essential determination Brahma remains the abstract being, the uni- versal, the substance without subjectivity in itself; therefore, it is not concrete, it is not the spirit (just as it happens with the modern philosophers, who determine God as concrete when they call him the essence of the essences). With such content --which is in fact lack of content-- that masculinum (Brahma) is not an individual subject; the personality is in him an empty form, a personification. It is of utmost importance while studying religions to distinguish between the mere personification of a god and a god, some- thing that one can find in every mythology, and the personality, which is by content. Since personification is something superficial, the objective autono- my of the god before the subject collapses. For instance, at the beginning of the Iliad, when Eros or Pallas prevents that Achilles draws his sword, we immediately take that as the subjective feeling of love, as the good sense that makes itself present in Achilles himself (BS 186).
In its parenthesis, this passage denounces those Western men who are incapable of conceiving God as a true subject. What Hegel rejects is a divinity that lacks real autonomy in front of the human subject. What Hegel explicitly and sharply denies is the absorption that Findlay and his followers want to attribute to him.
Furthermore, Hegel accuses of atheism those Western theologians that do not conceive God as spirit.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Infinite and Distinction 155
They accuse Spinoza of atheism when in fact the intention of Spi- noza is not to deny the existence of God but the existence of the world (acosmism). But this is true: insofar Spinoza dies not conceive God as spirit, he is an atheist in that sense, but many theologians are atheists in that sense too. "Spinozism if far from being atheism in the ordinary sense, but in so far it does not conceive God as spirit, it actually is. Now, in this sense, many atheists are theologians that only call God the omnipotent and supreme being [. .
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 144 Hegel was right
of the series infinite is that the last element does not exist. And the same thing goes to the entire series: it does not exist.
Further, all these attempts work with numbers. But a number is not a sensible data. It is an invention of the understanding. Animals do not know how to count; Thomas Aquinas and Kant already said this: sensibility does not perceive the number. Hegel said that too: "Number is a non-sensuous object" (WL I 212).
In order to be convinced of this, we must bear into account that we are able to count the most heterogeneous things, without them having any sensible relation whatsoever between them. A flower, an emotion, a tempest, a flavor, a soul, a bull and a thought sum up seven. Perhaps one could say that the common denominator is that all of them are beings. Now, this would be enough to demonstrate that the number is not an empirical data, for we have exposed (II 7) that empirical data do not apprehend the being. However, we could add nothingness as another numeral and then we would have eight. Whenever we have the whim of counting stuff, we do not depend at all on the empiri- cal: numbers have nothing to do with sensibility. The example we just mentioned teaches us that --even when the countable elements are ob- jects that can be perceived empirically-- the idea of number does not enter through the senses but is rather an initiative on account of the intellect. Besides, in order to constitute a number, the elements need to be summed up between them; otherwise, each element would exist independently and we would not have the total number. But empirical impressions --as they originally come to us-- do not come this way: each of them is what it is and knows nothing about sums. The idea of summing them up must come from someplace else. Not even the fact that five empirical impressions could come simultaneously to our minds would make us count them; let alone the case of successive impressions, for the best thing that mechanical memory could do is to present them at the same time.
In a word, the efforts to give meaning to the word 'infinite' which are not based on self-consciousness employ the number, but for this very reason they fail since the number is not a sensible data. Furthermore, what they build up is neither the infinite nor anything that resembles it. Naturally, they can always employ the arbitrary recourse: we under- stand this by infinite. But we already said that whoever speaks like that remains only with this and renounces thus to the infinite; he prefers this and quits thereby the search for the infinite. Not even he knows
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Infinite and Distinction 145
why he takes this and not that, for he renounces to look up for the meaning of infinite. He could say I understand 'abracadabra' or 'X' by this, but whoever hears him does not know what he is talking about: he does not even know it himself.
We would now have to proceed positively and disentangle the true meaning of the infinite, but since it is also the meaning of the universal, it would be more convenient to dissipate the common illusion of those who believe that the universal has a meaning which is not intersubjec- tivity as such.
2. pSeudouniverSaL
First and foremost, one should notice how inadmissible it would be to build up the universal as the negation of the particular and the indi- vidual. First, because negation does not provide any content at all and thus the only positive content would be singularity, which is precisely what we cannot employ in order to construct the universal. Second, because the individual would be defined through the negation of the universal, the process would be circular and nothing would have been defined.
What we have just said refers to the alleged singular that we sup- posedly perceive by means of sensation. In fact, the empirical data says nothing about individuality or universality, the same way it says noth- ing with regard to finitude or infinitude. All these considerations are provided by the mind: they are not contributions of the sensibility. On the level of individuality, the fact that the individual must be mentioned in the definition of the universal and vice versa is very illustrative; this demonstrates that, if we leave aside the fixed and unintelligible abstrac- tions of the abstract intellect, the concrete and real individual is univer- sal in itself, and it would be the more universal the more individual it is. But let us not rush too much.
It is important to remind (II, 6) the reader how frivolous the theory of abstraction is. According to this theory, the origin of the universal is empirical data through a mysterious process of generalization. Before making a generalization in order to get a concrete universal, the mind needs to know which are the pertinent data, among the innumerable ones we have in the world, because just from them, not from all the existent ones, could the mind abstract the universal in question. Now,
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 146 Hegel was right
in order to know which objects we need and which aspects of these ob- jects are relevant, the mind needs the universal in question as a previous guide; otherwise, it would be trapped by a total despair, it would not know where to begin or where to draw its attention. Far from being the product of empirical impressions and the result of the said process of generalization, the universal is the condition of possibility of the for- mer and precedes the latter.
The aforementioned theory of abstraction is an unforgivable mis- placing, because Plato had already showed --in the decisive way we just evoked-- that the universal necessarily preexists.
Some people asked: where is it?
The key point is what we have to say. The question is imagining the universal (what is imaginary is spatial), not understanding it, because only in regard to a spatial object can one say things like location, posi- tion, etcetera. And so the same happens as in the case of the infinite: the infinite of imagination is not the infinite, and a universal of imagination is not universal. Neither the infinite nor the universal are imaginable.
By definition, the universal is what is fulfilled in many, in the belong- ing particulars. But an imagined and spatialized universal falls beyond the singulars; it is distinct and distant from them; it is not in them, it is not fulfilled in them and hence it is not universal; it is in the imagination and the particulars remain outside. The abstract intellect --whose mo- dus operandi is to follow imagination quietly-- believes that the fulfill- ment of the universal in the particulars consist in its mere considering that the universals are fulfilled in the particulars. But that would be a fiction of universality, not true universality. Nothing can be legitimate- ly called if it is not effectively fulfilled in the singulars. All the farce would be reduced to say that intellect has the whim of calling universal something that is not universal; but a whim does not legitimize the use of the term in the opposite sense contained in its definition.
Of course, it is useless to reply that one can define universal as that which is predicated of many. To predicate is to affirm that something is fulfilled in the thing that is being predicated. This is the only meaning of the operation called predicating. All the attempts to define predication by empirical means are doomed to failure. For instance, to say that one predicates something when one has the verb 'to be' is entirely misguid- ed, for all propositions predicates something about something, and the immense majority of propositions are built up without that verb. To sustain that there is predication when the attribute 'goes along' the
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subject in question is also completely mistaken, because the hyper- baton or other grammatical device can separate them to the opposite extremes of a sentence and yet the predication remains. No empirical data corresponds to the meaning of the predication. Its meaning is to affirm that something is fulfilled in that which is being predicted. And here we are, exactly where we were before this way out came to light.
One should notice that despite the pretensions of the abstract intellect of considering the universal within the particulars, the fact is that this does not happen as tall. What he is considering universal is either an imaginary confusing representation as indeterminate as pos- sible (for all determination would wipe out its alleged universality) or a word that supposedly consists in a set of sounds in a blob of ink. Any of these alleged universals is an entity on its own, which is completely different and distant from the singulars being referred. It is false that the intellect considers or even imagines it fulfilled in the singulars, for it considers or imagines it separately from the objects. It is not even a fictitious universal; it is not universal even for the deceiving intellect that calls it universal.
3. infinite and univerSaL
Infinite is the spirit. Every spirit, "since there cannot be two classes of reason or two classes of spirit" (PR I 43).
This is a necessary consequence of what we have said: since the con- cept of infinite cannot be empirical or imaginary, its origin cannot be sensibility or imagination; therefore, its origin is self-consciousness. But what we know by self-consciousness is the spirit. It follows that the meaning of the said concept is the spirit.
When it comes to the spirit, the point of departure has to be --as Hegel affirms emphatically-- the immensely meritorious contribution of Spinoza: every determination is negation; every peculiarity is limi- tation. Nevertheless, Spinoza did not understand that, if the limit is negation, the infinite is negation of negation.
When I published my previous work I had not yet realized that fini- tum and determinatum are passive past participles. If we say that some- one is infinite, what we are actually doing is denying that this person has been determined, for he is giving himself determinations, that is to say, he is self-determining himself. Infinitude is self-determination.
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"The spirit is not natural; it is only that which he makes of itself" (GP II 494).
Infinite is what is not determined by nature but what gives itself its own determinations which he can wipe out and replace with other ones. "Freedom consists precisely in the indetermination of the will, that is to say, the will does have in itself any natural determination. This is why it is in itself a universal will" (NH 224). "This absolute unity of individuality and universality called the self" (JLMN 163).
"The infinitude is the self-determination which refers to itself, the posing of an immanent and own determination, which is truly some- thing indifferent for he who poses it" (NH 87s).
"The practical spirit (moral) is first and foremost free will in the sense in which the self can abstract from any determination in which he is, and in any determination he remains undetermined and identical with himself" (NH 57).
We showed (III 7) that self-determination consists precisely in moral; the appearances are only natural determinations; self-determination consists precisely in not letting them to determine the self; this task is only for the self to do.
"The awareness of freedom contains the understanding that the sub- ject has of himself as a person, that means to say, as a universal in his individuality, as something which is capable of making abstraction of everything particular and of laying it down as an infinite" (VG 175).
The last thing we said should not be understood as if we were talking as potential infinitude, that is to say, as if infinitude consisted in the spirit's capacity of having all the determinations. It is the other way around: Determination is limit, negation. The infinitude is negation of that negation. The spirit is infinite because it does not have determi- nations "he is only what he makes himself being" (GP II 494).
In itself, the spirit does not have limits, and that is the definition of infinite: that which has no limits. As Hegel says, the limits and the de- terminations that he gives to himself are indifferent to it. In fact, they do not limit him, because he can do without them whenever he wants. Even in the act of giving itself certain determination or peculiarity, the spirit manifests its infinite and universal nature, for he could give itself this one instead of that one; these determinations do not deter- mine the spirit; it holds the dominion over his own acts. "By virtue of this original unity it follows, in the first place, that the first negative, or the determination, is not a limitation for the universal which, on the
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contrary, maintains itself therein and is positively identical with itself. " (WL II 241)
It is useless to object that such thing is not what is commonly under- stood by infinite. By infinite one can only understand that which has no limits. The only sense in which the definiendum can be real is the one we have been referring to. We have showed that people commonly imagine something that is not infinite, despite the fact that mathematicians and physics have the whim of calling it like that. The concept of infinite that we have showed can only be rejected by someone who has anoth- er concept of infinite, but neither philosophers nor physics have such concept or can have it. In particular, we said (IV, 1) that one should not confuse the infinite with a big magnitude. Further, one should not be tempted to say that the infinite is a 'magnitude without limits'!
By definition, every magnitude is a limit, so to talk about a magnitude without limit equals to speak about a limit without limit. "What has all determinations" is (implicitly) contradictory, because there are de- terminations that are contradictory between themselves. Besides, if all determination is limitation, this statement would be useless to define what is unlimited and infinite.
Let us do without the resistance of those who are not willing to admit that the human spirit is infinite. Evidently, they think that the human spirit is 'here' or 'there', in a given place and not in the an- tipodes; therefore, they conclude that it is not infinite. The ship of this objection is so feeble that one big wave will be enough to sink it. On the one hand, they suppose that the spirit is something material and spa- tial, for that would be the only way they could speak of location and place. On the other hand, they believe that infinitude is spatial; some- thing so big that is everywhere. We have said enough in this regard. Another recourse the objectors could employ is to say that the infinite is that which has all determinations, denying thereby that the human spirit is not in that case. But we pointed out that this could not be the definition of infinite:
In a word, finitude consists in having a limit, which means to say, that it puts its not-being in that point; in other words, in that point this thing ceases to be and makes reference to some other thing. On the other hand, the infinite reflection consists in that I do not refer to anything else but my- self and I am an object to myself. This pure reference to myself is the self, the root of the infinite Being itself. The leave aside completely, everything
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that is finite. The self as such does not have any content given by nature (immediate), but rather he has only himself as content. This pure form is at the same time his content. Any content given by nature is, in the first place, limited, while the content of the self is unlimited. In the second place, the content of nature is immediate, while the pure self does not have immedi- ate content since it only exists by means of doing without everything else. (NH 221).
"For the characteristic feature of the spiritual is not being abstract, but rather something vital, a universal individual, subjective, which determines and chooses itself" (PR III 47).
It is true that we sometimes express ourselves like that: my will was de- termined by such motives, circumstances, stimuli, impulses. At first, this expression implies that I behaved myself passively. But in fact I did not behave myself passively, but essentially in an active way, namely, my will admitted these circumstances as motives; it made them be regarded as motives [. . . ] By means of reflection, I can go beyond any determination given by the circumstances [. . . ] Circumstances and motives exert so much influence upon man as he lets them have. (NH 222s).
This self, which is essentially universal, is the one that specifies itself with these particular determinations, retaining its universality thereby since it gets hold of them freely and they do not set barriers to his self because the spirit could easily do without them and obtain other deter- minations. The really interesting thing about this is that in exercising its freedom the self truly becomes a self, in other words, it becomes more individual. The more universal and free it is, the more individual it becomes; and this comes about in the act in which it particularizes itself; if the spirit would let itself to be determined by natural im- pulses, it would not be something individual but only another part of nature. It follows that universality, particularity and individuality are identified with what is concrete, subjective and vital, despite the fixational intellect that only deals with abstractions and keeps these three things separated and without understanding them, for the abstract universal is not universal and the abstract individual is not individual. We have seen already (IV, 2) that the abstract intellect does not know what to do with them and does not understand them, for the abstract universal is not universal and the abstract individual is not individual. We saw that this abstract intellect did not know what to do with the
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universal, which by definition is fulfilled in the individual and identi- fies itself with it. This mediocre way out consists in declaring that the universal is not real; but that getaway is blocked by the evident fact that if it is not real it is not universal, because we cannot say that something unreal is realized in the individual.
There is nothing weird about the fact that the spirit is the meaning of the universal. If no empirical or imaginary data is universal, it follows that neither sensibility nor imagination could be the origin of the con- cept of 'universal', and hence the origin of it lies in self-consciousness. But what we know in self-consciousness is the spirit! That is the content of such concept.
By the way, it follows also that the universal and the particular identify themselves, for when the spirit knows itself by means of self- consciousness it knows himself as a self, that is, as individual. This clari- fies the explosive Hegelian thesis according to which judgments can only be true in regard to the spirit; the only thing that the judgment affirms is that the individual is universal:
It must be considered a complete lack of observation the fact that one does not points out in logics that any judgment emitted contains this assessment: "the individual is the universal" [. . . ] It is true that the determinations of individuality and universality, of subject and predicate, are distinguished, but this does not deny the general fact that any judgment declares them identical (EPW, 166A).
The contemporary logicist efforts miss the target completely when they say that the judgment only affirms that the subject is an element of a given set. We pointed out (IV, 1) that a set is not an empirical data and that it does not exist in reality. The only thing the spirit has is concepts, and only in the level of concepts one can give a meaning to every judg- ment. One has to do without the peculiar and the incidental character that the subject or the predicate of the judgment might have. Now, the common meaning to all these judgments is the one that Hegel stresses: the individual is the universal. That is the true form of the judgment: Hegel is right when he says that common logic is not formal enough in spite of its pretensions of being formal.
But let us go back to the infinite, which is our central subject. We have seen that the meaning of infinite is self-consciousness (the self), which is first and foremost self-determination since it is not determined by
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nature. But we said (III, 7) that self-consciousness and the conscious- ness I have of others feed each other, they make the other exist, and one can truly say that one is the being of the other: "without a thou the self is impossible"(JS 378). The most elemental analysis shows us that the meaning of infinite is self-consciousness, and if self-consciousness is essentially intersubjectivity, the very concept of infinite includes distinc- tion, that is to say, it is not a monistic and/or a pantheistic reality, as rightist and leftist superficial critics naively affirmed.
On this point, one cannot be too radical. As we have seen, one can- not give any other meaning to the word 'distinction' or 'distinct' than that which consists in intersubjectivity. It follows from this that not only the imputations of monism lack meaning completely, but also that this contribution of Hegel is one of the most revolutionary and im- portant ones ever made in the history of philosophy and in science in general (including physics, of course).
4. imputationS
If the leftist counterfeiters would have wanted to respect the rigor that science imposes, they would have put more attention to texts like the following one: "The Enlightment came from France to Germany, but with the difference that nobody dealt so openly with the dogma of such knowledge; they were twisted and turned in order to maintain the apparent respect towards religion, something that is still done now" (WG 916s).
It is clear in this text how genuine is the contempt that Hegel has against the hypocrisies that cover up and dissimulate the true ex- tent and meaning of a philosophical doctrine with the purpose of not offending certain religious instances. Besides, it is a text of Hegel's last intellectual period; it is absurd to suppose that they could impute him with the same charge he holds against them. I do not see how Findlay could possibly hold the following posture: "Though Hegel has veiled his treatment of Religion in much orthodox-sounding language, its out- come is quite clear. Theism in all its form is an imaginative distortion of final truth" (1958, 151). What we have here is this: the prestige and the huge intelligence of Hegel are so imposing that the atheists do not give up their wishes of having him on their side. One can read similar forced co-options in Kaufmann, Luka? cs, Althusser, Marx, Feuerbach, Adorno,
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Koje`ve, Marcuse, Garaudy, etcetera. One does not need to make a big fuzz about this: one only has to distinguish between the publicist and the scientific genre, for the form really has to be subjected to objectivity and to the accuracy of the texts.
Since we mentioned Enlightment, it is worthwhile to read this other passage from Hegel: "Enlightment --that conceit of the abstract in- tellect-- is the fiercest enemy of Philosophy; it hinders that one makes reason patent in the Christian religion; it hinders that Philosophy demonstrates that the testimony of the spirit of truth is placed within religion" (PR III 225).
I do not believe that a careful exegesis could question the sincerity of this declaration of war against Enlightment and in favor of Christianity. If Findlay et al would have said that theism is false and that Hegel was dumb --or, in either case, that he did not see the consequences of his principles-- we would be facing a whole different problem, but to say that Hegel is only pretending is something that cannot be done if one examine texts so aggressive and militant as the last one we quoted.
This other passage says clarifying things in regard of the illuminist pandemic:
That was in the rationalistic, enlightened, and apparently rational religion, but it was nothing else than renouncing to the fundamental teachings of religion, so that everything remained in general and superficial doctrines, such as that there is a God, that a man appeared, Christ, in order to teach de divine commandments and in that sense he appeared as a divine man, et- cetera [. . . ]. A religion that is satisfied with such contents is as insipid as the belonging philosophy [. . . ]. An agreement in which everything is so squat and flattened does not satisfy the depth of religiosity or the depth of the reason that thinks (EGP 292s).
This passage does not need to be commented. Findlay and his fol- lowers lacked the scientific seriousness of the hermeneutic: that is all. There is a point which is closely linked to the subject of our present chapter in which the aforementioned gentlemen would like Hegel to change his mind: Findlay expresses it thus: "Hegel further says that, in his True Infinite, the element of Infinity will absorb and overcome the Finite, but he might equally well have put it the other way round. "
(1958, 164)
We will later see that the divine does not absorb the human; on the
contrary, the former affirms the latter and makes it exist. But Findlay
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and his henchmen would want Hegel to think that man was the only thing real, and that all the non-sense about the infinite and the divin- ity were absorbed by the human. They probably missed the Hegelian mockery about the Greek religion in their reading of the Phenomenology: "both gods and men did one and the same thing. The earnestness of those divine powers is a ridiculous superfluity, since they are in fact the power or strength of the individuality performing the action. " (PG 508). In contrast to the God of Christianity, Hegel mocks the Greek divinities for not having personality and real individuality: "They are, in true, endowed with the form of individuality, but this is only in imagination and does not really and truly belong to them; the actual self does not have such an abstract moment for its substance and content" (PG 517s). Let us keep into account that these two texts are in the Phenomenology, which insistently isolated unscientifically from the rest of the Hegelian work, by those who forcefully want to suck the divine into the human.
Hegel denounces that the Indian divinities also lack real subjectivity and autonomy in front of the human subject:
In his essential determination Brahma remains the abstract being, the uni- versal, the substance without subjectivity in itself; therefore, it is not concrete, it is not the spirit (just as it happens with the modern philosophers, who determine God as concrete when they call him the essence of the essences). With such content --which is in fact lack of content-- that masculinum (Brahma) is not an individual subject; the personality is in him an empty form, a personification. It is of utmost importance while studying religions to distinguish between the mere personification of a god and a god, some- thing that one can find in every mythology, and the personality, which is by content. Since personification is something superficial, the objective autono- my of the god before the subject collapses. For instance, at the beginning of the Iliad, when Eros or Pallas prevents that Achilles draws his sword, we immediately take that as the subjective feeling of love, as the good sense that makes itself present in Achilles himself (BS 186).
In its parenthesis, this passage denounces those Western men who are incapable of conceiving God as a true subject. What Hegel rejects is a divinity that lacks real autonomy in front of the human subject. What Hegel explicitly and sharply denies is the absorption that Findlay and his followers want to attribute to him.
Furthermore, Hegel accuses of atheism those Western theologians that do not conceive God as spirit.
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They accuse Spinoza of atheism when in fact the intention of Spi- noza is not to deny the existence of God but the existence of the world (acosmism). But this is true: insofar Spinoza dies not conceive God as spirit, he is an atheist in that sense, but many theologians are atheists in that sense too. "Spinozism if far from being atheism in the ordinary sense, but in so far it does not conceive God as spirit, it actually is. Now, in this sense, many atheists are theologians that only call God the omnipotent and supreme being [. .
