No More Learning

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(i. e. One has to realize the emptiness of all dharmas, without any exception: To really remove completely all grasping to the self, that is the cause of all suffering, one has to realize the emptiness of inherent existence of all dharmas
without exception. Realizing the three marks: impermanence, unsatisfactoriness and no-self is not enough. If one follows only the teachings of the Hinayana, and still believe in the existence of some basic components as described in the Abhidharma, then there remains some subtle grasping, and there is no total definitive Liberation from samsara. Grasping at any absolute, any view, any method, any path, is still grasping. But that doesn't mean we should drop everything right now. )
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(-- Only by understanding that things do not exist as perceived by conceptions of true or inherent existence can the seed of cyclic existence be destroyed. We should therefore make a great effort to develop a correct understanding of reality. -- One gains release from cyclic existence when deluded ignorance which conceives things as truly existent ends. This depends on understanding emptiness of inherent existence.
-- The seed of worldly existence is the conception that phenomena are truly existent. Objects such as form are its sphere of activity. The seed of worldly existence is destroyed and one attains liberation by seeing that these objects lack an inherently existent self and by gaining familiarity with this. On becoming a Hearer or Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyer or on reaching the eight ground, one achieves the complete elimination of conceptions of true existence. )
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L3: [The summarizing stanza:]
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\ ###
\ All who have gained a free and fortunate human body,
\ Following the reasoning of Nagarjuna and his son,
\ SHOULD UNDERSTAND EMPTINESS TO MEAN DEPENDENT ARISING.
\ Who would not make an effort to achieve this end?
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(i. e. The perfection of wisdom: The Middle Way: while one should not take Dependent Origination as taught in the Abhidharma as an absolute truth (with inherently existing elements in it), one should not fall into the other extreme and think emptiness is the absolute truth. - Those two, dependent origination and emptiness, form two poles of an apparent duality; so we could use the same treatment as for any duality as stated in verse 346. Dependently originated phenomena cannot exist and then be empty of inherent existence. Nor can something empty exist and then be dependently originated. Each of those two cannot exist without the other. But still they are not the same thing. One cannot possess the other. They are not different, not the same. They are interdependent. They are two co-dependently arisen concepts. Thus both dependent origination and emptiness itself are also empty of inherent existence because dependently arisen. They are both conventional truths, even if emptiness is called the ultimate truth, or sacred truth. The real final truth is something else beyond any conceptualization. They are like two complementary antidotes, or skillful means. One fights nihilism or non-existence, the other fights realism or existence. This is the same thing as saying "we need both method and wisdom together all the time". - We cannot say what is the absolute truth beyond conceptualization (so we say there is no absolute truth, only adapted skillful means), but we can say what it is not; and it is not Dependent Origination (conventional truths), not emptiness (ultimate truth), not both together, not neither or something else that those two. That is how we stay away from the four extremes conceptions. The final truth is beyond conceptualization, it cannot be described and has to be directly seen, but it is called the Union of the Two Truths, the inseparability of appearances and emptiness, the perfection of dependent origination and of emptiness where one realize their non-duality: not two but still not one. )
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\ ###
\ This is the fourteenth chapter from the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing how to meditate on the refutation of extreme conceptions.
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This concludes the commentary on the fourteenth chapter, showing how to meditate on the refutation of extreme conceptions, from Essence of Good Explanations, Explanation of the "Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas".
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Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2] L2: [Chapter 15 - Refuting Truly Existent Characteristics [of products] -
Production / origination, duration, cessation - P. 277]
(i. e. SHOWING HOW TO MEDITATE ON THE REFUTATION OF THAT WHICH CONSTITUTES PRODUCTS.
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-- Refuting the inherent existence of production, duration and disintegration, the characteristics of products.
-- One of the argument used to assert the true existence of things is based on the supposedly objective observation of their production, duration and disappearance. It may also be assumed that things change into something else.
-- But the exact link between the cause and conditions and the effect is not clear at all. They cannot overlap in time, nor be simultaneous in time. Why? Because they are both merely imputed by the mind. They are mental constructions, based on each other. So there is no stopping of the cause, and starting of the effect at all.
-- There is no real production, and so forth, otherwise we would have infinite regress.
-- When we say a thing is in the process of production; it is never absolute. Some conditions can change and there would be no final product as expected. So nothing is absolutely in the process of production; nothing is being produced. -- The process of production itself is unclear; it cannot be found.
-- So the exact time of production cannot be found. And the distinction between past, present and future become blur. Why? Because there is no real production and so forth; it is merely labeled by the mind.
-- So thing are not produced from other things, nor by themselves, nor from non-things, . . . And things do not change.
-- The three characteristics of impermanent things (the product) are not real characteristics either. They cannot exist independently of each other, and of the characterized. Nor are they all the same. Neither simultaneous, nor consecutive.
-- In general, the characteristics and the characterized are not different, not the same. Why? Because they are both merely imputed by the mind. They are mental constructions, based on each other.
-- So there is no real cause, production, product. There is no real impermanent things with origination, duration, cessation. Production cannot be used as an argument to prove the existence of things.
-- Nothing is before, during or after production / change.
-- There is no real past, present, future. Why? Because they are relative to the existence of something real, and nothing is real.
-- But, still, there is no effect without a cause. )
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-- (Assumption: Things exist and change; they have origination, duration and cessation. Because there is this inherent production, things really exist. )
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L3: [I. Extensively establishing dependent arising which are not inherently produced as existing in the manner of a magicians's illusions]
L4: [A. Specific refutation of inherent production]
L5: [1. Extensive explanation]
L6: [a. Refutation by examining whether that which exists or does not exist is produced] L7: [(1) Reason refuting production of that which exists or does not exist]
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\ ###
\ 351.
\ How can the non-existent be produced,
\ If what does not exist at the last is produced?
\ How can that which exists be produced,
\ If what exists from the outset is produced?
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(i. e. There is no inherent production because the effect cannot be existing, nor non-existing at the time of its cause. Examining whether it exists or not at the time of its cause. If they, cause & effect, exist simultaneously then there is no need for production; if they exist sequentially then there is no causal link between the two. So there is no real cause and effect as we think they are, there is no real production as we think there is. It is much more subtle than this. )
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(-- Inherent production of a thing is impossible, for neither that which exists nor that which does not exist at the time of its causes is produced by way of its own entity.
-- Assertion: Products exist inherently because their characteristics such as production exist.
-- Answer: Products would exist if their characteristics existed, but these do not exist inherently. If production is
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\ ###
\ 354.
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
asserted to produce products, then according to those who propound the non-existence of the effect, the sprout which does not exist at the time of the seed is produced after the final moment of a seed for which the necessary causes and conditions are assembled.
-- A sprout which does not exist during the last moment of the seed cannot be produced by way of its own entity, otherwise it follows that donkey's horn and so forth would also be produced. Thus how can anything which does not exist at the time of its cause be produced by way of its own entity? It cannot. How can anything which exist at the time of its cause be produced? It follows that it will not be produced, since anything existing at the time of its cause was produced from the outset, prior to being itself. The subject, a sprout, is not produced by way of its own entity, for neither that which exists at the time of its cause nor that which does not exist at the time of its cause is produced by way of its own entity. )
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L7: [(2) Establishing its mode [of operation]]
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\ ###
\ 352.
\ Since the effect destroys the cause,
\ That which does not exist will not be produced.
\ Nor will that which exists be produced
\ Since what is established needs no establisher.
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(i. e. The cause and the effect cannot be sequential, not overlapping, because then there is no causal link between the two and it would mean that the effect is without any cause, that anything could be produced from anything else. The cause and the effect cannot overlap either because if the effect is already existing at the time of the cause what need is there to produce it again? )
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(-- Something non-existent at the time of its causes cannot come into being in and of itself. If it could, even totally non- existent things like rabbits' horns could occur, since they would not depend on producing causes. On the other hand, neither would something already existent at the time of its causes require anything to bring it into existence.
-- ab: Since the sprout cannot be produced unless the seed undergoes change, the process which produces the resultant sprout destroys the causal seed. Thus something which does not exist at the time of the seed will not be produced by way of its own entity. In general, even though a sprout which is non-existent at the time of the seed is produced, it is incorrect to accept truly existent production, for then one must also accept production of rabbits' horns.
-- cd: Since something which is established at the time of its cause does not need anything to establish it, that which exists at the time of its cause will not be produced. )
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L7: [(3) Refutation by examining the time of production]
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\ ###
\ 353.
\ There is no production at that time,
\ Nor is there production at another.
\ If not produced at that time nor another,
\ When will there ever be production?
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(i. e. There is no inherent production because the exact time of production cannot be found: At the time of the cause there is no production yet; at the time of the effect there is no more production. And since those two cannot overlap or be separated, then when exactly is there production ? )
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(-- A thing is not produced while it exists nor while it is non-existent. Since there is no other possibility, how can production be truly existent, for when analyzed nothing is findable.
-- At a time when the sprout itself exists there is no production, since it does not need to be produced. Other than that, when it does not exist there is no production, since it cannot be produced. If it is not produced at that time nor at the other, when will there ever be production? There cannot be a time of production. )
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L7: [(4) Refutation by examining the thing itself and another thing]
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\ Just as there is no production
\ Of that as the thing it is,
\ Neither is it produced
\ As something else.
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(i. e. There is no inherent production because the cause and the effect cannot be the same, nor different. If they are the same there is no need for production; if they are different then they have no causal link. )
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(-- Assertion: Milk turning into something which is curd constitutes production.
-- Answer: That is incorrect
-- Since something which exists as milk does not need to become milk, there is no production. Neither is that milk produced as something else, i. e. curd, for the two are different entities.
-- see Karikas 13 -- Nothing is being produced, and nothing is changing into something else. For example, when we say "milk changes into curds"; it is not milk that is curds, so milk has not changed. Like "milk becoming curd"; it is not "milk" existing as "curds". It is not the same continuing. It is about the duality "existence" vs "other-existence"; neither exist independently. )
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L6: [b. Refutation by examining the beginning, middle and end]
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\ ###
\ 355.
\ The first, intermediate and last
\ Are not possible prior to production.
\ How can each begin
\ Without the other two?
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(i. e. There is no inherent production because origination, duration and cessation are not independent - they cannot exist before a product, nor exist independently of each other: A product is defined as having those three absolute characteristics: origination, duration, cessation. To be inherently existing those three characteristics have to be able to exist independently, on their own. But they cannot exist before the product; they are dependent on a product. And they cannot exist independently of each other because a product need to have those three to be a product. They have no real existence on their own, they are empty of inherent existence because co-dependently arisen concepts. We would never be able to see them directly contrary to what the Abhidharma say the Yogis can do. )
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(-- Do the three characteristics -- production, duration and disintegration -- occur sequentially? They cannot, for they are simultaneous aspects of an on-going process, dependent on one another. Unless a thing has all three of these features, it cannot be a product.
-- There is no inherent production for the following reason too:
-- ab: First production, then duration and lastly disintegration are not possible prior to production, because that which is unproduced cannot have production, duration and disintegration.
-- Assertion: Production while a thing is being produced, duration while it lasts and disintegration when it disintegrates exists consecutively by way of their own entity.
-- cd: How could each at its particular time begin without the other two? Duration and disintegration are impossible without production. The same applies to the other two. Moreover a product is not feasible without any one of these characteristics. )
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L6: [c. Refutation by examining both self and other]
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\ ###
\ 356.
\ The thing itself does not occur
\ Without other things.
\ Thus there is no coming into existence
\ Either from self or from other.
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(i. e. There is no inherent production because the cause and the effect cannot be the same (self-production), nor different (other production). Never has anything been seen to originate from self, from others, from both, or from neither. In the case of self there is no need for production. In the case of other, how could there be production; if that
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\ ###
\ 359.
\ A present thing does not
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
was the case anything would originate from anything else. )
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(-- Moreover inherent production is impossible, since things are not produced from themselves, i. e. from that which has the same nature, nor from that which has a different nature, for neither have inherent existence.
-- For this reason too products cannot be inherently produced:
-- The thing itself, such as a clay pot, does not occur without other things, such as clay, since it depends upon clay. The clay does not exist by way of its own entity either, since it depends on pebbles. Thus the pot does not come into existence either from self or from other, for since neither self nor other exist by way of their own entity, there is no inherent production. )
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L6: [d. Refutation by examining sequentiality and simultaneity] L7: [(1) Actual meaning]
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\ ###
\ 357.
\ It cannot be said to exist
\ Before, after or simultaneously.
\ Therefore production does not occur
\ Simultaneously with the pot.
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(i. e. There is no inherent production because those three characteristics cannot exist before, during, or after the product. The product and its production are two co-dependently arisen concepts. . )
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(-- Since production, duration and disintegration cannot be found to exist before, simultaneously or after that which they characterize, they cannot exist inherently.
-- Moreover there is no inherent production, since it is impossible to say that production and so forth exist before, after or simultaneously with the pot. Therefore the pot's production does not occur simultaneously with the pot by way of its own entity. If it did, since the basis and that which is based upon it would be co-existent, it would follow that the pot had been produced, for it must exist even as it is approaching production. )
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L7: [(2) Refuting proof of inherent production]
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\ ###
\ 358.
\ That which was previously produced
\ Was not old when first produced.
\ Also that which afterwards has been
\ Constantly produced is not old.
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(i. e. No real duration or getting old: a product do not last and get old. As it conventionally get old it never stays the same, it continually changes. There is no duration of the same product. Nothing is produced and last. Nothing exist and change. )
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(-- Even aging is relative, for a product constantly undergoes production.
-- Assertion: The pot's production exists, for without it there could be no oldness and so forth, but there is oldness characterized by cessation.
-- That is incorrect.
-- The previously produced pot was not old when first produced because at that time it was new. A previously produced thing does not grow by way of its own entity. Nor is that old which afterwards has constantly been produced, for also at that time it is new. Since afterward it is newly produced, it will not become old by way of its own entity. Furthermore, by refuting production existent by way of its own entity, oldness existent by way of its own entity is refuted, but mere [conventional] oldness is accepted in our system too. )
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L6: [e. Refutation by examining the three times]
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\ Come into existence from itself,
\ Not come into existence from the future,
\ And also not from the past.
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(i. e. There is no inherent production because there is no possible production in the present, the future or the past. The cause and the effect cannot be simultaneous, not sequentially in any order. Production is like an illusion. The product is like an illusion. The three characteristics are like illusions. All part of a conceptual system, an elaborate mental fabrications trying to justify inherent existence, and to control the apparent world. )
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(-- Since there is no inherent production in any of the three times, production does not truly exist.
-- Since cause and effect are not simultaneous, a present thing does not come into existence from its present self. Nor does it come into existence from the future, not from the past. Moreover, since there is no inherent production in any of the three times, one must accept that production is false and like a magician's illusion.
Sutra says: "Monks, it is as follows: when the eye is produced, it does not come from anywhere, and when it ceases, it does not go anywhere. " Thus if there were inherent production, a thing should come from somewhere when it is produced, like the rising mood, and go somewhere when it ceases, like the setting moon. In that case it would be permanent, but since production and cessation are mere nominal imputations, one must accept that they are like magical illusions. )
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L5: [2. Summarized meaning: showing the effects of refuting production]
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\ ###
\ 360.
\ There is NO COMING of the produced,
\ Likewise NO GOING of that which has ceased.
\ Since it is thus, why should existence
\ Not be like a magician's illusions?
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(i. e. The Middle Way about production: Production / origination, duration, and cessation are like illusions. They are empty of inherent existence because dependently arisen. But that doesn't mean that they are completely non-existent. They are not existent, not non-existent, not both, not neither. They are dependent on the mind, but not from the mind only. They are like illusions but not total illusions. )
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(-- Since things do not come from anywhere when they are produced nor go anywhere when they cease, why should external and internal existence not be like a magician's illusions? When dependent arising is seen as it is, it is like a created illusion and not like a barren woman's child.
At this point Candrakirti's commentary says that if mere production is negated, it is the kind of object of comprehension that a barren woman's child is and thus a denial of dependent arising. Inability to assert production in one's own system and placing hope in a system which claims production neither exists [nor does not exist] destroys the Madhyamika view. Since adherence to such an interpretation creates causes for bad rebirths, it should be discarded like a gob of spittle!
-- Production is not truly existent, but, neither absolutely non existent. It exist in dependence. )
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L4: [B. General refutation of inherently existent production, duration and disintegration]
L5: [1. Refutation of inherently existent characteristics by examining sequentiality and simultaneity]
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\ ###
\ 361.
\ PRODUCTION, DURATION AND DISINTEGRATION
\ DO NOT OCCUR simultaneously.
\ If they are not consecutive either,
\ When can they ever occur?
.
(i. e. There is no inherent origination, duration and production because they cannot exist simultaneously or sequentially: so when do they exist ? )
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(-- Since production, duration and disintegration, the characteristics of products, do not occur simultaneously by way of their own entity nor consecutively by way of their own entity, when do they occur by way of their own entity? The
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subjects -- production, duration and disintegration -- do not exist inherently because of not being inherently simultaneous or consecutive. )
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L5: [2. Refutation through the consequence of infinite regress of the characteristics]
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\ ###
\ 362.
\ If for production and all the others,
\ All of these occurred again,
\ Disintegration would seem like production
\ And duration like disintegration.
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(i. e. There is no inherent origination, duration and production because otherwise there would be infinite regress: As product themselves they would also have origination, duration and cessation, and this ad infinitum. Infinite regress is not acceptable. )
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(-- Since production, duration and disintegration would all require the production of production and so forth, disintegration, like production, would have another disintegration, and duration too would seem like disintegration in that one would have to assert that it has another duration. Thus there would be infinite regress. In that case the basic characteristics would not be established. Therefore there is not even an atom of inherent existence. )
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L5: [3. Refutation by examining whether they are one or different]
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\ ###
\ 363.
\ If that which is characterized is said to be
\ Different from its characteristics,
\ How can the characterized be impermanent?
\ Alternatively, existence of all four is unclear.
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(i. e. There is no inherent origination, duration and production because they cannot be the same or different than the product they characterized: They are not different or separate, not the same. They cannot exist independently, alone, on their own, separate from the product. They are interdependent. They are co-dependently arisen concepts. And this is the same for any characteristics and its characterized. )
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(-- Question: Are the characteristics and that which they characterized one or different in nature?
-- Assertion: That which is characterized namely a product such as a pot, is different in nature from its three characteristics - production, duration and disintegration.
-- How can that which is characterized, namely a product such as a pot, be impermanent? It follows that it is not, for impermanence and the pot are inherently different. Alternatively, if they are inherently not different, the four, i. e. the three characteristics and that which they characterize, do not clearly have the entity of existing as functional things. It follows that the characteristics are not characteristics because of being one with that which they characterize, and that which they characterize is not what is characterized because of being one with the characteristics. One should therefore not assert that they are inherently one or different.
-- As characteristics of a characterized, they are neither one nor separate form it; none of them exist independently. Nothing "is" and is impermanent. )
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L5: [4. Refutation by examining whether they are existent or non-existent by way of their own entity] L6: [a. Refuting that production is truly existent because there are truly existent producing causes]
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\ ###
\ 364.
\ A thing is not produced from a thing
\ Nor is a thing produced from a non-thing.
\ A non-thing is not produced from a non-thing
\ Nor is a non-thing produced from a thing.
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(i. e. There is no inherent origination, duration and production because there is no way a thing or non-thing can be
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\ 366.
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produced by another thing or non-thing: I think it means again that the cause and the effect cannot be simultaneous not separate - this in the case of origination, and in the case of cessation. A produced thing is an origination; a produced non-thing is a cessation. A cause that is a thing is a cause that still exist (simultaneity) at the moment of origination or cessation. A cause that is a non-thing is a cause that do not exist anymore (separateness) at the moment of origination or cessation. So cause and effect (simultaneous or in sequence) cannot explain origination, nor cessation, and thus neither duration. )
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(-- Assertion: Production and so forth exist inherently because the agent of production exists inherently.
-- Answer:
-- The sprout, as an already existing functional thing, is not produced again while the seed as a functional thing exist, because a sprout is not produced unless the seed undergoes change. Also a sprout that has already been produced cannot be produced again. (simultaneity of cause and effect in the case of origination)
-- The sprout as a functional thing is not produced from a non-functional seed, because a non-functional thing does not have the ability to produce an effect. (cause and effect being separate in the case of origination)
-- Furthermore a non-functional effect is not produced from a non-functional cause: a burnt seed does not produce a burnt sprout. (cause and effect being separate in the case of cessation)
-- A non-functional effect is not produced from a functional cause since the fallacies already explained apply. (simultaneity of cause and effect in the case of cessation)
Since inherent production is impossible, causes and conditions giving rise to it are meaningless. )
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L6: [b. Production and so forth are neither truly existent things nor non-things]
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\ ###
\ 365.
\ A thing does not become a thing,
\ Nor does a non-thing become a thing.
\ A non-thing does not become a non-thing,
\ Nor does a thing become a non-thing.
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