Soviet Russia had extended diplomatic feelers to Kemal in 1919, and though progress was delayed by their competition in Transcaucasia, the two gov- ernments signed a formal friendship treaty in March 1921 and Moscow began providing arms and
financial
assistance.
Revolution and War_nodrm
91 See Katz, Secret War, 485--95.
? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
cans knew all-out war would be foolhardy and U. S. leaders knew they could afford to act with forebearance. Thus, Wilson justified his policy of "watchful waiting" in 1913 by saying, "We can afford to exercise the self-re- straint of a really great nation, which realizes its own strength and scorns to misuse it," and. he offered a similar appraisal the following year. 92
Second, the "ideology" of the Mexican revolutionary movements did not menace other states in the same way as French republicanism, Soviet Marx- ism, or Khomeini's version of Islamic fundamentalism. Instead, U. S. leaders were sympathetic to the basic ideals of the revolution (despite their reserva- tions about specific issues), and Wilson's various interventions were in- tended to guide the revolution but not to reverse it. 93 And in contrast to the other revolutions we have examined, in Mexico the revolutionaries did not develop a universalist ideology and did not see themselves as a model for other societies. 94 The danger of contagion was further reduced because the central goals of the revolution-the establishment of a liberal constitutional order and far-reaching agrarian reform-were simply not relevant north of the border. Apart from the minor threat posed by banditry and border raid- ing, therefore, there was no danger that the revolution would spread and thus little incentive for preventive war.
Apartial exception to this argument was the U. S. concern that Mexican ef- forts to assert control over foreign investments might establish a dangerous precedent for other developing countries. Especially after World War I, some U. S. officials seem to have believed that the Mexican government was fomenting unrest in the United States and was in cahoots with the Bolshe- viks and the International Workers of the World movement. Yet this danger was never great enough to justify intervention, because Carranza's revolu- tionary nationalism was not directed against private property per se and did not pose a serious threat to U. S. business interests. Indeed, some U. S. businessmen recognized that intervention might harm rather than protect U. S. assets in Mexico. 95
Third, U. S. leaders were aware that an invasion would not be easy or cheap; indeed, Wilson's diplomatic efforts were clearly inspired by his de-
92 InMarch1914,Wilsontoldareporterthat"acountryofthesizeandpoweroftheUnited States can afford to wait just as long as it pleases. Nobody doubts its power, and nobody doubts that Mr. Huerta is eventually to retire. " Quoted in Haley, Revolu tion and Intervention, 100, 130.
93 On the broad ndeological compatibility of the United States and Mexico, see Alan Knight, U. S. -Mexican Relations, 1910-1940 (San Diego: Center for U. S. -Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1987), 5-10.
94 On this point see Knight, Mexican Revolution, 2:297; and also Eric Woif, Peasant Wars ofthe Twentieth Century {New York: Harper, 1969), 25-26. The ideological background to the revo- lution is summarized in James D. Cockcroft, Intellectual Precursors of the Mexican Revolution, 1900-1913 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968).
95 See Smith, United States and Revolutionary Nationalism, 158-59, 174-75. [2971
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sire to avoid having to do more. Wilson had agreed to occupy Vera Cruz in 1914 because he believed (incorrectly) that the Mexicans would not resist, but the experience had been chastening. U. S. military leaders estimated tha? an all-out intervention in Mexico would require roughly five hundred thou- sand men, and given the deep divisions that persisted throughout the coun- try, merely sending an expedition to Mexico City would not have restored! order. Instead, a prolonged and costly occupation would have been neces- sary, on a much larger scale than the earlier U. S. occupations of Cuba or Nicaragua. Thus, the awareness that there was no offensive advantage vis-
a-vis Mexnco reinforced Wilson's already strong desire to avoid war.
The most important barrier to a North American war, however, was the outbreak of World War I. Wilson and his advisors recognized that large- scale involvement in Mexico would limit their ability to influence events in Europe, which they regarded as far more important. As Wilson told his pri- vate secretary in 1916: "It begins to look as if war with Germany is in- evitable. If it should come . . . I do not wish America's energies and forces divided for we will need every ounce of reserve we have to lick Germany. "96 This consideration also explains why Germany was eager to promote a U. S. - Mexican conflict; as Lansing put it in 1915, "Germany desires to keep up the turmoil in Mexico until the United States is forced to intervene; therefore, we must not intervene. "97 This concern increased as the U. S. entry into the world! war approached and helped persuade Wilson to withdraw the Punitive Ex-
pedition. House told the new U. S. ambassador, Henry Fletcher, "to do everything possible to avoid a break with Carranza," and Fletcher later re- called that "during the war my job was to keep Mexico quiet, and it was done. "98
Thus, the absence of war was due to the relatively low level of threat cre- ated by the revolution, as well as to the fact that events elsewhere posed an even greater danger. 99 Like the United States during the wars of the French Revolutio! l,l the Mexican revolutionaries were fortunate that a war in Eu- rope encouraged its potential opponents to act with restraint. U. S. -Mexican
% See Joseph Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him (Garden Gty, N. Y. : Garden City Pub- lishing, 1927), 159?
97 Quoted in Link, Wilson and the Progressive Era, 134 n. 59? Lansing later told a friend that concern for Germany "was a decided factor in our Mexican policy, I might say, a controlling factor. " According to Boaz Long, "but for the European war, the Mexican situation would have been one of the foremost foreign issues of our time. " Quoted in Smith, United States and Revolutionary Nationalism, 68-69.
98 Quoted in Smith, United States and Revolutionary Nationalism, 93; and see Katz, Secret War, 313.
99 Similar conditions facilitated Cardenas's consolidation of the revolution in the 1930s, es- pecially his nationalization of the Mexican oil industry in 1938. The United States would have opposed this step more strongly had the rise of Nazi Germany and the growing tensions in Europe not encouraged efforts to solidify ties with anti-Fascist leaders such as Cardenas.
? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
relations deteriorated again after the armistice (and unlike in 1916, the United States now possessed a sizeable army), but Wilson's attention was still focused primarily on European affairs and he remained firmly set against intervention for the remainder of his term.
Overall, this case is best seen as a near miss. Although war did not occur, the risk of war was very high on more than one occasion, and for many of the reasons identified by the theory. The Mexican instance also confirms that intervening nn a revolution is a difficult and unpredictable business; despite its more or less benevolent intentions and the absence of intense ideological conflict, U. S. efforts to guide the course of events in Mexico were unsuc- cessful at best and counterproductive at worst.
THE TURKISH REVOLUTION
Beginning in 1919, the Nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kemal transformed the core of the former Ottoman Empire from the center of multinational. Muslim dynasty into a secular Turkish state. Bernard Lewis describes this development as "one of the major revolutions of modern times," and it eventually enabled the Turks to escape the punitive condi- tions imposed at the end of World War I and to reemerge as an accepted member of the European system. 100
Like the American and Mexican cases, the revolution in Turkey did not re- sult in significant interstate violence. Although some familiar sources of conflict were present, their effects were relatively weak and short-lived. The revolution was accompanied by a major war with Greece, but this conflict was a cause of the revolution rather than an effect. The revolution also led to a protracted confrontation with Great Britain, and nearly to open warfare at one point, but a direct clash was avoided and Turkey soon established itself as a status quo power within the European order.
The comparatively mild repercussions of the Turkish Revolution were due in part to the origins and character of the revolutionary movement and its limited international objectives. This was not a mass revolution-from-below, guided or exploited by a revolutionary vanguard party; rather, it was an elite revolution-from-above conducted by dissident members of the old regime. 101 In constructing their new state, the leaders of the revolution explicitly re- jected a pan-Turanian or pan-Islamic agenda in favor of a program based on modernization and the promotion of Turkish nationalism within Anatolia proper. Thus, unlike most revolutionary states, Turkey did not pose a signif-
100 See his EmergenceofModern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 1.
101 See Ellen Kay Trimberger, Revolutionfrom Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru (New Brunswick, N. J. : Transaction Books, 1978).
[2991
? ? ? Revolution and War
icant threat to its immediate neighbors once its borders were reestablished after World War I. The Turks also benefited from favorable international con- ditions, which gave the new regime ample room for maneuver and aided its efforts to secure foreign recognition and diplomatic support.
The Revolutionary Process
The Ottoman Empire had been in decline since the seventeenth century, steadily losing territory and influence to its European neighbors. 102 In 19QS, the so-called Young Turk movement forced the sultan to recall Parliament and invited Western advisors to conduct military and economic reforms, but its initiatives failed to halt the empire's decline. Austria-Hungary an- nexed Bosma-Herzegovina in 1908, the Albanians revolted the following year, and the empire lost 83 percent of its European territory and 69 percent of its European population in the Balkan wars of 1912-1913. 103
The decislion to join the Central Powers in November 1914 was the Ot- toman Empire's final, fatal mistake. 104 By 1915, the Entente had agreed to partition the empire in the event of victory, with Russia receiving control of the Turkish Straits and Britain and France dividing the Arab portions of the empire into separate spheres of influence. Italy was promised the Dode- canese Islands, Libya, and portions of Anatolia, and Greece was eventually brought into the war with similar promises. 105
Although the Ottoman forces fought well on some fronts and obtained a large portion of Russian territory at Brest-Litovsk, the German collapse ended any chance of victory and the sultanate negotiated an armistice with the Entente on October 30, 1918. Based on the stated war aims of the Entente and Woodrow Wilson's pledge to preserve Turkish sovereignty, the Turks expected fairly lenient treatment at the hands of the Allies. To their surprise,
102 A map delllneating the Ottoman Empire's territorial losses is in Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History ofthe Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 2:xxiv.
103 The Young Turk movement was accompanied by a protracted debate of the Ottoman ideal of a decentralized, multinational empire, the concept of a new state based on Turkish nationalism, and proposals to reconstitute the empire along pan-Islamic lines. See Roderic Davison, Turkey (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Hall, 1968), uo-12; Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, 351-52; Shaw and Shaw, Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 2:301-305. On the B a l k a n w a r s , se e E . C . H e l m r e i c h , T h e D i p l o m a cy of t h e B a l k a n Wa r s ( C a m b r i d g e : H a rv a r d U n i - versity Press, 1938).
104 The decision to enter the war reflected both the pan-Turkic ambitions of some Turkish leaders (most notably Enver Pasha) and the belief that the war was an ideal opportunity to attack Russia. Shaw and Shaw, Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 2:31o-11.
105 For the texts of the various agreements, see J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East (1956; reprint, New York: Octagon Books, 1972), 2:7-25. On the Greek decision to enter the war, see A. A. Pallis, Greece's Anatolian Adventure-and After (London: Methuen, 1937), esp. 18.
? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
however, the end of the war unleashed the victors' acquisitive ambitions, accompanied by intense disputes over the size and distribution of the spoils. Istanbul was occupied and placed under military administration. French troops moved into Cilicia and eastern Thrace, Greece seized western Thrace, and British forces occupied Mosul, the Dardanelles, Samsun, and several other strategic points. 106 The newly independent Armenian state expanded into eastern Anatolia, and its claims for portions of former Ottoman terri- tory received a favorable hearing at the Paris Peace Conference. Greece and Italy also presented extensive claims for Turkish territory at the conference and began to back up their demands with military force. Italy landed troops on the southern coast of Anatolia in April 1919, and Britain, France, and the
United States helped Greek forces occupy Smyrna (Izmir) in May. 107
The Greek decision to occupy Smyrna was a manifestation of its long- standing desire to reunify the Greek peoples of the former Byzantine Em- pire. The Entente supported this step in order to forestall an Italian occupation of the same area, partly because British prime minister David Lloyd George was sympathetic to the Greeks and saw this move as a way of enhancing British influence in an important strategic area. As the Greek forces moved into the surrounding countryside, however, armed resistance groups began to form among the local population. 108 The sultanate was in- capable or unwilling to resist the Greek assault on Turkish sovereignty, and
the stage was set for a challenge to the sultan's authority.
Allied ocrupation and pressure from the emerging Armenian state had al- ready sparked resistance movements in eastern Anatolia, but it was the Greek occupation of Smyrna that was most responsible for inspiring the Na- tionalist movement in Turkey. 109 As the resistance grew, a group of national- ist officers led by Mustafa Kemal, inspector-general of the Ninth Army in Samsun, began to unite the resistance into a coherent movement. Kemal re- signed his commission and formed a Representative Committee to guide the new organization, and this group issued a proclamation in June declaring
106 See Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, 2:36-37; Salahi Ramsdan Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 1918-1923: Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish National Movement (Beverly Hills, Calif: SagePublishing, 1975), 2-3; and M. Phillips Price, AHistoryofTurkeyfrom Empire to Re- public (London: Allen and Unwin, 1956), 96.
107 Greece asked for all of Thrace, the Aegean islands, and a substantial portion of western Asia Minor, while Italy wanted the Dodacanese Islands and similar portions of Anatolia in accordance with the Tripartite Agreement of 1917. See Harry N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History, 1913-1923 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1931), 222-2J.
1 08 The population of Smyrna was predominantly Greek, but the surrounding territory was mainly Turkish.
109 See Howard, Partition of Turkey, 257? Harry J. Psomiades argues that although many Turks accepted the Allied occupation as a necessary evil, "it was the Greek occupation which was an affront which no patriotic Turk could endure. " The Eastern Question: The Last Phase: A Study in Greek-Turkish Diplomacy (Thessalonica: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1968), esp. 31.
[301]
? Revolution and War
that "national independence [was] in danger" because the sultanate was "unable to carry out its responsibilities. "11? Kemal consolidated additional support at a congress of the so-called Society for the Defense of the Rights of Eastern Anatolia in July, and a new National Congress consisting of three delegates from each province then confirmed these resolutions in September.
The Nationalists dominated elections for the Chamber of Deputies in No- vember, and Kemal informed the Entente that the sultan's emissaries at the Paris Peace Conference no longer represented the will of the nation. The new parliament met in Istanbul in January 1920 and proclaimed a new Na- tional Pact that reaffirmed the resolutions of the earlier congresses and de- manded "complete independence and liberty. "111
International Consequences
These developments threatened the Entente's plans for extensive spheres of influence in Anatolia and jeopardized British hopes of controlling the Turkish Straits. In response, British troops occupied the Turkish areas of Is- tanbul in March 1920 in order to arrest and deport the Nationalist deputies. Most of the Nationalists managed to escape, however, and Kemal organized a Grand National Assembly in Ankara outside the reach of the Allied forces. Declaring that the sultan was a prisoner who was unable to exercise his au- thority, the Assembly and Representative Committee proclaimed them- selves the true government of a new Turkish state.
Meanwhile, the Entente had completed its negotiations for the distribu- tion of Ottoman territories and submitted the Treaty of 5evres to the sultan in May. To forestall a Nationalist attack on Istanbul, the Supreme Allied Council approved a Greek proposal for an offensive against the Nationalist forces. The attack was successful and the Greek forces had occupied sub- stantial portions of Anatolia and Thrace by midsummer. When the sultan accepted the peace treaty in August, the triumph of Allied ambitions over Turkish weakness seemed complete. 112 Yet a combination of astute diplo-
110 Quoted in Elaine Diana Smith, Turkey: Origins of the Kemalist Movement and the Govern- mentoftheGrarodNationalAssembly,1919-1923 (Washington,D. C. :JuddandDetweiler,1959), 12-13. Mustafa Kemal was one of the Ottoman Empire's most accomplished commanders. He was connected with the Young Turk movement but had fallen out with its leaders before World War I and did not play a political role during the war.
111 See Roderic Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne," in The Diplomats, 1919-1939, ed. Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), 17S--79; and Hlllrewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, 2:74-'75?
112 The Treaty of 5evres opened the Dardanelles to international shipping, established Kur- dish autonomy, gave Grece e de facto control over Smyrna and the surrounding region, forced Turkey to recognize Armenian independence and made the rest of the former empire either independent or placed under British, French, or Italian control. See Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, 2:81--89; and Howard, Partition ofTurkey, 242-49.
? ? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
macy and the Nationalists' growing military power gradually restored the Turkish position, overthrew the sultanate, and turned the Treaty of sevres into an irrelevant anachronism. 113
The Nationalists began by seeking an alliance with Soviet Russia.
Soviet Russia had extended diplomatic feelers to Kemal in 1919, and though progress was delayed by their competition in Transcaucasia, the two gov- ernments signed a formal friendship treaty in March 1921 and Moscow began providing arms and financial assistance. n4
The Nationalists were equally successful in their efforts to divide the En- tente and isolate the Greeks. Relations among the Allies were already. strained by conflicting imperial interests, contentious discussions at the peace conference, and growing public opposition to costly military commit- ments, and the Nationalists exploited these tensions with considerable skill. The Turks also benefited when a Greek plebiscite removed Prime Minister Elftherios Venizelos and restored the deposed King Constantine, undermin- ing French and Italian support for the Greek cause and forcing the Greeks to rely solely on Great Britain. Allied fears of the growing Soviet-Turkish rap- prochement led them to propose a formal revision of the Sevres agreement. The resulting London conference in February 1921 enhanced the status and prestige of the Nationalists. Kemal refused to send a delegation until the Nationalists received a direct invitation, and the decision to let the Nation- alist representative, Bekir Sami, speak on behalf of the Istanbul and Ankara governments underscored the Nationalists' dominant position still further. Britain still refused to end its support for the Greeks, but France and Italy now broke ranks and agreed to withdraw from Anatolia in exchange for economic concessions. Although Kemal later declared that Sami had ex- ceeded his authority and repudiated the agreements, the London conference had exposed the rifts within the Entente and revealed that the Treaty of Sevres was not cast in stone. 115
Turkey's improved military position aided its attempts at fostering divi- sions within the Entente. The Greek advance had been halted in January 1921, and the Nationalists defeated a second Greek offensive in ApriL When a third offensive was thwarted in July, British support began to waver, and
the Supreme Allied Council now declared that it would remain neutral in the Greco-Turkish conflict. The breakthrough came with an agreement with
113 For an account of Kemal's diplomatic and military strategy, see George W. Gawryeh, "Kemal Atatiirk's Politico-Military Strategy in the Turkish War of Independence, 1918-1922: From Guerrilla Warfare to the Decisive Battle," Journal of Strategic Studies 11, no. 3 (1988).
114 See Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy," 186-91; and Jane Degras, ed. , Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1951-52), 1:237-42.
115 The background and results of the London conference of 1921 are discussed in Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy," 188""9o; Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 95-105; Howard, Partition ofTurkey, 26o-61.
? ? Revolution and War
France. The French government regarded the Treaty of 5evres as excessively favorable to Britain, and its forces in Cilicia were facing increasingly effec- tive resistance from the Nationalist forces. Negotiations began in earnest in June 1921, and the final treaty was completed in October, whereby France agreed to withdraw from Cilicia in exchange for temporary control over the disputed district of Alexandretta. The French also agreed to recognize the Turkish National Pact, in effect abandoning the Treaty of 5evres. 116 Italy was next. The Italian government, which viewed the Treaty of Sevres with even less enthusiasm than France, had begun withdrawing its troops from Adalia in June 1921. Aformal rapprochement with the Nationalists was delayed by political shifts in Italy, and subsequent negotiations in the fall of 1921 foundered on Turkey's refusal to grant economic concessions, but it was clear that Italy had given up any hope of making territorial gains at Turkey's expense. 117
These improvements in Turkey's relations with the West threatened its ties with the Soviet Union and forced Kemal to walk a fine line. The Na- tionalists assured Soviet foreign minister Chicherin that the detente with France would not undermine the Soviet-Turkish friendship treaty, and they signed a formal treaty guaranteeing their eastern frontier with Russia, Geor- gia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in October 1921. A visit by a Soviet military mission to Ankara in December arranged for additional military aid and wasfollowed! by afriendshiptreatybetweenTurkeyandtheUkrainianSo- viet Socialist Republic in January 1922. A Soviet ambassador took up resi- dence in Ankara, and the Soviet mission soon became the largest foreign delegation there. 118
The cessation of hostilities with France and Italy and the guarantee of Turkey's eastern border allowed Kemal to tum his attention back to the Greeks. Britain and France tried to arrange a negotiated settlement, but the Nationalists Jl'efused to modify the terms of the National Pact and continued their preparations for an all-out offensive. The attack was finally launched in August 1922, the Greek forces were routed, and the remnants of the Greek Army had withdrawn by the end of the month. JJ9
n& According to Kemal, the agreement with France "proved to the whole world that the treaty [of Sevres) was merely a rag. " Quoted in Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 135-38; and see Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, 2:97-99.
117 ItalyreporiedlyprovidedKemal'sforceswithadditionalmilitaryequipmentduringthis period, although the precise sources and magnitude of the support is hard to determine. See David Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties (London: Victor Gollancz, 1938) 2:1 349; Harold Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase, 1 9 1 9-1925: A Study in Postwar Diplomacy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1934), 264; and Pallis, Greece's Anatolian Adventure, 135.
118 See Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy," 194; and Degras, Soviet Documents, 1:263-69.
119 SeeShawandShaw,OttomanEmpireandModernTurkey,2:362-63;Sonyel,TurkishDiplo- macy, 171-73; Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy," 197; Howard, Partition ofTurkey, 267-68.
? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
This campaign caused a final crisis with Great Britain, briefly bringing the two sides to the brink of war in September 1922. The Nationalists sought the complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Turkish territory, including the removal of the remaining Greek forces in eastern Thrace. Lloyd George was still committed to the Greek cause, however, and the British government was worried that a further Turkish advance would jeopardize freedom of navigation in the Turkish Straits. As the Greeks withdrew, therefore, Great Britain reinforced its positions in the neutral zone established by the Treaty of 5evres and the Cabinet ordered the British commander, Lieutenant-Gen- eral Charles ("Tim") Harington, to oppose any attempt to force the straits. The French and Italian commanders sent small contingents in response to
Harington's request for a show of Allied solidarity, but both states subse- quently withdrew their forces after Lloyd George and Winston Churchill dispatched a bellicose message to the Dominions requesting support to de- fend the neutral zones. The rift was soon patched, and a joirit proposal for armistice negotiations was dispatched to the Turks on September 23, but it was clear that neither France nor Italy would go to war over this issue. Sup- port within England and the rest of the British Empire was doubtful as well, leaving Lloyd George virtually alone in his willingness to confront the Turks. 120 Egged on by the Soviets and by hard-liners within the Nationalist movement, elements of Kemal's forces entered the neutral zone and even- tually stood face-to-face with the outnumbered British garrison at Chanak.
Lloyd George was still determined to resist, however, and the British Cab- inet issued an ultimatum on September 29 demanding that the Turkish forces pull back from Chanak or be fired upon. Convinced that such an ulti- matum would merely provoke the Turks and make it more difficult to reach a negotiated solution, Harington and the British high commissioner, Horace Rumbold, chose to ignore the Cabinet's order. This decision prevented an immediate clash and gave time for cooler heads to prevail. Negotiations be- tween military representatives began on October 3, and a compromise was finally reached on the eleventh, just seventy-five minutes before the British troops were to have opened fire on the Turkish positions. 121 The Nationalists agreed to remain outside the neutral zones at Istanbul, Gallipoli, and Ismit pending a final peace settlement, while the Allies pledged that Greece would withdraw from eastern Thrace up to the Maritsa River. 122
121 See Stephen F. Evans, The Slow Rapprochement: Britain and Turkey in the Age of Kemal Atatiirk, 1919-1938 (Beverley, Eng. : Eothen Press, 1982), 63; and Briton Cooper Busch, Mudros to Lausanne: Britain's Frontier in West Asia, 1918-1923 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976), 351-55.
120 See Peter Rowland, Lloyd George (London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1975), 578.
122 On these events, see Evans, Slow Rapprochement, chap. 5; David Walder, The Chanak Af- fair (London: Hutchinson, 1969); Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, 34o-58; Sonyel, Turkish Diplo- macy, 173-76; Howard, Partition ofTurkey, 269-73; Nicolson, Curzon, 274-75; Laurence Evans,
United States Policy and the Partition ofTurkey, 1914-1924 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univer-
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The armistice set the stage for the Lausanne Conference in 1923, which formally dismantled the Treaty of sevres and placed Turkey's relations with the West on a new basis. The Nationalists' primacy was now unchallenged, and when the Allies tried to invite representatives from the Istanbul and Ankara regimes, the Assembly simply abolished the sultanate and placed the office of the caliphate under its authority. After two separate rounds of negotiations, a final agreement was reached in July. With the exception of a clause granting Britain control over Mosul, Turkey's new borders corre-
sponded almost perfectly to the principles of the National Pact. 123 The En- tente accepted the borders established by the Treaty of Kars, and the restoration of eastern Thrace gave Turkey a foothold in Europe as well. The treaty abolished the foreign capitulations established during the Ottomall1l period (meaning that foreign residents and companies would now be sub- ject to Turkish law) and opened the Turkish Straits to international shipping under the control of an international commission. The parties also agreed to
conduct a compulsory population exchange between Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion and Greek nationals of the Muslim religion. The exchange agreement eliminated the main source of Greco-Turkish ri- valry and paved the way for a major rapprochement at the end of the decade. 124
The Lausanne Conference also signaled Turkey's reemergence as a mem- ber of the international community. Elections for a new National Assembly were held in August 1923, the new Republic of Turkey was officially pro- claimed in October with Mustafa Kemal (Atatiirk) as its first president, and the capital was moved from Istanbul to Ankara. With their triumph now complete, Kemal and his followers launched the extensive program of west- ernization that created the modem Turkish state. 125
Is the Turkish Revolution an Exception?
The Turkish Revolution differs in a number of ways from the other cases examined in this book, but many familiar features are present as weH.
sity Press, 1965), 378-86; Davidson, "Turkish Diplomacy," 197-<;9; and Kenneth 0. Morgan, Consensus and Disunity: The Lloyd George Coalition Government, 1918-1922 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 311)-23.
123 The text of the treaty is reprinted in Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, 2:119-127.
124 See Psomiades, Eastern Question, chap. 7; and Dimitri Pentzopoulos, The Balkan Exchange ofMinorities and Its Impact on Greece (Paris: Mouton, 1962).
125 Turkish diplomacy at Lausanne is described in Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy," 199-208; Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 185-229; Edward Reginald Vere-Hodge, Turkish Foreign Policrj, 1918-1948 (Ambilly-Annemasse: Imprimerie Franco-Suisse, 1950), 3&-50; Howard, Partition ofTurkey, chap. 9; and Evans, U. S. Policy and Turkey, chap. 14. For an account emphasizing Curzon's success in weaning Turkey away from Russia, see Nicolson, Curzon, chaps. 1o-11.
? ? ? [306]
? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
Turkey's fragility in the aftermath of World War I led Britain, France, Italy, Greece, and Russia to seek territorial acquisitions at the Turks' expense, and their conflicting ambitions gave rise to serious disagreements once the war was over. The revolution was not responsible for this power vacuum, how- ever, as Turkey's weakness was a direct result of its decision to align with the Central Powers and their subsequent defeat in 1918. Instead, the Na- tionalist revolution was itself a response to the sultan's inability to defend
Anatolia. Thus, although Turkey's vulnerability made it the object of intense foreign competition and encouraged direct military intervention, this was not directly attributable to the revolution.
Once the revolution was underway, however, both sides quickly con- cluded that the other was hostile and potentially threatening. The National- ist movement arose from Turkish opposition to foreign (especially Greek) intervention, and Kemal remained suspicious of the Entente for quite some
time. 126 Similarly, Britain and France saw the Kemalist movement as a threat to their postwar ambitions in the Near East, leading them to occupy Istan- bul in March 1920 and to endorse the Greek offensive later that summer.
In addition to the obvious conflicts of interest-the Allies wished to partition Turkey while the Nationalists sought to reestablish Turkish sover- eignty-Allied hostility was increased by several unfortunate mispercep- tions, particularly by the British. Lloyd George's belief that the Kemalist movement was a linear descendant of the Young Turks' Committee on Union and Progress (CUP) reinforced his pro-Greek sympathies, and the suspicion that Kemal harbored the same pan-Turkic tendencies displayed by earlier Turkish nationalists made the Nationalists seem even more threat- ening. 127 Lloyd George regarded the Turks as an "unspeakable" race that had "forfeited! their title to rule majorities of other peoples," and he once re-
ferred to Kemal as "no better than a carpet seller in a bazaar. " Stephen Evans reports that British officials placed the Nationalists "side by side with the CUP and the Bolsheviks," a view that nicely reveals British ignorance about the true character of the Nationalist movement. In particular, British leaders seem to have been unaware that Kemal had broken with Enver Pasha and the CUP in 1914, had explicitly rejected a pan-Turkic agenda, and had repeatedly expressed his desire for harmonious relations with the West. 12. s
126 In 1921, he told his followers, "I am not sure of the good faith of England, who wants to play us a trick. " Quoted in Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 95?
127 TheCUPhadplayedacentralroleintheOttomandecisiontoallywiththeCentralPowers, and CUP leaders such as Enver Pasha were strongly committed to a pan-Turkic foreign policy.
128 See Evans, Slow Rapprochement, 64? 5; Morgan, Consensus and Disunity, 319; and Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, 171-72. On the rivalry between Kemal and Enver Pasha, see Salahi R. Sonyel, "Mustafa Kemal and Enver in Conflict, 1918-1922," Middle Eastern Studies 25, no. 4 (1<)89).
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Not surprisingly, these suspicions encouraged intransigence on both sides. Several unfortunate incidents reinforced perceptions of hostility, in- cluding the execution of a British subject on charges of espionage (which the British high commissioner in Istanbul saw as sign of the Nationalists' "un- compromising hostility towards His Majesty's government" ), a Nationalist raid on the British ship Palitana, and Britain's open support for the Greeks. 129 These events sustained the Nationalists' desire for the complete removal of all foreign troops and help explain why Lloyd George sought to oppose the Turkish advance on Istanbul in 1922Y0
The Nationalists' opponents also seem to have consistently underesti- mated Kemal's popularity and the military prowess of his troops while ex- aggerating their own capacity to impose a solution by force. This was most evident in the case of Greece and its British patron; although a number of British, French, arid Greek officials argued that Kemal would be difficult to defeat, Prime Minister Venizelos assured the Allies that the Greeks "would be able to clear up the whole of the neighborhood between Smyrna and the Dardanelles in the course of fifteen days. "131 The Greeks' initial successes boosted this overconfidence and silenced opposition but failed to overcome the Nationalist resistance and left the Greek forces badly overextended.
Nonetheless, Venizelos's successor as prime minister described Kemal's forces as a "rabble worthy of little or no consideration" and promised that a new offensive would "scatter the Kemalist forces and . . . impose the will of the powers" within three months. 132
As usual, these problems were exacerbated by uncertainty and misinfor- mation. In June 1919, for example, the British foreign office representative stated that he "knew nothing of Mustapha Kemal," and another Allied re- port declared that "the whole movement appears to have had little success and for the most part not much interest is taken. " Other British agents re- ported that the Nationalist Congress at Erzerum had been a failure, and as noted earlier, top British officials were convinced that Kemal was either a Bolshevik or a follower of the CUP or else was under the control of the offi-
129 The remarks were made by High Commissioner Horace Rumbold; quoted in Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 115.
130 Lloyd George later blamed the failure of his policy in part on lack of information. De- scribing the initial emergence of Mustafa Kemal, he wrote that "no information had been re- ceived as to his activities in Asia Minor in reorganizing the shattered and depleted armies of Turkey. Our military intelligence had never been more thoroughly unintelligent. " Tru th about the Peace Treaties, 2:1285.
131 See Howard, Partition ofTurkey, 259? On the ill-advised nature of the Greek advance, see Pallis, Greece's Anatolian Adventure, 54-58, 102-105.
132 The Greek government opposed any modification of the 5evres agreement at the Lon- don conference in February 1921, and the deputy chief of staff told the delegates that a re- newed Greek advance would proceed "up to Ankara as a first stage. " Quoted in Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 96 (emphasis added); and Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, 239-40.
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? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
cial government in Istanbul. Moreover, the lack of official contacts forced Kemal to rely on unofficial channels, allowing these misconceptions to sur- vive intact. 133
Thus, although the Nationalist revolution in Turkey did not lead directly to war, it does provide partial support for my main propositions. Foreign powers did seek to exploit the vacuum resulting from the Ottoman collapse, and the revolutionary movement was seen as threatening to their interests and objectives. The level of threat was exaggerated, however, and opposing states overstated their ability to defeat the revolutionary movement by force. These misperceptions and miscalculations stemmed in part from a lack of information and inadequate channels of communication (although the impact of this factor varied). Finally, although all-out war was avoided, Britain and Turkey did come close in 1922 and could easily have stumbled into a serious clash. In short, the Turkish case is a partial exception at best: although war did not occur, the pressures for war that did arise are consis- tent with the theory.
Why were Turkey and the great powers able to avoid war, and why were the Turks able to integrate themselves into the existing order with far less di. fficulty than other revolutionary states?
First, the Turkish Revolution owed much of its moderate impact to its character as an elite revolution. Its leaders were for the most part prominent members of the old regime, and they were willing and able to seize power because the sultanate had been discredited by defeat and because they re- tained the loyalty of key institutions (especially the army). In addition, the Nationalists did not have to wage an extended struggle against internal op-
ponents, because the sultan lacked the capacity to resist and was increasingly dependent on foreign support. As a result, the Nationalist movement did not develop an elaborate ideology of social revolution in order to mobilize sup- porters and to justify its rule. The principle of national independence was sufficient, especially after the Greek invasion galvanized Turkish resistance. Although pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic programs were actively debated dur- ing the Young Turk period, Kemal explicitly rejected these more ambitious programs in favor of the limited goal of independence based on Turkish na- tionalism. Thus, the Nationalist program was limited to restoring national sovereignty within a specific geographic area, exporting the revolution was precluded by definition, and the revolution posed no ideological threat to its neighbors. 134 Thus, whereas the Jacobins, the Bolsheviks, and the Iranian
133 "Thislackofdiplomaticcontactonlyreinforcedthe[British]HighCommission'sfalse assumptions concerning the Nationalists, and had the effect of keeping the two sides apart. " Stephen Evans, Slow Rapprochement, 65; and see Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, 16cr72.
1 34 Armenia is a partial exception in this regard, because it had established itself on territo- ries that the Nationalists regarded as part of the Turkish homeland. See Shaw and Shaw, Ot- toman Empire and Modern Turkey, 2:376.
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clerics saw their opponents as intrinsically evil and endorsed revolutionary transformations at home and abroad, Kemal and his followers sought a rapnd reconciliation with the West in order to concentrate on modemization. 135
Second, like Mexico in 1916 and the United States after 1787, the revolu- tionary Turks profited from favorable international conditions. The Central Powers had been defeated and disarmed. The Entente was exhausted and war-weary. Russia was weakened and distracted by its own revolution. Great Britain tried to use the Greeks as surrogates but was unwilling to es- calate when this expedient failed, giving Kemal and the Nationalists the time they needed to consolidate their position. The revolution in Russia and the antipathy between Moscow and the West was a valuable asset for the Turks as well. In addition to obtaining modest amounts of financial and mnl-
itary assistance from the Bolsheviks, Kemal was able to play off the two sides, wnth considerable success. As in the French and Russian cases, in short, divisions among the other great powers prevented joint action to ar- rest or reverse the revolution.
The Turkish case reveals many familiar dynamics of revolutionary situa- tions, but in a muted and less dangerous form. The preferences and goals of the Nationalists differed from those of the old regime and threatened the in- terests of several foreign powers. These states found it difficult to formulate an effective response to the revolutionary movement because they overesti- mated its hostility and underestimated its capabilities, giving rise to exag- gerated perceptions of threat and making the use of force somewhat more attractive. These states revised their estimates over time, however, and
eventually reestablished more or less cordial relations.
THE CHINESE REVOLUTION
As my theory would predict, the revolution in Chi. na contributed to the emerging security competition between the United States and the Sovieft Union and played a major role in bringing the Cold War to Asia. The new regime went to war in Korea less than a year after gaining power, and the origins of its involvement bear a striking resemblance to those of the wars that followed the French, Russian, and Iranian revolutions.
The foreign policy of the People's Republic of China (PRC) also highlights the tension between revolutionary objectives and systemic constraints. Al- though the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) openly endorsed the goal of
135 Kemal warned in a 1923 speech: "The successes which our army has gained up to now cannot be regarded as having achieved the real salvation of our country. . . . Let us not be puffed up with military victories. Let us rather prepare for the new victories in science and economics. " Quoted in Lewis, Emergence ofModern Turkey, 255-56.
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world revolution and saw its victory as a model for other developing coun- tries, Chinese foreign policy tended to be cautious and defensive, focused more on preserving Chinese security than on promoting revolution. On the whole, therefore, the Chinese Revolution provides strong support for the main argument of this book.
Maoist Revolutionary Ideology
Maoist political thought closely resembles the ideal type of revolutionary ideology described in chapter 2. 136 During its long struggle against both the Guomindang (GMD) and Japan, the CCP developed a body of revolution- ary doctrine designed to inspire prolonged sacrifices and provide tactical guidance to the Communist cadres. As a Marxist-Leninist, CCP leader Mao Tse-tung viewed politics as inherently competitive and regarded oppo- nents-e- specially the imperialist powers-as hostile. 137 The Maoist world- view was also intrinsically optimistic: although enemies might appear stronger, they were actually "paper tigers. " "In appearance [they] are terri- fying but in reality they are not so powerful. " As a result, victory was in- evitable provided the cadres did not lose heart. 138 Like Lenin, Mao tempered this optimism with a sense of realism, stressing the need to analyze political and strategic problems systematically and warning against both rightist de- viations (passivity and fear of struggle) and leftist deviations (overconfident recklessness). In his words, the CCP should "despise the enemy strategi- cally while taking full account of him tactically," meaning that although vic- tory was inevitable, achieving it required prolonged effort, careful preparation, and tactical flexibility. 139 Maoist ideology combined nationalist
136 In addition to Mao's writings, this summary of Maoist ideology is based on Stuart Schram, The Thought ofMao Tse-tung (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), chap. 2; J.
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cans knew all-out war would be foolhardy and U. S. leaders knew they could afford to act with forebearance. Thus, Wilson justified his policy of "watchful waiting" in 1913 by saying, "We can afford to exercise the self-re- straint of a really great nation, which realizes its own strength and scorns to misuse it," and. he offered a similar appraisal the following year. 92
Second, the "ideology" of the Mexican revolutionary movements did not menace other states in the same way as French republicanism, Soviet Marx- ism, or Khomeini's version of Islamic fundamentalism. Instead, U. S. leaders were sympathetic to the basic ideals of the revolution (despite their reserva- tions about specific issues), and Wilson's various interventions were in- tended to guide the revolution but not to reverse it. 93 And in contrast to the other revolutions we have examined, in Mexico the revolutionaries did not develop a universalist ideology and did not see themselves as a model for other societies. 94 The danger of contagion was further reduced because the central goals of the revolution-the establishment of a liberal constitutional order and far-reaching agrarian reform-were simply not relevant north of the border. Apart from the minor threat posed by banditry and border raid- ing, therefore, there was no danger that the revolution would spread and thus little incentive for preventive war.
Apartial exception to this argument was the U. S. concern that Mexican ef- forts to assert control over foreign investments might establish a dangerous precedent for other developing countries. Especially after World War I, some U. S. officials seem to have believed that the Mexican government was fomenting unrest in the United States and was in cahoots with the Bolshe- viks and the International Workers of the World movement. Yet this danger was never great enough to justify intervention, because Carranza's revolu- tionary nationalism was not directed against private property per se and did not pose a serious threat to U. S. business interests. Indeed, some U. S. businessmen recognized that intervention might harm rather than protect U. S. assets in Mexico. 95
Third, U. S. leaders were aware that an invasion would not be easy or cheap; indeed, Wilson's diplomatic efforts were clearly inspired by his de-
92 InMarch1914,Wilsontoldareporterthat"acountryofthesizeandpoweroftheUnited States can afford to wait just as long as it pleases. Nobody doubts its power, and nobody doubts that Mr. Huerta is eventually to retire. " Quoted in Haley, Revolu tion and Intervention, 100, 130.
93 On the broad ndeological compatibility of the United States and Mexico, see Alan Knight, U. S. -Mexican Relations, 1910-1940 (San Diego: Center for U. S. -Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1987), 5-10.
94 On this point see Knight, Mexican Revolution, 2:297; and also Eric Woif, Peasant Wars ofthe Twentieth Century {New York: Harper, 1969), 25-26. The ideological background to the revo- lution is summarized in James D. Cockcroft, Intellectual Precursors of the Mexican Revolution, 1900-1913 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968).
95 See Smith, United States and Revolutionary Nationalism, 158-59, 174-75. [2971
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sire to avoid having to do more. Wilson had agreed to occupy Vera Cruz in 1914 because he believed (incorrectly) that the Mexicans would not resist, but the experience had been chastening. U. S. military leaders estimated tha? an all-out intervention in Mexico would require roughly five hundred thou- sand men, and given the deep divisions that persisted throughout the coun- try, merely sending an expedition to Mexico City would not have restored! order. Instead, a prolonged and costly occupation would have been neces- sary, on a much larger scale than the earlier U. S. occupations of Cuba or Nicaragua. Thus, the awareness that there was no offensive advantage vis-
a-vis Mexnco reinforced Wilson's already strong desire to avoid war.
The most important barrier to a North American war, however, was the outbreak of World War I. Wilson and his advisors recognized that large- scale involvement in Mexico would limit their ability to influence events in Europe, which they regarded as far more important. As Wilson told his pri- vate secretary in 1916: "It begins to look as if war with Germany is in- evitable. If it should come . . . I do not wish America's energies and forces divided for we will need every ounce of reserve we have to lick Germany. "96 This consideration also explains why Germany was eager to promote a U. S. - Mexican conflict; as Lansing put it in 1915, "Germany desires to keep up the turmoil in Mexico until the United States is forced to intervene; therefore, we must not intervene. "97 This concern increased as the U. S. entry into the world! war approached and helped persuade Wilson to withdraw the Punitive Ex-
pedition. House told the new U. S. ambassador, Henry Fletcher, "to do everything possible to avoid a break with Carranza," and Fletcher later re- called that "during the war my job was to keep Mexico quiet, and it was done. "98
Thus, the absence of war was due to the relatively low level of threat cre- ated by the revolution, as well as to the fact that events elsewhere posed an even greater danger. 99 Like the United States during the wars of the French Revolutio! l,l the Mexican revolutionaries were fortunate that a war in Eu- rope encouraged its potential opponents to act with restraint. U. S. -Mexican
% See Joseph Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him (Garden Gty, N. Y. : Garden City Pub- lishing, 1927), 159?
97 Quoted in Link, Wilson and the Progressive Era, 134 n. 59? Lansing later told a friend that concern for Germany "was a decided factor in our Mexican policy, I might say, a controlling factor. " According to Boaz Long, "but for the European war, the Mexican situation would have been one of the foremost foreign issues of our time. " Quoted in Smith, United States and Revolutionary Nationalism, 68-69.
98 Quoted in Smith, United States and Revolutionary Nationalism, 93; and see Katz, Secret War, 313.
99 Similar conditions facilitated Cardenas's consolidation of the revolution in the 1930s, es- pecially his nationalization of the Mexican oil industry in 1938. The United States would have opposed this step more strongly had the rise of Nazi Germany and the growing tensions in Europe not encouraged efforts to solidify ties with anti-Fascist leaders such as Cardenas.
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relations deteriorated again after the armistice (and unlike in 1916, the United States now possessed a sizeable army), but Wilson's attention was still focused primarily on European affairs and he remained firmly set against intervention for the remainder of his term.
Overall, this case is best seen as a near miss. Although war did not occur, the risk of war was very high on more than one occasion, and for many of the reasons identified by the theory. The Mexican instance also confirms that intervening nn a revolution is a difficult and unpredictable business; despite its more or less benevolent intentions and the absence of intense ideological conflict, U. S. efforts to guide the course of events in Mexico were unsuc- cessful at best and counterproductive at worst.
THE TURKISH REVOLUTION
Beginning in 1919, the Nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kemal transformed the core of the former Ottoman Empire from the center of multinational. Muslim dynasty into a secular Turkish state. Bernard Lewis describes this development as "one of the major revolutions of modern times," and it eventually enabled the Turks to escape the punitive condi- tions imposed at the end of World War I and to reemerge as an accepted member of the European system. 100
Like the American and Mexican cases, the revolution in Turkey did not re- sult in significant interstate violence. Although some familiar sources of conflict were present, their effects were relatively weak and short-lived. The revolution was accompanied by a major war with Greece, but this conflict was a cause of the revolution rather than an effect. The revolution also led to a protracted confrontation with Great Britain, and nearly to open warfare at one point, but a direct clash was avoided and Turkey soon established itself as a status quo power within the European order.
The comparatively mild repercussions of the Turkish Revolution were due in part to the origins and character of the revolutionary movement and its limited international objectives. This was not a mass revolution-from-below, guided or exploited by a revolutionary vanguard party; rather, it was an elite revolution-from-above conducted by dissident members of the old regime. 101 In constructing their new state, the leaders of the revolution explicitly re- jected a pan-Turanian or pan-Islamic agenda in favor of a program based on modernization and the promotion of Turkish nationalism within Anatolia proper. Thus, unlike most revolutionary states, Turkey did not pose a signif-
100 See his EmergenceofModern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 1.
101 See Ellen Kay Trimberger, Revolutionfrom Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru (New Brunswick, N. J. : Transaction Books, 1978).
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icant threat to its immediate neighbors once its borders were reestablished after World War I. The Turks also benefited from favorable international con- ditions, which gave the new regime ample room for maneuver and aided its efforts to secure foreign recognition and diplomatic support.
The Revolutionary Process
The Ottoman Empire had been in decline since the seventeenth century, steadily losing territory and influence to its European neighbors. 102 In 19QS, the so-called Young Turk movement forced the sultan to recall Parliament and invited Western advisors to conduct military and economic reforms, but its initiatives failed to halt the empire's decline. Austria-Hungary an- nexed Bosma-Herzegovina in 1908, the Albanians revolted the following year, and the empire lost 83 percent of its European territory and 69 percent of its European population in the Balkan wars of 1912-1913. 103
The decislion to join the Central Powers in November 1914 was the Ot- toman Empire's final, fatal mistake. 104 By 1915, the Entente had agreed to partition the empire in the event of victory, with Russia receiving control of the Turkish Straits and Britain and France dividing the Arab portions of the empire into separate spheres of influence. Italy was promised the Dode- canese Islands, Libya, and portions of Anatolia, and Greece was eventually brought into the war with similar promises. 105
Although the Ottoman forces fought well on some fronts and obtained a large portion of Russian territory at Brest-Litovsk, the German collapse ended any chance of victory and the sultanate negotiated an armistice with the Entente on October 30, 1918. Based on the stated war aims of the Entente and Woodrow Wilson's pledge to preserve Turkish sovereignty, the Turks expected fairly lenient treatment at the hands of the Allies. To their surprise,
102 A map delllneating the Ottoman Empire's territorial losses is in Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History ofthe Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 2:xxiv.
103 The Young Turk movement was accompanied by a protracted debate of the Ottoman ideal of a decentralized, multinational empire, the concept of a new state based on Turkish nationalism, and proposals to reconstitute the empire along pan-Islamic lines. See Roderic Davison, Turkey (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Hall, 1968), uo-12; Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, 351-52; Shaw and Shaw, Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 2:301-305. On the B a l k a n w a r s , se e E . C . H e l m r e i c h , T h e D i p l o m a cy of t h e B a l k a n Wa r s ( C a m b r i d g e : H a rv a r d U n i - versity Press, 1938).
104 The decision to enter the war reflected both the pan-Turkic ambitions of some Turkish leaders (most notably Enver Pasha) and the belief that the war was an ideal opportunity to attack Russia. Shaw and Shaw, Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 2:31o-11.
105 For the texts of the various agreements, see J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East (1956; reprint, New York: Octagon Books, 1972), 2:7-25. On the Greek decision to enter the war, see A. A. Pallis, Greece's Anatolian Adventure-and After (London: Methuen, 1937), esp. 18.
? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
however, the end of the war unleashed the victors' acquisitive ambitions, accompanied by intense disputes over the size and distribution of the spoils. Istanbul was occupied and placed under military administration. French troops moved into Cilicia and eastern Thrace, Greece seized western Thrace, and British forces occupied Mosul, the Dardanelles, Samsun, and several other strategic points. 106 The newly independent Armenian state expanded into eastern Anatolia, and its claims for portions of former Ottoman terri- tory received a favorable hearing at the Paris Peace Conference. Greece and Italy also presented extensive claims for Turkish territory at the conference and began to back up their demands with military force. Italy landed troops on the southern coast of Anatolia in April 1919, and Britain, France, and the
United States helped Greek forces occupy Smyrna (Izmir) in May. 107
The Greek decision to occupy Smyrna was a manifestation of its long- standing desire to reunify the Greek peoples of the former Byzantine Em- pire. The Entente supported this step in order to forestall an Italian occupation of the same area, partly because British prime minister David Lloyd George was sympathetic to the Greeks and saw this move as a way of enhancing British influence in an important strategic area. As the Greek forces moved into the surrounding countryside, however, armed resistance groups began to form among the local population. 108 The sultanate was in- capable or unwilling to resist the Greek assault on Turkish sovereignty, and
the stage was set for a challenge to the sultan's authority.
Allied ocrupation and pressure from the emerging Armenian state had al- ready sparked resistance movements in eastern Anatolia, but it was the Greek occupation of Smyrna that was most responsible for inspiring the Na- tionalist movement in Turkey. 109 As the resistance grew, a group of national- ist officers led by Mustafa Kemal, inspector-general of the Ninth Army in Samsun, began to unite the resistance into a coherent movement. Kemal re- signed his commission and formed a Representative Committee to guide the new organization, and this group issued a proclamation in June declaring
106 See Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, 2:36-37; Salahi Ramsdan Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 1918-1923: Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish National Movement (Beverly Hills, Calif: SagePublishing, 1975), 2-3; and M. Phillips Price, AHistoryofTurkeyfrom Empire to Re- public (London: Allen and Unwin, 1956), 96.
107 Greece asked for all of Thrace, the Aegean islands, and a substantial portion of western Asia Minor, while Italy wanted the Dodacanese Islands and similar portions of Anatolia in accordance with the Tripartite Agreement of 1917. See Harry N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History, 1913-1923 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1931), 222-2J.
1 08 The population of Smyrna was predominantly Greek, but the surrounding territory was mainly Turkish.
109 See Howard, Partition of Turkey, 257? Harry J. Psomiades argues that although many Turks accepted the Allied occupation as a necessary evil, "it was the Greek occupation which was an affront which no patriotic Turk could endure. " The Eastern Question: The Last Phase: A Study in Greek-Turkish Diplomacy (Thessalonica: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1968), esp. 31.
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that "national independence [was] in danger" because the sultanate was "unable to carry out its responsibilities. "11? Kemal consolidated additional support at a congress of the so-called Society for the Defense of the Rights of Eastern Anatolia in July, and a new National Congress consisting of three delegates from each province then confirmed these resolutions in September.
The Nationalists dominated elections for the Chamber of Deputies in No- vember, and Kemal informed the Entente that the sultan's emissaries at the Paris Peace Conference no longer represented the will of the nation. The new parliament met in Istanbul in January 1920 and proclaimed a new Na- tional Pact that reaffirmed the resolutions of the earlier congresses and de- manded "complete independence and liberty. "111
International Consequences
These developments threatened the Entente's plans for extensive spheres of influence in Anatolia and jeopardized British hopes of controlling the Turkish Straits. In response, British troops occupied the Turkish areas of Is- tanbul in March 1920 in order to arrest and deport the Nationalist deputies. Most of the Nationalists managed to escape, however, and Kemal organized a Grand National Assembly in Ankara outside the reach of the Allied forces. Declaring that the sultan was a prisoner who was unable to exercise his au- thority, the Assembly and Representative Committee proclaimed them- selves the true government of a new Turkish state.
Meanwhile, the Entente had completed its negotiations for the distribu- tion of Ottoman territories and submitted the Treaty of 5evres to the sultan in May. To forestall a Nationalist attack on Istanbul, the Supreme Allied Council approved a Greek proposal for an offensive against the Nationalist forces. The attack was successful and the Greek forces had occupied sub- stantial portions of Anatolia and Thrace by midsummer. When the sultan accepted the peace treaty in August, the triumph of Allied ambitions over Turkish weakness seemed complete. 112 Yet a combination of astute diplo-
110 Quoted in Elaine Diana Smith, Turkey: Origins of the Kemalist Movement and the Govern- mentoftheGrarodNationalAssembly,1919-1923 (Washington,D. C. :JuddandDetweiler,1959), 12-13. Mustafa Kemal was one of the Ottoman Empire's most accomplished commanders. He was connected with the Young Turk movement but had fallen out with its leaders before World War I and did not play a political role during the war.
111 See Roderic Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne," in The Diplomats, 1919-1939, ed. Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), 17S--79; and Hlllrewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, 2:74-'75?
112 The Treaty of 5evres opened the Dardanelles to international shipping, established Kur- dish autonomy, gave Grece e de facto control over Smyrna and the surrounding region, forced Turkey to recognize Armenian independence and made the rest of the former empire either independent or placed under British, French, or Italian control. See Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, 2:81--89; and Howard, Partition ofTurkey, 242-49.
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macy and the Nationalists' growing military power gradually restored the Turkish position, overthrew the sultanate, and turned the Treaty of sevres into an irrelevant anachronism. 113
The Nationalists began by seeking an alliance with Soviet Russia.
Soviet Russia had extended diplomatic feelers to Kemal in 1919, and though progress was delayed by their competition in Transcaucasia, the two gov- ernments signed a formal friendship treaty in March 1921 and Moscow began providing arms and financial assistance. n4
The Nationalists were equally successful in their efforts to divide the En- tente and isolate the Greeks. Relations among the Allies were already. strained by conflicting imperial interests, contentious discussions at the peace conference, and growing public opposition to costly military commit- ments, and the Nationalists exploited these tensions with considerable skill. The Turks also benefited when a Greek plebiscite removed Prime Minister Elftherios Venizelos and restored the deposed King Constantine, undermin- ing French and Italian support for the Greek cause and forcing the Greeks to rely solely on Great Britain. Allied fears of the growing Soviet-Turkish rap- prochement led them to propose a formal revision of the Sevres agreement. The resulting London conference in February 1921 enhanced the status and prestige of the Nationalists. Kemal refused to send a delegation until the Nationalists received a direct invitation, and the decision to let the Nation- alist representative, Bekir Sami, speak on behalf of the Istanbul and Ankara governments underscored the Nationalists' dominant position still further. Britain still refused to end its support for the Greeks, but France and Italy now broke ranks and agreed to withdraw from Anatolia in exchange for economic concessions. Although Kemal later declared that Sami had ex- ceeded his authority and repudiated the agreements, the London conference had exposed the rifts within the Entente and revealed that the Treaty of Sevres was not cast in stone. 115
Turkey's improved military position aided its attempts at fostering divi- sions within the Entente. The Greek advance had been halted in January 1921, and the Nationalists defeated a second Greek offensive in ApriL When a third offensive was thwarted in July, British support began to waver, and
the Supreme Allied Council now declared that it would remain neutral in the Greco-Turkish conflict. The breakthrough came with an agreement with
113 For an account of Kemal's diplomatic and military strategy, see George W. Gawryeh, "Kemal Atatiirk's Politico-Military Strategy in the Turkish War of Independence, 1918-1922: From Guerrilla Warfare to the Decisive Battle," Journal of Strategic Studies 11, no. 3 (1988).
114 See Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy," 186-91; and Jane Degras, ed. , Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1951-52), 1:237-42.
115 The background and results of the London conference of 1921 are discussed in Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy," 188""9o; Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 95-105; Howard, Partition ofTurkey, 26o-61.
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France. The French government regarded the Treaty of 5evres as excessively favorable to Britain, and its forces in Cilicia were facing increasingly effec- tive resistance from the Nationalist forces. Negotiations began in earnest in June 1921, and the final treaty was completed in October, whereby France agreed to withdraw from Cilicia in exchange for temporary control over the disputed district of Alexandretta. The French also agreed to recognize the Turkish National Pact, in effect abandoning the Treaty of 5evres. 116 Italy was next. The Italian government, which viewed the Treaty of Sevres with even less enthusiasm than France, had begun withdrawing its troops from Adalia in June 1921. Aformal rapprochement with the Nationalists was delayed by political shifts in Italy, and subsequent negotiations in the fall of 1921 foundered on Turkey's refusal to grant economic concessions, but it was clear that Italy had given up any hope of making territorial gains at Turkey's expense. 117
These improvements in Turkey's relations with the West threatened its ties with the Soviet Union and forced Kemal to walk a fine line. The Na- tionalists assured Soviet foreign minister Chicherin that the detente with France would not undermine the Soviet-Turkish friendship treaty, and they signed a formal treaty guaranteeing their eastern frontier with Russia, Geor- gia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in October 1921. A visit by a Soviet military mission to Ankara in December arranged for additional military aid and wasfollowed! by afriendshiptreatybetweenTurkeyandtheUkrainianSo- viet Socialist Republic in January 1922. A Soviet ambassador took up resi- dence in Ankara, and the Soviet mission soon became the largest foreign delegation there. 118
The cessation of hostilities with France and Italy and the guarantee of Turkey's eastern border allowed Kemal to tum his attention back to the Greeks. Britain and France tried to arrange a negotiated settlement, but the Nationalists Jl'efused to modify the terms of the National Pact and continued their preparations for an all-out offensive. The attack was finally launched in August 1922, the Greek forces were routed, and the remnants of the Greek Army had withdrawn by the end of the month. JJ9
n& According to Kemal, the agreement with France "proved to the whole world that the treaty [of Sevres) was merely a rag. " Quoted in Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 135-38; and see Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, 2:97-99.
117 ItalyreporiedlyprovidedKemal'sforceswithadditionalmilitaryequipmentduringthis period, although the precise sources and magnitude of the support is hard to determine. See David Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties (London: Victor Gollancz, 1938) 2:1 349; Harold Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase, 1 9 1 9-1925: A Study in Postwar Diplomacy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1934), 264; and Pallis, Greece's Anatolian Adventure, 135.
118 See Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy," 194; and Degras, Soviet Documents, 1:263-69.
119 SeeShawandShaw,OttomanEmpireandModernTurkey,2:362-63;Sonyel,TurkishDiplo- macy, 171-73; Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy," 197; Howard, Partition ofTurkey, 267-68.
? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
This campaign caused a final crisis with Great Britain, briefly bringing the two sides to the brink of war in September 1922. The Nationalists sought the complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Turkish territory, including the removal of the remaining Greek forces in eastern Thrace. Lloyd George was still committed to the Greek cause, however, and the British government was worried that a further Turkish advance would jeopardize freedom of navigation in the Turkish Straits. As the Greeks withdrew, therefore, Great Britain reinforced its positions in the neutral zone established by the Treaty of 5evres and the Cabinet ordered the British commander, Lieutenant-Gen- eral Charles ("Tim") Harington, to oppose any attempt to force the straits. The French and Italian commanders sent small contingents in response to
Harington's request for a show of Allied solidarity, but both states subse- quently withdrew their forces after Lloyd George and Winston Churchill dispatched a bellicose message to the Dominions requesting support to de- fend the neutral zones. The rift was soon patched, and a joirit proposal for armistice negotiations was dispatched to the Turks on September 23, but it was clear that neither France nor Italy would go to war over this issue. Sup- port within England and the rest of the British Empire was doubtful as well, leaving Lloyd George virtually alone in his willingness to confront the Turks. 120 Egged on by the Soviets and by hard-liners within the Nationalist movement, elements of Kemal's forces entered the neutral zone and even- tually stood face-to-face with the outnumbered British garrison at Chanak.
Lloyd George was still determined to resist, however, and the British Cab- inet issued an ultimatum on September 29 demanding that the Turkish forces pull back from Chanak or be fired upon. Convinced that such an ulti- matum would merely provoke the Turks and make it more difficult to reach a negotiated solution, Harington and the British high commissioner, Horace Rumbold, chose to ignore the Cabinet's order. This decision prevented an immediate clash and gave time for cooler heads to prevail. Negotiations be- tween military representatives began on October 3, and a compromise was finally reached on the eleventh, just seventy-five minutes before the British troops were to have opened fire on the Turkish positions. 121 The Nationalists agreed to remain outside the neutral zones at Istanbul, Gallipoli, and Ismit pending a final peace settlement, while the Allies pledged that Greece would withdraw from eastern Thrace up to the Maritsa River. 122
121 See Stephen F. Evans, The Slow Rapprochement: Britain and Turkey in the Age of Kemal Atatiirk, 1919-1938 (Beverley, Eng. : Eothen Press, 1982), 63; and Briton Cooper Busch, Mudros to Lausanne: Britain's Frontier in West Asia, 1918-1923 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976), 351-55.
120 See Peter Rowland, Lloyd George (London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1975), 578.
122 On these events, see Evans, Slow Rapprochement, chap. 5; David Walder, The Chanak Af- fair (London: Hutchinson, 1969); Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, 34o-58; Sonyel, Turkish Diplo- macy, 173-76; Howard, Partition ofTurkey, 269-73; Nicolson, Curzon, 274-75; Laurence Evans,
United States Policy and the Partition ofTurkey, 1914-1924 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univer-
? ? Revolution and War
The armistice set the stage for the Lausanne Conference in 1923, which formally dismantled the Treaty of sevres and placed Turkey's relations with the West on a new basis. The Nationalists' primacy was now unchallenged, and when the Allies tried to invite representatives from the Istanbul and Ankara regimes, the Assembly simply abolished the sultanate and placed the office of the caliphate under its authority. After two separate rounds of negotiations, a final agreement was reached in July. With the exception of a clause granting Britain control over Mosul, Turkey's new borders corre-
sponded almost perfectly to the principles of the National Pact. 123 The En- tente accepted the borders established by the Treaty of Kars, and the restoration of eastern Thrace gave Turkey a foothold in Europe as well. The treaty abolished the foreign capitulations established during the Ottomall1l period (meaning that foreign residents and companies would now be sub- ject to Turkish law) and opened the Turkish Straits to international shipping under the control of an international commission. The parties also agreed to
conduct a compulsory population exchange between Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion and Greek nationals of the Muslim religion. The exchange agreement eliminated the main source of Greco-Turkish ri- valry and paved the way for a major rapprochement at the end of the decade. 124
The Lausanne Conference also signaled Turkey's reemergence as a mem- ber of the international community. Elections for a new National Assembly were held in August 1923, the new Republic of Turkey was officially pro- claimed in October with Mustafa Kemal (Atatiirk) as its first president, and the capital was moved from Istanbul to Ankara. With their triumph now complete, Kemal and his followers launched the extensive program of west- ernization that created the modem Turkish state. 125
Is the Turkish Revolution an Exception?
The Turkish Revolution differs in a number of ways from the other cases examined in this book, but many familiar features are present as weH.
sity Press, 1965), 378-86; Davidson, "Turkish Diplomacy," 197-<;9; and Kenneth 0. Morgan, Consensus and Disunity: The Lloyd George Coalition Government, 1918-1922 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 311)-23.
123 The text of the treaty is reprinted in Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, 2:119-127.
124 See Psomiades, Eastern Question, chap. 7; and Dimitri Pentzopoulos, The Balkan Exchange ofMinorities and Its Impact on Greece (Paris: Mouton, 1962).
125 Turkish diplomacy at Lausanne is described in Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy," 199-208; Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 185-229; Edward Reginald Vere-Hodge, Turkish Foreign Policrj, 1918-1948 (Ambilly-Annemasse: Imprimerie Franco-Suisse, 1950), 3&-50; Howard, Partition ofTurkey, chap. 9; and Evans, U. S. Policy and Turkey, chap. 14. For an account emphasizing Curzon's success in weaning Turkey away from Russia, see Nicolson, Curzon, chaps. 1o-11.
? ? ? [306]
? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
Turkey's fragility in the aftermath of World War I led Britain, France, Italy, Greece, and Russia to seek territorial acquisitions at the Turks' expense, and their conflicting ambitions gave rise to serious disagreements once the war was over. The revolution was not responsible for this power vacuum, how- ever, as Turkey's weakness was a direct result of its decision to align with the Central Powers and their subsequent defeat in 1918. Instead, the Na- tionalist revolution was itself a response to the sultan's inability to defend
Anatolia. Thus, although Turkey's vulnerability made it the object of intense foreign competition and encouraged direct military intervention, this was not directly attributable to the revolution.
Once the revolution was underway, however, both sides quickly con- cluded that the other was hostile and potentially threatening. The National- ist movement arose from Turkish opposition to foreign (especially Greek) intervention, and Kemal remained suspicious of the Entente for quite some
time. 126 Similarly, Britain and France saw the Kemalist movement as a threat to their postwar ambitions in the Near East, leading them to occupy Istan- bul in March 1920 and to endorse the Greek offensive later that summer.
In addition to the obvious conflicts of interest-the Allies wished to partition Turkey while the Nationalists sought to reestablish Turkish sover- eignty-Allied hostility was increased by several unfortunate mispercep- tions, particularly by the British. Lloyd George's belief that the Kemalist movement was a linear descendant of the Young Turks' Committee on Union and Progress (CUP) reinforced his pro-Greek sympathies, and the suspicion that Kemal harbored the same pan-Turkic tendencies displayed by earlier Turkish nationalists made the Nationalists seem even more threat- ening. 127 Lloyd George regarded the Turks as an "unspeakable" race that had "forfeited! their title to rule majorities of other peoples," and he once re-
ferred to Kemal as "no better than a carpet seller in a bazaar. " Stephen Evans reports that British officials placed the Nationalists "side by side with the CUP and the Bolsheviks," a view that nicely reveals British ignorance about the true character of the Nationalist movement. In particular, British leaders seem to have been unaware that Kemal had broken with Enver Pasha and the CUP in 1914, had explicitly rejected a pan-Turkic agenda, and had repeatedly expressed his desire for harmonious relations with the West. 12. s
126 In 1921, he told his followers, "I am not sure of the good faith of England, who wants to play us a trick. " Quoted in Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 95?
127 TheCUPhadplayedacentralroleintheOttomandecisiontoallywiththeCentralPowers, and CUP leaders such as Enver Pasha were strongly committed to a pan-Turkic foreign policy.
128 See Evans, Slow Rapprochement, 64? 5; Morgan, Consensus and Disunity, 319; and Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, 171-72. On the rivalry between Kemal and Enver Pasha, see Salahi R. Sonyel, "Mustafa Kemal and Enver in Conflict, 1918-1922," Middle Eastern Studies 25, no. 4 (1<)89).
? ? ? Revolution and War
Not surprisingly, these suspicions encouraged intransigence on both sides. Several unfortunate incidents reinforced perceptions of hostility, in- cluding the execution of a British subject on charges of espionage (which the British high commissioner in Istanbul saw as sign of the Nationalists' "un- compromising hostility towards His Majesty's government" ), a Nationalist raid on the British ship Palitana, and Britain's open support for the Greeks. 129 These events sustained the Nationalists' desire for the complete removal of all foreign troops and help explain why Lloyd George sought to oppose the Turkish advance on Istanbul in 1922Y0
The Nationalists' opponents also seem to have consistently underesti- mated Kemal's popularity and the military prowess of his troops while ex- aggerating their own capacity to impose a solution by force. This was most evident in the case of Greece and its British patron; although a number of British, French, arid Greek officials argued that Kemal would be difficult to defeat, Prime Minister Venizelos assured the Allies that the Greeks "would be able to clear up the whole of the neighborhood between Smyrna and the Dardanelles in the course of fifteen days. "131 The Greeks' initial successes boosted this overconfidence and silenced opposition but failed to overcome the Nationalist resistance and left the Greek forces badly overextended.
Nonetheless, Venizelos's successor as prime minister described Kemal's forces as a "rabble worthy of little or no consideration" and promised that a new offensive would "scatter the Kemalist forces and . . . impose the will of the powers" within three months. 132
As usual, these problems were exacerbated by uncertainty and misinfor- mation. In June 1919, for example, the British foreign office representative stated that he "knew nothing of Mustapha Kemal," and another Allied re- port declared that "the whole movement appears to have had little success and for the most part not much interest is taken. " Other British agents re- ported that the Nationalist Congress at Erzerum had been a failure, and as noted earlier, top British officials were convinced that Kemal was either a Bolshevik or a follower of the CUP or else was under the control of the offi-
129 The remarks were made by High Commissioner Horace Rumbold; quoted in Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 115.
130 Lloyd George later blamed the failure of his policy in part on lack of information. De- scribing the initial emergence of Mustafa Kemal, he wrote that "no information had been re- ceived as to his activities in Asia Minor in reorganizing the shattered and depleted armies of Turkey. Our military intelligence had never been more thoroughly unintelligent. " Tru th about the Peace Treaties, 2:1285.
131 See Howard, Partition ofTurkey, 259? On the ill-advised nature of the Greek advance, see Pallis, Greece's Anatolian Adventure, 54-58, 102-105.
132 The Greek government opposed any modification of the 5evres agreement at the Lon- don conference in February 1921, and the deputy chief of staff told the delegates that a re- newed Greek advance would proceed "up to Ankara as a first stage. " Quoted in Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 96 (emphasis added); and Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, 239-40.
[3o8]
? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
cial government in Istanbul. Moreover, the lack of official contacts forced Kemal to rely on unofficial channels, allowing these misconceptions to sur- vive intact. 133
Thus, although the Nationalist revolution in Turkey did not lead directly to war, it does provide partial support for my main propositions. Foreign powers did seek to exploit the vacuum resulting from the Ottoman collapse, and the revolutionary movement was seen as threatening to their interests and objectives. The level of threat was exaggerated, however, and opposing states overstated their ability to defeat the revolutionary movement by force. These misperceptions and miscalculations stemmed in part from a lack of information and inadequate channels of communication (although the impact of this factor varied). Finally, although all-out war was avoided, Britain and Turkey did come close in 1922 and could easily have stumbled into a serious clash. In short, the Turkish case is a partial exception at best: although war did not occur, the pressures for war that did arise are consis- tent with the theory.
Why were Turkey and the great powers able to avoid war, and why were the Turks able to integrate themselves into the existing order with far less di. fficulty than other revolutionary states?
First, the Turkish Revolution owed much of its moderate impact to its character as an elite revolution. Its leaders were for the most part prominent members of the old regime, and they were willing and able to seize power because the sultanate had been discredited by defeat and because they re- tained the loyalty of key institutions (especially the army). In addition, the Nationalists did not have to wage an extended struggle against internal op-
ponents, because the sultan lacked the capacity to resist and was increasingly dependent on foreign support. As a result, the Nationalist movement did not develop an elaborate ideology of social revolution in order to mobilize sup- porters and to justify its rule. The principle of national independence was sufficient, especially after the Greek invasion galvanized Turkish resistance. Although pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic programs were actively debated dur- ing the Young Turk period, Kemal explicitly rejected these more ambitious programs in favor of the limited goal of independence based on Turkish na- tionalism. Thus, the Nationalist program was limited to restoring national sovereignty within a specific geographic area, exporting the revolution was precluded by definition, and the revolution posed no ideological threat to its neighbors. 134 Thus, whereas the Jacobins, the Bolsheviks, and the Iranian
133 "Thislackofdiplomaticcontactonlyreinforcedthe[British]HighCommission'sfalse assumptions concerning the Nationalists, and had the effect of keeping the two sides apart. " Stephen Evans, Slow Rapprochement, 65; and see Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, 16cr72.
1 34 Armenia is a partial exception in this regard, because it had established itself on territo- ries that the Nationalists regarded as part of the Turkish homeland. See Shaw and Shaw, Ot- toman Empire and Modern Turkey, 2:376.
? ? Revolution and War
clerics saw their opponents as intrinsically evil and endorsed revolutionary transformations at home and abroad, Kemal and his followers sought a rapnd reconciliation with the West in order to concentrate on modemization. 135
Second, like Mexico in 1916 and the United States after 1787, the revolu- tionary Turks profited from favorable international conditions. The Central Powers had been defeated and disarmed. The Entente was exhausted and war-weary. Russia was weakened and distracted by its own revolution. Great Britain tried to use the Greeks as surrogates but was unwilling to es- calate when this expedient failed, giving Kemal and the Nationalists the time they needed to consolidate their position. The revolution in Russia and the antipathy between Moscow and the West was a valuable asset for the Turks as well. In addition to obtaining modest amounts of financial and mnl-
itary assistance from the Bolsheviks, Kemal was able to play off the two sides, wnth considerable success. As in the French and Russian cases, in short, divisions among the other great powers prevented joint action to ar- rest or reverse the revolution.
The Turkish case reveals many familiar dynamics of revolutionary situa- tions, but in a muted and less dangerous form. The preferences and goals of the Nationalists differed from those of the old regime and threatened the in- terests of several foreign powers. These states found it difficult to formulate an effective response to the revolutionary movement because they overesti- mated its hostility and underestimated its capabilities, giving rise to exag- gerated perceptions of threat and making the use of force somewhat more attractive. These states revised their estimates over time, however, and
eventually reestablished more or less cordial relations.
THE CHINESE REVOLUTION
As my theory would predict, the revolution in Chi. na contributed to the emerging security competition between the United States and the Sovieft Union and played a major role in bringing the Cold War to Asia. The new regime went to war in Korea less than a year after gaining power, and the origins of its involvement bear a striking resemblance to those of the wars that followed the French, Russian, and Iranian revolutions.
The foreign policy of the People's Republic of China (PRC) also highlights the tension between revolutionary objectives and systemic constraints. Al- though the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) openly endorsed the goal of
135 Kemal warned in a 1923 speech: "The successes which our army has gained up to now cannot be regarded as having achieved the real salvation of our country. . . . Let us not be puffed up with military victories. Let us rather prepare for the new victories in science and economics. " Quoted in Lewis, Emergence ofModern Turkey, 255-56.
? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
world revolution and saw its victory as a model for other developing coun- tries, Chinese foreign policy tended to be cautious and defensive, focused more on preserving Chinese security than on promoting revolution. On the whole, therefore, the Chinese Revolution provides strong support for the main argument of this book.
Maoist Revolutionary Ideology
Maoist political thought closely resembles the ideal type of revolutionary ideology described in chapter 2. 136 During its long struggle against both the Guomindang (GMD) and Japan, the CCP developed a body of revolution- ary doctrine designed to inspire prolonged sacrifices and provide tactical guidance to the Communist cadres. As a Marxist-Leninist, CCP leader Mao Tse-tung viewed politics as inherently competitive and regarded oppo- nents-e- specially the imperialist powers-as hostile. 137 The Maoist world- view was also intrinsically optimistic: although enemies might appear stronger, they were actually "paper tigers. " "In appearance [they] are terri- fying but in reality they are not so powerful. " As a result, victory was in- evitable provided the cadres did not lose heart. 138 Like Lenin, Mao tempered this optimism with a sense of realism, stressing the need to analyze political and strategic problems systematically and warning against both rightist de- viations (passivity and fear of struggle) and leftist deviations (overconfident recklessness). In his words, the CCP should "despise the enemy strategi- cally while taking full account of him tactically," meaning that although vic- tory was inevitable, achieving it required prolonged effort, careful preparation, and tactical flexibility. 139 Maoist ideology combined nationalist
136 In addition to Mao's writings, this summary of Maoist ideology is based on Stuart Schram, The Thought ofMao Tse-tung (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), chap. 2; J.
