" In
this way humility may be competent to every man.
this way humility may be competent to every man.
Summa Theologica
in the Opus
Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "He who is
not angry, whereas he has cause to be, sins. For unreasonable patience
is the hotbed of many vices, it fosters negligence, and incites not
only the wicked but even the good to do wrong. "
I answer that, Anger may be understood in two ways. In one way, as a
simple movement of the will, whereby one inflicts punishment, not
through passion, but in virtue of a judgment of the reason: and thus
without doubt lack of anger is a sin. This is the sense in which anger
is taken in the saying of Chrysostom, for he says (Hom. xi in Matth. ,
in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom):
"Anger, when it has a cause, is not anger but judgment. For anger,
properly speaking, denotes a movement of passion": and when a man is
angry with reason, his anger is no longer from passion: wherefore he is
said to judge, not to be angry. In another way anger is taken for a
movement of the sensitive appetite, which is with passion resulting
from a bodily transmutation. This movement is a necessary sequel, in
man, to the movement of his will, since the lower appetite necessarily
follows the movement of the higher appetite, unless there be an
obstacle. Hence the movement of anger in the sensitive appetite cannot
be lacking altogether, unless the movement of the will be altogether
lacking or weak. Consequently lack of the passion of anger is also a
vice, even as the lack of movement in the will directed to punishment
by the judgment of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: He that is entirely without anger when he ought
to be angry, imitates God as to lack of passion, but not as to God's
punishing by judgment.
Reply to Objection 2: The passion of anger, like all other movements of
the sensitive appetite, is useful, as being conducive to the more
prompt execution [*Cf. [3582]FS, Q[24], A[3]] of reason's dictate:
else, the sensitive appetite in man would be to no purpose, whereas
"nature does nothing without purpose" [*Aristotle, De Coelo i, 4].
Reply to Objection 3: When a man acts inordinately, the judgment of his
reason is cause not only of the simple movement of the will but also of
the passion in the sensitive appetite, as stated above. Wherefore just
as the removal of the effect is a sign that the cause is removed, so
the lack of anger is a sign that the judgment of reason is lacking.
__________________________________________________________________
OF CRUELTY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider cruelty, under which head there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency?
(2) Of its comparison with savagery or brutality.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency?
Objection 1: It would seem that cruelty is not opposed to clemency. For
Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "those are said to be cruel who
exceed in punishing," which is contrary to justice. Now clemency is
reckoned a part, not of justice but of temperance. Therefore apparently
cruelty is not opposed to clemency.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Jer. 6:23): "They are cruel, and
will have no mercy"; so that cruelty would seem opposed to mercy. Now
mercy is not the same as clemency, as stated above ([3583]Q[157], A[4],
ad 3). Therefore cruelty is not opposed to clemency.
Objection 3: Further, clemency is concerned with the infliction of
punishment, as stated above ([3584]Q[157], A[1]): whereas cruelty
applies to the withdrawal of beneficence, according to Prov. 11:17,
"But he that is cruel casteth off even his own kindred. " Therefore
cruelty is not opposed to clemency.
On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "the opposite of
clemency is cruelty, which is nothing else but hardness of heart in
exacting punishment. "
I answer that, Cruelty apparently takes its name from "cruditas"
[rawness]. Now just as things when cooked and prepared are wont to have
an agreeable and sweet savor, so when raw they have a disagreeable and
bitter taste. Now it has been stated above ([3585]Q[157], A[3], ad 1;
A[4], ad 3) that clemency denotes a certain smoothness or sweetness of
soul, whereby one is inclined to mitigate punishment. Hence cruelty is
directly opposed to clemency.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as it belongs to equity to mitigate
punishment according to reason, while the sweetness of soul which
inclines one to this belongs to clemency: so too, excess in punishing,
as regards the external action, belongs to injustice; but as regards
the hardness of heart, which makes one ready to increase punishment,
belongs to cruelty.
Reply to Objection 2: Mercy and clemency concur in this, that both shun
and recoil from another's unhappiness, but in different ways. For it
belongs to mercy [*Cf. [3586] Q[30], A[1]] to relieve another's
unhappiness by a beneficent action, while it belongs to clemency to
mitigate another's unhappiness by the cessation of punishment. And
since cruelty denotes excess in exacting punishment, it is more
directly opposed to clemency than to mercy; yet on account of the
mutual likeness of these virtues, cruelty is sometimes taken for
mercilessness.
Reply to Objection 3: Cruelty is there taken for mercilessness, which
is lack of beneficence. We may also reply that withdrawal of
beneficence is in itself a punishment.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether cruelty differs from savagery or brutality?
Objection 1: It would seem that cruelty differs not from savagery or
brutality. For seemingly one vice is opposed in one way to one virtue.
Now both savagery and cruelty are opposed to clemency by way of excess.
Therefore it would seem that savagery and cruelty are the same.
Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that "severity is as it
were savagery with verity, because it holds to justice without
attending to piety": so that savagery would seem to exclude that
mitigation of punishment in delivering judgment which is demanded by
piety. Now this has been stated to belong to cruelty (A[1], ad 1).
Therefore cruelty is the same as savagery.
Objection 3: Further, just as there is a vice opposed to a virtue by
way of excess, so is there a vice opposed to it by way of deficiency,
which latter is opposed both to the virtue which is the mean, and to
the vice which is in excess. Now the same vice pertaining to deficiency
is opposed to both cruelty and savagery, namely remission or laxity.
For Gregory says (Moral. xx, 5): "Let there be love, but not that which
enervates, let there be severity, but without fury, let there be zeal
without unseemly savagery, let there be piety without undue clemency. "
Therefore savagery is the same as cruelty.
On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "a man who is
angry without being hurt, or with one who has not offended him, is not
said to be cruel, but to be brutal or savage. "
I answer that, "Savagery" and "brutality" take their names from a
likeness to wild beasts which are also described as savage. For animals
of this kind attack man that they may feed on his body, and not for
some motive of justice the consideration of which belongs to reason
alone. Wherefore, properly speaking, brutality or savagery applies to
those who in inflicting punishment have not in view a default of the
person punished, but merely the pleasure they derive from a man's
torture. Consequently it is evident that it is comprised under
bestiality: for such like pleasure is not human but bestial, and
resulting as it does either from evil custom, or from a corrupt nature,
as do other bestial emotions. On the other hand, cruelty not only
regards the default of the person punished, but exceeds in the mode of
punishing: wherefore cruelty differs from savagery or brutality, as
human wickedness differs from bestiality, as stated in Ethic. vii, 5.
Reply to Objection 1: Clemency is a human virtue; wherefore directly
opposed to it is cruelty which is a form of human wickedness. But
savagery or brutality is comprised under bestiality, wherefore it is
directly opposed not to clemency, but to a more excellent virtue, which
the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5) calls "heroic" or "god-like," which
according to us, would seem to pertain to the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Consequently we may say that savagery is directly opposed to the gift
of piety.
Reply to Objection 2: A severe man is not said to be simply savage,
because this implies a vice; but he is said to be "savage as regards
the truth," on account of some likeness to savagery which is not
inclined to mitigate punishment.
Reply to Objection 3: Remission of punishment is not a vice, except it
disregard the order of justice, which requires a man to be punished on
account of his offense, and which cruelty exceeds. On the other hand,
cruelty disregards this order altogether. Wherefore remission of
punishment is opposed to cruelty, but not to savagery.
__________________________________________________________________
OF MODESTY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider modesty: and (1) Modesty in general; (2) Each of
its species. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether modesty is a part of temperance?
(2) What is the matter of modesty?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether modesty is a part of temperance?
Objection 1: It would seem that modesty is not a part of temperance.
For modesty is denominated from mode. Now mode is requisite in every
virtue: since virtue is directed to good; and "good," according to
Augustine (De Nat. Boni 3), "consists in mode, species, and order. "
Therefore modesty is a general virtue, and consequently should not be
reckoned a part of temperance.
Objection 2: Further, temperance would seem to be deserving of praise
chiefly on account of its moderation. Now this gives modesty its name.
Therefore modesty is the same as temperance, and not one of its parts.
Objection 3: Further, modesty would seem to regard the correction of
our neighbor, according to 2 Tim. 2:24,25, "The servant of the Lord
must not wrangle, but be mild towards all men . . . with modesty
admonishing them that resist the truth. " Now admonishing wrong-doers is
an act of justice or of charity, as stated above ([3587]Q[33], A[1]).
Therefore seemingly modesty is a part of justice rather than of
temperance.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons modesty as a
part of temperance.
I answer that, As stated above ([3588]Q[141], A[4];[3589] Q[157],
A[3]), temperance brings moderation into those things wherein it is
most difficult to be moderate, namely the concupiscences of pleasures
of touch. Now whenever there is a special virtue about some matter of
very great moment, there must needs be another virtue about matters of
lesser import: because the life of man requires to be regulated by the
virtues with regard to everything: thus it was stated above
([3590]Q[134], A[3], ad 1), that while magnificence is about great
expenditure, there is need in addition for liberality, which is
concerned with ordinary expenditure. Hence there is need for a virtue
to moderate other lesser matters where moderation is not so difficult.
This virtue is called modesty, and is annexed to temperance as its
principal.
Reply to Objection 1: When a name is common to many it is sometimes
appropriated to those of the lowest rank; thus the common name of angel
is appropriated to the lowest order of angels. In the same way, mode
which is observed by all virtues in common, is specially appropriated
to the virtue which prescribes the mode in the slightest things.
Reply to Objection 2: Some things need tempering on account of their
strength, thus we temper strong wine. But moderation is necessary in
all things: wherefore temperance is more concerned with strong
passions, and modesty about weaker passions.
Reply to Objection 3: Modesty is to be taken there for the general
moderation which is necessary in all virtues.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether modesty is only about outward actions?
Objection 1: It would seem that modesty is only about outward actions.
For the inward movements of the passions cannot be known to other
persons. Yet the Apostle enjoins (Phil. 4:5): "Let your modesty be
known to all men. " Therefore modesty is only about outward actions.
Objection 2: Further, the virtues that are about the passions are
distinguished from justice which is about operations. Now modesty is
seemingly one virtue. Therefore, if it be about outward works, it will
not be concerned with inward passions.
Objection 3: Further, no one same virtue is both about things
pertaining to the appetite---which is proper to the moral virtues---and
about things pertaining to knowledge---which is proper to the
intellectual virtues---and again about things pertaining to the
irascible and concupiscible faculties. Therefore, if modesty be one
virtue, it cannot be about all these things.
On the contrary, In all these things it is necessary to observe the
"mode" whence modesty takes its name. Therefore modesty is about all of
them.
I answer that, As stated above [3591](A[1]), modesty differs from
temperance, in that temperance moderates those matters where restraint
is most difficult, while modesty moderates those that present less
difficulty. Authorities seem to have had various opinions about
modesty. For wherever they found a special kind of good or a special
difficulty of moderation, they withdrew it from the province of
modesty, which they confined to lesser matters. Now it is clear to all
that the restraint of pleasures of touch presents a special difficulty:
wherefore all distinguished temperance from modesty.
In addition to this, moreover, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54)
considered that there was a special kind of good in the moderation of
punishment; wherefore he severed clemency also from modesty, and held
modesty to be about the remaining ordinary matters that require
moderation. These seemingly are of four kinds. one is the movement of
the mind towards some excellence, and this is moderated by "humility. "
The second is the desire of things pertaining to knowledge, and this is
moderated by "studiousness" which is opposed to curiosity. The third
regards bodily movements and actions, which require to be done
becomingly and honestly [*Cf. [3592] Q[145], A[1]], whether we act
seriously or in play. The fourth regards outward show, for instance in
dress and the like.
To some of these matters, however, other authorities appointed certain
special virtues: thus Andronicus [*De Affectibus] mentions "meekness,
simplicity, humility," and other kindred virtues, of which we have
spoken above (Q[143]); while Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) assigned
{eutrapelia} to pleasures in games, as stated above ([3593]FS, Q[60],
A[5]). All these are comprised under modesty as understood by Tully;
and in this way modesty regards not only outward but also inward
actions.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle speaks of modesty as regarding
externals. Nevertheless the moderation of the inner man may be shown by
certain outward signs.
Reply to Objection 2: Various virtues assigned by various authorities
are comprised under modesty. Wherefore nothing prevents modesty from
regarding matters which require different virtues. Yet there is not so
great a difference between the various parts of modesty, as there is
between justice, which is about operations, and temperance, which is
about passions, because in actions and passions that present no great
difficulty on the part of the matter, but only on the part of
moderation, there is but one virtue, one namely for each kind of
moderation.
Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection also is clear.
__________________________________________________________________
OF HUMILITY (SIX ARTICLES)
We must consider next the species of modesty: (1) Humility, and pride
which is opposed to it; (2) Studiousness, and its opposite, Curiosity;
(3) Modesty as affecting words or deeds; (4) Modesty as affecting
outward attire.
Concerning humility there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether humility is a virtue?
(2) Whether it resides in the appetite, or in the judgment of reason?
(3) Whether by humility one ought to subject oneself to all men?
(4) Whether it is a part of modesty or temperance?
(5) Of its comparison with the other virtues;
(6) Of the degrees of humility.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether humility is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that humility is not a virtue. For virtue
conveys the notion of a penal evil, according to Ps. 104:18, "They
humbled his feet in fetters. " Therefore humility is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, virtue and vice are mutually opposed. Now
humility seemingly denotes a vice, for it is written (Ecclus. 19:23):
"There is one that humbleth himself wickedly. " Therefore humility is
not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But
humility is apparently opposed to the virtue of magnanimity, which aims
at great things, whereas humility shuns them. Therefore it would seem
that humility is not a virtue.
Objection 4: Further, virtue is "the disposition of that which is
perfect" (Phys. vii, text. 17). But humility seemingly belongs to the
imperfect: wherefore it becomes not God to be humble, since He can be
subject to none. Therefore it seems that humility is not a virtue.
Objection 5: Further, every moral virtue is about actions and passions,
according to Ethic. ii, 3. But humility is not reckoned by the
Philosopher among the virtues that are about passions, nor is it
comprised under justice which is about actions. Therefore it would seem
not to be a virtue.
On the contrary, Origen commenting on Lk. 1:48, "He hath regarded the
humility of His handmaid," says (Hom. viii in Luc. ): "One of the
virtues, humility, is particularly commended in Holy Writ; for our
Saviour said: 'Learn of Me, because I am meek, and humble of heart. '"
I answer that, As stated above ([3594]FS, Q[23], A[2]) when we were
treating of the passions, the difficult good has something attractive
to the appetite, namely the aspect of good, and likewise something
repulsive to the appetite, namely the difficulty of obtaining it. In
respect of the former there arises the movement of hope, and in respect
of the latter, the movement of despair. Now it has been stated above
([3595]FS, Q[61], A[2]) that for those appetitive movements which are a
kind of impulse towards an object, there is need of a moderating and
restraining moral virtue, while for those which are a kind of recoil,
there is need, on the part of the appetite, of a moral virtue to
strengthen it and urge it on. Wherefore a twofold virtue is necessary
with regard to the difficult good: one, to temper and restrain the
mind, lest it tend to high things immoderately; and this belongs to the
virtue of humility: and another to strengthen the mind against despair,
and urge it on to the pursuit of great things according to right
reason; and this is magnanimity. Therefore it is evident that humility
is a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: As Isidore observes (Etym. x), "a humble man is
so called because he is, as it were, 'humo acclinis'" [*Literally,
'bent to the ground'], i. e. inclined to the lowest place. This may
happen in two ways. First, through an extrinsic principle, for instance
when one is cast down by another, and thus humility is a punishment.
Secondly, through an intrinsic principle: and this may be done
sometimes well, for instance when a man, considering his own failings,
assumes the lowest place according to his mode: thus Abraham said to
the Lord (Gn. 18:27), "I will speak to my Lord, whereas I am dust and
ashes. " In this way humility is a virtue. Sometimes, however, this may
be ill-done, for instance when man, "not understanding his honor,
compares himself to senseless beasts, and becomes like to them" (Ps.
48:13).
Reply to Objection 2: As stated (ad 1), humility, in so far as it is a
virtue, conveys the notion of a praiseworthy self-abasement to the
lowest place. Now this is sometimes done merely as to outward signs and
pretense: wherefore this is "false humility," of which Augustine says
in a letter (Ep. cxlix) that it is "grievous pride," since to wit, it
would seem to aim at excellence of glory. Sometimes, however, this is
done by an inward movement of the soul, and in this way, properly
speaking, humility is reckoned a virtue, because virtue does not
consist externals, but chiefly in the inward choice of the mind, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5).
Reply to Objection 3: Humility restrains the appetite from aiming at
great things against right reason: while magnanimity urges the mind to
great things in accord with right reason. Hence it is clear that
magnanimity is not opposed to humility: indeed they concur in this,
that each is according to right reason.
Reply to Objection 4: A thing is said to be perfect in two ways. First
absolutely; such a thing contains no defect, neither in its nature nor
in respect of anything else, and thus God alone is perfect. To Him
humility is fitting, not as regards His Divine nature, but only as
regards His assumed nature. Secondly, a thing may be said to be perfect
in a restricted sense, for instance in respect of its nature or state
or time. Thus a virtuous man is perfect: although in comparison with
God his perfection is found wanting, according to the word of Is.
40:17, "All nations are before Him as if they had no being at all.
" In
this way humility may be competent to every man.
Reply to Objection 5: The Philosopher intended to treat of virtues as
directed to civic life, wherein the subjection of one man to another is
defined according to the ordinance of the law, and consequently is a
matter of legal justice. But humility, considered as a special virtue,
regards chiefly the subjection of man to God, for Whose sake he humbles
himself by subjecting himself to others.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether humility has to do with the appetite?
Objection 1: It would seem that humility concerns, not the appetite but
the judgment of reason. Because humility is opposed to pride. Now pride
concerns things pertaining to knowledge: for Gregory says (Moral.
xxxiv, 22) that "pride, when it extends outwardly to the body, is first
of all shown in the eyes": wherefore it is written (Ps. 130:1), "Lord,
my heart is not exalted, nor are my eyes lofty. " Now eyes are the chief
aids to knowledge. Therefore it would seem that humility is chiefly
concerned with knowledge, whereby one thinks little of oneself.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that "almost
the whole of Christian teaching is humility. " Consequently nothing
contained in Christian teaching is incompatible with humility. Now
Christian teaching admonishes us to seek the better things, according
to 1 Cor. 12:31, "Be zealous for the better gifts. " Therefore it
belongs to humility to restrain not the desire of difficult things but
the estimate thereof.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the same virtue both to restrain
excessive movement, and to strengthen the soul against excessive
withdrawal: thus fortitude both curbs daring and fortifies the soul
against fear. Now it is magnanimity that strengthens the soul against
the difficulties that occur in the pursuit of great things. Therefore
if humility were to curb the desire of great things, it would follow
that humility is not a distinct virtue from magnanimity, which is
evidently false. Therefore humility is concerned, not with the desire
but with the estimate of great things.
Objection 4: Further, Andronicus [*De Affectibus] assigns humility to
outward show; for he says that humility is "the habit of avoiding
excessive expenditure and parade. " Therefore it is not concerned with
the movement of the appetite.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Poenit. [*Serm. cccli]) that "the
humble man is one who chooses to be an abject in the house of the Lord,
rather than to dwell in the tents of sinners. " But choice concerns the
appetite. Therefore humility has to do with the appetite rather than
with the estimative power.
I answer that, As stated above [3596](A[1]), it belongs properly to
humility, that a man restrain himself from being borne towards that
which is above him. For this purpose he must know his disproportion to
that which surpasses his capacity. Hence knowledge of one's own
deficiency belongs to humility, as a rule guiding the appetite.
Nevertheless humility is essentially in the appetite itself; and
consequently it must be said that humility, properly speaking,
moderates the movement of the appetite.
Reply to Objection 1: Lofty eyes are a sign of pride, inasmuch as it
excludes respect and fear: for fearing and respectful persons are
especially wont to lower the eyes, as though not daring to compare
themselves with others. But it does not follow from this that humility
is essentially concerned with knowledge.
Reply to Objection 2: It is contrary to humility to aim at greater
things through confiding in one's own powers: but to aim at greater
things through confidence in God's help, is not contrary to humility;
especially since the more one subjects oneself to God, the more is one
exalted in God's sight. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi): "It
is one thing to raise oneself to God, and another to raise oneself up
against God. He that abases himself before Him, him He raiseth up; he
that raises himself up against Him, him He casteth down. "
Reply to Objection 3: In fortitude there is the same reason for
restraining daring and for strengthening the soul against fear: since
the reason in both cases is that man should set the good of reason
before dangers of death. But the reason for restraining presumptuous
hope which pertains to humility is not the same as the reason for
strengthening the soul against despair. Because the reason for
strengthening the soul against despair is the acquisition of one's
proper good lest man, by despair, render himself unworthy of a good
which was competent to him; while the chief reason for suppressing
presumptuous hope is based on divine reverence, which shows that man
ought not to ascribe to himself more than is competent to him according
to the position in which God has placed him. Wherefore humility would
seem to denote in the first place man's subjection to God; and for this
reason Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) ascribes humility, which
he understands by poverty of spirit, to the gift of fear whereby man
reveres God. Hence it follows that the relation of fortitude to daring
differs from that of humility to hope. Because fortitude uses daring
more than it suppresses it: so that excess of daring is more like
fortitude than lack of daring is. On the other hand, humility
suppresses hope or confidence in self more than it uses it; wherefore
excessive self-confidence is more opposed to humility than lack of
confidence is.
Reply to Objection 4: Excess in outward expenditure and parade is wont
to be done with a view of boasting, which is suppressed by humility.
Accordingly humility has to do, in a secondary way, with externals, as
signs of the inward movement of the appetite.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one ought, by humility, to subject oneself to all men?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not, by humility, to subject
oneself to all men. For, as stated above (A[2], ad 3), humility
consists chiefly in man's subjection to God. Now one ought not to offer
to a man that which is due to God, as is the case with all acts of
religious worship. Therefore, by humility, one ought not to subject
oneself to man.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Nat. et Gratia xxxiv):
"Humility should take the part of truth, not of falsehood. " Now some
men are of the highest rank, who cannot, without falsehood, subject
themselves to their inferiors. Therefore one ought not, by humility, to
subject oneself to all men.
Objection 3: Further no one ought to do that which conduces to the
detriment of another's spiritual welfare. But if a man subject himself
to another by humility, this is detrimental to the person to whom he
subjects himself; for the latter might wax proud, or despise the other.
Hence Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "Lest through excessive
humility the superior lose his authority. " Therefore a man ought not,
by humility, to subject himself to all.
On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:3): "In humility, let each
esteem others better than themselves. "
I answer that, We may consider two things in man, namely that which is
God's, and that which is man's. Whatever pertains to defect is man's:
but whatever pertains to man's welfare and perfection is God's,
according to the saying of Osee 13:9, "Destruction is thy own, O
Israel; thy help is only in Me. " Now humility, as stated above (A[1],
ad 5; A[2], ad 3), properly regards the reverence whereby man is
subject to God. Wherefore every man, in respect of that which is his
own, ought to subject himself to every neighbor, in respect of that
which the latter has of God's: but humility does not require a man to
subject what he has of God's to that which may seem to be God's in
another. For those who have a share of God's gifts know that they have
them, according to 1 Cor. 2:12: "That we may know the things that are
given us from God. " Wherefore without prejudice to humility they may
set the gifts they have received from God above those that others
appear to have received from Him; thus the Apostle says (Eph. 3:5):
"(The mystery of Christ) was not known to the sons of men as it is now
revealed to His holy apostles. " In like manner. humility does not
require a man to subject that which he has of his own to that which his
neighbor has of man's: otherwise each one would have to esteem himself
a greater sinner than anyone else: whereas the Apostle says without
prejudice to humility (Gal. 2:15): "We by nature are Jews, and not of
the Gentiles, sinners. " Nevertheless a man may esteem his neighbor to
have some good which he lacks himself, or himself to have some evil
which another has not: by reason of which, he may subject himself to
him with humility.
Reply to Objection 1: We must not only revere God in Himself, but also
that which is His in each one, although not with the same measure of
reverence as we revere God. Wherefore we should subject ourselves with
humility to all our neighbors for God's sake, according to 1 Pet. 2:13,
"Be ye subject . . . to every human creature for God's sake"; but to
God alone do we owe the worship of latria.
Reply to Objection 2: If we set what our neighbor has of God's above
that which we have of our own, we cannot incur falsehood. Wherefore a
gloss [*St. Augustine, QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 71] on Phil. 2:3, "Esteem
others better than themselves," says: "We must not esteem by pretending
to esteem; but we should in truth think it possible for another person
to have something that is hidden to us and whereby he is better than we
are, although our own good whereby we are apparently better than he, be
not hidden. "
Reply to Objection 3: Humility, like other virtues, resides chiefly
inwardly in the soul. Consequently a man, by an inward act of the soul,
may subject himself to another, without giving the other man an
occasion of detriment to his spiritual welfare. This is what Augustine
means in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "With fear, the superior should prostrate
himself at your feet in the sight of God. " On the other hand, due
moderation must be observed in the outward acts of humility even as of
other virtues, lest they conduce to the detriment of others. If,
however, a man does as he ought, and others take therefrom an occasion
of sin, this is not imputed to the man who acts with humility; since he
does not give scandal, although others take it.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether humility is a part of modesty or temperance?
Objection 1: It would seem that humility is not a part of modesty or
temperance. For humility regards chiefly the reverence whereby one is
subject to God, as stated above [3597](A[3]). Now it belongs to a
theological virtue to have God for its object. Therefore humility
should be reckoned a theological virtue rather than a part of
temperance or modesty.
Objection 2: Further, temperance is in the concupiscible, whereas
humility would seem to be in the irascible, just as pride which is
opposed to it, and whose object is something difficult. Therefore
apparently humility is not a part of temperance or modesty.
Objection 3: Further, humility and magnanimity are about the same
object, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But magnanimity is reckoned a
part, not of temperance but of fortitude, as stated above
([3598]Q[129], A[5]). Therefore it would seem that humility is not a
part of temperance or modesty.
On the contrary, Origen says (Hom. viii super Luc. ): "If thou wilt hear
the name of this virtue, and what it was called by the philosophers,
know that humility which God regards is the same as what they called
{metriotes}, i. e. measure or moderation. " Now this evidently pertains
to modesty or temperance. Therefore humility is a part of modesty or
temperance.
I answer that, As stated above ([3599]Q[137], A[2], ad 1;[3600] Q[157],
A[3], ad 2), in assigning parts to a virtue we consider chiefly the
likeness that results from the mode of the virtue. Now the mode of
temperance, whence it chiefly derives its praise, is the restraint or
suppression of the impetuosity of a passion. Hence whatever virtues
restrain or suppress, and the actions which moderate the impetuosity of
the emotions, are reckoned parts of temperance. Now just as meekness
suppresses the movement of anger, so does humility suppress the
movement of hope, which is the movement of a spirit aiming at great
things. Wherefore, like meekness, humility is accounted a part of
temperance. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a
man who aims at small things in proportion to his mode is not
magnanimous but "temperate," and such a man we may call humble.
Moreover, for the reason given above ([3601]Q[160], A[2]), among the
various parts of temperance, the one under which humility is comprised
is modesty as understood by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54), inasmuch
as humility is nothing else than a moderation of spirit: wherefore it
is written (1 Pet. 3:4): "In the incorruptibility of a quiet and meek
spirit. "
Reply to Objection 1: The theological virtues, whose object is our last
end, which is the first principle in matters of appetite, are the
causes of all the other virtues. Hence the fact that humility is caused
by reverence for God does not prevent it from being a part of modesty
or temperance.
Reply to Objection 2: Parts are assigned to a principal virtue by
reason of a sameness, not of subject or matter, but of formal mode, as
stated above ([3602]Q[137], A[2], ad 1;[3603] Q[157], A[3], ad 2).
Consequently, although humility is in the irascible as its subject, it
is assigned as a part of modesty or temperance by reason of its mode.
Reply to Objection 3: Although humility and magnanimity agree as to
matter, they differ as to mode, by reason of which magnanimity is
reckoned a part of fortitude, and humility a part of temperance.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether humility is the greatest of the virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that humility is the greatest of the
virtues. For Chrysostom, expounding the story of the Pharisee and the
publican (Lk. 18), says [*Eclog. hom. vii de Humil. Animi. ] that "if
humility is such a fleet runner even when hampered by sin that it
overtakes the justice that is the companion of pride, whither will it
not reach if you couple it with justice? It will stand among the angels
by the judgment seat of God. " Hence it is clear that humility is set
above justice. Now justice is either the most exalted of all the
virtues, or includes all virtues, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
v, 1). Therefore humility is the greatest of the virtues.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. , Serm. [*S. 10,
C[1]]): "Are you thinking of raising the great fabric of spirituality?
Attend first of all to the foundation of humility. " Now this would seem
to imply that humility is the foundation of all virtue. Therefore
apparently it is greater than the other virtues.
Objection 3: Further, the greater virtue deserves the greater reward.
Now the greatest reward is due to humility, since "he that humbleth
himself shall be exalted" (Lk. 14:11). Therefore humility is the
greatest of virtues.
Objection 4: Further, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. 16),
"Christ's whole life on earth was a lesson in moral conduct through the
human nature which He assumed. " Now He especially proposed His humility
for our example, saying (Mat. 11:29): "Learn of Me, because I am meek
and humble of heart. " Moreover, Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 1) that the
"lesson proposed to us in the mystery of our redemption is the humility
of God. " Therefore humility would seem to be the greatest of virtues.
On the contrary, Charity is set above all the virtues, according to
Col. 3:14, "Above all . . . things have charity. " Therefore humility is
not the greatest of virtues.
I answer that, The good of human virtue pertains to the order of
reason: which order is considered chiefly in reference to the end:
wherefore the theological virtues are the greatest because they have
the last end for their object. Secondarily, however, it is considered
in reference to the ordering of the means to the end. This ordinance,
as to its essence, is in the reason itself from which it issues, but by
participation it is in the appetite ordered by the reason; and this
ordinance is the effect of justice, especially of legal justice. Now
humility makes a man a good subject to ordinance of all kinds and in
all matters; while every other virtue has this effect in some special
matter. Therefore after the theological virtues, after the intellectual
virtues which regard the reason itself, and after justice, especially
legal justice, humility stands before all others.
Reply to Objection 1: Humility is not set before justice, but before
that justice which is coupled with pride, and is no longer a virtue;
even so, on the other hand, sin is pardoned through humility: for it is
said of the publican (Lk. 18:14) that through the merit of his humility
"he went down into his house justified. " Hence Chrysostom says [*De
incompr. Nat. Dei, Hom. v]: "Bring me a pair of two-horse chariots: in
the one harness pride with justice, in the other sin with humility: and
you will see that sin outrunning justice wins not by its own strength,
but by that of humility: while you will see the other pair beaten, not
by the weakness of justice, but by the weight and size of pride. "
Reply to Objection 2: Just as the orderly assembly of virtues is, by
reason of a certain likeness, compared to a building, so again that
which is the first step in the acquisition of virtue is likened to the
foundation, which is first laid before the rest of the building. Now
the virtues are in truth infused by God. Wherefore the first step in
the acquisition of virtue may be understood in two ways. First by way
of removing obstacles: and thus humility holds the first place,
inasmuch as it expels pride, which "God resisteth," and makes man
submissive and ever open to receive the influx of Divine grace. Hence
it is written (James 4:6): "God resisteth the proud, and giveth grace
to the humble. " In this sense humility is said to be the foundation of
the spiritual edifice. Secondly, a thing is first among virtues
directly, because it is the first step towards God. Now the first step
towards God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6, "He that cometh to God
must believe. " In this sense faith is the foundation in a more
excellent way than humility.
Reply to Objection 3: To him that despises earthly things, heavenly
things are promised: thus heavenly treasures are promised to those who
despise earthly riches, according to Mat. 6:19,20, "Lay not up to
yourselves treasures on earth . . . but lay up to yourselves treasures
in heaven. " Likewise heavenly consolations are promised to those who
despise worldly joys, according to Mat. 4:5, "Blessed are they that
mourn, for they shall be comforted. " In the same way spiritual
uplifting is promised to humility, not that humility alone merits it,
but because it is proper to it to despise earthly uplifting. Wherefore
Augustine says (De Poenit. [*Serm. cccli]): "Think not that he who
humbles himself remains for ever abased, for it is written: 'He shall
be exalted. ' And do not imagine that his exaltation in men's eyes is
effected by bodily uplifting. "
Reply to Objection 4: The reason why Christ chiefly proposed humility
to us, was because it especially removes the obstacle to man's
spiritual welfare consisting in man's aiming at heavenly and spiritual
things, in which he is hindered by striving to become great in earthly
things. Hence our Lord, in order to remove an obstacle to our spiritual
welfare, showed by giving an example of humility, that outward
exaltation is to be despised.
Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "He who is
not angry, whereas he has cause to be, sins. For unreasonable patience
is the hotbed of many vices, it fosters negligence, and incites not
only the wicked but even the good to do wrong. "
I answer that, Anger may be understood in two ways. In one way, as a
simple movement of the will, whereby one inflicts punishment, not
through passion, but in virtue of a judgment of the reason: and thus
without doubt lack of anger is a sin. This is the sense in which anger
is taken in the saying of Chrysostom, for he says (Hom. xi in Matth. ,
in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom):
"Anger, when it has a cause, is not anger but judgment. For anger,
properly speaking, denotes a movement of passion": and when a man is
angry with reason, his anger is no longer from passion: wherefore he is
said to judge, not to be angry. In another way anger is taken for a
movement of the sensitive appetite, which is with passion resulting
from a bodily transmutation. This movement is a necessary sequel, in
man, to the movement of his will, since the lower appetite necessarily
follows the movement of the higher appetite, unless there be an
obstacle. Hence the movement of anger in the sensitive appetite cannot
be lacking altogether, unless the movement of the will be altogether
lacking or weak. Consequently lack of the passion of anger is also a
vice, even as the lack of movement in the will directed to punishment
by the judgment of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: He that is entirely without anger when he ought
to be angry, imitates God as to lack of passion, but not as to God's
punishing by judgment.
Reply to Objection 2: The passion of anger, like all other movements of
the sensitive appetite, is useful, as being conducive to the more
prompt execution [*Cf. [3582]FS, Q[24], A[3]] of reason's dictate:
else, the sensitive appetite in man would be to no purpose, whereas
"nature does nothing without purpose" [*Aristotle, De Coelo i, 4].
Reply to Objection 3: When a man acts inordinately, the judgment of his
reason is cause not only of the simple movement of the will but also of
the passion in the sensitive appetite, as stated above. Wherefore just
as the removal of the effect is a sign that the cause is removed, so
the lack of anger is a sign that the judgment of reason is lacking.
__________________________________________________________________
OF CRUELTY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider cruelty, under which head there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency?
(2) Of its comparison with savagery or brutality.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency?
Objection 1: It would seem that cruelty is not opposed to clemency. For
Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "those are said to be cruel who
exceed in punishing," which is contrary to justice. Now clemency is
reckoned a part, not of justice but of temperance. Therefore apparently
cruelty is not opposed to clemency.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Jer. 6:23): "They are cruel, and
will have no mercy"; so that cruelty would seem opposed to mercy. Now
mercy is not the same as clemency, as stated above ([3583]Q[157], A[4],
ad 3). Therefore cruelty is not opposed to clemency.
Objection 3: Further, clemency is concerned with the infliction of
punishment, as stated above ([3584]Q[157], A[1]): whereas cruelty
applies to the withdrawal of beneficence, according to Prov. 11:17,
"But he that is cruel casteth off even his own kindred. " Therefore
cruelty is not opposed to clemency.
On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "the opposite of
clemency is cruelty, which is nothing else but hardness of heart in
exacting punishment. "
I answer that, Cruelty apparently takes its name from "cruditas"
[rawness]. Now just as things when cooked and prepared are wont to have
an agreeable and sweet savor, so when raw they have a disagreeable and
bitter taste. Now it has been stated above ([3585]Q[157], A[3], ad 1;
A[4], ad 3) that clemency denotes a certain smoothness or sweetness of
soul, whereby one is inclined to mitigate punishment. Hence cruelty is
directly opposed to clemency.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as it belongs to equity to mitigate
punishment according to reason, while the sweetness of soul which
inclines one to this belongs to clemency: so too, excess in punishing,
as regards the external action, belongs to injustice; but as regards
the hardness of heart, which makes one ready to increase punishment,
belongs to cruelty.
Reply to Objection 2: Mercy and clemency concur in this, that both shun
and recoil from another's unhappiness, but in different ways. For it
belongs to mercy [*Cf. [3586] Q[30], A[1]] to relieve another's
unhappiness by a beneficent action, while it belongs to clemency to
mitigate another's unhappiness by the cessation of punishment. And
since cruelty denotes excess in exacting punishment, it is more
directly opposed to clemency than to mercy; yet on account of the
mutual likeness of these virtues, cruelty is sometimes taken for
mercilessness.
Reply to Objection 3: Cruelty is there taken for mercilessness, which
is lack of beneficence. We may also reply that withdrawal of
beneficence is in itself a punishment.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether cruelty differs from savagery or brutality?
Objection 1: It would seem that cruelty differs not from savagery or
brutality. For seemingly one vice is opposed in one way to one virtue.
Now both savagery and cruelty are opposed to clemency by way of excess.
Therefore it would seem that savagery and cruelty are the same.
Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that "severity is as it
were savagery with verity, because it holds to justice without
attending to piety": so that savagery would seem to exclude that
mitigation of punishment in delivering judgment which is demanded by
piety. Now this has been stated to belong to cruelty (A[1], ad 1).
Therefore cruelty is the same as savagery.
Objection 3: Further, just as there is a vice opposed to a virtue by
way of excess, so is there a vice opposed to it by way of deficiency,
which latter is opposed both to the virtue which is the mean, and to
the vice which is in excess. Now the same vice pertaining to deficiency
is opposed to both cruelty and savagery, namely remission or laxity.
For Gregory says (Moral. xx, 5): "Let there be love, but not that which
enervates, let there be severity, but without fury, let there be zeal
without unseemly savagery, let there be piety without undue clemency. "
Therefore savagery is the same as cruelty.
On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "a man who is
angry without being hurt, or with one who has not offended him, is not
said to be cruel, but to be brutal or savage. "
I answer that, "Savagery" and "brutality" take their names from a
likeness to wild beasts which are also described as savage. For animals
of this kind attack man that they may feed on his body, and not for
some motive of justice the consideration of which belongs to reason
alone. Wherefore, properly speaking, brutality or savagery applies to
those who in inflicting punishment have not in view a default of the
person punished, but merely the pleasure they derive from a man's
torture. Consequently it is evident that it is comprised under
bestiality: for such like pleasure is not human but bestial, and
resulting as it does either from evil custom, or from a corrupt nature,
as do other bestial emotions. On the other hand, cruelty not only
regards the default of the person punished, but exceeds in the mode of
punishing: wherefore cruelty differs from savagery or brutality, as
human wickedness differs from bestiality, as stated in Ethic. vii, 5.
Reply to Objection 1: Clemency is a human virtue; wherefore directly
opposed to it is cruelty which is a form of human wickedness. But
savagery or brutality is comprised under bestiality, wherefore it is
directly opposed not to clemency, but to a more excellent virtue, which
the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5) calls "heroic" or "god-like," which
according to us, would seem to pertain to the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Consequently we may say that savagery is directly opposed to the gift
of piety.
Reply to Objection 2: A severe man is not said to be simply savage,
because this implies a vice; but he is said to be "savage as regards
the truth," on account of some likeness to savagery which is not
inclined to mitigate punishment.
Reply to Objection 3: Remission of punishment is not a vice, except it
disregard the order of justice, which requires a man to be punished on
account of his offense, and which cruelty exceeds. On the other hand,
cruelty disregards this order altogether. Wherefore remission of
punishment is opposed to cruelty, but not to savagery.
__________________________________________________________________
OF MODESTY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider modesty: and (1) Modesty in general; (2) Each of
its species. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether modesty is a part of temperance?
(2) What is the matter of modesty?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether modesty is a part of temperance?
Objection 1: It would seem that modesty is not a part of temperance.
For modesty is denominated from mode. Now mode is requisite in every
virtue: since virtue is directed to good; and "good," according to
Augustine (De Nat. Boni 3), "consists in mode, species, and order. "
Therefore modesty is a general virtue, and consequently should not be
reckoned a part of temperance.
Objection 2: Further, temperance would seem to be deserving of praise
chiefly on account of its moderation. Now this gives modesty its name.
Therefore modesty is the same as temperance, and not one of its parts.
Objection 3: Further, modesty would seem to regard the correction of
our neighbor, according to 2 Tim. 2:24,25, "The servant of the Lord
must not wrangle, but be mild towards all men . . . with modesty
admonishing them that resist the truth. " Now admonishing wrong-doers is
an act of justice or of charity, as stated above ([3587]Q[33], A[1]).
Therefore seemingly modesty is a part of justice rather than of
temperance.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons modesty as a
part of temperance.
I answer that, As stated above ([3588]Q[141], A[4];[3589] Q[157],
A[3]), temperance brings moderation into those things wherein it is
most difficult to be moderate, namely the concupiscences of pleasures
of touch. Now whenever there is a special virtue about some matter of
very great moment, there must needs be another virtue about matters of
lesser import: because the life of man requires to be regulated by the
virtues with regard to everything: thus it was stated above
([3590]Q[134], A[3], ad 1), that while magnificence is about great
expenditure, there is need in addition for liberality, which is
concerned with ordinary expenditure. Hence there is need for a virtue
to moderate other lesser matters where moderation is not so difficult.
This virtue is called modesty, and is annexed to temperance as its
principal.
Reply to Objection 1: When a name is common to many it is sometimes
appropriated to those of the lowest rank; thus the common name of angel
is appropriated to the lowest order of angels. In the same way, mode
which is observed by all virtues in common, is specially appropriated
to the virtue which prescribes the mode in the slightest things.
Reply to Objection 2: Some things need tempering on account of their
strength, thus we temper strong wine. But moderation is necessary in
all things: wherefore temperance is more concerned with strong
passions, and modesty about weaker passions.
Reply to Objection 3: Modesty is to be taken there for the general
moderation which is necessary in all virtues.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether modesty is only about outward actions?
Objection 1: It would seem that modesty is only about outward actions.
For the inward movements of the passions cannot be known to other
persons. Yet the Apostle enjoins (Phil. 4:5): "Let your modesty be
known to all men. " Therefore modesty is only about outward actions.
Objection 2: Further, the virtues that are about the passions are
distinguished from justice which is about operations. Now modesty is
seemingly one virtue. Therefore, if it be about outward works, it will
not be concerned with inward passions.
Objection 3: Further, no one same virtue is both about things
pertaining to the appetite---which is proper to the moral virtues---and
about things pertaining to knowledge---which is proper to the
intellectual virtues---and again about things pertaining to the
irascible and concupiscible faculties. Therefore, if modesty be one
virtue, it cannot be about all these things.
On the contrary, In all these things it is necessary to observe the
"mode" whence modesty takes its name. Therefore modesty is about all of
them.
I answer that, As stated above [3591](A[1]), modesty differs from
temperance, in that temperance moderates those matters where restraint
is most difficult, while modesty moderates those that present less
difficulty. Authorities seem to have had various opinions about
modesty. For wherever they found a special kind of good or a special
difficulty of moderation, they withdrew it from the province of
modesty, which they confined to lesser matters. Now it is clear to all
that the restraint of pleasures of touch presents a special difficulty:
wherefore all distinguished temperance from modesty.
In addition to this, moreover, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54)
considered that there was a special kind of good in the moderation of
punishment; wherefore he severed clemency also from modesty, and held
modesty to be about the remaining ordinary matters that require
moderation. These seemingly are of four kinds. one is the movement of
the mind towards some excellence, and this is moderated by "humility. "
The second is the desire of things pertaining to knowledge, and this is
moderated by "studiousness" which is opposed to curiosity. The third
regards bodily movements and actions, which require to be done
becomingly and honestly [*Cf. [3592] Q[145], A[1]], whether we act
seriously or in play. The fourth regards outward show, for instance in
dress and the like.
To some of these matters, however, other authorities appointed certain
special virtues: thus Andronicus [*De Affectibus] mentions "meekness,
simplicity, humility," and other kindred virtues, of which we have
spoken above (Q[143]); while Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) assigned
{eutrapelia} to pleasures in games, as stated above ([3593]FS, Q[60],
A[5]). All these are comprised under modesty as understood by Tully;
and in this way modesty regards not only outward but also inward
actions.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle speaks of modesty as regarding
externals. Nevertheless the moderation of the inner man may be shown by
certain outward signs.
Reply to Objection 2: Various virtues assigned by various authorities
are comprised under modesty. Wherefore nothing prevents modesty from
regarding matters which require different virtues. Yet there is not so
great a difference between the various parts of modesty, as there is
between justice, which is about operations, and temperance, which is
about passions, because in actions and passions that present no great
difficulty on the part of the matter, but only on the part of
moderation, there is but one virtue, one namely for each kind of
moderation.
Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection also is clear.
__________________________________________________________________
OF HUMILITY (SIX ARTICLES)
We must consider next the species of modesty: (1) Humility, and pride
which is opposed to it; (2) Studiousness, and its opposite, Curiosity;
(3) Modesty as affecting words or deeds; (4) Modesty as affecting
outward attire.
Concerning humility there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether humility is a virtue?
(2) Whether it resides in the appetite, or in the judgment of reason?
(3) Whether by humility one ought to subject oneself to all men?
(4) Whether it is a part of modesty or temperance?
(5) Of its comparison with the other virtues;
(6) Of the degrees of humility.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether humility is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that humility is not a virtue. For virtue
conveys the notion of a penal evil, according to Ps. 104:18, "They
humbled his feet in fetters. " Therefore humility is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, virtue and vice are mutually opposed. Now
humility seemingly denotes a vice, for it is written (Ecclus. 19:23):
"There is one that humbleth himself wickedly. " Therefore humility is
not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But
humility is apparently opposed to the virtue of magnanimity, which aims
at great things, whereas humility shuns them. Therefore it would seem
that humility is not a virtue.
Objection 4: Further, virtue is "the disposition of that which is
perfect" (Phys. vii, text. 17). But humility seemingly belongs to the
imperfect: wherefore it becomes not God to be humble, since He can be
subject to none. Therefore it seems that humility is not a virtue.
Objection 5: Further, every moral virtue is about actions and passions,
according to Ethic. ii, 3. But humility is not reckoned by the
Philosopher among the virtues that are about passions, nor is it
comprised under justice which is about actions. Therefore it would seem
not to be a virtue.
On the contrary, Origen commenting on Lk. 1:48, "He hath regarded the
humility of His handmaid," says (Hom. viii in Luc. ): "One of the
virtues, humility, is particularly commended in Holy Writ; for our
Saviour said: 'Learn of Me, because I am meek, and humble of heart. '"
I answer that, As stated above ([3594]FS, Q[23], A[2]) when we were
treating of the passions, the difficult good has something attractive
to the appetite, namely the aspect of good, and likewise something
repulsive to the appetite, namely the difficulty of obtaining it. In
respect of the former there arises the movement of hope, and in respect
of the latter, the movement of despair. Now it has been stated above
([3595]FS, Q[61], A[2]) that for those appetitive movements which are a
kind of impulse towards an object, there is need of a moderating and
restraining moral virtue, while for those which are a kind of recoil,
there is need, on the part of the appetite, of a moral virtue to
strengthen it and urge it on. Wherefore a twofold virtue is necessary
with regard to the difficult good: one, to temper and restrain the
mind, lest it tend to high things immoderately; and this belongs to the
virtue of humility: and another to strengthen the mind against despair,
and urge it on to the pursuit of great things according to right
reason; and this is magnanimity. Therefore it is evident that humility
is a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: As Isidore observes (Etym. x), "a humble man is
so called because he is, as it were, 'humo acclinis'" [*Literally,
'bent to the ground'], i. e. inclined to the lowest place. This may
happen in two ways. First, through an extrinsic principle, for instance
when one is cast down by another, and thus humility is a punishment.
Secondly, through an intrinsic principle: and this may be done
sometimes well, for instance when a man, considering his own failings,
assumes the lowest place according to his mode: thus Abraham said to
the Lord (Gn. 18:27), "I will speak to my Lord, whereas I am dust and
ashes. " In this way humility is a virtue. Sometimes, however, this may
be ill-done, for instance when man, "not understanding his honor,
compares himself to senseless beasts, and becomes like to them" (Ps.
48:13).
Reply to Objection 2: As stated (ad 1), humility, in so far as it is a
virtue, conveys the notion of a praiseworthy self-abasement to the
lowest place. Now this is sometimes done merely as to outward signs and
pretense: wherefore this is "false humility," of which Augustine says
in a letter (Ep. cxlix) that it is "grievous pride," since to wit, it
would seem to aim at excellence of glory. Sometimes, however, this is
done by an inward movement of the soul, and in this way, properly
speaking, humility is reckoned a virtue, because virtue does not
consist externals, but chiefly in the inward choice of the mind, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5).
Reply to Objection 3: Humility restrains the appetite from aiming at
great things against right reason: while magnanimity urges the mind to
great things in accord with right reason. Hence it is clear that
magnanimity is not opposed to humility: indeed they concur in this,
that each is according to right reason.
Reply to Objection 4: A thing is said to be perfect in two ways. First
absolutely; such a thing contains no defect, neither in its nature nor
in respect of anything else, and thus God alone is perfect. To Him
humility is fitting, not as regards His Divine nature, but only as
regards His assumed nature. Secondly, a thing may be said to be perfect
in a restricted sense, for instance in respect of its nature or state
or time. Thus a virtuous man is perfect: although in comparison with
God his perfection is found wanting, according to the word of Is.
40:17, "All nations are before Him as if they had no being at all.
" In
this way humility may be competent to every man.
Reply to Objection 5: The Philosopher intended to treat of virtues as
directed to civic life, wherein the subjection of one man to another is
defined according to the ordinance of the law, and consequently is a
matter of legal justice. But humility, considered as a special virtue,
regards chiefly the subjection of man to God, for Whose sake he humbles
himself by subjecting himself to others.
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Whether humility has to do with the appetite?
Objection 1: It would seem that humility concerns, not the appetite but
the judgment of reason. Because humility is opposed to pride. Now pride
concerns things pertaining to knowledge: for Gregory says (Moral.
xxxiv, 22) that "pride, when it extends outwardly to the body, is first
of all shown in the eyes": wherefore it is written (Ps. 130:1), "Lord,
my heart is not exalted, nor are my eyes lofty. " Now eyes are the chief
aids to knowledge. Therefore it would seem that humility is chiefly
concerned with knowledge, whereby one thinks little of oneself.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that "almost
the whole of Christian teaching is humility. " Consequently nothing
contained in Christian teaching is incompatible with humility. Now
Christian teaching admonishes us to seek the better things, according
to 1 Cor. 12:31, "Be zealous for the better gifts. " Therefore it
belongs to humility to restrain not the desire of difficult things but
the estimate thereof.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the same virtue both to restrain
excessive movement, and to strengthen the soul against excessive
withdrawal: thus fortitude both curbs daring and fortifies the soul
against fear. Now it is magnanimity that strengthens the soul against
the difficulties that occur in the pursuit of great things. Therefore
if humility were to curb the desire of great things, it would follow
that humility is not a distinct virtue from magnanimity, which is
evidently false. Therefore humility is concerned, not with the desire
but with the estimate of great things.
Objection 4: Further, Andronicus [*De Affectibus] assigns humility to
outward show; for he says that humility is "the habit of avoiding
excessive expenditure and parade. " Therefore it is not concerned with
the movement of the appetite.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Poenit. [*Serm. cccli]) that "the
humble man is one who chooses to be an abject in the house of the Lord,
rather than to dwell in the tents of sinners. " But choice concerns the
appetite. Therefore humility has to do with the appetite rather than
with the estimative power.
I answer that, As stated above [3596](A[1]), it belongs properly to
humility, that a man restrain himself from being borne towards that
which is above him. For this purpose he must know his disproportion to
that which surpasses his capacity. Hence knowledge of one's own
deficiency belongs to humility, as a rule guiding the appetite.
Nevertheless humility is essentially in the appetite itself; and
consequently it must be said that humility, properly speaking,
moderates the movement of the appetite.
Reply to Objection 1: Lofty eyes are a sign of pride, inasmuch as it
excludes respect and fear: for fearing and respectful persons are
especially wont to lower the eyes, as though not daring to compare
themselves with others. But it does not follow from this that humility
is essentially concerned with knowledge.
Reply to Objection 2: It is contrary to humility to aim at greater
things through confiding in one's own powers: but to aim at greater
things through confidence in God's help, is not contrary to humility;
especially since the more one subjects oneself to God, the more is one
exalted in God's sight. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi): "It
is one thing to raise oneself to God, and another to raise oneself up
against God. He that abases himself before Him, him He raiseth up; he
that raises himself up against Him, him He casteth down. "
Reply to Objection 3: In fortitude there is the same reason for
restraining daring and for strengthening the soul against fear: since
the reason in both cases is that man should set the good of reason
before dangers of death. But the reason for restraining presumptuous
hope which pertains to humility is not the same as the reason for
strengthening the soul against despair. Because the reason for
strengthening the soul against despair is the acquisition of one's
proper good lest man, by despair, render himself unworthy of a good
which was competent to him; while the chief reason for suppressing
presumptuous hope is based on divine reverence, which shows that man
ought not to ascribe to himself more than is competent to him according
to the position in which God has placed him. Wherefore humility would
seem to denote in the first place man's subjection to God; and for this
reason Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) ascribes humility, which
he understands by poverty of spirit, to the gift of fear whereby man
reveres God. Hence it follows that the relation of fortitude to daring
differs from that of humility to hope. Because fortitude uses daring
more than it suppresses it: so that excess of daring is more like
fortitude than lack of daring is. On the other hand, humility
suppresses hope or confidence in self more than it uses it; wherefore
excessive self-confidence is more opposed to humility than lack of
confidence is.
Reply to Objection 4: Excess in outward expenditure and parade is wont
to be done with a view of boasting, which is suppressed by humility.
Accordingly humility has to do, in a secondary way, with externals, as
signs of the inward movement of the appetite.
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Whether one ought, by humility, to subject oneself to all men?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not, by humility, to subject
oneself to all men. For, as stated above (A[2], ad 3), humility
consists chiefly in man's subjection to God. Now one ought not to offer
to a man that which is due to God, as is the case with all acts of
religious worship. Therefore, by humility, one ought not to subject
oneself to man.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Nat. et Gratia xxxiv):
"Humility should take the part of truth, not of falsehood. " Now some
men are of the highest rank, who cannot, without falsehood, subject
themselves to their inferiors. Therefore one ought not, by humility, to
subject oneself to all men.
Objection 3: Further no one ought to do that which conduces to the
detriment of another's spiritual welfare. But if a man subject himself
to another by humility, this is detrimental to the person to whom he
subjects himself; for the latter might wax proud, or despise the other.
Hence Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "Lest through excessive
humility the superior lose his authority. " Therefore a man ought not,
by humility, to subject himself to all.
On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:3): "In humility, let each
esteem others better than themselves. "
I answer that, We may consider two things in man, namely that which is
God's, and that which is man's. Whatever pertains to defect is man's:
but whatever pertains to man's welfare and perfection is God's,
according to the saying of Osee 13:9, "Destruction is thy own, O
Israel; thy help is only in Me. " Now humility, as stated above (A[1],
ad 5; A[2], ad 3), properly regards the reverence whereby man is
subject to God. Wherefore every man, in respect of that which is his
own, ought to subject himself to every neighbor, in respect of that
which the latter has of God's: but humility does not require a man to
subject what he has of God's to that which may seem to be God's in
another. For those who have a share of God's gifts know that they have
them, according to 1 Cor. 2:12: "That we may know the things that are
given us from God. " Wherefore without prejudice to humility they may
set the gifts they have received from God above those that others
appear to have received from Him; thus the Apostle says (Eph. 3:5):
"(The mystery of Christ) was not known to the sons of men as it is now
revealed to His holy apostles. " In like manner. humility does not
require a man to subject that which he has of his own to that which his
neighbor has of man's: otherwise each one would have to esteem himself
a greater sinner than anyone else: whereas the Apostle says without
prejudice to humility (Gal. 2:15): "We by nature are Jews, and not of
the Gentiles, sinners. " Nevertheless a man may esteem his neighbor to
have some good which he lacks himself, or himself to have some evil
which another has not: by reason of which, he may subject himself to
him with humility.
Reply to Objection 1: We must not only revere God in Himself, but also
that which is His in each one, although not with the same measure of
reverence as we revere God. Wherefore we should subject ourselves with
humility to all our neighbors for God's sake, according to 1 Pet. 2:13,
"Be ye subject . . . to every human creature for God's sake"; but to
God alone do we owe the worship of latria.
Reply to Objection 2: If we set what our neighbor has of God's above
that which we have of our own, we cannot incur falsehood. Wherefore a
gloss [*St. Augustine, QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 71] on Phil. 2:3, "Esteem
others better than themselves," says: "We must not esteem by pretending
to esteem; but we should in truth think it possible for another person
to have something that is hidden to us and whereby he is better than we
are, although our own good whereby we are apparently better than he, be
not hidden. "
Reply to Objection 3: Humility, like other virtues, resides chiefly
inwardly in the soul. Consequently a man, by an inward act of the soul,
may subject himself to another, without giving the other man an
occasion of detriment to his spiritual welfare. This is what Augustine
means in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "With fear, the superior should prostrate
himself at your feet in the sight of God. " On the other hand, due
moderation must be observed in the outward acts of humility even as of
other virtues, lest they conduce to the detriment of others. If,
however, a man does as he ought, and others take therefrom an occasion
of sin, this is not imputed to the man who acts with humility; since he
does not give scandal, although others take it.
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Whether humility is a part of modesty or temperance?
Objection 1: It would seem that humility is not a part of modesty or
temperance. For humility regards chiefly the reverence whereby one is
subject to God, as stated above [3597](A[3]). Now it belongs to a
theological virtue to have God for its object. Therefore humility
should be reckoned a theological virtue rather than a part of
temperance or modesty.
Objection 2: Further, temperance is in the concupiscible, whereas
humility would seem to be in the irascible, just as pride which is
opposed to it, and whose object is something difficult. Therefore
apparently humility is not a part of temperance or modesty.
Objection 3: Further, humility and magnanimity are about the same
object, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But magnanimity is reckoned a
part, not of temperance but of fortitude, as stated above
([3598]Q[129], A[5]). Therefore it would seem that humility is not a
part of temperance or modesty.
On the contrary, Origen says (Hom. viii super Luc. ): "If thou wilt hear
the name of this virtue, and what it was called by the philosophers,
know that humility which God regards is the same as what they called
{metriotes}, i. e. measure or moderation. " Now this evidently pertains
to modesty or temperance. Therefore humility is a part of modesty or
temperance.
I answer that, As stated above ([3599]Q[137], A[2], ad 1;[3600] Q[157],
A[3], ad 2), in assigning parts to a virtue we consider chiefly the
likeness that results from the mode of the virtue. Now the mode of
temperance, whence it chiefly derives its praise, is the restraint or
suppression of the impetuosity of a passion. Hence whatever virtues
restrain or suppress, and the actions which moderate the impetuosity of
the emotions, are reckoned parts of temperance. Now just as meekness
suppresses the movement of anger, so does humility suppress the
movement of hope, which is the movement of a spirit aiming at great
things. Wherefore, like meekness, humility is accounted a part of
temperance. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a
man who aims at small things in proportion to his mode is not
magnanimous but "temperate," and such a man we may call humble.
Moreover, for the reason given above ([3601]Q[160], A[2]), among the
various parts of temperance, the one under which humility is comprised
is modesty as understood by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54), inasmuch
as humility is nothing else than a moderation of spirit: wherefore it
is written (1 Pet. 3:4): "In the incorruptibility of a quiet and meek
spirit. "
Reply to Objection 1: The theological virtues, whose object is our last
end, which is the first principle in matters of appetite, are the
causes of all the other virtues. Hence the fact that humility is caused
by reverence for God does not prevent it from being a part of modesty
or temperance.
Reply to Objection 2: Parts are assigned to a principal virtue by
reason of a sameness, not of subject or matter, but of formal mode, as
stated above ([3602]Q[137], A[2], ad 1;[3603] Q[157], A[3], ad 2).
Consequently, although humility is in the irascible as its subject, it
is assigned as a part of modesty or temperance by reason of its mode.
Reply to Objection 3: Although humility and magnanimity agree as to
matter, they differ as to mode, by reason of which magnanimity is
reckoned a part of fortitude, and humility a part of temperance.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether humility is the greatest of the virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that humility is the greatest of the
virtues. For Chrysostom, expounding the story of the Pharisee and the
publican (Lk. 18), says [*Eclog. hom. vii de Humil. Animi. ] that "if
humility is such a fleet runner even when hampered by sin that it
overtakes the justice that is the companion of pride, whither will it
not reach if you couple it with justice? It will stand among the angels
by the judgment seat of God. " Hence it is clear that humility is set
above justice. Now justice is either the most exalted of all the
virtues, or includes all virtues, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
v, 1). Therefore humility is the greatest of the virtues.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. , Serm. [*S. 10,
C[1]]): "Are you thinking of raising the great fabric of spirituality?
Attend first of all to the foundation of humility. " Now this would seem
to imply that humility is the foundation of all virtue. Therefore
apparently it is greater than the other virtues.
Objection 3: Further, the greater virtue deserves the greater reward.
Now the greatest reward is due to humility, since "he that humbleth
himself shall be exalted" (Lk. 14:11). Therefore humility is the
greatest of virtues.
Objection 4: Further, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. 16),
"Christ's whole life on earth was a lesson in moral conduct through the
human nature which He assumed. " Now He especially proposed His humility
for our example, saying (Mat. 11:29): "Learn of Me, because I am meek
and humble of heart. " Moreover, Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 1) that the
"lesson proposed to us in the mystery of our redemption is the humility
of God. " Therefore humility would seem to be the greatest of virtues.
On the contrary, Charity is set above all the virtues, according to
Col. 3:14, "Above all . . . things have charity. " Therefore humility is
not the greatest of virtues.
I answer that, The good of human virtue pertains to the order of
reason: which order is considered chiefly in reference to the end:
wherefore the theological virtues are the greatest because they have
the last end for their object. Secondarily, however, it is considered
in reference to the ordering of the means to the end. This ordinance,
as to its essence, is in the reason itself from which it issues, but by
participation it is in the appetite ordered by the reason; and this
ordinance is the effect of justice, especially of legal justice. Now
humility makes a man a good subject to ordinance of all kinds and in
all matters; while every other virtue has this effect in some special
matter. Therefore after the theological virtues, after the intellectual
virtues which regard the reason itself, and after justice, especially
legal justice, humility stands before all others.
Reply to Objection 1: Humility is not set before justice, but before
that justice which is coupled with pride, and is no longer a virtue;
even so, on the other hand, sin is pardoned through humility: for it is
said of the publican (Lk. 18:14) that through the merit of his humility
"he went down into his house justified. " Hence Chrysostom says [*De
incompr. Nat. Dei, Hom. v]: "Bring me a pair of two-horse chariots: in
the one harness pride with justice, in the other sin with humility: and
you will see that sin outrunning justice wins not by its own strength,
but by that of humility: while you will see the other pair beaten, not
by the weakness of justice, but by the weight and size of pride. "
Reply to Objection 2: Just as the orderly assembly of virtues is, by
reason of a certain likeness, compared to a building, so again that
which is the first step in the acquisition of virtue is likened to the
foundation, which is first laid before the rest of the building. Now
the virtues are in truth infused by God. Wherefore the first step in
the acquisition of virtue may be understood in two ways. First by way
of removing obstacles: and thus humility holds the first place,
inasmuch as it expels pride, which "God resisteth," and makes man
submissive and ever open to receive the influx of Divine grace. Hence
it is written (James 4:6): "God resisteth the proud, and giveth grace
to the humble. " In this sense humility is said to be the foundation of
the spiritual edifice. Secondly, a thing is first among virtues
directly, because it is the first step towards God. Now the first step
towards God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6, "He that cometh to God
must believe. " In this sense faith is the foundation in a more
excellent way than humility.
Reply to Objection 3: To him that despises earthly things, heavenly
things are promised: thus heavenly treasures are promised to those who
despise earthly riches, according to Mat. 6:19,20, "Lay not up to
yourselves treasures on earth . . . but lay up to yourselves treasures
in heaven. " Likewise heavenly consolations are promised to those who
despise worldly joys, according to Mat. 4:5, "Blessed are they that
mourn, for they shall be comforted. " In the same way spiritual
uplifting is promised to humility, not that humility alone merits it,
but because it is proper to it to despise earthly uplifting. Wherefore
Augustine says (De Poenit. [*Serm. cccli]): "Think not that he who
humbles himself remains for ever abased, for it is written: 'He shall
be exalted. ' And do not imagine that his exaltation in men's eyes is
effected by bodily uplifting. "
Reply to Objection 4: The reason why Christ chiefly proposed humility
to us, was because it especially removes the obstacle to man's
spiritual welfare consisting in man's aiming at heavenly and spiritual
things, in which he is hindered by striving to become great in earthly
things. Hence our Lord, in order to remove an obstacle to our spiritual
welfare, showed by giving an example of humility, that outward
exaltation is to be despised.
