No More Learning

This sub-division of chauth continued under the régime of the
Peshwas; and when the territories, which paid both the levies, were
finally incorporated in the Maratha dominions, the remaining three-
fourths of their revenues, after deducting the chauth, were styled
jagir and were also granted in varying proportions to different indi-
viduals. As previously stated, this system was characterised by a
multiplicity of individual claims upon the revenues of a single tract
or village, and consequently in great complication of the accounts,
which the Brahman secretariat in Poona was alone in a position to
comprehend and elucidate. During the Peshwa's rule a somewhat
similar sub-division was made of the sardesinukhi, which had origi-
nally been credited wholly to the raja, in accordance with Sivaji's
fictitious claim to be the hereditary sardesmukh of the Deccan.
The second important head of state revenue was the agricultural
assessment upon village lands, which were generally divided between
two classes of holders, the mirasdar and the upri. 2 The former, who
is supposed to have been the descendant of original settlers who
cleared the forest and first prepared the soil for agriculture, possessed
permanent proprietary rights and could not be ejected from his hold-
ing so long as his rent was paid to the government. His property was
hereditary and saleable; and even if he was dispossessed for failure
to pay the government dues, he had a right of recovery at any time
during the next thirty or forty years, on his liquidating all arrears.
The upri, on the other hand, was a stranger and tenant-at-will, who
merely rented and cultivated his fields with the permission and under
the supervision of the Peshwa's district officers. He did not enjoy
the same advantages and fixity of tenure as the mirasdar, but he was
not liable, like the latter, to sudden and arbitrary impositions, and
he bore a comparatively moderate proportion of the miscellaneous
village expenses, which included such items as the maintenance of
the village temple and the repair of the village well. Theoretically
the assessment on the village lands was supposed to be based on a
careful survey of the cultivated area, the lands themselves being
divided into three main classes. Allowance was also supposed to be
1 Sen, p. 112.
2 Idem, pp. 237-9


## p. 396 (#424) ############################################

396
MARATHA ADMINISTRATION
made for the character of the crop and the facilities existing for
irrigation, and special rates were imposed upon coconut and other
plantations and also upon waste or permanently unproductive lands.
The assessment was payable either in cash or in kind, and it was gener-
ally recognised that reinission of the assessment and advances of money
and grain (tagai) should be granted to the peasantry in seasons of
drought and distress. Theoretically, indeed, the Maratha land revenue
system was favourable to the interests of the cultivator, and under
the rule of, a Peshwa like Madhu Rao I the peasantry were probably
contented and tolerably well off. But actually the patel was the only
person who could champion the rights of the villager against the
higher official authorities, and as the latter had usually to satisfy the
demands of the government and fill their own pockets at one and the
same time, the cultivator met with much less consideration than was
due to his position in the economic sphere. Under a bad ruler like
Baji Rao II, whose administration was stained by perfidy, rapacity and
cruelty, the equitable maxims of land revenue assessment and collec-
tion were widely neglected, and the cultivator was reduced in many
cases to practical penury by the merciless exactions of the Peshwa's
Dificials. In addition to the regular village. lands, there were certain
lands which were regarded as the private property of the Peshwa.
These fell into the four-fold category of pasture, garden, orchard, and
cultivated land, and were usually let on lease to upris under the
authority of the mamlatdar or kamávisdar, who was responsible for
recovering the rental and other dues from the tenant. 1
A third item of the Maratha revenues consisted of miscellaneous
taxes, which varied in different districts. They included, inter alia,
a tax of one year's rent in ten on the lands held by the destrukh and
despande, a tax on land reserved for the village Mahars, a triennial
cess on mirasdar occupants, a tax on land irrigated from wells, a
house tax recovered from everyone except Brahmans and village
officers, an annual fee for the testing of weights and measures, a tax
on marriage and on the remarriage of widows, taxes on sheep and
she-buffaloes, a pasturage fee, a tax on melon cultivation in river
beds, a succession duty, and a town duty, including a fee of 17 per
cent. on the sale of a house. There were several other taxes and cesses
of more or less importance, as for example the bat chhapai or fee for
the stamping of cloth and other merchandise; and some of these can
be traced back to the Mauryan epoch and were probably levied by
Indian rulers at an even earlier date. In theory such taxes were to
be proportioned in their incidence to the resources of the individual;
but on the not infrequent occasions when the Maratha Government
was pressed for money, it had no scruple in levying on all landholders
a karja: patti. or jasti patti, which was generally equivalent to one
year's income of the individual tax-payer. 2
1 Sen, op. cit. pp. 277-307.
2 Idem, pp. 308-14.


## p. 397 (#425) ############################################

MISCELLANEOUS REVENUES
397
The fourth source of Maratha revenue was customs duties, which
fell roughly into the two classes of mohatarfa or taxes on trades an:
professions, and jakat or duties on purchase and sale, octroi and ferry
charges. The mohatarfa, for example, included a palanquin tax on
the Kolis, a shop tax on goldsmiths, blacksmiths, shoemakers and
other retail dealers, a tax on oil mills, potter's wheels and boats, and
a professional impost of three rupees a year on the Gondhalis or wor-
shippers of the goddess Bhavani. The jakat, a term originally borrow-
ed from the Muhammadans, was collected from traders of ail castes
and sects, and was farmed out to contractors, who were often corrupt
and oppressive. It was levied separately in each district, and was divi-
ded into thalbarit or tax at the place of loading the merchandise, thal.
mod or tax at the place of-sale, and chhapa or stamping-duty. In some
places a special fee on cattle, termed shingshinyoti, was also imposed.
Remissions of jakat were sometimes granted, particularly to cultivators
who had suffered from scarcity or from the incursions of troups; but,
as a rule, every trader had to submit to the inconvenience of having
his goods stopped frequently in transit for the payment of these dues
and octroi. Elphinstone records that the system was responsible for
the appearance of a class of hundikaris or middlemen, who in return
for a lump payment undertook to arrange with the custom farmers
for the unimpeded transit of a merchant's gonds. Brahmans and
government officials were usually granted exemption from duty on
goods imported for their own consumption, just as they were exenip-
ied from the house tax and certain minor cesses.
A small revenue was derived from forests by the sale of permits
to cut timber for building or for fuel, by the sale of grass, bamboos,
fuei and wild honey, and by fees for pasturage in reserved areas
(kurans). Licences for private mints also brought some profit to the
state treasury. These licences were issued to approved goldsmiths
(sonars), who paid a varying royalty and undertook to maintain a
standard proportion of alloy, on pain of fine and forfeiture 'of licence.
At times spurious and faulty coins were put into circulation, as foi
example in the Dharwar division in 1760. On that occasion the
Maratha Government closed all private mints in that area and esta-
blished in their stead a central inint, which charged a fee of seven
coins in every thousand. 3
The administration of justice produced a small and uncertain
amount of revenue. In civil disputes relating to money bonds, the
state claimed a fee of 25 per cent. of the amount realised; whicn
really amounted to a bribe to secure the assistance of the official who
heard the case. The general inertia of the government effectually
prevented the growth of revenue from legal fees and obliged suitors to
depend for satisfaction of their claims on private redress in the form
2 Idem, pp. 314-17.
1 Sen, op. cit. pp. 321-5.
3 Idem, pp. 317:21.


## p. 398 (#426) ############################################

398
MARATHA ADMINISTRATION
>
of takaza or dharna (dunning), or on patronage, which signified the
enlistment of the aid of a superior neighbour or influential friend. In
suits for partition of property worth more than 300 rupees in value,
the parties were expected to pay a fee at the rate of 10 per cent. of
the value of the property; fees were also charged in cases concerned
with maintenance or inheritance, particularly in cases in which an
applicant claimed to succeed to the estate of a childless brother. It
is not clear what proportion of the fines imposed in criminal proceed-
ings was credited to the state; but during the ministry of Nana
Phadnavis (1762-1800) the legal revenues included a considerable sum
extorted from persons suspected or found guilty of adultery.
No definite estimate of the total revenue of the Maratha state can
be given. Lord Valentia (1802-6) calculated the Feshwa's revenue at
rather more than 7,000,000 rupees; while J. Grant, writing in 1798,
estiniated the total revenue of the Maratha empire at six crores, and
the revenue of the Peshwa alone at not less than three crores of
rupees, including chauth from the Nizam, Tipu Sultan, and the Rajput
chiefs of Bundelkhand. The revenue of a state which subsists largely
on marauding excursions and blackmail, as the Maratha Government
did in the time both of Sivaji and the Peshwas, must necessarily
fluctuate; and the facts outlined in the preceding pages will serve to
indicate that, though the general principles of the domestic adminis-
tration may have been worthy of commendation, the practices of the
Maratha Government and its officials precluded all possibility of the
steady economic and educational advance of the country. Tone
records that the Maratha Government invariably anticipated its land
revenues.
These mortgages on the territorial income are negotiated by wealthy sou-
cars (between whom and the Minister there always exists a proper under-
standing), and frequently at a discount of 30 per cent. and then paid in the
inost depreciated specie.
Owing to the unsettled state of the country, the Maratha Government
preferred to raise a lump sum at enormous interest on the security
of the precarious revenue of the next two or four years, and made
little or no attempt to balance its revenue and current expenditure.
The Maratha army was organised primarily for the purpose of
plunder, and not so much for the extension of territory directly
administered; and the people were gradualiy impoverished by the
system of continuous freebooting, which the Marathas regarded as
their most important means of subsistence. The general tone of the
internal administration was not calculated to counteract to any
appreciable extent the feelings of instability and insecurity. engend-
ered among the mass of the people by the predatory activities of their
rulers. Indeed the constitution of the Maratha Government and army
was "more calculated to destroy, than to create an empire”; and the
1 Sen, op. cit. pp. 371-3.
2 Idem; pp. 342-3.


## p. 399 (#427) ############################################

PREDATORY POLICY
399
spirit which directed their external policy and their internal admi-
nistration prevented all chance of permanent improvement of the
country over which they claimed sovereign rights. There can be no
doubt that the final destruction of the Maratha political power and
the substitution of orderly government by the East India Company
were necessary, and productive of incalculable benefit to India.


## p. 400 (#428) ############################################

CHAPTER XXIV
THE CONQUEST OF CEYLON, 1795-1815
THE English had been nearly two centuries in India before Ceylon
attracted their attention. They were too much occupied with, at
first, establishing a precarious foothold, and then extending their
conquests on the continent, to trouble much about a small island so
far to the south. There had indeed been a curious attempt at inter-
course as far back as 1664, which the Dutch historian, Valentyn,
records. The king of Kandi at that period had a penchant for retaining
in captivity any Englishman he could capture—mostly castaways
from merchant-ships wrecked on the coast, and an effort was made
to negotiate with him for their release, but it was abortive, and the
curtain fell for 100 years. But towards the end of the eighteenth
century, the rivalry with the Dutch became acute, and the protection
of our communications with our Indian possessions was a question
of vital importance. Not only might the Dutch prey upon our com-
merce from their harbours in Ceylon, but there was a fear lest other
nations, tempted by the tales of the fabulous wealth that poured into
Holland from the Isle of Spices, Inight be induced to forestall us.
Indeed the French, our dangerous rivals in India, had shown signs
of this inclination a hundred years earlier, and had sent a fleet to
attack Trinkomali. Though it was repulsed, a small embassy under
de Laverolle was dispatched to Kandi to negotiate with the raja. But
the ambassador was badly chosen: his unwise and intemperate
behaviour resulted not only in the failure of the mission but in his
own imprisonment.
The first serious attempt made by the English to gain a footing was
in 1762, when Pybus was sent to Kandi to arrange a treaty with the
raja, Kirti Sri. He has left an account of his mission-subsequently
published from the records of the Madras Government-which gives
a curicus, if somewhat tedious, sketch of the state of affairs at the
Kandian court. He was admitted to the audience hall at midnight,
and ordered to pull his shoes off and hold above his head the silver
dish containing the letter for the raja. Six separate curtains, white
and red, were withdrawn, and the king was then discovered seated
on his throne, which was a large chair, handsomely carved and gilt,
which may now be seen in Windsor Castle. The envoy was forced
upon his knees and had to make endless prostrations till at last his
painful progress ended at the foot of the throne, where he presented
his credentials. He describes the elaborate costume of the monarch,
and the decorations of the hall, and adds :
I should have been well enough pleased with the appearance it made, had


## p. 401 (#429) ############################################

>
CAPTURE OF COLOMBO
401
I been in a more agreeable situation. At the foot of the throne knelt one of
the King's Prime Ministers, to whom he communicated what he had to say to
me, who, after prostrating himself on the ground, related it to one of the
generals who sat by me; who, after having prostrated himself, explained it to
a Malabar doctor, who told it in Malabar to my cubash, and he to me. And
this ceremony was repeated on asking every question. 1
Whether or not this somewhat tortuous method of communicaticn
led to misunderstandings, the Madras Government took no steps to
pursue the matter further then; but in 1782 war' was declared against
the Dutch, an English fleet under Hughes captured Trinkomali, anci
Hugh Boyd was sent to Kandi to solicit the raja's help against the
Dutch. The failure of Pybus's mission had left a bad impression on
the Kandian court; the raja curtly refused to negotiate; and Trinko-
mali was next year lost to the French and finally restored to the
Dutch when peace was declared. However in 1795 the Dutch were
involved in the European upheaval, and had also got into trouble
with the Kandian court; and the English determined to strike. A
force under Colonel James Stuart was dispatched to Ceylon by the
governor of Madras, and accomplished its object with an unexpected
rapidity. The Dutch had been firmly established for 140 years along
the sea coast; they had built magnificent forts--the great foriress of
Jaffna, which is little the worse for wear even to-day, was perhaps the
finest specimen—and they were a sturdy and tenacious people. But
the smaller sea-ports were easily occupied, and the garrison of Colombo
marched out without a blow. The English historian asserts that the
enemy was in a state of utter demoralisation. When the English
entered the gates of Colombo, he says,
the Duich were found by us in a state of the most infamous disorder and
drunkenness, in no discipline, no obedience, no spirit. The soldiers then awoke
to a sense of their degradation, but it was too late; they accused Van Angelbeck
of betraying them, vented loud reproaches against their commanders, and
recklessly insulted the British as they filed into the fortress, even spitiing on
them as they passed. "
On the other hand it is asserted that adequate preparations had been
made for the defence, but that the surrender was due to the treachery
of the governor. Van Angelbeck. The facts were as follows. Early
in 1795 an English agent, Hugh Cleghorn, induced the Comte de
Meuron, colonel propriétaire of the Swiss regiment of that nanie, to
transfer his regiment, then forming the chief part of the Ceylon
forces, from the Dutch to the English service. Cleghorn and de
Meuron arrived in India in the following September. Much seemed
to depend upon the conduct of Van Angelbeck. He was believed
to be an Orangist, but several of his council were strong revolution-
aries, and it was feared that precipitate action might lead to the
governor's arrest or murder. It was decided therefore to send him a
"Pybus, Mission, t. 79,
2 Percival, r. 118.
3 Thombe, Voyage aux Indes Orientales.
26


## p. 402 (#430) ############################################

402
CONQUEST OF CEYLON, 1795-1815
copy of the capitulation regarding the de Meuron regiment, with a
demand for its execution; but the news was also secretly communi-
cated to the commandant of the regiment at Colombo. Van Angelbeck,
who clearly did not intend more than a show of resistance, allowed
the regiment to depart; and, when Stuart appeared before Colombo,
surrendered it on terms. Indeed the withdrawal of the Swiss troops
left him no alternative, whatever may have been his political views.
Accordingly the British flag flew over Colombo for the first time on
16 February, 1796, and the Dutch rule was over. Most of the wealthy
folk filtered away to Batavia and elsewhere, but many of the officials
were wisely kept on to finish up the judicial and other matters in
which they were engaged.
It is open to argument whether the Portuguese or the Dutch left
the stronger mark of their rule upon the island. The Sinhalese
language was strongly affected by both. Nearly all the words con-
nected with building are of Portuguese origin, for the ancient houses
of the Sinhalese were rude and primitive structures. In the same way,
most of the words connected with the household, domestic utensils,
the kitchen, food, etc. come from the Dutch-the legacy of the
lluisvrouw. In religious influences the Portuguese were far the more
powerful, and the number of Portuguese names (bestowed at bap-
tism) still surviving among the natives is most remarkable. The
Dutch Reformed religion never got beyond the walls of the fortresses,
but they taught the natives many lessons in town planning, sanita-
tion, and the amenities of life.
"Within the castle (of Colombo)”, says a Dutch writer 3 in 1676, “there are
many pretty walks of nut-trees set in an uniform order : the strects are pleasant
walks themselves, having trees on both sides and before the houses. "
But it was by their magnificent bequest of Roman-Dutch law that
they left their most abiding mark on the island; while their zeal for
trade was a curious counterpart to the Portuguese zeal for conversion.
Nor must it be forgotten that the "burgher" (the offspring of Dutch
and native marriages) is probably the best outcome of mixed unions
to be found in the East, and the colony has good reason to be grateful
for the fine work they have accomplished in many official callings.
The transfer of power was effected without any great upheaval
and with little bloodshed, and at first it seemed likely that the future
course of events would be peaceful and prosperous. As the island had
been taken by the troops, and at the expense, of the East India Com-
pany, it was only natural that it should claim the right to administer
it; a right which it proceeded to assert, in spite of the opposition of
Pitt and Melville, who wished it to be handed over to the crown. The
1 The Cleghorn Papers, pp. 14 sqq. , 202 sqa.
? Census Report, 1911, by E. B. Denham.
3 Christopher Sweitzer's Account of Ceylon.


## p. 403 (#431) ############################################

EARLY MISTAKES
403
results were lamentable. The Company selected as its representative
a Madras civilian named Andrews, who was to negotiate a treaty with
the king of Kandi, and, with plenary powers, to superintend the
revenue arrangements. He was a mari of rash and drastic measures,
utterly ignorant of the people he was sent to govern, and blind to the
fact that a newly, and barely, conquered country requires sympathy
and tactful persuasion rather than revolutionary changes. He ruth-
lessly swept away all the old customs and service tenures, and intro-
duced, without warning or preparation, the revenue system of Madras,
which meant not only taxes and duties unheard of before, but the
farming-out of those imposts to aliens from the coast of India,
"enemies to the religion of the Sinhalese, strangers to their habits,
and animated by no impulse but extortion" (Governor North). 1 They
were under inadequate supervision, and it did not take many months
to bring about the inevitable catastrophe. A fierce rebellion broke
out; the forces at the disposal of the new rulers were few; the rebels
held strong positions on the borderland between the low country and
the hills; and it was only after fierce fighting and considerable loss
of life that any headway was made against them.
This state of affairs was intolerable. Andrews was at once with-
drawn; his outrageous crew of tax-collectors was sent back to the
coast, and Pitt got his way earlier than he expected. The island was
made a crown colony, and the first governor sent out to administer
it was Frederick North, who landed in October, 1798. He was at
first placed under the orders of the governor-general of India; but
after the Treaty of Amiens four years later, this arrangement was
ended. He kept up a considerable correspondence with Lord Morn-
ington (afterwards the Marquess Wellesley), preserved in the
Wellesley MSS, and his letters throw a revealing light upon the
questionable policy he adopted. He set to work at once to abolish
the hateful taxes of his predecessor, eject the remaining Madras
civilians, and change the fiscal policy of the government by reverting
for the time to the system which the Dutch had worked upon; for
in spite of its obvious defects, it was at least familiar to the people.
Unfortunately his attention was diverted from these peaceful efforts
towards reform by a series of events at the capital of the island,
Kandi; and his method of dealing with this crisis has undoubtedly
left a stain upon his character. At the same time it may be urged
that a man must to a certain extent be judged by the standard of his
age; and it was not an age of extreme official probity or humanity.
In 1787 we find Governor Phillip, before starting for New South
Wales, deliberately suggesting in an official memorandum that, for
certain crimes,
.
1 Letter from Hon. F. North, Wellesley MSS.
2 Afterwards fifth Earl of Guildford. He was remarkable for his love of
Greece and the Greek language. He had a good deal to do with the foundation
of the Ionian University at Corfu, of which he was the first Chancellor,


## p. 404 (#432) ############################################

404
CONQUEST OF CEYLON, 1795-1815
I would wish to confine the criminal till an opportunity offered of delivering
him as a prisoner to the natives of New Zealand, and let them eat him. 1
It was not a nice age, from the modern point of view; but whether
such instances as these can excuse North for the breach of faith he
was guilty of, must be left to the judgment of the reader.
The king of Kandi died, or was deposed, in the same year as
governor North landed, and the prime minister nominated a nephew
of the queen's, Vikrama Raja Sinha, to succeed him. This was quite
in accordance with Kandian custom, and the English Government
accepted the arrangement, and prepared an embassy to the new king.
The prime minister's name was Pilamé Talawé, and he was to bulk
very large in the history of Ceylon for the next few luckless years.
He was a traitor of a not unfamiliar oriental type, and had no sooner
put his nominee on the throne than he began to conspire against him
with a view to his own advancement to the kingly dignity. He sought
a secret interview with North and explained his plans, his excuse for
his treachery being that the reigning family was of alien (i. e. South
Indian) origin, and that it was advisable to replace it by a family of
native extraction. Unfortunately North listened to the tempter; he
was anxious to get hold of Kandi, and thought he saw his chance.
After much tortuous negotiation it was finally agreed that the prime
minister should persuade the king to allow an ambassador to enter
Kandi with an armed escort, which was to be far larger than was
reported to the king; and North hoped that this "ambassador” (to
wit, his principal general) would be able to secure and hold Kandi
for the English, depose the unoffending monarch, and put Pilamé
Talawé in his place as titular monarch.
The plot fell through; for though the raja at first fell into the trap
and sanctioned the entry, the size of the escort leaked out, the other
nobles got alarmed, the king was persuaded to cancel his permission,
and the troops were mostly stopped at the boundary or led astray.
The general did indeed arrive at Kandi, but with only a handful of
men, and there was nothing for him to do but return discomfited.
But this rebuff by no means diverted the prime minister (or
adigar, as his real title was) from his intentions. After various fruitless
endeavours, he at last, in 1802, managed to effect a breach between
the Kandians and the English by causing a rich caravan, belonging
to English subjects, to be robbed by Kandian officials. This was
enough for North, who sent a large force under General Macdowall
to seize Kandi-an easy victory, as the inhabitants and the king
precipitately fled. A puppet king, Mutuswamy, with some claims
to royal blood, was placed on the throne; but it was agreed with
Pilamé Talawé that this puppet should be at once deported and that
he, the traitor, should reign in his stead. The English were sufficiently
1 Historical Records of New South Wales, vol. I, pt », p. 53.


## p. 405 (#433) ############################################

MASSACRE OF 1803
406
deluded to believe in the good faith of such a turncoat, and retired
in triumph to the coast, leaving a very small garrison (only 300
English and some native levies) behind. They had their due reward.
The adigar saw his chance, and was as ready to betray his allies the
English as his master the monarch. He calculated that by destroying
the tiny garrison and seizing the two kings, he could attain the summit
of his desires without further tedious negotiations; and proceeded to
carry out the former part of the programme. He surrounded Kandi
with sufficient troops to make resistance hopeless; he attacked and
killed many of the garrison, already decimated by disease, and called
on the remnant to surrender. Their commander, Major Davie, was
apparently not of the "bull-dog breed”. He accepted the traitor's
word that their lives should be spared, laid down his arms, and
marched out of the town on his way to Trinkomali with his sickly
following and the puppet king, Mutuswamy. But the adigar knew
well that they could not cross the large river near Kandi, as it was
swollen by floods.
A party of headmen came up while they were
waiting desperately by the bank, and explained that unless Mutu-
swamy was given up, they would never be allowed to cross. Davie
was base enough to entreat the prince to agree, as the envoys had
promised that his life should be spared. The prince knew his country-
men and the adigar too well. “My god”, he exclaimed, "is it possible
that the triumphant arms of England can be so humbled as to fear
the menaces of such cowards as the Kandians? ”
Nevertheless, he was unconditionally surrendered; he stood a
mock trial with heroic restraint, answering only, "I am at the king's
mercy”; and within five minutes he met his death from the krises of
the Malay guard. His relatives and followers. were stabbed or im-
paled, and his servants were deprived of their noses and ears.
But this base act failed to save the English remnant. They were
seized by the king's troops, Major Davie was taken back to Kandi,
and the other officers and men were led two by two into a hollow
out of sight of their comrades, felled by blows inflicted by the Caffres,
and dispatched by the knives of the Kandians. One man alone
escaped from the carnage. He was found to be alive, and was twice
hung by the Kandians, but each time the rope broke. He survived
this trying ordeal, and struggled in the darkness to a hut, where a
kindly villager fed him and tended his wounds, and eventually took
him before the king, who spared his life, more probably from
superstition than humanity.
The scene of the massacre is still pointed out. "Davie's Tree"
is about three miles from Kandi, near the fatal river. The ill-starred
1 Emerson Tennent, Ceylon, II, 83.
2 See An Account of the Interior of Ceylon, by Dr Davy, a brother of the
Celebrated Şir Humphry Davy.


## p. 406 (#434) ############################################

406
CONQUEST OF CEYLON, 1795-1815
Major Davie met with a lingering doom. His life was spared, says
Mrs Heber in her journal, from a kind of superstitious feeling, as
being the individual with whom the treaty was made. He was
removed to Dumbara, but, owing to a plot by some Malays to carry
him off and get a reward from the English Government, he was
brought back to Kandi, suffering from ill-health, and died there in
1810. Several attempts were made by government to obtain his release,
but the king demanded a sea-port on the coast as the ransom for his
prisoner, and the negotiations broke down. He assumed the dress
and habits of the natives, from whom he is said latterly to have been
scarcely distinguishable, and if he had a defence for his conduct, he
was never able to make it known. His apparent cowardice was in
marked contrast to the heroism of two subordinate officers, whose
nan:es should be remembered. Captain Madge was in command of
a small fort named Fort Macdowall, with a tiny force at his disposal.
It was assaulted by swarms of Kandians simultaneously with the
attack on the capital, and safe conduct was offered in return for
capitulation. Captain Madge sternly refused, stood a blockade of
three days, and then cut his way out and began a masterly retreat
to Trinkomali, which he reached in safety, though his march lay
through an almost unbroken ambuscade. Ensign Grant was in charge
of a small redoubt called Dambudenia, slightly constructed of fascines
and earth, and garrisoned by fourteen convalescent Europeans and
twenty-two invalid Malays. He equally scorned the threats and
promises of the enemy, strengthened his flimsy fortifications with bags
of rice and provision stores, and sustained an almost incessant fire
from several thousand Kandians for ten days. His force was then
relieved from Colombo, and the place dismantled
Such was the result of North's disastrous policy; yet he seems to
have been fortunate enough to escape all official censure. Certainly
his letters to Lord Mornington do not show much remorse for his
crooked dealings; doubtless he had strong influence at home; and
the date alone may explain his escape, for in 1803 England was far
too deeply involved in her struggles with Napoleon to have much
time to spare for the petty squabbles of a distant and hardly-known
island.
The effects of the disastrous surrender at Kandi were immediate
and widespread. The whole island hovered on the verge of revolt, or
broke out into open hostilities; and the available British troops,
thinned by death and sickness, could do no more than repel the attacks
of the invaders; while the war between England and France made it
impossible to send reinforcements from home. The king of Kandi,
infiamed. by hatred of the English, defied the wiles of Pilamé Talawe,
and was backed by his whole people in his efforts to eject them from
Ceylon. He sent emissaries throughout the low country, inciting the
population to revolt, and led a large army to lay siege to Colombo.
But the garrison was strong enough to repel him when he was eighteen


## p. 407 (#435) ############################################

KANDLAN WAR
407
miles from his objective, and he retired to his hill-fastnesses, where
he felt himself secure. For it must be remembered that the country
was then without roads of any kind; dense forests and steep hills and
ravines guarded the approach to the capital; the damp enervating
heat of the low country and the foot-hills, and the plague of leeches
and mosquitoes, constituted an additional defence against English
soldiers, whose dress and equipment at that period were not exactly
of the kind best suited to warfare in near proximity to the equator.
An abortive attempt to attack Kandi from six different points in
1804 led to a very gallant action. The necessary orders had been
issued to the six different commanders, but it was eventually decided
that the difficulties were too great, and fresh orders were sent can-
celling the whole scheme. But the countermand failed to reach
Captain Johnston, whose original orders were to march from Batti-
caloa, join a detachment from Uva, and attack Kandi from the east.
He set out accordingly, with a force of 82 Europeans and 220 native
troops, failed to find any detachment from Uva, fought his way to
Kandi through the thick, unhealthy jungle and unknown country,
and took and occupied the capital for three days. As there was no
sign of any of the supporting contingents, he evacuated the town and
marched back to Trinkomali, with only sixteen British soldiers killed
and wounded. His march was through a continuous ambuscade; and,
besides his human foes, he had to contend with malaria, heavy rains,
bad equipment, the plague of insects and the want of provisions. He
has the credit of having performed the pluckiest military feat in the
annals of Ceylon.
A long period of sullen inaction followed, during which the
Kandian king gave way to all the worst excesses of an oriental tyrant.
The traitor adigar was detected in an attempt to assassinate the king
and met with a traitor's doom in 1812, and was succeeded by his
nephew, Eheylapola. This minister, heedless of the warning of his
uncle's fate, secretly solicited the help of the English to organise a
general revolt against the despot of the hills. But his treason was
discovered, and he fled for protection to Colombo, leaving behind
him his wife and family. The tragedy which followed is thus
described by Dr Davy : 1
Hurried along by the flood of his revenge, the tyrant resolved to punish
Eheylapola through his family, who still remained in his power : he sentenced
his wife and children, and his brother and wife, to death-the brother and
children to be beheaded, and the females to be drowned. In front of the
Queen's Palace the wife and children were brought from prison and delivered
over to their executioners. The lady, with great resolution, maintained her
own and her children's innocence, and then desired her eldest child to submit
to his fate. The poor boy, who was eleven years old, clung to his mother terrified
and crying; her second son, of nine years, stepped forward and bade his brother
not to be afraid; he would show him the way to die. y the blow of a sword
1 An Account of the Interior of Ceylon.


## p. 408 (#436) ############################################

408
CONQUEST OF CEYLON, 1795-1815
the head of the child was severed from the body, and thrown into a rice
mortar : the pestle was put into the mother's hands, and she was ordered to
pound it, or be disgracefully tortured. To avoid the infamy, the wretched
woman did lift up the pestle and let it fall. One by one the heads of the
children were cut off, and one by one the poor mother-but the circumstance
is too dreadful to be dwelt on. One of the children was an infant; it was
plucked from its mother's breast to be beheaded. After the execution the
sufferings of the mother were speedily relieved. She and her sister-in-law
were taken to the little tank at Bogambara and drowned.
This extract has been given in full because the memory of the
horror is still very vivid among the Sinhalese; and "The Tragedy of
Eheylapola's wife" is told and retold by many a professional story-
teller,
But the tyrant's punishment was fortunately near at hand, and
the year 1815 equally witnessed the defeat of Napoleon and the
extinction of the Kandian dynasty. He ventured to seize and disgrace-
fully mutilate a party of merchants, British subjects, who had gone
up to Kandi to trade, and sent them back to Colombo with their
severed members tied round their necks. This was the last straw :
an avenging army was instantly on the march, led by Governor Sir
R. Brownrigg in person, and within two weeks was well within reach
of the capital. The king meanwhile remained in a state of almost
passive inertness, rejecting all belief in our serious intentions to
attack him. A messenger brought him news of our troops having
crossed the frontiers : he directed his head to be struck off. Another
informed him of the defeat of his troops in the Seven Korles : he
ordered him to be impaled alive. At length he precipitately quitted
Kandi, and (14 February) the English marched in and took posses-
sion. An armed party sent out by Eheylapola discovered the house to
which the king had fled, pulled down the wall of the room where he
was hiding, and suddenly exposed the crouching tyrant to the glare of
the torches of the bystanders. He was bound with ropes, subjected
to every obloquy and insult, and handed over to the English autho-
rities, who eventually transported him to Vellore in India, where he
died in January, 1832. 2
Kandian independence was over; the whole island was in the
hands of the English, and the new régime began.
1 Emerson Tennent, Ceylon, II, 89.
2 A narrative of events which have recently occurred in Ceylon, by a
Gentleman on the Spot, London, 1815.


## p. 409 (#437) ############################################

CHAPTER XXV
THE REVENUE ADMINISTRATION OF BENGAL,
1765-86
In May, 1765, Clive returned to India, and his forceful personality
was soon at work. On 16 August, 1765, the emperor Shah 'Alam,
from motives very foreign to those of Akbar, divested the nawab of
his powers as diwan, and conferred that office on the British East India
Company to hold as a free gift and royal grant in perpetuity
(altamgha). The Company in turn appointed as its deputy or naib
diwan the same officer who had been selected to act as naib nazim,
viz. Muhammad Reza Khan, who now united in his person the full
powers of the nizamat and diwanni which had been separated by
Akbar and reunited by Murshid Kuli Khan. But the arrangement
spelt failure from the beginning. The emperor was a ruler in name
only : his diwan in Bengal was a mysterious being locally known as
the Kompani Sahib Bahadur, represented by a victorious and master-
ful foreign soldier, assisted by men who were avowedly traders, whose
interests were principally engaged in maintaining the Company's
dividends, and who lacked completely the professional training
essential to efficient administration. Confusion reigned both in the
provinces of justice and revenue.
The revenue of Bengal as assessed in the reign of Akbar 1 varied
little either in the amount or the mode of levying it until the
eighteenth century, when increasing anarchy introduced fresh assess-
ments and further exactions under the name of abwabs or cesses. The
three main sources of revenue at the time when the Company assumed
the diwanni were (a) mal, i. e. the land revenue, including royalties
on salt; (b) sair, i. e. the revenue received from the customs, tolls,
ferries, etc. ; (c) bazi jama, i. e. miscellaneous headings, such as receipts
from fines, properties, excise, etc. The land revenue was collected by
hereditary agents who held land in the various districts, paid the
revenue, and stood between the government and the actual cultivators
of the soil; these agents were in general known as zamindars, and the
cultivators of the soil as ryots.
The position of the zamindar gave considerable difficulty to the
Company's senior officers. At first he was looked upon merely as a
revenue agent, with an hereditary interest and privileges in certain
districts; but later he was considered as owning land in fee simple.
The controversy is too lengthy to be followed in this chapter; but it
may be asserted that the zamindar, though not the owner of the land
1 Report of Anderson, Croftes and Bogle, dated 28 March, 1778.


## p. 410 (#438) ############################################

410
REVENUE ADMINISTRATION OF BENGAL, 1765-86
in fee simple, was by no means a mere revenue agent; it was practi-
cally impossible by constitutional methods to break his hereditary
connection with the land of which he was the zamindar; and as long
as he performed his duties he was far more impregnable in his position
than the average English official. On the other hand, the position
cf the ryots was less enviable than that of an English cultivator of
the soil at the same period. In each village there was a mandal, or
chief ryot, who acted as their agent in dealing with the various petty
officers employed by the zamindar in the collection of the land
revenue: The result of the investigation ordered in 1776 was to give
a sad picture of the lot of the ryot and of the zamindar's indifference
to liis welfare, especially during the chaotic fifty years that followed
or the death of Murshid Kuli Khan, during which the zamindar's
receipts, owing to anarchy and consequent lack of cultivation,
diminished.
“Although", in the words of the 1776 report, "the increase of the assessinent
[in 1772] may have been the principal, or at least the original cause of the
various additional taxes imposed on the ryots it did not follow that a reduction
in the assessment would produce a diminution in the rents. The prospect of
contingent and future venefits from the cultivation and improvement of his
country is hardly sometimes sufficiently powerful to induce a zamindar to forego
the immediate advantage which he enjoys by rack-renting his zamindari and
exacting the greatest possible revenue from the tenants and vassals. Were
it necessary to support the truth of this position we could produce many proofs
from the accounts which we have collected. The instances, especially in large
zamindaris, are not infrequent where a reduction in the demands of Govern-
ment have been immediately followed by new taxes and new impositions. "
The proceedings contain frequent references from the districts in
Bengal complaining of the exactions and harshness of the zamindars.
After so many years ougnt not Government [i. e. the nawab's government]
to have obtained the most perfect and intimate nature of the value of the rents
and will it be believed at this day, it is still in the dark?
So wrote Edward Baber, Resident at Midnapur, in a letter dated 13
December, 1772, to the Committee of Revenue in Calcutta. 1 We
niust now consider the efforts by the leading executive officers of the
Company to pierce this fog of ignorance.
It has been alleged 2 that having accepted the diwanni the English
deliberately adopted a policy of festina lente chiefly because they
wished to avoid the expense and unpopularity of a general survey of
the lands; but such a survey, unless conducted entirely under expert
European supervision, was worthless, and such supervision was un-
procurable. Moreover the existing revenue nomenclature had then
been in use for nearly two centuries, the population was almost
entirely illiterate, and the bulk of such revenue records as existed
were in the hands of native registrars; these factors, combined with
2
1 Revenue Board Proceedings, 15 December, 1772, pp. 417-26.
2 Firminger: Fifth Report, etc. I, 167.


## p. 411 (#439) ############################################

THE SUPERVISORS
411
their own curtailed powers and the caprices of the directors, might
well induce the Company's local authorities to move slowly. The
directors commenced by attaching an enormous salary, nine lakhs
of rupees per annum, to the office of the naib diwan, hoping thereby
to obtain uncorrupt and efficient service.
Meanwhile, under the governorship of Verelst, the president and
Select Committee made as full an enquiry as they could, arriving at
the well-known conclusions, contained in their Proceedings 2 for
16 August, 1769, in which "certain grand original sources" of the
unsatisfactory state of the revenue collection in Bengal were enume-
rated. At home, the court of directors in June, 1769, had sent orders
to Bengal, appointing a committee "for the management of the
the diwanni revenue”; and three "supervisors” with plenary powers
sailed from England in September, 1769, but after leaving the Cape
of Good Hope were never heard of again.
Verelst and his committee made a correct diagnosis of the trouble.
They realised that the Company's European servants were kept in
complete ignorance “of the real produce and capacity of the country
by a set of men who first deceive us from interest and afterwards
continue the deception from a necessary regard to their own safety".
The chaos and misrule caused by the venal officials and adventurers
who had frequented Bengal since the death of Aurangzib, combined
with the secretive methods which a continuous oppression of the ryot
by the zamindar had produced, formed an impenetrable labyrinth
of which the key was sought in vain.
Verelst's committee established supervisors of the collections;
these supervisors received instructions to make a full and complete
enquiry into the method of collecting the revenue in their respective
districts and, in fact, into any customs, knowledge of which might
assist to improve the condition of the people; the instructions breathe
a warm and humane spirit and a real desire, not merely to collect
revenue, but to assist the oppressed cultivator of the soil. The super-
visors failed, as indeed they were bound to do. Their instructions
ordered them to prepare a rent roll, and, by enquiry, to ascertain tho
fact from which a just and profitable assessment of the revenue could
be made. Such instructions were impossible to carry out. The super-
visors soon found themselves confronted by a most formidable passive
opposition from the zamindars and kanungos which prevented any
real knowledge whatever of the amount of revenue actually paid by
the ryot to the zamindar from coming to the knowledge of the Com-
pany. By this conspiracy of two corrupt and hereditary revenue
agencies all avenues of information were closed. Between them, the
zamindars and the kanungos held all the essential information, but
the kanungo was the dominant figure.
1 Cf. letter from Hastings to the Secret Committee, 1 September 1792.
2 Cf. Verelst, A View, etc. pp. 224-39.


## p. 412 (#440) ############################################

412
REVENUE ADAINISTRATION OF BENGAL, 1765-86
A full account of this officer and his duty was submitted in May,
1787, to the Board of Revenue by J. Patterson, register, Kanungo's
Office,
The kanungo comes into prominence in the reign of Akbar, who
employed him, as the name implies, to keep the records of the pargana,
a revenue sub-division. He was in fact a registrar of a district ap-
pointed to see that the crown received its dues and that the ryot was
not oppressed; his duties were responsible and onerous; he had to
register the usages of a district, the rates and mode of its assessment, and all
regulations relating thereto. To note and record the progress of cultivation, the
produce of the land and the price current thereof, and to be at all times able to
furnish Government with materials to regulate the assessment by just and
equitable proportions.
The kanungo's duties also included
che keeping of a record of all events, such as the appointments, deaths or re-
movals of zamindars, to preserve the records of the Tumar and Taksim Jama,
and the record of the boundaries and limits of zamindars, talukdaris, parganas,
villages, etc.
They also preserved in their registers the genealogies of zamindars,
records of all grants of land, copies of the contracts of the zamindars
and tax-farmers with the government, and, in short, acted as general
custodians for every description of record in the district. There were
two main, or sadar, kanungos for Bengal, but in each pargana thera
was a deputy or naib kanungo; the office became hereditary at an
early date. Murshid Kuli Khan is stated to have replaced the
kanungos of his day by an entirely new set, but the evil was not
checked, because the new kanungos passed on their office and their
knowledge to their descendants in the same way as the evicted ones
had done.
Thus the whole of the land registration, and the entire knowledge
of the actual receipts of the land revenue, were in the hands of a
hereditary close corporation, who were the only authorities on the
real state of the revenue; their power was enormous; and only com-
plete ignorance can explain Verelst and his committee's imagining
that such knowledge would be surrendered to the Company on
demand. Edward Baber, in his letter of 13 December, 1772, called the
attention of the Board of Revenue to these facts, and to the great
power which the kanungos had over the zamindars,
because it was in the power of the Kanungos to expose the value of their
parganas. This power the Kanungos availed themselves of, and it was the
rod which they held over them so that the apprehension of an increase of his
rents kept the zamindar in very effectual awe of the Kanungo. . . . In a word
the Kanungos have an absolute influence over the Zamindars which they
exercise in every measure that can promote their own interests.
It now
1 Original consultations, no. 63, Revenue Dept. 18 May, 1787. Printed ap.
Ramshothanı, Land Revenue History of Bengal, pp. 163-97.


## p. 413 (#441) ############################################

THE KANUNGOS
413
happens that the Kanungos manage, not only the zamindars, but the business
of the province. There is not a record but what is in their possession and so
much of the executive part have they at last obtained that they are now virtually
the Collector, while he is a mere passive representative of Government. They
are the channel through which all his orders are conveyed. . . Instead of
being the agents of Government they are become the associates of the zamin-
dars and conspire with them to conceal what it is their chief duty to divulge.
Baber drives home the argument by challenging the board to
state how the last settlement (he is referring to the settlement made
by the Committee of Circuit in 1772) was made; taking the example
of Midnapur, his own district, he asks "on what information, on what
materials was it made? was there a single instrument produced to
guide the judgment of the board? " i It will be obvious that the
1
supervisors appointed in 1769 were bound to fail. They were com-
pletely and wilfully kept in the dark by officials who had everything
to lose and nothing to gain by giving the required information. The
kanungos were only prepared to serve the state on their own terms;
and those terms included a retention of the very information which
their office was created to obtain for the state. Their action was
utterly unconstitutional and involved the admission that a few families
a
should hereditarily possess information which is the sole prerogative
of the state, and that they should use that information for their
personal and pecuniary profit.
The Company's government in India created in 1770 two Boards
of Revenue, one in Murshidabad and one in Patna, to control respec-
tively the Bengal and Bihar collections; but dissensions taking place
in the council, John Cartier was ordered to hand over his office to
Warren Hastings and several other alterations were made. Hastings
assumed office as governor and president of Fort William on 13 April,
1772.
The outstanding result of the first seven years of the Company's
administration of the diwanni is that the Company's officers in Bengal
realised that they were face to face with the great problem of ascer-
taining the difference between the sum received as land revenue by
government, and the sum actually paid by the ryot to the zamindar.
This was the secret of the zamindar and kanungo which the Company
never fathomed; it forms the burden of the collectors' reports to the
Board of Revenue from 1772 onwards; and it is the basis of the great
Shore-Grant controversy. When the revenue settlement was made
permanent in 1793 this information was still wanting, and not a single
revenue officer of the Company in 1793 could state with accuracy the
entire actual amount which the zamindars in his district received
from the ryots, or the proportion which it bore to that which the
zamindar paid to the government; yet these were the conditions in
which the revenue settlement was declared permanent.
Hastings brought to his work a sound experience of Bengal, a
1 Revenue Board Proceedings, 16 December, 1772, pp. 417-26.


## p. 414 (#442) ############################################

414
REVENUE ADMINISTRATION OF BENGAL, 1765-86
1
fluent and accurate knowledge both of Persian and of Bengali : more-
over, he had the reputation of being a loyal and most efficient servant
of the Company. It is still difficult to give an impartial verdict on his
official career. In revenue work his ability was not remarkable, and
on his own admission ? he had no practical working knowledge of it;
in fact, his influence on the actual conditions of the revenue was
unfortunate, especially when contrasted with his administration and
reorganisation of the judicature in the districts, which was a vigorous
beneficial achievement. His masterful temperament often prevented
him from using the advice of subordinates better qualified than him-
self to speak authoritatively on details of revenue administration
This inflexibility must share responsibility with the jealousy of
Francis and the ill-temper of Clavering for the deadlock which
occurred in the administration of Bengal between 1774 and 1776.
The directors' orders which confronted the new governor were
of a disturbing nature. On 14 April, 1772, these dispatches containing
the well-known proclamation arrived in Calcutta. On 11 May the
information was made public :
Notice is hereby given that the Hon'ble the Court of Directors have been
pleased to divest the Nawab Muhammad Reza Khan of his station of Naib
Diwan and have determined to stand forth publicly themselves in the character
of Diwan.
This announcement radically altered the existing system of the
collections.
The new governor and his council as a prelude to carrying out
their orders, appointed a committee to tour through various districts
of Bengal and to submit a report on their observations. Thus was
formed the Committee of Circuit, consisting of the Company's most
senior officers, including the governor himself, S. Middleton, P. M.
Dacres, J. Lawrell, and J. Graham. Their terms of reference were
based on the resolutions taken by the council on 14 May, 1772, viz.
(a) to farm the lands for a period of five years;
(b) to establish a Committee of Circuit to form the settlement;
(c) to re-introduce the supervisors under the name of collectors,
assisted by an Indian diwan in each district;
(d) to restrict the officials of the Company from any private
employment.
The Committee of Circuit realised the difficulty of their work.
The Hon'ble Court of Directors . . . declare their determination to stand
forth as Diwan, and, by the agency of the Company's servants, to take upon
themselves the entire care and management of the Revenue.