For must be con fessed of the categories, that they are not of
themselves
suffi cient for the cognition of things in themselves, and without the data of sensibility are mere subjective forms of the unity of the understanding.
Kant - Critique of Pure Reason
-- In an object of the pur*
When reality represented
? ? a
a
a
is
it
a
3 in in
is a
;
oj
is
a
is it,
is
it
is
is,
? OF THE EQUIYOCAL NATURE OF THE COKCEPTIOKB. 193
understanding only that is internal which has no relation (an regards its existence) to anything different from itself. On the other hand, the internal determinations of a substantia phenomenon in space are nothing but relations, and it is itself nothing more than a complex of mere relations. Substance in space we are cognisant of only through forces operative in either drawing others towards itself (attraction), or preventing others from forcing into itself (repulsion and impe netrability). We know no other properties that make up the conception of substance phenomenal in space, and which we term matter. On the other hand, as an object of the pure understanding, every substance must have internal determina tions and forces. But what other internal attributes of such an object can think than those which my internal sense presents to me --That, to wit, which either itself thought, or something analogous to it. Hence Leibnitz, who looked upon things as noumena, after denying them everything like external relation, and therefore also composition or combina tion, declared that all substances, even the component parts of matter, were simple substances with powers of represen tation, in one word, monads.
4. Matter and Form. -- These two conceptions lie at the
foundation of all other reflection, so inseparably are they con
nected with every mode of exercising the understanding. The former denotes the determinable in general, the second its determination, both in transcendental sense, abstraction being made of every difference in that which given, and of the mode in which determined. Logicians formerly termed the universal, matter, the specific difference of this or that part of the universal, form. In judgment one may call the given conceptions logical matter (for the judgment) the relation of these to each other (by means of the copula), the form of the judgment. In an object, the composite parts thereof (essentialia) are the matter the mode in which they
are connected in the object, the form. In respect to things in general, unlimited reality was regarded as the matter of all possibility, the limitation thereof (negation) as the form, by which one thing distinguished from another according to transcendental conceptions. The understanding demands that something be given (at least in the conception), in order to b<< able to determine in a. certain manner. Hence, con-
? ? ? ? in a
it
is
;
a
is
is
it
is a
? I
it,
? 194 TBANSCENDENTAIi DOOTBINE.
ception of the pure understanding, the matter precedes the
form, and for this reason Leibnitz first assumed the existence
of things (monads) and of an internal power of representation iu them, in order to found upon this their external relation and the community of their state (that of their representa tions). Hence, with him, space and time were possible --the former through the relation of substances, the latter through the connection of their determinations with each other, as causes and effects. And so would really be, the pure un derstanding were capable of an immediate application to ob
jects, and space and time were determinations of things in themselves. But being merely sensuous intuitions, in which we determine all objects solely as phenomena, the form of intuition (as subjective property of sensibility) must ante- cede all matter (sensations), consequently space and time must antecede all phenomena aud all data of experience, and rather make experience itself possible. But the intellectual philosopher could not endure that the form should precede the things themselves, and determine their possibility an ob
jection perfectly correct, we assume that we iutuite things as they are, although with confused representation. But as sensuous intuition is peculiar subjective condition, which
priori at the foundation of all perception, and the form of which primitive, the form must be given per se, and so far from matter (or the things themselves which appear) lying at the foundation of experience (as we must conclude, we judge by mere conceptions), the very possibility of itself presupposes, on the contrary, given formal intuition (space and time).
Rguabe on the Amfhiboly of the Conceftions of Reflection.
Let me be allowed to term the position which we assign to
conception either in the sensibility or in the pure under standing, the transcendental place. In this manner, the ap pointment of the position which must be taken each concep tion according to the difference in its use, and the directions for determining this place to all conceptions according to rules, would be transcendental topic, doctrine which would tho
roughly shield us from the surreptitious devices of the pure un derstanding and the delusions which thence arise, as would always distinguish to what faculty cf cognition each concert
? ? ? it
if
is
;
a
if a
a
it
is,
by
if
a
a
a
is
a
if
? Or THE CONCEPTIONS OT BEFLECTIOJT. 195
tion properly belonged. Every conception, every title, under which many cognitions rank together, may be called a logical place. Upon this is based the logical topic of Aristotle, of which teachers and rhetoricians could avail themselves, in order, under certain titles of thought, to observe what would
best suit the matter they had to treat, and thus enable them
selves to quibble and talk with fluency and an appearance of
profundity.
Transcendental topic, on the contrary, contains nothing
more than the above-mentioned four titles of all comparison
and distinction, which differ from categories in this respect,
that they do not represent the object according to that which
constitutes its conception (quantity, reality), but set forth
merely the comparison of representations, which precedes our
conceptions of things. But this comparison requires a pre vious reflection, that is, a determination of the place to which
the representations of the things which are compared belong, whether, to wit, they are cogitated by the pure understanding, or given by sensibility.
Conceptions may be logically compared without the trouble of inquiring to what faculty their objects belong, whether as noumena, to the understanding, or as phenomena to sensi bility. If, however, we wish to employ these conceptions in respect of objects, previous transcendental reflection is neces sary. Without this reflection I should make a very unsafe use of these conceptions, and construct pretended synthetical propositions which critical reason cannot acknowledge, and which are based solely upon a transcendental amphiboly, that
upon substitution of an object of pure understanding for phenomenon.
For want of this doctrine of transcendental topic, and con sequently deceived by the amphiboly of the conceptions of reflection, the celebrated Leibnitz constructed an intellectual
the world, or rather, believed himself competent to cognize the internal nature of things, comparing all objects merely with the understanding and the abstract formal con ceptions of thought. Our table of the conceptions of reflec tion gives us the unexpected advantage of being able to exhibit the distinctive peculiarities of his system in all its parts, and at the same time of exposing the fundamental principle of this peo-iliar mode of thought, which rested upon nought but
? tystem
? ? a
by
of
a is, a
? 198 TRAKSCENDE5TAL DOCTHIKS.
misconception. He compared all things with each other merely by means of conceptions, and naturally found no other differences than those by which the understanding distin guishes its pure conceptions one from another. The con ditions of sensuous intuition, which contain in themselves their own means of distinction, he did not look upon as pri mitive, because sensibility was to him but a confused mode of
representation, and not any particular source of representa tions. A phenomenon was for him the representation of the thing in itself, although distinguished from cognition by the understanding only in respect of the logical form --the former with its usual want of analysis containing, according to him, a certain mixture of collateral representations in its concep
tion of a thing, which it is the duty of the understanding to separate and distinguish. In one word, Leibnitz intellectva- lised phenomena, just as Locke, in his system of noogony (if I may be allowed to make use of such expressions), sensualized the conceptions of the understanding, that is to say, declared them to be nothing more than empirical or abstract concep tions of reflection. Instead of seeking in the understanding and sensibility two different sources of representations, which, however, can present us with objective judgments of things only in conjunction, each of these great men recognised but one
of these faculties, which, in their opinion, applied immediately to things in themselves, the other having no duty but that of confusing or arranging the representations of the former.
Accordingly, the objects of sense were compared by Leib nitz as things in general merely in the understanding.
1st. He compares them in regard to their identity or dif ference --as judged by the understanding. As, therefore, he considered merely the conceptions of objects, and not their position in intuition, in which alone objects can be given, and left quite out of sight the transcendental locale of these conceptions --whether, that their object ought to be classed among phenomena, or among things themselves, was to be expected that he should extend the application of the principle
of indiscernibles, which valid solely of conceptions of things in general, to objects of sense (mundus phenomenon), and that he should believe that he had thereby contributed in no small degree to extend our knowledge of nature. In truth,
cognize in all ita inner determinations drop of water a*
? ? ? if I
a
is
is,
in
it
? Or THE CONCEPTIONS OF BETLECTIOS. 197
a thing in itself, I cannot look upon one drop as different . ham another, if the conception of the one is completely iden tical with that of the othe. \ But if it is a phenomenon in fcpace, it has a place not merely in the understanding (among conceptions), hut also in sensuous external intuition (in space), and in this case, the physical locale is a matter of indifference in regard to the internal determinations of things, and one place, B, may contain a thing which is perfectly similar and equal to another in a place, A, lust as well as if the two things were in every respect different from each other. Difference of place without any other conditions, makes the plurality and distinction of objects as phsenomena, not only possible in itself, but even necessary. Consequently, the above so-called law is not a law of nature. It is merely an analytical rule for the comparison of things by means of mere conceptions.
? 2nd. The principle, " Realities (as simple affirmations) never logically contradict each other," is a proposition perfectly true respecting the relation of conceptions, but, whether as regards nature, or things in themselves (of which we have
not the slightest conception), is without any the least meaning. For real opposition, in which A -- B is = 0, exists everywhere, an opposition, that in which one reality united with another in the same subject annihilates the effects of the other -- fact which constantly brought before our eyes the different antagonistic actions and operations in nature, which, nevertheless, as depending on real forces, must be called rea- litates pheenomena. General mechanics can even present us with the empirical condition of this opposition in an priori rule, as directs its attention to the opposition in the direction of forces -- condition of which the transcendental conception of reality can tell us nothing. Although M. Leibnitz did not announce this proposition with precisely the pomp of new principle, he yet employed for the establishment of new propositions, and his followers introduced into their Leib- nitzio-Wolfian system of philosophy. According to this prin ciple, for example, all evils are but consequences of the limited nature of created beings, that negations, because these are the only opposite of reality. (In the mere conception of
thing in general this really the case, but not in things as phenomena). In like manner, the upholders of this system deem not only possible, but natural also, to connect and
? ? it
is
is
is,
a
it is,
it
it a
a
a a
by
? 1M TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE.
unite all reality in one being, because they acknowledge no other sort of opposition than that of contradiction (by which the conception itself of a thing is annihilated), and find them selves unable to conceive an opposition of reciprocal destruc tion, so to speak, in which one real cause destroys the effect of another, and the conditions of whose representation we meet with only in sensibility.
3rd. The Leibnitzian Monadology has really no better foun dation than on this philosopher's mode of falsely representing the difference of the internal and external solely in relation to the understanding. Substances, in general, must have some thing inward, which is therefore free from external relations, consequently from that of composition also. The simple-- that which can be represented by a unit -- is therefore the foundation of that which is internal in things in themselves. The internal state of substances cannot therefore consist in place, shape, contact, or motion, determinations which are all external relations, and we can ascribe to them no other than that whereby we internally determine our faculty of sense itself that is to say, the state of representation. Thus, then, were constructed the monads, which were to form the elements of the universe, the active force of which consists in repre sentation, the effects of this force being thus entirely confined to themselves.
For the same reason, his view of the possible community of substances could not represent it but as a predetermined har mony, and by no means as a physical influence. For inasmuch as everything is occupied only internally, that with its own representations, the state of the representations of one sub stance could not stand active and living connection with that of another, but some third cause operating on all without exception was necessary to make the different states corre spond with one another. And this did not happen by means of assistance applied in each particular case (systema assis- tentiee), bi't through the unity of the idea of cause occupied and connected with all substances, in which they necessarily receive, according to the Leibnitzian school, their existence and permanence, consequently also reciprocal correspondence, according to universal laws.
4th. This philosopher's celebrated doctrine spare and time, in which he iutellertualized these forms of sensibility, ori
? ? ? of
a
in
is,
? Or THE COKCCTTIOnS OF KUFLECTIOW.
199
ginated in the same delusion of transcendental reflection. If I attempt to represent by the mere understanding, the external relations of things, I can do bo only by employing the con
ception of their reciprocal action, and if I wish to connect one state of the same thing with another state, I must avail myself of the notion of the order of cause and effect. And thus Leib nitz regarded space as a certain order in the community of substances, and time as the dynamical sequence of their states. That which space and time possess proper to themselves and independent of things, he ascribed to a necessary confusion in our conceptions of them, whereby that which is a mere form of dynamical relations is held to be a self-existent intuition, antecedent even to things themselves. Thus space and time were the intelligible form of the connection of things (sub stances and their states) in themselves. But things were in telligible substances (substantia: noumena). At the same time, he made these conceptions valid of phsenomena, because he did not allow to sensibility a peculiar mode of intuition, but sought all, even the empirical representation of objects, in the under standing, and left to sense nought but the despicable task of confusing and disarranging the representations of the former.
But even if we could frame any synthetical proposition con cerning things in themselves by means of the pure under
standing (which is impossible), it could not apply to pheno mena, which do not represent things in themselves. In such a case I should be obliged in transcendental reflection to compare my conceptions only under the conditions of sensi bility, and so space and time would not be determinations of things in themselves, but of phenomena. What things may be in themselves, I know not, and need not know, because a thing is never presented to me otherwise than as a phenomenon.
of reflection. Matter is substantia phenomenon. That in it which is internal I seek to discover in all parts of space which it occupies, and in all the functions and opera tions it performs, and which are indeed never anything but phenomena of the external sense. I cannot therefore find any thing that is absolutely, but only what is comparatively in ternal, and which itself consist* of external relations. The absolutely internal in matter, and as it should be according to the pure understanding, is a mere chimera, for matter is not an
? I must adopt the same mode of procedure with the other
conceptions
? ? ? 200 TRAWSCENDEXTAX DOCTHTWS.
object for the pure understanding. But the transcendental object, which is the foundation of the phenomenon which we call matter, is a mere nescio quid, the nature of which we could not understand, even though some one were found able to tell us. For we can understand nothing that does not bring with it something ir. intuition corresponding to the expressions em ployed. If by the complaint of being unable to perceive the internal nature of things, it is meant that we do not comprehend by the pure understanding what the things which appear to us may be in themselves, it is a silly and unreasonable com plaint ; for those who talk thus, really desire that we should be able to cognize, consequently to intuite things without senses, and therefore wish that we possessed a faculty of cog nition perfectly different from the human faculty, not merely in degree, but even as regards intuition and the mode thereof, so that thus we should not be men, but belong to a class of beings, the possibility of whose existence, much less their nature and constitution, we have no means of cognizing. observation and analysis of phenomena we penetrate into the interior of nature, and no one can say what progress this knowledge may make in time. But those transcendental questions which pass beyond the limits of nature, we could never answer, even although all nature were laid open to us, because we have not the power of observing our own mind with any other intuition than that of our internal sense. For herein lies the mystery of the origin and source of our faculty of sensibility. Its application to an object, and the transcendental ground of this unity of subjective and objec tive, lie too deeply concealed for us, who cognize ourselves only through the internal sense, consequently as phenomena, to be able to discover in our existence any thing but pheno mena, the non-sensuous cause of which we at the same time
earnestly desire to penetrate to.
The great utility of this critique of conclusions arrived at
by the processes of mere reflection consists in its clear demon stration of the nullity of all conclusions respecting objects
which are compared with each other in the understanding atone, while it at the same time confirms what we particularly insisted on, namely, that, although phenomena are not included as things in themselves among the objects of the pure under standing, they are nevertheless the only things by which oui
? By
? ? ? THE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF REFLECTION. 201
cognition can possess objective reality, that is to say, which give us intuitions to correspond with our conceptions.
When we reflect in a purely logical manner, we do nothing
more than compare conceptions in our understanding, to dis cover whether both have the same content, whether they are
self-contradictory or not, whether anything is contained in either conception, which of the two is given, and which is merely a mode of thinking that given. But if I apply these con ceptions to an object in general (in the transcendental seuse), without first determining whether it is an object of sensuous or intellectual intuition, certain limitations present themselves, which forbid us to pass beyond the conceptions, and render all empirical use of them impossible. And thus these limit ations prove, that the representation of an object as a thing in general is not only insufficient, but, without sensuous de termination a*id independently of empirical conditions, self- contradictory ; that we must therefore make abstraction of all objects, as in logic, or, admitting them, must think them under conditions of sensuous intuition ; that, consequently, the intelligible requires an altogether peculiar intuition, which we do not possess, and in the absence of which it is for us nothing ; while, on the other hand, phenomena cannot be ob
jects in themselves. For, when I merely think things in general, the difference in their external relations cannot con stitute a difference in the things themselves ; on the contrary, the former presupposes the latter, and if the conception of one of two things is not internally different from that of the other, I am merely thinking the same thing in different relations. Further, by the addition of one affirmation (reality) to the other, the positive therein is really augmented, and nothing is abstracted or withdrawn from it ; hence the real in things cannot be in contradiction with or opposition to itself--and so on.
The true use of the conceptions of reflection in the employ ment of the understanding, has, as we have shown, been so mis conceived by Leibnitz, one of the most acute philosophers of either ancient or modern times, that he has been misled into the construction of a baseless system of intellectual cognition, which professes to determine its objects without the intervention of the senses. For this reason, the exposition of the cause of the
? ? ? ? 202 DOCTBINB OH ELEMENTS.
amphiboly of these conceptions, as the origin of these falsi principles, is of great utility in determining with certainty the proper limits of the understanding.
It is right to say, whatever is affirmed or denied of the whole of a conception can be affirmed or denied of any part of it (dictum de omni et nullo) ; but it would be absurd so to alter this logical proposition, as to say, whatever is not contained in a general conception, is likewise not contained in the par ticular conceptions which rank under it ; for the latter are particular conceptions, for the very reason that their content is greater than that which is cogitated in the general concep tion. And yet the whole intellectual system of Leibnitz is based upon this false principle, and with it must necessarily fall to (he ground, together with all the ambiguous principles in reference to the employment of the understanding which have thence originated.
Leibnitz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles or indistinguishables is really based on the presupposition, that, if in the conception of a thing a certain distinction is not to be found, it is also not to be met with in things themselves ;
? that, consequently, all tnings are completely identical (numero eadem) which are not distinguishable from each other (as to quality or quantity) in our conceptions of them. But, as in the mere conception of anything abstraction has been made of many necessary conditions of intuition, that of which abstrac tion has been made is rashly held to be non-existent, and nothing is attributed to the thing but what is contained in its conception.
The conception of a cubic foot of space, however I may think in itself completely identical. But two cubic feet in space are nevertheless distinct from each other from the sole fact of their being in different places (they are numero
and these places are conditions of intuition, wherein the object of this conception given, and which do not belong to the conception, but to the faculty of sensibility. In like manner, there in the conception of thing no contradiction when negative not connected with an affirmative and merely affirmative conceptions cannot, in conjunction, produce any negation. But in sensuous intuition, wherein reality (take for example, motion) given, we find conditions (opposite directions) -- of which abstraction has been made the con
diversa)
? ? is
in
;
a
;
it, is
is is
a
is
? THE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF REFLECTION.
ception of motion in general --which render possible a contra, diction or opposition (not indeed of a logical kind) --and wLich from pure positives produce zero = 0. We arc therefore not justified in saying, that all reality is in perfect agreement and harmony, because no contradiction is discoverable among ita conceptions. * According to mere conceptions, that which is internal is the substratum of all relations or external deter minations. When, therefore, I abstract all conditions of in tuition, and confine myself solely to the conception of a thing in general, I can make abstraction of all external relations, and there must nevertheless remain a conception of that which in dicates no relation, but merely internal determinations. Now it seems to follow, that in everything (substance) there is something which is absolutely internal, and which antecedes all external determinations, inasmuch as it renders them pos sible ; and that therefore this substratum is something which does not contain any external relations, and is consequently simple (for corporeal things are never any thing but relations, at least of their parts external to each other) ; and inasmuch as we know of no other absolutely internal determinations than those of the internal sense, this substratum is not only simple, but also, analogously with our internal sense, deter mined through representations, that is to say, all things are properly monads, or simple beings endowed with the power of representation. Now all this would be perfectly correct, if the conception of a thing were the only necessary condition of the presentation of objects of external intuition. It is, on the contrary, manifest that a permanent phsenomenon in space (impenetrable extension) can contain mere relations, and nothing that is absolutely internal, and yet be the primary substratum of all external perception. By mere concep tions I cannot think any thing external, without, at the same
* If any one wishes here to have recourse to the usual subterfuge, and to say, that at least reatitatet noumena cannot be in opposition to each other, it will be requisite for him to adduce an example of this pure and non-sensuous reality, that it may be understood whether the notion re presents something or nothing. But an example cannot be found except in experience, which never presents to us anything more than phenomena ,. and thus the proposition means nothing more than that the conception which contains only affirmatives, does not contain anything negative-- a Imposition nobody ever doubted.
203
? ? ? ? 204 DOCTItlNE Or ELEMENTS.
time, thinking something internal, for the reason that cor*
ceptions of relations presuppose given things, and without these are impossible. But, as in intuition there is something
space, which, with all contains, consists of purely formal, or, indeed, real relations) which not found in the mere conception of thing in general, and this presents to us the
substratum which could not be cognized through conceptions alone, cannot say because tiling cannot be represented
mere conceptions without something absolutely internal, there also, in the things themselves which are contained under these conceptions, and in their intuition nothing external to which something absolutely internal does not serve as the foundation. For, when we have made abstraction of all the conditions of intuition, there certainly remains in the mere conception nothing but the internal in general, through which alone the external possible. But this necessity, which grounded upon abstraction alone, does not obtain in the cane of things themselves, in so far as they are given in intuition with such determinations as express mere relations, without having any thing internal as their foundation for they are not things in themselves, but only phenomena. What we cognize in matter nothing but relations (what we call its internal determinations are but comparatively internal). But there are some self-subsistent and permanent, through which
determined object given. That when abstraction is
made of these relations, have nothing more to think, does
not destroy the conception of thing as phenomenon, nor the conception of an object in abstracto, but does away with
the possibility of an object that determinable according to
(that
? certainly startling to hear that thing consists solely of relations but this thing simply phenomenon, and cannot be cogitated
bv means of the mere categories does itself consist in the mere relation of some thing in general to the senses. In the tame way, we cannot cogitate relations of things in nbstracto,
we commence with conceptions alone, in any other manner than that one the cause of determinations the other fot that itself the conception of the understanding or category of relation. But, as in this case we make abstraction of all intuition, we lose altogether the mode which the manifold
determines to each of its parti, its place, that the form
mere conceptions, that of noumenon.
? ? in
I,
is
in is,
it It
;
of
is
if is
a
by
is I is,
is
a is is :
;
is ;
: it
a
is
a ait
is
a
a
is
is,
? TOE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF KEPLECTIOW. 205
sensibility (space) ; and yet this mode antccedes all empirical causality.
If by intelligible objects we understand things which can be thought by means of the pure categories, without the need of the schemata of sensibility, such objects are impossible. For the condition of the objective use of all our conceptions of understanding is the mode of our sensuous intuition, whereby objects are given ; and, if we make abstraction of the latter, the former can have no relation to an object. And even if we should suppose a different kind of intuition from our own, still our functions of thought would have no use or signification in respect thereof. But if we understand by the term, objects of a non-sensuous intuition, in respect of which our categories are not valid, and of which we can accordingly have no knowledge (neither intuition nor conception), in this merely negative sense noumeua must be admitted. For this is no more than saying that our mode of intuition is not ap plicable to all things, but only to objects of our senses, that consequently its objective validity is limited, and that room is therefore left for another kind of intuition, and thus also for things that may be objects of it. But in this sense the conception of a nonmenon is problematical, that is to say, it is the notion of a thing of which we can neither say that it is possible, nor that it is impossible, inasmuch as we do not know of any mode of intuition besides the sensuous, or of any other sort of conceptions than the categories --a mode of in tuition and a kind of conception neither of which is applicable to a non-sensuous object. We are on this account incom petent to extend the sphere of our objects of thought beyond the conditions of our sensibility, and to assume the existence of objects of pure thought, that of noumena, inasmuch as these have no true positive signification.
For must be con fessed of the categories, that they are not of themselves suffi cient for the cognition of things in themselves, and without the data of sensibility are mere subjective forms of the unity of the understanding. Thought certainly not product of
? the senses, and in so far not limited by them, but does not therefore follow that may be employed purely and with out the intervention of sensibility, for would then be with out reference to an object. And we cannot call noumenon an object of pure thougLt for the representation thereof
? ? ;
it is
it
is it
is,
a
it
it a
? 206 DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS.
but the problematical conception of an object for a perfectly different intuition and a perfectly different understanding from ours, both of which are consequently themselves problematical. The conception of a noumenon is therefore not the conception of an object, but merely a problematical conception insepar ably connected with the limitation of our sensibility. That is to say, this conception contains the answer to the question -- Are there objects quite unconnected with, and independent of, our intuition ? -- a question to which only an indeterminate answer can be given. That answer is : Inasmuch as sensuous intuition does not apply to all things without distinction, there remains room for other and different objects. The existence of these problematical objects is therefore not absolutely denied, in the absence of a determinate conception of them, but, as no category is valid in respect of them, neither must they be ad mitted as objects for our understanding.
Understanding accordingly limits sensibility, without at the same time enlarging its own field. While, moreover, it for bids sensibility to apply its forms and modes to things in themselves and restricts it to the sphere of phenomena, it cogitates an object in itself, only, however, as a transcendental object, which is the cause of a phenomenon (consequently not itself a phenomenon), and which cannot be thought either as a quantity or as reality, or as substance (because these conceptions always require sensuous forms in which to determine an object) --an object, therefore, of which we are quite unable to say whether it can be met with in ourselves or out of us, whether it would be annihilated together with sensibility, or, if this were taken away, would continue to exist. If we wish to call this object a noumenon, because the
? representation
of it is uon-sensuous, we are at liberty to do so.
But as we can apply to it none of the conceptions of onr under
standing, the representation is for us quite void, and is avail
able only for the indication of the limits of our sensuous intni- iton, thereby leaving at the same time an empty space, which we are competent to fill by the aid neither of possible experi ence, nor of the pure understanding.
The Critique of the pure understanding, accordingly, does not permit us to create for ourselves a new field of objects be. yond those which are presented to us as phenomena, and tc stray into intelligible worlds ; nay, it does not even allow us to
? ? ? TEX JLMPHEBOLT OF THE CONCEPTIONS 0! REFLECTION.
20/
endeavour to form so much as a conception of them. The spe cious error which leads to this--and which is a perfectly excusable one --lies in the fact that the employment of the understanding, contrary to its proper purpose and destination, is made tran scendental, and objects, that possible intuitions, are made to regulate themselves according to conceptions, instead of the conceptions arranging themselves according to the intui tions, on which alone their own objective validity rests. Now the reason of this again that apperception, and with
thought, antecedes all possible determinate arrrangement of representa tions. Accordingly we think something in general, and de
termine on the one hand sensuously, but, on the other, distinguish the general and in abslracto represented object from this particular mode of intuiting it. In this case there remains mode of determining the object by mere thought, which really but logical form without content, which, however, seems to us to be a mode of the existence of the ob ject in itself (noumenon), without regard to intuition which limited to our senses.
? Before ending this transcendental analytic, we must make an addition, which, although in itself of no particular import ance, seems to be necessary to the completeness of the system. The highest conception, with which transcendental philosophy commonly begins, the division into possible and impossible. But as all division pre-supposes divided conception, a still higher one must exist, and this the conception of an object
general --problematically understood, and without its being decided, whether something or nothing. As the categories are the only conceptions, which apply to objects in general, the distinguishing of an object, whether something or nothing, must proceed according to the order and direction of the categories.
To the categories of quantity, that the conceptions of all, many, and one, the conception which annihilates all, that the conception of none opposed. And thus the object of conception, to which no intuition can be found to correspond, is=nothing. That conception without an object (ens rationis), like noumena, which cannot be considered
ible in the sphere of reality, though they must not there- be held to be impossible, --or like certa'n new funda
? ? is,
is a
is a
is,
it
is a
a
it
1. is,
is a a
is,
it is
it is
is
is,
in
is
it,
? 208 DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS.
mental forces in matter, the existence of which is cogitable without contradiction, though, as examples from experience are not forthcoming, they must not be regarded as possible.
2. Reality is something ; negation is nothing, that is, a conception of the absence of an object, as cold, a shadow (nihil privativum).
3. The mere form of intuition, without substance, is in itself no object, but the merely formal condition of an object (as phenomenon), as pure space and pure time. These are cer tainly something, as forms of intuition, but are not themselves objects which are intuited [ens imaginarium).
4. The object of a conception which is self-contradictory, is nothing, because the conception is nothing -- is impossible, as a figure composed of two straight lines (nihil negativum).
The table of this division of the conception of nothing corresponding division of the conception of something does not require special description,) must therefore be arranged as follows :
Nothing.
As 1.
Empty conception without object, ens rationis.
? 2.
Empty object of a conception, nihil privativum.
(the
3.
Empty intuition without object,
ens imaginarium.
4.
Empty object without conception,
nihil negativum.
We see that the ens rationt* is distinguished from the nihil negativum or pure nothing by the consideration, that the for mer must not be reckoned among possibilities, because it is a mere fiction --though not self-contradictory, while the latter is completely opposed to all possibility, inasmuch as the concep tion annihilates itself. Both, however, are empty conceptions. On the other hand, the nihil privativum and ens imaginarium are empty data for conceptions. If light be not given to the senses, we cannot represent to ourselves darkness,
and if extended objects are not perceived, we cannot represent space.
Neither the negation, nor the mere form of intuition can, with out something real, be an object.
? ? ? IKrHODDCTIOX.
TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. SECOND DIVISION.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. INTRODUCTION.
I.
Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance.
Tliis does not signify a doctrine of probability ;f for probability U truth, only cognised upon insufficient grounds, and though
We termed Dialectic in general a logic of appearance. *
? the information it gives us is imperfect, it is not therefore deceitful. Hence it must not be separated from tl e analytical part of logic. Still less must phenomenon % and appearance be held to be identical. For truth or illusory appearance doea not reside in the object, in so far as it is intuited, but in the judgment upon the object, in so far as it is thought. It is there fore quite correct to say that the senses do not err, not because they always judge correctly, but because they do not
judge at all. Hence truth and error, consequently also, illu sory appearance as the cause of error, are only to be found in a judgment, that in the relation of an object to our under
In cognition, which completely harmonises with the laws of the understanding, no error can exist. In a representation of the senses -- as not containing any judgment -- there also no error. But no power of nature can of itself deviate from its own laws. Hence neither the understanding
per *e (without the influence of auother cause), nor the senses per te, would fall into error the former could not, because,
standing.
acts only according to its own laws, the effect (the judg ment) must necessarily accord with these laws. But accordance with the laws of the understanding consists the formal element
all truth. In the senses there no judgment --neither true nor false one. But, as we have no source of cognition besides these two, follows, that error caused solely the unobserved influence of the sensibility upon the understanding. And thus happens that the subjective giounds of judgment blend and are confounded with the objective, and cause them
? Scbem. WalirscheinlicUKeit. Erscheinung.
? ? it
f it
a is
J
is is
a P
in
by
a
in if it
;
a
is,
? 210 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
to deviate from their proper determination,* just as a body in motion would always of itself proceed in a straight line, but if another impetus gives to it a different direction, it will then start off into a curvilinear line of motion. To distinguish the peculiar action of the understanding from the power which mingles with necessary to consider an erroneous judg ment as the diagonal between two forces, that determine the judgment two different directions, which, as were, form an angle, and to resolve this composite operation into the simple ones of the understanding aud the sensibility. In pure
priori judgments this must be done by means of transcen dental reflection, whereby, as has been already shown, each representation has its place appointed in the corresponding faculty of cognition, and consequently the influence of the one
faculty upon the other made apparent.
not at present our business to treat of empirical illusory
appearance (for example, optical illusion), which occurs in the empirical application of otherwise correct rules of the understanding, and in which the judgment misled the influence of imagination. Our purpose to speak of trans- cemtental illusory appearance, which influences principles --that are not even applied to experience, for in this case we should possess sure test of their correctness--but which leads us, in disregard of all the warnings of criticism, com pletely beyond the empirical employment of the categories, and deludes us with the chimera of an extension of the sphere of the pure understanding. We shall term those principles, the application of which confined entirely within the limits of possible experience, immanent; those, on the other hand, which transgress these limits, we shall call transcendent principles. But by these latter do not understand principles of the transcendental use or misuse of the categories, which in
mere fault of the judgment when not under due restraint from criticism, and therefore not paying sufficient attention to the limits of the sphere in which the pure under standing allowed to exercise its functions but real principles which exhort us to break down all those barriers, and to lay
* Sensibility, subjected to the understanding, as the object upon which Ibe understanding employs its functions, the source of real cognitions. But, in so far as exercises an influence upon the action of the under standing, and determines to judgment, sensibility itself the cause of error.
? reality
? ? it
I
is
is
it
it, it is
is
a is
in
;
is
is
is
by
a
It is
is
a
it
? nrraoDUCTion. 21 1
claim to a perfectly new field of cognition, which recognise* no line of demarcation. Thus transcendental and transcendent are not identical terms. The principles of the pure under standing, which we have already propounded, ought to be of empirical and not of transcendental use, that they are not applicable to any object beyond the sphere of experience. principle which removes these limits, nay, which authorizes us to overstep them, called transcendent. If our criticism can succeed in exposing the illusion in these pretended principles, those which are limited in their employment to the sphere of experience, may be called, in opposition to the others, immanent principles of the pure understanding.
Logical illusion, which consists merely in the imitation of the form of reason (the illusion in sophistical syllogisms), arises entirely from want of due attention to logical rules. So soon as the attention awakened to the case before us, this illusion totally disappears. Transcendental illusion, on the contrary, does not cease to exist, even after has been exposed, and its nothingness clearly perceived means of transcendental criticism. --Take, for example, the illusion in the proposition, "The world must have beginning in time. " --The cause of this as follows. In our reason, subjectively considered as faculty of human cognition, there exist fundamental rules and maxims of its exercise, which have completely the appearance of objective principles. Now from this cause happens, that the subjective necessity of certain connection of our concep tions, regarded as an objective necessity of the determination of things in themselves. This illusion impossible to avoid, just as we cannot avoid perceiving that the sea appears to be higher at distance than near the shore, because we see the former means of higher rays than the latter, or, which
still stronger case, as even the astronomer cannot prevent himself from seeing the moon larger at its rising than some time afterwards, although he not deceived this illusion.
Transcendental dialectic will therefore content itself with exposing the illusory appearance in transcendental judgments, and guarding us against but to make as in the case of logical illusion, entirely disappear and cease to be illu sion, utterly beyond its power. For we have here to do with natural and unavoidable illusion, which rests upon subjective principles, and imposes these upon us as objective,
? ? ? r 2
a is
is a
is
it
it
a
; is is
a
it,
by
it
is a
by
it is
by
it
a is
is
aA
is,
? 212 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
while logical dialectic, in the detection of sophism*, has to do merely with an error in the logical consequence of the pro- Dositions, or with an artificially constructed illusion, in imitation of the natural error. There is therefore a natural and unavoid able dialectic of pure reason --not that in which the bungler, from want of the requisite knowledge, involves himself, nor that which the sophist devises for the purpose of misleading, but that which is an inseparable adjunct of human reason, and
which, even after its illusions have been exposed, does not cease to deceive, and continually to lead reason into momen tary errors, which it becomes necessary continually to remove.
II.
Of Pure Reason as the Seat of the Transcendental Illusory
Appearance. A.
OF BEASON IN CXKXBAL.
All our knowledge begins with sense, proceeds thence to understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which nothing higher can be discovered in the human mind for elaborating the matter of intuition and subjecting it to the highest unity of
At this stage of our inquiry it is my duty to give an explanation of this, the highest faculty of cognition, and I confess I find myself here in some difficulty. Of reason, as of the understanding, there is a merely formal, that logical use, in which makes abstraction of all content of cognition but there also real use, inasmuch as contains in itself the source of certain conceptions and principles, which does not borrow either from the senses or the understanding. The former faculty has been long defined by logicians as the faculty of mediate conclusion in contradistinction to immedi ate conclusions {consequently immediate:) but the nature of the latter, which itself generates conceptions, not to be understood from this definition. Now as division of reason into logical and transcendental faculty presents itself here,
becomes necessary to seek for higher conception of this source of cognition which shall comprehend both conceptions. In this we may expect, according to the analogy of the con ceptions of the understanding, that the logical conception will give us the key to the transcendental, and that the table of the functions of the former will present us with the clue to the Conceptions of reason.
? thought.
? ? it
a
a
a
it a
a
;
it
is
is
is, it
;
? IKTHODtJCTION. -- OF REA8OK IS GENERAL. 213
la the former part of our transcendental logic, we defined the understanding to be the faculty of rules ; reason may be distinguished from understanding as the faculty of principles.
The term principle is ambiguous, and commonly signifies merely a cognition that may be employed as a principle ; although it is not in itself, and as regards its proper origin, entitled to the distinction. Every general proposition, even if derived from experience by the process of induction, may serve as the majcr in a syllogism ; but it is not for that reason a principle. Mathematical axioms (for example, there can be only one straight line between two points. ) are general & priori cognitions, and are therefore rightly denominated principles, relatively to the cases which can be subsumed under them. But I cannot for this reason say that I cognize this property of a straight line from principles -- I cognize it only in purt intuition.
Cognition from principles, then, is that cognition in whick I cognize the particular in the general by means of concept tions. Thus every syllogism is a form of the deduction of a
? cognition from a principle. For the major always gives a conception, through which everything that is subsumed under the condition thereof, is cognized according to a principle. Now as every general cognition may serve as the major in a syllogism, and the understanding presents us with such general & priori propositions, they may be termed principles, in re spect of their possible use.
But if we consider these principles of the pure understand ing in relation to their origin, we shall find them to be any thing rather than cognitions from conceptions. For they would not even be possible & priori, if we could not rely on the assistance of pure intuition (in mathematics), or on that of the conditions of a possible experience. That every thing that happens has a cause, cannot be concluded from the general conception of that which happens ; on the contrary the prin ciple of causality instructs us as to the mode of obtaining from that which happens a determinate empirical conception.
Synthetical cognitions from conceptions the understanding cannot supply, and they alone are entitled to be called prin ciples. At the same time, all general propositions may bo termed comparative principles. --
It has been a long-cherished wish
that, (who knows how
? ? ? 21 1 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
late,) rcay one day be happily accomplished --that the princi ples of the endless variety of civil laws should be investigated and exposed ; for in this way alone can we find the secret of sim plifying legislation. But ill this case, laws are nothing more than limitations of our freedom upon conditions under which it subsists in perfect harmony with itself ; they consequently have for their object that which is completely our own work, and of which we ourselves may be the cause by means of these conceptions. But how objects as things in themselves -- how the nature of things is subordinated to principles and is to be
determined according to conceptions, is a question which it seems well nigh impossible to answer. Be this however as it may -- for on this point our investigation is yet to be made -- it is at least manifest from what we have said, that cognition from principles is something very different from cognition by means of the understanding, which may indeed precede other cognitions in the form of a principle, but in itself--in so far as it is synthetical --is neither based upon mere thought, nor contains a general proposition drawn from conceptions alone.
The understanding may be a faculty for the production of unity of phsenomena by virtue of rules ; the reason is a faculty
for the production of unity of rules (of the understanding) under principles. Reason, therefore, never applies directly to
experience, or to any sensuous object ; its object on the contrary, the understanding, to the manifold cognition of which gives uuity priori by means of conceptions -- unity which may be called rational unity, and which of nature very different from that of the unity produced the understanding.
The above the general conception of the faculty of reason, in so far as has been possible to make comprehensible in the absence of examples. These will be given in the sequel.
B.
OF THE LO01CAL TJSE OF REA80N.
distinction commonly made between that which immediately cognized and that which inferred or concluded, 'iliat in figure which bounded three straight lines, there are three angles, an immediate cognition but that these angles are together equal to two right angles, an inference
? ? ? ; is
is
is is
A a
it
by
is
is aa
it is
a
it
is by
a
is,
? nfTRODUCTION. --OF TI1E LOGICAL USB OF REASON. 215
or conclusion. Now, as we are constantly employing this mode of thought, and have thus become quite accustomed to
we uo longer remark the above distinction, and, as in the case of the so-called deceptions of sense, consider as immediately perceived, what has really been inferred. In every reasoning or syllogism, there fundamental proposition, afterwards second drawn from and finally the conclusion, which con nects the truth in the first with the truth in the second --and that infallibly. the judgment concluded so contained in the first proposition, that can be deduced from without the mediation of third notion, the conclusion called imme diate (consequentia immediata) :* prefer the term conclusion of the understanding. But in addition to the fundamental cognition, second judgment necessary for the production of the conclusion, called conclusion of the reason. In the proposition, All m? n are mortal, are contained the propo sitions, Some men are mortal, Nothing that not mortal a man, and these are therefore immediate conclusions from the first. On the other hand, the proposition, All the learned are
mortal, not contained in the main proposition (for the con ception of learned man does not occur in it), and can bu deduced from the main proposition only by means of me diating judgment.
In every syllogism first cogitate rule (the major) means of the understanding. In the next place subsume cognition under the condition of the rule (and this the minor)
means of the judgment. And finally determine my cog nition by means of the predicate of the rule (this the conclusio), consequently, determine priori means of the reason. The relations, therefore, which the major propo sition, as the rule, represents between cognition and its condition, constitute the different kinds of syllogisms. These are just threefold -- analogously with all judgments, in so far as they differ in the mode of expressing the relation of cog nition in the understanding --namely, categorical, hypotheti, al
and disjunctive.
con-ieyutntia immediata -- there really be such thing, and
lie not contradiction in terms -- evideutly does not belong to the spbera of logic proper, the oliject-matter of which the syllogism, which always consists of three propositions, either in thought or expressed. This indeed
tantamount to declaring that there uo such mode ot reasoning. -- Tr.
? ?
When reality represented
? ? a
a
a
is
it
a
3 in in
is a
;
oj
is
a
is it,
is
it
is
is,
? OF THE EQUIYOCAL NATURE OF THE COKCEPTIOKB. 193
understanding only that is internal which has no relation (an regards its existence) to anything different from itself. On the other hand, the internal determinations of a substantia phenomenon in space are nothing but relations, and it is itself nothing more than a complex of mere relations. Substance in space we are cognisant of only through forces operative in either drawing others towards itself (attraction), or preventing others from forcing into itself (repulsion and impe netrability). We know no other properties that make up the conception of substance phenomenal in space, and which we term matter. On the other hand, as an object of the pure understanding, every substance must have internal determina tions and forces. But what other internal attributes of such an object can think than those which my internal sense presents to me --That, to wit, which either itself thought, or something analogous to it. Hence Leibnitz, who looked upon things as noumena, after denying them everything like external relation, and therefore also composition or combina tion, declared that all substances, even the component parts of matter, were simple substances with powers of represen tation, in one word, monads.
4. Matter and Form. -- These two conceptions lie at the
foundation of all other reflection, so inseparably are they con
nected with every mode of exercising the understanding. The former denotes the determinable in general, the second its determination, both in transcendental sense, abstraction being made of every difference in that which given, and of the mode in which determined. Logicians formerly termed the universal, matter, the specific difference of this or that part of the universal, form. In judgment one may call the given conceptions logical matter (for the judgment) the relation of these to each other (by means of the copula), the form of the judgment. In an object, the composite parts thereof (essentialia) are the matter the mode in which they
are connected in the object, the form. In respect to things in general, unlimited reality was regarded as the matter of all possibility, the limitation thereof (negation) as the form, by which one thing distinguished from another according to transcendental conceptions. The understanding demands that something be given (at least in the conception), in order to b<< able to determine in a. certain manner. Hence, con-
? ? ? ? in a
it
is
;
a
is
is
it
is a
? I
it,
? 194 TBANSCENDENTAIi DOOTBINE.
ception of the pure understanding, the matter precedes the
form, and for this reason Leibnitz first assumed the existence
of things (monads) and of an internal power of representation iu them, in order to found upon this their external relation and the community of their state (that of their representa tions). Hence, with him, space and time were possible --the former through the relation of substances, the latter through the connection of their determinations with each other, as causes and effects. And so would really be, the pure un derstanding were capable of an immediate application to ob
jects, and space and time were determinations of things in themselves. But being merely sensuous intuitions, in which we determine all objects solely as phenomena, the form of intuition (as subjective property of sensibility) must ante- cede all matter (sensations), consequently space and time must antecede all phenomena aud all data of experience, and rather make experience itself possible. But the intellectual philosopher could not endure that the form should precede the things themselves, and determine their possibility an ob
jection perfectly correct, we assume that we iutuite things as they are, although with confused representation. But as sensuous intuition is peculiar subjective condition, which
priori at the foundation of all perception, and the form of which primitive, the form must be given per se, and so far from matter (or the things themselves which appear) lying at the foundation of experience (as we must conclude, we judge by mere conceptions), the very possibility of itself presupposes, on the contrary, given formal intuition (space and time).
Rguabe on the Amfhiboly of the Conceftions of Reflection.
Let me be allowed to term the position which we assign to
conception either in the sensibility or in the pure under standing, the transcendental place. In this manner, the ap pointment of the position which must be taken each concep tion according to the difference in its use, and the directions for determining this place to all conceptions according to rules, would be transcendental topic, doctrine which would tho
roughly shield us from the surreptitious devices of the pure un derstanding and the delusions which thence arise, as would always distinguish to what faculty cf cognition each concert
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if
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;
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if a
a
it
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by
if
a
a
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a
if
? Or THE CONCEPTIONS OT BEFLECTIOJT. 195
tion properly belonged. Every conception, every title, under which many cognitions rank together, may be called a logical place. Upon this is based the logical topic of Aristotle, of which teachers and rhetoricians could avail themselves, in order, under certain titles of thought, to observe what would
best suit the matter they had to treat, and thus enable them
selves to quibble and talk with fluency and an appearance of
profundity.
Transcendental topic, on the contrary, contains nothing
more than the above-mentioned four titles of all comparison
and distinction, which differ from categories in this respect,
that they do not represent the object according to that which
constitutes its conception (quantity, reality), but set forth
merely the comparison of representations, which precedes our
conceptions of things. But this comparison requires a pre vious reflection, that is, a determination of the place to which
the representations of the things which are compared belong, whether, to wit, they are cogitated by the pure understanding, or given by sensibility.
Conceptions may be logically compared without the trouble of inquiring to what faculty their objects belong, whether as noumena, to the understanding, or as phenomena to sensi bility. If, however, we wish to employ these conceptions in respect of objects, previous transcendental reflection is neces sary. Without this reflection I should make a very unsafe use of these conceptions, and construct pretended synthetical propositions which critical reason cannot acknowledge, and which are based solely upon a transcendental amphiboly, that
upon substitution of an object of pure understanding for phenomenon.
For want of this doctrine of transcendental topic, and con sequently deceived by the amphiboly of the conceptions of reflection, the celebrated Leibnitz constructed an intellectual
the world, or rather, believed himself competent to cognize the internal nature of things, comparing all objects merely with the understanding and the abstract formal con ceptions of thought. Our table of the conceptions of reflec tion gives us the unexpected advantage of being able to exhibit the distinctive peculiarities of his system in all its parts, and at the same time of exposing the fundamental principle of this peo-iliar mode of thought, which rested upon nought but
? tystem
? ? a
by
of
a is, a
? 198 TRAKSCENDE5TAL DOCTHIKS.
misconception. He compared all things with each other merely by means of conceptions, and naturally found no other differences than those by which the understanding distin guishes its pure conceptions one from another. The con ditions of sensuous intuition, which contain in themselves their own means of distinction, he did not look upon as pri mitive, because sensibility was to him but a confused mode of
representation, and not any particular source of representa tions. A phenomenon was for him the representation of the thing in itself, although distinguished from cognition by the understanding only in respect of the logical form --the former with its usual want of analysis containing, according to him, a certain mixture of collateral representations in its concep
tion of a thing, which it is the duty of the understanding to separate and distinguish. In one word, Leibnitz intellectva- lised phenomena, just as Locke, in his system of noogony (if I may be allowed to make use of such expressions), sensualized the conceptions of the understanding, that is to say, declared them to be nothing more than empirical or abstract concep tions of reflection. Instead of seeking in the understanding and sensibility two different sources of representations, which, however, can present us with objective judgments of things only in conjunction, each of these great men recognised but one
of these faculties, which, in their opinion, applied immediately to things in themselves, the other having no duty but that of confusing or arranging the representations of the former.
Accordingly, the objects of sense were compared by Leib nitz as things in general merely in the understanding.
1st. He compares them in regard to their identity or dif ference --as judged by the understanding. As, therefore, he considered merely the conceptions of objects, and not their position in intuition, in which alone objects can be given, and left quite out of sight the transcendental locale of these conceptions --whether, that their object ought to be classed among phenomena, or among things themselves, was to be expected that he should extend the application of the principle
of indiscernibles, which valid solely of conceptions of things in general, to objects of sense (mundus phenomenon), and that he should believe that he had thereby contributed in no small degree to extend our knowledge of nature. In truth,
cognize in all ita inner determinations drop of water a*
? ? ? if I
a
is
is,
in
it
? Or THE CONCEPTIONS OF BETLECTIOS. 197
a thing in itself, I cannot look upon one drop as different . ham another, if the conception of the one is completely iden tical with that of the othe. \ But if it is a phenomenon in fcpace, it has a place not merely in the understanding (among conceptions), hut also in sensuous external intuition (in space), and in this case, the physical locale is a matter of indifference in regard to the internal determinations of things, and one place, B, may contain a thing which is perfectly similar and equal to another in a place, A, lust as well as if the two things were in every respect different from each other. Difference of place without any other conditions, makes the plurality and distinction of objects as phsenomena, not only possible in itself, but even necessary. Consequently, the above so-called law is not a law of nature. It is merely an analytical rule for the comparison of things by means of mere conceptions.
? 2nd. The principle, " Realities (as simple affirmations) never logically contradict each other," is a proposition perfectly true respecting the relation of conceptions, but, whether as regards nature, or things in themselves (of which we have
not the slightest conception), is without any the least meaning. For real opposition, in which A -- B is = 0, exists everywhere, an opposition, that in which one reality united with another in the same subject annihilates the effects of the other -- fact which constantly brought before our eyes the different antagonistic actions and operations in nature, which, nevertheless, as depending on real forces, must be called rea- litates pheenomena. General mechanics can even present us with the empirical condition of this opposition in an priori rule, as directs its attention to the opposition in the direction of forces -- condition of which the transcendental conception of reality can tell us nothing. Although M. Leibnitz did not announce this proposition with precisely the pomp of new principle, he yet employed for the establishment of new propositions, and his followers introduced into their Leib- nitzio-Wolfian system of philosophy. According to this prin ciple, for example, all evils are but consequences of the limited nature of created beings, that negations, because these are the only opposite of reality. (In the mere conception of
thing in general this really the case, but not in things as phenomena). In like manner, the upholders of this system deem not only possible, but natural also, to connect and
? ? it
is
is
is,
a
it is,
it
it a
a
a a
by
? 1M TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE.
unite all reality in one being, because they acknowledge no other sort of opposition than that of contradiction (by which the conception itself of a thing is annihilated), and find them selves unable to conceive an opposition of reciprocal destruc tion, so to speak, in which one real cause destroys the effect of another, and the conditions of whose representation we meet with only in sensibility.
3rd. The Leibnitzian Monadology has really no better foun dation than on this philosopher's mode of falsely representing the difference of the internal and external solely in relation to the understanding. Substances, in general, must have some thing inward, which is therefore free from external relations, consequently from that of composition also. The simple-- that which can be represented by a unit -- is therefore the foundation of that which is internal in things in themselves. The internal state of substances cannot therefore consist in place, shape, contact, or motion, determinations which are all external relations, and we can ascribe to them no other than that whereby we internally determine our faculty of sense itself that is to say, the state of representation. Thus, then, were constructed the monads, which were to form the elements of the universe, the active force of which consists in repre sentation, the effects of this force being thus entirely confined to themselves.
For the same reason, his view of the possible community of substances could not represent it but as a predetermined har mony, and by no means as a physical influence. For inasmuch as everything is occupied only internally, that with its own representations, the state of the representations of one sub stance could not stand active and living connection with that of another, but some third cause operating on all without exception was necessary to make the different states corre spond with one another. And this did not happen by means of assistance applied in each particular case (systema assis- tentiee), bi't through the unity of the idea of cause occupied and connected with all substances, in which they necessarily receive, according to the Leibnitzian school, their existence and permanence, consequently also reciprocal correspondence, according to universal laws.
4th. This philosopher's celebrated doctrine spare and time, in which he iutellertualized these forms of sensibility, ori
? ? ? of
a
in
is,
? Or THE COKCCTTIOnS OF KUFLECTIOW.
199
ginated in the same delusion of transcendental reflection. If I attempt to represent by the mere understanding, the external relations of things, I can do bo only by employing the con
ception of their reciprocal action, and if I wish to connect one state of the same thing with another state, I must avail myself of the notion of the order of cause and effect. And thus Leib nitz regarded space as a certain order in the community of substances, and time as the dynamical sequence of their states. That which space and time possess proper to themselves and independent of things, he ascribed to a necessary confusion in our conceptions of them, whereby that which is a mere form of dynamical relations is held to be a self-existent intuition, antecedent even to things themselves. Thus space and time were the intelligible form of the connection of things (sub stances and their states) in themselves. But things were in telligible substances (substantia: noumena). At the same time, he made these conceptions valid of phsenomena, because he did not allow to sensibility a peculiar mode of intuition, but sought all, even the empirical representation of objects, in the under standing, and left to sense nought but the despicable task of confusing and disarranging the representations of the former.
But even if we could frame any synthetical proposition con cerning things in themselves by means of the pure under
standing (which is impossible), it could not apply to pheno mena, which do not represent things in themselves. In such a case I should be obliged in transcendental reflection to compare my conceptions only under the conditions of sensi bility, and so space and time would not be determinations of things in themselves, but of phenomena. What things may be in themselves, I know not, and need not know, because a thing is never presented to me otherwise than as a phenomenon.
of reflection. Matter is substantia phenomenon. That in it which is internal I seek to discover in all parts of space which it occupies, and in all the functions and opera tions it performs, and which are indeed never anything but phenomena of the external sense. I cannot therefore find any thing that is absolutely, but only what is comparatively in ternal, and which itself consist* of external relations. The absolutely internal in matter, and as it should be according to the pure understanding, is a mere chimera, for matter is not an
? I must adopt the same mode of procedure with the other
conceptions
? ? ? 200 TRAWSCENDEXTAX DOCTHTWS.
object for the pure understanding. But the transcendental object, which is the foundation of the phenomenon which we call matter, is a mere nescio quid, the nature of which we could not understand, even though some one were found able to tell us. For we can understand nothing that does not bring with it something ir. intuition corresponding to the expressions em ployed. If by the complaint of being unable to perceive the internal nature of things, it is meant that we do not comprehend by the pure understanding what the things which appear to us may be in themselves, it is a silly and unreasonable com plaint ; for those who talk thus, really desire that we should be able to cognize, consequently to intuite things without senses, and therefore wish that we possessed a faculty of cog nition perfectly different from the human faculty, not merely in degree, but even as regards intuition and the mode thereof, so that thus we should not be men, but belong to a class of beings, the possibility of whose existence, much less their nature and constitution, we have no means of cognizing. observation and analysis of phenomena we penetrate into the interior of nature, and no one can say what progress this knowledge may make in time. But those transcendental questions which pass beyond the limits of nature, we could never answer, even although all nature were laid open to us, because we have not the power of observing our own mind with any other intuition than that of our internal sense. For herein lies the mystery of the origin and source of our faculty of sensibility. Its application to an object, and the transcendental ground of this unity of subjective and objec tive, lie too deeply concealed for us, who cognize ourselves only through the internal sense, consequently as phenomena, to be able to discover in our existence any thing but pheno mena, the non-sensuous cause of which we at the same time
earnestly desire to penetrate to.
The great utility of this critique of conclusions arrived at
by the processes of mere reflection consists in its clear demon stration of the nullity of all conclusions respecting objects
which are compared with each other in the understanding atone, while it at the same time confirms what we particularly insisted on, namely, that, although phenomena are not included as things in themselves among the objects of the pure under standing, they are nevertheless the only things by which oui
? By
? ? ? THE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF REFLECTION. 201
cognition can possess objective reality, that is to say, which give us intuitions to correspond with our conceptions.
When we reflect in a purely logical manner, we do nothing
more than compare conceptions in our understanding, to dis cover whether both have the same content, whether they are
self-contradictory or not, whether anything is contained in either conception, which of the two is given, and which is merely a mode of thinking that given. But if I apply these con ceptions to an object in general (in the transcendental seuse), without first determining whether it is an object of sensuous or intellectual intuition, certain limitations present themselves, which forbid us to pass beyond the conceptions, and render all empirical use of them impossible. And thus these limit ations prove, that the representation of an object as a thing in general is not only insufficient, but, without sensuous de termination a*id independently of empirical conditions, self- contradictory ; that we must therefore make abstraction of all objects, as in logic, or, admitting them, must think them under conditions of sensuous intuition ; that, consequently, the intelligible requires an altogether peculiar intuition, which we do not possess, and in the absence of which it is for us nothing ; while, on the other hand, phenomena cannot be ob
jects in themselves. For, when I merely think things in general, the difference in their external relations cannot con stitute a difference in the things themselves ; on the contrary, the former presupposes the latter, and if the conception of one of two things is not internally different from that of the other, I am merely thinking the same thing in different relations. Further, by the addition of one affirmation (reality) to the other, the positive therein is really augmented, and nothing is abstracted or withdrawn from it ; hence the real in things cannot be in contradiction with or opposition to itself--and so on.
The true use of the conceptions of reflection in the employ ment of the understanding, has, as we have shown, been so mis conceived by Leibnitz, one of the most acute philosophers of either ancient or modern times, that he has been misled into the construction of a baseless system of intellectual cognition, which professes to determine its objects without the intervention of the senses. For this reason, the exposition of the cause of the
? ? ? ? 202 DOCTBINB OH ELEMENTS.
amphiboly of these conceptions, as the origin of these falsi principles, is of great utility in determining with certainty the proper limits of the understanding.
It is right to say, whatever is affirmed or denied of the whole of a conception can be affirmed or denied of any part of it (dictum de omni et nullo) ; but it would be absurd so to alter this logical proposition, as to say, whatever is not contained in a general conception, is likewise not contained in the par ticular conceptions which rank under it ; for the latter are particular conceptions, for the very reason that their content is greater than that which is cogitated in the general concep tion. And yet the whole intellectual system of Leibnitz is based upon this false principle, and with it must necessarily fall to (he ground, together with all the ambiguous principles in reference to the employment of the understanding which have thence originated.
Leibnitz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles or indistinguishables is really based on the presupposition, that, if in the conception of a thing a certain distinction is not to be found, it is also not to be met with in things themselves ;
? that, consequently, all tnings are completely identical (numero eadem) which are not distinguishable from each other (as to quality or quantity) in our conceptions of them. But, as in the mere conception of anything abstraction has been made of many necessary conditions of intuition, that of which abstrac tion has been made is rashly held to be non-existent, and nothing is attributed to the thing but what is contained in its conception.
The conception of a cubic foot of space, however I may think in itself completely identical. But two cubic feet in space are nevertheless distinct from each other from the sole fact of their being in different places (they are numero
and these places are conditions of intuition, wherein the object of this conception given, and which do not belong to the conception, but to the faculty of sensibility. In like manner, there in the conception of thing no contradiction when negative not connected with an affirmative and merely affirmative conceptions cannot, in conjunction, produce any negation. But in sensuous intuition, wherein reality (take for example, motion) given, we find conditions (opposite directions) -- of which abstraction has been made the con
diversa)
? ? is
in
;
a
;
it, is
is is
a
is
? THE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF REFLECTION.
ception of motion in general --which render possible a contra, diction or opposition (not indeed of a logical kind) --and wLich from pure positives produce zero = 0. We arc therefore not justified in saying, that all reality is in perfect agreement and harmony, because no contradiction is discoverable among ita conceptions. * According to mere conceptions, that which is internal is the substratum of all relations or external deter minations. When, therefore, I abstract all conditions of in tuition, and confine myself solely to the conception of a thing in general, I can make abstraction of all external relations, and there must nevertheless remain a conception of that which in dicates no relation, but merely internal determinations. Now it seems to follow, that in everything (substance) there is something which is absolutely internal, and which antecedes all external determinations, inasmuch as it renders them pos sible ; and that therefore this substratum is something which does not contain any external relations, and is consequently simple (for corporeal things are never any thing but relations, at least of their parts external to each other) ; and inasmuch as we know of no other absolutely internal determinations than those of the internal sense, this substratum is not only simple, but also, analogously with our internal sense, deter mined through representations, that is to say, all things are properly monads, or simple beings endowed with the power of representation. Now all this would be perfectly correct, if the conception of a thing were the only necessary condition of the presentation of objects of external intuition. It is, on the contrary, manifest that a permanent phsenomenon in space (impenetrable extension) can contain mere relations, and nothing that is absolutely internal, and yet be the primary substratum of all external perception. By mere concep tions I cannot think any thing external, without, at the same
* If any one wishes here to have recourse to the usual subterfuge, and to say, that at least reatitatet noumena cannot be in opposition to each other, it will be requisite for him to adduce an example of this pure and non-sensuous reality, that it may be understood whether the notion re presents something or nothing. But an example cannot be found except in experience, which never presents to us anything more than phenomena ,. and thus the proposition means nothing more than that the conception which contains only affirmatives, does not contain anything negative-- a Imposition nobody ever doubted.
203
? ? ? ? 204 DOCTItlNE Or ELEMENTS.
time, thinking something internal, for the reason that cor*
ceptions of relations presuppose given things, and without these are impossible. But, as in intuition there is something
space, which, with all contains, consists of purely formal, or, indeed, real relations) which not found in the mere conception of thing in general, and this presents to us the
substratum which could not be cognized through conceptions alone, cannot say because tiling cannot be represented
mere conceptions without something absolutely internal, there also, in the things themselves which are contained under these conceptions, and in their intuition nothing external to which something absolutely internal does not serve as the foundation. For, when we have made abstraction of all the conditions of intuition, there certainly remains in the mere conception nothing but the internal in general, through which alone the external possible. But this necessity, which grounded upon abstraction alone, does not obtain in the cane of things themselves, in so far as they are given in intuition with such determinations as express mere relations, without having any thing internal as their foundation for they are not things in themselves, but only phenomena. What we cognize in matter nothing but relations (what we call its internal determinations are but comparatively internal). But there are some self-subsistent and permanent, through which
determined object given. That when abstraction is
made of these relations, have nothing more to think, does
not destroy the conception of thing as phenomenon, nor the conception of an object in abstracto, but does away with
the possibility of an object that determinable according to
(that
? certainly startling to hear that thing consists solely of relations but this thing simply phenomenon, and cannot be cogitated
bv means of the mere categories does itself consist in the mere relation of some thing in general to the senses. In the tame way, we cannot cogitate relations of things in nbstracto,
we commence with conceptions alone, in any other manner than that one the cause of determinations the other fot that itself the conception of the understanding or category of relation. But, as in this case we make abstraction of all intuition, we lose altogether the mode which the manifold
determines to each of its parti, its place, that the form
mere conceptions, that of noumenon.
? ? in
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is
in is,
it It
;
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;
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? TOE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF KEPLECTIOW. 205
sensibility (space) ; and yet this mode antccedes all empirical causality.
If by intelligible objects we understand things which can be thought by means of the pure categories, without the need of the schemata of sensibility, such objects are impossible. For the condition of the objective use of all our conceptions of understanding is the mode of our sensuous intuition, whereby objects are given ; and, if we make abstraction of the latter, the former can have no relation to an object. And even if we should suppose a different kind of intuition from our own, still our functions of thought would have no use or signification in respect thereof. But if we understand by the term, objects of a non-sensuous intuition, in respect of which our categories are not valid, and of which we can accordingly have no knowledge (neither intuition nor conception), in this merely negative sense noumeua must be admitted. For this is no more than saying that our mode of intuition is not ap plicable to all things, but only to objects of our senses, that consequently its objective validity is limited, and that room is therefore left for another kind of intuition, and thus also for things that may be objects of it. But in this sense the conception of a nonmenon is problematical, that is to say, it is the notion of a thing of which we can neither say that it is possible, nor that it is impossible, inasmuch as we do not know of any mode of intuition besides the sensuous, or of any other sort of conceptions than the categories --a mode of in tuition and a kind of conception neither of which is applicable to a non-sensuous object. We are on this account incom petent to extend the sphere of our objects of thought beyond the conditions of our sensibility, and to assume the existence of objects of pure thought, that of noumena, inasmuch as these have no true positive signification.
For must be con fessed of the categories, that they are not of themselves suffi cient for the cognition of things in themselves, and without the data of sensibility are mere subjective forms of the unity of the understanding. Thought certainly not product of
? the senses, and in so far not limited by them, but does not therefore follow that may be employed purely and with out the intervention of sensibility, for would then be with out reference to an object. And we cannot call noumenon an object of pure thougLt for the representation thereof
? ? ;
it is
it
is it
is,
a
it
it a
? 206 DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS.
but the problematical conception of an object for a perfectly different intuition and a perfectly different understanding from ours, both of which are consequently themselves problematical. The conception of a noumenon is therefore not the conception of an object, but merely a problematical conception insepar ably connected with the limitation of our sensibility. That is to say, this conception contains the answer to the question -- Are there objects quite unconnected with, and independent of, our intuition ? -- a question to which only an indeterminate answer can be given. That answer is : Inasmuch as sensuous intuition does not apply to all things without distinction, there remains room for other and different objects. The existence of these problematical objects is therefore not absolutely denied, in the absence of a determinate conception of them, but, as no category is valid in respect of them, neither must they be ad mitted as objects for our understanding.
Understanding accordingly limits sensibility, without at the same time enlarging its own field. While, moreover, it for bids sensibility to apply its forms and modes to things in themselves and restricts it to the sphere of phenomena, it cogitates an object in itself, only, however, as a transcendental object, which is the cause of a phenomenon (consequently not itself a phenomenon), and which cannot be thought either as a quantity or as reality, or as substance (because these conceptions always require sensuous forms in which to determine an object) --an object, therefore, of which we are quite unable to say whether it can be met with in ourselves or out of us, whether it would be annihilated together with sensibility, or, if this were taken away, would continue to exist. If we wish to call this object a noumenon, because the
? representation
of it is uon-sensuous, we are at liberty to do so.
But as we can apply to it none of the conceptions of onr under
standing, the representation is for us quite void, and is avail
able only for the indication of the limits of our sensuous intni- iton, thereby leaving at the same time an empty space, which we are competent to fill by the aid neither of possible experi ence, nor of the pure understanding.
The Critique of the pure understanding, accordingly, does not permit us to create for ourselves a new field of objects be. yond those which are presented to us as phenomena, and tc stray into intelligible worlds ; nay, it does not even allow us to
? ? ? TEX JLMPHEBOLT OF THE CONCEPTIONS 0! REFLECTION.
20/
endeavour to form so much as a conception of them. The spe cious error which leads to this--and which is a perfectly excusable one --lies in the fact that the employment of the understanding, contrary to its proper purpose and destination, is made tran scendental, and objects, that possible intuitions, are made to regulate themselves according to conceptions, instead of the conceptions arranging themselves according to the intui tions, on which alone their own objective validity rests. Now the reason of this again that apperception, and with
thought, antecedes all possible determinate arrrangement of representa tions. Accordingly we think something in general, and de
termine on the one hand sensuously, but, on the other, distinguish the general and in abslracto represented object from this particular mode of intuiting it. In this case there remains mode of determining the object by mere thought, which really but logical form without content, which, however, seems to us to be a mode of the existence of the ob ject in itself (noumenon), without regard to intuition which limited to our senses.
? Before ending this transcendental analytic, we must make an addition, which, although in itself of no particular import ance, seems to be necessary to the completeness of the system. The highest conception, with which transcendental philosophy commonly begins, the division into possible and impossible. But as all division pre-supposes divided conception, a still higher one must exist, and this the conception of an object
general --problematically understood, and without its being decided, whether something or nothing. As the categories are the only conceptions, which apply to objects in general, the distinguishing of an object, whether something or nothing, must proceed according to the order and direction of the categories.
To the categories of quantity, that the conceptions of all, many, and one, the conception which annihilates all, that the conception of none opposed. And thus the object of conception, to which no intuition can be found to correspond, is=nothing. That conception without an object (ens rationis), like noumena, which cannot be considered
ible in the sphere of reality, though they must not there- be held to be impossible, --or like certa'n new funda
? ? is,
is a
is a
is,
it
is a
a
it
1. is,
is a a
is,
it is
it is
is
is,
in
is
it,
? 208 DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS.
mental forces in matter, the existence of which is cogitable without contradiction, though, as examples from experience are not forthcoming, they must not be regarded as possible.
2. Reality is something ; negation is nothing, that is, a conception of the absence of an object, as cold, a shadow (nihil privativum).
3. The mere form of intuition, without substance, is in itself no object, but the merely formal condition of an object (as phenomenon), as pure space and pure time. These are cer tainly something, as forms of intuition, but are not themselves objects which are intuited [ens imaginarium).
4. The object of a conception which is self-contradictory, is nothing, because the conception is nothing -- is impossible, as a figure composed of two straight lines (nihil negativum).
The table of this division of the conception of nothing corresponding division of the conception of something does not require special description,) must therefore be arranged as follows :
Nothing.
As 1.
Empty conception without object, ens rationis.
? 2.
Empty object of a conception, nihil privativum.
(the
3.
Empty intuition without object,
ens imaginarium.
4.
Empty object without conception,
nihil negativum.
We see that the ens rationt* is distinguished from the nihil negativum or pure nothing by the consideration, that the for mer must not be reckoned among possibilities, because it is a mere fiction --though not self-contradictory, while the latter is completely opposed to all possibility, inasmuch as the concep tion annihilates itself. Both, however, are empty conceptions. On the other hand, the nihil privativum and ens imaginarium are empty data for conceptions. If light be not given to the senses, we cannot represent to ourselves darkness,
and if extended objects are not perceived, we cannot represent space.
Neither the negation, nor the mere form of intuition can, with out something real, be an object.
? ? ? IKrHODDCTIOX.
TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. SECOND DIVISION.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. INTRODUCTION.
I.
Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance.
Tliis does not signify a doctrine of probability ;f for probability U truth, only cognised upon insufficient grounds, and though
We termed Dialectic in general a logic of appearance. *
? the information it gives us is imperfect, it is not therefore deceitful. Hence it must not be separated from tl e analytical part of logic. Still less must phenomenon % and appearance be held to be identical. For truth or illusory appearance doea not reside in the object, in so far as it is intuited, but in the judgment upon the object, in so far as it is thought. It is there fore quite correct to say that the senses do not err, not because they always judge correctly, but because they do not
judge at all. Hence truth and error, consequently also, illu sory appearance as the cause of error, are only to be found in a judgment, that in the relation of an object to our under
In cognition, which completely harmonises with the laws of the understanding, no error can exist. In a representation of the senses -- as not containing any judgment -- there also no error. But no power of nature can of itself deviate from its own laws. Hence neither the understanding
per *e (without the influence of auother cause), nor the senses per te, would fall into error the former could not, because,
standing.
acts only according to its own laws, the effect (the judg ment) must necessarily accord with these laws. But accordance with the laws of the understanding consists the formal element
all truth. In the senses there no judgment --neither true nor false one. But, as we have no source of cognition besides these two, follows, that error caused solely the unobserved influence of the sensibility upon the understanding. And thus happens that the subjective giounds of judgment blend and are confounded with the objective, and cause them
? Scbem. WalirscheinlicUKeit. Erscheinung.
? ? it
f it
a is
J
is is
a P
in
by
a
in if it
;
a
is,
? 210 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
to deviate from their proper determination,* just as a body in motion would always of itself proceed in a straight line, but if another impetus gives to it a different direction, it will then start off into a curvilinear line of motion. To distinguish the peculiar action of the understanding from the power which mingles with necessary to consider an erroneous judg ment as the diagonal between two forces, that determine the judgment two different directions, which, as were, form an angle, and to resolve this composite operation into the simple ones of the understanding aud the sensibility. In pure
priori judgments this must be done by means of transcen dental reflection, whereby, as has been already shown, each representation has its place appointed in the corresponding faculty of cognition, and consequently the influence of the one
faculty upon the other made apparent.
not at present our business to treat of empirical illusory
appearance (for example, optical illusion), which occurs in the empirical application of otherwise correct rules of the understanding, and in which the judgment misled the influence of imagination. Our purpose to speak of trans- cemtental illusory appearance, which influences principles --that are not even applied to experience, for in this case we should possess sure test of their correctness--but which leads us, in disregard of all the warnings of criticism, com pletely beyond the empirical employment of the categories, and deludes us with the chimera of an extension of the sphere of the pure understanding. We shall term those principles, the application of which confined entirely within the limits of possible experience, immanent; those, on the other hand, which transgress these limits, we shall call transcendent principles. But by these latter do not understand principles of the transcendental use or misuse of the categories, which in
mere fault of the judgment when not under due restraint from criticism, and therefore not paying sufficient attention to the limits of the sphere in which the pure under standing allowed to exercise its functions but real principles which exhort us to break down all those barriers, and to lay
* Sensibility, subjected to the understanding, as the object upon which Ibe understanding employs its functions, the source of real cognitions. But, in so far as exercises an influence upon the action of the under standing, and determines to judgment, sensibility itself the cause of error.
? reality
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I
is
is
it
it, it is
is
a is
in
;
is
is
is
by
a
It is
is
a
it
? nrraoDUCTion. 21 1
claim to a perfectly new field of cognition, which recognise* no line of demarcation. Thus transcendental and transcendent are not identical terms. The principles of the pure under standing, which we have already propounded, ought to be of empirical and not of transcendental use, that they are not applicable to any object beyond the sphere of experience. principle which removes these limits, nay, which authorizes us to overstep them, called transcendent. If our criticism can succeed in exposing the illusion in these pretended principles, those which are limited in their employment to the sphere of experience, may be called, in opposition to the others, immanent principles of the pure understanding.
Logical illusion, which consists merely in the imitation of the form of reason (the illusion in sophistical syllogisms), arises entirely from want of due attention to logical rules. So soon as the attention awakened to the case before us, this illusion totally disappears. Transcendental illusion, on the contrary, does not cease to exist, even after has been exposed, and its nothingness clearly perceived means of transcendental criticism. --Take, for example, the illusion in the proposition, "The world must have beginning in time. " --The cause of this as follows. In our reason, subjectively considered as faculty of human cognition, there exist fundamental rules and maxims of its exercise, which have completely the appearance of objective principles. Now from this cause happens, that the subjective necessity of certain connection of our concep tions, regarded as an objective necessity of the determination of things in themselves. This illusion impossible to avoid, just as we cannot avoid perceiving that the sea appears to be higher at distance than near the shore, because we see the former means of higher rays than the latter, or, which
still stronger case, as even the astronomer cannot prevent himself from seeing the moon larger at its rising than some time afterwards, although he not deceived this illusion.
Transcendental dialectic will therefore content itself with exposing the illusory appearance in transcendental judgments, and guarding us against but to make as in the case of logical illusion, entirely disappear and cease to be illu sion, utterly beyond its power. For we have here to do with natural and unavoidable illusion, which rests upon subjective principles, and imposes these upon us as objective,
? ? ? r 2
a is
is a
is
it
it
a
; is is
a
it,
by
it
is a
by
it is
by
it
a is
is
aA
is,
? 212 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
while logical dialectic, in the detection of sophism*, has to do merely with an error in the logical consequence of the pro- Dositions, or with an artificially constructed illusion, in imitation of the natural error. There is therefore a natural and unavoid able dialectic of pure reason --not that in which the bungler, from want of the requisite knowledge, involves himself, nor that which the sophist devises for the purpose of misleading, but that which is an inseparable adjunct of human reason, and
which, even after its illusions have been exposed, does not cease to deceive, and continually to lead reason into momen tary errors, which it becomes necessary continually to remove.
II.
Of Pure Reason as the Seat of the Transcendental Illusory
Appearance. A.
OF BEASON IN CXKXBAL.
All our knowledge begins with sense, proceeds thence to understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which nothing higher can be discovered in the human mind for elaborating the matter of intuition and subjecting it to the highest unity of
At this stage of our inquiry it is my duty to give an explanation of this, the highest faculty of cognition, and I confess I find myself here in some difficulty. Of reason, as of the understanding, there is a merely formal, that logical use, in which makes abstraction of all content of cognition but there also real use, inasmuch as contains in itself the source of certain conceptions and principles, which does not borrow either from the senses or the understanding. The former faculty has been long defined by logicians as the faculty of mediate conclusion in contradistinction to immedi ate conclusions {consequently immediate:) but the nature of the latter, which itself generates conceptions, not to be understood from this definition. Now as division of reason into logical and transcendental faculty presents itself here,
becomes necessary to seek for higher conception of this source of cognition which shall comprehend both conceptions. In this we may expect, according to the analogy of the con ceptions of the understanding, that the logical conception will give us the key to the transcendental, and that the table of the functions of the former will present us with the clue to the Conceptions of reason.
? thought.
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a
a
a
it a
a
;
it
is
is
is, it
;
? IKTHODtJCTION. -- OF REA8OK IS GENERAL. 213
la the former part of our transcendental logic, we defined the understanding to be the faculty of rules ; reason may be distinguished from understanding as the faculty of principles.
The term principle is ambiguous, and commonly signifies merely a cognition that may be employed as a principle ; although it is not in itself, and as regards its proper origin, entitled to the distinction. Every general proposition, even if derived from experience by the process of induction, may serve as the majcr in a syllogism ; but it is not for that reason a principle. Mathematical axioms (for example, there can be only one straight line between two points. ) are general & priori cognitions, and are therefore rightly denominated principles, relatively to the cases which can be subsumed under them. But I cannot for this reason say that I cognize this property of a straight line from principles -- I cognize it only in purt intuition.
Cognition from principles, then, is that cognition in whick I cognize the particular in the general by means of concept tions. Thus every syllogism is a form of the deduction of a
? cognition from a principle. For the major always gives a conception, through which everything that is subsumed under the condition thereof, is cognized according to a principle. Now as every general cognition may serve as the major in a syllogism, and the understanding presents us with such general & priori propositions, they may be termed principles, in re spect of their possible use.
But if we consider these principles of the pure understand ing in relation to their origin, we shall find them to be any thing rather than cognitions from conceptions. For they would not even be possible & priori, if we could not rely on the assistance of pure intuition (in mathematics), or on that of the conditions of a possible experience. That every thing that happens has a cause, cannot be concluded from the general conception of that which happens ; on the contrary the prin ciple of causality instructs us as to the mode of obtaining from that which happens a determinate empirical conception.
Synthetical cognitions from conceptions the understanding cannot supply, and they alone are entitled to be called prin ciples. At the same time, all general propositions may bo termed comparative principles. --
It has been a long-cherished wish
that, (who knows how
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late,) rcay one day be happily accomplished --that the princi ples of the endless variety of civil laws should be investigated and exposed ; for in this way alone can we find the secret of sim plifying legislation. But ill this case, laws are nothing more than limitations of our freedom upon conditions under which it subsists in perfect harmony with itself ; they consequently have for their object that which is completely our own work, and of which we ourselves may be the cause by means of these conceptions. But how objects as things in themselves -- how the nature of things is subordinated to principles and is to be
determined according to conceptions, is a question which it seems well nigh impossible to answer. Be this however as it may -- for on this point our investigation is yet to be made -- it is at least manifest from what we have said, that cognition from principles is something very different from cognition by means of the understanding, which may indeed precede other cognitions in the form of a principle, but in itself--in so far as it is synthetical --is neither based upon mere thought, nor contains a general proposition drawn from conceptions alone.
The understanding may be a faculty for the production of unity of phsenomena by virtue of rules ; the reason is a faculty
for the production of unity of rules (of the understanding) under principles. Reason, therefore, never applies directly to
experience, or to any sensuous object ; its object on the contrary, the understanding, to the manifold cognition of which gives uuity priori by means of conceptions -- unity which may be called rational unity, and which of nature very different from that of the unity produced the understanding.
The above the general conception of the faculty of reason, in so far as has been possible to make comprehensible in the absence of examples. These will be given in the sequel.
B.
OF THE LO01CAL TJSE OF REA80N.
distinction commonly made between that which immediately cognized and that which inferred or concluded, 'iliat in figure which bounded three straight lines, there are three angles, an immediate cognition but that these angles are together equal to two right angles, an inference
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? nfTRODUCTION. --OF TI1E LOGICAL USB OF REASON. 215
or conclusion. Now, as we are constantly employing this mode of thought, and have thus become quite accustomed to
we uo longer remark the above distinction, and, as in the case of the so-called deceptions of sense, consider as immediately perceived, what has really been inferred. In every reasoning or syllogism, there fundamental proposition, afterwards second drawn from and finally the conclusion, which con nects the truth in the first with the truth in the second --and that infallibly. the judgment concluded so contained in the first proposition, that can be deduced from without the mediation of third notion, the conclusion called imme diate (consequentia immediata) :* prefer the term conclusion of the understanding. But in addition to the fundamental cognition, second judgment necessary for the production of the conclusion, called conclusion of the reason. In the proposition, All m? n are mortal, are contained the propo sitions, Some men are mortal, Nothing that not mortal a man, and these are therefore immediate conclusions from the first. On the other hand, the proposition, All the learned are
mortal, not contained in the main proposition (for the con ception of learned man does not occur in it), and can bu deduced from the main proposition only by means of me diating judgment.
In every syllogism first cogitate rule (the major) means of the understanding. In the next place subsume cognition under the condition of the rule (and this the minor)
means of the judgment. And finally determine my cog nition by means of the predicate of the rule (this the conclusio), consequently, determine priori means of the reason. The relations, therefore, which the major propo sition, as the rule, represents between cognition and its condition, constitute the different kinds of syllogisms. These are just threefold -- analogously with all judgments, in so far as they differ in the mode of expressing the relation of cog nition in the understanding --namely, categorical, hypotheti, al
and disjunctive.
con-ieyutntia immediata -- there really be such thing, and
lie not contradiction in terms -- evideutly does not belong to the spbera of logic proper, the oliject-matter of which the syllogism, which always consists of three propositions, either in thought or expressed. This indeed
tantamount to declaring that there uo such mode ot reasoning. -- Tr.
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