No More Learning

Reply to Objection 1: When the Master says that "because He begets, He
is Father," the term "Father" is taken as meaning relation only, but
not as signifying the subsisting person; for then it would be necessary
to say conversely that because He is Father He begets.

Reply to Objection 2: This objection avails of paternity as a relation,
but not as constituting a person.

Reply to Objection 3: Nativity is the way to the person of the Son; and
so, in the order of intelligence, it precedes filiation, even as
constituting the person of the Son. But active generation signifies a
proceeding from the person of the Father; wherefore it presupposes the
personal property of the Father.
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OF THE PERSONS IN REFERENCE TO THE NOTIONAL ACTS (SIX ARTICLES)

We now consider the persons in reference to the notional acts,
concerning which six points of inquiry arise:

(1) Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons?

(2) Whether these acts are necessary, or voluntary?

(3) Whether as regards these acts, a person proceeds from nothing or
from something?

(4) Whether in God there exists a power as regards the notional acts?

(5) What this power means?

(6) Whether several persons can be the term of one notional act?
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Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons?

Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts are not to be
attributed to the persons. For Boethius says (De Trin. ): "Whatever is
predicated of God, of whatever genus it be, becomes the divine
substance, except what pertains to the relation. " But action is one of
the ten "genera. " Therefore any action attributed to God belongs to His
essence, and not to a notion.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 4,5) that,
"everything which is said of God, is said of Him as regards either His
substance, or relation. " But whatever belongs to the substance is
signified by the essential attributes; and whatever belongs to the
relations, by the names of the persons, or by the names of the
properties. Therefore, in addition to these, notional acts are not to
be attributed to the persons.

Objection 3: Further, the nature of action is of itself to cause
passion. But we do not place passions in God. Therefore neither are
notional acts to be placed in God.

On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum ii) says: "It
is a property of the Father to beget the Son. " Therefore notional acts
are to be placed in God.

I answer that, In the divine persons distinction is founded on origin.
But origin can be properly designated only by certain acts. Wherefore,
to signify the order of origin in the divine persons, we must attribute
notional acts to the persons.

Reply to Objection 1: Every origin is designated by an act. In God
there is a twofold order of origin: one, inasmuch as the creature
proceeds from Him, and this is common to the three persons; and so
those actions which are attributed to God to designate the proceeding
of creatures from Him, belong to His essence. Another order of origin
in God regards the procession of person from person; wherefore the acts
which designate the order of this origin are called notional; because
the notions of the persons are the mutual relations of the persons, as
is clear from what was above explained ([341]Q[32], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 2: The notional acts differ from the relations of
the persons only in their mode of signification; and in reality are
altogether the same. Whence the Master says that "generation and
nativity in other words are paternity and filiation" (Sent. i, D,
xxvi). To see this, we must consider that the origin of one thing from
another is firstly inferred from movement: for that anything be changed
from its disposition by movement evidently arises from some cause.
Hence action, in its primary sense, means origin of movement; for, as
movement derived from another into a mobile object, is called
"passion," so the origin of movement itself as beginning from another
and terminating in what is moved, is called "action. " Hence, if we take
away movement, action implies nothing more than order of origin, in so
far as action proceeds from some cause or principle to what is from
that principle. Consequently, since in God no movement exists, the
personal action of the one producing a person is only the habitude of
the principle to the person who is from the principle; which habitudes
are the relations, or the notions. Nevertheless we cannot speak of
divine and intelligible things except after the manner of sensible
things, whence we derive our knowledge, and wherein actions and
passions, so far as these imply movement, differ from the relations
which result from action and passion, and therefore it was necessary to
signify the habitudes of the persons separately after the manner of
act, and separately after the manner of relations. Thus it is evident
that they are really the same, differing only in their mode of
signification.

Reply to Objection 3: Action, so far as it means origin of movement,
naturally involves passion; but action in that sense is not attributed
to God. Whence, passions are attributed to Him only from a grammatical
standpoint, and in accordance with our manner of speaking, as we
attribute "to beget" with the Father, and to the Son "to be begotten. "
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Whether the notional acts are voluntary?

Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts are voluntary. For
Hilary says (De Synod. ): "Not by natural necessity was the Father led
to beget the Son. "

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says, "He transferred us to the
kingdom of the Son of His love" (Col. 1:13). But love belongs to the
will. Therefore the Son was begotten of the Father by will.

Objection 3: Further, nothing is more voluntary than love. But the Holy
Ghost proceeds as Love from the Father and the Son. Therefore He
proceeds voluntarily.

Objection 4: Further, the Son proceeds by mode of the intellect, as the
Word. But every word proceeds by the will from a speaker. Therefore the
Son proceeds from the Father by will, and not by nature.

Objection 5: Further, what is not voluntary is necessary. Therefore if
the Father begot the Son, not by the will, it seems to follow that He
begot Him by necessity; and this is against what Augustine says (Ad
Orosium qu. vii).

On the contrary, Augustine says, in the same book, that, "the Father
begot the Son neither by will, nor by necessity. "

I answer that, When anything is said to be, or to be made by the will,
this can be understood in two senses. In one sense, the ablative
designates only concomitance, as I can say that I am a man by my
will---that is, I will to be a man; and in this way it can be said that
the Father begot the Son by will; as also He is God by will, because He
wills to be God, and wills to beget the Son. In the other sense, the
ablative imports the habitude of a principle as it is said that the
workman works by his will, as the will is the principle of his work;
and thus in that sense it must be said the God the Father begot the
Son, not by His will; but that He produced the creature by His will.
Whence in the book De Synod, it is said: "If anyone say that the Son
was made by the Will of God, as a creature is said to be made, let him
be anathema. " The reason of this is that will and nature differ in
their manner of causation, in such a way that nature is determined to
one, while the will is not determined to one; and this because the
effect is assimilated to the form of the agent, whereby the latter
acts. Now it is manifest that of one thing there is only one natural
form whereby it exists; and hence such as it is itself, such also is
its work. But the form whereby the will acts is not only one, but many,
according to the number of ideas understood. Hence the quality of the
will's action does not depend on the quality of the agent, but on the
agent's will and understanding. So the will is the principle of those
things which may be this way or that way; whereas of those things which
can be only in one way, the principle is nature. What, however, can
exist in different ways is far from the divine nature, whereas it
belongs to the nature of a created being; because God is of Himself
necessary being, whereas a creature is made from nothing. Thus, the
Arians, wishing to prove the Son to be a creature, said that the Father
begot the Son by will, taking will in the sense of principle. But we,
on the contrary, must assert that the Father begot the Son, not by
will, but by nature. Wherefore Hilary says (De Synod. ): "The will of
God gave to all creatures their substance: but perfect birth gave the
Son a nature derived from a substance impassible and unborn. All things
created are such as God willed them to be; but the Son, born of God,
subsists in the perfect likeness of God. "

Reply to Objection 1: This saying is directed against those who did not
admit even the concomitance of the Father's will in the generation of
the Son, for they said that the Father begot the Son in such a manner
by nature that the will to beget was wanting; just as we ourselves
suffer many things against our will from natural necessity---as, for
instance, death, old age, and like ills. This appears from what
precedes and from what follows as regards the words quoted, for thus we
read: "Not against His will, nor as it were, forced, nor as if He were
led by natural necessity did the Father beget the Son. "

Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle calls Christ the Son of the love of
God, inasmuch as He is superabundantly loved by God; not, however, as
if love were the principle of the Son's generation.

Reply to Objection 3: The will, as a natural faculty, wills something
naturally, as man's will naturally tends to happiness; and likewise God
naturally wills and loves Himself; whereas in regard to things other
than Himself, the will of God is in a way, undetermined in itself, as
above explained ([342]Q[19], A[3]). Now, the Holy Ghost proceeds as
Love, inasmuch as God loves Himself, and hence He proceeds naturally,
although He proceeds by mode of will.

Reply to Objection 4: Even as regards the intellectual conceptions of
the mind, a return is made to those first principles which are
naturally understood. But God naturally understands Himself, and thus
the conception of the divine Word is natural.

Reply to Objection 5: A thing is said to be necessary "of itself," and
"by reason of another. " Taken in the latter sense, it has a twofold
meaning: firstly, as an efficient and compelling cause, and thus
necessary means what is violent; secondly, it means a final cause, when
a thing is said to be necessary as the means to an end, so far as
without it the end could not be attained, or, at least, so well
attained. In neither of these ways is the divine generation necessary;
because God is not the means to an end, nor is He subject to
compulsion. But a thing is said to be necessary "of itself" which
cannot but be: in this sense it is necessary for God to be; and in the
same sense it is necessary that the Father beget the Son.
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Whether the notional acts proceed from something?

Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts do not proceed from
anything. For if the Father begets the Son from something, this will be
either from Himself or from something else. If from something else,
since that whence a thing is generated exists in what is generated, it
follows that something different from the Father exists in the Son, and
this contradicts what is laid down by Hilary (De Trin. vii) that, "In
them nothing diverse or different exists. " If the Father begets the Son
from Himself, since again that whence a thing is generated, if it be
something permanent, receives as predicate the thing generated
therefrom just as we say, "The man is white," since the man remains,
when not from white he is made white---it follows that either the
Father does not remain after the Son is begotten, or that the Father is
the Son, which is false. Therefore the Father does not beget the Son
from something, but from nothing.

Objection 2: Further, that whence anything is generated is the
principle regarding what is generated. So if the Father generate the
Son from His own essence or nature, it follows that the essence or
nature of the Father is the principle of the Son. But it is not a
material principle, because in God nothing material exists; and
therefore it is, as it were, an active principle, as the begetter is
the principle of the one begotten. Thus it follows that the essence
generates, which was disproved above ([343]Q[39], A[5]).

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that the three
persons are not from the same essence; because the essence is not
another thing from person. But the person of the Son is not another
thing from the Father's essence. Therefore the Son is not from the
Father's essence.

Objection 4: Further, every creature is from nothing. But in Scripture
the Son is called a creature; for it is said (Ecclus. 24:5), in the
person of the Wisdom begotten,"I came out of the mouth of the Most
High, the first-born before all creatures": and further on (Ecclus.
24:14) it is said as uttered by the same Wisdom, "From the beginning,
and before the world was I created. " Therefore the Son was not begotten
from something, but from nothing. Likewise we can object concerning the
Holy Ghost, by reason of what is said (Zech. 12:1): "Thus saith the
Lord Who stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the foundations of
the earth, and formeth the spirit of man within him"; and (Amos 4:13)
according to another version [*The Septuagint]: "I Who form the earth,
and create the spirit. "

On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i, 1) says:
"God the Father, of His nature, without beginning, begot the Son equal
to Himself. "

I answer that, The Son was not begotten from nothing, but from the
Father's substance. For it was explained above ([344]Q[27], A[2];
[345]Q[33], AA[2] ,3) that paternity, filiation and nativity really and
truly exist in God. Now, this is the difference between true
"generation," whereby one proceeds from another as a son, and "making,"
that the maker makes something out of external matter, as a carpenter
makes a bench out of wood, whereas a man begets a son from himself.
Now, as a created workman makes a thing out of matter, so God makes
things out of nothing, as will be shown later on ([346]Q[45], A[1]),
not as if this nothing were a part of the substance of the thing made,
but because the whole substance of a thing is produced by Him without
anything else whatever presupposed. So, were the Son to proceed from
the Father as out of nothing, then the Son would be to the Father what
the thing made is to the maker, whereto, as is evident, the name of
filiation would not apply except by a kind of similitude. Thus, if the
Son of God proceeds from the Father out of nothing, He could not be
properly and truly called the Son, whereas the contrary is stated (1
Jn. 5:20): "That we may be in His true Son Jesus Christ. " Therefore the
true Son of God is not from nothing; nor is He made, but begotten.

That certain creatures made by God out of nothing are called sons of
God is to be taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a certain
likeness of assimilation to Him Who is the true Son. Whence, as He is
the only true and natural Son of God, He is called the "only begotten,"
according to Jn. 1:18, "The only begotten Son, Who is in the bosom of
the Father, He hath declared Him"; and so as others are entitled sons
of adoption by their similitude to Him, He is called the "first
begotten," according to Rom. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew He also
predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son, that He
might be the first born of many brethren. " Therefore the Son of God is
begotten of the substance of the Father, but not in the same way as man
is born of man; for a part of the human substance in generation passes
into the substance of the one begotten, whereas the divine nature
cannot be parted; whence it necessarily follows that the Father in
begetting the Son does not transmit any part of His nature, but
communicates His whole nature to Him, the distinction only of origin
remaining as explained above ([347]Q[40], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 1: When we say that the Son was born of the Father,
the preposition "of" designates a consubstantial generating principle,
but not a material principle. For that which is produced from matter,
is made by a change of form in that whence it is produced. But the
divine essence is unchangeable, and is not susceptive of another form.

Reply to Objection 2: When we say the Son is begotten of the essence of
the Father, as the Master of the Sentences explains (Sent. i, D, v),
this denotes the habitude of a kind of active principle, and as he
expounds, "the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father"---that is,
of the Father Who is essence; and so Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 13):
"When I say of the Father Who is essence, it is the same as if I said
more explicitly, of the essence of the Father. "

This, however, is not enough to explain the real meaning of the words.
For we can say that the creature is from God Who is essence; but not
that it is from the essence of God. So we may explain them otherwise,
by observing that the preposition "of" [de] always denotes
consubstantiality. We do not say that a house is "of" [de] the builder,
since he is not the consubstantial cause. We can say, however, that
something is "of" another, if this is its consubstantial principle, no
matter in what way it is so, whether it be an active principle, as the
son is said to be "of" the father, or a material principle, as a knife
is "of" iron; or a formal principle, but in those things only in which
the forms are subsisting, and not accidental to another, for we can say
that an angel is "of" an intellectual nature. In this way, then, we say
that the Son is begotten 'of' the essence of the Father, inasmuch as
the essence of the Father, communicated by generation, subsists in the
Son.

Reply to Objection 3: When we say that the Son is begotten of the
essence of the Father, a term is added which saves the distinction. But
when we say that the three persons are 'of' the divine essence, there
is nothing expressed to warrant the distinction signified by the
preposition, so there is no parity of argument.

Reply to Objection 4: When we say "Wisdom was created," this may be
understood not of Wisdom which is the Son of God, but of created wisdom
given by God to creatures: for it is said, "He created her [namely,
Wisdom] in the Holy Ghost, and He poured her out over all His works"
(Ecclus. 1:9,10). Nor is it inconsistent for Scripture in one text to
speak of the Wisdom begotten and wisdom created, for wisdom created is
a kind of participation of the uncreated Wisdom. The saying may also be
referred to the created nature assumed by the Son, so that the sense
be, "From the beginning and before the world was I made"---that is, I
was foreseen as united to the creature. Or the mention of wisdom as
both created and begotten insinuates into our minds the mode of the
divine generation; for in generation what is generated receives the
nature of the generator and this pertains to perfection; whereas in
creation the Creator is not changed, but the creature does not receive
the Creator's nature. Thus the Son is called both created and begotten,
in order that from the idea of creation the immutability of the Father
may be understood, and from generation the unity of nature in the
Father and the Son. In this way Hilary expounds the sense of this text
of Scripture (De Synod. ). The other passages quoted do not refer to the
Holy Ghost, but to the created spirit, sometimes called wind, sometimes
air, sometimes the breath of man, sometimes also the soul, or any other
invisible substance.
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Whether in God there is a power in respect of the notional acts?

Objection 1: It would seem that in God there is no power in respect of
the notional acts. For every kind of power is either active or passive;
neither of which can be here applied, there being in God nothing which
we call passive power, as above explained ([348]Q[25], A[1]); nor can
active power belong to one person as regards another, since the divine
persons were not made, as stated above [349](A[3]). Therefore in God
there is no power in respect of the notional acts.

Objection 2: Further, the object of power is what is possible. But the
divine persons are not regarded as possible, but necessary. Therefore,
as regards the notional acts, whereby the divine persons proceed, there
cannot be power in God.

Objection 3: Further, the Son proceeds as the word, which is the
concept of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, which
belongs to the will. But in God power exists as regards effects, and
not as regards intellect and will, as stated above ([350]Q[25], A[1]).
Therefore, in God power does not exist in reference to the notional
acts.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 1): "If God the
Father could not beget a co-equal Son, where is the omnipotence of God
the Father? " Power therefore exists in God regarding the notional acts.

I answer that, As the notional acts exist in God, so must there be also
a power in God regarding these acts; since power only means the
principle of act. So, as we understand the Father to be principle of
generation; and the Father and the Son to be the principle of
spiration, we must attribute the power of generating to the Father, and
the power of spiration to the Father and the Son; for the power of
generation means that whereby the generator generates. Now every
generator generates by something. Therefore in every generator we must
suppose the power of generating, and in the spirator the power of
spirating.

Reply to Objection 1: As a person, according to notional acts, does not
proceed as if made; so the power in God as regards the notional acts
has no reference to a person as if made, but only as regards the person
as proceeding.

Reply to Objection 2: Possible, as opposed to what is necessary, is a
consequence of a passive power, which does not exist in God. Hence, in
God there is no such thing as possibility in this sense, but only in
the sense of possible as contained in what is necessary; and in this
latter sense it can be said that as it is possible for God to be, so
also is it possible that the Son should be generated.

Reply to Objection 3: Power signifies a principle: and a principle
implies distinction from that of which it is the principle. Now we must
observe a double distinction in things said of God: one is a real
distinction, the other is a distinction of reason only. By a real
distinction, God by His essence is distinct from those things of which
He is the principle by creation: just as one person is distinct from
the other of which He is principle by a notional act. But in God the
distinction of action and agent is one of reason only, otherwise action
would be an accident in God. And therefore with regard to those actions
in respect of which certain things proceed which are distinct from God,
either personally or essentially, we may ascribe power to God in its
proper sense of principle. And as we ascribe to God the power of
creating, so we may ascribe the power of begetting and of spirating.
But "to understand" and "to will" are not such actions as to designate
the procession of something distinct from God, either essentially or
personally. Wherefore, with regard to these actions we cannot ascribe
power to God in its proper sense, but only after our way of
understanding and speaking: inasmuch as we designate by different terms
the intellect and the act of understanding in God, whereas in God the
act of understanding is His very essence which has no principle.
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Whether the power of begetting signifies a relation, and not the essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that the power of begetting, or of
spirating, signifies the relation and not the essence. For power
signifies a principle, as appears from its definition: for active power
is the principle of action, as we find in Metaph. v, text 17. But in
God principle in regard to Person is said notionally. Therefore, in
God, power does not signify essence but relation.

Objection 2: Further, in God, the power to act [posse] and 'to act' are
not distinct. But in God, begetting signifies relation. Therefore, the
same applies to the power of begetting.

Objection 3: Further, terms signifying the essence in God, are common
to the three persons. But the power of begetting is not common to the
three persons, but proper to the Father. Therefore it does not signify
the essence.

On the contrary, As God has the power to beget the Son, so also He
wills to beget Him. But the will to beget signifies the essence.
Therefore, also, the power to beget.

I answer that, Some have said that the power to beget signifies
relation in God. But this is not possible. For in every agent, that is
properly called power, by which the agent acts. Now, everything that
produces something by its action, produces something like itself, as to
the form by which it acts; just as man begotten is like his begetter in
his human nature, in virtue of which the father has the power to beget
a man. In every begetter, therefore, that is the power of begetting in
which the begotten is like the begetter.

Now the Son of God is like the Father, who begets Him, in the divine
nature. Wherefore the divine nature in the Father is in Him the power
of begetting. And so Hilary says (De Trin. v): "The birth of God cannot
but contain that nature from which it proceeded; for He cannot subsist
other than God, Who subsists from no other source than God. "

We must therefore conclude that the power of begetting signifies
principally the divine essence as the Master says (Sent. i, D, vii),
and not the relation only. Nor does it signify the essence as
identified with the relation, so as to signify both equally.
For
although paternity is signified as the form of the Father, nevertheless
it is a personal property, being in respect to the person of the
Father, what the individual form is to the individual creature. Now the
individual form in things created constitutes the person begetting, but
is not that by which the begetter begets, otherwise Socrates would
beget Socrates. So neither can paternity be understood as that by which
the Father begets, but as constituting the person of the Father,
otherwise the Father would beget the Father. But that by which the
Father begets is the divine nature, in which the Son is like to Him.
And in this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18) that generation
is the "work of nature," not of nature generating, but of nature, as
being that by which the generator generates. And therefore the power of
begetting signifies the divine nature directly, but the relation
indirectly.

Reply to Objection 1: Power does not signify the relation itself of a
principle, for thus it would be in the genus of relation; but it
signifies that which is a principle; not, indeed, in the sense in which
we call the agent a principle, but in the sense of being that by which
the agent acts. Now the agent is distinct from that which it makes, and
the generator from that which it generates: but that by which the
generator generates is common to generated and generator, and so much
more perfectly, as the generation is more perfect. Since, therefore,
the divine generation is most perfect, that by which the Begetter
begets, is common to Begotten and Begetter by a community of identity,
and not only of species, as in things created. Therefore, from the fact
that we say that the divine essence "is the principle by which the
Begetter begets," it does not follow that the divine essence is
distinct (from the Begotten): which would follow if we were to say that
the divine essence begets.

Reply to Objection 2: As in God, the power of begetting is the same as
the act of begetting, so the divine essence is the same in reality as
the act of begetting or paternity; although there is a distinction of
reason.

Reply to Objection 3: When I speak of the "power of begetting," power
is signified directly, generation indirectly: just as if I were to say,
the "essence of the Father. " Wherefore in respect of the essence, which
is signified, the power of begetting is common to the three persons:
but in respect of the notion that is connoted, it is proper to the
person of the Father.
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Whether several persons can be the term of one notional act?

Objection 1: It would seem that a notional act can be directed to
several Persons, so that there may be several Persons begotten or
spirated in God. For whoever has the power of begetting can beget. But
the Son has the power of begetting. Therefore He can beget. But He
cannot beget Himself: therefore He can beget another son. Therefore
there can be several Sons in God.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 12): "The Son
did not beget a Creator: not that He could not, but that it behoved Him
not. "

Objection 3: Further, God the Father has greater power to beget than
has a created father. But a man can beget several sons. Therefore God
can also: the more so that the power of the Father is not diminished
after begetting the Son.

On the contrary, In God "that which is possible," and "that which is"
do not differ. If, therefore, in God it were possible for there to be
several Sons, there would be several Sons. And thus there would be more
than three Persons in God; which is heretical.

I answer that, As Athanasius says, in God there is only "one Father,
one Son, one Holy Ghost. " For this four reasons may be given.

The first reason is in regard to the relations by which alone are the
Persons distinct. For since the divine Persons are the relations
themselves as subsistent, there would not be several Fathers, or
several Sons in God, unless there were more than one paternity, or more
than one filiation. And this, indeed, would not be possible except
owing to a material distinction: since forms of one species are not
multiplied except in respect of matter, which is not in God. Wherefore
there can be but one subsistent filiation in God: just as there could
be but one subsistent whiteness.

The second reason is taken from the manner of the processions. For God
understands and wills all things by one simple act. Wherefore there can
be but one person proceeding after the manner of word, which person is
the Son; and but one person proceeding after the manner of love, which
person is the Holy Ghost.

The third reason is taken from the manner in which the persons proceed.
For the persons proceed naturally, as we have said [351](A[2]), and
nature is determined to one.

The fourth reason is taken from the perfection of the divine persons.
For this reason is the Son perfect, that the entire divine filiation is
contained in Him, and that there is but one Son. The argument is
similar in regard to the other persons.

Reply to Objection 1: We can grant, without distinction, that the Son
has the same power as the Father; but we cannot grant that the Son has
the power "generandi" [of begetting] thus taking "generandi" as the
gerund of the active verb, so that the sense would be that the Son has
the "power to beget. " Just as, although Father and Son have the same
being, it does not follow that the Son is the Father, by reason of the
notional term added. But if the word "generandi" [of being begotten] is
taken as the gerundive of the passive verb, the power "generandi" is in
the Son---that is, the power of being begotten. The same is to be said
if it be taken as the gerundive of an impersonal verb, so that the
sense be "the power of generation"---that is, a power by which it is
generated by some person.

Reply to Objection 2: Augustine does not mean to say by those words
that the Son could beget a Son: but that if He did not, it was not
because He could not, as we shall see later on ([352]Q[42], A[6], ad
3).

Reply to Objection 3: Divine perfection and the total absence of matter
in God require that there cannot be several Sons in God, as we have
explained. Wherefore that there are not several Sons is not due to any
lack of begetting power in the Father.
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OF EQUALITY AND LIKENESS AMONG THE DIVINE PERSONS (SIX ARTICLES)

We now have to consider the persons as compared to one another:
firstly, with regard to equality and likeness; secondly, with regard to
mission. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry.

(1) Whether there is equality among the divine persons?

(2) Whether the person who proceeds is equal to the one from Whom He
proceeds in eternity?

(3) Whether there is any order among the divine persons?

(4) Whether the divine persons are equal in greatness?

(5) Whether the one divine person is in another?

(6) Whether they are equal in power?
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Whether there is equality in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that equality is not becoming to the divine
persons. For equality is in relation to things which are one in
quantity as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 20). But in the
divine persons there is no quantity, neither continuous intrinsic
quantity, which we call size, nor continuous extrinsic quantity, which
we call place and time. Nor can there be equality by reason of discrete
quantity, because two persons are more than one. Therefore equality is
not becoming to the divine persons.

Objection 2: Further, the divine persons are of one essence, as we have
said ([353]Q[39], A[2]). Now essence is signified by way of form. But
agreement in form makes things to be alike, not to be equal. Therefore,
we may speak of likeness in the divine persons, but not of equality.

Objection 3: Further, things wherein there is to be found equality, are
equal to one another, for equality is reciprocal. But the divine
persons cannot be said to be equal to one another. For as Augustine
says (De Trin. vi, 10): "If an image answers perfectly to that whereof
it is the image, it may be said to be equal to it; but that which it
represents cannot be said to be equal to the image. " But the Son is the
image of the Father; and so the Father is not equal to the Son.
Therefore equality is not to be found among the divine persons.

Objection 4: Further, equality is a relation. But no relation is common
to the three persons; for the persons are distinct by reason of the
relations. Therefore equality is not becoming to the divine persons.

On the contrary, Athanasius says that "the three persons are co-eternal
and co-equal to one another. "

I answer that, We must needs admit equality among the divine persons.
For, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x, text 15,16, 17), equality
signifies the negation of greater or less. Now we cannot admit anything
greater or less in the divine persons; for as Boethius says (De Trin.
i): "They must needs admit a difference [namely, of Godhead] who speak
of either increase or decrease, as the Arians do, who sunder the
Trinity by distinguishing degrees as of numbers, thus involving a
plurality. " Now the reason of this is that unequal things cannot have
the same quantity. But quantity, in God, is nothing else than His
essence. Wherefore it follows, that if there were any inequality in the
divine persons, they would not have the same essence; and thus the
three persons would not be one God; which is impossible. We must
therefore admit equality among the divine persons.

Reply to Objection 1: Quantity is twofold. There is quantity of "bulk"
or dimensive quantity, which is to be found only in corporeal things,
and has, therefore, no place in God. There is also quantity of
"virtue," which is measured according to the perfection of some nature
or form: to this sort of quantity we allude when we speak of something
as being more, or less, hot; forasmuch as it is more or less, perfect
in heat. Now this virtual quantity is measured firstly by its
source---that is, by the perfection of that form or nature: such is the
greatness of spiritual things, just as we speak of great heat on
account of its intensity and perfection. And so Augustine says (De
Trin. vi, 18) that "in things which are great, but not in bulk, to be
greater is to be better," for the more perfect a thing is the better it
is. Secondly, virtual quantity is measured by the effects of the form.
Now the first effect of form is being, for everything has being by
reason of its form. The second effect is operation, for every agent
acts through its form. Consequently virtual quantity is measured both
in regard to being and in regard to action: in regard to being,
forasmuch as things of a more perfect nature are of longer duration;
and in regard to action, forasmuch as things of a more perfect nature
are more powerful to act. And so as Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad
Petrum i) says: "We understand equality to be in the Father, Son and
Holy Ghost, inasmuch as no one of them either precedes in eternity, or
excels in greatness, or surpasses in power. "

Reply to Objection 2: Where we have equality in respect of virtual
quantity, equality includes likeness and something besides, because it
excludes excess. For whatever things have a common form may be said to
be alike, even if they do not participate in that form equally, just as
the air may be said to be like fire in heat; but they cannot be said to
be equal if one participates in the form more perfectly than another.
And because not only is the same nature in both Father and Son, but
also is it in both in perfect equality, therefore we say not only that
the Son is like to the Father, in order to exclude the error of
Eunomius, but also that He is equal to the Father to exclude the error
of Arius.

Reply to Objection 3: Equality and likeness in God may be designated in
two ways---namely, by nouns and by verbs. When designated by nouns,
equality in the divine persons is mutual, and so is likeness; for the
Son is equal and like to the Father, and conversely. This is because
the divine essence is not more the Father's than the Son's. Wherefore,
just as the Son has the greatness of the Father, and is therefore equal
to the Father, so the Father has the greatness of the Son, and is
therefore equal to the Son. But in reference to creatures, Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. ix): "Equality and likeness are not mutual. " For
effects are said to be like their causes, inasmuch as they have the
form of their causes; but not conversely, for the form is principally
in the cause, and secondarily in the effect.

But verbs signify equality with movement. And although movement is not
in God, there is something that receives. Since, therefore, the Son
receives from the Father, this, namely, that He is equal to the Father,
and not conversely, for this reason we say that the Son is equalled to
the Father, but not conversely.

Reply to Objection 4: In the divine persons there is nothing for us to
consider but the essence which they have in common and the relations in
which they are distinct. Now equality implies both ---namely,
distinction of persons, for nothing can be said to be equal to itself;
and unity of essence, since for this reason are the persons equal to
one another, that they are of the same greatness and essence. Now it is
clear that the relation of a thing to itself is not a real relation.
Nor, again, is one relation referred to another by a further relation:
for when we say that paternity is opposed to filiation, opposition is
not a relation mediating between paternity and filiation. For in both
these cases relation would be multiplied indefinitely. Therefore
equality and likeness in the divine persons is not a real relation
distinct from the personal relations: but in its concept it includes
both the relations which distinguish the persons, and the unity of
essence. For this reason the Master says (Sent. i, D, xxxi) that in
these "it is only the terms that are relative. "
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Whether the person proceeding is co-eternal with His principle, as the Son
with the Father?

Objection 1: It would seem that the person proceeding is not co-eternal
with His principle, as the Son with the Father. For Arius gives twelve
modes of generation. The first mode is like the issue of a line from a
point; wherein is wanting equality of simplicity. The second is like
the emission of rays from the sun; wherein is absent equality of
nature. The third is like the mark or impression made by a seal;
wherein is wanting consubstantiality and executive power. The fourth is
the infusion of a good will from God; wherein also consubstantiality is
wanting. The fifth is the emanation of an accident from its subject;
but the accident has no subsistence. The sixth is the abstraction of a
species from matter, as sense receives the species from the sensible
object; wherein is wanting equality of spiritual simplicity. The
seventh is the exciting of the will by knowledge, which excitation is
merely temporal. The eighth is transformation, as an image is made of
brass; which transformation is material. The ninth is motion from a
mover; and here again we have effect and cause. The tenth is the taking
of species from genera; but this mode has no place in God, for the
Father is not predicated of the Son as the genus of a species. The
eleventh is the realization of an idea [ideatio], as an external coffer
arises from the one in the mind. The twelfth is birth, as a man is
begotten of his father; which implies priority and posteriority of
time. Thus it is clear that equality of nature or of time is absent in
every mode whereby one thing is from another. So if the Son is from the
Father, we must say that He is less than the Father, or later than the
Father, or both.

Objection 2: Further, everything that comes from another has a
principle. But nothing eternal has a principle. Therefore the Son is
not eternal; nor is the Holy Ghost.

Objection 3: Further, everything which is corrupted ceases to be. Hence
everything generated begins to be; for the end of generation is
existence. But the Son is generated by the Father. Therefore He begins
to exist, and is not co-eternal with the Father.

Objection 4: Further, if the Son be begotten by the Father, either He
is always being begotten, or there is some moment in which He is
begotten. If He is always being begotten, since, during the process of
generation, a thing must be imperfect, as appears in successive things,
which are always in process of becoming, as time and motion, it follows
that the Son must be always imperfect, which cannot be admitted. Thus
there is a moment to be assigned for the begetting of the Son, and
before that moment the Son did not exist.

On the contrary, Athanasius declares that "all the three persons are
co-eternal with each other. "

I answer that, We must say that the Son is co-eternal with the Father.
In proof of which we must consider that for a thing which proceeds from
a principle to be posterior to its principle may be due to two reasons:
one on the part of the agent, and the other on the part of the action.
On the part of the agent this happens differently as regards free
agents and natural agents. In free agents, on account of the choice of
time; for as a free agent can choose the form it gives to the effect,
as stated above ([354]Q[41], A[2]), so it can choose the time in which
to produce its effect. In natural agents, however, the same happens
from the agent not having its perfection of natural power from the very
first, but obtaining it after a certain time; as, for instance, a man
is not able to generate from the very first. Considered on the part of
action, anything derived from a principle cannot exist simultaneously
with its principle when the action is successive. So, given that an
agent, as soon as it exists, begins to act thus, the effect would not
exist in the same instant, but in the instant of the action's
termination. Now it is manifest, according to what has been said
([355]Q[41], A[2]), that the Father does not beget the Son by will, but
by nature; and also that the Father's nature was perfect from eternity;
and again that the action whereby the Father produces the Son is not
successive, because thus the Son would be successively generated, and
this generation would be material, and accompanied with movement; which
is quite impossible. Therefore we conclude that the Son existed
whensoever the Father existed and thus the Son is co-eternal with the
Father, and likewise the Holy Ghost is co-eternal with both.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Verbis Domini, Serm. 38),
no mode of the procession of any creature perfectly represents the
divine generation. Hence we need to gather a likeness of it from many
of these modes, so that what is wanting in one may be somewhat supplied
from another; and thus it is declared in the council of Ephesus: "Let
Splendor tell thee that the co-eternal Son existed always with the
Father; let the Word announce the impassibility of His birth; let the
name Son insinuate His consubstantiality. " Yet, above them all the
procession of the word from the intellect represents it more exactly;
the intellectual word not being posterior to its source except in an
intellect passing from potentiality to act; and this cannot be said of
God.

Reply to Objection 2: Eternity excludes the principle of duration, but
not the principle of origin.

Reply to Objection 3: Every corruption is a change; and so all that
corrupts begins not to exist and ceases to be. The divine generation,
however, is not changed, as stated above ([356]Q[27], A[2]). Hence the
Son is ever being begotten, and the Father is always begetting.

Reply to Objection 4: In time there is something indivisible---namely,
the instant; and there is something else which endures---namely, time.
But in eternity the indivisible "now" stands ever still, as we have
said above ([357]Q[10], A[2] ad 1, A[4] ad 2). But the generation of
the Son is not in the "now" of time, or in time, but in eternity. And
so to express the presentiality and permanence of eternity, we can say
that "He is ever being born," as Origen said (Hom. in Joan. i). But as
Gregory [*Moral. xxix, 21] and Augustine [*Super Ps. 2:7] said, it is
better to say "ever born," so that "ever" may denote the permanence of
eternity, and "born" the perfection of the only Begotten. Thus,
therefore, neither is the Son imperfect, nor "was there a time when He
was not," as Arius said.
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Whether in the divine persons there exists an order of nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that among the divine persons there does not
exist an order of nature. For whatever exists in God is the essence, or
a person, or a notion. But the order of nature does not signify the
essence, nor any of the persons, or notions. Therefore there is no
order of nature in God.

Objection 2: Further, wherever order of nature exists, there one comes
before another, at least, according to nature and intellect. But in the
divine persons there exists neither priority nor posteriority, as
declared by Athanasius. Therefore, in the divine persons there is no
order of nature.

Objection 3: Further, wherever order exists, distinction also exists.
But there is no distinction in the divine nature. Therefore it is not
subject to order; and order of nature does not exist in it.

Objection 4: Further, the divine nature is the divine essence. But
there is no order of essence in God. Therefore neither is there of
nature.

On the contrary, Where plurality exists without order, confusion
exists. But in the divine persons there is no confusion, as Athanasius
says. Therefore in God order exists.

I answer that, Order always has reference to some principle. Wherefore
since there are many kinds of principle---namely, according to site, as
a point; according to intellect, as the principle of demonstration; and
according to each individual cause---so are there many kinds of order.
Now principle, according to origin, without priority, exists in God as
we have stated ([358]Q[33], A[1]): so there must likewise be order
according to origin, without priority; and this is called 'the order of
nature': in the words of Augustine (Contra Maxim. iv): "Not whereby one
is prior to another, but whereby one is from another. "

Reply to Objection 1: The order of nature signifies the notion of
origin in general, not a special kind of origin.

Reply to Objection 2: In things created, even when what is derived from
a principle is co-equal in duration with its principle, the principle
still comes first in the order of nature and reason, if formally
considered as principle. If, however, we consider the relations of
cause and effect, or of the principle and the thing proceeding
therefrom, it is clear that the things so related are simultaneous in
the order of nature and reason, inasmuch as the one enters the
definition of the other. But in God the relations themselves are the
persons subsisting in one nature.