In this hypothesis, no present word would
designate
a past or future thing.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-1-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
41) the minds are multiple, but this multiplicity can be designated as being one mind]
iii. However, since one cannot consider characteristics as things in and of themselves, one can say that each moment taken separately possesse the four characterisitcs.
In fact, (1) each moment exists after having been non-existent: its existence, following upon its non-existence, is its arising; (2) after having existed, it does not exist anymore: this is its disappearance; (3) the duration of the moment is the concatenation or the process of successive moments: in fact, if the subsequent moment resembles the previous moment, it is then its substitute: the previous moment still exists or still lasts. Thus the subsequent moment can be considered as the duration of the previous moment; (4) the dissimilitude of duration is its transformation.
Would you say that there is no dissimilitude when the successive moments are similar (sadrsa)?
There is dissimilitude, as this results from the difference in time of the slower or faster falling of a vajra that is or is not projected, and which is projected with or without force: difference due in each case to a transformation or a difference of the primary elements of the vajra. When the dharmas succeed themselves in a homogeneous series, the difference is small; that is why, although they differ, they are considered as similar.
[The Sarvastivadins object:] Your definition of characteristics does
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not hold for all conditioned dharmas. In fact, your definition of duration supposes a subsequent moment: but such a moment does not exist for the last moment of the mind of an Arhat. Hence the last moment of a sound, a flame, or an Arhat, has neither duration nor transformation.
We do not attribute duration to all conditioned dharmas\ We say rather, that all duration is subject to transformation. The Blessed One teaches three characteristics, because, in certain cases, there are three characteristics. But, for the last moment of a flame, there is only producation and disappearance, and no duration or transformation.
In short, conditioned dharmas exist after having existed; after having existed, they no longer exist; the series of dharmas is their duration; dissimilarity of the series is their transformation. Such is the teaching that the Blessed One gives in the Sutra of the Three Characteristics. This has nothing to do with things in and of themselves, arising, etc.
[iv. The Vaibhasikas object:] According to you, arising is the dharma itself in so far as it exists after having been non-existent. The dharma which is the "thing characterized" {laksya), would then be the characteristic (laksana) also.
What is wrong with that? The marks of a Mahapurusa are not different or distinct from the Mahapurusa himself. The horns, the hump, the fetlock, the hoof, and the tail of a cow, which are its marks, are not different from the cow. The primary elements do not exist apart from their individual characteristics, solidity, etc. (i. l2d). In this same way, for the Vaibhasikas who affirm the "momentariness" of the
294 dharmas, the rising of smoke is none other than the smoke itself
Let us look at this a bit closer. Although I grasp the individual
nature of visible things, etc. , which are conditioned, yet as long as I do
not know the fact that they did not exist previously, that they will not
exist later, and that their series transforms itself, then I shall not know
their quality of being conditioned. Consequently, the quality of being
conditioned does not have for a mark the quality of being conditioned,
295
but rather previous non-existence, etc. And there do not exist
characteristics, things in and of themselves, distinct from visible things
? and other conditioned things.
v. If we admit the reality of characteristics, then since they are
given as simultaneous, we would have to admit that one dharma arises, lasts, grows old and perishes at one and the same time.
It is in vain that the Sarvastivadins pretend that the characteristics do not exercise their activity at one and the same time; that arising engenders before being born itself, being still in a future state, and that once it is born it does not engender any longer; that duration, old age, and impermanence exercise their activity when they are present and not in a future state; and that, consequently, the last three character- istics are active in a moment when the first is no longer active, so the four characteristics can be simultaneous without contradiction.
Let us first consider arising which, being future, engenders. One must examine whether a future dharma, supposing that it does exist, can be active. If future arising produces the operation of engendering, how can one say that it is future? In fact, according to the Vaibhasikas, a future dharma is one that does not exercise its activity. You would have to define future. On the other hand, when a dharma has arisen, has been engendered, and the operation of arising is past, how can you say that arising is then of the present? You would have to define present.
And either the activity of the other characteristics is exercised simultaneously, or their activity is exercised in succession. In the first hypothesis, whereas duration makes a dharma last, old age makes it age and impermanence destroys it: the dharma lasts, ages and perishes at the same time. As for the second hypothesis, to admit that the activity of these characteristics is not simultaneous is to admit three
296 moments, and this is to renounce the doctrine of momentariness.
time during which the characteristics have achieved their operation. Then explain why, in this hypothesis, duration, arising at the same time as old age and impermanence, accomplishes its operation of "making last that which should last" before old age and impermanence accomplish their operation of making things age and destroying them. If you answer that duration, being stronger, accomplishes its operation
[The Vaibhasikas answer:] For us, the ksana or moment is the 297
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first, then we would ask how duration is weakened later in such a manner that, encountering old age and impermanence, it ages and perishes, not alone, but with the dharma that it should have made last.
You say perhaps that duration, having achieved its task, cannot perform it again, in the same way that arising, having engendered something, engenders no more. The comparison is not legitimate. The operation of arising consists of attracting the dharma that it should engender from the future and causing it to enter into the present; once the dharma has entered into the present, arising is incapable of making it enter therein again. But the operation of duration is to make the dharma "which should be made to last" last, of hindering the dharma which makes old age and perishing last. Duration is capable of making that which lasts last indefinitely. Consequently, duration is capable of repeating its operation.
By reason of what obstacle or from what adverse forces would the activity of duration cease once it has begun? Would these forces be old age and impermanence, old age weakening duration which imperma- nence then kills? Since, in this hypothesis, old age and impermanence are stronger than duration, it is proper then that they exercise their activity first. Further, according to your conception of duration and its role, it is through the activity of duration that, not only the principal dharma, but also old age and impermanence, last. Hence, when the activity of duration ends, the principal dharma, as well as old age and impermanence, cease their duration. We ask how, and with regard to what object, old age and impermanence exercise their activity of aging and causing to perish?
We do not see what it is that old age and impermanence have to do. It is through duration that one dharma, once it arises, does not perish for a certain time, does not perish as soon as it arises. If duration, its task completed, neglects the dharma, it will quite certainly not last any longer; that is to say, it perishes in and of itself.
We well understand the duration and impermanence of the dharma, "A dharma, after having arisen, does not perish," "A dharma, after having lasted, perishes. " But how can one attribute old age to a dharma} Old age is a transformation, a dissimilarity between two
? states. Now, can one say of a single dharma that it becomes different from itself?
"If it remains this, it is not that; if it is transformed, it is no longer this. Hence the transformation of a dharma is impossible. "
298
According to another School,
external causes of destruction, fire or a hammer, etc. , that the characteristics of impermanence causes certain dharmas to perish, as wood or a pot.
This is a theory as absurd as a sick person, who, after having taken a medicine, begs the gods to render it efficacious! In the logic of this system, it is the external causes of destruction which destroy, and the characteristic of impermanence serves no function.
The same School admits that the mind and its mental states, like sound or a flame, perish immediately, without any foreign causes intervening, through the chacteristic of impermanence. Impermanence and duration accomplish their operation at one and the same time: a dharma lasts and perishes at the same time. This is inadmissable.
We conclude that it is with regard to the series that the Blessed One teaches the characteristics of conditioned things. Thus understood, the Sutra does not invite criticism, "There are three characteristics that show that the conditioned is conditioned, that it is produced through
2 successive causes . . . " "
***
If arising engenders, in a future state, the dharma that it should engender, why do not all future dharmas arise at one and the same
300
time?
46c-d. Arising engenders the dharma that it should engender, 301
but not without the cooperation of causes and conditions.
Isolated arising does not have the force of engendering the dharma that it should engender independent of the cooperation of causes and conditions.
[1. Objection of the Sautrantikas:] If this is the case, we rather
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it is with the cooperation of
? 248 Chapter Two
believe that it is the cause that engenders, and not arising; this characteristic accompanies the dhanna since the beginning of time and causes the dharma to arise when, finally, the cause of this dharma encounters another! When the causes are completed, the dharma arises; when they are not completed, it does not arise: what efficacy can
302 we attribute to arising?
[2. The Sarvastivadins answer:] Do you pretend to know all the 303
dharmas that exist? The nature of dharmas is subtle! Even though one sees them, one does not know their nature.
Moreover, in the absence of the characteristic "arising," the idea of 304
"birth" (jatabuddhi = jata iti) would be absent. And if arising is nothing other than the dharma itself exisitng after having been non- existent, the genitive "the arising of warmth" or "the arising of sensation" would not be justified; for this amounts to saying "the warmth of warmth" or "the sensation of sensation. " This is the same for duration, old age, and extinction.
[3. Reply of the Sautrantikas:] This theory leads you very far afield: in order to justify the idea of empty (sunya), or the idea of the impersonal, you would admit the existence of an entity called "emptiness" or the existence of an entity called "non-self. " And ag^in, in order to justify the ideas of one and two, large and small, separate, associated and disassociated, this and that, existant, etc. , you would admit, in agreement with the Vaisesikas, a long series of entities: number, extension, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, quality of being that, quality of being this, existence, etc. It obliges you to create a "pot-ness" in order to justify the idea of a pot.
As for the genitive, you do not admit that the individual nature of warmth and warmth are different things, and yet you speak of the individual nature of warmth.
Hence you have not proven that "arising" is a thing in and of itself; you have not proven that this is not merely a designation of a dharma in so far as it exists after having been non-existent.
When I want to teach someone that a certain dharma exists which formerly did not exist, I say to him, "This dharma has arisen," and I designate this dharma as being born. Many dharmas,--warmth,
? sensation, etc. ,--arise, that is to say, "exist after having been non- existent. " Hence there are many arisings, that is, many dharmas arising. Since arising is multiple, in order to distinguish it from other arisings, so that my questioner knows that it refers to an arising having the name "warmth" and not to an arising having the name "sensa- tion," I will employ the genitive, "the arising of warmth," or "the arising of sensation," although the arising of warmth is only the warmth arising. In the same way one says, in the world, "the odor of sandalwood," although sandalwood is only odor, or "the body of the
305 bust," although a bust is only its body.
[4. The Sarvastivadins answer:] We hold to the existence of the characteristic "arising," which belongs to conditioned things and does not belong to unconditioned things, and we can easily explain this by virtue of the fact that unconditioned things do not arise. But if conditioned things arise without "arising," why do unconditioned things, space, etc. , not arise?
We say that conditioned things arise, for they exist after having been non-existent. But how can unconditioned things arise, since they are eternal? You explain that certain dharmas,--the unconditioned dharmas,--are devoid of the characteristic "arising," because, you say, such is the nature of things (dharmata): we say, rather, that by virtue of the nature of things, none of the dharmas are susceptible of arising. Moreover, according to you, all conditioned things equally possess the characteristic "arising" that you refuse to unconditioned things: yet you admit that certain causes are capable of producing warmth but incapable of producing sensation. In the same way, according to you, since conditioned and unconditioned things are equally devoid of the characteristic of "arising," all causes that produce conditioned things are ineffacacious with regard to unconditioned things.
[5. The Vaibhasikas say that] the four characteristics, arising, etc. ,
306 are things in and of themselves.
Why?
307 308
Should we abandon the Agamas for the sole reason
that there are persons who object to them? One does not renounce
sowing for fear of deer, and one does not renounce eating dainties
309
because of flies. One must refute objections and adhere to the
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Doctrine.
***
What is namakaya, padakdya, and vyanjanakdyal
47a-b. Namakaya, etc. , are collections of samjrlas, vdkyas, and
m aksaras.
1. Ndman, "name" or "word" is understood as "that which causes 311
ideas to arise," for example the words "warmth," "sound," "odor," etc.
2. Pada or "phrase" is understood as vakya, a discourse, a phrase 312
allowing the development necessary for a complete sentence, for
example the stanza, "Impermanent are the samskdras . . . " and the 313
rest. Or rather, one should understand pada as that which causes one to comprehend the different modalities of activity, quality, and time which concern a certain person: for example, he cooks, he reads, he
314
goes; it is black, yellow, or red; he cooks, he will cook, or he
315 cooked.
3. Vyanjana is understood as aksara or phoneme (varna), vowels andconsonents,forexample,a,d,[i,/,]etc.
But are not the aksaras the names of the letters?
One does not make or one does not pronounce phonemes with a view to designating, or of giving an idea of the letters; but one makes or one writes the letters with a view to giving an idea of the phonemes, so that, when one does not understand them, one still has an idea of them through writing. Consequently the phonemes are not the names of letters.
4. Kaya or "body" means "collection;" samukti, in fact, has the sense of samavaya according to the Dhdtupdtha, iv. 114.
Hence we have: namakaya = color, sound, odor, etc. ; padakdya = "The samskdras are impermanent, the dharmas are impersonal; Nirvana is tranquil. . . " etc. ; and vyanjanakaya = ka, kha, ga, gha . . .
***
? [1. Objection of the Sautrantikas:] Are not words, phrases, and phonemes (ndman, pada, vyanjana) "voice" (vac) by nature, and consequently "sound" (sabda)? Hence they form part of the mpaskandha\ they are not samskdras disassociated from the mind as the Sarvastivadins believe.
[The Sarvastivadins:] They are not "voice. " Voice is "vocal sound," and a vocal sound only; for example, a cry does not cause one to attain to or comprehend an object. But a word (ndman) which moreover is a function of vocal sound, illumines, causes one to attain to, or signifies the object.
[The Sautrantikas:] What I call "voice" is not merely vocal sound, but a vocal sound that causes one to attain to an object, that is, a vocal sound with regard to which persons who are speaking are in agreement as to what a certain thing signifies. It is thus that the Ancients have invested the sound go with the power to signify nine things: "The sages have established the sound go in nine things, that is, cardinal region, cattle, land, a beam of light, a word, a diamond, an
316
eye, a haven, and water. " The philosopher for whom "it is the word
(ndman) which illumines the object" should admit that the sound go has been endowed by convention with these different meanings. Then if a given object is signified to the hearer by a certain word, it is indeed vocal sound and nothing else, that signifies it. What advantage is there in supposing the existence of an entity you call "word? "
[2. The Sautrantikas continue:] A word is either produced by the
317 318
voice or revealed by the voice.
a. In the first hypothesis, since voice is vocal sound by nature, any vocal sound whatsoever, even the cry of an animal, would produce a word. If you answer that a word is produced solely through a vocal sound of a certain nature--the articulation of sound, varndtmaka--we would say that this sort of vocal sound which is capable of producing a word would be quite capable of designating an object also.
In the second hypothesis, this same criticism holds by replacing the verb "to produce" with the verb "to manifest. "
b. But it is absurd to suppose that the voice produces a word. In fact, sounds do not exist at the same time? one has, for example,
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r-u-p-a--whereas the word, which you define as a dharma, an entity, cannot arise in parts. Then how can the voice, when it produces a word, produce it? You say that the case is analogous to that of avijnapti (iv. 3d): the last moment of the vijnapti, a corporeal or vocal act, creates avijnapti by reason of its previous moments. But, we would say, if the last moment of the sound of the voice creates the word, it would suffice to understand the last sound in order to attain or comprehend the object.
It is not an evasion to suppose that voice engenders the phoneme (vyanjana), that a phoneme engenders a word, and that a word causes comprehension of objects. In fact, the same objection is present, "The phonemes do not exist at the same time, etc. "
For these same reasons, it is absurd to suppose that the voice manifests a word. [Sounds do not exist at the same time, and a dharma, one entity, such as a word, cannot be mainfested in parts . . . and following].
c. [The hypothesis that "voice" engenders a phoneme--a hy- pothesis that we have previously tolerated--calls moreover for some new remarks]. Experts vainly apply their minds but do not discover a phoneme distinct from the voice. Moreover, the voice neither en- genders nor manifests the phoneme, for the same reasons that allow that the voice neither engenders nor manifests a word. [Since the "voice" is vocal sound by nature, all vocal sound would engender or manifest phonemes. If you reply that phonemes are only engendered or manifested by the vocal sound of a certain nature . . . as above ad 2a2. ]
[3. But the Sarvastivadins may suppose that] a word arises with its object, like the characteristic "arising. " The question of knowing whether it is produced or manifested by the voice, disappears.
In this hypothesis, no present word would designate a past or future thing. Moreover, a father, a mother, or other persons arbitrarily fix the word that is the proper name of a son, etc. : how can you admit that the word, like the characteristic "arising," arises simultaneously with the object? Finally, unconditioned things would not have any name, since they do not arise: a consequence that the Sarvastivadins
? cannot admit.
[4. But the Sarvastivadins are warranted by a text. ] The Blessed
One said, "A stanza (gdthd) depends on words, and a poem depends on 319
stanzas. "
[The Sautrantikas answer that] word (ndman) is a sound (sabda)
upon which persons have come to an agreement that it signifies a 32
certain thing. ? A stanza {gdtha) is a certain arrangement of words: it is in this sense that it, according to the Blessed One, depends on words. To admit an entity in and of itself called pada, is a very superfluous hypothesis. You might as well maintain that there exists, distinct from ants and minds, things in and of themselves termed "a row of ants" or
321
"a succession of minds. " Recognize then that only the phonemes
(aksaras), which are sounds, exist in and of themselves.
The Vaibhasikas admit ndmakdya, padakdya, and vyanjanakdya, as
samskdras disassociated from the mind, for, they say, none of these 322
dharmas serve as a gate of understanding. ***
We ask: (1) to which sphere of existence do the phonemes, words, and phrases belong? (2) Do they belong to living beings (sattvdkhya, i. lOb)? (3) Are they of retribution, of accumulation or of out-flowing (i. 37)? and (4) Are they good, bad, or neutral?
47c-d. They exist in Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu; they belong to
323 living beings; they are out-flowing; and they are neutral.
The phonemes, etc. , belong to two spheres of existence. According
to one opinion, they also exist in Arupyadhatu, but there they are
324 "unpronounceable. "
They belong to living beings, being produced through the efforts of living beings and consisting of articulated sounds (varna), etc. In fact, they belong to the person who speaks, not to the things that they designate.
They are an out-flowing, being produced through sabhdgahetu
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(ii. 52); they are not of retribution, since they proceed from the desire of the person who speaks; they are not of accumulation, since they are not material.
325 They are non-defiled-neutral {anivrtdvydkrta, ii. 28).
##*
We shall briefly explain the characteristics, not as yet mentioned, of the other dharmas disassociated from the mind (ii. 35).
47d-48b. The same for "genre," {sabhdgatd) which is also from retribution, and which belongs to the three spheres of existence.
"The same for," that is to say, like phonemes, words, and phrases, sabhdgatd is of the first two spheres of existence; it belongs to living beings; it is from out-flowing; and it is non-defiled-neutral.
But sabhdgatd is not only from out-flowing: it is also of retribution; it not only belongs to the first two spheres of existence, it also belongs to the third.
326 48b. Possession (prapti) is of two types.
It is of out-flowing and of retribution. 48c. Its characteristics also.
Its characteristics, arising, etc. , are of two types, like possession.
48c-d. The absorptions and non-possession (aprdpti) are of out-flowing.
The two absorptions and non-possession are only out-flowings.
As for their spheres, their relationship with living beings, their moral qualifications (good, etc. ), the explanations have been given above. The characteristics belong to all conditioned things, hence they belong to living beings and to non-living beings. For the dsamjnika and the ayus, see ii. 41d and 45a.
*##
? We have seen (9ii. 47c-d) that arising, in order to engender the
dharma that it should engender, needs the cooperation of hetus or
causes, and pratyayas or conditions. What are the hetus, and what are
327 the pratyayas?
49. The hetus are sixfold: kdranahetu, sahabhu, sabhdga, m
samprayutaka, sarvatraga, and vipdka.
Kdranahetu is reason for existence; sahabhuhetu is coexistent
cause; sabhdgahetu is parallel cause; samprayuktakahetu is associated
cause; sarvatragahetu is universal cause, and vipdkahetu is retributive
cause: such are the six types of causes that the Abhidharmikas (Jndna- 329
prasthdna, TD p. 920c5) recognize.
50a. All dharmas are kdranahetu with regard to all, with the
exception of themselves.
A dharma is not a kdranahetu of itself.
With this exception, that all of the dharmas are kdranahetu with regard to all other conditioned dharmas, because no dharma constitutes an obstacle to the arising of the dharmas susceptible of arising.
It results from this definition that the dharmas that are saha- bhuhetu, etc. , are also kdranahetu: all other hetus are included within kdranahetu. The hetu that does not receive a special name, which is simply kdrana, "reason for existence," without any other qualification is kdranahetu: it receives as its particular name the name that suits all the hetus. Compare this with the name of the rupdyatana (i. 24).
***
Kdranahetu calls for the following observations:
1. Vices are produced among the ignorant; once the Truths are known, they are not produced, as the stars are not visible when the sun shines. Hence the consciousness of the Truths, or the sun, causes an obstacle to the vices, or to the stars. Then it is false to say that all conditioned dharmas are kdranahetu because they create no obstacle to arising.
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We understand that the consciousness of the Truths and the clarity
of the sun create no obstacle to the arising of the dharma which is
"arising" {utpadyamdnd), that is to say of the dharma, which, its causes 330
being completed, continues to exist.
2. What is called cause or reason for existence, may be what is
capable of causing, or of not causing, an obstacle! In faa, when their
lord does not oppress them, villagers say, "We are fortunate through
331
the actions of our master. " But can one call cause that which, being
incapable of causing an obstacle, does not cause an obstacle? Nirvana is incapable of creating any obstacle to the arising of any conditioned thing: such too are future dharmas with regard to past dharmas, or creatures of hell or animals with regard to beings in Arupyadhatu: Nirvana, future dharmas, or creatures in hell are as if they did not exist with regard to their being an obstacle to the arising of the conditioned things in question. Can one consider them as causes?
They are causes; for, even when the lord is incapable of harming them, the villagers express themselves as we have said; but not about a non-existent lord
3. The definition that we have given of kdranahetu is a general
definition and includes that which is kdranahetu par excellence and
that which is simply kdranahetu. Kdranahetu par excellence is the
generating cause: in this sense, eye and color are the kdranahetu of the 332
consciousness of sight; as food is with regard to the body, the seeds, etc. , with regard to the sprout, etc. (see ii. 56b).
[4. Objection. ] If all the dharmas are the causes of other dharmas because they do not cause any obstacle, why do not all the dharmas
333
arise together? Why, when one murder is committed, are not all
creatures, like the murderer himself, guilty of the crime of murder? This objection is useless. In faa, all the dharmas receive the name of kdranahetu because they do not create any obstacle: it is not that
they are all agents.
5. According to other masters, all karanahetus possess a real
efficacy with regard to all dharmas. For example Nirvana and the consciousness of sight: a mental consciousness, good or bad, arises having Nirvana as its objea (dlambana, ii. 62c-d); from this mental
? consciousness there later arises a consciousness of sight; then Nirvana has efficacy, albeit mediately, with regard to the consciousness of sight.
The same argument applies to future dharmas, to beings in hell, etc.
***
50c-d Sahabhuhetu, coexistent causes, namely the elements
(bhuta), the mind and the companions of the mind, character-
istics and the thing characterized, are the dharmas that are 334
11. The dharmas that are causes (purusakdraphala, ii. 58) one of the other, are called sahabhuhetu. ^
336
For example, the primary elements (mahdbhuta) are, among
themselves, sahabhuhetu. The same for the mind and its companions (ii. 51); the same for the characteristics, arising, etc. (ii. 45b), and the dharmas that they characterize.
causes one of the other.
In the category of sahabhuhetu are then included all conditioned 337
dharmas which are in a mutual relationship of causality.
2. We have reason not to complete the above definition. A dharma
is a sahabhuhetu of its secondary characteristics (anulaksana, ii. 45)
without being in a mutual relationship of causality with them: for the
secondary characteristics are not the sahabhuhetu of their dharma. 338
This is a case to be added to the definition.
*#*
What dharmas are called "the companions of the mind? "
51a-c The companions of the mind are: the mental states; the two disciplines (samvara); and the characteristics (laksanas) of the mental states, the two disciplines and the mind
These are all the dharmas associated with the mind {cittasam- prayukta, ii. 24), the discipline of absorption and pure discipline
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(iv. l7d), and the characteristics, arising, etc. (ii. 45b) of all these, and also of the mind
[Why are they termed "companions of the mind"? ]
5 Id. From the point of view of time, of result, etc. , and of goodness, etc.
The companions are associated with the mind:
1. In regard to time: they have the same arising, the same duration,
and the same destruction as does the mind; they are of the same time period as the mind.
When we say "the same arising . . . ," we understand the word "same" in the sense of concomitance: the companions arise, last, and perish at the same time as does the mind; but their arising is distinct.
The minds that are not destined to arise do not arise, nor last, nor perish: the same for their companions. This is why the phrase, "The companions are of the same time period as the mind" is added. [The mind which should arise is future until the moment when it arises if it is to arise: its companions are hence future; it is past after the moment
339
when it shall perish if it arose: its companions are then past. ]
2. In regard to the result, etc. Result means purusakdraphala
(ii. 58a-b) and visamyogaphala (ii. 57d); and "et cetera" refers to vipdkaphala (ii. 57) and nisyandaphala (ii. 57c).
The companions have the same result, the same vipaka, and the same nisyanda as the mind: "same" indicates identity.
3. In regard to goodness, etc. The companions are good, bad, or neutral, like the mind which they accompany.
There are then ten reasons why the companions are termed
34 companions. ?
***
341
The mind having the least number of companions is a
sahabhuhetu of fifty-eight dharmas: namely 1) the ten mahdhhumikas (ii. 23) with the four characteristics of each of them; and 2) the four characteristics and the four secondary characteristics (anulaksana,
? ii. 46).
If, from these fifty-eight dharmas, the four secondary character-
istics of the mind--which have no effect upon it--are set aside, then 342
we have fifty-four dharmas that are sahahhuhetu of the same mind. According to another opinion, only fourteen dharmas are sahahhuhetu of this mind, namely its four charaaeristics and the ten
mahabhumikas. As the secondary charaaeristics have no effea on the mind, the characteristics of the mahabhumikas likewise have no effect on the mind
The Vaibhasikas reject this opinion--that the forty charaaeristics
of the mahabhumikas are not sahahhuhetu of the mind,--as contra-
dictory to the doctrine of the Prakaranagrantha according to which
"the four charaaeristics,--arising, duration, old age, and imperma-
nence,--of the belief in self {satkayadrsti) . . . and in the dharmas
associated with this belief (comprising the mahabhumikas), are at the 343
same time a result and a cause of the belief in self. "
Certain Masters, in their reading of the Prakaranagrantha, omit
the words, "and of the dharmas associated with this belief. " According to the Vaibhasikas of Kdsmir, these words figure in the text; or, if they are missing, the context indicates that one should supply them and that the passage as it stands is incomplete.
***
Any dharma that is a sahahhuhetu cause is a sahabhil or a coexistant item. But there are some coexistant items that are not sahahhuhetu:
1. the secondary characteristics of the principal dharma (mula- dharma) are not a sahahhuhetu regarding this dharma (ii. 46a-b);
2. these same are not sahahhuhetu among themselves;
3. the secondary characteristics of the companions of the mind are not a sahahhuhetu regarding the mind;
4. these same are not a sahahhuhetu among themselves;
5. derived matter, blue, etc. , susceptible of resistance and which has also arisen together, are not a sahahhuhetu among themselves;
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6. a part of derived matter not susceptible to resistance and also arisen together with them, is not a sahabhuhetu) with the exception of the two disciplines (see 1. 136);
7. no derived matter, even though arisen with the elements, is a sahabhuhetu with the elements;
8. possession (prapti), even when it arises with the dbarma to which it is related, is not a sahabhuhetu to it.
The dharmas of these eight categories are coexistant (sahabhu), but are not sahabhuhetu, because their results, vipdka or nisyanda, are not identical (see p. 259). As for possession, it does not always accompany the dharma: it arises either before the dharma, or after it, or at the same time as it (ii. 37-38).
***
[The Sautrantikas criticize the doctrine of coexistant causes. ]
All this may be right, that is, "what is a sahabhuhetu cause, a mutually coexistant cause, is a coexistant item," and the rest. Never- theless, in the world, the relationship of cause to effect is well proven in certain cases: the cause is previous to the effect. It is in this way that a seed is the cause of the sprout, the sprout of the stalk, etc. But one does not prove a similar relationship between simultaneous things. You should then demonstrate that dharmas arisen together can be in a cause and effect relationship.
[The Sarvastivadins supply two examples. ] The lamp arises with its light; the sprout, growing in the light, arises with its shadow. Now a lamp is the cause of its light and a sprout is the cause of its shadow. Thus cause and effect can be simultaneous.
[The Sautrantikas:] These examples are not proven. We must examine whether a lamp is the cause of its light, or if, as we think, a lamp with its light are both the effeet of a complex of previous causes and conditions, oil, wick, etc. In the same way, a complex of previous causes (seed, light) is the cause of the sprout and its shadow, of the sprout with its shadow.
[The Sarvastivadins:] The relationship of cause and effect is
? proven by the existence and the non-existence of what is called effect,
similar to the existence and the non-existence of what is called cause.
The definition of the Logicians {hetukas) is very good: "When A is or
is not, and when B is or is not, then A is considered as cause, and B is
considered as effect. " Granted this, if we examine the dharmas that we
have defined as mutually coexistent and sahabhilhetu, we see that they
all exist when one of them exists, and that none exist when one of
344
them is absent. They are then in a relationship of mutual cause and
effect.
[The Sautrantikas:] Admitting that among the simultaneous
dharmasy one dharma can be the cause of another dharma, then the 345
organ of sight is the cause of visual consciousness. But how many simultaneous dharmas are the cause and effect of one another?
[The Sarvastivadins:] Mutual causality is proven by the definition that we have given of causality. When the mind exists, its mental states exist, and vice versa.
[The Sautrantikas:] Very well, but then the Sarvastivadins should revise their system.
iii. However, since one cannot consider characteristics as things in and of themselves, one can say that each moment taken separately possesse the four characterisitcs.
In fact, (1) each moment exists after having been non-existent: its existence, following upon its non-existence, is its arising; (2) after having existed, it does not exist anymore: this is its disappearance; (3) the duration of the moment is the concatenation or the process of successive moments: in fact, if the subsequent moment resembles the previous moment, it is then its substitute: the previous moment still exists or still lasts. Thus the subsequent moment can be considered as the duration of the previous moment; (4) the dissimilitude of duration is its transformation.
Would you say that there is no dissimilitude when the successive moments are similar (sadrsa)?
There is dissimilitude, as this results from the difference in time of the slower or faster falling of a vajra that is or is not projected, and which is projected with or without force: difference due in each case to a transformation or a difference of the primary elements of the vajra. When the dharmas succeed themselves in a homogeneous series, the difference is small; that is why, although they differ, they are considered as similar.
[The Sarvastivadins object:] Your definition of characteristics does
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not hold for all conditioned dharmas. In fact, your definition of duration supposes a subsequent moment: but such a moment does not exist for the last moment of the mind of an Arhat. Hence the last moment of a sound, a flame, or an Arhat, has neither duration nor transformation.
We do not attribute duration to all conditioned dharmas\ We say rather, that all duration is subject to transformation. The Blessed One teaches three characteristics, because, in certain cases, there are three characteristics. But, for the last moment of a flame, there is only producation and disappearance, and no duration or transformation.
In short, conditioned dharmas exist after having existed; after having existed, they no longer exist; the series of dharmas is their duration; dissimilarity of the series is their transformation. Such is the teaching that the Blessed One gives in the Sutra of the Three Characteristics. This has nothing to do with things in and of themselves, arising, etc.
[iv. The Vaibhasikas object:] According to you, arising is the dharma itself in so far as it exists after having been non-existent. The dharma which is the "thing characterized" {laksya), would then be the characteristic (laksana) also.
What is wrong with that? The marks of a Mahapurusa are not different or distinct from the Mahapurusa himself. The horns, the hump, the fetlock, the hoof, and the tail of a cow, which are its marks, are not different from the cow. The primary elements do not exist apart from their individual characteristics, solidity, etc. (i. l2d). In this same way, for the Vaibhasikas who affirm the "momentariness" of the
294 dharmas, the rising of smoke is none other than the smoke itself
Let us look at this a bit closer. Although I grasp the individual
nature of visible things, etc. , which are conditioned, yet as long as I do
not know the fact that they did not exist previously, that they will not
exist later, and that their series transforms itself, then I shall not know
their quality of being conditioned. Consequently, the quality of being
conditioned does not have for a mark the quality of being conditioned,
295
but rather previous non-existence, etc. And there do not exist
characteristics, things in and of themselves, distinct from visible things
? and other conditioned things.
v. If we admit the reality of characteristics, then since they are
given as simultaneous, we would have to admit that one dharma arises, lasts, grows old and perishes at one and the same time.
It is in vain that the Sarvastivadins pretend that the characteristics do not exercise their activity at one and the same time; that arising engenders before being born itself, being still in a future state, and that once it is born it does not engender any longer; that duration, old age, and impermanence exercise their activity when they are present and not in a future state; and that, consequently, the last three character- istics are active in a moment when the first is no longer active, so the four characteristics can be simultaneous without contradiction.
Let us first consider arising which, being future, engenders. One must examine whether a future dharma, supposing that it does exist, can be active. If future arising produces the operation of engendering, how can one say that it is future? In fact, according to the Vaibhasikas, a future dharma is one that does not exercise its activity. You would have to define future. On the other hand, when a dharma has arisen, has been engendered, and the operation of arising is past, how can you say that arising is then of the present? You would have to define present.
And either the activity of the other characteristics is exercised simultaneously, or their activity is exercised in succession. In the first hypothesis, whereas duration makes a dharma last, old age makes it age and impermanence destroys it: the dharma lasts, ages and perishes at the same time. As for the second hypothesis, to admit that the activity of these characteristics is not simultaneous is to admit three
296 moments, and this is to renounce the doctrine of momentariness.
time during which the characteristics have achieved their operation. Then explain why, in this hypothesis, duration, arising at the same time as old age and impermanence, accomplishes its operation of "making last that which should last" before old age and impermanence accomplish their operation of making things age and destroying them. If you answer that duration, being stronger, accomplishes its operation
[The Vaibhasikas answer:] For us, the ksana or moment is the 297
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first, then we would ask how duration is weakened later in such a manner that, encountering old age and impermanence, it ages and perishes, not alone, but with the dharma that it should have made last.
You say perhaps that duration, having achieved its task, cannot perform it again, in the same way that arising, having engendered something, engenders no more. The comparison is not legitimate. The operation of arising consists of attracting the dharma that it should engender from the future and causing it to enter into the present; once the dharma has entered into the present, arising is incapable of making it enter therein again. But the operation of duration is to make the dharma "which should be made to last" last, of hindering the dharma which makes old age and perishing last. Duration is capable of making that which lasts last indefinitely. Consequently, duration is capable of repeating its operation.
By reason of what obstacle or from what adverse forces would the activity of duration cease once it has begun? Would these forces be old age and impermanence, old age weakening duration which imperma- nence then kills? Since, in this hypothesis, old age and impermanence are stronger than duration, it is proper then that they exercise their activity first. Further, according to your conception of duration and its role, it is through the activity of duration that, not only the principal dharma, but also old age and impermanence, last. Hence, when the activity of duration ends, the principal dharma, as well as old age and impermanence, cease their duration. We ask how, and with regard to what object, old age and impermanence exercise their activity of aging and causing to perish?
We do not see what it is that old age and impermanence have to do. It is through duration that one dharma, once it arises, does not perish for a certain time, does not perish as soon as it arises. If duration, its task completed, neglects the dharma, it will quite certainly not last any longer; that is to say, it perishes in and of itself.
We well understand the duration and impermanence of the dharma, "A dharma, after having arisen, does not perish," "A dharma, after having lasted, perishes. " But how can one attribute old age to a dharma} Old age is a transformation, a dissimilarity between two
? states. Now, can one say of a single dharma that it becomes different from itself?
"If it remains this, it is not that; if it is transformed, it is no longer this. Hence the transformation of a dharma is impossible. "
298
According to another School,
external causes of destruction, fire or a hammer, etc. , that the characteristics of impermanence causes certain dharmas to perish, as wood or a pot.
This is a theory as absurd as a sick person, who, after having taken a medicine, begs the gods to render it efficacious! In the logic of this system, it is the external causes of destruction which destroy, and the characteristic of impermanence serves no function.
The same School admits that the mind and its mental states, like sound or a flame, perish immediately, without any foreign causes intervening, through the chacteristic of impermanence. Impermanence and duration accomplish their operation at one and the same time: a dharma lasts and perishes at the same time. This is inadmissable.
We conclude that it is with regard to the series that the Blessed One teaches the characteristics of conditioned things. Thus understood, the Sutra does not invite criticism, "There are three characteristics that show that the conditioned is conditioned, that it is produced through
2 successive causes . . . " "
***
If arising engenders, in a future state, the dharma that it should engender, why do not all future dharmas arise at one and the same
300
time?
46c-d. Arising engenders the dharma that it should engender, 301
but not without the cooperation of causes and conditions.
Isolated arising does not have the force of engendering the dharma that it should engender independent of the cooperation of causes and conditions.
[1. Objection of the Sautrantikas:] If this is the case, we rather
The Indriyas 247
it is with the cooperation of
? 248 Chapter Two
believe that it is the cause that engenders, and not arising; this characteristic accompanies the dhanna since the beginning of time and causes the dharma to arise when, finally, the cause of this dharma encounters another! When the causes are completed, the dharma arises; when they are not completed, it does not arise: what efficacy can
302 we attribute to arising?
[2. The Sarvastivadins answer:] Do you pretend to know all the 303
dharmas that exist? The nature of dharmas is subtle! Even though one sees them, one does not know their nature.
Moreover, in the absence of the characteristic "arising," the idea of 304
"birth" (jatabuddhi = jata iti) would be absent. And if arising is nothing other than the dharma itself exisitng after having been non- existent, the genitive "the arising of warmth" or "the arising of sensation" would not be justified; for this amounts to saying "the warmth of warmth" or "the sensation of sensation. " This is the same for duration, old age, and extinction.
[3. Reply of the Sautrantikas:] This theory leads you very far afield: in order to justify the idea of empty (sunya), or the idea of the impersonal, you would admit the existence of an entity called "emptiness" or the existence of an entity called "non-self. " And ag^in, in order to justify the ideas of one and two, large and small, separate, associated and disassociated, this and that, existant, etc. , you would admit, in agreement with the Vaisesikas, a long series of entities: number, extension, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, quality of being that, quality of being this, existence, etc. It obliges you to create a "pot-ness" in order to justify the idea of a pot.
As for the genitive, you do not admit that the individual nature of warmth and warmth are different things, and yet you speak of the individual nature of warmth.
Hence you have not proven that "arising" is a thing in and of itself; you have not proven that this is not merely a designation of a dharma in so far as it exists after having been non-existent.
When I want to teach someone that a certain dharma exists which formerly did not exist, I say to him, "This dharma has arisen," and I designate this dharma as being born. Many dharmas,--warmth,
? sensation, etc. ,--arise, that is to say, "exist after having been non- existent. " Hence there are many arisings, that is, many dharmas arising. Since arising is multiple, in order to distinguish it from other arisings, so that my questioner knows that it refers to an arising having the name "warmth" and not to an arising having the name "sensa- tion," I will employ the genitive, "the arising of warmth," or "the arising of sensation," although the arising of warmth is only the warmth arising. In the same way one says, in the world, "the odor of sandalwood," although sandalwood is only odor, or "the body of the
305 bust," although a bust is only its body.
[4. The Sarvastivadins answer:] We hold to the existence of the characteristic "arising," which belongs to conditioned things and does not belong to unconditioned things, and we can easily explain this by virtue of the fact that unconditioned things do not arise. But if conditioned things arise without "arising," why do unconditioned things, space, etc. , not arise?
We say that conditioned things arise, for they exist after having been non-existent. But how can unconditioned things arise, since they are eternal? You explain that certain dharmas,--the unconditioned dharmas,--are devoid of the characteristic "arising," because, you say, such is the nature of things (dharmata): we say, rather, that by virtue of the nature of things, none of the dharmas are susceptible of arising. Moreover, according to you, all conditioned things equally possess the characteristic "arising" that you refuse to unconditioned things: yet you admit that certain causes are capable of producing warmth but incapable of producing sensation. In the same way, according to you, since conditioned and unconditioned things are equally devoid of the characteristic of "arising," all causes that produce conditioned things are ineffacacious with regard to unconditioned things.
[5. The Vaibhasikas say that] the four characteristics, arising, etc. ,
306 are things in and of themselves.
Why?
307 308
Should we abandon the Agamas for the sole reason
that there are persons who object to them? One does not renounce
sowing for fear of deer, and one does not renounce eating dainties
309
because of flies. One must refute objections and adhere to the
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Doctrine.
***
What is namakaya, padakdya, and vyanjanakdyal
47a-b. Namakaya, etc. , are collections of samjrlas, vdkyas, and
m aksaras.
1. Ndman, "name" or "word" is understood as "that which causes 311
ideas to arise," for example the words "warmth," "sound," "odor," etc.
2. Pada or "phrase" is understood as vakya, a discourse, a phrase 312
allowing the development necessary for a complete sentence, for
example the stanza, "Impermanent are the samskdras . . . " and the 313
rest. Or rather, one should understand pada as that which causes one to comprehend the different modalities of activity, quality, and time which concern a certain person: for example, he cooks, he reads, he
314
goes; it is black, yellow, or red; he cooks, he will cook, or he
315 cooked.
3. Vyanjana is understood as aksara or phoneme (varna), vowels andconsonents,forexample,a,d,[i,/,]etc.
But are not the aksaras the names of the letters?
One does not make or one does not pronounce phonemes with a view to designating, or of giving an idea of the letters; but one makes or one writes the letters with a view to giving an idea of the phonemes, so that, when one does not understand them, one still has an idea of them through writing. Consequently the phonemes are not the names of letters.
4. Kaya or "body" means "collection;" samukti, in fact, has the sense of samavaya according to the Dhdtupdtha, iv. 114.
Hence we have: namakaya = color, sound, odor, etc. ; padakdya = "The samskdras are impermanent, the dharmas are impersonal; Nirvana is tranquil. . . " etc. ; and vyanjanakaya = ka, kha, ga, gha . . .
***
? [1. Objection of the Sautrantikas:] Are not words, phrases, and phonemes (ndman, pada, vyanjana) "voice" (vac) by nature, and consequently "sound" (sabda)? Hence they form part of the mpaskandha\ they are not samskdras disassociated from the mind as the Sarvastivadins believe.
[The Sarvastivadins:] They are not "voice. " Voice is "vocal sound," and a vocal sound only; for example, a cry does not cause one to attain to or comprehend an object. But a word (ndman) which moreover is a function of vocal sound, illumines, causes one to attain to, or signifies the object.
[The Sautrantikas:] What I call "voice" is not merely vocal sound, but a vocal sound that causes one to attain to an object, that is, a vocal sound with regard to which persons who are speaking are in agreement as to what a certain thing signifies. It is thus that the Ancients have invested the sound go with the power to signify nine things: "The sages have established the sound go in nine things, that is, cardinal region, cattle, land, a beam of light, a word, a diamond, an
316
eye, a haven, and water. " The philosopher for whom "it is the word
(ndman) which illumines the object" should admit that the sound go has been endowed by convention with these different meanings. Then if a given object is signified to the hearer by a certain word, it is indeed vocal sound and nothing else, that signifies it. What advantage is there in supposing the existence of an entity you call "word? "
[2. The Sautrantikas continue:] A word is either produced by the
317 318
voice or revealed by the voice.
a. In the first hypothesis, since voice is vocal sound by nature, any vocal sound whatsoever, even the cry of an animal, would produce a word. If you answer that a word is produced solely through a vocal sound of a certain nature--the articulation of sound, varndtmaka--we would say that this sort of vocal sound which is capable of producing a word would be quite capable of designating an object also.
In the second hypothesis, this same criticism holds by replacing the verb "to produce" with the verb "to manifest. "
b. But it is absurd to suppose that the voice produces a word. In fact, sounds do not exist at the same time? one has, for example,
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r-u-p-a--whereas the word, which you define as a dharma, an entity, cannot arise in parts. Then how can the voice, when it produces a word, produce it? You say that the case is analogous to that of avijnapti (iv. 3d): the last moment of the vijnapti, a corporeal or vocal act, creates avijnapti by reason of its previous moments. But, we would say, if the last moment of the sound of the voice creates the word, it would suffice to understand the last sound in order to attain or comprehend the object.
It is not an evasion to suppose that voice engenders the phoneme (vyanjana), that a phoneme engenders a word, and that a word causes comprehension of objects. In fact, the same objection is present, "The phonemes do not exist at the same time, etc. "
For these same reasons, it is absurd to suppose that the voice manifests a word. [Sounds do not exist at the same time, and a dharma, one entity, such as a word, cannot be mainfested in parts . . . and following].
c. [The hypothesis that "voice" engenders a phoneme--a hy- pothesis that we have previously tolerated--calls moreover for some new remarks]. Experts vainly apply their minds but do not discover a phoneme distinct from the voice. Moreover, the voice neither en- genders nor manifests the phoneme, for the same reasons that allow that the voice neither engenders nor manifests a word. [Since the "voice" is vocal sound by nature, all vocal sound would engender or manifest phonemes. If you reply that phonemes are only engendered or manifested by the vocal sound of a certain nature . . . as above ad 2a2. ]
[3. But the Sarvastivadins may suppose that] a word arises with its object, like the characteristic "arising. " The question of knowing whether it is produced or manifested by the voice, disappears.
In this hypothesis, no present word would designate a past or future thing. Moreover, a father, a mother, or other persons arbitrarily fix the word that is the proper name of a son, etc. : how can you admit that the word, like the characteristic "arising," arises simultaneously with the object? Finally, unconditioned things would not have any name, since they do not arise: a consequence that the Sarvastivadins
? cannot admit.
[4. But the Sarvastivadins are warranted by a text. ] The Blessed
One said, "A stanza (gdthd) depends on words, and a poem depends on 319
stanzas. "
[The Sautrantikas answer that] word (ndman) is a sound (sabda)
upon which persons have come to an agreement that it signifies a 32
certain thing. ? A stanza {gdtha) is a certain arrangement of words: it is in this sense that it, according to the Blessed One, depends on words. To admit an entity in and of itself called pada, is a very superfluous hypothesis. You might as well maintain that there exists, distinct from ants and minds, things in and of themselves termed "a row of ants" or
321
"a succession of minds. " Recognize then that only the phonemes
(aksaras), which are sounds, exist in and of themselves.
The Vaibhasikas admit ndmakdya, padakdya, and vyanjanakdya, as
samskdras disassociated from the mind, for, they say, none of these 322
dharmas serve as a gate of understanding. ***
We ask: (1) to which sphere of existence do the phonemes, words, and phrases belong? (2) Do they belong to living beings (sattvdkhya, i. lOb)? (3) Are they of retribution, of accumulation or of out-flowing (i. 37)? and (4) Are they good, bad, or neutral?
47c-d. They exist in Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu; they belong to
323 living beings; they are out-flowing; and they are neutral.
The phonemes, etc. , belong to two spheres of existence. According
to one opinion, they also exist in Arupyadhatu, but there they are
324 "unpronounceable. "
They belong to living beings, being produced through the efforts of living beings and consisting of articulated sounds (varna), etc. In fact, they belong to the person who speaks, not to the things that they designate.
They are an out-flowing, being produced through sabhdgahetu
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(ii. 52); they are not of retribution, since they proceed from the desire of the person who speaks; they are not of accumulation, since they are not material.
325 They are non-defiled-neutral {anivrtdvydkrta, ii. 28).
##*
We shall briefly explain the characteristics, not as yet mentioned, of the other dharmas disassociated from the mind (ii. 35).
47d-48b. The same for "genre," {sabhdgatd) which is also from retribution, and which belongs to the three spheres of existence.
"The same for," that is to say, like phonemes, words, and phrases, sabhdgatd is of the first two spheres of existence; it belongs to living beings; it is from out-flowing; and it is non-defiled-neutral.
But sabhdgatd is not only from out-flowing: it is also of retribution; it not only belongs to the first two spheres of existence, it also belongs to the third.
326 48b. Possession (prapti) is of two types.
It is of out-flowing and of retribution. 48c. Its characteristics also.
Its characteristics, arising, etc. , are of two types, like possession.
48c-d. The absorptions and non-possession (aprdpti) are of out-flowing.
The two absorptions and non-possession are only out-flowings.
As for their spheres, their relationship with living beings, their moral qualifications (good, etc. ), the explanations have been given above. The characteristics belong to all conditioned things, hence they belong to living beings and to non-living beings. For the dsamjnika and the ayus, see ii. 41d and 45a.
*##
? We have seen (9ii. 47c-d) that arising, in order to engender the
dharma that it should engender, needs the cooperation of hetus or
causes, and pratyayas or conditions. What are the hetus, and what are
327 the pratyayas?
49. The hetus are sixfold: kdranahetu, sahabhu, sabhdga, m
samprayutaka, sarvatraga, and vipdka.
Kdranahetu is reason for existence; sahabhuhetu is coexistent
cause; sabhdgahetu is parallel cause; samprayuktakahetu is associated
cause; sarvatragahetu is universal cause, and vipdkahetu is retributive
cause: such are the six types of causes that the Abhidharmikas (Jndna- 329
prasthdna, TD p. 920c5) recognize.
50a. All dharmas are kdranahetu with regard to all, with the
exception of themselves.
A dharma is not a kdranahetu of itself.
With this exception, that all of the dharmas are kdranahetu with regard to all other conditioned dharmas, because no dharma constitutes an obstacle to the arising of the dharmas susceptible of arising.
It results from this definition that the dharmas that are saha- bhuhetu, etc. , are also kdranahetu: all other hetus are included within kdranahetu. The hetu that does not receive a special name, which is simply kdrana, "reason for existence," without any other qualification is kdranahetu: it receives as its particular name the name that suits all the hetus. Compare this with the name of the rupdyatana (i. 24).
***
Kdranahetu calls for the following observations:
1. Vices are produced among the ignorant; once the Truths are known, they are not produced, as the stars are not visible when the sun shines. Hence the consciousness of the Truths, or the sun, causes an obstacle to the vices, or to the stars. Then it is false to say that all conditioned dharmas are kdranahetu because they create no obstacle to arising.
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We understand that the consciousness of the Truths and the clarity
of the sun create no obstacle to the arising of the dharma which is
"arising" {utpadyamdnd), that is to say of the dharma, which, its causes 330
being completed, continues to exist.
2. What is called cause or reason for existence, may be what is
capable of causing, or of not causing, an obstacle! In faa, when their
lord does not oppress them, villagers say, "We are fortunate through
331
the actions of our master. " But can one call cause that which, being
incapable of causing an obstacle, does not cause an obstacle? Nirvana is incapable of creating any obstacle to the arising of any conditioned thing: such too are future dharmas with regard to past dharmas, or creatures of hell or animals with regard to beings in Arupyadhatu: Nirvana, future dharmas, or creatures in hell are as if they did not exist with regard to their being an obstacle to the arising of the conditioned things in question. Can one consider them as causes?
They are causes; for, even when the lord is incapable of harming them, the villagers express themselves as we have said; but not about a non-existent lord
3. The definition that we have given of kdranahetu is a general
definition and includes that which is kdranahetu par excellence and
that which is simply kdranahetu. Kdranahetu par excellence is the
generating cause: in this sense, eye and color are the kdranahetu of the 332
consciousness of sight; as food is with regard to the body, the seeds, etc. , with regard to the sprout, etc. (see ii. 56b).
[4. Objection. ] If all the dharmas are the causes of other dharmas because they do not cause any obstacle, why do not all the dharmas
333
arise together? Why, when one murder is committed, are not all
creatures, like the murderer himself, guilty of the crime of murder? This objection is useless. In faa, all the dharmas receive the name of kdranahetu because they do not create any obstacle: it is not that
they are all agents.
5. According to other masters, all karanahetus possess a real
efficacy with regard to all dharmas. For example Nirvana and the consciousness of sight: a mental consciousness, good or bad, arises having Nirvana as its objea (dlambana, ii. 62c-d); from this mental
? consciousness there later arises a consciousness of sight; then Nirvana has efficacy, albeit mediately, with regard to the consciousness of sight.
The same argument applies to future dharmas, to beings in hell, etc.
***
50c-d Sahabhuhetu, coexistent causes, namely the elements
(bhuta), the mind and the companions of the mind, character-
istics and the thing characterized, are the dharmas that are 334
11. The dharmas that are causes (purusakdraphala, ii. 58) one of the other, are called sahabhuhetu. ^
336
For example, the primary elements (mahdbhuta) are, among
themselves, sahabhuhetu. The same for the mind and its companions (ii. 51); the same for the characteristics, arising, etc. (ii. 45b), and the dharmas that they characterize.
causes one of the other.
In the category of sahabhuhetu are then included all conditioned 337
dharmas which are in a mutual relationship of causality.
2. We have reason not to complete the above definition. A dharma
is a sahabhuhetu of its secondary characteristics (anulaksana, ii. 45)
without being in a mutual relationship of causality with them: for the
secondary characteristics are not the sahabhuhetu of their dharma. 338
This is a case to be added to the definition.
*#*
What dharmas are called "the companions of the mind? "
51a-c The companions of the mind are: the mental states; the two disciplines (samvara); and the characteristics (laksanas) of the mental states, the two disciplines and the mind
These are all the dharmas associated with the mind {cittasam- prayukta, ii. 24), the discipline of absorption and pure discipline
The Indriyas 257
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(iv. l7d), and the characteristics, arising, etc. (ii. 45b) of all these, and also of the mind
[Why are they termed "companions of the mind"? ]
5 Id. From the point of view of time, of result, etc. , and of goodness, etc.
The companions are associated with the mind:
1. In regard to time: they have the same arising, the same duration,
and the same destruction as does the mind; they are of the same time period as the mind.
When we say "the same arising . . . ," we understand the word "same" in the sense of concomitance: the companions arise, last, and perish at the same time as does the mind; but their arising is distinct.
The minds that are not destined to arise do not arise, nor last, nor perish: the same for their companions. This is why the phrase, "The companions are of the same time period as the mind" is added. [The mind which should arise is future until the moment when it arises if it is to arise: its companions are hence future; it is past after the moment
339
when it shall perish if it arose: its companions are then past. ]
2. In regard to the result, etc. Result means purusakdraphala
(ii. 58a-b) and visamyogaphala (ii. 57d); and "et cetera" refers to vipdkaphala (ii. 57) and nisyandaphala (ii. 57c).
The companions have the same result, the same vipaka, and the same nisyanda as the mind: "same" indicates identity.
3. In regard to goodness, etc. The companions are good, bad, or neutral, like the mind which they accompany.
There are then ten reasons why the companions are termed
34 companions. ?
***
341
The mind having the least number of companions is a
sahabhuhetu of fifty-eight dharmas: namely 1) the ten mahdhhumikas (ii. 23) with the four characteristics of each of them; and 2) the four characteristics and the four secondary characteristics (anulaksana,
? ii. 46).
If, from these fifty-eight dharmas, the four secondary character-
istics of the mind--which have no effect upon it--are set aside, then 342
we have fifty-four dharmas that are sahahhuhetu of the same mind. According to another opinion, only fourteen dharmas are sahahhuhetu of this mind, namely its four charaaeristics and the ten
mahabhumikas. As the secondary charaaeristics have no effea on the mind, the characteristics of the mahabhumikas likewise have no effect on the mind
The Vaibhasikas reject this opinion--that the forty charaaeristics
of the mahabhumikas are not sahahhuhetu of the mind,--as contra-
dictory to the doctrine of the Prakaranagrantha according to which
"the four charaaeristics,--arising, duration, old age, and imperma-
nence,--of the belief in self {satkayadrsti) . . . and in the dharmas
associated with this belief (comprising the mahabhumikas), are at the 343
same time a result and a cause of the belief in self. "
Certain Masters, in their reading of the Prakaranagrantha, omit
the words, "and of the dharmas associated with this belief. " According to the Vaibhasikas of Kdsmir, these words figure in the text; or, if they are missing, the context indicates that one should supply them and that the passage as it stands is incomplete.
***
Any dharma that is a sahahhuhetu cause is a sahabhil or a coexistant item. But there are some coexistant items that are not sahahhuhetu:
1. the secondary characteristics of the principal dharma (mula- dharma) are not a sahahhuhetu regarding this dharma (ii. 46a-b);
2. these same are not sahahhuhetu among themselves;
3. the secondary characteristics of the companions of the mind are not a sahahhuhetu regarding the mind;
4. these same are not a sahahhuhetu among themselves;
5. derived matter, blue, etc. , susceptible of resistance and which has also arisen together, are not a sahahhuhetu among themselves;
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6. a part of derived matter not susceptible to resistance and also arisen together with them, is not a sahabhuhetu) with the exception of the two disciplines (see 1. 136);
7. no derived matter, even though arisen with the elements, is a sahabhuhetu with the elements;
8. possession (prapti), even when it arises with the dbarma to which it is related, is not a sahabhuhetu to it.
The dharmas of these eight categories are coexistant (sahabhu), but are not sahabhuhetu, because their results, vipdka or nisyanda, are not identical (see p. 259). As for possession, it does not always accompany the dharma: it arises either before the dharma, or after it, or at the same time as it (ii. 37-38).
***
[The Sautrantikas criticize the doctrine of coexistant causes. ]
All this may be right, that is, "what is a sahabhuhetu cause, a mutually coexistant cause, is a coexistant item," and the rest. Never- theless, in the world, the relationship of cause to effect is well proven in certain cases: the cause is previous to the effect. It is in this way that a seed is the cause of the sprout, the sprout of the stalk, etc. But one does not prove a similar relationship between simultaneous things. You should then demonstrate that dharmas arisen together can be in a cause and effect relationship.
[The Sarvastivadins supply two examples. ] The lamp arises with its light; the sprout, growing in the light, arises with its shadow. Now a lamp is the cause of its light and a sprout is the cause of its shadow. Thus cause and effect can be simultaneous.
[The Sautrantikas:] These examples are not proven. We must examine whether a lamp is the cause of its light, or if, as we think, a lamp with its light are both the effeet of a complex of previous causes and conditions, oil, wick, etc. In the same way, a complex of previous causes (seed, light) is the cause of the sprout and its shadow, of the sprout with its shadow.
[The Sarvastivadins:] The relationship of cause and effect is
? proven by the existence and the non-existence of what is called effect,
similar to the existence and the non-existence of what is called cause.
The definition of the Logicians {hetukas) is very good: "When A is or
is not, and when B is or is not, then A is considered as cause, and B is
considered as effect. " Granted this, if we examine the dharmas that we
have defined as mutually coexistent and sahabhilhetu, we see that they
all exist when one of them exists, and that none exist when one of
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them is absent. They are then in a relationship of mutual cause and
effect.
[The Sautrantikas:] Admitting that among the simultaneous
dharmasy one dharma can be the cause of another dharma, then the 345
organ of sight is the cause of visual consciousness. But how many simultaneous dharmas are the cause and effect of one another?
[The Sarvastivadins:] Mutual causality is proven by the definition that we have given of causality. When the mind exists, its mental states exist, and vice versa.
[The Sautrantikas:] Very well, but then the Sarvastivadins should revise their system.
