The determining fac- tors have been 'feel' and
distance
from English-usage.
SIMMEL-Georg-Sociology-Inquiries-Into-the-Construction-of-Social-Forms-2vol
.
.
.
.
.
.
666
Index of Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 677 Index of Topics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 679
? FOREWORD BY GEORG SIMMEL
When an inquiry proceeds in accordance with the legitimate cognitive purposes and methods of an existing discipline, it is then defined by its relation to this context; the introduction to the new inquiry does not have to start by justifying the right to such a study, but merely take advantage of what has already been justified. If an inquiry for the time being goes without the kind of preliminaries that make the justification for its problematic at least beyond question, if the outline that delimits the field in terms of phenomena finds its formula mapped out in no area of known investigation--then its obvious position in the system of sciences and the discussion of its methods and their potential fruitfulness is a new and independent endeavor. It demands its solution, in lieu of a foreword, as the first part of the inquiry itself.
The endeavor undertaken here finds itself in this situation--to give the protean concept of sociology a well-defined content, governed by a methodically reliable design of the problem. The demand on the reader to grasp this one problem continuously as the first chapter develops it--because otherwise these pages could appear to be an accumulation of incoherent facts and reflections--is the one thing that must be placed in the front of the book.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank Horst Helle for providing this volume with an introduction to Georg Simmel and his social thought, and for review- ing part of the translation. We are also indebted to Lutz Kaelber and Dietrich Jung, who also reviewed parts of the translation. We would like to thank Hans Geser and Daniel Liechty for responding to our inqui- ries, and William H. Swatos, Jr. , for editorial advice. We would like to express our thanks to Tennessee State University for providing Anthony J. Blasi with release time for this work. The following editors of Brill have been immensely helpful: Hylke Faber, Nienke Brienen-Moolenaar, Regine Reincke, Joed Elich. A special thank you to Jean Roth Jacobs and to Becki Kanjirathinkal for their remarkable patience and support. For encouragement and advice, we are deeply grateful to Fabio Barbosa Dasilva. Of course, any shortcomings are our responsibility.
AJB, AKJ, MK
A NOTE ON THE TRANSLATION
The original translated in this volume is the first, 1908, edition of Soziologie. Untersuchungen u? ber die Formen der Vergesellschaftung by Georg Simmel. There was a posthumous edition issued by the same publisher in 1922 after Simmel died in 1918. Suhrkamp published it again in 1992, with variations, most of which are not substantive in nature and, of course, were not overseen by Simmel. We have sought to give voice in English to what Simmel himself gave expression.
Simmel has an idiosyncratic use of German that is difficult to read and certainly to translate. We have tried to retain his basic style (in terms of overall sentence and paragraph structure, choice of metaphors) while writing in twenty-first century standard English (in terms of diction, grammar, punctuation) as clearly as we can. The faithfulness to Simmel means it will not read exactly as it would if a native English speaker had written it, but the efforts to offer clear English will, we hope, make Simmel accessible in ways he has not been heretofore.
The declension of adjectives, pronouns, and articles in German allows much greater freedom to substitute them for nouns when referring to a noun earlier in a sentence or in another sentence prior. However, it can be confusing in English since, for example, 'it' in English is the only form of 'it,' whereas in German 'it' can be es, ihm, ihn, sie, dem, den, and so on. So at times we have repeated the noun instead of using the pronoun, have added the noun to its substantive adjective, and so on. For example, in chapter five we have offered the sentence:
The superfluous 'overflows,' i. e. it flows out further from one's starting point; and while it then is still attached to this point, around the area of the merely necessary it lays another more encircling periphery that is in principle without boundary.
If translated more literally it would read:
The superfluous 'overflows,' i. e. it flows out further from one's starting point; and while it then is still attached to this, around the area of the merely necessary it lays another more encircling that is in principle without boundary.
xiv a note on the translation
? In the German 'this' refers to 'starting point' in this sentence, and 'more encircling' refers to 'periphery' used in the sentence immediately prior.
Throughout we have used gender-inclusive language. This has been a little more difficult than usual because the use of gender plays a more powerful grammatical role in German and because of Simmel's idiosyncratic use of German, which offers then the double difficulty of translating Simmel both clearly and faithfully. We have also used inclusive language wherever Simmel talked about God, trying to avoid male references to the divine. We have been quite strict about inclusive language except where the use of gender is essential for the meaning.
Simmel uses words and phrases from a variety of languages. At times we have left the original in the text, usually offering a translation in a footnote that ends in '--ed. ' referring to us, the translators and editors. At other times, we have translated the word or phrase into standard English, again with an explanatory footnote.
The determining fac- tors have been 'feel' and distance from English-usage. We also added footnotes that identify allusions and sources that Simmel himself did not identify. Simmel's own footnotes are simply translated without any identifying information.
It was common in 1908 to use 'primitive' for peoples and practices of societies before widespread agricultural development, literacy, and a more highly, usually hierarchically, organized division of labor. Social scientists came to view the concept as evaluative, implying superiority on the part of Western observers. It is not easily translated without any sense of evaluation; however, we have worked at casting it in a vari- ety of ways, depending on the context, in language today considered non-evaluative, or at least less so. But this has usually meant the use of 'indigenous people(s). ' Related to this cultural sensitivity, Simmel sometimes manifested the sense of superiority to less developed societ- ies common at that time in ways that could not be changed without violating fidelity in translation, and so we have left those instances as they are.
Simmel has a fondness for using the word Kreis (circle, sphere) in contexts where the more generic English word 'group' would also work and has often been so translated in the past. And he has a fondness for using the word Element (element, component part) in contexts where the English word 'member' would also work. Since 'circle,' 'sphere,' and 'element' can also function in this way in English, we have tended
a note on the translation xv
? to stay close to Simmel's usage out of fidelity to his style; however, at times when it seemed a bit too odd in English, we have departed from that practice.
Finally, there is Simmel's neologism, Vergesellschaftung. Early translators rendered it 'socialization,' but that term has come to mean in English, having an impact on an individual that makes the latter a competent member of a society or group. Midway through the twentieth century, Kurt Wolff translated it with the English neologism 'sociation'; that term has not generally found its way into common usage, outside of discussions of Simmel's sociology. 1 Sometimes Simmel means by Vergesellschaftung to refer to social interaction, but at other times he is referring to the creation of social entities; the two meanings pertain to processes that may be empirically the same but are spoken of in different ways in English. Consequently we have translated it as 'social interaction' or 'creating society,' as the context suggests.
The English word 'social' can translate the German sozial, gesell- schaftlich, and soziologisch, all of which Simmel used in various contexts. We have used 'social' throughout for sozial and gesellschaftlich, but have varied 'social' and 'sociological' for soziologisch.
There have been earlier translations of portions of Simmel's Soziologie, many of them very good ones. 2 We have found them to be freer
1 Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, translated, edited and with an intro- duction by Kurt H. Wolff. New York: Free Press, 1950.
2 In addition to the Wolff translation cited above, which translated major portions from the 1923 edition, major portions are also translated in Wolff (ed. ), Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1955); Wolff (ed. ), Georg Simmel, 1858-1918: A Collection of Essays, with Translations and a Bibliography (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1959); and Donald N. Levine (ed. ) Georg Simmel on Individuality and SocialForms (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971). Other translations from Soziologie include "The Problem of Sociology," Annals of the American Academy of Politi- cal and Social Science 6(3):412-23 (1895), anonymous translator, also American Journal of Sociology (hereafter AJS) 15(3):289-320 (1909), Albion W. Small ; "Superiority and Subordination as Subject-Matter of Sociology," AJS 2(2):167-89, (3):392-415 (1896), Albion W. Small; "The Persistence of Social Groups," AJS 3(5):662-98, (6):829-36, 4(1):35-50 (1898), Albion W. Small; "The Number of Members as Determining the Sociological Form of the Group," AJS 8(1):1-46, (2):158-96 (1902), Albion W. Small; "The Sociology of Conflict," AJS 9(4):490-525, (5):672-89, (6):798-811 (1904), Albion W. Small; "Fashion," International Quarterly 10(1):130-55 (1904), anonymous; "The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies," AJS 11(4):441-98 (1906), Albion W. Small; "How is Society Possible? " AJS 16(3):372-91 (1910), Albion W. Small; "The Sociological Significance of the 'Stranger'," in Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, Introduction to the Science of Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921 [1924]), pp. 322-27; "Sociology of the Senses: Visual Interaction," in Park and Burgess, pp.
? xvi a note on the translation
? renderings than permissible for our project of giving Simmel himself a voice. In a few instances, earlier efforts strike us as more paraphrases than genuine translations. There is nothing inherently erroneous in a paraphrase; for example, one would hardly criticize Harriet Matineau for paraphrasing Auguste Comte. But we have desired to make manifest the mode of argument of Simmel himself, a method embodied in his authorial procedures, a method that runs throughout his book in the form of quite consistent modalities of expression. We believe that the whole volume is something different from a collection of its parts, and so we have translated de novo, giving the whole, we hope, a fresh and accurate reading.
? 356-61; "The Poor," Social Problems 13:2 (1965), Claire Jacobnson; "Space and Spatial Relations," in David Frisby and Mike Featherstone (eds. ) Simmel on Culture (London: Sage, 1997). A few of the Wolff translations are reprinted in P. A. Lawrence (ed. ) Georg Simmel: Sociologist and European (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1976).
INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSLATION Horst J. Helle
When my Munich team and I published the English language version of Simmel's Essays on Religion (Simmel 1997) we noticed to our surprise that some of our German native speakers from Austria, Northern Switzerland and Germany preferred to work with the English transla- tion rather than the German original (Simmel 1989). They explained their preference by pointing to the complicated sentence structure in Simmel's authentic writing, which we had to change in order to pro- duce a readable English language text. That astonishing effect may well repeat itself in the case of the present volume.
As its translators explain in their Note on the Translation, Simmel's Ger- man "is difficult to read and certainly to translate. " This is so because preserving the typical sentence structure on the one hand, and remaining faithful to the author's intentions on the other frequently turn out to be troubling alternatives. The test for the quality of this English language rendering accordingly is not to put an isolated sentence from the origi- nal and its translation side by side to compare them linguistically, but rather to read a whole page in one language and then ponder whether or not the same meaning is coming across in the other. Passing such a test would reflect the intentions of the present translators.
This translation of course stands--fortunately--on the shoulder of giants. The Free Press, then a famous American publishing house in Glencoe, Illinois, produced a book in 1955 with the double title Conflict, translated by Kurt H. Wolff--The Web of Group-Affiliations, translated by Reinhard Bendix. Everett Cherrington Hughes in his Foreword praises Wolff for doing "American scholars a distinct service by translating and publishing important parts of the sociological work of Georg Simmel in a volume entitled The Sociology of Georg Simmel (1950)" (Simmel 1955, 7). Hughes then goes on welcoming Reinhard Bendix to the joint effort, thanking him for "making an additional chapter of Simmel's Soziologie available. " This is necessary because--and Hughes, whose German was fluent, regrets that--"Americans whose mother-tongue is English (including those among them whose mother tongue was not English) are extremely loathe to learn other languages" (Simmel 1955, 7). For
2 introduction to the translation by horst j. helle
? Wolff (see Simmel 1950) and Bendix, of course, German was a native language. If making an English translation of Simmel's work available was a distinct service to scholarship in 1955, it is certainly so in 2008. Such service has been contributed by Peter Etzkorn, Guy Oakes, Donald Levine, Deena Weinstein, Michael Weinstein and others.
Yet, crossing the language barrier--which in the past was more or less identical with crossing the Atlantic Ocean--was for Simmel's ideas a project that started much earlier than half a century ago. It appears that Simmel's two volume book Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft (Introduction to the moral science) (Simmel reprinted 1983a, 1983b) was made known in excerpts in the International Journal of Ethics very soon after it appeared in German in 1892-93 (Simmel 1893), and what has become part of the present book as The Problem of Sociology was previously published in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences in 1895 (Sim- mel 1895). This shows that Simmel was known in America during his life time (1858-1918) when of course many more American scholars than today had the ability to also read him in German, and when George Herbert Mead--to name an example--published a review on Simmel's book on money (Simmel 1907) within months after Simmel's work became available (Mead 1901).
Simmel examined from 1894 to 1908 the fundamental premises relating to a methodical basis for the new discipline of sociology. As earlier publications leading up to the 1908 book we must mention the book of 1890 On Social Differentiation, the article "Das Problem der Soziologie" ("The problem of sociology") in Schmoller's yearbook of 1894 (Simmel 1894), "The problem of sociology" of 1895 (Simmel 1895), the lecture which Robert Park apparently noted down in 1899 (Simmel 1931), and the incorporation of that lecture manuscript in the present book Soziologie (Simmel 1908).
Simmel preferred being spontaneous about picking his topics and had been publishing on a wide variety of subject matters because he was devising and testing a unified method for the humanities. But he acknowledged in a letter to Heinrich Rickert of May 28, 1901 that he felt the obligation to publish a book with the purpose of clarifying what sociology is and which theoretical approach the new discipline ought to take. It took him till 1908 before that book was finally completed, and we have it before us here in English a century later.
Simmel explains in his preface that to clarify the position of sociol- ogy in the context of the other scholarly activities, and to describe its methods and their respective usefulness, is to him a new and important
introduction to the translation by horst j. helle 3
? task that cannot be undertaken in a preface but rather must be tackled in chapter 1 of the book. In it the author wants to free sociology from its vagueness by linking it firmly to a content that is governed by a uni- fying approach. In his short preface Simmel also beseeches his readers to keep chapter 1 in mind when reading the other parts of his book: Unless regarded from the perspective developed in chapter 1, the other texts may appear to be incoherent.
Having given this brief orientation in the preface Simmel turns to The Problem of Sociology as his first chapter. Sociology came about dur- ing the nineteenth century as a reaction to the political power of the masses that established themselves over against the interests of the individual. The new discipline claims to follow up that effective power and to describe it in its consequences within society. Social classes initiate political change not by affecting the significance of individuals but rather by being part of society. As a consequence, humans became conscious of the fact that individual lives are affected by a multitude of influences from the social environment.
As a consequence of the overcoming of the individualistic perspective, Simmel argues that the traditional manner of conducting intellectual enquiry--ascribing all important phenomena to the action of individu- als--had come to an end. A new understanding was beginning to find acceptance that saw the forces of social developments as being rooted in society. The new discipline of sociology, he believed, attempted to take account of this. Simmel gives examples: art, religion, economic life, morality, technological progress, politics and health. These are all areas in which he believes people are beginning to realize that society is not only the target, but also the originator of certain events.
Simmel points out that this then-new way of looking at individual lives has given rise to relativism. It carried with it the temptation to dissolve the individual, and what is essential in itself, into outcomes of exchanges, with the singularity of the person being reduced to an intersection of social influences. He is critical of such relativistic think- ing and throughout his publications has been a strong spokesperson for the uniqueness of the individual and for the dignity of the person. Simmel is also critical of conceiving sociology as the universal disci- pline of human affairs with no distinct borders, like a newly discovered country in which every homeless or uprooted area of research can stake a claim. The fact that the thinking and acting of humans occur in the context of society is to Simmel not a sufficient and acceptable reason for dealing with every aspect of it from a sociological context.
4 introduction to the translation by horst j. helle
? Simmel also rejects any definition of sociology as a collective term for the accumulation of certain facts, empty generalizations and abstrac- tions. It is this kind of accumulation of empty concepts detached from concrete life that has brought about the "doom of philosophy" (Sim- mel, 1894: 272) and would mean the same ruin for sociology. Almost prophetically, he anticipates the dead end that certain areas of socio- logical theorization would reach. If sociology is to establish itself as a serious and respectable discipline, it must differentiate itself within the broad field of the social sciences, which includes economics, psychol- ogy and history, and be in a position to emphasize the distinctiveness of its approach.
Having outlined what he rejects, Simmel turns to positively describ- ing what he wants to constitute sociology, what he wants sociology to be. While all the humanities will have to acknowledge that humans are influenced by the fact that they live in interaction with each other, sociology differs from them not by what is under investigation but rather by how it is studied. Sociology then, is a new method, a novel approach that will investigate familiar phenomena from a new angel. For sociol- ogy to be able to establish itself as an independent new discipline, it must raise the concept of society to the level of an overarching idea to which other phenomena will then have to be subordinated. They all, by being viewed in the context of society, and to the extent to which that happens, will then became the object of one discipline, sociology.
The formative processes in society take place as a result of the large number of interactions, to which Simmel assigns the status of 'objec- tive reality. ' This is derived from the epistemological thesis that reality is embodied in relations. And it is indeed the interactions between individuals that constitute life itself. The reality with which social sci- ence is therefore concerned does not only consist of elements which are, as it were, anatomically dissected, lifeless entities; instead we are to perceive life as a unified whole, integrated through interaction. This approach applies to the psychical unity of the individual as well as the unity of society and the other complex social groups that sociology investigates.
Thus, the concept of society is central as well as crucial. It requires the distinction between form and content. However, form and content do not signify separate objects but distinct aspects of what sociology studies. Simmel calls contents those driving forces that move individual persons to interact with others, which by themselves are not yet social. Examples he mentions are impulses, interests, inclinations and psycho-
introduction to the translation by horst j. helle 5
? logical conditions of a person that cause humans to turn toward one another. Other illustrations of content are hunger, love, and religiosity. Forms come about as a result of the interaction that these contents motivate. The individuals create together and for each other social forms in the context of which their wishes can be fulfilled, their desires can be realized. The forms are based on a common interest, like a sect that serves religious needs, and all forms culminate so to speak in the form of forms at the highest level, which is society. The chapters that follow chapter 1 of this book are illustrations of the variety of forms in society.
Simmel expects his readers to grasp that well enough so they can follow him as it were to the next exercise. He points out that identi- cal forms can come about in society on the basis of totally different contents, therefore serving quite disparate purposes. His examples are competition, division of labor, subordination as forms of social behav- ior that we encounter in government offices, in business enterprises, in churches and elsewhere. The contents in these illustrations are political, economic, and religious interests; and diverse as those contents may be, they all have the potential of leading to the same forms, like competi- tion and division of labor.
On the other hand, Simmel also wants his readers to understand that identical content may produce quite divers forms. This is immediately plausible if religiosity is used as an illustration. The religious desire as a content can find its socialized form in a strict sect with near dictatorial leadership, in a liberal association of self-governing faithful, in a hierar- chical church etc. Similarly, the content of hunger resulting in economic interests has created in human history a wide variety of forms of which money (Simmel 1907) is the one that interests Simmel most.
Having clarified what he means by form and content, Simmel returns to the central concept that identifies sociology as a discipline: society. This central and all encompassing idea too, has the two aspects: society as content and society as form. Society as content is the mass of people that comprise it and who of course have a reality beyond the social. To study what is content, however, is not the task of sociology. Other disciplines, like history, psychology, or economics are responsible for that. Sociology then, is the study of society as form, as the highest and overarching form that encompasses all the other forms within it.
Attached to chapter 1 is a long footnote (followed by a shorter one). In it Simmel describes the other chapters of the book as both illustrations--from the perspective of his sociological method--and as
6 introduction to the translation by horst j. helle
? fragments--from the perspective of the organization of the subject matter of the book. He also anticipates the likely critique that his text lacks systematic coherence. The chapter closes with philosophical con- siderations of sociology as a problem and with the fundamental question of how society is possible. This leads Simmel to his first excursus.
Following Kant's investigation about the prerequisites for the existence of nature--"How is nature possible? "--Simmel asks the analogous questions about society. To enquire into the requirements for the exis- tence of society is of course the most thorough method of clarifying what Simmel understands by 'society. ' In answer to the question "How is nature possible? " Kant had sought to identify the forms that make up the essence of the human intellect, since he claimed that nature was a product of intellectual activity anyway. By posing the analogous question for society, Simmel emphasize that his methodical intention is completely different from Kant's.
The qualitative threshold that divides natural philosophy from social philosophy will become clear to anyone who, like Simmel, appreciates that when dealing with data relating to nature, unity is only created in the mind of the researcher and that the objects of research remain unaffected by this. Society, in contrast, consists of conscious individuals, and their intellectual constructs create a unity (in circumstances that are the very object of investigation) not only within the individual but also as an immediate reality of society.
Thus natural philosophy creates and studies processes that do not directly influence nature, whereas social philosophy must take account of processes of the conscious mind that themselves already are, and certainly influence, social reality. There is for Simmel a new transition from nature to society in which epistemology becomes empirical science. By 1908, the year he first published this book, Simmel's epistemology had reached a level that made it possible to adapt easily to a theory of society and henceforth to become sociology. What then are the intel- lectual processes that individuals, as the elements of society, must have undergone in order for society to be possible?
Simmel attempts to outline some of the a priori conditions or forms of socialization that must exist in order to make society possible:
1. The image that one person gains of another person from personal contact is skewed in the direction of generalization using familiar categories. This image cannot be the mirror-like reflection of an unchanging reality, but is constructed in a particular way. That is a
introduction to the translation by horst j. helle 7
? necessary consequence of the fact that complete knowledge of the individuality of others is not accessible to us. For society to be pos- sible, we form generalized impressions of our fellow humans and assign each of them to a general category, despite the singularity of each. It is then possible to designate each person to a particular sphere. Within the spheres of military officers, people of religious faith, civil servants, scholars, and family members, each individual makes a certain assumption in how he or she sees the other person by implying: This person is a member of my social circle.
2. Every individual is not only a part of society but also something else besides. There can be no total social engulfment; the individual must always hold back a part of personal existence from total iden- tification with society. Simmel sees this in such a differentiated and dynamic way as to envisage the different variations of the relationship between both 'parts,' saying of the individual: The nature of one's being social is determined or partly determined by the nature of one's not being completely social. Simmel anticipates his studies and mentions as examples the stranger, the enemy, the criminal, and the poor, which are presented as social forms in other chapters of this book. The quality of interaction of people within social categories would be quite different, were each person to confront every other person only as what one is in a particular category, as representative of the particular social role one happens to be seen in.
3. Society is a combination of dissimilar elements, for even where democratic or socialist forces plan or partially realize an 'equality,' it can only be equality in the sense of being equal in value; there can be no question of homogeneity. In this diversity lies the pre- requisite for cooperation. The a priori principle Simmel is leading up to here is the assumption that each individual can find a place in society, that this ideally appropriate position for the individual in society does actually exist in social reality--this is the condition upon which the social life of the individual is based, and which one might term the universality of individuality. This a priori principle is the basis for the category of occupation (vocation), but is of course not identical with the world of working life.
It may be appropriated to state that Simmel's account of social a prioris does not possess normative status. He also repeatedly mentions that those theoretical fundamentals do not describe social conditions. He thus neither requires that these a prioris should empirically exist,
8 introduction to the translation by horst j. helle
? nor does he claim that they do. If in any concrete individual case the condition of the a priori is not fulfilled, then that particular person is not constituting society. But society as a whole is only possible because people--Simmel calls them society's elements--generally speaking do actually realize these a priori conditions.
As the author reminded his readers in the preface, the methodological directives of chapter 1 must be kept in mind in order to understand the rest of the book. It is not meaningful in this introduction to the translation to attempt a preview of the entire volume, but two important segments are picked here to use them as illustrations of how Simmel applies his method to social forms: They are competition as a form in which humans may interact under conditions of conflict, and the from of strangeness in interaction that becomes the fate and characteristic of Simmel's famous stranger.
The observations on competition are embedded in chapter 4 on con- flict. Simmel chooses his illustrations of this specific form of interaction from different contents of social life: from commerce of course--and that was to be expected--but also from erotic interaction (two men competing for the attention of a women), from religion (two denomi- nations competing for membership of the faithful), and from physical performance in sport. What competitive activities in these various areas of human behavior have in common is the transformation of intentions of the potentially selfish individual into some common good. Simmel sees here advantages for the community in which a particular type of conflict occurs, advantages that only competition can generate.
He expands on the idea that activities undertaken by an individual for purely subjective reasons have the potential of resulting in objec- tive advantages for society as a whole. This is, however, not merely a confirmation of the invisible hand behind the selfish actions of individu- als, it is for Simmel a philosophical principle of a much more general scope. In fact Simmel illustrates his point by referring to examples from religion, erotic pleasure, and scholarship. In each of these domains individualistic interests have the potential of resulting in an increase of the common good. Scholarship, for instance, is a content of the objective culture, and is realized by means of individual curiosity and drive for new insights.
All these advantages can only be achieved provided conflict occurs in the specific form of competition.
Index of Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 677 Index of Topics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 679
? FOREWORD BY GEORG SIMMEL
When an inquiry proceeds in accordance with the legitimate cognitive purposes and methods of an existing discipline, it is then defined by its relation to this context; the introduction to the new inquiry does not have to start by justifying the right to such a study, but merely take advantage of what has already been justified. If an inquiry for the time being goes without the kind of preliminaries that make the justification for its problematic at least beyond question, if the outline that delimits the field in terms of phenomena finds its formula mapped out in no area of known investigation--then its obvious position in the system of sciences and the discussion of its methods and their potential fruitfulness is a new and independent endeavor. It demands its solution, in lieu of a foreword, as the first part of the inquiry itself.
The endeavor undertaken here finds itself in this situation--to give the protean concept of sociology a well-defined content, governed by a methodically reliable design of the problem. The demand on the reader to grasp this one problem continuously as the first chapter develops it--because otherwise these pages could appear to be an accumulation of incoherent facts and reflections--is the one thing that must be placed in the front of the book.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank Horst Helle for providing this volume with an introduction to Georg Simmel and his social thought, and for review- ing part of the translation. We are also indebted to Lutz Kaelber and Dietrich Jung, who also reviewed parts of the translation. We would like to thank Hans Geser and Daniel Liechty for responding to our inqui- ries, and William H. Swatos, Jr. , for editorial advice. We would like to express our thanks to Tennessee State University for providing Anthony J. Blasi with release time for this work. The following editors of Brill have been immensely helpful: Hylke Faber, Nienke Brienen-Moolenaar, Regine Reincke, Joed Elich. A special thank you to Jean Roth Jacobs and to Becki Kanjirathinkal for their remarkable patience and support. For encouragement and advice, we are deeply grateful to Fabio Barbosa Dasilva. Of course, any shortcomings are our responsibility.
AJB, AKJ, MK
A NOTE ON THE TRANSLATION
The original translated in this volume is the first, 1908, edition of Soziologie. Untersuchungen u? ber die Formen der Vergesellschaftung by Georg Simmel. There was a posthumous edition issued by the same publisher in 1922 after Simmel died in 1918. Suhrkamp published it again in 1992, with variations, most of which are not substantive in nature and, of course, were not overseen by Simmel. We have sought to give voice in English to what Simmel himself gave expression.
Simmel has an idiosyncratic use of German that is difficult to read and certainly to translate. We have tried to retain his basic style (in terms of overall sentence and paragraph structure, choice of metaphors) while writing in twenty-first century standard English (in terms of diction, grammar, punctuation) as clearly as we can. The faithfulness to Simmel means it will not read exactly as it would if a native English speaker had written it, but the efforts to offer clear English will, we hope, make Simmel accessible in ways he has not been heretofore.
The declension of adjectives, pronouns, and articles in German allows much greater freedom to substitute them for nouns when referring to a noun earlier in a sentence or in another sentence prior. However, it can be confusing in English since, for example, 'it' in English is the only form of 'it,' whereas in German 'it' can be es, ihm, ihn, sie, dem, den, and so on. So at times we have repeated the noun instead of using the pronoun, have added the noun to its substantive adjective, and so on. For example, in chapter five we have offered the sentence:
The superfluous 'overflows,' i. e. it flows out further from one's starting point; and while it then is still attached to this point, around the area of the merely necessary it lays another more encircling periphery that is in principle without boundary.
If translated more literally it would read:
The superfluous 'overflows,' i. e. it flows out further from one's starting point; and while it then is still attached to this, around the area of the merely necessary it lays another more encircling that is in principle without boundary.
xiv a note on the translation
? In the German 'this' refers to 'starting point' in this sentence, and 'more encircling' refers to 'periphery' used in the sentence immediately prior.
Throughout we have used gender-inclusive language. This has been a little more difficult than usual because the use of gender plays a more powerful grammatical role in German and because of Simmel's idiosyncratic use of German, which offers then the double difficulty of translating Simmel both clearly and faithfully. We have also used inclusive language wherever Simmel talked about God, trying to avoid male references to the divine. We have been quite strict about inclusive language except where the use of gender is essential for the meaning.
Simmel uses words and phrases from a variety of languages. At times we have left the original in the text, usually offering a translation in a footnote that ends in '--ed. ' referring to us, the translators and editors. At other times, we have translated the word or phrase into standard English, again with an explanatory footnote.
The determining fac- tors have been 'feel' and distance from English-usage. We also added footnotes that identify allusions and sources that Simmel himself did not identify. Simmel's own footnotes are simply translated without any identifying information.
It was common in 1908 to use 'primitive' for peoples and practices of societies before widespread agricultural development, literacy, and a more highly, usually hierarchically, organized division of labor. Social scientists came to view the concept as evaluative, implying superiority on the part of Western observers. It is not easily translated without any sense of evaluation; however, we have worked at casting it in a vari- ety of ways, depending on the context, in language today considered non-evaluative, or at least less so. But this has usually meant the use of 'indigenous people(s). ' Related to this cultural sensitivity, Simmel sometimes manifested the sense of superiority to less developed societ- ies common at that time in ways that could not be changed without violating fidelity in translation, and so we have left those instances as they are.
Simmel has a fondness for using the word Kreis (circle, sphere) in contexts where the more generic English word 'group' would also work and has often been so translated in the past. And he has a fondness for using the word Element (element, component part) in contexts where the English word 'member' would also work. Since 'circle,' 'sphere,' and 'element' can also function in this way in English, we have tended
a note on the translation xv
? to stay close to Simmel's usage out of fidelity to his style; however, at times when it seemed a bit too odd in English, we have departed from that practice.
Finally, there is Simmel's neologism, Vergesellschaftung. Early translators rendered it 'socialization,' but that term has come to mean in English, having an impact on an individual that makes the latter a competent member of a society or group. Midway through the twentieth century, Kurt Wolff translated it with the English neologism 'sociation'; that term has not generally found its way into common usage, outside of discussions of Simmel's sociology. 1 Sometimes Simmel means by Vergesellschaftung to refer to social interaction, but at other times he is referring to the creation of social entities; the two meanings pertain to processes that may be empirically the same but are spoken of in different ways in English. Consequently we have translated it as 'social interaction' or 'creating society,' as the context suggests.
The English word 'social' can translate the German sozial, gesell- schaftlich, and soziologisch, all of which Simmel used in various contexts. We have used 'social' throughout for sozial and gesellschaftlich, but have varied 'social' and 'sociological' for soziologisch.
There have been earlier translations of portions of Simmel's Soziologie, many of them very good ones. 2 We have found them to be freer
1 Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, translated, edited and with an intro- duction by Kurt H. Wolff. New York: Free Press, 1950.
2 In addition to the Wolff translation cited above, which translated major portions from the 1923 edition, major portions are also translated in Wolff (ed. ), Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1955); Wolff (ed. ), Georg Simmel, 1858-1918: A Collection of Essays, with Translations and a Bibliography (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1959); and Donald N. Levine (ed. ) Georg Simmel on Individuality and SocialForms (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971). Other translations from Soziologie include "The Problem of Sociology," Annals of the American Academy of Politi- cal and Social Science 6(3):412-23 (1895), anonymous translator, also American Journal of Sociology (hereafter AJS) 15(3):289-320 (1909), Albion W. Small ; "Superiority and Subordination as Subject-Matter of Sociology," AJS 2(2):167-89, (3):392-415 (1896), Albion W. Small; "The Persistence of Social Groups," AJS 3(5):662-98, (6):829-36, 4(1):35-50 (1898), Albion W. Small; "The Number of Members as Determining the Sociological Form of the Group," AJS 8(1):1-46, (2):158-96 (1902), Albion W. Small; "The Sociology of Conflict," AJS 9(4):490-525, (5):672-89, (6):798-811 (1904), Albion W. Small; "Fashion," International Quarterly 10(1):130-55 (1904), anonymous; "The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies," AJS 11(4):441-98 (1906), Albion W. Small; "How is Society Possible? " AJS 16(3):372-91 (1910), Albion W. Small; "The Sociological Significance of the 'Stranger'," in Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, Introduction to the Science of Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921 [1924]), pp. 322-27; "Sociology of the Senses: Visual Interaction," in Park and Burgess, pp.
? xvi a note on the translation
? renderings than permissible for our project of giving Simmel himself a voice. In a few instances, earlier efforts strike us as more paraphrases than genuine translations. There is nothing inherently erroneous in a paraphrase; for example, one would hardly criticize Harriet Matineau for paraphrasing Auguste Comte. But we have desired to make manifest the mode of argument of Simmel himself, a method embodied in his authorial procedures, a method that runs throughout his book in the form of quite consistent modalities of expression. We believe that the whole volume is something different from a collection of its parts, and so we have translated de novo, giving the whole, we hope, a fresh and accurate reading.
? 356-61; "The Poor," Social Problems 13:2 (1965), Claire Jacobnson; "Space and Spatial Relations," in David Frisby and Mike Featherstone (eds. ) Simmel on Culture (London: Sage, 1997). A few of the Wolff translations are reprinted in P. A. Lawrence (ed. ) Georg Simmel: Sociologist and European (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1976).
INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSLATION Horst J. Helle
When my Munich team and I published the English language version of Simmel's Essays on Religion (Simmel 1997) we noticed to our surprise that some of our German native speakers from Austria, Northern Switzerland and Germany preferred to work with the English transla- tion rather than the German original (Simmel 1989). They explained their preference by pointing to the complicated sentence structure in Simmel's authentic writing, which we had to change in order to pro- duce a readable English language text. That astonishing effect may well repeat itself in the case of the present volume.
As its translators explain in their Note on the Translation, Simmel's Ger- man "is difficult to read and certainly to translate. " This is so because preserving the typical sentence structure on the one hand, and remaining faithful to the author's intentions on the other frequently turn out to be troubling alternatives. The test for the quality of this English language rendering accordingly is not to put an isolated sentence from the origi- nal and its translation side by side to compare them linguistically, but rather to read a whole page in one language and then ponder whether or not the same meaning is coming across in the other. Passing such a test would reflect the intentions of the present translators.
This translation of course stands--fortunately--on the shoulder of giants. The Free Press, then a famous American publishing house in Glencoe, Illinois, produced a book in 1955 with the double title Conflict, translated by Kurt H. Wolff--The Web of Group-Affiliations, translated by Reinhard Bendix. Everett Cherrington Hughes in his Foreword praises Wolff for doing "American scholars a distinct service by translating and publishing important parts of the sociological work of Georg Simmel in a volume entitled The Sociology of Georg Simmel (1950)" (Simmel 1955, 7). Hughes then goes on welcoming Reinhard Bendix to the joint effort, thanking him for "making an additional chapter of Simmel's Soziologie available. " This is necessary because--and Hughes, whose German was fluent, regrets that--"Americans whose mother-tongue is English (including those among them whose mother tongue was not English) are extremely loathe to learn other languages" (Simmel 1955, 7). For
2 introduction to the translation by horst j. helle
? Wolff (see Simmel 1950) and Bendix, of course, German was a native language. If making an English translation of Simmel's work available was a distinct service to scholarship in 1955, it is certainly so in 2008. Such service has been contributed by Peter Etzkorn, Guy Oakes, Donald Levine, Deena Weinstein, Michael Weinstein and others.
Yet, crossing the language barrier--which in the past was more or less identical with crossing the Atlantic Ocean--was for Simmel's ideas a project that started much earlier than half a century ago. It appears that Simmel's two volume book Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft (Introduction to the moral science) (Simmel reprinted 1983a, 1983b) was made known in excerpts in the International Journal of Ethics very soon after it appeared in German in 1892-93 (Simmel 1893), and what has become part of the present book as The Problem of Sociology was previously published in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences in 1895 (Sim- mel 1895). This shows that Simmel was known in America during his life time (1858-1918) when of course many more American scholars than today had the ability to also read him in German, and when George Herbert Mead--to name an example--published a review on Simmel's book on money (Simmel 1907) within months after Simmel's work became available (Mead 1901).
Simmel examined from 1894 to 1908 the fundamental premises relating to a methodical basis for the new discipline of sociology. As earlier publications leading up to the 1908 book we must mention the book of 1890 On Social Differentiation, the article "Das Problem der Soziologie" ("The problem of sociology") in Schmoller's yearbook of 1894 (Simmel 1894), "The problem of sociology" of 1895 (Simmel 1895), the lecture which Robert Park apparently noted down in 1899 (Simmel 1931), and the incorporation of that lecture manuscript in the present book Soziologie (Simmel 1908).
Simmel preferred being spontaneous about picking his topics and had been publishing on a wide variety of subject matters because he was devising and testing a unified method for the humanities. But he acknowledged in a letter to Heinrich Rickert of May 28, 1901 that he felt the obligation to publish a book with the purpose of clarifying what sociology is and which theoretical approach the new discipline ought to take. It took him till 1908 before that book was finally completed, and we have it before us here in English a century later.
Simmel explains in his preface that to clarify the position of sociol- ogy in the context of the other scholarly activities, and to describe its methods and their respective usefulness, is to him a new and important
introduction to the translation by horst j. helle 3
? task that cannot be undertaken in a preface but rather must be tackled in chapter 1 of the book. In it the author wants to free sociology from its vagueness by linking it firmly to a content that is governed by a uni- fying approach. In his short preface Simmel also beseeches his readers to keep chapter 1 in mind when reading the other parts of his book: Unless regarded from the perspective developed in chapter 1, the other texts may appear to be incoherent.
Having given this brief orientation in the preface Simmel turns to The Problem of Sociology as his first chapter. Sociology came about dur- ing the nineteenth century as a reaction to the political power of the masses that established themselves over against the interests of the individual. The new discipline claims to follow up that effective power and to describe it in its consequences within society. Social classes initiate political change not by affecting the significance of individuals but rather by being part of society. As a consequence, humans became conscious of the fact that individual lives are affected by a multitude of influences from the social environment.
As a consequence of the overcoming of the individualistic perspective, Simmel argues that the traditional manner of conducting intellectual enquiry--ascribing all important phenomena to the action of individu- als--had come to an end. A new understanding was beginning to find acceptance that saw the forces of social developments as being rooted in society. The new discipline of sociology, he believed, attempted to take account of this. Simmel gives examples: art, religion, economic life, morality, technological progress, politics and health. These are all areas in which he believes people are beginning to realize that society is not only the target, but also the originator of certain events.
Simmel points out that this then-new way of looking at individual lives has given rise to relativism. It carried with it the temptation to dissolve the individual, and what is essential in itself, into outcomes of exchanges, with the singularity of the person being reduced to an intersection of social influences. He is critical of such relativistic think- ing and throughout his publications has been a strong spokesperson for the uniqueness of the individual and for the dignity of the person. Simmel is also critical of conceiving sociology as the universal disci- pline of human affairs with no distinct borders, like a newly discovered country in which every homeless or uprooted area of research can stake a claim. The fact that the thinking and acting of humans occur in the context of society is to Simmel not a sufficient and acceptable reason for dealing with every aspect of it from a sociological context.
4 introduction to the translation by horst j. helle
? Simmel also rejects any definition of sociology as a collective term for the accumulation of certain facts, empty generalizations and abstrac- tions. It is this kind of accumulation of empty concepts detached from concrete life that has brought about the "doom of philosophy" (Sim- mel, 1894: 272) and would mean the same ruin for sociology. Almost prophetically, he anticipates the dead end that certain areas of socio- logical theorization would reach. If sociology is to establish itself as a serious and respectable discipline, it must differentiate itself within the broad field of the social sciences, which includes economics, psychol- ogy and history, and be in a position to emphasize the distinctiveness of its approach.
Having outlined what he rejects, Simmel turns to positively describ- ing what he wants to constitute sociology, what he wants sociology to be. While all the humanities will have to acknowledge that humans are influenced by the fact that they live in interaction with each other, sociology differs from them not by what is under investigation but rather by how it is studied. Sociology then, is a new method, a novel approach that will investigate familiar phenomena from a new angel. For sociol- ogy to be able to establish itself as an independent new discipline, it must raise the concept of society to the level of an overarching idea to which other phenomena will then have to be subordinated. They all, by being viewed in the context of society, and to the extent to which that happens, will then became the object of one discipline, sociology.
The formative processes in society take place as a result of the large number of interactions, to which Simmel assigns the status of 'objec- tive reality. ' This is derived from the epistemological thesis that reality is embodied in relations. And it is indeed the interactions between individuals that constitute life itself. The reality with which social sci- ence is therefore concerned does not only consist of elements which are, as it were, anatomically dissected, lifeless entities; instead we are to perceive life as a unified whole, integrated through interaction. This approach applies to the psychical unity of the individual as well as the unity of society and the other complex social groups that sociology investigates.
Thus, the concept of society is central as well as crucial. It requires the distinction between form and content. However, form and content do not signify separate objects but distinct aspects of what sociology studies. Simmel calls contents those driving forces that move individual persons to interact with others, which by themselves are not yet social. Examples he mentions are impulses, interests, inclinations and psycho-
introduction to the translation by horst j. helle 5
? logical conditions of a person that cause humans to turn toward one another. Other illustrations of content are hunger, love, and religiosity. Forms come about as a result of the interaction that these contents motivate. The individuals create together and for each other social forms in the context of which their wishes can be fulfilled, their desires can be realized. The forms are based on a common interest, like a sect that serves religious needs, and all forms culminate so to speak in the form of forms at the highest level, which is society. The chapters that follow chapter 1 of this book are illustrations of the variety of forms in society.
Simmel expects his readers to grasp that well enough so they can follow him as it were to the next exercise. He points out that identi- cal forms can come about in society on the basis of totally different contents, therefore serving quite disparate purposes. His examples are competition, division of labor, subordination as forms of social behav- ior that we encounter in government offices, in business enterprises, in churches and elsewhere. The contents in these illustrations are political, economic, and religious interests; and diverse as those contents may be, they all have the potential of leading to the same forms, like competi- tion and division of labor.
On the other hand, Simmel also wants his readers to understand that identical content may produce quite divers forms. This is immediately plausible if religiosity is used as an illustration. The religious desire as a content can find its socialized form in a strict sect with near dictatorial leadership, in a liberal association of self-governing faithful, in a hierar- chical church etc. Similarly, the content of hunger resulting in economic interests has created in human history a wide variety of forms of which money (Simmel 1907) is the one that interests Simmel most.
Having clarified what he means by form and content, Simmel returns to the central concept that identifies sociology as a discipline: society. This central and all encompassing idea too, has the two aspects: society as content and society as form. Society as content is the mass of people that comprise it and who of course have a reality beyond the social. To study what is content, however, is not the task of sociology. Other disciplines, like history, psychology, or economics are responsible for that. Sociology then, is the study of society as form, as the highest and overarching form that encompasses all the other forms within it.
Attached to chapter 1 is a long footnote (followed by a shorter one). In it Simmel describes the other chapters of the book as both illustrations--from the perspective of his sociological method--and as
6 introduction to the translation by horst j. helle
? fragments--from the perspective of the organization of the subject matter of the book. He also anticipates the likely critique that his text lacks systematic coherence. The chapter closes with philosophical con- siderations of sociology as a problem and with the fundamental question of how society is possible. This leads Simmel to his first excursus.
Following Kant's investigation about the prerequisites for the existence of nature--"How is nature possible? "--Simmel asks the analogous questions about society. To enquire into the requirements for the exis- tence of society is of course the most thorough method of clarifying what Simmel understands by 'society. ' In answer to the question "How is nature possible? " Kant had sought to identify the forms that make up the essence of the human intellect, since he claimed that nature was a product of intellectual activity anyway. By posing the analogous question for society, Simmel emphasize that his methodical intention is completely different from Kant's.
The qualitative threshold that divides natural philosophy from social philosophy will become clear to anyone who, like Simmel, appreciates that when dealing with data relating to nature, unity is only created in the mind of the researcher and that the objects of research remain unaffected by this. Society, in contrast, consists of conscious individuals, and their intellectual constructs create a unity (in circumstances that are the very object of investigation) not only within the individual but also as an immediate reality of society.
Thus natural philosophy creates and studies processes that do not directly influence nature, whereas social philosophy must take account of processes of the conscious mind that themselves already are, and certainly influence, social reality. There is for Simmel a new transition from nature to society in which epistemology becomes empirical science. By 1908, the year he first published this book, Simmel's epistemology had reached a level that made it possible to adapt easily to a theory of society and henceforth to become sociology. What then are the intel- lectual processes that individuals, as the elements of society, must have undergone in order for society to be possible?
Simmel attempts to outline some of the a priori conditions or forms of socialization that must exist in order to make society possible:
1. The image that one person gains of another person from personal contact is skewed in the direction of generalization using familiar categories. This image cannot be the mirror-like reflection of an unchanging reality, but is constructed in a particular way. That is a
introduction to the translation by horst j. helle 7
? necessary consequence of the fact that complete knowledge of the individuality of others is not accessible to us. For society to be pos- sible, we form generalized impressions of our fellow humans and assign each of them to a general category, despite the singularity of each. It is then possible to designate each person to a particular sphere. Within the spheres of military officers, people of religious faith, civil servants, scholars, and family members, each individual makes a certain assumption in how he or she sees the other person by implying: This person is a member of my social circle.
2. Every individual is not only a part of society but also something else besides. There can be no total social engulfment; the individual must always hold back a part of personal existence from total iden- tification with society. Simmel sees this in such a differentiated and dynamic way as to envisage the different variations of the relationship between both 'parts,' saying of the individual: The nature of one's being social is determined or partly determined by the nature of one's not being completely social. Simmel anticipates his studies and mentions as examples the stranger, the enemy, the criminal, and the poor, which are presented as social forms in other chapters of this book. The quality of interaction of people within social categories would be quite different, were each person to confront every other person only as what one is in a particular category, as representative of the particular social role one happens to be seen in.
3. Society is a combination of dissimilar elements, for even where democratic or socialist forces plan or partially realize an 'equality,' it can only be equality in the sense of being equal in value; there can be no question of homogeneity. In this diversity lies the pre- requisite for cooperation. The a priori principle Simmel is leading up to here is the assumption that each individual can find a place in society, that this ideally appropriate position for the individual in society does actually exist in social reality--this is the condition upon which the social life of the individual is based, and which one might term the universality of individuality. This a priori principle is the basis for the category of occupation (vocation), but is of course not identical with the world of working life.
It may be appropriated to state that Simmel's account of social a prioris does not possess normative status. He also repeatedly mentions that those theoretical fundamentals do not describe social conditions. He thus neither requires that these a prioris should empirically exist,
8 introduction to the translation by horst j. helle
? nor does he claim that they do. If in any concrete individual case the condition of the a priori is not fulfilled, then that particular person is not constituting society. But society as a whole is only possible because people--Simmel calls them society's elements--generally speaking do actually realize these a priori conditions.
As the author reminded his readers in the preface, the methodological directives of chapter 1 must be kept in mind in order to understand the rest of the book. It is not meaningful in this introduction to the translation to attempt a preview of the entire volume, but two important segments are picked here to use them as illustrations of how Simmel applies his method to social forms: They are competition as a form in which humans may interact under conditions of conflict, and the from of strangeness in interaction that becomes the fate and characteristic of Simmel's famous stranger.
The observations on competition are embedded in chapter 4 on con- flict. Simmel chooses his illustrations of this specific form of interaction from different contents of social life: from commerce of course--and that was to be expected--but also from erotic interaction (two men competing for the attention of a women), from religion (two denomi- nations competing for membership of the faithful), and from physical performance in sport. What competitive activities in these various areas of human behavior have in common is the transformation of intentions of the potentially selfish individual into some common good. Simmel sees here advantages for the community in which a particular type of conflict occurs, advantages that only competition can generate.
He expands on the idea that activities undertaken by an individual for purely subjective reasons have the potential of resulting in objec- tive advantages for society as a whole. This is, however, not merely a confirmation of the invisible hand behind the selfish actions of individu- als, it is for Simmel a philosophical principle of a much more general scope. In fact Simmel illustrates his point by referring to examples from religion, erotic pleasure, and scholarship. In each of these domains individualistic interests have the potential of resulting in an increase of the common good. Scholarship, for instance, is a content of the objective culture, and is realized by means of individual curiosity and drive for new insights.
All these advantages can only be achieved provided conflict occurs in the specific form of competition.
