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a horse and an ox. Secondly, as perfect and imperfect in the same
species, e. g. a boy and a man: and in this way the Divine law is
divided into Old and New. Hence the Apostle (Gal. 3:24,25) compares the
state of man under the Old Law to that of a child "under a pedagogue";
but the state under the New Law, to that of a full grown man, who is
"no longer under a pedagogue. "

Now the perfection and imperfection of these two laws is to be taken in
connection with the three conditions pertaining to law, as stated
above. For, in the first place, it belongs to law to be directed to the
common good as to its end, as stated above ([1975]Q[90], A[2]). This
good may be twofold. It may be a sensible and earthly good; and to
this, man was directly ordained by the Old Law: wherefore, at the very
outset of the law, the people were invited to the earthly kingdom of
the Chananaeans (Ex. 3:8, 17). Again it may be an intelligible and
heavenly good: and to this, man is ordained by the New Law. Wherefore,
at the very beginning of His preaching, Christ invited men to the
kingdom of heaven, saying (Mat. 4:17): "Do penance, for the kingdom of
heaven is at hand. " Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. iv) that
"promises of temporal goods are contained in the Old Testament, for
which reason it is called old; but the promise of eternal life belongs
to the New Testament. "

Secondly, it belongs to the law to direct human acts according to the
order of righteousness [1976](A[4]): wherein also the New Law surpasses
the Old Law, since it directs our internal acts, according to Mat.
5:20: "Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and
Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. " Hence the
saying that "the Old Law restrains the hand, but the New Law controls
the mind" ( Sentent. iii, D, xl).

Thirdly, it belongs to the law to induce men to observe its
commandments. This the Old Law did by the fear of punishment: but the
New Law, by love, which is poured into our hearts by the grace of
Christ, bestowed in the New Law, but foreshadowed in the Old. Hence
Augustine says (Contra Adimant. Manich. discip. xvii) that "there is
little difference [*The 'little difference' refers to the Latin words
'timor' and 'amor'---'fear' and 'love. '] between the Law and the
Gospel---fear and love. "

Reply to Objection 1: As the father of a family issues different
commands to the children and to the adults, so also the one King, God,
in His one kingdom, gave one law to men, while they were yet imperfect,
and another more perfect law, when, by the preceding law, they had been
led to a greater capacity for Divine things.

Reply to Objection 2: The salvation of man could not be achieved
otherwise than through Christ, according to Acts 4:12: "There is no
other name . . . given to men, whereby we must be saved. " Consequently
the law that brings all to salvation could not be given until after the
coming of Christ. But before His coming it was necessary to give to the
people, of whom Christ was to be born, a law containing certain
rudiments of righteousness unto salvation, in order to prepare them to
receive Him.

Reply to Objection 3: The natural law directs man by way of certain
general precepts, common to both the perfect and the imperfect:
wherefore it is one and the same for all. But the Divine law directs
man also in certain particular matters, to which the perfect and
imperfect do not stand in the same relation. Hence the necessity for
the Divine law to be twofold, as already explained.
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Whether there is a law in the fomes of sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no law of the "fomes" of sin.
For Isidore says (Etym. v) that the "law is based on reason. " But the
"fomes" of sin is not based on reason, but deviates from it. Therefore
the "fomes" has not the nature of a law.

Objection 2: Further, every law is binding, so that those who do not
obey it are called transgressors. But man is not called a transgressor,
from not following the instigations of the "fomes"; but rather from his
following them. Therefore the "fomes" has not the nature of a law.

Objection 3: Further, the law is ordained to the common good, as stated
above ([1977]Q[90], A[2]). But the "fomes" inclines us, not to the
common, but to our own private good. Therefore the "fomes" has not the
nature of sin.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): "I see another law in my
members, fighting against the law of my mind. "

I answer that, As stated above [1978](A[2]; Q[90], A[1], ad 1), the
law, as to its essence, resides in him that rules and measures; but, by
way of participation, in that which is ruled and measured; so that
every inclination or ordination which may be found in things subject to
the law, is called a law by participation, as stated above [1979](A[2];
Q[90], A[1] , ad 1). Now those who are subject to a law may receive a
twofold inclination from the lawgiver. First, in so far as he directly
inclines his subjects to something; sometimes indeed different subjects
to different acts; in this way we may say that there is a military law
and a mercantile law. Secondly, indirectly; thus by the very fact that
a lawgiver deprives a subject of some dignity, the latter passes into
another order, so as to be under another law, as it were: thus if a
soldier be turned out of the army, he becomes a subject of rural or of
mercantile legislation.

Accordingly under the Divine Lawgiver various creatures have various
natural inclinations, so that what is, as it were, a law for one, is
against the law for another: thus I might say that fierceness is, in a
way, the law of a dog, but against the law of a sheep or another meek
animal. And so the law of man, which, by the Divine ordinance, is
allotted to him, according to his proper natural condition, is that he
should act in accordance with reason: and this law was so effective in
the primitive state, that nothing either beside or against reason could
take man unawares. But when man turned his back on God, he fell under
the influence of his sensual impulses: in fact this happens to each one
individually, the more he deviates from the path of reason, so that,
after a fashion, he is likened to the beasts that are led by the
impulse of sensuality, according to Ps. 48:21: "Man, when he was in
honor, did not understand: he hath been compared to senseless beasts,
and made like to them. "

So, then, this very inclination of sensuality which is called the
"fomes," in other animals has simply the nature of a law (yet only in
so far as a law may be said to be in such things), by reason of a
direct inclination. But in man, it has not the nature of law in this
way, rather is it a deviation from the law of reason. But since, by the
just sentence of God, man is destitute of original justice, and his
reason bereft of its vigor, this impulse of sensuality, whereby he is
led, in so far as it is a penalty following from the Divine law
depriving man of his proper dignity, has the nature of a law.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the "fomes" in itself, as
an incentive to evil. It is not thus that it has the nature of a law,
as stated above, but according as it results from the justice of the
Divine law: it is as though we were to say that the law allows a
nobleman to be condemned to hard labor for some misdeed.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers law in the light of a
rule or measure: for it is in this sense that those who deviate from
the law become transgressors. But the "fomes" is not a law in this
respect, but by a kind of participation, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the "fomes" as to its
proper inclination, and not as to its origin. And yet if the
inclination of sensuality be considered as it is in other animals, thus
it is ordained to the common good, namely, to the preservation of
nature in the species or in the individual. And this is in man also, in
so far as sensuality is subject to reason. But it is called "fomes" in
so far as it strays from the order of reason.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE EFFECTS OF LAW (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the effects of law; under which head there are two
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether an effect of law is to make men good?

(2) Whether the effects of law are to command, to forbid, to permit,
and to punish, as the Jurist states?
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Whether an effect of law is to make men good?

Objection 1: It seems that it is not an effect of law to make men good.
For men are good through virtue, since virtue, as stated in Ethic. ii,
6 is "that which makes its subject good. " But virtue is in man from God
alone, because He it is Who "works it in us without us," as we stated
above ([1980]Q[55], A[4]) in giving the definition of virtue. Therefore
the law does not make men good.

Objection 2: Further, Law does not profit a man unless he obeys it. But
the very fact that a man obeys a law is due to his being good.
Therefore in man goodness is presupposed to the law. Therefore the law
does not make men good.

Objection 3: Further, Law is ordained to the common good, as stated
above ([1981]Q[90], A[2]). But some behave well in things regarding the
community, who behave ill in things regarding themselves. Therefore it
is not the business of the law to make men good.

Objection 4: Further, some laws are tyrannical, as the Philosopher says
(Polit. iii, 6). But a tyrant does not intend the good of his subjects,
but considers only his own profit. Therefore law does not make men
good.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that the
"intention of every lawgiver is to make good citizens. "

I answer that, as stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 2; AA[3],4), a law is
nothing else than a dictate of reason in the ruler by whom his subjects
are governed. Now the virtue of any subordinate thing consists in its
being well subordinated to that by which it is regulated: thus we see
that the virtue of the irascible and concupiscible faculties consists
in their being obedient to reason; and accordingly "the virtue of every
subject consists in his being well subjected to his ruler," as the
Philosopher says (Polit. i). But every law aims at being obeyed by
those who are subject to it. Consequently it is evident that the proper
effect of law is to lead its subjects to their proper virtue: and since
virtue is "that which makes its subject good," it follows that the
proper effect of law is to make those to whom it is given, good, either
simply or in some particular respect. For if the intention of the
lawgiver is fixed on true good, which is the common good regulated
according to Divine justice, it follows that the effect of the law is
to make men good simply. If, however, the intention of the lawgiver is
fixed on that which is not simply good, but useful or pleasurable to
himself, or in opposition to Divine justice; then the law does not make
men good simply, but in respect to that particular government. In this
way good is found even in things that are bad of themselves: thus a man
is called a good robber, because he works in a way that is adapted to
his end.

Reply to Objection 1: Virtue is twofold, as explained above
([1982]Q[63], A[2]), viz. acquired and infused. Now the fact of being
accustomed to an action contributes to both, but in different ways; for
it causes the acquired virtue; while it disposes to infused virtue, and
preserves and fosters it when it already exists. And since law is given
for the purpose of directing human acts; as far as human acts conduce
to virtue, so far does law make men good. Wherefore the Philosopher
says in the second book of the Politics (Ethic. ii) that "lawgivers
make men good by habituating them to good works. "

Reply to Objection 2: It is not always through perfect goodness of
virtue that one obeys the law, but sometimes it is through fear of
punishment, and sometimes from the mere dictates of reason, which is a
beginning of virtue, as stated above ([1983]Q[63], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 3: The goodness of any part is considered in
comparison with the whole; hence Augustine says (Confess. iii) that
"unseemly is the part that harmonizes not with the whole. " Since then
every man is a part of the state, it is impossible that a man be good,
unless he be well proportionate to the common good: nor can the whole
be well consistent unless its parts be proportionate to it.
Consequently the common good of the state cannot flourish, unless the
citizens be virtuous, at least those whose business it is to govern.
But it is enough for the good of the community, that the other citizens
be so far virtuous that they obey the commands of their rulers. Hence
the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 2) that "the virtue of a sovereign is
the same as that of a good man, but the virtue of any common citizen is
not the same as that of a good man. "

Reply to Objection 4: A tyrannical law, through not being according to
reason, is not a law, absolutely speaking, but rather a perversion of
law; and yet in so far as it is something in the nature of a law, it
aims at the citizens' being good. For all it has in the nature of a law
consists in its being an ordinance made by a superior to his subjects,
and aims at being obeyed by them, which is to make them good, not
simply, but with respect to that particular government.
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Whether the acts of law are suitably assigned?

Objection 1: It would seem that the acts of law are not suitably
assigned as consisting in "command," "prohibition," "permission" and
"punishment. " For "every law is a general precept," as the jurist
states. But command and precept are the same. Therefore the other three
are superfluous.

Objection 2: Further, the effect of a law is to induce its subjects to
be good, as stated above [1984](A[1]). But counsel aims at a higher
good than a command does. Therefore it belongs to law to counsel rather
than to command.

Objection 3: Further, just as punishment stirs a man to good deeds, so
does reward. Therefore if to punish is reckoned an effect of law, so
also is to reward.

Objection 4: Further, the intention of a lawgiver is to make men good,
as stated above [1985](A[1]). But he that obeys the law, merely through
fear of being punished, is not good: because "although a good deed may
be done through servile fear, i. e. fear of punishment, it is not done
well," as Augustine says (Contra duas Epist. Pelag. ii). Therefore
punishment is not a proper effect of law.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 19): "Every law either permits
something, as: 'A brave man may demand his reward'": or forbids
something, as: "No man may ask a consecrated virgin in marriage": or
punishes, as: "Let him that commits a murder be put to death. "

I answer that, Just as an assertion is a dictate of reason asserting
something, so is a law a dictate of reason, commanding something. Now
it is proper to reason to lead from one thing to another. Wherefore
just as, in demonstrative sciences, the reason leads us from certain
principles to assent to the conclusion, so it induces us by some means
to assent to the precept of the law.

Now the precepts of law are concerned with human acts, in which the law
directs, as stated above ([1986]Q[90], AA[1],2;[1987] Q[91], A[4]).
Again there are three kinds of human acts: for, as stated above
([1988]Q[18], A[8]), some acts are good generically, viz. acts of
virtue; and in respect of these the act of the law is a precept or
command, for "the law commands all acts of virtue" (Ethic. v, 1). Some
acts are evil generically, viz. acts of vice, and in respect of these
the law forbids. Some acts are generically indifferent, and in respect
of these the law permits; and all acts that are either not distinctly
good or not distinctly bad may be called indifferent. And it is the
fear of punishment that law makes use of in order to ensure obedience:
in which respect punishment is an effect of law.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as to cease from evil is a kind of good, so
a prohibition is a kind of precept: and accordingly, taking precept in
a wide sense, every law is a kind of precept.

Reply to Objection 2: To advise is not a proper act of law, but may be
within the competency even of a private person, who cannot make a law.
Wherefore too the Apostle, after giving a certain counsel (1 Cor. 7:12)
says: "I speak, not the Lord. " Consequently it is not reckoned as an
effect of law.

Reply to Objection 3: To reward may also pertain to anyone: but to
punish pertains to none but the framer of the law, by whose authority
the pain is inflicted. Wherefore to reward is not reckoned an effect of
law, but only to punish.

Reply to Objection 4: From becoming accustomed to avoid evil and
fulfill what is good, through fear of punishment, one is sometimes led
on to do so likewise, with delight and of one's own accord.
Accordingly, law, even by punishing, leads men on to being good.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE ETERNAL LAW (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider each law by itself; and (1) The eternal law; (2)
The natural law; (3) The human law; (4) The old law; (5) The new law,
which is the law of the Gospel. Of the sixth law which is the law of
the "fomes," suffice what we have said when treating of original sin.

Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry:

(1) What is the eternal law?

(2) Whether it is known to all?

(3) Whether every law is derived from it?

(4) Whether necessary things are subject to the eternal law?

(5) Whether natural contingencies are subject to the eternal law?

(6) Whether all human things are subject to it?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the eternal law is a sovereign type [*Ratio] existing in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the eternal law is not a sovereign type
existing in God. For there is only one eternal law. But there are many
types of things in the Divine mind; for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii,
qu. 46) that God "made each thing according to its type. " Therefore the
eternal law does not seem to be a type existing in the Divine mind.

Objection 2: Further, it is essential to a law that it be promulgated
by word, as stated above (Q[90], A[4]). But Word is a Personal name in
God, as stated in the [1989]FP, Q[34], A[1]: whereas type refers to the
Essence. Therefore the eternal law is not the same as a Divine type.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxx): "We see a
law above our minds, which is called truth. " But the law which is above
our minds is the eternal law. Therefore truth is the eternal law. But
the idea of truth is not the same as the idea of a type. Therefore the
eternal law is not the same as the sovereign type.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "the eternal
law is the sovereign type, to which we must always conform. "

I answer that, Just as in every artificer there pre-exists a type of
the things that are made by his art, so too in every governor there
must pre-exist the type of the order of those things that are to be
done by those who are subject to his government. And just as the type
of the things yet to be made by an art is called the art or exemplar of
the products of that art, so too the type in him who governs the acts
of his subjects, bears the character of a law, provided the other
conditions be present which we have mentioned above (Q[90]). Now God,
by His wisdom, is the Creator of all things in relation to which He
stands as the artificer to the products of his art, as stated in the
[1990]FP, Q[14], A[8]. Moreover He governs all the acts and movements
that are to be found in each single creature, as was also stated in the
[1991]FP, Q[103], A[5]. Wherefore as the type of the Divine Wisdom,
inasmuch as by It all things are created, has the character of art,
exemplar or idea; so the type of Divine Wisdom, as moving all things to
their due end, bears the character of law. Accordingly the eternal law
is nothing else than the type of Divine Wisdom, as directing all
actions and movements.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking in that passage of the
ideal types which regard the proper nature of each single thing; and
consequently in them there is a certain distinction and plurality,
according to their different relations to things, as stated in the
[1992]FP, Q[15], A[2]. But law is said to direct human acts by
ordaining them to the common good, as stated above (Q[90], A[2]). And
things, which are in themselves different, may be considered as one,
according as they are ordained to one common thing. Wherefore the
eternal law is one since it is the type of this order.

Reply to Objection 2: With regard to any sort of word, two points may
be considered: viz. the word itself, and that which is expressed by the
word. For the spoken word is something uttered by the mouth of man, and
expresses that which is signified by the human word. The same applies
to the human mental word, which is nothing else that something
conceived by the mind, by which man expresses his thoughts mentally. So
then in God the Word conceived by the intellect of the Father is the
name of a Person: but all things that are in the Father's knowledge,
whether they refer to the Essence or to the Persons, or to the works of
God, are expressed by this Word, as Augustine declares (De Trin. xv,
14). And among other things expressed by this Word, the eternal law
itself is expressed thereby. Nor does it follow that the eternal law is
a Personal name in God: yet it is appropriated to the Son, on account
of the kinship between type and word.

Reply to Objection 3: The types of the Divine intellect do not stand in
the same relation to things, as the types of the human intellect.
For
the human intellect is measured by things, so that a human concept is
not true by reason of itself, but by reason of its being consonant with
things, since "an opinion is true or false according as it answers to
the reality. " But the Divine intellect is the measure of things: since
each thing has so far truth in it, as it represents the Divine
intellect, as was stated in the [1993]FP, Q[16], A[1]. Consequently the
Divine intellect is true in itself; and its type is truth itself.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the eternal law is known to all?

Objection 1: It would seem that the eternal law is not known to all.
Because, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:11), "the things that are of God
no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God. " But the eternal law is a type
existing in the Divine mind. Therefore it is unknown to all save God
alone.

Objection 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) "the
eternal law is that by which it is right that all things should be most
orderly. " But all do not know how all things are most orderly.
Therefore all do not know the eternal law.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi) that "the
eternal law is not subject to the judgment of man. " But according to
Ethic. i, "any man can judge well of what he knows. " Therefore the
eternal law is not known to us.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "knowledge of
the eternal law is imprinted on us. "

I answer that, A thing may be known in two ways: first, in itself;
secondly, in its effect, wherein some likeness of that thing is found:
thus someone not seeing the sun in its substance, may know it by its
rays. So then no one can know the eternal law, as it is in itself,
except the blessed who see God in His Essence. But every rational
creature knows it in its reflection, greater or less. For every
knowledge of truth is a kind of reflection and participation of the
eternal law, which is the unchangeable truth, as Augustine says (De
Vera Relig. xxxi). Now all men know the truth to a certain extent, at
least as to the common principles of the natural law: and as to the
others, they partake of the knowledge of truth, some more, some less;
and in this respect are more or less cognizant of the eternal law.

Reply to Objection 1: We cannot know the things that are of God, as
they are in themselves; but they are made known to us in their effects,
according to Rom. 1:20: "The invisible things of God . . . are clearly
seen, being understood by the things that are made. "

Reply to Objection 2: Although each one knows the eternal law according
to his own capacity, in the way explained above, yet none can
comprehend it: for it cannot be made perfectly known by its effects.
Therefore it does not follow that anyone who knows the eternal law in
the way aforesaid, knows also the whole order of things, whereby they
are most orderly.

Reply to Objection 3: To judge a thing may be understood in two ways.
First, as when a cognitive power judges of its proper object, according
to Job 12:11: "Doth not the ear discern words, and the palate of him
that eateth, the taste? " It is to this kind of judgment that the
Philosopher alludes when he says that "anyone can judge well of what he
knows," by judging, namely, whether what is put forward is true. In
another way we speak of a superior judging of a subordinate by a kind
of practical judgment, as to whether he should be such and such or not.
And thus none can judge of the eternal law.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether every law is derived from the eternal law?

Objection 1: It would seem that not every law is derived from the
eternal law. For there is a law of the "fomes," as stated above
([1994]Q[91], A[6]), which is not derived from that Divine law which is
the eternal law, since thereunto pertains the "prudence of the flesh,"
of which the Apostle says (Rom. 8:7), that "it cannot be subject to the
law of God. " Therefore not every law is derived from the eternal law.

Objection 2: Further, nothing unjust can be derived from the eternal
law, because, as stated above (A[2], OBJ[2]), "the eternal law is that,
according to which it is right that all things should be most orderly. "
But some laws are unjust, according to Is. 10:1: "Woe to them that make
wicked laws. " Therefore not every law is derived from the eternal law.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) that "the law
which is framed for ruling the people, rightly permits many things
which are punished by Divine providence. " But the type of Divine
providence is the eternal law, as stated above [1995](A[1]). Therefore
not even every good law is derived from the eternal law.

On the contrary, Divine Wisdom says (Prov. 8:15): "By Me kings reign,
and lawgivers decree just things. " But the type of Divine Wisdom is the
eternal law, as stated above [1996](A[1]). Therefore all laws proceed
from the eternal law.

I answer that, As stated above ([1997]Q[90], AA[1],2), the law denotes
a kind of plan directing acts towards an end. Now wherever there are
movers ordained to one another, the power of the second mover must
needs be derived from the power of the first mover; since the second
mover does not move except in so far as it is moved by the first.
Wherefore we observe the same in all those who govern, so that the plan
of government is derived by secondary governors from the governor in
chief; thus the plan of what is to be done in a state flows from the
king's command to his inferior administrators: and again in things of
art the plan of whatever is to be done by art flows from the chief
craftsman to the under-crafts-men, who work with their hands. Since
then the eternal law is the plan of government in the Chief Governor,
all the plans of government in the inferior governors must be derived
from the eternal law. But these plans of inferior governors are all
other laws besides the eternal law. Therefore all laws, in so far as
they partake of right reason, are derived from the eternal law. Hence
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "in temporal law there is
nothing just and lawful, but what man has drawn from the eternal law. "

Reply to Objection 1: The "fomes" has the nature of law in man, in so
far as it is a punishment resulting from Divine justice; and in this
respect it is evident that it is derived from the eternal law. But in
so far as it denotes a proneness to sin, it is contrary to the Divine
law, and has not the nature of law, as stated above ([1998]Q[91],
A[6]).

Reply to Objection 2: Human law has the nature of law in so far as it
partakes of right reason; and it is clear that, in this respect, it is
derived from the eternal law. But in so far as it deviates from reason,
it is called an unjust law, and has the nature, not of law but of
violence. Nevertheless even an unjust law, in so far as it retains some
appearance of law, though being framed by one who is in power, is
derived from the eternal law; since all power is from the Lord God,
according to Rom. 13:1.

Reply to Objection 3: Human law is said to permit certain things, not
as approving them, but as being unable to direct them. And many things
are directed by the Divine law, which human law is unable to direct,
because more things are subject to a higher than to a lower cause.
Hence the very fact that human law does not meddle with matters it
cannot direct, comes under the ordination of the eternal law. It would
be different, were human law to sanction what the eternal law condemns.
Consequently it does not follow that human law is not derived from the
eternal law, but that it is not on a perfect equality with it.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether necessary and eternal things are subject to the eternal law?

Objection 1: It would seem that necessary and eternal things are
subject to the eternal law. For whatever is reasonable is subject to
reason. But the Divine will is reasonable, for it is just. Therefore it
is subject to (the Divine) reason. But the eternal law is the Divine
reason. Therefore God's will is subject to the eternal law. But God's
will is eternal. Therefore eternal and necessary things are subject to
the eternal law.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is subject to the King, is subject to
the King's law. Now the Son, according to 1 Cor. 15:28,24, "shall be
subject . . . to God and the Father . . . when He shall have delivered
up the Kingdom to Him. " Therefore the Son, Who is eternal, is subject
to the eternal law.

Objection 3: Further, the eternal law is Divine providence as a type.
But many necessary things are subject to Divine providence: for
instance, the stability of incorporeal substances and of the heavenly
bodies. Therefore even necessary things are subject to the eternal law.

On the contrary, Things that are necessary cannot be otherwise, and
consequently need no restraining. But laws are imposed on men, in order
to restrain them from evil, as explained above ([1999]Q[92], A[2]).
Therefore necessary things are not subject to the eternal law.

I answer that, As stated above [2000](A[1]), the eternal law is the
type of the Divine government. Consequently whatever is subject to the
Divine government, is subject to the eternal law: while if anything is
not subject to the Divine government, neither is it subject to the
eternal law. The application of this distinction may be gathered by
looking around us. For those things are subject to human government,
which can be done by man; but what pertains to the nature of man is not
subject to human government; for instance, that he should have a soul,
hands, or feet. Accordingly all that is in things created by God,
whether it be contingent or necessary, is subject to the eternal law:
while things pertaining to the Divine Nature or Essence are not subject
to the eternal law, but are the eternal law itself.

Reply to Objection 1: We may speak of God's will in two ways. First, as
to the will itself: and thus, since God's will is His very Essence, it
is subject neither to the Divine government, nor to the eternal law,
but is the same thing as the eternal law. Secondly, we may speak of
God's will, as to the things themselves that God wills about creatures;
which things are subject to the eternal law, in so far as they are
planned by Divine Wisdom. In reference to these things God's will is
said to be reasonable [rationalis]: though regarded in itself it should
rather be called their type [ratio].

Reply to Objection 2: God the Son was not made by God, but was
naturally born of God. Consequently He is not subject to Divine
providence or to the eternal law: but rather is Himself the eternal law
by a kind of appropriation, as Augustine explains (De Vera Relig.
xxxi). But He is said to be subject to the Father by reason of His
human nature, in respect of which also the Father is said to be greater
than He.

The third objection we grant, because it deals with those necessary
things that are created.

Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 6),
some necessary things have a cause of their necessity: and thus they
derive from something else the fact that they cannot be otherwise. And
this is in itself a most effective restraint; for whatever is
restrained, is said to be restrained in so far as it cannot do
otherwise than it is allowed to.
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Whether natural contingents are subject to the eternal law?

Objection 1: It would seem that natural contingents are not subject to
the eternal law. Because promulgation is essential to law, as stated
above ([2001]Q[90], A[4]). But a law cannot be promulgated except to
rational creatures, to whom it is possible to make an announcement.
Therefore none but rational creatures are subject to the eternal law;
and consequently natural contingents are not.

Objection 2: Further, "Whatever obeys reason partakes somewhat of
reason," as stated in Ethic. i. But the eternal law, is the supreme
type, as stated above [2002](A[1]). Since then natural contingents do
not partake of reason in any way, but are altogether void of reason, it
seems that they are not subject to the eternal law.

Objection 3: Further, the eternal law is most efficient. But in natural
contingents defects occur. Therefore they are not subject to the
eternal law.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 8:29): "When He compassed the sea
with its bounds, and set a law to the waters, that they should not pass
their limits. "

I answer that, We must speak otherwise of the law of man, than of the
eternal law which is the law of God. For the law of man extends only to
rational creatures subject to man. The reason of this is because law
directs the actions of those that are subject to the government of
someone: wherefore, properly speaking, none imposes a law on his own
actions. Now whatever is done regarding the use of irrational things
subject to man, is done by the act of man himself moving those things,
for these irrational creatures do not move themselves, but are moved by
others, as stated above ([2003]Q[1], A[2]). Consequently man cannot
impose laws on irrational beings, however much they may be subject to
him. But he can impose laws on rational beings subject to him, in so
far as by his command or pronouncement of any kind, he imprints on
their minds a rule which is a principle of action.

Now just as man, by such pronouncement, impresses a kind of inward
principle of action on the man that is subject to him, so God imprints
on the whole of nature the principles of its proper actions. And so, in
this way, God is said to command the whole of nature, according to Ps.
148:6: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away. " And thus
all actions and movements of the whole of nature are subject to the
eternal law. Consequently irrational creatures are subject to the
eternal law, through being moved by Divine providence; but not, as
rational creatures are, through understanding the Divine commandment.

Reply to Objection 1: The impression of an inward active principle is
to natural things, what the promulgation of law is to men: because law,
by being promulgated, imprints on man a directive principle of human
actions, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Irrational creatures neither partake of nor are
obedient to human reason: whereas they do partake of the Divine Reason
by obeying it; because the power of Divine Reason extends over more
things than human reason does. And as the members of the human body are
moved at the command of reason, and yet do not partake of reason, since
they have no apprehension subordinate to reason; so too irrational
creatures are moved by God, without, on that account, being rational.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the defects which occur in natural
things are outside the order of particular causes, they are not outside
the order of universal causes, especially of the First Cause, i. e. God,
from Whose providence nothing can escape, as stated in the [2004]FP,
Q[22], A[2]. And since the eternal law is the type of Divine
providence, as stated above [2005](A[1]), hence the defects of natural
things are subject to the eternal law.
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Whether all human affairs are subject to the eternal law?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all human affairs are subject to
the eternal law. For the Apostle says (Gal. 5:18): "If you are led by
the spirit you are not under the law. " But the righteous who are the
sons of God by adoption, are led by the spirit of God, according to
Rom. 8:14: "Whosoever are led by the spirit of God, they are the sons
of God. " Therefore not all men are under the eternal law.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 8:7): "The prudence
[Vulg. : 'wisdom'] of the flesh is an enemy to God: for it is not
subject to the law of God. " But many are those in whom the prudence of
the flesh dominates. Therefore all men are not subject to the eternal
law which is the law of God.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "the
eternal law is that by which the wicked deserve misery, the good, a
life of blessedness. " But those who are already blessed, and those who
are already lost, are not in the state of merit. Therefore they are not
under the eternal law.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12): "Nothing evades
the laws of the most high Creator and Governor, for by Him the peace of
the universe is administered. "

I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing is subject to the
eternal law, as explained above [2006](A[5]): first, by partaking of
the eternal law by way of knowledge; secondly, by way of action and
passion, i. e. by partaking of the eternal law by way of an inward
motive principle: and in this second way, irrational creatures are
subject to the eternal law, as stated above [2007](A[5]). But since the
rational nature, together with that which it has in common with all
creatures, has something proper to itself inasmuch as it is rational,
consequently it is subject to the eternal law in both ways; because
while each rational creature has some knowledge of the eternal law, as
stated above [2008](A[2]), it also has a natural inclination to that
which is in harmony with the eternal law; for "we are naturally adapted
to the recipients of virtue" (Ethic. ii, 1).

Both ways, however, are imperfect, and to a certain extent destroyed,
in the wicked; because in them the natural inclination to virtue is
corrupted by vicious habits, and, moreover, the natural knowledge of
good is darkened by passions and habits of sin. But in the good both
ways are found more perfect: because in them, besides the natural
knowledge of good, there is the added knowledge of faith and wisdom;
and again, besides the natural inclination to good, there is the added
motive of grace and virtue.

Accordingly, the good are perfectly subject to the eternal law, as
always acting according to it: whereas the wicked are subject to the
eternal law, imperfectly as to their actions, indeed, since both their
knowledge of good, and their inclination thereto, are imperfect; but
this imperfection on the part of action is supplied on the part of
passion, in so far as they suffer what the eternal law decrees
concerning them, according as they fail to act in harmony with that
law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 15): "I esteem that the
righteous act according to the eternal law; and (De Catech. Rud.
xviii): Out of the just misery of the souls which deserted Him, God
knew how to furnish the inferior parts of His creation with most
suitable laws. "

Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Apostle may be understood in
two ways. First, so that a man is said to be under the law, through
being pinned down thereby, against his will, as by a load. Hence, on
the same passage a gloss says that "he is under the law, who refrains
from evil deeds, through fear of punishment threatened by the law, and
not from love of virtue. " In this way the spiritual man is not under
the law, because he fulfils the law willingly, through charity which is
poured into his heart by the Holy Ghost. Secondly, it can be understood
as meaning that the works of a man, who is led by the Holy Ghost, are
the works of the Holy Ghost rather than his own. Therefore, since the
Holy Ghost is not under the law, as neither is the Son, as stated above
(A[4], ad 2); it follows that such works, in so far as they are of the
Holy Ghost, are not under the law. The Apostle witnesses to this when
he says (2 Cor. 3:17): "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is
liberty. "

Reply to Objection 2: The prudence of the flesh cannot be subject to
the law of God as regards action; since it inclines to actions contrary
to the Divine law: yet it is subject to the law of God, as regards
passion; since it deserves to suffer punishment according to the law of
Divine justice. Nevertheless in no man does the prudence of the flesh
dominate so far as to destroy the whole good of his nature: and
consequently there remains in man the inclination to act in accordance
with the eternal law. For we have seen above ([2009]Q[85], A[2]) that
sin does not destroy entirely the good of nature.

Reply to Objection 3: A thing is maintained in the end and moved
towards the end by one and the same cause: thus gravity which makes a
heavy body rest in the lower place is also the cause of its being moved
thither. We therefore reply that as it is according to the eternal law
that some deserve happiness, others unhappiness, so is it by the
eternal law that some are maintained in a happy state, others in an
unhappy state. Accordingly both the blessed and the damned are under
the eternal law.
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OF THE NATURAL LAW (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the natural law; concerning which there are six
points of inquiry:

(1) What is the natural law?

(2) What are the precepts of the natural law?