By means of Christianity Byzantine influence spread beyond the
boundaries of the Empire in Justinian's reign, and many were the peoples
affected by it; Huns from the Cimmerian Bosphorus, Souanians, Abasgi,
Apsilians from the Caucasus district, Alans, and Sabirian Huns, Tzani
from the upper Euphrates, Arabs from Syria, Himyarites from Yemen,
Nobadae and Blemmyes from the upper Nile, Berbers from the oases of
the Sahara, and Heruls from Moesia.
boundaries of the Empire in Justinian's reign, and many were the peoples
affected by it; Huns from the Cimmerian Bosphorus, Souanians, Abasgi,
Apsilians from the Caucasus district, Alans, and Sabirian Huns, Tzani
from the upper Euphrates, Arabs from Syria, Himyarites from Yemen,
Nobadae and Blemmyes from the upper Nile, Berbers from the oases of
the Sahara, and Heruls from Moesia.
Cambridge Medieval History - v2 - Rise of the Saracens and Foundation of the Western Empire
To realise this last he would not have hesitated at a breach
with Rome if it had become necessary. In spite of his efforts and good
intentions Anastasius had not succeeded in realising his ideal. But it
was right in principle and, thanks to Theodora, it inspired the policy of
Justinian in the East. In this way the Empress made a great impression
on her husband's government, and as soon as she died a decay set in
which brought the glorious reign to a sad close.
## p. 28 (#58) ##############################################
I
First Persian War [527-531
II.
The imperial policy in the West had been essentially offensive. In
the East, on the other hand, it was generally restricted to a defensive
attitude. Justinian submitted to war or accepted it when offered rather
than sought it, because he was anxious to preserve all his forces for
Africa and Italy. /Thus he maintained the safety of the monarchy in the
East less by a series of great victories than by military arrangements
combined with clever diplomatic action. I
In Asia, Persia had been the perpetual enemy of the Romans for
centuries. There was a ceaseless temptation to strife and a pretext for
warfare in the coincidence of the two frontiers, and the rival influence
which the two States exercised in Armenia in the Caucasus, and among
the Arab tribes of the Syrian desert. The hundred years' peace
concluded in 422 had certainly restored tranquillity for the rest of the
fifth century, but hostilities had broken out afresh in the reign of
Anastasius (502); and it was evident that the peace of 505 would only
prove to be a truce, although Persia was torn by domestic discord, and
had lost her prestige and strength, and her old king Kawad did not yS
seek adventures. In proportion as Justinian profited by the relative "*
weakness of his foes he attempted to bring more peoples into the relation
of clients to Rome. Such were the populations of Lazica (the ancient
Colchis), the tribes of Iberia and Georgia, and even the Sabirian
Huns who occupied the celebrated defiles of the Caspian Gates at
the foot of the Caucasus range on the boundary of the two Empires.
With great skill (Byzantine diplomacy, by spreading Christianity in
those regions, had inclined the peoples to wish for the protection of
the orthodox Emperor, and so had obtained possession of important
strategic and commercial posig for Greek use. This policy of encroach-\
ment was bound to lead to a rupture, which came in 527, during the
last months of Justin's reignA
The war however was neither very long nor disastrous. Neither of
the two adversaries wanted to fight to the death. Kawad, who had
taken up arms, was distracted by domestic difficulties and the task of
assuring the succession of his son. Justinian wanted to disengage himself
as soon as possible in order to have his hands free to deal with affairs in
the West. Under these conditions the imperial army, which was of a
good size, and well commanded by Belisarius, was able to snatch a signal
victory at Dara in 530, the first victory won against Persia for many
years. Another general was able to make considerable progress in
Persian Armenia at the same time, but Justinian did not set himself
seriously to profit by his successes. The next year a Persian invasion of
Syria forced Belisarius to engage in and to lose the disastrous battle of
Callinicum (531). Then, in spite of the fact that the Persians were
## p. 29 (#59) ##############################################
531-544] Second Persian War 29
besieging Martyropolis (581) and that a career of pillage had brought
the Huns under the very walls of Antioch (December 531), the Great
King troubled as little to push his advantages as the Emperor did
to avenge his defeat. Negotiations were as important in this war as
military operations. When therefore in September 531 the death of
Kawiid gave the throne to his son Chosroes I Anoushirvan, the new
sovereign was preoccupied by the endeavour to consolidate his power at
home, and willingly joined in the negotiations which ended in the
conclusion of an "everlasting peace," in September 532. Justinian was
delighted to end the war, and gave way on almost every point. He
agreed to pay once more the annual subsidy which the Romans had
handed over to the Persians to keep up the fortresses which defended
the passes of the Caucasus against the Northern barbarians. This was
a large sum of 110,000 pounds of gold, a thinly veiled form of tribute.
He promised to move the residence of the Duke of Mesopotamia from
Dara, the great fortress built by Anastasius in 507, to Constantina,
which was further from the frontier; and he abandoned the protectorate
over Iberia. In return the country of the Lazi remained within the
sphere of Byzantine influence, and the Persians evacuated the fortresses
in it.
But Chosroes was not the man to rest contented with these first
successes. He was a young prince, ambitious, active and anxious for
conquests. It was not without suspicion that he viewed the progress and
success of the imperial ambition, for he knew that the longing for
universal dominion might well form a menace to the Sassanid monarchy,
as well as to the West. He therefore made use of the years which followed
the peace of 532 to reconstruct his army, and when he saw what seemed
to him a favourable opportunity, he resolutely began the war again (540).
This happened when he discovered that the Roman frontier was stripped
of troops, Armenia and the country of the Lazi discontented under
Byzantine rule, and the Goths at bay after the Vandals were conquered.
At the beginning of hostilities he threw himself on Syria, which he
cruelly ravaged, and seized Antioch, which he completely ruined under
the eyes of the helpless Roman generals. In vain Justinian sent the
best generals against him, first Germanus and then Belisarius, hastily
recalled from Italy at the beginning of 541. Their troops were not
sufficient to defend the country effectively. In 541, Chosroes attacked
Lazica, reduced Iberia and swept away the strong fortress of Petra, which
Justinian had lately built to the south of Phasis. In 542 he ravaged
Commagene; in 543 he made a demonstration on the Armenian frontier;
and in 544 he again appeared in Mesopotamia which he ravaged cruelly,
in spite of the heroic resistance of Edessa. Meanwhile the imperial
troops did nothing: and the generals spent their time in intrigues
instead of in fighting. The military prestige of Belisarius had made
Chosroes give way for a brief space, but the general was absorbed in his
## p. 30 (#60) ##############################################
30 Second Persian War [542-561
domestic troubles, and let slip the time when he should have taken the
offensive with vigour; and by so doing more or less justified the disgrace
which soon overtook him through Theodora's ill-will (542). The only
military enterprise undertaken in 543 by Justinian's army was the invasion
of Persian Armenia, with more than 30,000 men, and it led to a great
disaster. The Emperor was seriously concerned with events in Italy
—Totila had just reconquered nearly the whole peninsula—and he was
very lucky to be able to buy with gold a truce for five years, instead of
a final peace (545). Thanks to the renewal of this convention in 551
and 552 the Asiatic provinces enjoyed tranquillity once more, though
the war continued in Lazica for many years afterwards.
It was an easy matter for the diplomacy of the two Empires to win
allies from amongst the belligerent tribes of the Caucasus, since their
good faith was always an uncertain quantity. While the Lazi, who were
discontented under the Persian tyranny, returned to Justinian in 549,
other peoples who had formerly been within the Byzantine sphere of
influence now attached themselves to Chosroes. Furthermore the war
seemed unending in a country rendered almost impassable by mountains
and forests. A struggle was maintained for several years over Petra.
Taken by the Persians in 541, it was attacked in vain by the Byzantines
in 549, and was only finally regained in 551. Other places were attacked
and defended with equal tenacity. Justinian realised the importance of
possessing a region which would enable him to deprive the Persians of
an outlet on the Black Sea, and therefore he made unheard-of efforts to
keep it. He concentrated as many as 50,000 men there in 552. Finally
Chosroes saw the uselessness of the interminable strife; and the armistice
of 555 was turned into a definite treaty in 561. Peace was declared
for fifty years, and the Persians agreed to evacuate Lazica, where they
knew that their power could hardly be maintained, since the people were
enthusiastically Christian. But the Emperor's success was dearly bought.
He bound himself to pay an annual tribute of 30,000 aurei, handing
over the sum-total for the first seven years in advance. He promised
for the future to discontinue any religious propaganda in the dominions
of the Great King, in return for the extension of toleration to Christians
in Persia. These concessions dealt a blow at Justinian's pride as an
Emperor and a Christian. However, Lazica remained to him, and it
was a considerable gain in the direction of securing the safety of the
Empire. Still the treaty was intentionally so vague in some points that
it contained the beginnings of many future difficulties.
While Roman Asia was cruelly suffering from these endless wars, the
European provinces were not escaping. Although the shock of the great
barbarian invasions had shaken the East much less than the West, a
succession of barbarian peoples were settled north of the Danube. The
Lombards, Heruls and Gepidae were on the west; Slavs and Bulgars,
Antae and Huns on the lower reaches of the river, while behind them
\
## p. 31 (#61) ##############################################
527-562] The Huns 31
lay the strong nation of Avars, still roving to the north of the Palus
Maeotis but gradually spreading themselves westward. The Empire
proved as attractive to these barbarians as to those who had invaded
the West. They had all one wish and one aim—some day to become
members of the rich and civilised commonwealth, whose towns were
fair, whose fields were fertile, and in which men received great treasures
and honour from the hand of the Emperor. Without doubt these
sentiments were largely inspired by greed of the splendid plunder that
the Roman territory offered to the enterprise of the barbarians, and if
their peaceful offers were declined they did not hesitate to keep their
vows by the use of force. Thus, at the end of the fifth century the
tribes had formed the habit of crossing the Danube periodically, either
in unnoticed driblets, or by sudden invasions, and certain groups were
legally settled on the south side of the river by the beginning of the
sixth century. The movement continued during the whole of Justinian's
reign.
From the beginning of his reign the Huns had appeared in Thrace
and the Antae in Illyricum; but they were repulsed with such energy
that, according to Malalas, "a great terror overcame the barbarian
nations. " Soon however the resistance gave way. As had been the
case in Asia, the frontier was denuded of troops in consequence of the
expeditions to the West, and the boldness of the invaders increased.
In 534 the Slavs and Bulgars crossed the Danube, and the magister
militum of Thrace perished in the attempt to drive them back. In 538
the Huns invaded Scythia and Moesia, in 540 they went further and
ravaged Thrace, Illyricum and Greece as far as the Isthmus of Corinth.
One of their bands even penetrated to the environs of Constantinople,
and spread a terrible panic in the capital. In 546 there was another
Hunnish invasion, in 547 an attack from the Slavs who devastated
Illyricum as far as Dyrrachium, while the imperial generals did not even
dare to face them. In 551 a band of three thousand Slavs pillaged
Thrace and Illyricum and advanced as far as the Aegean Sea. In 552
the Slavs and Antae menaced Thessalonica and settled themselves on
Byzantine land as though they had conquered it. In 558 the Kotrigur
Huns pushed into Thrace, one of their bands reaching Thermopylae,
while another appeared under the walls of Constantinople, which was
only just saved by the courage of the old Belisarius. In 562 the
Huns reappeared. Then the insolent and menacing Avars became
prominent, on the very eve of Justinian's death. It is quite certain that
none of these incursions would have led to the permanent establishment
of a barbarian people within the limits of the Empire, as had happened
in the West, for the imperial generals were always finally successful in
hurling the swarms of invaders back over the Danube. At the same
time the incessant scourge could not fail to produce lamentable
consequences in the provinces which suffered from it. Procopius
## p. 31 (#62) ##############################################
22 Administration in Africa
keep a sharp watch on the roads crossing the lime*; in time of war they
took up arms either to defend the post specially committed to their
charge, or combined with similar troops to beat back the invader. In
either case they might never leave the limes, as perpetual military service
was the necessary condition of their tenure of land. These tenant-
soldiers were empowered to marry, grouped in regiments commanded by
tribunes, and stationed in the fortified towns and castles on the frontier.
This kind of territorial army, organised by Justinian along all the
borders of the Empire, enabled him to reduce the strength of the troops
of the line, and keep them for big wars. A close-drawn net of fortresses
supported this formation. In Africa, specially, where the Vandals had
razed the fortifications of nearly all the towns, Justinian's lieutenants
had an enormous task before them. No point was left undefended, and
in Byzacena and Numidia several parallel lines of fortresses served to
block all openings, cover all positions of strategic importance, and offer
a refuge to the surrounding population in time of dangerA A number
of fortresses were built or restored from Tripolitana to the Pillars of
Hercules, where stood Septem "that the whole world could not take,"
and from the Aures and Hodna to Tell. Even to-day North Africa
abounds in the colossal ruins of Justinian's fortresses, and the hardly
dismantled ramparts of Haidra, Beja, Madaura, Tebessa and Timgad, to
cite no more, bear witness to the great effort by which, in a few years,
Justinian restored the Roman system of defence. Furthermore, in
following the example set by Rome, Justinian tried to incorporate in
the imperial army the barbaric peoples dwelling on the outskirts of the
Empire. These gentiles or J'oederati made a perpetual treaty with the
Emperor, on receiving a promise of an annual subsidy (annona). They
put their contingents at the disposal of the Roman dukes of the limes,
and their chiefs received from the Emperor's hands a kind of investiture,
as a sign of the Roman sovereignty, when they were given insignia to
denote their command, and titles from the Byzantine hierarchy. Thus
from the Syrtis to Mauretania there stretched a fringe of barbarian client
princes, acknowledging themselves as vassals of the basileus, and called—
Mauri pacifici. According to the expression of the African poet
Corippus, "trembling before the arms and success of Rome, of their own
accord they hastened to place themselves under the Roman yoke and
laws. "
By carrying out the great work of reorganisation in Africa and Italy,
Justinian flattered himself that he had achieved the double object of
restoring the "complete peace" in the West and " repairing the disasters n
which war had heaped on the unhappy countries. It remains to be seen
how far his optimism was justified, and to reckon the price paid by the
inhabitants for the privilege of entering the Roman Empire once more.
In a celebrated passage of the Secret History Procopius has enumerated
## p. 31 (#63) ##############################################
Misgovernment 23
all the misfortunes which the imperial restoration brought on Africa and
Italy. According to the historian the country was depopulated, the
provinces left undefended and badly governed, ruined further by financial
exactions, religious intolerance, and military insurrections, while five
million human lives were sacrificed in Africa, and still more in Italy.
These were the benefits conferred in the West by the " glorious reign of
Justinian. '" Although in crediting this account some allowance must be
made for oratorical exaggeration, yet it is certain that Africa and Italy
emerged from the many years of warfare to a great extent ruined, and
that a terrible economic and financial crisis accompanied the imperial
restoration. During many years Africa suffered all the horrors inci-
dent to Berber incursions, military revolts, destruction of the country
by sword and fire, and the murder and flight of the population. The
inevitable consequences of the struggle pressed no less hardly on Italy,
which underwent the horrors of long sieges, famine, massacre, disease,
the passage of the Goths, and the passage of imperialists, added to the
furious devastations of the Alemanni. The largest towns, such as
Naples, Milan, and specially Rome were almost devoid of inhabitants,
the depopulated country was uncultivated, and the large Italian pro-
prietors were repaid for their devotion to Byzantium and their hostility
to Totila by total ruin.
The exactions of the soldiers added yet more wretchedness. By their
greed, insolence and depredations the imperialists made those whom they
declared free regret the barbarian domination. The new administration
added the harshest financial tyranny to the misery caused by the war.
Justinian was obliged to get money at any cost, and therefore the barely
conquered country was given over to the pitiless exactions of the agents
of the fisc. The provinces were not only expected to support unaided
the expense of the very complicated administration imposed on them by
Justinian, but were further obliged to send money to Constantinople for
the general needs of the monarchy. The imperial logoihetae applied the
burdensome system of Roman taxes to the ruined countries without
making any allowance for the prevailing distress. They mercilessly
demanded arrears dating from the time of the Goths, falsified the
registers in order to increase the returns, and enriched themselves at the
expense of the taxpayer to such an extent that, according to a
contemporary writer, "nothing remained for the inhabitants but to die,
since they were bereft of all the necessities of life. '"
Desolate, helpless, brought to the lowest straits, the Western
provinces begged the Emperor to help them in their misery if he did
not wish, to quote the official document, "that they should be overcome
by the impossibility of paying their debts. " Justinian heard this appeal.
Measures were taken in Africa to restore cultivation to the fields, the
country districts were repeopled, various works of public utility were
organised in the towns, ports were opened on the coasts, hydraulic
## p. 32 (#64) ##############################################
32 Justinian's Fortresses
estimates that more than 200,000 people were either slain or led
captive during its course. He also compares the annually ravaged
lands to the "Scythian deserts,1'' and tells how the folk were forced
to flee to the forests and mountains to avoid the outrages and
atrocities which the barbarians would have inflicted upon them.
However, in Asia as in Europe, Justinian had taken wise and
vigorous measures to secure the defence of his provinces, to give them,
as he said, "peace and tranquillity,11 and to remove the "temptation to
invade and ravage the countries where the Emperor's subjects dwelt **
from the barbarians. With this object of efficiency in view he re-
organised the great military commands which were created to guard
the frontier. In Asia one general, the magister militum of the East,
had commanded the enormous district reaching from the Black Sea
to Egypt. This command was too large, and Justinian divided it,
_cjnstiiuting magistri militum for Armenia and Mesopotamia. In
Europe he added a magister militum of Moesia to those of Illyricum
and Thrace. But above all, for the immediate defence of the frontier
he organised all along the limes military districts commanded by
duces and occupied by special troops, the limitanei. We have already
seen how the duties and divisions of this formation were determined
in Africa. The same system was extended to the whole Empire, and
a large strip of military lands round its whole circumference assured
the safety of the interior. Although several of these limites were in
existence before the time of Justinian, he had the merit of organising
and completing the whole system. Three limites were formed in Egypt,
several commands were halved in Syria and on the Euphrates, and duces
were established in Armenia, while others kept watch on the Danube, in
Scythia, in the two Moesias and in Dacia. Thus the barbarians were
again confronted with the opposing wall that used to be called "the
"^monarchy's wrapper" (praetentura imperii).
•i Justinian also busied himself in building a continuous chain of
fortresses along all the frontiers, as he had done in Africa. Rome had
formerly been forced to undertake the immediate defence of the frontiers
of the Empire in order to protect her territories. Justinian did more.
Behind the first line of castella, and attached to them by a succession of
stations, he built a series of large fortresses placed further apart, and
more important. These served to strengthen the frontier castles, made
a second barrier against invasion, and were a place of refuge for the
inhabitants of the country. Thus the whole district was covered with
strong castles. They were of unequal importance and strength, but
they kept a watch on the enemy's territory, occupied points of strategic
importance, barred the defiles, commanded the important routes,
protected the safety of the towns and sheltered the rural population.
They covered all the provinces with a close-meshed net of fortresses, a
## p. 33 (#65) ##############################################
Justinian's Buildings 33
network through which it seemed impossible for the enemy to slip. It
had taken only a few years for Justinian's resolution to raise or repair
hundreds of fortresses, from the Danube to the Armenian mountains, and
to the banks of the Euphrates. If ancient Roman posts were merely
repaired at some points, while at others it was only necessary to complete
buildings begun by Anastasius, yet the dazed admiration which con-
temporaries seem to have felt for this colossal work was justified, for
Justinian gave unity to the whole system and displayed the greatest
energy in carrying it out. According to Procopius, by it he truly
"saved the monarchy. "
In his De Aedificiis Procopius gives the detailed list of the countless
buildings repaired or built by the Emperor's orders. Here it must
suffice to notice the chief features of the work. On the Danube more
^ than eighty castles were built or restored between the place where the
Save enters that river and the Black Sea. Among them may be men-
tioned Singidunum (Belgrade), Octavum, Viminacium, Novae, further to
the east Ratiaria, Augusta, Securisca, Durostorum (Silistria), Troesmis,
and, on the left bank, the strongly fortified bridge of Lederata. These
were for the most part ancient Roman citadels newly repaired.
Justinian's original work consisted chiefly in the measures which he took
^-* to strengthen the rear. Hundreds of castella sprang up in Dacia,
Dardania, and Moesia, further south in Epirus, Macedonia and Thrace.
Thus there was a second and even a third line of defence. In Dardania
S" alone, Justinian's native country, Procopius enumerates more than one
hundred and fifty castella besides such great posts as Justiniana Prima,
Sardica and Naissus. Fortifications were even constructed on the shore
^ of the Sea of Marmora and the Archipelago. To protect Constantinople
Anastasius had built the Long Wall in 512. It ran from the Sea of
Marmora to Selymbria on . the Black Sea. Similar long walls covered the
Thracian Chersonesus, barred the passes of Thermopylae, and cut across
the Isthmus of Corinth. Fortresses were also raised in Thessaly and
northern Greece. Thus the whole of the Balkan peninsula formed a
vast entrenched camp. On the side of the Euxine long walls protected
the approaches to Cherson, and the strong castle of Petra Justiniana
defended Lazica. Then several lines of fortresses were drawn up from
Trebizond to the Euphrates. In Armenia there was Theodosiopolis
(now Erzeroum), Kitharizon and Martyropolis; in Mesopotamia Amida,
Constantina, Dara, called "the rampart of the Roman Empire," and
another Theodosiopolis; Circesium was on the Euphrates and Zenobia
and Palmyra on the borders of the desert. Added to these there were
the intermediate castella which connected the big fortresses. A little to
the rear, in the second line, were Satala, Coloneia, Nicopolis, Sebaste,
Melitene, "the bulwark of Armenia," Edessa, Carrhae, Callinicum in
Osrhoene, Sura, Hierapolis, Zeugma in the Euphrates district, and
Antioch after the catastrophe of 540. These made a formidable field
C. MED. H. VOL. II. CH. II. 3
## p. 34 (#66) ##############################################
34 Justinian s Diplomacy
for warfare. It is certain that all these buildings do not date from
Justinian's reign, but he must have the credit of combining them all
into a sure and splendid defensive system.
Military methods alone were not employed for the defence of the
Empire in the East. The imperial diplomacy was putting forth all its
powers to that end, and displayed wonderful skill and ingenuity in the
task. The Empire always possessed a great influence over the bar-
barians settled on the Roman frontiers. They were proud when their
services and good faith won for them the approval of the basileus. They
gladly placed their forces at his disposal when they received the annual
subsidy (annona), and became the auxiliaries and vassals of the Empire,
bearing the name of foederati. Their chiefs felt themselves honoured
when they received the splendid insignia of their commands from the
hands of the basileus. They gladly adorned themselves with titles culled
from the hierarchy of the palace, and hastened to declare themselves to be
"Slaves of the imperial Majesty. " Constantinople and the Court dazzled
their simple minds, they flocked there gladly, and it was easy for the
Emperor by the mere splendour of their reception to impress them with
a great idea of the strength of the monarchy. During the whole
of Justinian's reign the Sacred Palace was filled with a never-ending
succession of strange and barbaric sovereigns. Heruls, Huns, Gepidae,
Avars, Saracens, Axumitae, Lazi, Iberians, men of every race and of every
land, with their wives and children and their retinue in picturesque
garments, filled the capital with a babel of all the tongues in the
universe. They were loaded with honours, presents, and magnificent
demonstrations of affection, and returned to their native wilds dazzled
by the spectacle of the imperial majesty. Naturally they felt them-
selves only too happy to be allowed to serve this basileus who gave
so warm a welcome to his faithful servitors, and recompensed them so
generously.
Thus by the clever distribution of favours and money the Emperor
was able to maintain a fringe of barbarian clients on all his frontiers.
At the same time the authorities at Byzantium never forgot that the
fickle and perfidious allies might prove to be dangerous servants because
of their indiscipline, faithlessness and greed. The imperial diplomacy
watched them with an eagle eye, skilfully treating them with a mixture
of sternness and leniency; and endeavouring tfi render them harmless by
the policy of setting them against each other, and fostering rivalry and
hatred amongst them^XJustinian maintained a possible rival to every
barbarian king, he had always a hostile people waiting his word to
descend on every other people. The Lombards menaced the Gepidae,
the Utigurs the Kotrigurs, the Avars the Huns. Thus, as Agathias
wrote, " so long as the barbarians destroyed each other, the Emperor was
always victor without drawing his sword, no matter what was the end of
## p. 35 (#67) ##############################################
Justinian's Diplomacy 35
the struggle. " Formerly Rome had found the same methods necessary
to govern the barbarians. Byzantium was able to add to the Roman
traditions the influence which she wielded because of her propagation of
Christianity. \Her missionaries worked for the consolidation of the
imperial power as effectively as her diplomatists. They opened a road
for politicians, and prepared new territories for Byzantine influence and
civilisation. Thanks to them conversions increased everywhere, from
the plains of southern Russia to the Abyssinian plateau, and from the
Caucasus Mountains to the oases of the Sahara.
By means of Christianity Byzantine influence spread beyond the
boundaries of the Empire in Justinian's reign, and many were the peoples
affected by it; Huns from the Cimmerian Bosphorus, Souanians, Abasgi,
Apsilians from the Caucasus district, Alans, and Sabirian Huns, Tzani
from the upper Euphrates, Arabs from Syria, Himyarites from Yemen,
Nobadae and Blemmyes from the upper Nile, Berbers from the oases of
the Sahara, and Heruls from Moesia.
By these means Justinian was able to checkmate his enemies. In the
East he sought amongst the Sabirian Huns for allies against the Sassanid
monarchy, because they could rush upon the Persian realm from the
north. He also went to the Arabs of the Syrian desert because they
might make useful diversions from the south, and he formed them into
a unique State, under the phylarchiw Harith the Ghassanid(531). Not
content with this, he went yet further and made friends among the Arabs
on the Yemen and in the Ethiopian kingdom of Axum. In the West
he skilfully managed to sow discord amongst the tribes who crowded on
the Danube frontier, checking the Bulgars by the Huns, the Huns by the
Antae, and the Antae and Utigurs by the Avars. He scattered money
and lands liberally amongst them all, loading their ambassadors with
silken robes and golden chains, in return for which he only asked them
to supply Byzantium with soldiers. In this way he settled the Lombards
in Pan noma, the Heruls in Dacia, and the Kotrigur Huns in Thrace.
He offered the Avars lands suitable for settlement on the Save, and
similarly managed to procure a number of vassals on all the frontiers of
the Empire. On the Danube there were the Heruls, Gepidae, Lombards,
Huns and Antae; on the borders of Armenia, the Lazi and Tzani; on
the Syrian frontier the crowd of Arab tribes; in Africa the Berber
inhabitants of Byzacena, Numidia and Mauritania.
Thus with wonderful skill Justinian exercised the difficult art of
ruling barbarians, and he did it from the depth of his palace and capital.
Contemporaries waxed eloquent in praise of the prudence, the fairness
and delicacy displayed by the Emperor in carrying out this policy, and
in celebrating that evfiovXLa by which, according to Menander, "he
would have destroyed the barbarians without fighting if he had lived
long enough. 11 However this policy was not without its dangers. UJy
displaying the riches of the Empire to the barbarians, and by lavishly
ch. ii. 3—2
t^
## p. 36 (#68) ##############################################
36 Defects of Justinian's Diplomacy
distributing money and lands amongst them, their demands were
naturally increased enormously, and their invasions provoked\ Procopius
very wisely observed that " once they had tasted Byzantine"wealth it was
impossible to keep them from it, or to make them forget the road to it. "
The obvious antidote for the dangers of this course of diplomacy was a
strong military organisation. Procopius again wrote "there is no other
way of compelling the barbarians to keep faith with Rome except by the
fear of the imperial armies. " Justinian understood this quite well.
Unfortunately, in proportion as the West again absorbed the resources
and attention of the Empire, lack of money led to the disorganisation
of those military institutions which had been formed to protect the East.
Corps of limitanei were disbanded, the fighting force of the troops of the
line in Syria was diminished, strong positions were left undefended,
often bereft of garrisons altogether, and Justinian's excellent network of
fortresses no longer sufficed to keep out the barbarians. The Emperor
seemed to prefer diplomatic action by itself to the practical military
precautions that he had applied so actively at the beginning of his reign.
He thought it more clever to buy off the invaders than to beat them by
force of arms, he considered it cheaper to subsidise the barbarians than
to maintain a large army on a war footing; he found it more agreeable
to direct a subtle diplomacy than great military operations, and he never
realised that the first result of his policy was to encourage the barbarians
in rr>t,iirn\ .
This was the fundamental defect of Justinian's foreign policy in the
East. It rested on a skilful combination of military force and diplomacy.
As long as the balance was maintained between these two elements
equilibrium was secured, the end aimed at was attained, and the Empire
was well defended and comparatively safe. But when this balance was
upset, everything went wrong at once. The Slavs appeared at Hadrianople,
the Huns under the walls of Constantinople, while the Avars assumed a
threatening attitude and regions of the Balkans were terribly ravaged.
Procopius was justified when he reproached Justinian with having "wasted
the riches of the Empire in extravagant gifts to. the barbarians," and in
his assertion that the Emperor's rash generosity only incited them to
return perpetually "to sell the peace for which they were always well
paid. " The historian goes on to explain that "after them came others,
who made a double profit, from the rapine in which they indulged and
from the money with which the liberality of the prince always furnished
them. Thus the evil continued with no abatement, and there was no
escape from the vicious circle. "
This mistaken policy cost the Empire dear. Nevertheless, it was
founded on a right principle, and some of the results which it
produced were not to be despised, in connexion with the defence of
territory, the development of commerce, or the spread of civilisation.
Justinian's mistake—specially during the last years of his reign—lay in
## p. 37 (#69) ##############################################
Domestic Government 37
the fact that he carried the system to excess. When he allowed the
army to become disorganised and fortresses to fall into ruin he bereft
his diplomacy of the force that was necessary to support his plans.
When he ceased to awe the barbarians he found himself at their mercy.
III.
The domestic government of the East took up as much of Justinian's
attention as the defence of the territory. /The urgent need for adminis-
trative reform in the, midst of a serious religious crisis provided ample
food for his anxiety,
In Byzantium lie salej)fjpublic offices was an ancient custom, and
this venality led to deplorable results. The governors expected to recoup
themselves from the province for the expenses which they incurred in
obtaining their posts, and to enrich themselves to as great an extent as
possible while they held them. The other agents in so corrupt an
administration only followed the governor's example, when they pillaged
and crushed the district to their heart's content. The__financial system
was oppressive and exacting; justice was sold or partially administered,
and deep misery and general insecurity was the natural result. The
people left the country, the towns were emptied, the fields deserted, and
agriculture abandoned. While those who were strong or rich enough to
defend themselves managed to escape the exactions of the tax-collector,
the great proprietors maintained troops of armed men in their pay, and
ravaged the country, attacked people and seized land, sure of immunity
from the magistrates. Everywhere murder, brigandage, agitation and
risings abounded, and last and most serious result of all the disorders,
thej-eturnsj>f thejaxfis-from the exhausted provinces were but scanty.
Justinian calculated that only one-third of the taxes imposed really
reached the treasury, and the misery of the subjects destroyed the source
of the public wealth. It will be easy to understand why the Emperor felt
so much concern at affairs in the East, if we add that the laws abounded
in contradictions, obscurities and useless prolixity, which gave rise to
very long law-suits, and furnished an opportunity for the j udges to give
arbitrary decisions, or to decide matters to suit their own convenience.
Justinian, as we know, had the qualities that go to make a good
administrator. He loved order, he had a sincere wish to do good work,
and a real care for the well-being of his subjects. With an authoritative
disposition and absolutist tendencies, he combined a taste for adminis-
trative centralisation. But above all, his vast projects left him incessantly
in need of large sums of money. He saw that the best way to ensure
the regularity of the returns was to protect those who paid from the
functionaries who ruined them; and thus in furthering the well-being
and quiet of his subjects the Emperor was also serving the best interests
## p. 38 (#70) ##############################################
38 Justinians Legislation [533-636
of the fisc. Moreover it satisfied Justinian's pride to maintain the
tradition of the great Roman Emperors by being a reformer and
legislator. For these various reasons from the time of his accession
he undertook a double work. In order to give the Empire certain and
unquestionable laws he had legislative monuments drawn up under
i Tribonian's direction, which are known as Justinian's Code (529), the
Digest (533), the Institutes (533), and completed by the series of Novellae
. (534-565).
The details of Justinian's legislative work will be found in another
chapter. All that is done here is to indicate their place in the reign as
a whole and in the general policy of the Emperor. After the great crisis
of the Nika riot had clearly shewn him the public discontent and the
faults of Ihe government, he promulgated juie two great ordinances of
April 535. By these two documents Justinian laid down the principles
of his administrative reform and shewed his functionaries the new duties
which he expected of them. rThe sale of offices was abolished. To take
all pretext for exploiting the population from the governors, their salaries
were raised, while their prestige was increased in order to remove from
them the temptation to yield to the demands of powerful private persons.
But before all things, the Emperor wished his agents to be scrupulously
honest, and was always urging them to keep their "hands clean. " He
gave minute instructions to his magistrates, and bade them render
the same justice to all, keep a watchful eye on the conduct of their
subordinates, protect the subjects from all vexations, hinder the en-
croachments of the great, ensure the maintenance of order by frequent
progresses, and govern, in fact, "paternally. " But above all he bade
them neglect nothing that might defend the interests of the fisc, and
increase its resources. To pay in the taxes regularly was the first duty
of a good officer, as the first duty of a taxpayer was to acquit himself
regularly and completely of the whole sum due. Furthermore, to ensure
the carrying out of his plans, Justiniait requested the bishops to inspect
the conduct of the magistrates; and he invited anyone who wished to
make complaints to come to Constantinople, and lay his grievances at
the feet of the sovereign. )
During the years 535 and 536 a series of special measures was added
to the general enactments. Their object wasQp strengthen the local
government and to ensure obedience to the central power. ■ In the fourth
century the traditional method of conducting the administration was to
multiply provincial districts, to complicate an endless hierarchy of officials
and to separate civil and military authority. Justinian made a deter-
mined break in these pedantic traditions. He desired to simplify the
administration, to have fewer provinces but to have them better organ-
ised. He also wished to diminish the number of officials, to give those
that remained better salaries, and to make them stronger, and more
dependent on the central government. To further this end he reduced
## p. 39 (#71) ##############################################
535-539] The Administration 39
the number of circumscriptions, by uniting couples of them or by grouping
them more reasonably. (He suppressed the useless vicarii, who had been
intermediaries between the provincial governors and the praetorian
praefect, and he reunited the civil and military authority in the hands
of the same officials in a great number of provinces. (He created praetors
in Pisidia, Lycaonia, Pamphylia and Thrace; counts in Isauria, Phrygia
Pacatiana, Galatia, Syria and Armenia; an administrative moderator
in the Hellespont; a proconsul to govern Cappadocia. The Emperor
adorned all these officials with the high-sounding title of Justiniani, and
they united authority over the troops stationed in their circumscription
to their competence in civil matters. This was a great innovation and
was fraught with serious consequences in the administrative history of
the Byzantine Empire.
The reorganisation of the judicial administration completed these
useful measures. Justinian desired that justice should be administered
with more speed and security in these provinces. In order to avoid the
obstruction of business in the courts of the capital he made(a series of
courts of appeal midway between the court of the provincial governor
and that of the praetorian praefect and the quaestor^ Thus appeals
were made easier and less burdensome to the subjects) and at the same
time Constantinople was freed from the crowd of litigants who had
flocked there, and who, since they were discontented and idle, were only
too ready to join the ranks of thieves or agitators.
One of the great difficulties confronting the government was the police
of the capital. Praetors of the people were instituted there in 535, to
judge cases of theft, adultery, murder, and to repress disturbances. In
589 another magistrate, the quaesitor, was established, to rid the city of
the crowd of provincials who obstructed it with no valid excuse. At the
same time, probably owing to Theodora's initiative, the guardians of
public morals were reorganised, and rigorous mandates were issued to
check excessive gambling, impious blasphemy and the scandal caused by
infamous persons who did not wait for night to hide their deeds.
To those who had been driven to vice by need rather than choice pro-
tection was also given against the lenones who took advantage of them.
The Empress1 charity was exercised to provide a refuge for these
unfortunate girls, in the convent of Repentance (^rdvoia) established
by her wish in an old imperial palace on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus.
But above all the various factions were closely watched, the games in the
circus were suppressed for several years, and the tranquillity of the capital
was undisturbed for at least fifteen years.
This administrative work was completed by the great impetus which
was given to the public works. In the instructions to his officials
Justinian had commended to their attention the maintenance of roads,
bridges, walls and aqueducts, and had promised large supplies for such
purposes. In consequence new roads were everywhere made to facilitate
CH. II.
## p. 40 (#72) ##############################################
40 The City of Constantinople [532-664
communication, wells and reservoirs were established along them so that
caravans might be supplied with water; bridges spanned the rivers, and
the course of the streams was controlled. Schemes were carried out in
order to supply drinking-water to the great towns in the Empire, and
many public baths were built. After the disaster of 540 Antioch
was rebuilt with unheard-of luxury. It was plentifully supplied with
aqueducts, sewers, baths, public squares, theatres, and in fact with
"everything which testifies to the prosperity of a town. " After the
earthquakes of 551 and 554 the Syrian towns rose from their ruins more
splendid than ever, thanks to Justinian's munificence. The Empire was
covered with new cities built at the prince's wish, and bearing, to please
him, the surname of "Justiniana. " Tauresium, the modest village in
which the Emperor was born, became a great city in this way with the
name of Justiniana Prima. It was populous and prosperous, "truly
worthy of a badleus. "" Constantinople, which had been partly destroyed
by the fire of 532, was rebuilt with incomparable magnificence. The
church of St Sophia was begun in 532 under the direction of Isidore
of Miletus and Anthemius of Tralles, and finished in 537; the Sacred
Palace with the Choice vestibule was built in 538 and completely lined
with mosaics and marbles, while the great throne-room or Cormstorium
was dazzling with the shimmer of precious metals. There were also
the great square of the Augusteum, in the centre of which stood an
equestrian statue of Justinian and which was surrounded on every side
by splendid monuments; the long porticoes which stretched from the
imperial residence to the forum of Constantine; the church of the Holy
Apostles, begun by Theodora in 536 and completed in 550; and the
numerous hostels and hospitals founded by Justinian and Theodora,
together with palaces and basilicae; all these attested the luxurious
taste and magnificent pride of the Emperor. To this day the splendid
reservoirs of Jerebatan-Serai and Bin-bir-Direk (the thousand and one
columns) shew the trouble that was taken to supply the capital with
drinking-water; and the churches of St Irene, and SS. Sergius and
Bacchus, above all St Sophia, that miracle of stability and boldness,
of purity of line and brightness of colour, remain as incomparable
witnesses to Justinian's grandeur1.
A solid economic prosperity justified so many expensive splendours.
In order to develop industry and commerce in his Empire Justinian gave
great attention to economic questions. He set himself to free the
Byzantine merchants from the tyranny of middlemen who had oppressed
them and to open fresh fields for their enterprise. As a matter of fact,
in the sixth century Byzantium did not obtain exotic commodities
and precious materials for her luxury straight from the countries
which produced them. The land routes by which the products of the
1 A fuller account of the city will be given in Vol. iv.
V -.
## p. 41 (#73) ##############################################
530-554] Trade 41
Far East were brought to the Mediterranean from China through the
oases of Sogdiana, and the sea routes by which precious stones,
spices and silk were brought from Ceylon to the ports on the
Persian Gulf, were in the hands of Persia. Persia not only guarded
these routes jealously, but also regulated with special severity the
exportation of silk, which was indispensable to the Byzantines. Justinian -
determined to remedy this state of things. In the Black Sea, the ports
of the Crimea, Bosporus and Cherson made, with the south of Russia,
a splendid district for barter; besides this Byzantium, situated at the
mouth of the Black Sea, carried on a brisk trade with Lazica. But, from
the Sea of Azof, as well as from Colchis, the Caspian could be reached,
and then if a northerly direction were taken the oases of Sogdiana could
be reached without crossing Persian territory. Another route offered
itself more to the south. The Syrian and Egyptian merchants set out
from Aila on the Gulf of Akabah to work the shores of the Red Sea, and
then extended their operations as far as the ports of Himyar on the east,
and the great Ethiopian port of Adoulis on the west. But Adoulis kept
up widespread relations with the whole of the Asiatic East, and her
ships, like those of the Arabs of Yemen, went as far as Ceylon, the great
emporium for India. Thanks to these routes, Justinian thought that he
could divert the trade of which the Persians had the monopoly from the
usual routes. During 530 or 581 strange negotiations took place with
the Himyarites and the Court of Axum, with the object of persuading
those peoples to agree with the Emperor's plans, and to bring the
products of the Far East straight to the Red Sea. The "King of
Kings" of Axum readily agreed to do so; but the Persians had the
upper hand in the Indian ports, and they would not allow themselves to
be deprived of their profits. The peace therefore of 582 restored the
transactions between the Empire and the Sassanid monarchy to their
ordinary footing. ^,
However, thanks to the importation of raw silk, which became once
more regular, the Syrian manufactures were flourishing. The rupture
with Persia in 540 brought about a grave crisis for them, and Justinian
only made matters worse by the unwise measures which he took. In his
excessive love of regulations he attempted to fix the price of raw silk, by _-
a law which enforced a maximum price. He hoped thus to substitute a
monopoly of the manufactures of the State for the ruined private industry.
The Syrian industry was seriously injured by these measures. Luckily
the cultivation of si Ik . worms did much to repair the disasters. The eggs
of the worms were brought into the Empire from the country of Serinda
by two missionaries, between 552 and 554. The silk industry soon
recovered when raw material could be obtained more cheaply, although
Byzantium was not successful in freeing herself completely from Persia.
On the whole, however, Byzantine commerce was flourishing.
Alexandria was a splendid port, and grew rich by exporting corn,
## p. 42 (#74) ##############################################
42 Justinian's Exactions [535-565
while her merchants travelled as far as the Indies. Syria found a
market for her manufactures as far away as China. But above all,
Constantinople, with her incomparable situation between Europe and
Asia, was a wonderful mart, towards which, according to a contemporary,
the ships of the world's commerce sailed, freighted with expectation.
Her numerous industrial societies, and the active commerce in silver
i carried on there with wealthy bankers, increased her riches still further;
and seeing the prosperity of his capital, Justinian was able, with his
usual optimism, to congratulate himself on "having given another
flower to the State by his splendid conceptions. '"
But in spite of the Emperor's good intentions, his administrative
reform miscarried. From 535 until the end of the reign Justinian was
constantly obliged to renew his ordinances, think out new measures and
blame the zeal of his officials. In the great ordinance of 556 he was
forced to repeat everything which he had laid down twenty years earlier.
From the statements of the public documents themselves we learn that
the peace continued to be disturbed, the officials continued to steal openly
"in their shameful love of gain "; the soldiers continued to pillage, the
financial administration was more oppressive than ever; while justice was
slow, venal and corrupt, as it had been before the reform.
More and more Justinian needed money. He needed it for his wars
of conquest, for his buildings, for the maintenance of his imperial luxury,
and for the expenses of his policy with regard to the barbarians. Thus
after having ordered that the subjects of the Empire should be treated
leniently, and having declared that he would be content with the
\existing taxes, he was himself forced to create new dues, and to exact
Tfcne returns with a merciless severity. Worse still, thanks to the
financial distress against which he struggled, he was obliged to tolerate
all the exactions of his officials. As long as money came to the treasury,
'no one troubled to enquire how it was obtained: and as it had been
necessary to yield to the venality of the public offices, so the only course
was to appear as blind to the dealings of the administration as to the
sufferings of the subjects. Besides, a corrupt example was set in high
quarters. John of Cappadocia, brutal and covetous as he was, speculating
on everything, stealing from everyone, still maintained the Emperor's credit
in a wonderful way until 541 "by his constant labours to increase the public
revenue. " Peter Barsymes who succeeded him in 548 was the prince's
chief favourite until 559, in spite of his shameless traffic in the magis-
tracies, and his scandalous speculation in corn, simply because he was
able, in some degree, to supply money for all Justinian's needs. The
provincial officials followed the lead of their chiefs, and even rivalled
them in exactions and corruption, while the Emperor looked the other
way. The financial tyranny had reached such a pitch by this time that
a contemporary tells us that "a foreign invasion seemed less formidable
to the taxpayers than the arrival of the officials of the fisc. " The misery
## p. 43 (#75) ##############################################
527-565] The Church 43
suffered was terrible enough to justify the sinister fact recorded by John
Lydus, "The tax-gatherers could find no more money to take to the
Emperor, because there were no people left to pay the taxes. " Justinian's
administrative system had woefully miscarried.
In common with all the Emperors who had occupied the throne of
the Caesars since the time of Constantine, Justinian gave much attention
to the Church, as niueh—for political reasons as because of his zeal for
orthodoxy. His autocratic disposition was unable to realise that
anything could be exempt from the prince's inspection in a well-
regulated monarchy. He claimed therefore to exercise his authority
not only with regard to ecclesiastics—the greatest included—but
further, when questions of discipline or dogma arose his word was never
lacking. He wrote somewhere that "good order in the Church is the
prop of the Empire. '" He spared nothing which might lead to this good
order. (Both Justinian's Code and the Novellae abound in laws dealing
with the organisation of the clergy, the regulation of their moral life,
the foundation and administration of religious houses, the government
of ecclesiastical property and the control of the jurisdiction to which
clerics were liable. During his whole reign Justinian claimed the right
to appoint and dispossess bishops, to convoke and direct councils, to
sanction their decisions, and to amend or abolish their canons. Since he
enjoyed theological controversies, and had a real talent for conducting
them, he was not deterred by pope, patriarchs and bishops, from setting
himself up as a doctor of the Church, and as an interpreter of the
Scriptures. In this capacity he drew up confessions of faith and hurled
forth anathemas. ""!
In exchangerfor the mastery which he assumed over it,£he extended
his special protection to the Church. A crowd of religious buildings,
churches, convents and hospitals sprang up in every part of the Empire,
thanks to the Emperor's generosity. Throughout the monarchy the
bishops were encouraged to make use of the government's authority and
resources to spread their faith as well as to suppress heresy. Justinian
believed that the first duty of a sovereign was "to keep the pure
Christian faith inviolate, and to defend the Catholic and Apostolic
Church from any harm. " He therefore employed the most severe
measures against anyone who wished to injure or introduce changes into
the unity of the Church. Religious intolerance was transformed into
a public virtue^
From the beginning of his reign Uustinian promulgated the severest
laws against heretics in 527 and 528. They were excluded from holding
any public office, and from the liberal professions. Their meetings were
forbidden and their churches shut. They were even deprived of some of
their civil rights, for the Emperor declared that it was only right that
orthodox persons should have more privileges in society than heretics,
for whom "to exist is sufficient. " The pagans, Hellenes as they
CH. II.
## p. 44 (#76) ##############################################
44 Justinian's Religious Policy [527-566
were called, were persecuted by the enforcement of these general rules;
Justinian endeavoured, above all things, to deprive them of education,
and he had the University of Athens closed in 529; at the same time
ordering wholesale conversions. ^)
Missions were frequently sent to the Monophysites of Asia by
John, bishop of Ephesus, who called himself "the destroyer of idols
and the hammer of the heathen" (542). Those sanctuaries which
were not yet closed, that of Isis at Philae and that of Amnion in the
oasis of Augila, were shut by force, and nothing remained of paganism
but an amusement for a few men of leisure, or a form of political oppo-
sition in the shape of secret societies. The Jews fared no better, and
the Samaritan revolt in 529 made their position still worse. Other
sects which refused to conform, Manichaeans, Montanists, Arians and
Donatists, were persecuted in the same way. Religious intolerance
accompanied the imperial restoration in the West. In Africa, as in
Italy, Arians were spoiled for the benefit of Catholics, their churches
were destroyed or ruined, and their lands confiscated. . /the Mono-
physites alone profited by comparative toleration, because . they engrossed
more of Justinian^s attention, since they were stronger and more numerous
than the others. 1
Justinian had been thrown into the arms of Rome at the beginning
of his reign, partly by the orthodox restoration effected by Justin, and
jaartly by his own desire to maintain friendly relations with the Papacy;
(adesire due to political interests as well as to religious zeal. | Resounding
confessions of faith testified to the purity of his belief and'his profound
respect for Rome, while his measures against heretics proved the sincerity
of his zeal. Justinian spared nothing in his efforts to conciliate the
Roman Church, and we find inserted with evident satisfaction in
Justinian's Code pontifical letters, which praise his efforts to maintain
"the peace of the Church and the unity of religion,11 and assert that
"nothing is finer than faith in the bosom of a prince. '"
However,/if concord with Rome was a necessary condition of the
establishment and maintenance of the imperial domination in the Wesy
the Monophysites had to be reckoned with in the East. In spite of the
persecutions of Justin's reign, they were still strong and numerous within
the Empire. They were masters of Egypt, where the monks formed
a fanatical and devoted army at the disposal of their patriarch.
with Rome if it had become necessary. In spite of his efforts and good
intentions Anastasius had not succeeded in realising his ideal. But it
was right in principle and, thanks to Theodora, it inspired the policy of
Justinian in the East. In this way the Empress made a great impression
on her husband's government, and as soon as she died a decay set in
which brought the glorious reign to a sad close.
## p. 28 (#58) ##############################################
I
First Persian War [527-531
II.
The imperial policy in the West had been essentially offensive. In
the East, on the other hand, it was generally restricted to a defensive
attitude. Justinian submitted to war or accepted it when offered rather
than sought it, because he was anxious to preserve all his forces for
Africa and Italy. /Thus he maintained the safety of the monarchy in the
East less by a series of great victories than by military arrangements
combined with clever diplomatic action. I
In Asia, Persia had been the perpetual enemy of the Romans for
centuries. There was a ceaseless temptation to strife and a pretext for
warfare in the coincidence of the two frontiers, and the rival influence
which the two States exercised in Armenia in the Caucasus, and among
the Arab tribes of the Syrian desert. The hundred years' peace
concluded in 422 had certainly restored tranquillity for the rest of the
fifth century, but hostilities had broken out afresh in the reign of
Anastasius (502); and it was evident that the peace of 505 would only
prove to be a truce, although Persia was torn by domestic discord, and
had lost her prestige and strength, and her old king Kawad did not yS
seek adventures. In proportion as Justinian profited by the relative "*
weakness of his foes he attempted to bring more peoples into the relation
of clients to Rome. Such were the populations of Lazica (the ancient
Colchis), the tribes of Iberia and Georgia, and even the Sabirian
Huns who occupied the celebrated defiles of the Caspian Gates at
the foot of the Caucasus range on the boundary of the two Empires.
With great skill (Byzantine diplomacy, by spreading Christianity in
those regions, had inclined the peoples to wish for the protection of
the orthodox Emperor, and so had obtained possession of important
strategic and commercial posig for Greek use. This policy of encroach-\
ment was bound to lead to a rupture, which came in 527, during the
last months of Justin's reignA
The war however was neither very long nor disastrous. Neither of
the two adversaries wanted to fight to the death. Kawad, who had
taken up arms, was distracted by domestic difficulties and the task of
assuring the succession of his son. Justinian wanted to disengage himself
as soon as possible in order to have his hands free to deal with affairs in
the West. Under these conditions the imperial army, which was of a
good size, and well commanded by Belisarius, was able to snatch a signal
victory at Dara in 530, the first victory won against Persia for many
years. Another general was able to make considerable progress in
Persian Armenia at the same time, but Justinian did not set himself
seriously to profit by his successes. The next year a Persian invasion of
Syria forced Belisarius to engage in and to lose the disastrous battle of
Callinicum (531). Then, in spite of the fact that the Persians were
## p. 29 (#59) ##############################################
531-544] Second Persian War 29
besieging Martyropolis (581) and that a career of pillage had brought
the Huns under the very walls of Antioch (December 531), the Great
King troubled as little to push his advantages as the Emperor did
to avenge his defeat. Negotiations were as important in this war as
military operations. When therefore in September 531 the death of
Kawiid gave the throne to his son Chosroes I Anoushirvan, the new
sovereign was preoccupied by the endeavour to consolidate his power at
home, and willingly joined in the negotiations which ended in the
conclusion of an "everlasting peace," in September 532. Justinian was
delighted to end the war, and gave way on almost every point. He
agreed to pay once more the annual subsidy which the Romans had
handed over to the Persians to keep up the fortresses which defended
the passes of the Caucasus against the Northern barbarians. This was
a large sum of 110,000 pounds of gold, a thinly veiled form of tribute.
He promised to move the residence of the Duke of Mesopotamia from
Dara, the great fortress built by Anastasius in 507, to Constantina,
which was further from the frontier; and he abandoned the protectorate
over Iberia. In return the country of the Lazi remained within the
sphere of Byzantine influence, and the Persians evacuated the fortresses
in it.
But Chosroes was not the man to rest contented with these first
successes. He was a young prince, ambitious, active and anxious for
conquests. It was not without suspicion that he viewed the progress and
success of the imperial ambition, for he knew that the longing for
universal dominion might well form a menace to the Sassanid monarchy,
as well as to the West. He therefore made use of the years which followed
the peace of 532 to reconstruct his army, and when he saw what seemed
to him a favourable opportunity, he resolutely began the war again (540).
This happened when he discovered that the Roman frontier was stripped
of troops, Armenia and the country of the Lazi discontented under
Byzantine rule, and the Goths at bay after the Vandals were conquered.
At the beginning of hostilities he threw himself on Syria, which he
cruelly ravaged, and seized Antioch, which he completely ruined under
the eyes of the helpless Roman generals. In vain Justinian sent the
best generals against him, first Germanus and then Belisarius, hastily
recalled from Italy at the beginning of 541. Their troops were not
sufficient to defend the country effectively. In 541, Chosroes attacked
Lazica, reduced Iberia and swept away the strong fortress of Petra, which
Justinian had lately built to the south of Phasis. In 542 he ravaged
Commagene; in 543 he made a demonstration on the Armenian frontier;
and in 544 he again appeared in Mesopotamia which he ravaged cruelly,
in spite of the heroic resistance of Edessa. Meanwhile the imperial
troops did nothing: and the generals spent their time in intrigues
instead of in fighting. The military prestige of Belisarius had made
Chosroes give way for a brief space, but the general was absorbed in his
## p. 30 (#60) ##############################################
30 Second Persian War [542-561
domestic troubles, and let slip the time when he should have taken the
offensive with vigour; and by so doing more or less justified the disgrace
which soon overtook him through Theodora's ill-will (542). The only
military enterprise undertaken in 543 by Justinian's army was the invasion
of Persian Armenia, with more than 30,000 men, and it led to a great
disaster. The Emperor was seriously concerned with events in Italy
—Totila had just reconquered nearly the whole peninsula—and he was
very lucky to be able to buy with gold a truce for five years, instead of
a final peace (545). Thanks to the renewal of this convention in 551
and 552 the Asiatic provinces enjoyed tranquillity once more, though
the war continued in Lazica for many years afterwards.
It was an easy matter for the diplomacy of the two Empires to win
allies from amongst the belligerent tribes of the Caucasus, since their
good faith was always an uncertain quantity. While the Lazi, who were
discontented under the Persian tyranny, returned to Justinian in 549,
other peoples who had formerly been within the Byzantine sphere of
influence now attached themselves to Chosroes. Furthermore the war
seemed unending in a country rendered almost impassable by mountains
and forests. A struggle was maintained for several years over Petra.
Taken by the Persians in 541, it was attacked in vain by the Byzantines
in 549, and was only finally regained in 551. Other places were attacked
and defended with equal tenacity. Justinian realised the importance of
possessing a region which would enable him to deprive the Persians of
an outlet on the Black Sea, and therefore he made unheard-of efforts to
keep it. He concentrated as many as 50,000 men there in 552. Finally
Chosroes saw the uselessness of the interminable strife; and the armistice
of 555 was turned into a definite treaty in 561. Peace was declared
for fifty years, and the Persians agreed to evacuate Lazica, where they
knew that their power could hardly be maintained, since the people were
enthusiastically Christian. But the Emperor's success was dearly bought.
He bound himself to pay an annual tribute of 30,000 aurei, handing
over the sum-total for the first seven years in advance. He promised
for the future to discontinue any religious propaganda in the dominions
of the Great King, in return for the extension of toleration to Christians
in Persia. These concessions dealt a blow at Justinian's pride as an
Emperor and a Christian. However, Lazica remained to him, and it
was a considerable gain in the direction of securing the safety of the
Empire. Still the treaty was intentionally so vague in some points that
it contained the beginnings of many future difficulties.
While Roman Asia was cruelly suffering from these endless wars, the
European provinces were not escaping. Although the shock of the great
barbarian invasions had shaken the East much less than the West, a
succession of barbarian peoples were settled north of the Danube. The
Lombards, Heruls and Gepidae were on the west; Slavs and Bulgars,
Antae and Huns on the lower reaches of the river, while behind them
\
## p. 31 (#61) ##############################################
527-562] The Huns 31
lay the strong nation of Avars, still roving to the north of the Palus
Maeotis but gradually spreading themselves westward. The Empire
proved as attractive to these barbarians as to those who had invaded
the West. They had all one wish and one aim—some day to become
members of the rich and civilised commonwealth, whose towns were
fair, whose fields were fertile, and in which men received great treasures
and honour from the hand of the Emperor. Without doubt these
sentiments were largely inspired by greed of the splendid plunder that
the Roman territory offered to the enterprise of the barbarians, and if
their peaceful offers were declined they did not hesitate to keep their
vows by the use of force. Thus, at the end of the fifth century the
tribes had formed the habit of crossing the Danube periodically, either
in unnoticed driblets, or by sudden invasions, and certain groups were
legally settled on the south side of the river by the beginning of the
sixth century. The movement continued during the whole of Justinian's
reign.
From the beginning of his reign the Huns had appeared in Thrace
and the Antae in Illyricum; but they were repulsed with such energy
that, according to Malalas, "a great terror overcame the barbarian
nations. " Soon however the resistance gave way. As had been the
case in Asia, the frontier was denuded of troops in consequence of the
expeditions to the West, and the boldness of the invaders increased.
In 534 the Slavs and Bulgars crossed the Danube, and the magister
militum of Thrace perished in the attempt to drive them back. In 538
the Huns invaded Scythia and Moesia, in 540 they went further and
ravaged Thrace, Illyricum and Greece as far as the Isthmus of Corinth.
One of their bands even penetrated to the environs of Constantinople,
and spread a terrible panic in the capital. In 546 there was another
Hunnish invasion, in 547 an attack from the Slavs who devastated
Illyricum as far as Dyrrachium, while the imperial generals did not even
dare to face them. In 551 a band of three thousand Slavs pillaged
Thrace and Illyricum and advanced as far as the Aegean Sea. In 552
the Slavs and Antae menaced Thessalonica and settled themselves on
Byzantine land as though they had conquered it. In 558 the Kotrigur
Huns pushed into Thrace, one of their bands reaching Thermopylae,
while another appeared under the walls of Constantinople, which was
only just saved by the courage of the old Belisarius. In 562 the
Huns reappeared. Then the insolent and menacing Avars became
prominent, on the very eve of Justinian's death. It is quite certain that
none of these incursions would have led to the permanent establishment
of a barbarian people within the limits of the Empire, as had happened
in the West, for the imperial generals were always finally successful in
hurling the swarms of invaders back over the Danube. At the same
time the incessant scourge could not fail to produce lamentable
consequences in the provinces which suffered from it. Procopius
## p. 31 (#62) ##############################################
22 Administration in Africa
keep a sharp watch on the roads crossing the lime*; in time of war they
took up arms either to defend the post specially committed to their
charge, or combined with similar troops to beat back the invader. In
either case they might never leave the limes, as perpetual military service
was the necessary condition of their tenure of land. These tenant-
soldiers were empowered to marry, grouped in regiments commanded by
tribunes, and stationed in the fortified towns and castles on the frontier.
This kind of territorial army, organised by Justinian along all the
borders of the Empire, enabled him to reduce the strength of the troops
of the line, and keep them for big wars. A close-drawn net of fortresses
supported this formation. In Africa, specially, where the Vandals had
razed the fortifications of nearly all the towns, Justinian's lieutenants
had an enormous task before them. No point was left undefended, and
in Byzacena and Numidia several parallel lines of fortresses served to
block all openings, cover all positions of strategic importance, and offer
a refuge to the surrounding population in time of dangerA A number
of fortresses were built or restored from Tripolitana to the Pillars of
Hercules, where stood Septem "that the whole world could not take,"
and from the Aures and Hodna to Tell. Even to-day North Africa
abounds in the colossal ruins of Justinian's fortresses, and the hardly
dismantled ramparts of Haidra, Beja, Madaura, Tebessa and Timgad, to
cite no more, bear witness to the great effort by which, in a few years,
Justinian restored the Roman system of defence. Furthermore, in
following the example set by Rome, Justinian tried to incorporate in
the imperial army the barbaric peoples dwelling on the outskirts of the
Empire. These gentiles or J'oederati made a perpetual treaty with the
Emperor, on receiving a promise of an annual subsidy (annona). They
put their contingents at the disposal of the Roman dukes of the limes,
and their chiefs received from the Emperor's hands a kind of investiture,
as a sign of the Roman sovereignty, when they were given insignia to
denote their command, and titles from the Byzantine hierarchy. Thus
from the Syrtis to Mauretania there stretched a fringe of barbarian client
princes, acknowledging themselves as vassals of the basileus, and called—
Mauri pacifici. According to the expression of the African poet
Corippus, "trembling before the arms and success of Rome, of their own
accord they hastened to place themselves under the Roman yoke and
laws. "
By carrying out the great work of reorganisation in Africa and Italy,
Justinian flattered himself that he had achieved the double object of
restoring the "complete peace" in the West and " repairing the disasters n
which war had heaped on the unhappy countries. It remains to be seen
how far his optimism was justified, and to reckon the price paid by the
inhabitants for the privilege of entering the Roman Empire once more.
In a celebrated passage of the Secret History Procopius has enumerated
## p. 31 (#63) ##############################################
Misgovernment 23
all the misfortunes which the imperial restoration brought on Africa and
Italy. According to the historian the country was depopulated, the
provinces left undefended and badly governed, ruined further by financial
exactions, religious intolerance, and military insurrections, while five
million human lives were sacrificed in Africa, and still more in Italy.
These were the benefits conferred in the West by the " glorious reign of
Justinian. '" Although in crediting this account some allowance must be
made for oratorical exaggeration, yet it is certain that Africa and Italy
emerged from the many years of warfare to a great extent ruined, and
that a terrible economic and financial crisis accompanied the imperial
restoration. During many years Africa suffered all the horrors inci-
dent to Berber incursions, military revolts, destruction of the country
by sword and fire, and the murder and flight of the population. The
inevitable consequences of the struggle pressed no less hardly on Italy,
which underwent the horrors of long sieges, famine, massacre, disease,
the passage of the Goths, and the passage of imperialists, added to the
furious devastations of the Alemanni. The largest towns, such as
Naples, Milan, and specially Rome were almost devoid of inhabitants,
the depopulated country was uncultivated, and the large Italian pro-
prietors were repaid for their devotion to Byzantium and their hostility
to Totila by total ruin.
The exactions of the soldiers added yet more wretchedness. By their
greed, insolence and depredations the imperialists made those whom they
declared free regret the barbarian domination. The new administration
added the harshest financial tyranny to the misery caused by the war.
Justinian was obliged to get money at any cost, and therefore the barely
conquered country was given over to the pitiless exactions of the agents
of the fisc. The provinces were not only expected to support unaided
the expense of the very complicated administration imposed on them by
Justinian, but were further obliged to send money to Constantinople for
the general needs of the monarchy. The imperial logoihetae applied the
burdensome system of Roman taxes to the ruined countries without
making any allowance for the prevailing distress. They mercilessly
demanded arrears dating from the time of the Goths, falsified the
registers in order to increase the returns, and enriched themselves at the
expense of the taxpayer to such an extent that, according to a
contemporary writer, "nothing remained for the inhabitants but to die,
since they were bereft of all the necessities of life. '"
Desolate, helpless, brought to the lowest straits, the Western
provinces begged the Emperor to help them in their misery if he did
not wish, to quote the official document, "that they should be overcome
by the impossibility of paying their debts. " Justinian heard this appeal.
Measures were taken in Africa to restore cultivation to the fields, the
country districts were repeopled, various works of public utility were
organised in the towns, ports were opened on the coasts, hydraulic
## p. 32 (#64) ##############################################
32 Justinian's Fortresses
estimates that more than 200,000 people were either slain or led
captive during its course. He also compares the annually ravaged
lands to the "Scythian deserts,1'' and tells how the folk were forced
to flee to the forests and mountains to avoid the outrages and
atrocities which the barbarians would have inflicted upon them.
However, in Asia as in Europe, Justinian had taken wise and
vigorous measures to secure the defence of his provinces, to give them,
as he said, "peace and tranquillity,11 and to remove the "temptation to
invade and ravage the countries where the Emperor's subjects dwelt **
from the barbarians. With this object of efficiency in view he re-
organised the great military commands which were created to guard
the frontier. In Asia one general, the magister militum of the East,
had commanded the enormous district reaching from the Black Sea
to Egypt. This command was too large, and Justinian divided it,
_cjnstiiuting magistri militum for Armenia and Mesopotamia. In
Europe he added a magister militum of Moesia to those of Illyricum
and Thrace. But above all, for the immediate defence of the frontier
he organised all along the limes military districts commanded by
duces and occupied by special troops, the limitanei. We have already
seen how the duties and divisions of this formation were determined
in Africa. The same system was extended to the whole Empire, and
a large strip of military lands round its whole circumference assured
the safety of the interior. Although several of these limites were in
existence before the time of Justinian, he had the merit of organising
and completing the whole system. Three limites were formed in Egypt,
several commands were halved in Syria and on the Euphrates, and duces
were established in Armenia, while others kept watch on the Danube, in
Scythia, in the two Moesias and in Dacia. Thus the barbarians were
again confronted with the opposing wall that used to be called "the
"^monarchy's wrapper" (praetentura imperii).
•i Justinian also busied himself in building a continuous chain of
fortresses along all the frontiers, as he had done in Africa. Rome had
formerly been forced to undertake the immediate defence of the frontiers
of the Empire in order to protect her territories. Justinian did more.
Behind the first line of castella, and attached to them by a succession of
stations, he built a series of large fortresses placed further apart, and
more important. These served to strengthen the frontier castles, made
a second barrier against invasion, and were a place of refuge for the
inhabitants of the country. Thus the whole district was covered with
strong castles. They were of unequal importance and strength, but
they kept a watch on the enemy's territory, occupied points of strategic
importance, barred the defiles, commanded the important routes,
protected the safety of the towns and sheltered the rural population.
They covered all the provinces with a close-meshed net of fortresses, a
## p. 33 (#65) ##############################################
Justinian's Buildings 33
network through which it seemed impossible for the enemy to slip. It
had taken only a few years for Justinian's resolution to raise or repair
hundreds of fortresses, from the Danube to the Armenian mountains, and
to the banks of the Euphrates. If ancient Roman posts were merely
repaired at some points, while at others it was only necessary to complete
buildings begun by Anastasius, yet the dazed admiration which con-
temporaries seem to have felt for this colossal work was justified, for
Justinian gave unity to the whole system and displayed the greatest
energy in carrying it out. According to Procopius, by it he truly
"saved the monarchy. "
In his De Aedificiis Procopius gives the detailed list of the countless
buildings repaired or built by the Emperor's orders. Here it must
suffice to notice the chief features of the work. On the Danube more
^ than eighty castles were built or restored between the place where the
Save enters that river and the Black Sea. Among them may be men-
tioned Singidunum (Belgrade), Octavum, Viminacium, Novae, further to
the east Ratiaria, Augusta, Securisca, Durostorum (Silistria), Troesmis,
and, on the left bank, the strongly fortified bridge of Lederata. These
were for the most part ancient Roman citadels newly repaired.
Justinian's original work consisted chiefly in the measures which he took
^-* to strengthen the rear. Hundreds of castella sprang up in Dacia,
Dardania, and Moesia, further south in Epirus, Macedonia and Thrace.
Thus there was a second and even a third line of defence. In Dardania
S" alone, Justinian's native country, Procopius enumerates more than one
hundred and fifty castella besides such great posts as Justiniana Prima,
Sardica and Naissus. Fortifications were even constructed on the shore
^ of the Sea of Marmora and the Archipelago. To protect Constantinople
Anastasius had built the Long Wall in 512. It ran from the Sea of
Marmora to Selymbria on . the Black Sea. Similar long walls covered the
Thracian Chersonesus, barred the passes of Thermopylae, and cut across
the Isthmus of Corinth. Fortresses were also raised in Thessaly and
northern Greece. Thus the whole of the Balkan peninsula formed a
vast entrenched camp. On the side of the Euxine long walls protected
the approaches to Cherson, and the strong castle of Petra Justiniana
defended Lazica. Then several lines of fortresses were drawn up from
Trebizond to the Euphrates. In Armenia there was Theodosiopolis
(now Erzeroum), Kitharizon and Martyropolis; in Mesopotamia Amida,
Constantina, Dara, called "the rampart of the Roman Empire," and
another Theodosiopolis; Circesium was on the Euphrates and Zenobia
and Palmyra on the borders of the desert. Added to these there were
the intermediate castella which connected the big fortresses. A little to
the rear, in the second line, were Satala, Coloneia, Nicopolis, Sebaste,
Melitene, "the bulwark of Armenia," Edessa, Carrhae, Callinicum in
Osrhoene, Sura, Hierapolis, Zeugma in the Euphrates district, and
Antioch after the catastrophe of 540. These made a formidable field
C. MED. H. VOL. II. CH. II. 3
## p. 34 (#66) ##############################################
34 Justinian s Diplomacy
for warfare. It is certain that all these buildings do not date from
Justinian's reign, but he must have the credit of combining them all
into a sure and splendid defensive system.
Military methods alone were not employed for the defence of the
Empire in the East. The imperial diplomacy was putting forth all its
powers to that end, and displayed wonderful skill and ingenuity in the
task. The Empire always possessed a great influence over the bar-
barians settled on the Roman frontiers. They were proud when their
services and good faith won for them the approval of the basileus. They
gladly placed their forces at his disposal when they received the annual
subsidy (annona), and became the auxiliaries and vassals of the Empire,
bearing the name of foederati. Their chiefs felt themselves honoured
when they received the splendid insignia of their commands from the
hands of the basileus. They gladly adorned themselves with titles culled
from the hierarchy of the palace, and hastened to declare themselves to be
"Slaves of the imperial Majesty. " Constantinople and the Court dazzled
their simple minds, they flocked there gladly, and it was easy for the
Emperor by the mere splendour of their reception to impress them with
a great idea of the strength of the monarchy. During the whole
of Justinian's reign the Sacred Palace was filled with a never-ending
succession of strange and barbaric sovereigns. Heruls, Huns, Gepidae,
Avars, Saracens, Axumitae, Lazi, Iberians, men of every race and of every
land, with their wives and children and their retinue in picturesque
garments, filled the capital with a babel of all the tongues in the
universe. They were loaded with honours, presents, and magnificent
demonstrations of affection, and returned to their native wilds dazzled
by the spectacle of the imperial majesty. Naturally they felt them-
selves only too happy to be allowed to serve this basileus who gave
so warm a welcome to his faithful servitors, and recompensed them so
generously.
Thus by the clever distribution of favours and money the Emperor
was able to maintain a fringe of barbarian clients on all his frontiers.
At the same time the authorities at Byzantium never forgot that the
fickle and perfidious allies might prove to be dangerous servants because
of their indiscipline, faithlessness and greed. The imperial diplomacy
watched them with an eagle eye, skilfully treating them with a mixture
of sternness and leniency; and endeavouring tfi render them harmless by
the policy of setting them against each other, and fostering rivalry and
hatred amongst them^XJustinian maintained a possible rival to every
barbarian king, he had always a hostile people waiting his word to
descend on every other people. The Lombards menaced the Gepidae,
the Utigurs the Kotrigurs, the Avars the Huns. Thus, as Agathias
wrote, " so long as the barbarians destroyed each other, the Emperor was
always victor without drawing his sword, no matter what was the end of
## p. 35 (#67) ##############################################
Justinian's Diplomacy 35
the struggle. " Formerly Rome had found the same methods necessary
to govern the barbarians. Byzantium was able to add to the Roman
traditions the influence which she wielded because of her propagation of
Christianity. \Her missionaries worked for the consolidation of the
imperial power as effectively as her diplomatists. They opened a road
for politicians, and prepared new territories for Byzantine influence and
civilisation. Thanks to them conversions increased everywhere, from
the plains of southern Russia to the Abyssinian plateau, and from the
Caucasus Mountains to the oases of the Sahara.
By means of Christianity Byzantine influence spread beyond the
boundaries of the Empire in Justinian's reign, and many were the peoples
affected by it; Huns from the Cimmerian Bosphorus, Souanians, Abasgi,
Apsilians from the Caucasus district, Alans, and Sabirian Huns, Tzani
from the upper Euphrates, Arabs from Syria, Himyarites from Yemen,
Nobadae and Blemmyes from the upper Nile, Berbers from the oases of
the Sahara, and Heruls from Moesia.
By these means Justinian was able to checkmate his enemies. In the
East he sought amongst the Sabirian Huns for allies against the Sassanid
monarchy, because they could rush upon the Persian realm from the
north. He also went to the Arabs of the Syrian desert because they
might make useful diversions from the south, and he formed them into
a unique State, under the phylarchiw Harith the Ghassanid(531). Not
content with this, he went yet further and made friends among the Arabs
on the Yemen and in the Ethiopian kingdom of Axum. In the West
he skilfully managed to sow discord amongst the tribes who crowded on
the Danube frontier, checking the Bulgars by the Huns, the Huns by the
Antae, and the Antae and Utigurs by the Avars. He scattered money
and lands liberally amongst them all, loading their ambassadors with
silken robes and golden chains, in return for which he only asked them
to supply Byzantium with soldiers. In this way he settled the Lombards
in Pan noma, the Heruls in Dacia, and the Kotrigur Huns in Thrace.
He offered the Avars lands suitable for settlement on the Save, and
similarly managed to procure a number of vassals on all the frontiers of
the Empire. On the Danube there were the Heruls, Gepidae, Lombards,
Huns and Antae; on the borders of Armenia, the Lazi and Tzani; on
the Syrian frontier the crowd of Arab tribes; in Africa the Berber
inhabitants of Byzacena, Numidia and Mauritania.
Thus with wonderful skill Justinian exercised the difficult art of
ruling barbarians, and he did it from the depth of his palace and capital.
Contemporaries waxed eloquent in praise of the prudence, the fairness
and delicacy displayed by the Emperor in carrying out this policy, and
in celebrating that evfiovXLa by which, according to Menander, "he
would have destroyed the barbarians without fighting if he had lived
long enough. 11 However this policy was not without its dangers. UJy
displaying the riches of the Empire to the barbarians, and by lavishly
ch. ii. 3—2
t^
## p. 36 (#68) ##############################################
36 Defects of Justinian's Diplomacy
distributing money and lands amongst them, their demands were
naturally increased enormously, and their invasions provoked\ Procopius
very wisely observed that " once they had tasted Byzantine"wealth it was
impossible to keep them from it, or to make them forget the road to it. "
The obvious antidote for the dangers of this course of diplomacy was a
strong military organisation. Procopius again wrote "there is no other
way of compelling the barbarians to keep faith with Rome except by the
fear of the imperial armies. " Justinian understood this quite well.
Unfortunately, in proportion as the West again absorbed the resources
and attention of the Empire, lack of money led to the disorganisation
of those military institutions which had been formed to protect the East.
Corps of limitanei were disbanded, the fighting force of the troops of the
line in Syria was diminished, strong positions were left undefended,
often bereft of garrisons altogether, and Justinian's excellent network of
fortresses no longer sufficed to keep out the barbarians. The Emperor
seemed to prefer diplomatic action by itself to the practical military
precautions that he had applied so actively at the beginning of his reign.
He thought it more clever to buy off the invaders than to beat them by
force of arms, he considered it cheaper to subsidise the barbarians than
to maintain a large army on a war footing; he found it more agreeable
to direct a subtle diplomacy than great military operations, and he never
realised that the first result of his policy was to encourage the barbarians
in rr>t,iirn\ .
This was the fundamental defect of Justinian's foreign policy in the
East. It rested on a skilful combination of military force and diplomacy.
As long as the balance was maintained between these two elements
equilibrium was secured, the end aimed at was attained, and the Empire
was well defended and comparatively safe. But when this balance was
upset, everything went wrong at once. The Slavs appeared at Hadrianople,
the Huns under the walls of Constantinople, while the Avars assumed a
threatening attitude and regions of the Balkans were terribly ravaged.
Procopius was justified when he reproached Justinian with having "wasted
the riches of the Empire in extravagant gifts to. the barbarians," and in
his assertion that the Emperor's rash generosity only incited them to
return perpetually "to sell the peace for which they were always well
paid. " The historian goes on to explain that "after them came others,
who made a double profit, from the rapine in which they indulged and
from the money with which the liberality of the prince always furnished
them. Thus the evil continued with no abatement, and there was no
escape from the vicious circle. "
This mistaken policy cost the Empire dear. Nevertheless, it was
founded on a right principle, and some of the results which it
produced were not to be despised, in connexion with the defence of
territory, the development of commerce, or the spread of civilisation.
Justinian's mistake—specially during the last years of his reign—lay in
## p. 37 (#69) ##############################################
Domestic Government 37
the fact that he carried the system to excess. When he allowed the
army to become disorganised and fortresses to fall into ruin he bereft
his diplomacy of the force that was necessary to support his plans.
When he ceased to awe the barbarians he found himself at their mercy.
III.
The domestic government of the East took up as much of Justinian's
attention as the defence of the territory. /The urgent need for adminis-
trative reform in the, midst of a serious religious crisis provided ample
food for his anxiety,
In Byzantium lie salej)fjpublic offices was an ancient custom, and
this venality led to deplorable results. The governors expected to recoup
themselves from the province for the expenses which they incurred in
obtaining their posts, and to enrich themselves to as great an extent as
possible while they held them. The other agents in so corrupt an
administration only followed the governor's example, when they pillaged
and crushed the district to their heart's content. The__financial system
was oppressive and exacting; justice was sold or partially administered,
and deep misery and general insecurity was the natural result. The
people left the country, the towns were emptied, the fields deserted, and
agriculture abandoned. While those who were strong or rich enough to
defend themselves managed to escape the exactions of the tax-collector,
the great proprietors maintained troops of armed men in their pay, and
ravaged the country, attacked people and seized land, sure of immunity
from the magistrates. Everywhere murder, brigandage, agitation and
risings abounded, and last and most serious result of all the disorders,
thej-eturnsj>f thejaxfis-from the exhausted provinces were but scanty.
Justinian calculated that only one-third of the taxes imposed really
reached the treasury, and the misery of the subjects destroyed the source
of the public wealth. It will be easy to understand why the Emperor felt
so much concern at affairs in the East, if we add that the laws abounded
in contradictions, obscurities and useless prolixity, which gave rise to
very long law-suits, and furnished an opportunity for the j udges to give
arbitrary decisions, or to decide matters to suit their own convenience.
Justinian, as we know, had the qualities that go to make a good
administrator. He loved order, he had a sincere wish to do good work,
and a real care for the well-being of his subjects. With an authoritative
disposition and absolutist tendencies, he combined a taste for adminis-
trative centralisation. But above all, his vast projects left him incessantly
in need of large sums of money. He saw that the best way to ensure
the regularity of the returns was to protect those who paid from the
functionaries who ruined them; and thus in furthering the well-being
and quiet of his subjects the Emperor was also serving the best interests
## p. 38 (#70) ##############################################
38 Justinians Legislation [533-636
of the fisc. Moreover it satisfied Justinian's pride to maintain the
tradition of the great Roman Emperors by being a reformer and
legislator. For these various reasons from the time of his accession
he undertook a double work. In order to give the Empire certain and
unquestionable laws he had legislative monuments drawn up under
i Tribonian's direction, which are known as Justinian's Code (529), the
Digest (533), the Institutes (533), and completed by the series of Novellae
. (534-565).
The details of Justinian's legislative work will be found in another
chapter. All that is done here is to indicate their place in the reign as
a whole and in the general policy of the Emperor. After the great crisis
of the Nika riot had clearly shewn him the public discontent and the
faults of Ihe government, he promulgated juie two great ordinances of
April 535. By these two documents Justinian laid down the principles
of his administrative reform and shewed his functionaries the new duties
which he expected of them. rThe sale of offices was abolished. To take
all pretext for exploiting the population from the governors, their salaries
were raised, while their prestige was increased in order to remove from
them the temptation to yield to the demands of powerful private persons.
But before all things, the Emperor wished his agents to be scrupulously
honest, and was always urging them to keep their "hands clean. " He
gave minute instructions to his magistrates, and bade them render
the same justice to all, keep a watchful eye on the conduct of their
subordinates, protect the subjects from all vexations, hinder the en-
croachments of the great, ensure the maintenance of order by frequent
progresses, and govern, in fact, "paternally. " But above all he bade
them neglect nothing that might defend the interests of the fisc, and
increase its resources. To pay in the taxes regularly was the first duty
of a good officer, as the first duty of a taxpayer was to acquit himself
regularly and completely of the whole sum due. Furthermore, to ensure
the carrying out of his plans, Justiniait requested the bishops to inspect
the conduct of the magistrates; and he invited anyone who wished to
make complaints to come to Constantinople, and lay his grievances at
the feet of the sovereign. )
During the years 535 and 536 a series of special measures was added
to the general enactments. Their object wasQp strengthen the local
government and to ensure obedience to the central power. ■ In the fourth
century the traditional method of conducting the administration was to
multiply provincial districts, to complicate an endless hierarchy of officials
and to separate civil and military authority. Justinian made a deter-
mined break in these pedantic traditions. He desired to simplify the
administration, to have fewer provinces but to have them better organ-
ised. He also wished to diminish the number of officials, to give those
that remained better salaries, and to make them stronger, and more
dependent on the central government. To further this end he reduced
## p. 39 (#71) ##############################################
535-539] The Administration 39
the number of circumscriptions, by uniting couples of them or by grouping
them more reasonably. (He suppressed the useless vicarii, who had been
intermediaries between the provincial governors and the praetorian
praefect, and he reunited the civil and military authority in the hands
of the same officials in a great number of provinces. (He created praetors
in Pisidia, Lycaonia, Pamphylia and Thrace; counts in Isauria, Phrygia
Pacatiana, Galatia, Syria and Armenia; an administrative moderator
in the Hellespont; a proconsul to govern Cappadocia. The Emperor
adorned all these officials with the high-sounding title of Justiniani, and
they united authority over the troops stationed in their circumscription
to their competence in civil matters. This was a great innovation and
was fraught with serious consequences in the administrative history of
the Byzantine Empire.
The reorganisation of the judicial administration completed these
useful measures. Justinian desired that justice should be administered
with more speed and security in these provinces. In order to avoid the
obstruction of business in the courts of the capital he made(a series of
courts of appeal midway between the court of the provincial governor
and that of the praetorian praefect and the quaestor^ Thus appeals
were made easier and less burdensome to the subjects) and at the same
time Constantinople was freed from the crowd of litigants who had
flocked there, and who, since they were discontented and idle, were only
too ready to join the ranks of thieves or agitators.
One of the great difficulties confronting the government was the police
of the capital. Praetors of the people were instituted there in 535, to
judge cases of theft, adultery, murder, and to repress disturbances. In
589 another magistrate, the quaesitor, was established, to rid the city of
the crowd of provincials who obstructed it with no valid excuse. At the
same time, probably owing to Theodora's initiative, the guardians of
public morals were reorganised, and rigorous mandates were issued to
check excessive gambling, impious blasphemy and the scandal caused by
infamous persons who did not wait for night to hide their deeds.
To those who had been driven to vice by need rather than choice pro-
tection was also given against the lenones who took advantage of them.
The Empress1 charity was exercised to provide a refuge for these
unfortunate girls, in the convent of Repentance (^rdvoia) established
by her wish in an old imperial palace on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus.
But above all the various factions were closely watched, the games in the
circus were suppressed for several years, and the tranquillity of the capital
was undisturbed for at least fifteen years.
This administrative work was completed by the great impetus which
was given to the public works. In the instructions to his officials
Justinian had commended to their attention the maintenance of roads,
bridges, walls and aqueducts, and had promised large supplies for such
purposes. In consequence new roads were everywhere made to facilitate
CH. II.
## p. 40 (#72) ##############################################
40 The City of Constantinople [532-664
communication, wells and reservoirs were established along them so that
caravans might be supplied with water; bridges spanned the rivers, and
the course of the streams was controlled. Schemes were carried out in
order to supply drinking-water to the great towns in the Empire, and
many public baths were built. After the disaster of 540 Antioch
was rebuilt with unheard-of luxury. It was plentifully supplied with
aqueducts, sewers, baths, public squares, theatres, and in fact with
"everything which testifies to the prosperity of a town. " After the
earthquakes of 551 and 554 the Syrian towns rose from their ruins more
splendid than ever, thanks to Justinian's munificence. The Empire was
covered with new cities built at the prince's wish, and bearing, to please
him, the surname of "Justiniana. " Tauresium, the modest village in
which the Emperor was born, became a great city in this way with the
name of Justiniana Prima. It was populous and prosperous, "truly
worthy of a badleus. "" Constantinople, which had been partly destroyed
by the fire of 532, was rebuilt with incomparable magnificence. The
church of St Sophia was begun in 532 under the direction of Isidore
of Miletus and Anthemius of Tralles, and finished in 537; the Sacred
Palace with the Choice vestibule was built in 538 and completely lined
with mosaics and marbles, while the great throne-room or Cormstorium
was dazzling with the shimmer of precious metals. There were also
the great square of the Augusteum, in the centre of which stood an
equestrian statue of Justinian and which was surrounded on every side
by splendid monuments; the long porticoes which stretched from the
imperial residence to the forum of Constantine; the church of the Holy
Apostles, begun by Theodora in 536 and completed in 550; and the
numerous hostels and hospitals founded by Justinian and Theodora,
together with palaces and basilicae; all these attested the luxurious
taste and magnificent pride of the Emperor. To this day the splendid
reservoirs of Jerebatan-Serai and Bin-bir-Direk (the thousand and one
columns) shew the trouble that was taken to supply the capital with
drinking-water; and the churches of St Irene, and SS. Sergius and
Bacchus, above all St Sophia, that miracle of stability and boldness,
of purity of line and brightness of colour, remain as incomparable
witnesses to Justinian's grandeur1.
A solid economic prosperity justified so many expensive splendours.
In order to develop industry and commerce in his Empire Justinian gave
great attention to economic questions. He set himself to free the
Byzantine merchants from the tyranny of middlemen who had oppressed
them and to open fresh fields for their enterprise. As a matter of fact,
in the sixth century Byzantium did not obtain exotic commodities
and precious materials for her luxury straight from the countries
which produced them. The land routes by which the products of the
1 A fuller account of the city will be given in Vol. iv.
V -.
## p. 41 (#73) ##############################################
530-554] Trade 41
Far East were brought to the Mediterranean from China through the
oases of Sogdiana, and the sea routes by which precious stones,
spices and silk were brought from Ceylon to the ports on the
Persian Gulf, were in the hands of Persia. Persia not only guarded
these routes jealously, but also regulated with special severity the
exportation of silk, which was indispensable to the Byzantines. Justinian -
determined to remedy this state of things. In the Black Sea, the ports
of the Crimea, Bosporus and Cherson made, with the south of Russia,
a splendid district for barter; besides this Byzantium, situated at the
mouth of the Black Sea, carried on a brisk trade with Lazica. But, from
the Sea of Azof, as well as from Colchis, the Caspian could be reached,
and then if a northerly direction were taken the oases of Sogdiana could
be reached without crossing Persian territory. Another route offered
itself more to the south. The Syrian and Egyptian merchants set out
from Aila on the Gulf of Akabah to work the shores of the Red Sea, and
then extended their operations as far as the ports of Himyar on the east,
and the great Ethiopian port of Adoulis on the west. But Adoulis kept
up widespread relations with the whole of the Asiatic East, and her
ships, like those of the Arabs of Yemen, went as far as Ceylon, the great
emporium for India. Thanks to these routes, Justinian thought that he
could divert the trade of which the Persians had the monopoly from the
usual routes. During 530 or 581 strange negotiations took place with
the Himyarites and the Court of Axum, with the object of persuading
those peoples to agree with the Emperor's plans, and to bring the
products of the Far East straight to the Red Sea. The "King of
Kings" of Axum readily agreed to do so; but the Persians had the
upper hand in the Indian ports, and they would not allow themselves to
be deprived of their profits. The peace therefore of 582 restored the
transactions between the Empire and the Sassanid monarchy to their
ordinary footing. ^,
However, thanks to the importation of raw silk, which became once
more regular, the Syrian manufactures were flourishing. The rupture
with Persia in 540 brought about a grave crisis for them, and Justinian
only made matters worse by the unwise measures which he took. In his
excessive love of regulations he attempted to fix the price of raw silk, by _-
a law which enforced a maximum price. He hoped thus to substitute a
monopoly of the manufactures of the State for the ruined private industry.
The Syrian industry was seriously injured by these measures. Luckily
the cultivation of si Ik . worms did much to repair the disasters. The eggs
of the worms were brought into the Empire from the country of Serinda
by two missionaries, between 552 and 554. The silk industry soon
recovered when raw material could be obtained more cheaply, although
Byzantium was not successful in freeing herself completely from Persia.
On the whole, however, Byzantine commerce was flourishing.
Alexandria was a splendid port, and grew rich by exporting corn,
## p. 42 (#74) ##############################################
42 Justinian's Exactions [535-565
while her merchants travelled as far as the Indies. Syria found a
market for her manufactures as far away as China. But above all,
Constantinople, with her incomparable situation between Europe and
Asia, was a wonderful mart, towards which, according to a contemporary,
the ships of the world's commerce sailed, freighted with expectation.
Her numerous industrial societies, and the active commerce in silver
i carried on there with wealthy bankers, increased her riches still further;
and seeing the prosperity of his capital, Justinian was able, with his
usual optimism, to congratulate himself on "having given another
flower to the State by his splendid conceptions. '"
But in spite of the Emperor's good intentions, his administrative
reform miscarried. From 535 until the end of the reign Justinian was
constantly obliged to renew his ordinances, think out new measures and
blame the zeal of his officials. In the great ordinance of 556 he was
forced to repeat everything which he had laid down twenty years earlier.
From the statements of the public documents themselves we learn that
the peace continued to be disturbed, the officials continued to steal openly
"in their shameful love of gain "; the soldiers continued to pillage, the
financial administration was more oppressive than ever; while justice was
slow, venal and corrupt, as it had been before the reform.
More and more Justinian needed money. He needed it for his wars
of conquest, for his buildings, for the maintenance of his imperial luxury,
and for the expenses of his policy with regard to the barbarians. Thus
after having ordered that the subjects of the Empire should be treated
leniently, and having declared that he would be content with the
\existing taxes, he was himself forced to create new dues, and to exact
Tfcne returns with a merciless severity. Worse still, thanks to the
financial distress against which he struggled, he was obliged to tolerate
all the exactions of his officials. As long as money came to the treasury,
'no one troubled to enquire how it was obtained: and as it had been
necessary to yield to the venality of the public offices, so the only course
was to appear as blind to the dealings of the administration as to the
sufferings of the subjects. Besides, a corrupt example was set in high
quarters. John of Cappadocia, brutal and covetous as he was, speculating
on everything, stealing from everyone, still maintained the Emperor's credit
in a wonderful way until 541 "by his constant labours to increase the public
revenue. " Peter Barsymes who succeeded him in 548 was the prince's
chief favourite until 559, in spite of his shameless traffic in the magis-
tracies, and his scandalous speculation in corn, simply because he was
able, in some degree, to supply money for all Justinian's needs. The
provincial officials followed the lead of their chiefs, and even rivalled
them in exactions and corruption, while the Emperor looked the other
way. The financial tyranny had reached such a pitch by this time that
a contemporary tells us that "a foreign invasion seemed less formidable
to the taxpayers than the arrival of the officials of the fisc. " The misery
## p. 43 (#75) ##############################################
527-565] The Church 43
suffered was terrible enough to justify the sinister fact recorded by John
Lydus, "The tax-gatherers could find no more money to take to the
Emperor, because there were no people left to pay the taxes. " Justinian's
administrative system had woefully miscarried.
In common with all the Emperors who had occupied the throne of
the Caesars since the time of Constantine, Justinian gave much attention
to the Church, as niueh—for political reasons as because of his zeal for
orthodoxy. His autocratic disposition was unable to realise that
anything could be exempt from the prince's inspection in a well-
regulated monarchy. He claimed therefore to exercise his authority
not only with regard to ecclesiastics—the greatest included—but
further, when questions of discipline or dogma arose his word was never
lacking. He wrote somewhere that "good order in the Church is the
prop of the Empire. '" He spared nothing which might lead to this good
order. (Both Justinian's Code and the Novellae abound in laws dealing
with the organisation of the clergy, the regulation of their moral life,
the foundation and administration of religious houses, the government
of ecclesiastical property and the control of the jurisdiction to which
clerics were liable. During his whole reign Justinian claimed the right
to appoint and dispossess bishops, to convoke and direct councils, to
sanction their decisions, and to amend or abolish their canons. Since he
enjoyed theological controversies, and had a real talent for conducting
them, he was not deterred by pope, patriarchs and bishops, from setting
himself up as a doctor of the Church, and as an interpreter of the
Scriptures. In this capacity he drew up confessions of faith and hurled
forth anathemas. ""!
In exchangerfor the mastery which he assumed over it,£he extended
his special protection to the Church. A crowd of religious buildings,
churches, convents and hospitals sprang up in every part of the Empire,
thanks to the Emperor's generosity. Throughout the monarchy the
bishops were encouraged to make use of the government's authority and
resources to spread their faith as well as to suppress heresy. Justinian
believed that the first duty of a sovereign was "to keep the pure
Christian faith inviolate, and to defend the Catholic and Apostolic
Church from any harm. " He therefore employed the most severe
measures against anyone who wished to injure or introduce changes into
the unity of the Church. Religious intolerance was transformed into
a public virtue^
From the beginning of his reign Uustinian promulgated the severest
laws against heretics in 527 and 528. They were excluded from holding
any public office, and from the liberal professions. Their meetings were
forbidden and their churches shut. They were even deprived of some of
their civil rights, for the Emperor declared that it was only right that
orthodox persons should have more privileges in society than heretics,
for whom "to exist is sufficient. " The pagans, Hellenes as they
CH. II.
## p. 44 (#76) ##############################################
44 Justinian's Religious Policy [527-566
were called, were persecuted by the enforcement of these general rules;
Justinian endeavoured, above all things, to deprive them of education,
and he had the University of Athens closed in 529; at the same time
ordering wholesale conversions. ^)
Missions were frequently sent to the Monophysites of Asia by
John, bishop of Ephesus, who called himself "the destroyer of idols
and the hammer of the heathen" (542). Those sanctuaries which
were not yet closed, that of Isis at Philae and that of Amnion in the
oasis of Augila, were shut by force, and nothing remained of paganism
but an amusement for a few men of leisure, or a form of political oppo-
sition in the shape of secret societies. The Jews fared no better, and
the Samaritan revolt in 529 made their position still worse. Other
sects which refused to conform, Manichaeans, Montanists, Arians and
Donatists, were persecuted in the same way. Religious intolerance
accompanied the imperial restoration in the West. In Africa, as in
Italy, Arians were spoiled for the benefit of Catholics, their churches
were destroyed or ruined, and their lands confiscated. . /the Mono-
physites alone profited by comparative toleration, because . they engrossed
more of Justinian^s attention, since they were stronger and more numerous
than the others. 1
Justinian had been thrown into the arms of Rome at the beginning
of his reign, partly by the orthodox restoration effected by Justin, and
jaartly by his own desire to maintain friendly relations with the Papacy;
(adesire due to political interests as well as to religious zeal. | Resounding
confessions of faith testified to the purity of his belief and'his profound
respect for Rome, while his measures against heretics proved the sincerity
of his zeal. Justinian spared nothing in his efforts to conciliate the
Roman Church, and we find inserted with evident satisfaction in
Justinian's Code pontifical letters, which praise his efforts to maintain
"the peace of the Church and the unity of religion,11 and assert that
"nothing is finer than faith in the bosom of a prince. '"
However,/if concord with Rome was a necessary condition of the
establishment and maintenance of the imperial domination in the Wesy
the Monophysites had to be reckoned with in the East. In spite of the
persecutions of Justin's reign, they were still strong and numerous within
the Empire. They were masters of Egypt, where the monks formed
a fanatical and devoted army at the disposal of their patriarch.
