No More Learning

k ^ In the cloister and court schools which formed the seats of this
newly beginning civilisation, permission for instruction in dialectic by the side of the arts most necessary for the training of the clergy had to be conquered step by step. For this elementary logical instruction they possessed in the first centuries of the Middle Ages only the two least important treatises of the Aristotelian Organon, De Categoriis and De Interpretations, in a Latin translation with the introduction of Porphyry, and a number of commentaries of the Neo-Platonic time, in particular those of Boethius. For the material of knowledge (of the Quadrivium) they used the com- pendiums of departing antiquity, which had been prepared by Marcianus Capella, Cassiodorus, and-Isidorus of Sevilla. Of the
,v^\)J' ^Sv
270 "ice
Chap. 1. ]
First Period. 271
great original works of ancient philosophy, only the Platonic Timeeus in the translation of Chalcidius was known.
j "nder these circumstances, scientific activity in the schools was mainly directed toward learning and practising the schematism of rormal logic, and the treatment even of the material parts of knowl- edge, in particular of religious dogma which was indeed regarded as something essentially complete and in its contents unaftaa. ila. hlp, took the direction of elaborating and setting forth what was given and handed down by tradition, in the Forms and according to the rules ot the Aristoielian-Stoic logic, in this process the main em phasis must necessarily tail upon formal arrangement, upon the formation and division of class-concepts, upon correct syllogistic
conclusions. Already in the Orient the ancient school logic had been put into the service of a rigidly articulated development of Church doctrine by John Damascenus, and now this took place in the schools of the West also.
Meanwhile this pursuit, which had its basis in the conditions of the tradition, had not only the didactic value of a mental exercise in the appropriation of material, but also the consequence that the beginnings of independent reflection necessarily took the direction of an inquiry as to the significance of logical relations, and so we find emerging early in the Western literature, investigations as to the relation Of Llic UUlll'eption on the one hand, to the word, and on
tin- tlirrrgr
The problem thus formed became strengthened by a peculiar com
plication. By the side of the Church doctrine there persisted, half
tolerated and half condemned, a mystical transmission of Chris
tianity in Neo-Platonic form. It went back to writings which had
arisen in the fifth century, but which were ascribed to Dionysius
the Areopagite, and it gained wider extension when these writings
were translated in the ninth century by John Scotus Erigena, and
made the basis of his own doctrine. In this doctrine, however,
a main point was that identification of The different grades of ab-_ A
"■taction with the stages of metaphysical reality, which had been ««Iffanh propounded in the older flatonism and in Weo-riatonism
JeT**''
In consequence of these incitements the question as to the meta- ^ Vf <y vhfticai significance of logical genera l>ecame, duriny the next, centuries, jff
dkB centre of philosophic thought. About this were grouped the
otber logical and metaphysical problems, and the answer given to
this question decided the party position of individual thinkers. Amid the great variety of decisions given in this controversy over universal*, three tendencies are prominent :c3tealisrny which main-
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272 Mediaeval Philosophy. [Part III.
tains the independent existence of genera and species, is the doctrine of Anselm of Canterbury, of William of Champeaux, and of the Platonists proper, among whom Bernard- of Chartres is prominent ; Nominalism, which sees in universals only designations or terms
,vhich apply commonly, is defended in this period principally by
finally a mediating theory, which has been called 'onceptualism or' Sermonism, is attached principally to the name of
A^rJeTaT* '
"" xhese conflicts came to an issue principally in the endless dispu- tations at the Paris University, which for this period and on into the following period formed the centre of scientific life in Europe and these battles, conducted with all the arts of dialectical dexterity, exercised upon this age fascinating power like that which the disputes of the Sophists and Socratic circles had once exercised upon the Greeks. Here as there the unreflective life of the popular consciousness was awakened to thought, and here as there wider
•circles were seized by feverish thirst for knowledge, and by pas sionate desire to take part in such hitherto unwonted intellectual games. Far beyond the narrow circles of the clergy, who had pre-
Roscellinus^
\r viously been the transmitters of scientific tradition,, the impulse
toward knowledge, thus awakened, forced its way to the surface.
— But this excessive vigour in dialectical development found at the ' same time manifold opposition. In fact, hid within itself a seri
ous danger. This brilliant performance, in which abstract thought proved its power, lacked all basis of real knowledge. With its dis tinctions and conclusions was carrying on to a certain extent juggler's game in the open air, which indeed set the formal mental' powers into beneficial motion, but which, in spite of all its turns and windings, could lead to no material knowledge. Hence, from intelli- gent men like Gerbert, who had receivedTnformation from the empir ical studies of the Arabians, went out the admonition to abandon the formalism of the schools and turn to the careful examination of Nature and to the tasks of practical civilisation.
But while such call still echoed mainly unheard, dialectic met more forcible resistance in the piety of faith and in the power of the ChuxcJ*. —The result was inevitable that thfl1"(j;'"11 wnrlrj^g nvnr nf the metaphysics of the Church's faith, and the consequences which were developed ill tft~ Strife about SaSacaal^ — ajTTjTst-without any reference to their religious bearing, — should come into contradiction wit-. K~t. hft dngma. nf the flhnrchj and the more this was repeatea~"the more dialectic appeared not only superfluous for the simply pious mind, but also dangerous to the interests of the Church. In this spirit it was attacked, sometimes with extreme violence, by the
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Cm*-. 1. ] Firtt Period. 273
Orthodox Mvsticd. among whom the most combative was Bernard of Clairraux, while the Victorines turned back from the excesses of dialectical arrogance to the study of Augustine, and sought to bring out the rich treasure of inner experience which his writings con tained, by transferring the fundamental thoughts of his psychology from the metaphysical to the empirical sphere.
Aureliua Augustinus (364-430), born at Thagaste in Numidia, and educated for a jurist there and also in Madaura in Carthage, passed through in his youth almost all phases of the scientific and religious movement of his time. He sought at first in Manichsism religious relief for his burning doubts, then fell into the Academic Scepticism which he had early absorbed from Cicero, passed over from this gradually to the Neo-1'latonic doctrine, and was at last won by Ambrose, Bishop of Milan, for Christianity, whose philosopher he was to become.
As priest, and later as bishop at Hippo Regius, he was unwearied in practical and literary activity for the unity of the Christian Church and doctrine; his doctrinal system was developed especially in the Donatist and Pelagian contro versies. Among his works (in Migne's collection, 16 vols. , Paris, 1835 ff. [tr. ed. by Dods, 16 vols. , Edin. 1871-77 ; also in Schaffs lib. , Nicene and 1'ost- Nicene Fathers, Vols. 1-8, Buffalo, 1886-88]) those of chief importance for philosophy are his autobiographical Confessions, and further Contra Academi- cos, De Biota Vita, De Ordine, De Quantitate Animce, De Libero Arbitrio, De
Trinitate, Soliloquia, De ImmortaliUite Animas, De Civitatt Dei. — Cf. C. Binde- mann, Der. hlg. A. (3 Bde. 1844-186H). — Fr. Bohringer, Kirchengeschichte in Biographien, XI. Bd. in 2 Thl. (Stuttgart, 1877-78). — A. Dorner, A. (Berlin, 1873). — W. Dilthey, Einleituug in die Oeistesvnssenschaften, I. (Leips. 1883), pp. 322 ff. —J. 8torz, Die Pkilos. des hlg. A. (Freiburg, 1892).
The fUtayuyii tit Tit rariryopiai of Porphyry (ed. by Busse, Berlin, 1887), in iu translation by Boethius, gave the external occasion for the controversy over universal*. Boothloa (470-525), aside from this, exercised an influence upon the esxly Middle Ages by his translations and commentaries upon the two Aristotelian treatises, and upon a number of Cicero's writings. In addition to his books there were still others which circulated under the name of Augustine. Cf. Prantl, Geseh. d. Log. im Abendl. , II. , and A. Jourdain, Becherches critiques swr Page et I'origine des traductions latines cT Aristotle (Paris, 2 ed. , 1843).
Among the scientific encyclopedias of departing antiquity, Marcianus Capella (from Carthage, the middle of the fifth century), in his Saturicon (ed. by Eyssenhardt, Leips. 1866), after his whimsical introduction De Nuptiis Mercurii
et PhilologUz, treats the seven liberal arts, of which, as is well known, in the activity of the schools grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic formed the Trivium, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music, including poetics, the Quadrivium. A valuable commentary on Capella was written later by Scotus Erigena (ed. by B. Hauresvu, Paris, 1861). — The Institutiones Dirinarum et Satcularium Lee- tionum and De Artibus ac Disciplinis Litterarum Liberalium of the Senator Cas- siodorus (480-670, Works, Paris, 1588), and the Originum sice Etymolngiarum, Lihri XX. (in Migne) of Isidnrut Hispalensis (died 03(1) are already completely upon theological ground. John Damascenus (about 7(H)) in his II>ry4) •y«A«»rt
While the storms of the national migrations were blustering upon the conti nent, scientific study had fled to the British Isles, in particular to Ireland, and later flourished to a certain extent in the school at York under the Venerable Bcde. From here learned education was won back to the continent through Alcuin, upon the inducement of Charles the Great ; beside the episcopal and the cloister schools arose the palatinal school, whose seat was fixed by Charles the Raid at Paris. The most important cloister schools were those of Fulda and Toon. At the former worked Rabanus (Khaban) Maurus (of Mainz, 776-866 ; D* Univcrto, Libri XXII. ), and Eric f Heiricus) of Auxerre; from it went out, at the end of the ninth century, Remlgius of Auxerre and the probable author
( Works, Venice, 1748) gave the classical example for the employment of the ancient school logic in the service of systematising the Church doctrines.
274 Mediaeval Philotophy. [Part III
of the commentary Super Porphyrium (printed in Cousin's Ouvrages Inedits d' Abelard, Paris, 1836). In Tours Alcuin was followed by the Abbot Frede- gisus, whose letter, De Nihilo et Tenebris, is preserved (in Migne, Vol. 105).
Later the cloister at St. Gall (Notker Labeo, died 1022) formed a principal seat of scientific tradition.
Cf. also for the literary relations, the Histoire Litteraire de la France.
The writings ascribed to the Areopagite (cf. Acts of the Apostles, 17 : 34), among which those of chief importance are repl /iwtucijs 9eo\oylas and irtpi rVjj Icpapxtas oipavlov (in Migne ; German by Engelhardt, Sulzbach, 1823), show the same mixture of Christian and Neo-Platonic philosophy which appeared fre quently in the Orient (the result of Origen's influence) and in an especially characteristic form in the Bishop Synesius (about 400 ; cf. R. Volkmann, S. von
Cyrene, Berlin, 1869). The above-named writings of the Pseudo-Dionysius, which probably arose in the fifth century, are first mentioned, 532, and their genuineness is there contested; nevertheless, this was defended by Maximus Confessor (580-662 ; De Variis Difficilioribus Locis Patrum Dionysii et Gregorii, ed. Oehler, Halle, 1857).
In connection with this Mysticism develops the first important scientific personality of the Middle Ages, John Scotus Erigena (sometimes Jerugena, from Ireland, about 810-880), of whose life it is certainly known that he was called by Charles the Bald to the court school at Paris, and was for a time active there. He translated the writings of the Areopagite, wrote against Gottschalk the treatise De Prizdestinatione, and put his own theories into his main work, De Divisione Naturae (German by Noack, Leips. 1870-76). The works form Vol. 122 in Migne's collection. Cf. J. Huber, J. S. E. (Munich, 1861).
Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1100) came from Aosta, was active for a long time in the Norman cloister at Bee, and was called to become Archbishop of Canterbury in 1003. Of his works (Migne, Vol. 155) the most important for philosophy besides the treatise Cur Deus Homo? are the Monologium and the Proslogium. The two latter are edited by C. Haas (Tlibingen, 1863), together with the refutation of a monk, Gaunilo (in the cloister Marmoutier near Tours), Liber pro Insipiente, and the reply of Anselm. Cf. Ch. Rfemusat, A. de C, tableau de la vie monastique et de la lutte du pouroir spirituel avec le pouvoir
tempnrel au ll"'
'William of Champeaux (died 1121 as Bishop of Chalons-sur'Marne) was a
Steele ed. , Paris, (2d
1868).
teacher who was much heard at the cathedral school in Paris, and established studies there in the August inian cloister at St. Victor. We are chiefly informed as to his philosophical views by his opponent A belaid ; his logical treatise is lost. Cf. E. Michaud, G. de Ch. et les ecoles de Paris au 12"" siecle (Paris, 1868).
The Flatonism of the earlier Middle Ages attached itself essentially to the Timmts, and under the influence of the Neo-Platonic interpretation gave to the doctrine of Ideas a form which did not completely correspond to the original sense. The most important figure in this line is Bernard of Chartrea (in the first half of the twelfth century). His work De Mundi Universitate sive Mega-
cosmus et Microcosmus has been edited by C. S. Barach (Innsbruck, William of Conches (Magna de Naturis Philosophia ; Dragmaticon Philoso
Roscellinus of Armorica in Brittany came forward as teacher at various places, especially at Locmenach where Abelard was his hearer, and was obliged to retract his opinions at the Council at Soissons. Of his own writings only a letter to Abelard is extant (printed in the Abhandl. der bair. Akad. , 1861) ;
the sources for his doctrine are Anselm, Abelard, John of Salisbury.
Abelard (Abeillard), the most impressive and energetic personality among the thinkers of this period, was born 1079 at Pallet, in the county of Nantes,
and was a pupil of William of Champeaux and of Roscellinus. His own activity as a teacher was developed at Melun and Corbeil, and most successfully in Paris at the cathedral school, and at the logical school St. Genevieve. The misfortune into which his well-known relationship to Heloise plunged him, and the conflicts into which his teaching brought him with the Church authority, chiefly at the instigation of his unwearied prosecutor, Bernard of Clairvaux
phic) and Walter of Montague are regarded as his disciples. Adelard of Bath also wrote in the same spirit (De Eodem et Diverso ; Questiones Xaturales).
1876).
Chap. I. ]
Fir »t Period. 275
(Synods at Soissons 1121, and Sens 1141), did not allow the restless man to attain complete clearness in his mind, and impelled him to seek resting-places in various cloisters : he died 1142 in St. Marcel, near Chalons-sur-Saone. Cf. his Hist aria Calamitatum Mearum, and his correspondence with Heloise (M. Car- riere, A. u. H. , 2d ed. , Giessen, 1863). His works have been edited by V. Cousin in two volumes (Paris, 1849-69). Among these the most important are his Dialectic, Introductio in Theologium, Theologia Christiana, Dialogus inter Philosophum, Christianum et Judatum, the treatise Sir et JVon, and the ethical treatise Scito Te Ipsum. Cf. Ch. d. Reinusat, Abelard (2 vols. , Paris, 1845).
A number of anonymous treatises (published by V. Cousin) occupy a position allied to that of Abelard. Of this description are a commentary on De Interpre- t-itione, De Intellectibut, and De Generibus et Speciebus (the latter is possibly from . loscellinus, a Bishop of Soissons who died 1161). Related to Abelard is also the philosophico-theological position of Gilbert de la Porree (Gilbertus Tom-tanim, died 1164 as Bishop of Poitiers), who taught in Chartres and Paris, and was drawn into the prosecution of Abelard by Bernard of Clairvaux. Resiile* a commentary on the De Trinitate and De Duabus Xaturis in Christo of Pseudo- Boethius, he wrote the De sex Principiisf which was much com mented upon later.
The consequences of the "dialectic" that were objectionable for the Church ■bowed themselves at an early date especially with Berengar of Tours (999- ltit<8), whose doctrine of the Sacrament was combated by Laniranc (1006- l(*t'. Anselm's predecessor at Bee and Canterbury). The latter is probably the author of the treatise formerly ascribed to Anselm and printed among his
works, Elucidarium site Dialogus Summam Totius Theologioe Complectens. In this compendium the effort first appears to give the whole compass of what had been established by the Church, in the form of a logically arranged text- book, putting aside dialectical innovations. From this proceeded later the works of the Summists [so called from their writings which took the form of a "Sum" of theology], among whom the most important is Peter Lombard (died 1164 as Bishop of Paris). His Libri IV. Sententiarum form Vol. 192 in Migne. Among the earlier we may perhaps mention Robert Pulley n (Kobertus Pullus, died 1160) ; among the later, Peter of Poitiers (died 1206) and Alanus KvmfI ("aft insults" • died 1203). Cf. on him Baumgartner (MUnster, 1896).
Gerbert (died 1003 as Pope Sylvester II. ) has the merit of having pointed out energetically the necessity of the study of mathematics and natural science.
He became acquainted with the work of the Arabians while in Spain and Italy, and acquired an amount of knowledge that made him an object of amazement and suspicion to his contemporaries. Cf. K. Werner, G. von Aurillar. dir Kirche und Wissenschaft seiner Zeit (2d ed. , Vienna, 1881). Like him his disciple, Fulbert (died 1029 as Bishop of Chartres), called men back from dialectic to simple piety, and in the same spirit Hildebert of Lavardin was active (1067-1133, Bishop of Tours).
The same thing was done upon a large scale by the orthodox Mysticism of the twelfth century. As its most zealous supporter we are met by Bernard of ClaJrrauJC (1091-1163). Among his writings those prominent are De Contemptu Mundi. and De liradibus Humilitatis (ed. by Mabillon. last ed. , Paris, 1839 f. ). Cf. Neander, Der heilii/e B. und seine Zeit (3d ed. , 1866) ; Morison, Life and
Tints of St. B. (l/. nd. 1868) ; [K. S. Storrs, B. of C. (N. Y. 1818)].
Mysticism became scientifically fruitful among the Victorinea, the conduc
tor* of the cloister school of St. Victor, in Paris. The most important was Hugo of St Victor (born 1096 as Count of Blankenburg in the Harz, died 1141). Among his works (in Migne, Vols. 176-177) the most important is De Sarra- mentiM Fidei Christiana;; for the psychology of Mysticism the most important work* are the Stdilnquium tie Arrha Animce, De Area Sue and De Vanitate
Mundi, and besides these the encyclopedic work Ervditio Didascalica. — Cf. A. Liebner, //. r. ,Slf. V. und die theologischen Iliehtungen seiner Zeit (Leips. 1836). Hie pupil, Richard of St. Victor (a Scot, died 1173), wrote De Statu, De
Erudition* Ilnmini* Interiuris, De Pre/iariitione Animi ad Contemplationem, and De Gratia Contemplations. His works form Vol. 194 in Migne. Cf. W. A. Kaulich, Die Lehren des H. und R. von St. V. (in the Abhandl. der
BShm. On dm Wis*. , 1863 f. ). His successor, Walter of St. Victor, ilistiii
276 Mediaeval Philosophy : First Period. [Part III.
guished himself in a less scientific polemic against the heretical dialectic (In
Quattuor Labyrinthos Francice).
At the close of this period appear the beginnings of a Humanist reaction
against the one-sidedness of the work of the schools, . in John of Salisbury (Johannes Saresberiensis, died 1180 as Bishop of Chartres), whose writings Poli- craticus and Metalogicus (Migne, Vol. 199) form a valuable source for the scientific life of the time. Cf. C. Schaarschmidt, J. S. nack Leben und Studien, Schriften und Philosophie (Leips. 1862).
§ 22. The Metaphysics of Inner Experience.
The philosophy of the great Church teacher Augustine is not presented in any of his works as a complete system; rather, it develops incidentally in all his literary activity in connection with the treatment of various subjects, for the most part theological.
? But from this work as a whole we receive the peculiar impression that these rich masses of thought are in motion in two different directions, and are held together only by the powerful personality
\ \/>of the man. As theologian Augustine throughout all his investi-
\d»j yffgations keeps the conception of the Church in mind, as criterion; as
» '
he makes all his ideas centre about the principle the ^y philosopher of
absolute and immediate certainty (Selbstgewissheit) of consciousness. By their double relation to these two fixed postulates, all questions come into active flux. Augustine's world of thought is like an elliptic system which is constructed by motion about two centres, and this, its inner duality, is frequently that of contradiction. 1
It becomes the task of the history of philosophy to separate from this complicated system those ideas by which Augustine far tran scended his time and likewise the immediately following centuries, and became one of the founders of modern thought. All these ideas, however, have their ultimate ground and inner union in the prin ciple of the immediate certainty of inner experience (selbstgewissen Innerlichheii), which Augustine first expressed with complete clear ness, and formulated and used as the starting-point of philosophy. Under the influence of the ethical and religious interest, metaphys- ical interest had become gradually and almost imperceptibly shifted from the sphere" of the outer to that of the inner life. Psychical coiiotiptiuiis had Taken the place of physical, as the fundamental factors in the conception of the world. It was reserved for Augus tine to bring into full and conscious use, this, which had already become an accomplished fact in Origen and Plotinus. '
1 It is unmistakable that Augustine himself in the course of his development transferred the emphasis of his personality more and more from the philosophi cal to the Church centre. This comes forward with especial distinctness in his backward look over his own literary activity, the Betractationes.
• Aug. De Ver. Bel. 39, 72. Noli foras ire ; in te ipsum redi : iw intgbiore iioMi. NK habitat Veritas.
Chat. 1, $ 22. ] Metaphysics of Inner Experience : Augustine. 277
This tendency toward inner experience even constitutes his pecu liar literary quality. Augustine is a virtuoso in self-observation and self-analysis ; he has a mastery in the portrayal of psychical states, which is as admirable as is his ability to analyse these in reflection and lay bare the deepest elements of feeling and impulse. Just for this reason it is from this source almost exclusively that he draws the views with which his metaphysics seeks to compre hend the universe. So there begins, as over against the Greek philosophy, a new course of development, which indeed, during the Middle Ages, made but little progress beyond what was achieved by Augustine in his first cast, and the full development of which is not to be found until the modern period.
1. This makes its appearance clearly already in Augustine's doctrine of the starting-point of philosophical knowledge. In cor respondence with the course of his personal development he seeks the way to certainty through doubt, and in this process, sceptical theories themselves must break the path. At first, to be sure, with the indomitable thirst of his ardent nature for happiness, he strikes down doubt by the Socratic postulate that the possession of truth (without the presupposition of which there is also no proba bility) is requisite for happiness, and therefore is to be regarded as attainable : but with greater emphasis he shows that even the sceptic who denies the external reality of the content of perception; or at least leaves it undecided, can yet not involve in doubt the internal existence of the sensation as such. But instead of con tenting himself with the relativistic or positivistic interpretations of this fact, Augustine presses forward just from this basis to victo rious certainty. He points out that together with the sensation there is given not only its content, which is liable to doubt in one direction or another, but also the reality of the perceiving subject, and this certainty which consciousness has in itself follows first of an from th** very act. of doubt. In that I doubt, or since I doubt, he says, I know that I, the doubter, am : and thus, just this doubt contains within itself the valuable truth of the reality of the con- rion* being. Even if I should err in all else, I cannot err in _this ; for in order to err I must exist. '
This fundamental certainty extends equally to all states of con
1 Augustine attributed fundamental importance to this line of argument, wMeb be frequently worked out (De Beat* \rita, 7; Sold II. 1 ff. ; De Ver. Btt. 72 f. ; De Trin. X. 14, etc. ). That it, however, was not completely unknown to Greek literature also is proved by the passage (III. fi f. ) of the compilation current under the name of " Metaphysics of Herennios. " The source of this passage has not ax yet been discovered, but is probably late Stoic. Ct on this E. Haiti: in SUt. -Ber. der Bert. Ak. d. IF. , 1889, pp. 1167 ft.
278 Mediceval Philosophy : First Period. [Part III
sctowsness (cogitare), and Augustine sought to show that all the various kinds of these states are already included in the act of doubt. He who doubts knows not only that he lives, but also that he remembers, that he knows, and that he wills : for the grounds 6f his doubt rest upon his former ideas ; in estimating the momenta of the doubt are developed thought, knowledge, and judgment; and the motive of his doubt is only this, that heis striving after truth. Without particularly reflecting upon this, or tlrawin^ farther in clusions from Augustine proves in this example his deep insight infoTEe psychical life, since he does not regard the ditterent kinds of psychical activity as separate spheres, but as the aspects of one and th~e_same act, inseparably united with one another. The soul
for him — and by this he rises far above Aristotle, and also above t. he^Neo-Flatonists — *hA hvrng nrhnlA nf perxn^glity^ whr^e lite is~
-(jvja unity, and which, by its self-consciousrfess, certain of its own reality as the surest truth.
But from this first certainty Augustine's doctrine at once leads farther, and not only his religious conviction, but also deep epistemological reflection, that makes him regard the idea
of God as immediately involved in the certainty which the indi vidual consciousness has of itself. Here, too, the fundamental fact of doubt of authoritative importance in this case, also, already contains implicitly the full truth. How should we come to question and doubt the perceptions of the external world which force themselves upon us with such elementary power, asks Augus tine, we did not possess, besides these, and from other sources, criteria and standards of truths by which to measure and examine these perceptions? He who doubts must know the truth, for only for its sake does he doubt. 1 In reality, continues the philosopher, man possesses, besides sensation (sensus), the higher capacity of reason Xintellectus, ratio), i. e. of the immediate perception of incor- poTea1~~Eruths under the latter Augustine understands, notPonly the logical laWS, but also the norms of the good and the beautiful in" general, all those truths not to be attained by sensation,
which are requisite to elaborate and judge what given, — the principles
otjudging. '
De Ver. Bel. 39, 72
Aspectus animi, quo per se ipsum non per corpus verum intuetur De Trin. XII. 2. Cf. Contra Acad. III. 13, 29.
The apprehension of these intelligible truths by human consciousness was at the first designated by Augustine quite Platonically &v&nrri<rti. It was ortho dox scruples against the assumption of the pre-existence of the soul that led him to regard the reason as the intuitive faculty for the incorporeal world. CI. also J. Stortz, Die Philotophie des hi. Augustinus (Freiburg B. 1882).
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Chap. 1, § 22. ] Metaphysics of Inner Experience : Augustine. 279
Such norms of reason assert themselves as standards of judg ment in doubt as in all activities of consciousness ; but thev transcend, as something higher, the individual consciousness into which tney enter in the course of tune: they are the same tor all who think rationally, ana experience no alteration in this their worth. Thus the individual consciousness sees itself attached in its own function to something universally valid and far reaching. '
But 5 SIflBgg to the essence of truth that it is or exists. Augus tine also proceeds from this fundamental conception of the" ancient, as of every naive theory of knowledge. But the Being or existence of those universal truths, since they are absolutely incorporeal in their nature, can be thought only as that of the Ideas in God — after the Neo-Platonic mode ; they are the changeless Forms and norms of all reality (principales formal vel rationes rerum stabiles aique incommutabiles, quae in divino intellectu continental-), and the determinations of the content of the divine mind. In him they are all contained in highest union ; he is the absolute unity, the all- embracing truth ; he is the highest Being, the highest Good, perfect Beauty (unum, verum, bonum). All rational knowledge is ulti mately knowledge of God. Complete knowledge of God, indeed, even according to Augustine's admission, is denied to human insight in the earthly life. Perhaps only the negative element in our idea of him is completely certain ; and, in particular, we have no ade quate idea of the way in which the different elements of divine truth which the reason beholds are united in him to form the highest real unity. For his incorporeal and changeless essence
^
C^_ <>
(essentia) far transcends all forms of relation and association that belong to human thought ; even the category of substance appliesrx^ to him as little as do the rest. 1
3. Directly consistent as these thoughts are with Neo-Platonism,s
their Christian character is yet preserved in Augustine's presenta-
tion by the fact that the religious idea of the deity as absolute personality is inseparably fused with the philosophical conception ^p g^r ol tne deity as the sum and essence of all truth. But just for this ^^^" reason the whole Augustinian metaphysics is built up upon the V
« De Lib. Arb. II. 7 ff. ;"
* 'rt»;_gW'"'i'>1 "''"g this is the insight, that the categories acquired in
knowing Nature are inadequate for the peculiar nature of spiritual synthesis ( accxtrdiBl! Ut Wllll'li the diviim uiwonoo bIwwW -brTTioTIgtHT. I he new categories ufjnternality are, however, with Augustine only in the process of coming into -rniti>n"«> ; fti If'B following!
* In fact, Augustine seeks throughout to identify the nvt of Plotinus with the \iyox ol Origen ; but by dropping from the Neo-Platonic doctrine the emanistic derivation of the «5t and its acquirement of independent existence, he abrogates the physical schema of the world potencies in favour of the psychical.
. >
280 Mediceval Philosophy : First Period. [Part IIL
self-knowledge of the finite personality j. that upon fee fact of
inner experience. ' For so far as essence at all possible for man,
com prehension of the divine can be gained pnly after the This, however, shows the fol
analogy of human self-knowledge.
lowing fundamental composit"^" nf ^np innpr lifo the permanent
existence of spiritual Being given in the sum-total of its content of consciousness, or reproducible ideas; its movement and living activity consistsirTthe processes of uniting and separating these elements in judgments and the impelling force in this motion the will, directed toward the attainment of highest blessedness. Thus the three aspects of psychical reality are icfea Vorstellung), judgment, and will memoria, intellectus, voluntas,1 and Augustine expressly on his guard against conceiving of these modes of func tioning which are peculiar to personality, as the properties of bodies are conceived. Just as little do they mean different strata
unity the substance of the soul itself. In accordance with these relations
or spheres of its existence they form in their indissoluble
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4. A farther and essential consequence of placing philosophy upon consciously anthropological basis in Augustine's case, the ce:ntral position which he assigned in his theory of the universe to
The same triple division of the psychical activities found among the Stoics. Cf. p. 187.
thus recognised in man's mental life, Augustine then not only seeks to gain an analogical idea of the mystery of the Trinity, but recog nises, also, in the esse, nosse, and velle the fundamental determina
tions of all reality. Ttein^ knowing, ann* willing comprigp reality, and in omnipotp.