Among the many materials that it rec- ognizes and adopts, art considers that which is least subject to corruption and most durable and most
versatile
as best and most valuable.
Bruno-Cause-Principle-and-Unity
?
?
?
.
Well put.
I might add that that is the way in which the Peripatetics habitually express themselves also, saying that the dimensional act and all natural forms emerge and derive from the potency of matter.
Averroes understood this in part.
Although an Arab, and not knowing Greek, he grasped more of the Peripatetic doctrine than any Greek we have read and he would have understood still more, had he not been so devoted to his idol, Aristotle.
He says that matter, in its essence, comprises inde- terminate dimensions.
By this, he wishes to convey that they come to be determined - taking on now this figure and dimension, now others - according to the modification of natural forms.
In this sense, we see that
? ?
Fourth dialogue
? matter produces forms from itself, so to speak, and does not receive them as from outside. In a way, this is what Plotinus, prince of Plato's school, also understood. In establishing the difference between the matter of higher things and that of lower, he says that the first is everything at the same time and that, since it possesses all, there is nothing into which it changes, while the second, by means of a certain renovation at the level of parts, becomes everything, and becomes successively one thing after another - always, therefore, in a state of diversity, alteration and movement. In consequence, neither the one nor the other matter is ever formless, although each is formed differently; one in the instant of eternity, the other in the instant of time; one in simultaneity, the other in succession; one by way of enfold- ing, the other by way of unfolding; one as a unity, the other as multiplicity; one as being all and each thing, the other individually and thing after thing.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . So, you wish to infer that, not only according to your prin- ciples, but also according to those of other philosophical methods, matter is not prope nihil [almost nothing], pure potency, bare, without act, without virtue and perfection.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Exactly. Isaythatitisdeprivedofformsandwithoutthem, not in the way ice lacks warmth or the abyss is without light, but as a preg- nant woman lacks the offspring which she produces and expels forth from herself, and as the earth is without light at night in our hemisphere, which it can reacquire by its turning.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . So,evenintheseinferiorthings,actcoincidesintheend-if not entirely, at least to a great extent - with potency.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Ileaveyoutodecide.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . And what would happen if, finally, this potency from below became one with that from above?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Judgeforyourself. Youcanhenceforthrisetotheconcept,I do not say of the supreme and most excellent principle, which has been excluded from our inquiry, but to the concept of the world soul, insofar as it is the act of everything and the potency of everything, and insofar as it is present in its entirety in everything - whence it follows that (even if there exist innumerable individuals) all things are one, and the knowledge of that unity is the object and term of all philosophies and all meditation on nat- ural things - leaving in its domain the highest speculation of all, that which, surpassing nature, is impossible and vain for the unbeliever.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . That is true, for one ascends there guided by supernatural and not natural light.
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . It is that which is lacking in those who deem that everything is a body, simple like the ether, or composite like the stars and astral things - and who do not look for the divinity outside of the infinite world and the infinity of things, but inside that world and those things.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . It is only on that point, it seems to me, that the faithful theologian differs from the truthful philosopher.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Iagree. IthinkyouhaveunderstoodwhatImean.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Very clearly, I believe. And so, I infer from your remarks that, even if we do not let matter go beyond the level of natural things and keep to the common definition that the more vulgar philosophy gives of it, we will find that matter retains a greater excellence than is recognized in it by that philosophy. For, in the end, it does not attribute any other status to it except that of being a substratum of forms and a potency which is recep- tive to natural forms - without name, definition or determination because it is without any actuality. This point seemed difficult to certain monks17 who, wishing to excuse rather than to accuse this doctrine, claimed that matter possesses only entitative act - that is, different from that which is simply without being and which has no reality in nature, as, for example, some chimera or imaginary thing. For this matter, in the end, has being - which is enough for it - similar to that which, without mode or dignity, depends on actuality and is nothing. But you could insist on asking Aristotle: Why do you claim, O prince of the Peripatetics, that matter is nothing, from the fact of its having no act, rather than saying that it is all, from the fact that it possesses all acts, or possesses them confusedly and confoundedly, as you prefer? Is it not you who, always speaking of the new being of the forms in matter, or of the generation of things, says that forms proceed from and emerge from inside matter? You have never been heard to say that forms proceeded - through the action of the efficient cause - from outside matter, saying rather that the efficient cause makes them emerge from within. I shall not mention that you also make an internal principle of the efficient cause of those things, to which you give the com- mon name 'nature', and not an external principle as is the case with artifi- cial things. In that case, it seems to me we should say that when matter receives a form from outside, it does not possess in itself any form or act. It also seems to me that when one says it sends all forms forth from its womb, we must declare that it possesses them all. Is it not you who, if not obliged by reason, at least compelled by normal usage, defines matter by saying that
17 Followers of Duns Scotus.
? ? ?
18 Paraphrase of Genesis ? , ? ? and ? ? .
19 Genesis ? , ? : Bruno translates ferebatur as covava, 'brooded'.
Fourth dialogue
? it is 'that thing from which each natural species is produced', never saying that it is 'that in which things are made' - as we would say if acts did not come out of it and if, consequently, it did not possess them?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . CerteconsuevitdicereAristotelescumsuispotiusformaseduci de potentia materiae quam in illam induci, emergere potius ex ipsa quam in ipsam ingeri [Certainly, Aristotle and his followers usually say that forms come out from matter, rather than that they are introduced into it, that they emerge from it rather than being absorbed into it], but I would say that Aristotle preferred to call 'act' the unfolding of form rather than its enfolding.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . And I say that the expressed, sensible and unfolded being does not constitute the fundamental essence of actuality, but is a conse- quence and effect of it. In the same way, the principle being of wood and the essence of its actuality do not consist in being a bed, but in its being a substance so constituted that it can be a bed, a bench, a beam, an idol and anything else formed out of wood. Not to mention that all natural things are more genuinely produced from natural matter than artificial things are from artificial matter, for art generates forms from matter either by sub- traction, as when it forms a statue from stone, or by addition, as when a house is formed by joining stone to stone and wood and earth. But nature produces everything out of its own matter by means of separation, partu- rition and effluxion, as the Pythagoreans thought, as Anaxagoras and Democritus understood and the sages of Babylon confirmed. Moses, him- self, also subscribes to their opinion when, describing the generation of the things ordered by the universal efficient cause, he speaks thus: 'Let the earth bring forth its animals, let the waters bring forth living creatures. '18 It is as if he had said: Let matter bring them forth. For, as he says, water is the material principle of things - which explains why he also says that the efficient intellect (which he calls spirit) 'brooded on the waters':19 that is, he gave the waters a procreative power and produced from them the nat- ural species, which he says afterwards are waters in substance. Thus, speak- ing of the separation of lower and higher bodies, he says, 'the spirit sepa- rated the waters from the waters', and deduces from this that dry earth appeared in their midst. Everyone claims, then, that things come from matter by way of separation, and not by means of addition and reception. Therefore, rather than saying that matter is empty and excludes forms, we should say that it contains forms and includes them. This matter which
? ? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? unfolds what it possesses enfolded must, therefore, be called a divine and excellent parent, generator and mother of natural things - indeed, nature entire in substance. Is that not what you mean, Teofilo?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Certainly.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I am also very surprised that our Peripatetics have not worked out their art analogy further.
Among the many materials that it rec- ognizes and adopts, art considers that which is least subject to corruption and most durable and most versatile as best and most valuable. So, it deems gold more noble than wood, stone and iron, because it is less subject to cor- ruption, and because everything that can be made of wood or stone, and many other things besides, can also be made of gold, producing things of much greater value by reason of their beauty, resistance, suppleness and nobility. What, then, must we say of the matter of which man, gold and all natural things are made? Must it not be held more worthy than the material of art, and must we not attribute a higher actuality to it? Why, O Aristotle, will you not admit that what is the foundation and the basis of actuality - I mean, of that which is in act - and which you declare to exist forever and endure eternally, why will you not admit that it is more in act than your forms and your entelechies, which come and go? So that if you also wanted to seek the permanence of the formal principle . . .
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Quia principia oportet semper manere [Because principles should be permanent].
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . . . . without resorting to the fantastical ideas of Plato, since you are so hostile to them, you will be forced and obliged to say, either that the permanent actuality is found in the efficient cause - but this you can- not do, since you say that this efficient cause is what draws out and extracts the forms from the potency of matter - or that their permanent actuality is found in the bosom of matter. And, in fact, that is what you will be forced to say, because all the forms which appear as it were on the surface of mat- ter - those that were as much as those that are or will be - and which you call individual forms in act, are not themselves the principle, but are principled things. (I think, in fact, that the particular form is found on the surface of matter, in the same way as the accident is at the surface of the composite substance. Whence it follows that the actuality of the expressed form must be recognized as inferior to that of matter, just as the actuality of the accidental form is recognized as inferior to that of the composite. )
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Indeed, Aristotle concludes lamely by declaring, in con- cert with all the ancient philosophers, that principles must always be
? ?
Fourth dialogue
? permanent; later on, if we seek further in his doctrine for the place where the perpetual seat of natural form which floats on the back of matter might be, we will not find it either in the fixed stars - since the particular forms which we see do not descend from on high - nor in the ideal signs, sepa- rate from matter - for if these are not monsters, they are assuredly worse than monsters, being chimeras and pointless fantasies. What then? Forms are in the bosom of matter. And what then? Matter is the source of actual- ity. Do you want me to carry on and make you see all the absurdities into which Aristotle gets himself ? He says that matter exists in potency, but ask him: When will it be in act? Together with a great crowd he will respond: When it possesses form. But insist and ask: When that occurs, what com- mences to exist? They will answer, despite themselves: The composite, not matter, since the latter is always identical to itself, never renews itself, never changes. The same goes for artificial things: when one makes a statue of wood, we do not say that the wood begins to exist, for it is no more nor less wood than before. In fact, that which receives being and actuality is the new product, the composite, I mean the statue. How can you grant potency, then, to something that will never be in act nor possess act? For it follows from this that matter is not that which is in potency of being or that can be, for it is always identical and immutable, and is that upon which and in which change takes place, rather than that which changes. What is altered, augmented, diminished, moved in location, corrupted, is always (as you Peripatetics, yourselves, say) the composite, never matter. Then, why do you say that matter is now in potency, now in act? No one surely could doubt that matter, whether it receives forms or sends them forth from itself, does not receive a greater or lesser actuality in terms of its essence or its substance; so that there is no reason to say that it exists in potency. For potency concerns what is in continual movement in relation to matter, and not matter itself, which is not only eternally at rest, but the very cause of that state of eternal rest. For if form, in keeping with its fundamental, specific being possesses, not only logically - in the concept and in reason - but also physically in nature, a simple, invariable essence, then form must exist in the perpetual potency of matter, which is a potency not distinct from act, as I have several times explained in my various discussions concerning potency.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Queso[Ibegyou],spareawordfortheappetiteofmatter, so that Gervasio and I can resolve a little dispute between us.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes, please, Teofilo, for this person has given me a pain in ? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? the head with his comparison between matter and woman. He says that women are no more content with males than matter is with forms, and so forth.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Seeingthatmatterdoesnotreceiveanythingfromform,why do you think it desires it? If (as we have said) it brings forms out of its bosom and so possesses them in itself, how can you claim that it desires them? It does not desire those forms which daily change on its back, for every ordered thing desires that from which it receives perfection. And what can a corruptible thing bring to an eternal one? What can an imper- fect thing, as is the form of sensible things, which is always in movement, give to another so perfect that, if well pondered, is understood to be a divine being in things, as perhaps David of Dinant meant, who was so poorly understood by those who reported his opinion? 20 Matter does not desire form in order to be preserved by it, because a corruptible thing does not preserve an eternal one. Moreover, since matter clearly preserves form, form must desire matter in order to perpetuate itself, and not the other way around. For when form is separated from matter it ceases to exist, as is not the case with matter, which has all it had before the coming of form and which can have other forms as well. Not to mention that when we speak of the cause of corruption, we do not say that the form flees from matter or that it leaves matter, but that matter throws off one form to assume another. There is as little reason to say that matter desires form as that it hates it (I mean those forms that are generated and corrupted, because it cannot desire the source of forms, which it has within itself, because nothing desires what it possesses). By the same line of reasoning, according to which it is said to desire what it sometimes receives or produces, it can also be said to abhor whatever it throws off or rejects. In fact, it detests more fervidly than it desires, for it eternally throws off that individual form after retaining it a very short while. If you will remember this, that matter rejects as many forms as it assumes, you must agree with me when I say that it loathes form, just as I can allow your statements concerning desire.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Herelie,then,inruinsnotonlyPoliinnio'scastles,butalso others'.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Parciusistaviris[Donotboasttoomuch]. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Wehavelearnedenoughfortoday. Untiltomorrow.
? 20 David of Dinant, author of De tomis idest de divisionibus. 'Thou who reported his opinion' probably refers to Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles (? , ? ? ? ? ), where David of Dinant is said to have identified God with matter.
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Fifth dialogue
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then,goodbye.
End of the fourth dialogue
Fifth Dialogue
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Theuniverseis,therefore,one,infiniteandimmobile. Isaythat the absolute possibility is one, that the act is one; the form, or soul, is one, the matter, or body, is one, the thing is one, being is one. The maximum, and the optimum, is one: it cannot be comprehended and is therefore inde- terminable and not limitable, and hence infinite and limitless, and conse- quently immobile. It has no local movement since there is nothing outside of it to which it can be moved, given that it is the whole. It does not engen- der itself because there is no other being that it could anticipate or desire, since it possesses all being. It is not corrupted because there is no other thing into which it could change itself, given that it is everything. It cannot diminish or grow because it is an infinity to or from which nothing can be added or subtracted, since the infinite has no measurable parts. It is not alterable in terms of disposition, since it possesses no outside to which it might be subject and by which it might be affected. Moreover, since it com- prehends all contraries in its being in unity and harmony, and since it can have no propensity for another and new being, or even for one manner of being and then for another, it cannot be subject to change according to any quality whatsoever, nor can it admit any contrary or different thing that can alter it, because in it everything is concordant. It is not matter, because it is not configured or configurable, nor it is limited or limitable. It is not form, because it neither informs nor figures anything else, given that it is all, that it is maximum, that it is one, that it is universal. It is neither measurable nor a measure. It does not contain itself, since it is not greater than itself. It is not contained, since it is not less than itself. It is not equal to itself, because it is not one thing and another, but one and the same thing. Being one and the same, it does not have distinct beings; because it does not have distinct beings, it has no distinct parts; because it has no distinct parts, it is not composite. It is limit such that it is not limit, form such that it is not form, matter such that it is not matter, soul such that it is not soul: for it is all indifferently, and hence is one; the universe is one.
Indeed, in this one, the height is no greater than the length or depth, so that it is called a sphere by analogy, although it is not a sphere. Length,
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Cause, principle and unity
? breadth and depth in the sphere are identical, because they have the same limit, but in the universe, length, breadth and depth are identical because they are all equally without limit and infinite. If they have no half, quarter or other fraction, if there are no fractions at all, then there is no measurable part, nor, strictly, any part that differs from the whole. For, if you wish to speak of part of the infinite, you are obliged to call that infinite as well; if it is infinite, it coincides in one and the same being with the whole: therefore, the universe is one, infinite, indivisible. And if in the infinite you cannot find any difference as of part from whole, nor any difference as of one part from another, the infinite is undoubtedly one. There is no smaller part and greater part within the infinite's comprehension, for any part, however large, comes no nearer the proportion of the infinite than does any other, however small. In infinite duration, an hour is no different from a day, a day from a year, a year from a century, a century from an instant, because nei- ther moments nor hours exist any more than do centuries, and because none is more commensurable with eternity than another. Similarly, in the immensity, the palm is not different from the stadium1 , nor the stadium from the parasang2 , because the parasang is no nearer the immensity's pro- portions than is the stadium. Hence, there are no more infinite hours than there are infinite centuries, nor infinite palms in greater number than infinite parasangs. You come no nearer to commensurability, likeness, union and identity with the infinite by being a man than by being an ant, or by being a star than by being a man, for you get no nearer to that infinite being by being the sun or the moon than by being a man, or an ant. This is because, in the infinite, there is no difference between those things - and what I say of them applies just as well to all other existent particular things.
Now, if, in the infinite, all these particular things are not differentiated, are not divided into species, it necessarily follows that they have no num- ber: the universe, therefore, is one and immobile.
? ?
Fourth dialogue
? matter produces forms from itself, so to speak, and does not receive them as from outside. In a way, this is what Plotinus, prince of Plato's school, also understood. In establishing the difference between the matter of higher things and that of lower, he says that the first is everything at the same time and that, since it possesses all, there is nothing into which it changes, while the second, by means of a certain renovation at the level of parts, becomes everything, and becomes successively one thing after another - always, therefore, in a state of diversity, alteration and movement. In consequence, neither the one nor the other matter is ever formless, although each is formed differently; one in the instant of eternity, the other in the instant of time; one in simultaneity, the other in succession; one by way of enfold- ing, the other by way of unfolding; one as a unity, the other as multiplicity; one as being all and each thing, the other individually and thing after thing.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . So, you wish to infer that, not only according to your prin- ciples, but also according to those of other philosophical methods, matter is not prope nihil [almost nothing], pure potency, bare, without act, without virtue and perfection.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Exactly. Isaythatitisdeprivedofformsandwithoutthem, not in the way ice lacks warmth or the abyss is without light, but as a preg- nant woman lacks the offspring which she produces and expels forth from herself, and as the earth is without light at night in our hemisphere, which it can reacquire by its turning.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . So,evenintheseinferiorthings,actcoincidesintheend-if not entirely, at least to a great extent - with potency.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Ileaveyoutodecide.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . And what would happen if, finally, this potency from below became one with that from above?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Judgeforyourself. Youcanhenceforthrisetotheconcept,I do not say of the supreme and most excellent principle, which has been excluded from our inquiry, but to the concept of the world soul, insofar as it is the act of everything and the potency of everything, and insofar as it is present in its entirety in everything - whence it follows that (even if there exist innumerable individuals) all things are one, and the knowledge of that unity is the object and term of all philosophies and all meditation on nat- ural things - leaving in its domain the highest speculation of all, that which, surpassing nature, is impossible and vain for the unbeliever.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . That is true, for one ascends there guided by supernatural and not natural light.
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . It is that which is lacking in those who deem that everything is a body, simple like the ether, or composite like the stars and astral things - and who do not look for the divinity outside of the infinite world and the infinity of things, but inside that world and those things.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . It is only on that point, it seems to me, that the faithful theologian differs from the truthful philosopher.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Iagree. IthinkyouhaveunderstoodwhatImean.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Very clearly, I believe. And so, I infer from your remarks that, even if we do not let matter go beyond the level of natural things and keep to the common definition that the more vulgar philosophy gives of it, we will find that matter retains a greater excellence than is recognized in it by that philosophy. For, in the end, it does not attribute any other status to it except that of being a substratum of forms and a potency which is recep- tive to natural forms - without name, definition or determination because it is without any actuality. This point seemed difficult to certain monks17 who, wishing to excuse rather than to accuse this doctrine, claimed that matter possesses only entitative act - that is, different from that which is simply without being and which has no reality in nature, as, for example, some chimera or imaginary thing. For this matter, in the end, has being - which is enough for it - similar to that which, without mode or dignity, depends on actuality and is nothing. But you could insist on asking Aristotle: Why do you claim, O prince of the Peripatetics, that matter is nothing, from the fact of its having no act, rather than saying that it is all, from the fact that it possesses all acts, or possesses them confusedly and confoundedly, as you prefer? Is it not you who, always speaking of the new being of the forms in matter, or of the generation of things, says that forms proceed from and emerge from inside matter? You have never been heard to say that forms proceeded - through the action of the efficient cause - from outside matter, saying rather that the efficient cause makes them emerge from within. I shall not mention that you also make an internal principle of the efficient cause of those things, to which you give the com- mon name 'nature', and not an external principle as is the case with artifi- cial things. In that case, it seems to me we should say that when matter receives a form from outside, it does not possess in itself any form or act. It also seems to me that when one says it sends all forms forth from its womb, we must declare that it possesses them all. Is it not you who, if not obliged by reason, at least compelled by normal usage, defines matter by saying that
17 Followers of Duns Scotus.
? ? ?
18 Paraphrase of Genesis ? , ? ? and ? ? .
19 Genesis ? , ? : Bruno translates ferebatur as covava, 'brooded'.
Fourth dialogue
? it is 'that thing from which each natural species is produced', never saying that it is 'that in which things are made' - as we would say if acts did not come out of it and if, consequently, it did not possess them?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . CerteconsuevitdicereAristotelescumsuispotiusformaseduci de potentia materiae quam in illam induci, emergere potius ex ipsa quam in ipsam ingeri [Certainly, Aristotle and his followers usually say that forms come out from matter, rather than that they are introduced into it, that they emerge from it rather than being absorbed into it], but I would say that Aristotle preferred to call 'act' the unfolding of form rather than its enfolding.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . And I say that the expressed, sensible and unfolded being does not constitute the fundamental essence of actuality, but is a conse- quence and effect of it. In the same way, the principle being of wood and the essence of its actuality do not consist in being a bed, but in its being a substance so constituted that it can be a bed, a bench, a beam, an idol and anything else formed out of wood. Not to mention that all natural things are more genuinely produced from natural matter than artificial things are from artificial matter, for art generates forms from matter either by sub- traction, as when it forms a statue from stone, or by addition, as when a house is formed by joining stone to stone and wood and earth. But nature produces everything out of its own matter by means of separation, partu- rition and effluxion, as the Pythagoreans thought, as Anaxagoras and Democritus understood and the sages of Babylon confirmed. Moses, him- self, also subscribes to their opinion when, describing the generation of the things ordered by the universal efficient cause, he speaks thus: 'Let the earth bring forth its animals, let the waters bring forth living creatures. '18 It is as if he had said: Let matter bring them forth. For, as he says, water is the material principle of things - which explains why he also says that the efficient intellect (which he calls spirit) 'brooded on the waters':19 that is, he gave the waters a procreative power and produced from them the nat- ural species, which he says afterwards are waters in substance. Thus, speak- ing of the separation of lower and higher bodies, he says, 'the spirit sepa- rated the waters from the waters', and deduces from this that dry earth appeared in their midst. Everyone claims, then, that things come from matter by way of separation, and not by means of addition and reception. Therefore, rather than saying that matter is empty and excludes forms, we should say that it contains forms and includes them. This matter which
? ? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? unfolds what it possesses enfolded must, therefore, be called a divine and excellent parent, generator and mother of natural things - indeed, nature entire in substance. Is that not what you mean, Teofilo?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Certainly.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I am also very surprised that our Peripatetics have not worked out their art analogy further.
Among the many materials that it rec- ognizes and adopts, art considers that which is least subject to corruption and most durable and most versatile as best and most valuable. So, it deems gold more noble than wood, stone and iron, because it is less subject to cor- ruption, and because everything that can be made of wood or stone, and many other things besides, can also be made of gold, producing things of much greater value by reason of their beauty, resistance, suppleness and nobility. What, then, must we say of the matter of which man, gold and all natural things are made? Must it not be held more worthy than the material of art, and must we not attribute a higher actuality to it? Why, O Aristotle, will you not admit that what is the foundation and the basis of actuality - I mean, of that which is in act - and which you declare to exist forever and endure eternally, why will you not admit that it is more in act than your forms and your entelechies, which come and go? So that if you also wanted to seek the permanence of the formal principle . . .
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Quia principia oportet semper manere [Because principles should be permanent].
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . . . . without resorting to the fantastical ideas of Plato, since you are so hostile to them, you will be forced and obliged to say, either that the permanent actuality is found in the efficient cause - but this you can- not do, since you say that this efficient cause is what draws out and extracts the forms from the potency of matter - or that their permanent actuality is found in the bosom of matter. And, in fact, that is what you will be forced to say, because all the forms which appear as it were on the surface of mat- ter - those that were as much as those that are or will be - and which you call individual forms in act, are not themselves the principle, but are principled things. (I think, in fact, that the particular form is found on the surface of matter, in the same way as the accident is at the surface of the composite substance. Whence it follows that the actuality of the expressed form must be recognized as inferior to that of matter, just as the actuality of the accidental form is recognized as inferior to that of the composite. )
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Indeed, Aristotle concludes lamely by declaring, in con- cert with all the ancient philosophers, that principles must always be
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Fourth dialogue
? permanent; later on, if we seek further in his doctrine for the place where the perpetual seat of natural form which floats on the back of matter might be, we will not find it either in the fixed stars - since the particular forms which we see do not descend from on high - nor in the ideal signs, sepa- rate from matter - for if these are not monsters, they are assuredly worse than monsters, being chimeras and pointless fantasies. What then? Forms are in the bosom of matter. And what then? Matter is the source of actual- ity. Do you want me to carry on and make you see all the absurdities into which Aristotle gets himself ? He says that matter exists in potency, but ask him: When will it be in act? Together with a great crowd he will respond: When it possesses form. But insist and ask: When that occurs, what com- mences to exist? They will answer, despite themselves: The composite, not matter, since the latter is always identical to itself, never renews itself, never changes. The same goes for artificial things: when one makes a statue of wood, we do not say that the wood begins to exist, for it is no more nor less wood than before. In fact, that which receives being and actuality is the new product, the composite, I mean the statue. How can you grant potency, then, to something that will never be in act nor possess act? For it follows from this that matter is not that which is in potency of being or that can be, for it is always identical and immutable, and is that upon which and in which change takes place, rather than that which changes. What is altered, augmented, diminished, moved in location, corrupted, is always (as you Peripatetics, yourselves, say) the composite, never matter. Then, why do you say that matter is now in potency, now in act? No one surely could doubt that matter, whether it receives forms or sends them forth from itself, does not receive a greater or lesser actuality in terms of its essence or its substance; so that there is no reason to say that it exists in potency. For potency concerns what is in continual movement in relation to matter, and not matter itself, which is not only eternally at rest, but the very cause of that state of eternal rest. For if form, in keeping with its fundamental, specific being possesses, not only logically - in the concept and in reason - but also physically in nature, a simple, invariable essence, then form must exist in the perpetual potency of matter, which is a potency not distinct from act, as I have several times explained in my various discussions concerning potency.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Queso[Ibegyou],spareawordfortheappetiteofmatter, so that Gervasio and I can resolve a little dispute between us.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes, please, Teofilo, for this person has given me a pain in ? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? the head with his comparison between matter and woman. He says that women are no more content with males than matter is with forms, and so forth.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Seeingthatmatterdoesnotreceiveanythingfromform,why do you think it desires it? If (as we have said) it brings forms out of its bosom and so possesses them in itself, how can you claim that it desires them? It does not desire those forms which daily change on its back, for every ordered thing desires that from which it receives perfection. And what can a corruptible thing bring to an eternal one? What can an imper- fect thing, as is the form of sensible things, which is always in movement, give to another so perfect that, if well pondered, is understood to be a divine being in things, as perhaps David of Dinant meant, who was so poorly understood by those who reported his opinion? 20 Matter does not desire form in order to be preserved by it, because a corruptible thing does not preserve an eternal one. Moreover, since matter clearly preserves form, form must desire matter in order to perpetuate itself, and not the other way around. For when form is separated from matter it ceases to exist, as is not the case with matter, which has all it had before the coming of form and which can have other forms as well. Not to mention that when we speak of the cause of corruption, we do not say that the form flees from matter or that it leaves matter, but that matter throws off one form to assume another. There is as little reason to say that matter desires form as that it hates it (I mean those forms that are generated and corrupted, because it cannot desire the source of forms, which it has within itself, because nothing desires what it possesses). By the same line of reasoning, according to which it is said to desire what it sometimes receives or produces, it can also be said to abhor whatever it throws off or rejects. In fact, it detests more fervidly than it desires, for it eternally throws off that individual form after retaining it a very short while. If you will remember this, that matter rejects as many forms as it assumes, you must agree with me when I say that it loathes form, just as I can allow your statements concerning desire.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Herelie,then,inruinsnotonlyPoliinnio'scastles,butalso others'.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Parciusistaviris[Donotboasttoomuch]. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Wehavelearnedenoughfortoday. Untiltomorrow.
? 20 David of Dinant, author of De tomis idest de divisionibus. 'Thou who reported his opinion' probably refers to Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles (? , ? ? ? ? ), where David of Dinant is said to have identified God with matter.
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Fifth dialogue
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then,goodbye.
End of the fourth dialogue
Fifth Dialogue
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Theuniverseis,therefore,one,infiniteandimmobile. Isaythat the absolute possibility is one, that the act is one; the form, or soul, is one, the matter, or body, is one, the thing is one, being is one. The maximum, and the optimum, is one: it cannot be comprehended and is therefore inde- terminable and not limitable, and hence infinite and limitless, and conse- quently immobile. It has no local movement since there is nothing outside of it to which it can be moved, given that it is the whole. It does not engen- der itself because there is no other being that it could anticipate or desire, since it possesses all being. It is not corrupted because there is no other thing into which it could change itself, given that it is everything. It cannot diminish or grow because it is an infinity to or from which nothing can be added or subtracted, since the infinite has no measurable parts. It is not alterable in terms of disposition, since it possesses no outside to which it might be subject and by which it might be affected. Moreover, since it com- prehends all contraries in its being in unity and harmony, and since it can have no propensity for another and new being, or even for one manner of being and then for another, it cannot be subject to change according to any quality whatsoever, nor can it admit any contrary or different thing that can alter it, because in it everything is concordant. It is not matter, because it is not configured or configurable, nor it is limited or limitable. It is not form, because it neither informs nor figures anything else, given that it is all, that it is maximum, that it is one, that it is universal. It is neither measurable nor a measure. It does not contain itself, since it is not greater than itself. It is not contained, since it is not less than itself. It is not equal to itself, because it is not one thing and another, but one and the same thing. Being one and the same, it does not have distinct beings; because it does not have distinct beings, it has no distinct parts; because it has no distinct parts, it is not composite. It is limit such that it is not limit, form such that it is not form, matter such that it is not matter, soul such that it is not soul: for it is all indifferently, and hence is one; the universe is one.
Indeed, in this one, the height is no greater than the length or depth, so that it is called a sphere by analogy, although it is not a sphere. Length,
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Cause, principle and unity
? breadth and depth in the sphere are identical, because they have the same limit, but in the universe, length, breadth and depth are identical because they are all equally without limit and infinite. If they have no half, quarter or other fraction, if there are no fractions at all, then there is no measurable part, nor, strictly, any part that differs from the whole. For, if you wish to speak of part of the infinite, you are obliged to call that infinite as well; if it is infinite, it coincides in one and the same being with the whole: therefore, the universe is one, infinite, indivisible. And if in the infinite you cannot find any difference as of part from whole, nor any difference as of one part from another, the infinite is undoubtedly one. There is no smaller part and greater part within the infinite's comprehension, for any part, however large, comes no nearer the proportion of the infinite than does any other, however small. In infinite duration, an hour is no different from a day, a day from a year, a year from a century, a century from an instant, because nei- ther moments nor hours exist any more than do centuries, and because none is more commensurable with eternity than another. Similarly, in the immensity, the palm is not different from the stadium1 , nor the stadium from the parasang2 , because the parasang is no nearer the immensity's pro- portions than is the stadium. Hence, there are no more infinite hours than there are infinite centuries, nor infinite palms in greater number than infinite parasangs. You come no nearer to commensurability, likeness, union and identity with the infinite by being a man than by being an ant, or by being a star than by being a man, for you get no nearer to that infinite being by being the sun or the moon than by being a man, or an ant. This is because, in the infinite, there is no difference between those things - and what I say of them applies just as well to all other existent particular things.
Now, if, in the infinite, all these particular things are not differentiated, are not divided into species, it necessarily follows that they have no num- ber: the universe, therefore, is one and immobile.
