No More Learning

The speakers on both sides seem to me, ye men
of Athens, equally to blame--the partisans of the
Arcadians and the advocates for Lacedaemon. Like
the deputies of these communities, not like youi
citizens, to whom their deputations are addressed,
they excuse, they inveigh against each other. ' This,
I say, is to act like deputies: but to speak with a
true patriot spirit, to attend entirely to the interest of
the state, free from all factious principles, these are
their duties who assume the character of our coun-
sellors. But now, were not their persons known,
did they not speak bur language, I should have taken
many of them for two distinct people: the one of
Arcadia, the other of Lacedaemon.
How hazardous a part it is to urge your real
interests is to me apparent: for in this violence of
opposition, where you are all alike deceived, as well
the favourers of this as the supporters of the opposite
opinion, should a man attempt to point out the just
I This heat and acrimony did not always proceed from conviction and
zeal for the public interest. Every city or community that solicited any
matter in the Athenian assembly first took care to secure managers and
advocates among the popular speakers. If the interposition of these
pleaders proved successful, they were sometimes rewarded with a
statue erected in the city whose interests they had supported; some-
times, and indeed more frequently, with a sum of money. Agreements
were formally made, and, in some cases, securities given for the payment
of this fee. In the oration of JEsehines against Ctesiphon we have one
instance of a transaction of this nature between the city of Oreum and
Demosthenes himself, where the stipulation was so notorious as to
appear on the public records of this city; and so firm and binding, as to
oblige the people of Oreum, in a time of their distress, to mortgage their
revenues to the orator as a security for the sum agreed on, and to pay
kiterost, monthly, until the principal could be discharged.
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? ORATION FOR THE MEGALOPOL1TANS. 253
mean between them, and should you prove impatient
of direction, he would gratify neither party; he
would be calumniated by both. Yet still, I freely
choose, if such must be my fate, rather to be thought
weakly impertinent than to suffer any men to mis-
lead you from what I deem most advantageous to
the state. There are other points of which, if I have
your permission, I shall hereafter speak. I now
proceed, from principles acknowledged equally by
all, to deduce such truths as I think of greatest
moment.
There is not a man1 who can deny that it is for the
interest of Athens that both the Lacedaemonians and
the Thebans also should be weak; but such is the
present state of things ^if any conjecture may be
formed from the discourses we so often hear), that
if Orchomenus2 and Thespia and Plataea be re-
1 There is not a man, &c. ]--On this principle it is that the orator
founds all his reasoning. The wars which these three leading states
carried on against each other were either for acquiring, or supporting,
or recovering the sovereignty in Greece. A passion for this pre-emi-
nence constituted the principal part of national virtue and merit. They
talked, indeed, of the interest of the whole body of Greece, of an exten-
sive regard and affection to this body, and of the necessity of a just
batance of power; yet, in these days of degeneracy, at least, the duly
of aggrandizing their own community was frequently made the great
law of the morality of statesmen. And this contributed no less to the
final ruin of the Grecian states than their luxury and corruption.
"Graecia e civitates, dum imperare singulae cnpiunt, imperium omnes
perdiderunt," says Justin. A strict union with each other was neces-
sary, even to the being and support of each. But for extensive dominion,
the constitution and circumstances even of the most eminent of their
communities were by no means calculated.
2 There were two cities in Greece of this name; the one in Arcadia,
the other, of which the orator here speaks, in Bceotia, an ancient and
illustrious city, to which Thebes was tributary, in the heroic times,
until Hercules enabled it to assert its independence. After the battle of
! ,euctra the Thebans determined to reduce this rival city to their obedi-
ence, but were restrained by the moderation of Epaminondas, who pre-
vailed on his countrymen to admit the people of Orchomenus to their
alliance, instead of reducing them to slavery. However, after the battle
of Maritinea, in which this general fell, the Thebans found a pretence
for executing their former severe purposes against Orchomenus. Three
hundred Orchomenian cavalry, had joined with certain Theban exiles in
a conspiracy to overturn the aristocratical constitution of Thebes, and
were betrayed by those whom they had agreed to assist. The Thebans,
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? 254 orations or Demosthenes.
peopled, the Thebans must be weak; that the
Lacedemonians,1 if Arcadia be reduced to their
obedience, and the Great City be possessed by them,
must once more become powerful. We are, there-
fore, to be careful not to suffer these to be great and
formidable before the others are reduced; nor to
betray ourselves into greater inconveniences by the
strength of Lacedsemon than can possibly be com-
pensated by the weakness of Thebes. Not that we
assert that it is more eligible to have the Lacedae-
monians our enemies than the Thebans. This is not
the point we would support; but that neither of them
should have the power of injuring us in any instance:
for thus only can our fears be removed and our
security established.
' But it will be said, " Yes! this is, indeed, a point
of utmost moment: yet it is grievous to make those
our allies against whom we fought at Mantinea, to
unite with them against the very men with whom
we then shared the dangers of the field. " Grievous,
I confess, it is; but let such delicacy gain some
attention among others: let the parlies once agree
to live in peace, and we shall not, we need not, send
not contented with confining their vengeance to the guilty, seized the
city of Orchomenus, put the citizens to the sword, and made slaves of
their wives and children. --Lucckesini.
Of Thespia and Platasa, the reader will find some short account In the
oration on the Peace, note 2, p. 102. The vicinity of these three cities to
Thebes, and their hatred to the Thebans, inspired by the temembrance
of injuries never to be forgotten, sufficiently explain the assertion of
Demosthenes.
1 The subversion of the Lacedaemonian power seems to have been not
so much the effect of tue defeat at Leuctra as of the revolt of their allies
In Peloponnesus, and particularly of the Arcadians. It was not difficult
for a warlike nation to have reassembled and reinforced its troops after
such an engagement. Nor could the Thebans have ventured to pursue
their victory so far as even to threaten Sparta with slavery, unless they
had been assisted by the Arcadians. Hence both the Thebans and
Athenians ever courted the alliance of the Peloponnesiaos,and cultivated
their friendship with the greatest assiduity. And hence the orator is
justly warranted to observe that the power of Lacedremon must rise to
a formidable pitch by the reduction of the Arcadians, who, by the extent
of their territory, and the strength of their towns, were, next to Sparta,
evidently the most considerable of the Feloponnesian states ~Lu#-
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? ORATION FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS. 25S
support to the Megalopolitans; our swords shall not
then be drawn against our old fellow-soldiers. One
party (as they profess) are already in alliance with
us, the other are now soliciting our alliance. What
have we farther to desire? But what if justice
should be violated? if war should be resolved on?
If it be the sole object of debate whether we should
give up the Great City to the dominion of Laeedasmon
or no, let us give it up: I do not contend against it,
though it be not just: let us not arm against those
who once shared with us the dangers of the field.
But as we are all convinced, that if once masters of
this city, they will instantly attack Messene; let
any one of those who have been so severe on the
Megalopolitans rise and say what conduct he would
recommend to us on such an emergency. They are
silent: but you are not to be informed that whether
they should urge us or dissuade us, we should be
obliged to send succours, both by those sacred oaths
which engage us to Messene, and by our interest,
which requires that this city should subsist. 1 Con-
sider, therefore, with yourselves which would be the
noblest and most benevolent procedure, to begin
your opposition to the encroachments of Lacedaemon
by the defence of the Megalopolitans, or that of the
Messenians. In the one case, you will appear atten-
tive only to the safety of the Arcadians, and to the
solid establishment of that tranquillity for which you
have exposed yourselves to the dangers and the toils
of war: in the other, all mankind must see that in
defending Messene, you act not so much from prin-
ciples of equity as from your fears of Lacedaemon.
1 The Lacedemonians, mortified and incensed at the re-establishment
at Messene, refused to include this state in the general peace which was
made after the battle of Mantinea; and when the Thebans were once
Involved in the Phocian war, determined to seize the opportunity of
oppressing those Peloponnesians who had united with their rivals.
Hostilities were declared against the Messenians: this people applied for
succour to the Athenians, who engaged to defend them against inva
sions, though they refused to assist them in any offensive measures.
This seems to have been the engagement to which the orator reters.
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? 256
ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
Our designs and actions should be just; but we
should be careful that at the same time they may
also prove conducive to our interest. 1
It is urged by those who have spoken on the other
side that we should endeavour to regain Oropus.
But should we now make those our enemies who
would assist us in this design, we must forfeit all
hopes of their assistance. It is my opinion, too, that
we should attempt to regain Oropus. But that Lace-
daemon will now become our enemy if we unite
with those Arcadians who sue for our alliance, they,
of all men, never should assert,2 who persuaded us
to support the Lacedaemonians in the time of their
distress: for when the whole body of the Pelopon-
nesians was ready to unite with us, when they called
on us to lead them against the Lacedaemonians, the
very men who now urge this objection persuaded
you to reject their overtures,3 which forced them to
1 The reasoning in this passage may possibly deserve to be opened
and illustrated somewhat farther than can be done by a simple detail of
historical facts. It is one of the numberless instances of our orator's
accommodating his style and manner of address to the quickness and
liveliness of his countrymen ; and complimenting their understandings,
by leaving something to be supplied by them. The purport of his argu-
ment seems to be this; "Sooner or later we must oppose the attempts of
Lacedaemon, to extend our sovereignty. Our own interest requires it,
as well as our regard to equity and the general interest of Greece. To
both we owe the due attention, and it should be our care to make them
coincide: while the Arcadians are supported, the Lacedaemonians cannot
be supposed sufficiently powerful to become an object of terror: our
interposition, therefore, in favour of the Arcadians will be regarded as
the purc effect of public spirit. But if the Lacedemonians be first suf-
fered to reduce Arcadia, and the Athenians then begin to oppose their
farther progress, the motives of equity and public spirit may, indeed,
still be pleaded; but those of self-interest must necessatily be supposed
to have hnd the greater influence. "
2 They, of all men, never should assert, Ac. ]--Because these men
then reasoned from the necessity of preserving a due balance of power,
and preventing any one state from becoming formidable. The resent-
ment of the party to be opposed they then considered as of no weight
against so cogent an argument. The same argument was now urged
with equal force and propriety in favour of the Arcadians. They could
not, therefore, urge an objection now which, in a case exactly parallel,
they had affected to despise.
3 The history of this fact, as described by Xenophon, does not exactly
agree with this passage, unless supplied and illustrated by the narration
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? ORATION FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS. 257
apply to Thebes, then their sole resource, and to
expend your treasures and endanger your persons
in defence of Lacedaemon. Surely you could not
have acted with such spirit to save this people had
you been fairly told, that when once saved, no re-
straint must be prescribed to their desires, no bounds
to their injustice, else they would retain no sense of
that safety which we gave them. Let it then be
supposed that our forming an alliance with the
Arcadians be ever so repugnant to the views of the
Lacedaemonians, still that gratitude which they owe
to this state for their preservation at a time when
they were threatened with the utmost dangers, should
far outweigh any resentment they may conceive
from our opposing their injustice. And can they
then deny us their assistance to regain Oropus ?
This would prove them the most abandoned of man-
kind. No! by the gods, I cannot suspect them of
such baseness!
I hear it also urged, and am surprised at the ob-
jection, that by this alliance with the Arcadians, and
by the measures now proposed, the state must con-
tradict its former conduct, and thus lose its credit.
To me, Athenians, the very contrary seems manifest:
and why? Because it cannot be denied, that in de-
fending the Lacedaemonians, in granting the like
of Diodoras. After the battle of Leuctra the Athenians offered liberty
to all the states of Peloponnesus. The Mantineans, thus encouraged,
determined to fortify their city, but were opposed by the Laccda)
moniaus, who first remonstrated by their deputies, and then took up
arms. Many of the Arcadians themselves refused to give up their
authority over some of their dependent cities. This produced a war
between the Lacedemonians, Tegeans, and their allies, on one part;
and the Mantineans, and the principal Arcadian states, on the other.
The Mantineans and Arcadians were victorious: "Yet still," says
Diodorus (1. xv. An. 4, Olmp. 102), " they dreaded the weight of Sparta,
and could not venture by themselves to carry on the war. They there-
fore gained over the Argians and Eleans, and sent an embassy to the
Athenians, inviting them to unite in the confederacy against the Spar-
tans. But, as they could gain no attention at Athens, they had recourse
to the Thebans, and prevailed on them to join in a league against
Lacetuemon. " This extract from Diodorus throws sufficient light on the
present passage. --Lwxhesini.
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? 258 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES
defence to Thebes in former times, and lately in
saving the Eubreans,1 and then admitting them to an
alliance, we have uniformly pursued one and the
same design. And what is this? The protection
of the injured. And if this be so, the charge of
inconsistency must be urged, not against us, but those
who refuse to adhere to justice. Affairs have
changed by means of those whose ambition is un-
bounded : this state hath not changed. .
It appears to me that the Lacedaemonians are now
acting a subtle and insidious part: they say that the
Eleans2 ought to have a portion of Triphylia; the
Phliasians, Tricaranus; some" others of the Arca-
dians, the territories which are theirs; and we,
Oropus: not that they wish to see each of us in
possession of our rightful dominions: far from it!
Such public-spirited sentiments are new to them:
they but affect this zeal for the support of all in the
recovery of their several interests, that, when they
themselves march against Messene, all may arm in
their cause, and cheerfully unite with them; or else
appear to act unjustly, who had their concurrence in
regaining their particular claims, and yet refuse to
grant them the like returns of friendship. It is my
opinion, in the first place, that without subjecting
any part of Arcadia to the power of the Lacedaemo-
nians, Athens will regain Oropus; that these people
will themselves support our claim if they have the
least regard to justice; and that there are others3 to
1 In saving the Eubreans. )--At the time when the Tbebans had gained
possession of a part of the island, with an intent of destroying the Athe-
nian power in Eubrea. See note 3, p. 43.
2-That the Eleans, &c. l--Triphylia was a district on the seaooast,
situate between Elis and Messene. Certain Arcadian exiles had seized
Lassio, its principal city, and delivered it to the Eleans. This produced
a w^r, in which Triphylia so often changed its masters, that the right to
it became doubtful. The Arcadians, however, prevailed at length, and
now possessed several cities in this district. Tricaranus had been taken
from the Phliasians by the Argives, some time after the battle of Leuctra.
3 There are others, &c. ]--The Phocians. Thessalians, and Corinthjmc*,
who were now engaged against the Thebans in the sacred war.
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? ORATION FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS. 259
support it who think that Thebes should not be suf-
fered to possess the rights of others. But were it
evident that unless we permit the Lacedaemonians to
overturn all Peloponnesus, we never can be able to
obtain this city, I should think it more eligible (if I
may so speak) absolutely to resign our pretensions
to Oropus, than to abandon Messene and Pelopon-
nesus to the Lacedaemonians. It is not in this par-
ticular alone that we are to attend to the conduct of
Lacedsemon. --But 1 suppress those thoughts which
are now starting. I only say, we are in many in-
stances exposed to danger.
As to the actions of the Megalopolitans against this
state during their connexion with the Thebans, it is
absurd to urge these now as criminal. It is absurd,
I say, when they are inclined to form a strict union
with us, that so they may redeem their former con-
duct, by doing us effectual service, maliciously to
seek for all pretences to defeat such favourable in-
tentions ; and not to consider, that the greater zeal
and ardour they are proved to have discovered for
the interest of Thebes, the greater and the juster
should be your resentment against those who de-
prived the state of such confederates (for your pro-
tection they first solicited, before their application to
the Thebans). These are the wretched arguments
of men who wish that these people should unite with
other states. 1
From all the judgment I can form, on the most
mature reflection, I am persuaded (and there are
many here who agree with me in this opinion), that
if the Lacedaemonians are once masters of Mega-
1 Ttie objections on the other side were, " Shall we arm against the
Lacedaemonians, our fellow-soldiers in the Thenanwarl" and "Shall
We assist the Arcadians, who drew their swords against us at Man-
tinea 7" Both very popular, and likely to influence the assembly. Thf
speaker seems particularly to droad the latter: he stales it in gentle and
extenuating terms : his answer has as muchart and liveliness as forra,
and he appears not at all inclined to dwell long or particularly, on tbjr
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? 260 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
<
lopolis, Messene must certainly be in danger. Should
they gain this city also, I say, we must form an alli-
ance with the Thebans. And it will be much more
noble, much more advantageous, at once to take those
allies of the Thebans to our protection, and vigor-
ously to oppose the ambition of Lacedaemon, than to
refuse them that protection because allies to the
Thebans: to abandon them to their oppressors; and
thus be forced to save Thebes itself from ruin; nay,
to involve this our own state in danger. For I cannot
think it a matter of no consequence to Athens that
the Lacedaemonians should be masters of Mega-
lopolis, and resume their ancient greatness; while,
even now, I see them draw the sword, not to defend
their state from wrong, but to regain that sovereign
power which they formerly enjoyed. And what
were their designs when they enjoyed this power
you can better say than T, and must therefore feel
the juster and the stronger apprehensions. 1
I would gladly ask our speakers, those who ex-
press such aversion to Thebes, and those who declare
themselves the enemies of Lacedaemon, whether in
these their particular resentments they be actuated
by a regard to you and to your interests; or whether
they severally hate the Thebans, for the sake of the
Lacedaemonians; and the Lacedaemonians, from their
affection to the Thebans.
If for their sakes, they
have lost their reason, and are each unworthy of our
attention: if for our interest, whence this unneces-
sary zeal for their favourite states ? It is possible,
very possible, to humble the Thebans without
aggrandizing the Lacedaemonians. This may be
easily effected, as I shall now endeavour to convince
you.
It is well known that men are, to a certain degree,
1 The sovereignty of Lacedaemon is to be dated from the destruction
of Athens by Lysander, in the first year of the ninety-fourth Olympiad,
a considerable time before the birth of Demosthenes, but within the
memory of some citizens ; at least the consequences of this important
event must have been remembered by numbers in the assembly
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? ORATION FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS. 261
obliged by shame to adhere to justice, even where
their inclinations are averse. They affect to appear
strenuous against every injurious attempt; especially
when, in any instance, they have suffered by such
attempt. Here we find the great cause of all disor-
ders, the origin of all calamities, in this want of a
sincere, disinterested regard to justice. To avoid
this danger, therefore, in our attempts to reduce the
power of Thebes, let us declare that Thespia, and
Orchomenus, and Plataea must be restored: let us
exert ourselves for this purpose, and call on others
to assist us. Thus shall our true regard to equity,
our real patriotic spirit, be displayed in this generous
concern for the restoration of ancient cities: but, at
the same time, let us not abandon Messene and Me-
galopolis to the power of their oppressors. Let us
not, under the pretence of serving the Thespians
and Plataeans, look on with unconcern while cities
now in being, already filled with inhabitants, are
razed to their foundations. If we show this equal
regard to justice, there is not a state in Greece but
will readily unite with us to wrest from the Thebans
their unjust acquisition. If not, this people must
necessarily oppose our endeavours to restore the
cities: an event which they must justly regard as
their own destruction: and, in our own affair,1 the
attempt must prove ineffectual. And what in truth
can be expected, if we are ever suffering cities now
in being to be destroyed, and demanding that cities
long since ruined should be restored ?
It hath been urged in this debate, by those who
have spoken with the greatest appearance of reason,
that these people should take down the public monu-
ments2 of their treaty with Thebes, if they mean to
1 Our own aflair. ]^That Is, the recovery of Oropus.
2 The public monuments, &c. ]--In the original, Tas XTHAA2
Kadckuv ras irpos Qr}/iaiovs. It was the custom of Greece thit the trea-
ties of the several states, and the conditions of these treaties, should be
Inscribed on columns, which were erected, and, while the treaties sub-
sisted, were preserved, in the most public and frequented places; as u.
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? 262 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
be real allies to this state. On the other side, it is
alleged that it is not such monuments, but interest,
which they regTlrd as the essential cause of friend-
ship; that they must look on those as their real allies
who will grant them their assistance.
But, however sincerely they may thus profess, this
is my opinion: that you should demand both that
these monuments be taken down, and that Lacedae-
monTje obliged to peace. If either of these demands
be rejected, we should then unite with that party
which hath acquiesced: for, if when they are allowed
to live unmolested the Megalopolitans should still
adhere to their connexions with the Thebans, they
must then discover to the world that they were in-
fluenced by the hopes conceived from the superiority
of Thebes, not by motives of equity. If, on the other
hand, when the Megalopolitans have, with real faith
and sincerity, formed an alliance with us, the Lace-
daemonians should still refuse to live in peace, it must
be manifest that all this their solicitude is not that
Thespia may be restored, but that, while the Thebans
are embroiled in this war, they may seize the oppor-
tunity of reducing all Peloponnesus.
I am surprised at some persons, who express
dreadful apprehensions at the allies of Thebes be-
coming enemies to Lacedsemon; yet, should Lace-
the scenes of their great games, where the whole nation was collected
at particular seasons, and there had an opportunity of being witnesses
of tho terms agreed on. The observance of these was, in some sort, a
matter of national concern, and came under the cognizance of the great
couneil of amphictyons. That the contracting powers themselves might
have the monuments of their public acts continually in view, the like
columns were erected in the most conspicuous places of their cities.
. Thus we learn from Thucydides that when the Athenians and Lacedae-
monians had concluded a truce for fifty years, in the tenth year of the
famous Peloponnesian war, it was provided that the columns on which
the treaty was inscribed should be erected in such places as have been
mentioned. XrriXas Se crtiffat OXupttiafft, Kai HvOau Kai laB^y, Kai cv
ABiivais tv ttoXci, Kai tv AaKtSaiuovi tv A/iUKAaiif). Pausanias observes
that in his days many of these columns were preserved in the Olympian
temple, and particularly that which was the monument of the treaty
concluded between the Athenians, Argians, and Mantineans, in the
twelfth year ofthe Peloponnesian war.
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? ORATION FOR THE MEGAX. OPOLITANS. 263
daemon subdue these people, see no danger in such
an event; especially when we have the experience
of past times to assure us that the Thebans have
ever used those allies1 against the Lacedaemonians;
the Lacedaemonians, when their masters, have ever
employed them against us. It is therefore seriously
to be considered, that should you now refuse to admit
the Megalopolitans to your alliance, they must either
be subverted and dispersed, and then the Lacedae-
monians at once become powerful; or, they must
escape the danger (as we sometimes see strange and
unexpected events); and then, with good reason,
they must become firm associates to the Thebans:
but, if we accept of these their overtures, they must
then owe and acknowledge their preservation to this
state.
But let us turn our thoughts from their fortunes
and their dangers, arfd fix our attention on the The-
bans and Lacedaemonians. Should this war prove
fatal to the Thebans (as our interest requires), still
i By those allies, the orator undoubtedly means, not the Arcadians
only, but the whole body of the Peloponnesian states. And what he
observes of these states is fully eonfirrned by history. To mention only
the more famous battles fought between the Thebans and Athenians,
it appears that the former were not assisted by the Peloponnesians in
their first unsuccessful engagement at Tanagra (An. 4. Ol. 80): in the
second, when they were victorious (An. 2. 01. 83); or in the third, when
they were again conquered (An. 1. Oi. 89); or in theirvictory at Delium,
in the following year. On the other hand, after the battle of Leuctra the
Thebans were joined by the Arcadians in their invasion of Sparta (An.
3. 01. 102); and the next year entered the territory of LacedEemon, in
conjunction with the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleans. But the Lace-
dsemotiians were assisted by their Peloponnesian allies in all their wars
with the Athenians. In the great Peloponnesian war " the confederates
of the Lacedaemonians were (says Thucydides) all the Peloponnesians
that dwelt within the isthmus, except the Arrives and Achaeans, who
had attachments to each of the contending parries. "--AaKt&aipoviwv fiev
o'i fyfipaxoi, HeXoirovviurtoi. ptv oi tvtos IcOfiov iravriff, ttXiiv Apyemv
Kai A%atu)v. Tovtois oe eg afuporepovs 0iXia tiv.
Many other instances to the same purpose might be produced from
Mstory. But should U be objected to the assertion of the orator, that
at the battle of Man tinea, some of the Peloponnesians united with the
Thebans against the Athenian powers, the answer is obvious, that the
Athenians were not the objects of this confederacy; that it was formed
against the Spartans, to whom Athens served but as an auyin--"
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? 264 OB>>T)ONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
the powe 'Jf the Lacedaemonians will be duly circum-
scribed, while they have the Arcadians on their
borders, ever ready to arm against them. But sup-
pose the Thebans should prove superior to their
dangers, should still defend their country, and should
not fall before their enemies: yet, must they be the
less powerful, if on our side we be strengthened by
allies to v. hom we ourselves gave being ? At all
events, therefore, the interest of the state demands
that we should not abandon the Arcadians; that, if
preserved, they should not seem to owe their preserva-
tion to themselves; that they should not owe it to
any others; but that it should* be the act of the
Athenians. .
And now, my fellow-citizens, I call the gods to
witness, that I have spoken, not from private affec-
tion, not from particular resentment to either party,
but from a regard to what I deem the real interest
of my country! This then is my opinion; that you
should not abandon the people of Megalopolis; no,
nor any weaker state, to the power of the stronger. 1
1 It does not appear from history that this oration had the due effect.
Whether the prospect of recovering Oropus had greater influence than
the more liberal and less confined policy of Demosthenes; or whether
the present circumstances and connexions of the Athenians prevented
them from acting in favour of the Megalopolitans; certain it is, that they
did not exert themselves on this occasion in defence of the liberty of
Peloponnesus. The quarrel was carried on for some short time. The
LacedtBmonians had generally the advantage; but soon found it neces-
sary to end the war by a truce with the people of Megalopolis.
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? THE ORATION FOR THE LIBERTY OP
THE RHODIANS:
PRONOUNCED IN THE ARCIIONSHIP OF THKSSALUS, THE SECOND YEAR
OF THE HUNDRED AND SEVENTH OLYMPIAD.
INTRODUCTION.
An attempt made in the hundred and fifth. Olympiad to reduce the
states of Chios, Cos, and Rhodes to a dependency on Athens produced
the war well known by the name of " The Social War," wiiich was for
three years supported by the Athenians on one side, and on the other by
the Chians, Coans, and Rhodians, assisted by the Byzantines and by
Mausolus, King of Caria; which prince (or rather his wife, Artemisia,
who governed in his name) was the principal agent in fomenting this
quarrel. Their fears of the Persian arms obliged the Athenians to give
a peace to the confederates, in which it was expressly stipulated that
they should be free and independent. So that, in effect, these states tri-
umphed over their adversary, whose concessions were extorted by neces-
sity, and who, of consequent, harboured all the resentment of disap-
pointed ambition against their opponents.
The people of Rhodes, who had engaged warmly in this confederacy,
had formerly been indebted to Athens for assistance in defence of their
popular form of government against the favourers of aristocracy, who,
on their part, had been supported by the Lacedaemonians, The peace
now concluded promised to put an end to those civil commotions and
revolutions :o which the state of Rhodes had been exposed. But the
enterprising genius of Artemisia, who now reigned in Caria, prompted
her to attempt the conquest of Rhodes The King of Persia favoured her
design against an island which, by its situation, commanded the Egeau
Sea, and rendered the passage into Greece secure and easy ; and which
he justly expelled to gain from the Carian princess by treaty or by arms,
with less umbrage to the Greeks than any direct attack would give.
As a step previously necessary to this design, the aristocratical faction
was, partly by the gradual influence of secret practices and partly by
force, established in the government of Rhodes, which they proceeded
to exercise in an oppressive and tyrannical manner. The people, whose
liberties were thus overturned, saw no resource in their distress but to
apply to the generosity of Athens, their ancient protector. Ambassadors
were despatched to implore the assistance of the great defenders of
liberty; and in the assembly convened on this occasion the following
^ration was delivered in favour of the people of Rhodes.
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? 266 INTRODUCTION.
Their cause laboured under many difficulties. They had defied fht
people whose protection they were soliciting, and were now the objects
of their resentment. Their late opposition was considered at Athens as
the effect, not of a zeal for liberty, but of ingratitude and pride, of per-
verseness and insolence, which were represented as a part of their
national character. No speaker could venture to oppose these senti-
ments, which afforded those who spoke against the Rhodians ample
matter for invective. It was well known that the Persian king interested
himself in favour of the reigning party at Rhodes. The danger of irri-
tating this prince had been by Demosthenes himself strongly urged upon
other occasions; so that not only the passions and prejudices of the
assembly, but policy also pleaded powerfully against the present demand
of the Rhodians. Tn these circumstances, they required au able, artful,
and insinuating advocate; and such they found in our orator.
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? THE ORATION FOR THE LIBERTY OF
THE RHODIANS.
When affairs like these become the subject of our
uebates, it is my opinion, Athenians, that a general
liberty of speech should be allowed to all in this
assembly. 1 Not that I have ever thought it difficult
to point out the measures fittest to be pursued; for
(to speak my thoughts plainly) you seem of your-
selves sufficiently apprized of these. But to prevail
on you to pursue them,--there is the difficulty; for
when any thing hath been resolved, when it hath been
confirmed by your voices, we are just as far from
carrying it into execution as if it had never been
resolved.
> This exordium seems to have been founded on some particular cir-
cumstances of the assembly, or some difficulties which Demosthenes
was obliged to encounter before he could obtain an audience: the assem-
bly of the people at Athens was necessarily subject to the inconveniences
attending all popular meetings. Clamour, tumult, and contention fre-
quently disturbed it, especially when the point in debate was of an im-
portant kind, or the popular leaders divided, and, by interest or principle,
prompted to support their different opinions and parties with zeal and
ardour. Sometimes, as we learn from some passages in JEschines, the
leaders on one side took care to seize the gallery, from whence the
speakers addressed themselves to the people, and by open violence pre-
vented any one from taking his place there who was not a friend to the
measures which they recommended. Sometimes the magistrates who
presided in the assembly either thought it necessary for the preservation
of peace and order, or were induced by private motives to exert their
authority, and to circumscribe that liberty of speech for which the con-
stitution of Athens had so scrupulously provided. Hence frequently
arose a tumultuous mixture of acclamation, opposition, loud and vehe
ment commanding, and earnest expostulation, which formed a scene
fitted to discourage and terrify an inexperienced or dastardly speaker J--a
scene for which Demosthenes prepared himself by declaiming on the
seashore amid the roaring of the waves.
Vol. I. --X
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? 268
ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
One particular there is eminently distinguishable
among all those favours which we owe to Heaven. I
mean that they who not long since, prompted by their
insolence, appeared in arms against us, now rest all
their hopes of safety on this state; an event which
should inspire us with the greatest satisfaction: for
by a just and proper conduct on this occasion we
shall by our actions gloriously and nobly refute the
calumnies of our traducers. The Chians, and the
Byzantines, and the Rhodians accused us of danger-
ous designs against them, and from this pretence
conspired to raise the late war against us. But it
will now appear that Mausolus,1 the great author and
conductor of this war,--he who affected such zeal for
the interest of the Rhodians,--is the very person who
deprived them of their freedom; that the Chians and
the Byzantines,2 who then professed to be their allies,
have refused to assist them when distressed; but that
you, the great objects of their apprehensions, prove
to be the people of all others to whom alone they are
indebted for protection. When this is once made
manifest to the world, such must be the sentiments
with which you shall inspire the people of every com-
munity, that they will regard your friendship as the
pledge of their security. And surely, you cannot
enjoy greater happiness than such a universal confi-
dence and affection.
It is with surprise I find the very persons who urged
us to oppose the king3 in defence of the Egyptians
1 This passage seems to intimate that measures had been taken to
establish the aristocracy at Rhodes during the lifetime of Mausolus. The
queen, who is said to have directed and governed her husband, probably
recommended and made some progress in the execution of a design which,
was crowned with complete success in her own reign.
2 It was probably the fear of Artemisia's power which- prevented the
Chians and Byzantines from assisting their friends the Rhodians to
overturn the usurpation ; otherwise, the Chians, whose government was
republican, must have exerted themselves to secure the like constitution
to their allies. --LucChesini.
a When Artaxerxes engaged in the war with Nectanebus, King of
Egypt, both parties applied to the Greeks for assistance. The Persian
was refused; but such numbers of Grecian mercenaries engaged in tha
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? ORATION FOR THE KHODIANS. 269
now deterring us, by the apprehensions of his displea-
sure, from engaging in the affairs of Rhodes, and this
when it is well known that the Rhodians are really
Greeks; the others of the number of this prince's
subjects.
There are some among you who may remember
that at the time when the affairs of Persia were the
subject of our consultations, I was the first, I think
the only, or almost the only, one to recommend it as
the wisest measure not to assign your enmity to the
king as the motive of your armament; to make your
preparations against your avowed adversaries; but
to employ them even against him should he attempt
to injure you. Nor did I urge these things without
your full concurrence. You received them with ap-
plause. " On this present occasion my sentiments are
exactly consonant to what I then proposed; and were
I a subject to the king, were I called to be his coun-
sellor, to him I should suggest the very measures I
now recommend to you--to fight for his own domin
service of Nectanebus, that he was enabled to detach four thousand of
these to the assistance of the Sidonians; and probably the greater part
of these forces were Athenians, as the inveterate resentment of this
people to tin Persians prompted them to take all means of opposing thtm
which were not absolutely inconsistent with treaties. --Jjucchesini.
1 The approbation of tho people ho affects to consider as a full proof
of the justness of these his sentiments. "If they be then just, the king
must adopt them : no other can be recommended to him. And if his
conduct is to be guided by such principles, he cannot be provoked to take -
up arms against the Athenians by their interposition in favour of the
liberty of Rhodes, a Grecian state. It must be equally his interest not
to oppose the Athenians where his own kingdom is not immediately
attacked, as it is for the Athenians not to give unnecessary umbrage to
him. Such delicacy and caution must be acknowledged just and neces-
sary', hut are quite different from a supine inattention to all his motions
and an abject concession of all the conquests he may be prompted to
make, however injurious to Greece. Such conduct would not only be
dishonourable, but impolitic. While, on the contrary, vigour and resolu-
tion, prudently directed, instead of involving them in war, must awetheir
enemies, and preserve them in peace and security. " This seems to be
the sum of tho present argument; and the judicious will probably for-
give the attempt to open and illustrate particular passages, as the senti-
ments, in this oration especially, are delivered with such liveliness and
rapidity, that a reader not strictly attentive is oftentimes in danger of
losing the full view of our orator.
? ?